SOVIET MILITARY DEVELOPMENT: GENERAL STAFF PLANNING FOR THE 1990S (KEY JUDGEMEN

Created: 3/1/1991

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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Soviet Military Development: General Staff Planning for

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Soviet Military Development: General Staff Planning for

Soslcl MiliUrj Development: General Stiff Planning lor

Judgments

Soviet Gtnenl Stiff it preparing plans for the development of the armed forces tindtr tumultuous conditions. It must grapple with the deterioration of the Soviet economy. Including growing disarray in the defense-industrial bate. It muit sceotnmodslc sweeping changes in threats, as mililary confrontation with Ibe West recedes, internal strife increases, and regional threats loom on tbe horizon. It she must learn to operateew pollcyirtsting envirenraent, at new government agencies, the Supreme Soviet, republic ortici.li. and public opinion alt sect to ioRitnee defease policy. Chief of the General Staff Moltcyev has indicated, nevertheless, that the Stall is preparing development plans for (be armed forces to tbe

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reform agenda, doctrinal statements, force development patterns. and the shape of emu control agreements alt indicate that the Soviet military will be smaller and more defensively structured and postured. The Staff probably anticipates little, if any, real growth in Soviet tWeaw spending. Although coailngencies arc under study,

f_ Jbssellne plans still draw on tbe material and manpower resource* ofepublics aed assume the mission of defending tbe Soviet Union at presently con figured

these conditions, we believe tbe General Staff will adjust missions, seeking toi

Ensure that strategic offensive force* can continue to meet witting mission objectives under most conditions of coaAiet.

Concentrate strategic; defensive forces on ensuring the integriiy of Soviet airspace, degrading mayor attacks, and protecting key facilities.

Maintain general purpose forces capable of defeating enemy (tuck, restoring and defending Soviet borders, and controllingt(S.

It -il! deemphaiiw:

Large-scale offensive operations in continental (beaters to gain and secure territory.

Projection of military power to distant cootlnenul and rruiilime

Large-scale programs to defend against biRisiic missile attack

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Tlx Start "ill attempt to maintain capabilities by emphasisingdeveloping critical mililary tcchaosoglci. ncldiag improvednd fostering high pronckney in mililary pcttonnd

We believe these changing objectives are affecting General Stiff planning foi all iiiaicgic and general purpose force components:

Smaller and increasingly mobile lliaicgie offensive forcct would be ableeet meal currcni damageiven iraprovemenu In -rapo* ltlhaliiy. Mwediasifceuls associatedTARTrealy would Hill permit counurforce largeting bul probably not comprehensive, targeting oi other military and go-ernenrnt facJDlies.

SmalVrr lira leg Ic Oefeniive forces, even rf fuiihei roooernired. would only moderate damageirge-ieak strategics ici rhelosioi defensive depth, specially in the veil, via degrade Soviei ability lo defeat an air attack.

Smaller, restructured theater grousd aad air forcei deployed oa Sonet territory win conceaerate ona deeply echeVjwed deleaM of thearge portico of ibe mcai capable groaied aad air 'ore* units wtfl be deployed along ibe weaiera borders, while ground units belter configured for italic defense will probably be deployed in larger numbers along ihe southern border. The Staff probably anticipates Ihal Soviei force* would be able to defeat anyuck on th* Soviet homeland.

Smaller general purpose na.al force* would furiher concentrate on the protection of theorce and defenie of the homeland. The Staff probably expects that these change* will sustain ihe Navy's current ability lo protect the SSBN force but win erode its limited ability lo conduct operations ia distant waters

Although the General Stiff probably accept* ihal the likelihood ol general war bis declined, il probably still concludes thai it must prepare for at kail ibe same array or military cooling cock* as befor* and, because of re-gional and internal instabditiu. probably more. Il will worket.tn the ability io apply decisive force miiekly tor legnnal conflicts aad probably is more ee*6deni that such eonflins would net escalate By contr.il. Soviei source, indicate ihat USSR force wiikdra.ah. .eduction*Eastern Europe, and Ion of Warsaw Pact allies wculd make war owerf.lealbcati. pcaiibty invcevvng loss of Sc-tei territory before an attack were baked The Suff peeoebfy conclude* that lb* prospect of aaNcreOMaaeBul ascteai conflict bat declined as a

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of Ihe decreasing likelihoodATO-Pact conflict, but there ii no indication that the Suff his. modified hi view of the low hkel.bcod of limiting nuclear war with the United Sut.es once the threshold had been crossed, or wiih respect to bow strategic strikes wculd be eaceuted. Overall, although the SurTls probably eipericacing pala ewer the downsizingdefensive rcericmaiion of Soviet forces, it probably is confident that the forces It is counting on would be abac to generally execute the new. less demanding guidance.'

The Genera! Staff, nevertheless, appreciatesariety el developments could undermine this planning. Esealiiing econccnie problems and inlernsl political Instability would wrack the anticipated rrodeim" ration andof even diminished Soviet forces. Disintegration of the union would further orient Staff planning toward internal and regional confiicu. would undermine punning ioonvcntioasl defease in the west, and could drastically degrade Soviet strategic defense capabilities. If radial miliury reformers gained the upper band, tbey could force the Staffffectivelyinimum deterrence pottare, consolidate the combat services, and relymall volunteer force

Under any scenario, the General Sufi* it on the defensive. It has* the decline In tnllHary power by iafkeneirig the Sovieirocess, and ii probably will paint to demonstrated Western technological and operational prowess in Operation Desert Storm as justification for nurturing Soviet military power.ew leadership more favorably disposed to the miliuty, however, would be hard pressed to reverse the underlying socceconarnic cklerioration that is driving the decline.

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