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CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS UZUL'iJ&A$0
Organized Crime in the USSR: Its Growth and Impact
A Research Paper
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SOVtt-IOOOlX
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Directorate of Intelligence
Organized Crime in the TISSR: Its Growth and Impact
A Research Paper
Thia paper wu peepered
of Soviet Analywr. Coainicntj and queriesod ir-ty be dueled to tbeOVA,o-
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Orainlzcd Crime In (he USSR: Its Growth Had Impact
crime has fiourbhod in the Gorbachev eraesult of relaxed
coolrobexorwmk conditions. Theears
witnessed sharp increases ia crimes lucfa a> embeizlernerit and eatc-lion against sute enterrxi.es and private COrjperaUra. Soviet ganj;-steri art abo moring as*jressirdy into gambling. rarraUttsiitw, and drug trafficking.'
Tlie growth in organizedorrosive effect on ibe Soviei .yitem. the regime, and popular altitudes. Urgc-*cale bribery and extor-tion bave abo increased corruption significantly in the middle and lower ranks of the government bureaucracy, particulatly among economic and policeangs, moving quickly to take advantage of rampant ihortagcs and other problems stemming from tbe collapse of the centrally pUnived economy, have established extensive corrupt links to party and government leaden. Despite numerous public accusations that criminal readers have corrupted the highest ranks of tbe political system Io gain protection, invcsiigalon have not been able lo offer coemodoa proof
Widespread public anger over the rise of cvcaotied crime has also uridenninod aupport for Gorbachev, government institutions, and amiinued reform. The growth of organized crime, moreover, has fosteredTice! forces. Pointing to what they call thoanydemand an end io cxioperaUves and market) ration and use the specter of criminal Infestation of the ecottomy to argue that economic reform should be slowed
Soviet gangs have begun to establish links to organized crime forces outside the USSR, particularly to facilitate smuggling and foreign currency ofsmtions. la response io these international trrunina! links and the upsurge in domestic organized crime, Soviet officiab are actively loMr-ying to arrange tecrinoiogical and other forms of cooperahori with Western la. enforcement agencies. Moscow has abo joined Interpol, the interriational police organiiation. and is seeking formal lies lo the US Intelligence
IV MVD .enort".
however, thaiillion crime* ia alln (be fin*onihtpercent increatcover Ihe urn* periodf
fltffH-
Community io combat drug trafficking and organized crime C
L
While Soviet leaders' anxiety about the rise of organized crime has steadily increased over tbe past twoficials readily admit ihal the results of the fight against organized crime, begun in earnestave beenpaltry. Efforts to beef up and centralize law enforcement have failed toent in the problem, in part because of corruption in the MVD. Tbe KGB's entry into theby the reorganizationdirectorate that includes anti-organized-crirncsetight between the KGB and the MVD over budgetary resources and over wbo has authority to fight organized crime. The question of bow to cope with the rise of organized crime has triggered sharp debate between police officials, who are demanding more forceful measures to deal withas stiffcr penalties and the legal authority toreform-minded legal scholars and legislators, wbo are ejorKwrned that new police powers will undermine efforts toaw-based state
The devolution of power from the center lo the republics, if it continues, will probablyixed impact on the fight against organized crime. On the one band, this trend could leadeakening of law enforcement capabilities. As republic MVD organisations have declared themselves independent from the center, they have already refused to obey orders from the center and have become factionalizcd along ethnic lines. Looser ties between republic police agencies and the center could also cut thcra off from resources, such as investigators and anticrimehat are more plentiful on an all-union basis. On the other hand, local authorities are probably more familiar with the causes and types of crime in thcir area* and may be better at infiltrating criminal groups. Thus, the splintering of the various republic MVD organizations from the center could help make local and regional law enforcement units moreand effective
Whatever deal the independence-minded republics can strike with the Kremlin, the fundamental problem! feeding organized crime will grow:Organized crime is fueled by shortages and black markets, and the economic slide that is creating those conditions will continue for some
lime
Chronic problems in Soviet lawcorruption and the MVD's serious personneltake years to remedy at best.
:v
- Because thousand* of corrupt officials throughout the middle and lower levels of government and tbe Communist Party abet or participate In
organized crime, il will be difficult lo eliminate the problem by ttmply
putting more criminals behindiminution of social oontroli and respect for authority as well as such
social ills as youth alienation, alcoholism, and drug abuse also will
encourage the growth of organized crime
The most optimistic scenario for the next few years would probably putcrime out of business onlymall, vibrant republic like Lithuania or perhaps the entire Balticonly if these areas recover enough to eliminate the ecooomic and social problems that created
cn-ginired crime in ihe first place. In the Russian Republic and other Slavicreakup of the Soviet state would probably make little difference. If the republic* in Central Asia and the Caucasus became independent, tbey would probably be unable lo muster as many law
enforcement resources against organized gangs as tbey receive now with
tbe help of central Soviet authorities. Clan-based corruption and crime in
these areas could very well escalate.
i
Co nlcn Is
M
TV. Orifice- of Soviei Organized
Organized Cnmc Under
Wcapoto and Other
Typta of
Crimea Anal ail Cooper a
Ropbcriea. ThefU. and
i mil Slate
Drug* and Other
lateraaliooal
Political Irriract of Organised
Mtdlevel
CMragUQB ia the
Impart oa tbe
SUinuiating Oppoiiuoo to Political
Coaln^iUng to Ethnic_
Impact on Economic
Tht Rrilmc't Sputtering AltempU To
The MVD'a Inadequate
The KGB Eaten the
Rrratry ItoWca MVD-KGB
The Det^ Over Letpal
Enliitiin WtaicraIS
Snata*-
Orgatrireci1 Crime ia the USSR: tn Growlb and Impact
Orlatm of Sor*e< 'hrtaaJrrj
Organized crime hai flourished la the Gorbachev era, undergoing aa alarming growth Ihat rivali the level* reached ba other tnrtwkot peraoda of Soviei history Io. during ihe freewheeling era of the New Bcooomio Plan, citorticoliti ind olber criminal*Umirxd many owner* of acwry legalized baaineaaea Ltu-ge-acak criminal aetlviiica were virtually wiped out under Stalinesult of tbe pervasive tense of fear and the general level of poverty, aad gangs! ertoio thrived only la laborafia-type aerworks did not lurface again antD Khrushchev
Corruption increased markedly under Brezhnev and even reached into has family. Throughoutidespread scarcities of consumere risesecond ocoooeuy" ia which large amcaanta of raw material* were diverted from ttate enterprises Into undcrgrouad workshops and even factories. The many entrepreneur* wbo made vast fortunes often fell prey logsJwho resorted to violence to enforce tbctr payoff dctnands. Tltroaghout. underground businrumen worked outralittlag the profits and bribing government ceScial* to ensure ptotecti in and receive inputs for their factories. Soviet prca* accounts during Andropov't and Gorbachev* early anlicorruptionosed several huge mafa-ttyle net-orks and 'io^uaii- of %DCkj-ground miUiotuiires"
Orsauuxed Crime Under Gorbachev
The rise of organized crime under Ocrrbachev has been 'purred by relaaed social control* andeconomic condition* L,
eatimated that organized crimelmost twice the rate for Soviet crime Inriminal gangs have also grown ccnsiderably in number and strength over tbe last two years:
-.SM criminal groups were
brought to fuaoco ko Imore than during the previousthat thb wasmall part of the total. The niusiUooms are being cut down,'*cot the mcUarocan auaaii remain*
Theriminal groups that L
J were uncovered ia the first half0 ctxnmittedncluding cozen* of murder* and hundreds of robberies, thefts, and extortion*
The fairly unstructured nature of Soviet organiied crime has made for an unsettled aad violent situation-According to news accounts, criminal gangs have become much tnore brazen and violent than in the nasi, often resecting to contract murders against ci Uresis and government official* wbo stand in their way. Although some criminal groups divide their turf among oeighbcrbeoels or rayons (urban districts) through turfoccur frequently.
Jtiauail.0m. UK Lvacrvar taaaWtry CMVT*Mtt ta* oalUala atadI* dturautmi "Buna erne*anby Indrvaaaala ort>auaper UM mnvadaa at*ntkek* Aoereiaa ia Cat MVD.tmmm ermmm tmvaatwyw wet*to ttt its*scwUwtfttr amm poled to IN*.
iffmntaa laanakt It ImtWbta to pnctstly
co-crt If* vim.rmtOt mmll aw*a* SJg atwnl tmm lawfc.
peech to UM Soviet partiaii-ei la Deoctnbn Ift* I- >
giui tbe MwithCOO awr.it.ia
a* aB lad ear-ad awl tpbaasa af Uaaaaa ew UH taweW af
(oaniinw. Imara earitary totoalalM. aeaatataaliw. Tvotal or aaJta. rabheaiet. tavarUon. apaiuwt WiWfSaa
m*
Crime Defined
Wrr.ltrr. and Soviet observer, have labeled VOflOUS
aspects of Soviet life "organiseduring the Brezhnev years. Western analysts and Soviet citizens, noting how thoroughly corrupt iht lop leadership had become, considered Brezhnev's family and entourage to be tantamount to one large "mafia" organisation. Similarly, opponents of toe Soviet regime often refer lo Ihe party's holdorm of organised crime as well. Even In recent years, Soviet cliliens damn the CPSU as an extension of thtas the mafia itself. During the Brezhnev era and since, corruption has spread to society and the economy in general, creating what some consider another category of organisedthe underground econcJty. Western observersliken Ihe underground factories, begun in, lo organlztd crime because they were establishedlass of crooked entrepreneurs who depend on extra-legal relationshipset erf organised criminals exists in ihe USSR that mirrors In many ways the mafiapursued by Western law enforcement agencies. Thissubject of thisconsists af "truecriminals rather than political bosses or underground factory managers
Although the USSR criminal code does notegal dcfintllon of organised crime. Soviet scholars generally define II as the widespread functioning of stable, controlled associations of criminals wooia crimeusiness aad* use corruptioa or bribery to ensure their safely or the success of their criminal operations. Il is distinguishable fromstreet crime because organized gangs usually operale under informal "regulations" and have access to greater financial assets and mart sophisticated equipment and weapons wilh which to plan and carry out their crimes
Al Iht samt time, organised crime Is moreIn the USSR than In most Western countries. 'An Interior Ministry official has argued lhai almost all organized crime In the USSR is composed of interconnected but fundamentally Irufeptndtnt groups. Many gangs do not actively try to suborn political or law enforcement officials, and some small ones that do try to do so may not be part of organised crime because they eschew links to other gangs
shoot outs took place
between rival gangs in Moscowhe loose links among gangs make it hard for law enforce-nvtni authorities to penetrate the entire network, -
The depictions of Soviet organized crime in Western and Soviet media, as wellyriad of anecdotal evidence,ituation that In many respects resembles Chicago in thethe outward appearance of crime bosses to their use of violence to enforce gang*discipline. While gang violence against individual victims is probably lower in the USSR than in the United States, organized economic crimes such as embezzlement and extortion are probably more
numerous than in tbe West. At the same time, there appears toery high level of violence to enforce extortion threats in tbe USSR
x
Unlike then some other countries, roost gangs in the USSR do not appear to consist primarily of biologicallthough some, especially in Central Asia, ore composed of clans. Soviet gangs typically consist of fewer thanembers, but their loose financial connections with criminals in other areas of the country may make for an entire network consisting of hundred)
' NceASeleu, ibe SoWct public I. edy rvl Ino-TWlv oica tbe
lew,ben nfenint toaim.
Moil new gang members appear lo bo recruited from five toarcca: youths, farmereleaaed priioa-
en,'.cn aser eaten
active member* of ibe armed forces:
alienated youth* have banded Icaftther In Ii -thai later develop links to the organized crime
V
adult gang*close' link* uvyouth fanft. otten providing them with equipment aad training! Youth gang members frceioeotly become member* erfgang* when they are old cnough.
athlete* also aoooam for aoctvc of tbeL
J fans* often reesruit termer top athlete* because tney have acaxas to modern weapon* andnlimitednd (ood cceinection* abroad.in turn, may join gang* to continue living the "good life" they lose when their governmentcadt cad- OrgaaUed crime allow* aoene atnletea to translate their physical iireogtb and praweat Into quick money.
have recruited aeanc of the roughlyreleaaed in the last two year* who,to the Soviet media, could not find workof tbe country'* crime* are comrnittedwbo have previoualy been imprisoned.
Afgbanijtan war veteraas have also yoiaed the rank* of organized crime, according to tbe Soviet press. Kratnaya rvvrrdd hassag constating ofAfghanistan veteran* wbo, atpon their retara from tbe war, faced aa tinayeapathetic bureaucracyack of apartments, money, and jrjbe; criminaln the other band, were quick to attend to theiring leader* bo doubt prisexmea't mibtary experience andwith weapons.
Some active and retiredf*ctal* amreatlv have jcancd criminalH
Weapon aad Other Rcacaarrt*
Gangs ia rcccal month* have bad accca* to more and belter weapcoi than ever before. According to the Soviet media, police officer* have cocfiVatod ibe fetUowiogeapon* from criminal troops: handguns, autotnatkbtola with aUeocers, rifles, ammunition, eiplosive* (Includingear gas, howitzers, an ti taskrenadend light aiactuncgnns (seeI on page SI Gang* reportedly have little difficulty obtaining these and other aophli ilea ted equipment they need for tbedr crioiicaluch as belkopters, Wcatern lim-cm tines, earcramblerortable army radio Japanese VCRs, and military flak jackets.
In many balances, gang* Real thisas reported aumerou* tbefti fromindividuals andctstt from.and violent attacks on militia orof the weapons
available to gaagstcTi come from tbe military.Ministry "tncrait la several reeaaMka have warned about the need to beef un security around arnsoiie* to prevent auaulla C JkO-percent increase io the theft of weapons and monitions9 overgi also resort to leaa violent way* to obtainexample, smuggling from Afghanuian. bribing military penonnet.aad making purchases oa thelack market with fund* ei totted from cooperative*
Type* of AetMtk*
Or ginned group* engageide range of criminal activities, but concentrate on economic dimes like extortion and ember? lenient. Moat Crimea are directed against ccaaperauvea or eoternriaes ia the state eocno-my. but there arc also many turglsriea and violentagainatrug trafficking, anmhllrtg, aad prcatitatkoo appear to be less prevaleni
Crimesrv.anWismall privateegalized under Gorbachev haveavorite target of cvganirnd criminals, especially citortaonbtta. Gangster* view cooper*live*
SttlttT
Ceograpkic Distribution af Organized Crime
um groups operate tnvtrluatty every uptime and Mail copilot. Soviei llaiiillcj and anecdotalsuggest thai organized crime has spread to every region of ihe USSR:
In the Russian heartland, population centers ranging from small towns lo major elites are being terrorized by criminal gangs. The Soviets claim thai criminal groups involved In'lheft or extortion have been broken up In Moscow. Kalinin. Ulyanovsk. Tula. Tambov. Khabarovsk, and elsewhere.
The nait-Ruutan Slavic republics represent another hotbed of organisedassive schemethe suborning of hundreds of Ukrainianof them highsupport
, an underground textile operation was uncoveredIn
crime has Jumped markedly in Vitebsk, Minsk, and other cities and Is "assuming an Increasingly orga-nlsed and professional character."
Organized crimeong history In ikeDuring the Breshner era. according to press claims, major dots-based criminal associations In Armenia and Azerbaijan allowed criminals tonarcotics operations as well as manylectors of the economy. Soviet officials have claimed thai operations by corrupt dans and "smooth black-economy operators" account forercent of Azerbaijan's Income. Officials make similar statements about the Central Asianas well, particularly Uzbekistan.
Organized crime has also made Inroads In the Baltic slates IW.
said In December
There have probably never been as manyparticularly organized, committed In
peasant mafia" that had been caught terrorizing ihe heads of farm enterprises. Other reports suggest that organized gangs are also active In Estonia and Latvia
vulnerable became they often have difficulty obtaining supplies and raw materials, yot they geoer-ate large amounts of cash. The MVD claims that mobsters extort millions of rubies in cash and goods from co-ops and has miimated that criminals attacked cooperative* or their workers four times9 than In tbe previous year
Orgsnlred gangs have concentrated on cooperative restauranu and cafes
_Jall co-opoperating without any visiblepayoffs to
shakedowns render0 rubles, probably oo an annual basis. Criminals who have not gotten what they want have destroyed property; inflicted bodily harm; threatened to kill. maim, or kidnap the relatives of their targets; and blown up resisting enterprises
Antipathy toward cooperatives on the part of many officials and much of the public increases tbeof co-ops. Many police and local government authorities arc already ambivalent about themovemcnl or are in cahoots with local crime bosses. According to the Western press, only oae-fifth of ihe rxrpetratoa of crime* against co-ops arc caught. CoopcTBlire owners cannot count on support from Ibe public, much of which objects to their high (in tbe public's view, exorbitant) prices. (At the game time, attacks by criminal* have not slowed the growth of the cooperative sector. According to Soviet figures, the number of co-ops grew from8n0
Legitimate coepcratirej have also become popular investments for underworld fig urea, helping them to launder the cash they get from other activities such as
taxi driver* to attack and rob vulnerable Wet tern vbitors and Soviet and Western diplomats.
flfr, i. Wnoom<om/Uiairdfremorotltta
lr(mr frill TofUatl!tvw'nx "llhnt mu by Sovir* (aiuxivr iailo**id* lo rtton la
loU/xr
drug tiaftickittg and [Hottituiion Government oiTi-Oals have claimed that an toercent of all coopers lives are involved in racheice ring. Some co-ops have, in efleci, become fronts for crime groups
Tmefit. ana*he MVD claims to haveillion rubles" worth of valoablei aad cash from crime boasea6B Foreigners visiting the USSR haverime target of crime* threatening personal Injury. Forarge gang in Kiev headedormer boxer reportedly specialties in mugging foreigners for their cash, jewelry, and camerai C. JU gangs base made arrangements with Moscow
Ordinary Soviet ciUrem, particularly tourist* inresorts such as Yalta, also number among the many mugging victims. One paper claims that some gaags engage in murder with robbery aa their sole aaoUvc. Cangs have also reportedly intercrrttod bos-loads of departing ethnic German cralgres to rob themthe local militia tailing no action against tbe perpetrators
Crimes AmaUa -State /Vnyu ry. Tha aawere andtbortages of con tn riser good* ia the Stateplentiful opportunities for profiteers.the Soviet preat. goods are increasinglymisappropriated, or bought up at lowand resold to the pttbtscrcrncradousofficials call these activities thefficials uncovered snore than 1Crimea, inrliirling large-scale thefts,and spcculaliooof bribery and embcirJenscnt cases goSuch crime* have become particularlyin Ibe foodsectoi
The iueaaJ sale of governmentne oforganized crimes to root out becauae iton widespread and serious tbortages andby factory personnel and governmentwho have an intimate knowledge of theTbe MVD claims that gangs canlarge-scale euberaksraettl of statemany gang members and boates areas factorv directors, managers, or
ment of stateraw Biateriala inch as copper and Iron ore, raw leather, andood source of income for criminal gangs. These products are in high demand by cooperatives, which readily purchase Ihe materials from the gangs.
Dfmgi aad Oihtt Aciirliltt. Organised crime groups arc involved to some degree in drag truflicking. and, while ihey appear lo be somewhal less Interested in gambling and prestation, Ihey are making inroads in these areas as well
The Sorterraction ofany Westernaa already significant aad developing market that Soviet ccgu-niied crime has rnovcd too singleir drug ryrnlicate.rge number of cangs, often consisting of someoembers (rather Urge by Sovietre engaged In drug trafficking. Tbe groups handle all pliaaes of the opetaiwn. from production through street-level distri-bulion. androad geographic area. For caanv Pie. drugs procured by gangs in Tashkent may be shipped out through distribution networks ealeoding to Mcacow. Uoingrad. aod other cities in the western part of the country. InO Xrasnayo iwsa*t?
ragHCtsosxisBg operationad fences, an ceahun-pro-ceasmgcccwsplices it, rtrvw Sovietnd semcemen who creased the border wiit, Afghani-itan on official business and acted at drug couriers.
Soviei law enforcement officials dalm to have made some ptogiess against drug uafficking with several much-publicized raids, but their efforts have hardlyent in tbe problem. The MVD and local rnilitias are hamperedack of sufficient training, equipment, andby rampantC
3 drug dealers in Soviet Central Asia sornetirncsbribe* of more0 rubles to local easctab to keep poueetaen rooting tbe other way when drug shipments arrive.
Oiganited criminal group* have abo btvoo* in reived with bootlegging5 arrtlalcoholshifted (be alcohol industry to largely pti'ate hands and generated large amounts ofcath. whkh. in
'l&ei,li patwet) aeVauiCO
cpetaMc western Kfehr daiwn Itai iW
t.ilIt "
torn, attracted the interest of criminal gangs.oonshiners ia theere primarily rural women who reliedew regular customers to supplement their meager pensions, they have now been largely dn placed by organixed criminals in theirndho haveore contnwraal approach. The Soviet press claims thai bcotlcggers arrested in recent months have dealt io ules of alcohol worth hundreds of thousands of rubtes.
Judging from ibe level of attention the Soviet press dovote* to various kinds of organised crime, while gambling, smuggling, eounterfdting. and prostitution are becoming more Important, they are still reblively minor as compared with extortion, embezzlement, and other economic crimes. The press confirms, however, that crime bosses havetrong push into these areas, levying tribute on gam tiers, prostitutes, drag pushers, and common pickpocket*
International Links
Most observers believe that criminal groups ia the USSR have rather modest links to criminal group* outride tbeleast as compared with the international links maintained by Western criminals. Nonetheless, Soviet criminals are increasinglytie* to foreign group* or individuals, either to obtain goods (for example. Wet tern computers) to supply their domestic customer* orales outlet fot their contraband (for example, Soviet icons) C
Criminals can maintain links lo the outside more easily than before because the Gorbachev regime has loosened the bairien that previous regimes erected to
separate Soviet society from the Weal/ Sovietlike these in the Weal, now nse the telephone aad the pcatal system for contacting their supplier* abroad. Thefreedom of Soviet citizens and firms to establish overseas cocrunercial links has given additional impetus to organised crime as wesl as legitimate business concerns. Gangs have started to penetrate joint business ventures established byfirms, according to Bakatin
.Smuggling and loreign currency operations arethe major laicrnational activities ia which Soviet criminal groups engage KGB chief VUdimir Kryucb-kov hatapid erpaanou of suchlaiming that customs inspectors detained lent of thousands of smugglersane share of whom were prelum bly members of gangs.
Sovkt criminal grciupt also look to foreigna source of illegal drugs. Kryuchkovharp increase ia drugthe USSR, and the KOB chief iareferredgreen triangle" on tbe bordertbe USSR, aad Iran. On the other4 percent of
Soviet drugs come from foreignthe rest coming primarily from tbe southern Soviet republics.
Impact of Organised CitDe
Organurd crime hasenerally eorrcmve effect on tbe Soviet system, population, and regime. Moat directly, il has increased corruption sJgsuftcanily in the middle aad lower ranks of tbe governmentnarticularty among economic and police official:
Popular frustration over crime in general and gang violence In particular bisouring of the public mood, adding to fruit ration and cynicism about economic change. This frustration has helpedpublic doubts about ihe efficacy of government
t,iI Amor,ik, hemeemunt,
the So-irl borderanni. te+xtry and
feetli*VS dollar, and Ge*-
mun dent nhe mark/
instituiiOns; top leaders ire widely blamed for their inability lo stem organized crime. Finally, to the extent that criminal gangs have fcancnied ethnic unrealoint over which Soviet expertsbe issue of organized crime adds to the fissiparous forces already rsurspaat in the USSR
Mldlerrl Corruption
Soviet gangs have moved ia oakkly to take advantage of rampant shortage* aad other problems stemming from the collapse of the centrally planned economy.
paring the Level of bene
The Soviei pwblte probablyearrime ikon doi of man oiher court-irlei. Although ihe chancti af falling victim lo crime may be less In the USSR than elsewhere (for Jrlnlms that the Soviei murder rate ii ont-intra tne Americanhe drumbeat ofabout the Soviethai railed ihe level af public concern and fear considerably Recent Soviet articles Stress that witnesses and victims af orranlsed crime are often petrified and refuse to lesllfy.C
iC i percent ef Soviet youths anderceni of workers sold they would not Intervene If iheyrime. One paper noted, "Noihlng will Induce a
customer or restaurant worker to actitness
The militiamanong time trying to persuade some customer /iohe victims will Justfficial assurances lhai cillseni being presiured by extortionists should seek KGB or UVD protect loo have apparently dome nothing to alleviate public fears. In0 the UVD proposed iieeper penalties foe the use of Intimidation tacita 'fr
agamst escalating organizedI beltin reverie iheundoubtedly conirib-oiod lo the public's tow esteem for tbe Supreme Soviet tnd Centres* of People's Deputies as well, laponengthy report by then Interior Minister BakaUn. tbe Coogreu of People's Deputiesaw that did Utile more than makedeclarations urging tbe MVD and other agencies to take barabcr measures
SllmuUting Opposition lo Potitkal Reform
Antireform politicalleaders In Ihe Russian and Soviet Communistlatched onto the issue of organized crime to help there attack reform proponents.representing blue-collir workers, some at ihe instigation of embattled party stalwarts who oppose Gorbachev's reforms and tbe general course of the country, charge tbai Gorbachev his sold out to the maha. They use the emergence of organired Crime to underscore the breakdown of authority and decline in
law and order that they Manse oa the reforms. For* tactical reasons, traditionalist group* make littlebetween organired crime and the rise of crimethey do not, for example, distinguish between orgs ni red crime, on the one hand, and petty criminals, bUca-maikelocn. corrupt party officials, and the shadow eronomy. on the other
Organitatioos snefa as tbe United Worken' Front and some Russian nationalist groups stridently attack "mafiahese group* claim that corrupt officials,nd exsctperative* are diverting goods from tbe cheap state sector, enriching themselves, spreading crime, and trying to reinstate capitalism. Such groups demand an cad toand eeoesoenic ma rke urn lion and the eipropria -lion of billions of rubles from "shadow-economyraditionalists have also accusedreformers in tbe parliament of allyingwith the nsafia and ibe shadow economy
Contributing to Ethnic Violence
Organired criminal gangs have not been thebehind ethnic unrest, but they have playedand are widely seen by Soviet citizens aiin the increase in violence Organizedseems to have been limited primarily toand profiling from shortages of goodsof ethnic strife. Some Soviet dtizenscrime actually sparked the violenceconfuse organized gangs with ibe small,ones engaged in
Soviet and Western academics agree thai ethnic unrest in tbe Caucasus and Central Asia it dueomplex Interplayistorical,economic, and demographic Beginoirtgorbachev and other senior officials added the mafia factor to the equation, charging that organized crime helped stir up the wave of ethnic violence In the southern Soviet republics. Officials and journalists have bid out two hypotbeae*.
Corrupt political leaders with links to organized crime sparked the violence when they realized they were about to be investigated and tacked. Under
this scenario, republic ofikiaU and nationalist forces were ihe main instigators, and local criminal gang*arallel interest in ethnic nnrcstubsi diary role.
Organized crime figures heavily involved with the shadow economy stirred up ethnic tension on their owniversion to protect themselves andtheir ill-gotten mercenary gains from the police and any political leaders trying to end thdr criminal activities '*
Despite Soviet claims emphasizing both possibilities, criminal gangs almost certainly played only arole la the various outbicaLs of violence. Soviet othciaU emphasized the first hypothesis in theof the Fergana Valley and Osb disturbances. stressing Ihal corrupt, mafia-linked leaders provoked violence to avoid being tacked
MVD and other officials, on the other band, claim that gangs have instigated unrest on their own. The editor of pravda has claimed that organisedand shadow ccenomy operators carefully planned and organized invnethnlc discord in Baku In9 and in Fergana. Uzbekistan, io9 because they knew they would be Identified and attacked under peaceful conditions. as also claimed that -black-economy dealers" have 6nanced acts of violence io the Caucasus and suppliedmakers" wiib drug* and weapons. The KGB has even made arrests, apparently to demonstrate organized crime'* involvement in ethnic violence; for example, it arrestedell-known godfather" in9 for aHeeedly helping to organize mobs In Fergana
Impact on Fcortouiic Debate
In the course of the debate over how fast toarketrthodox, political activists and party leaders have shifted the public debate on privatization by denwrteing alleged criminal "inJertatioo" ofend other parts of tbe shadow economy. Having latched onto the mafia issue with gusto, traditionalists have put advocates of privatization on the defensive and caused some In the leadership to arguelowing down of ceo scenic reform
Although coci>eniives are often victims of organized crime, rightvrtng groups accuse co-ops of usingand extortion to get municipal licenses, raw materials, and access to marketplaces. OUninsUy controlled co-ops are abo said to engineer artificial shortages of goods and to engage in price gouging io order to maximize eritninals'example, the tobacco and bread shortages in Moscow during the htte summer0
The percepdon (and. to aome degree, reality) of organized gangs" growing influence amonghas alio encouraged the official government trade union and the United Workers' Front to take the offensive against economic reform. These groups, publicly blaming Gorbachev foelass of muliimuTiooaires, have advanced some proposals' to control organized crimes involvement with retailimposing high rates of incomeandteeply progressivetax Another one of their propouli calls for the compulsory (and confiscatory) exchange cf currency for new rublethe exchangeuble notes mandated inhose trying to exchange moreertainO00 rubles) would be forced to show that the excess was obtained legally
self-serving claims from law enforcement authorities, organiied crime figures almost certainly do not see their interests as coinciding exactly with the nationalists'. Criminal gangs usually seem lo take advantage of conflicis that already exist, rather than causing or even promoting them
Tbe Regime's Spattering Attempts To Cope
As members of the leadership began to acknowledge the problem of organized crime more openly9heir ability to marshal the Cootmunisl
and government's resources against criminals tkcOooi dramatically. Until the creation of ibeCouncil and (be weakenlna of the Politburo, former KGB chief Viktor Chehrikov apparently au-perviied the anticrime fight. The party's authority in this area apparently ended when Articlehich legitimized the CPSU's leading role in Soviet society, was excised from tbe Soviet Constitution in early IWO.andC aa publicly ttated thai the CPSU Centra! Committee nosupervises tbeaw erJcecement organs
Senior officials seem better at handwrrnging. howev-er. than at finding effective solutions. The official lesponse to organized crime has relied as much on symbol is ra as it has on substance. Efforts to beef up and centralize law enforcement have failed toent in the problem, and bureaucratic rivalry has seriously undermined regime countermcasures
Tbe MVD'. Wcouatr? Response
The MVD hasajor effort to try to cope with increased organized crime activity.he MVD announced the creationew section in tbeSixththe Soviet underworld. Analogous units were established on the local level tooonduct iointwith the KGB. MVD officials toM C
1 iinistry personnel work In some capacity against organized crime
The MVD has been lobbying for even more resources for almost (wo years. In9 theore investigators would beto fight street and organized crime, including embezzlement and the extortion of cooperatives, and0 it received anpereent increase In funding to fight crime. Tbe MVD has alsoiilion-rubte program to provide the police with automobiles, helicopters, and other crime-tigbting eCiuipeneuL
Despite generous funding aod ce^nizational changes, the MVD has not been able to stem organized crime because of iu own rampantresult of abysmally low pay that makes police officers highly susceptible to bribes from criminals, fj as admitted the "total collapse" of tbe struggle against corruption in the MVD. He has saidVD employees were punished for "official misdemeanors" ia the first half0 and9percent increase8 in (he number of MVD suffers taking bribes.
ercent ofall policemen have been nred for corruption since Brezhnev's death_
JJlhat, until the problem of MVDis solved, it will be hard to even assess how the fight against organized crime is proceeding.
Among other problems that hinder the police, under-suffing and outdated equipment rank high. Even in Moscow and Untngrad, (he police driveowered Soviet-made Ladas and receive radons of onlyallons ofonth, while gangs drive Urge imported cars, bom eti mes equipped with police-band radios (seeftenUrnes, gangsters can simply outgun theiodling recruitment of new officers, an exodus of experienced personnel, and the stress of dealing with eot-ting social unrest have lowered morale as well
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n tr. twturd Wlocal
KGB Eaters ibe
Until fairly recently, thee-ground battle against organizedthe extent onecentralized in the MVD. The regime authorized the KGB's entry into the picture In tbe fall9 because of iu greater professionalism (as compared
with the corrupiioo-riddeQ MVD) and Its superior techriical resources to fight sophisticated gangs. The leadership also wanted to bolster the KGB's public image, which has plunged in the face of withering media attacks allowed under glainoii
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Tbe Debateight. Rapi-il) growing organized crime has triggeredsharp debate between police officials, who arc demanding more forceful measures lo deal with of -fenders, aod reform-minded legal scholar* andwbo arc concerned that new pouce powers not undermine efforts toaw-based state. Police authorities hare denonnceel courtroom indulgence toward criminals. Implying it Is one of the main reasons organized crime is flourishing, and proposed tougher sanctions oa gangsters. Soviet legislators, however, have been wary of MVD proposals that tbey think are likely to encroach oa the presumption of innocence during trials r
MVD ometals have proposed etiffer penalties for gangfrom capital punishment to long terms In penal colonics in remote areas of tbe country. Frustrated that "mafuaos" can elude prosecution because tbey plan rather than execute criminal acts, the MVD has also proposed criaunaliring the acts of creating, leading, aad belongingriminal band. These proposals remain under debate. In0 the Supremea yearlonga law reopened by the MVD allowingideo and sound tapes, and photographs into court evidence. According to the law, telephone* can be tapped with (he approval of the prosecutor orourt ruling.
Soviei partismentarlina initially reacted angrily to (he bill when it was proposed by (he MVDccording to oik of the early drafts, wiretap approval could bo granted autcarsaiicallyrosecutor's requcal. Despite MVD corxtplaioU Ihat the inadinitsi-bilily of wiretap evidence bobbted investigators andeformers argued that only court* nothave (be right to approveOne law reformer argued that Baka tin'sbill failedefine (ho "grave crimes" that could (rigger MVD wiretaps and was replete with vague and sabjectrve phrases like "when sufficient grounds existrime weald beThe deteriorating crime rituation, however, apparently encouraged legislators lo pass the MVD bill over reformist objections "
Legal reformers have also criticized two otherproposed by Baka tin to fight organized crime. The aril, "workers' public order detachments" (ab-btcviated ROSM ineceived officialin aa9 Supreme Soviet decree ROSMs eeltst factory workers, who coetiowe on the factory payroll, to aa as deputized police cankers: Ihey apparently have the primary goal of fighting organized crime. ByOSMs were Inla thee, KSakhalin. Moldov*.'Krav. and I5 oblasts. The detachnaents have coax under at lack by liberal Sovietcholars because their members lack true police experience or legal education; ROSMs also have the potential for being misused against peaceful dexnocst rstcan
Tbe second disputed innovation ia pvoriaiceialto fight crime, which were created9 at the national, republic, Lray. and obtaat levels. At tbe local level, they consist of each rcgioo't chief prosecutor, judge, and militia officaxl. and tbey are headed by the chairman of the local ex ecu tire committee (UpolkomL In Ibe fall9 Um chief of (he MVDfor Fighting Organized Crime called on these commit toes to coordinate the activities of local law
'laha MoMetlaa SSRa aaaat la SSR
enforcement agencies. Legal reformers argue Ibai Ibe committee* violaic Ibe tepa ration -of* power* principle becauie Ibcy unite tbe proaccutor, judge, and miliiu chiefingle body. They also point out thai tbe coitusJuce't cvasi aggressive member* (uiually tbe MVD repreaeoUtivea) have free rein to come up with cri trie-fighting tueasures because the LspoJkomarc generally too busy to keep tabs on aad delegate authority to these racrnbera. They argue that the committees, in effect, subotdiaaie judges to MVD officials and subvert judicial itidependence
emphasized the organization's technical tuuxrttse, particularly iu computer data base on mterrutUonal criminal)
Soviet ofildab periodically propose establbhingties to the US Intelligence Coenmunily to combat drag trafficking and organized crime.
Western Sappott
Soviet officials have embarkedlurry of activity to enlist Western help against ngaxuxed crime, openly admitting thai they raced Western tecfarsotOgy and crime-ughting rncdcU to cope with Soviet gangs:
kaders have toad Z_
that they leaned heavily on US cumpte*drafting their own hills against organized crime They said ihey particularly admire the US witness protection program aad theand Corrupt Organizations ActS statuteakes It easier for tbe federal government to'seize mob property.
The MVD has talked wiih pcasce, internalr justice officials from the United Sutra, Great Britain, Italy, tha Netherlands, Belgitim, France, Canada, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Last April, Italy was the first Western country to agree to cooperate with the MVD specifically on crgnmrrd crime
Soviet customs officials have received training in mterccpting cocuaband from the US Caaiotrasand Moscow rigned an agrecoicui with the US Juiticc Department on nrhanging Information on organized crime and drag trafficking. Soviet curlocm official! have coc-perated with several other Western countries in jean' , <yt:oo oceralioas.
' In0 the USSR joined lotcrpoL the Internatiorial police organization, after many months of diitnatlortl la UUrvirw* about tbeto Moacow of Interpol membershtpr at
he USSR also signed cocoeratjou agreo-meeu with Czechoslovakia, the former Eastand probably other East European sutes oa fighting organized crime. Even with the fall ofIn Eastern Europe, some of these agrecznenu may continue In force because the acw govemmeau pat craruudarabte stock in fighting transnationalthat transcend ideology, and thus wouldbe willing to hdp Moscow combat organized crime Continued cooperation with the Easthowever, could allow Moscow to reestablish any leUttonaUpa with mtelligcace assets that have ccaacd. Tbe KGB would probably use Soviet nscmberarap la Interpol to seek outintelligence assets in that organization at we!
Prospects
At Scn-iotii themselves readily admit, tho results of the fight against organired crime, begun inave been paltry. Aa MVD official has said, "So far we arc losing our fight against crganized crime. We are lagging behind by some IJ toaakatie ackncrwledged the miliila'i "unsatisfactory" performance In tbe struggle.
irtually certain that the fundamental problems feeding cargaalzed crime will grow. For eaarntaV, tha cooeromic abde that wfll probably continue over the
-Stout"
near term will be strongly conduciveorsening of organized crime. Although acme Soviet citizen* may be going too far ia suggesting that criminal croups caused food, tobacco, and alcohol sbortacc* in tbe summerriminal* will continue to take advantage of the growing shortages. Furthermore, national and munidpal leaders unsympathetic to cooperatives will not protect those threatened by racketeers.
Chronic problem* in Soviet lawcorruption and the MVD's serious personneltake years to remedy, atrirrunals nave even iruutratcd the MVD's reiauvdy new SixthThe Procuracy has been bit by corruption as well, according to press reports
The penetration by organized crime of the middle and lower levels of the Soviet party and Government also bodes ill for tbe success of the campaign against orgaruzed erimd. Because scores of corrupt Coromu-nut Party officials protect ergaruzed criminals. It will be difficult to diminate tbe problem by simply putting morecriminab behind bars. New gangs will take their Place and continue lo suborn party and government offidalx. In
JUmented that be bad encountered "strong oprwiioo" when be told several regional leader, that theyroblem withed crimi
Social trends of recent years abo seem likely to encourage the growth of organized crime. CriminaU have become morereflection of theof social controls and respect for authority that have accelerated under democratizalion and the greater freedom of expression allowed in Soviei sod-ety. Other ingrained sodalas youth alienation, alcoholism, and drugalso indirectly contribute to ihe growth of eritiutial gangs.
The Urge number of youthful offenders suggests there willlentiful recruiting pool for crime leaders,lo Up in tbe future
On the other hand, some trends thai haveGorbachev could encourage more effectiveagainst organized crime, even if itAs the forces of law and order devote lessIhe repressive functions they emphasizedcrime prevention could benefit. Forlocal police and KGB forces seem to betime openly harassing dissident* and(although some groups still seem toA newen the press couldto spend less lime polidng unofficialand unlicensed printing presses. Thethe internal passportinocasingiyalsohift of resourcesactivities toward the fightgongs. MVD officials have cornplainedSoviei press that tbey could spend morecrime If they were not burdened withto crime fighting. Furthermore, evencorruption, the MVD could becomeagainst organized crime when it startshundreds of millions of rubles' worth ofncm-oa
The devolution of power from the center to the republics will probablyramatic out mixed impact on the fight against organized crime. Inala tin gave regional and local inter eutl affairs units considerable autcriorny, inducing the right to set up their own ratihisrocess of splintering by the various republic MVD* organizations from tbe center
Bakatia signed an agreementocia, giving it complete adrnlnbtrative authority over its own bw enforcement organizations and replacing the Mos-cow-arsodaied Estonian MVD, KGB. and ntiUtla nits with three locally controlled bodies.
1 KnntcUtoi. fa coeuui. fcu Soue tliuc lo. deonnnLnttoa or KOB sutborllv io ti, repubba, ahbenan minz of the republics are trvfa. on iWr own loitiiiMt lo uwn control mUHrm
KGBe
Similar agree menu arc being negotiated inand Latvia, and Yertstn's forces la the RSFSR ahow every alia of following Estonia's lead.
GotWbevccicc in0 that ordered the armed force, the KGB. and tbe MVD to come yp with plana to reform their internal political structure* withinayj
Given tbe MVD's key rote in fit hung organized crime, Ba satin's devolution of power to theiielj to be felt oauckly. On the one band, iteakening of btw en force meapabilities becauae it would cut off republic police agervdes from resources (investigators,nd to on) that are more plentiful on an ail-union bub. KGB and MVDhave pubUcly arguedg the ccutnoctioot between their respective headquarters and tbe repubuc or gam ration will gut the fight against organized crime Immediately after replacing Bakatia ai Interior Minister. Pugo indicated in public interviews that he would not letagmen union of tbe USSR impede the MVD's ability to counter organized crimeational baiU
On the etherevolution of power could make the KGB and MVD republic units more ptoftasional and effective at crime-lighting organizations. Authorities on the local level are prcatunabiy nsore familiar with the causes and typos of crime in their areas and better able to infiltrate criminal groups. Moreover, the splintering of the various republic MVD organizations and the decitlon to remove party control organs from the MVD will aot necessarily weaken interregional cooperation amonga Lithuania, for example, ibe Sajadb parfiameatariaa who beads the republic't newserviceerman paper that tbe one area in which hit agency wilt continue to oooperate with tbe national -level KGB will be organized crirnt
Tbeikely to grow ta tbe USSR aver the nest few years under almost every imaginableof whether Gorbachev remains ia powereplaced or whether the republics achieve full independence or arc tied to each otheronfederation. Tbe growth of tbe Soviet underworld
b occurring it the tame time thendergo--mg revolutions in its economy, political tyitnm, and society. More rapid movementarketwould eventually help to reduce the level of organized crime, but shortages of goods will surely persist, even ifble to achieve his most optlmbiic economic pbns. The more likelyhai the economy willong process of painful transition and rrusmaasgement. Givenrmphaua oo stability andee to move as fast on ceooennk reform as some ofwould like, we asttasrac the trauma of ecrjttemnk decline will continue to provide criminal gangs with countless opportunities In the future
Regardless of whether the USSR splinters apart rapidly or the center manages to retard the rate at which it loses power to tbe periphery, the protpects for eliminating organized crime in the various republics appear dim- At the same time, regional differences will strongly affect tbe struggle against tbe *
Tbe moat optimistic scenario would probably put organized crime out of basinet! only in small, vibrant republics like Lithuania and its Baltic neighbors, which enjoy greater social and economic cohesion than caber parts of the USSR. But even these areas could succeed only if they recovered enough lothe ccoooenk and social problems that spawned organized crime In the first ptaei
Ia the RSFSR and other Slavic republics, substantial leveb of aadcrwortd activity will probably continue regardless of the shape of tbe future Soviet staiS. If the irnaibuca ia Central Asia sad tbe Caucasus were to gam inrVcrjraxSar.ee, they would probably be unable to muster as many bw enforcement resource* against organized gongs as they receive now with the help of central Soviet authorities. The pertiiteooe of clan-based corruption and violent crime la these areas suggests that the problem could very well eacabte. In the event that social unrest deteriorates Into civileither rtationwide or over Urge parts of thecriminab an ortnuazed gangs willn climate in which so expand their tain tie.
Original document.
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