Directorate of Intelligence1
Implications of Insurre.ction Prospects for Saddam's Survival
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Summary
Saddam Husayn faces his most serious political challenge in more than twenty years of power. He ind his regime are confronted by economic chaos, armed insurrection, [he prospect of widespread civil war, and foreign intervention. His immediate plight may ease somewhat with suppression of the insurrection in the southelaxation of the UN-imposed embargo, but the Kurdish rebellion and the threat of foreign interventionerious threat to Saddam's continued hold on power.
Forces loyal to him have been able to contain much of the fighting in the Shia Muslim areas of southern Iraq, but Kurdish gains in the north are probably compelling him to prematurely transfer troops north, which could reverse recent progress tn restoring government control in the soulh. Efforts by external powers, especially Iran, to assist the rebels have aggravated (he danger to Saddam but are not yet sufficient to decide the issue.
Saddam's speech Saturday in which he promised political and economic reforms while warning of the dangers of external
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meddling suggests he is looking for ways io rally Iraqi patriotism around him. Other references in his speech suggest Saddam may have given advisors on the Revolutionary Commandider rote in shaping policy lo save his regime. Should these efforts be unsuccessful and large-scale unrest break out in Baghdad, Saddam could be in mortal danger. He must act quickly and decisively lo quell the Shia and Kurdish unrest andense of stability if he is to staveotential coup and Iraq is to remain united. I
Saddam's In Control For Now t
in the past week, Iraqi forces tightened their grip on the holy cities of An Najaf and KarbaJa in southern Iraq bul resistance forces have shown surprising resiliency. Baghdad is struggling, however, to eliminate insurgents from the smaller cities along the Tigris and Euphrates River valleys. Iran's press and Shia exile sources claim that fighting has erupted in several of Baghdad's suburbs. At the same time. Kurdish insurgents in the north are making considerable gains despite the arrival of regime reinforcements from southern Iraq. The main road from Karkuk to Baghdad has been cut, and Kurdish sources claim in the press to haveignificant amount of territory in the oil-rich province. The regime's hold on Dahuk Province, adjoining the border with Turkey, is collapsing. |
The regime appears to be getting on lop of the situation in the south but it has not yet stamped out the rebellion there. The Shia insurgents are driven by religious fervor and, like thetrong taste for revenge after years of oppression. They are also probably getting some logistic and financial support from Iran and Syria, and more may be on the way. If Saddam does not soon
quell ihe rebellions, lhc chanceserious outbreak in Baghdad will grow and his position will be more precarious. Time is not on his side. |
Saddam has dominated Iraq longer than any other figure in its modem history. Since the revolution which brought the Ba'th Party to power8 he has shaped its political and economic character, defined its foreign policies, andational identity for one of the most ethnically and religiously diverse countries in ihc Middle Kast. He has also created one of the most authoritarian and brutal regimes in the region. |
Since the end of the war. Saddam has taken steps to ensure military support and ease domestic economic stress. He has lauded the miliiary for its heroic role in the war and made no public search for scapegoats. He has also declared an amnesty for deserters, released some prisoners held in Iraqi jails, and cased rationing on gas. On Saturday, he offered unspecified political reforms, probably electionsew National Assembly with broader ethnic sectarian representation. He also said he wasew Minister for Reconstruction to oversee the rebuildingew Iraq. His "reforms' are probably intended to offer increased "popular" participation in government, bul meaningful involvement by the people is unlikely. Similarly, his economic proposals are probably aimed at securing domestic and foreign sympathy by stressing civilian reconstruction needs. Few Iraqis will be convinced by these gestures, but they may sway some who are afraid or unwilling to commit themselves to rebellion. Iraqis may not miss Saddam if and when he goes, but it is probably difficult for mostgiven the death and devastation of two major wars-to imagine life without him. Most Iraqis alive today have never known another leader.
Possible Outcomes to the Insurrection
There are several possible outcomes for the worst domestic crisis Iraq has faced since independence
Saddam wins and revitalizes bis control over Iraq. Saddam will use whatever means necessary, including draconian security measures and forced deportations, to ensure pacification. He probably has deployed military and intelligence units with orders to determine responsibility and exact maximum punishment. In his speech Saturday. Saddam described the rebellions as proof" external forces threaten Iraq. He is likely to use this threat to njly Iraqis, particularly Sunnis. around him. warn off potential backers of the insurrections, and. in the longer-term, justify rebuilding his war machine.
If Saddam is able to contain the insurrections he now faces, the next few years promise to be uncertain ones in Iraq. His forces willeavy toll for participating or sympathizing with rebels. In previous rebellions, punishment
has included executions, mass anests. and forced deportations and resettlement of large segments of the populationistant parts of ihe country. He will probably offer further cosmetic political reforms, such as presidential elections, and promise more economic relief when the coalition lifts the embargo. He will depend increasingly on an even narrower circle of family and Ba'Oiist loyalists, as suggested in his promotion of cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid to Intt "lor Minister.
Saddam loses,ro-Iranian Shia stale emerges in Baghdad. Saddam is unlikely to survive if the rebellion takes hold in Baghdadarge proportion of the army defects. The fighting in the southern Shia cilics probably began with local anti-regime Shias who saw an opportunity in the apparent breakdown of law and order to rise against Saddam. It spread quickly, pfbbably fanned by the arrival of Iranian-based Iraqi dissidents and Iraqi Shia certainly sought additional help from their brothers in Iran. The Shia community in Iraq is not controlled by Tehran and has indigenous historical traditions and religious institutions older than Iran's. Most Iraqi Shia probably would oppose Iraqatrapy of Iran, but many do support the political program of the Iraqi clerics in Iran, namely an Iranian-style Islamic republic, democratic elections, and majority rule. They would want to follow pro-Iranian policies,hia government in Baghdad would have to allowroader and possibly secular base if it wanted tonited Iraq. |
Iraq's Shias, led by their pre-eminent cleric Grand Ayatollah Khu'i, rejected Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini's concept of yelayat-e, faqih (political ruleupreme religious leader) and remained loyal to Baghdad during the eight-year war with Iran. More pragmatic Iraqi Shia leaders may view Tehran's style of government as appropriate for Iran, which is more thanercent Shia Muslim, but would probably not accept its complete application in Iraq, where the Shia are onlyercent of the population and need support from other ethnic and religious factions to overthrow Saddam.
A Shia takeover in Iraq, however, would revive Islamic revolutionary fervor in Iran and cause increased threats of Shia subversion and terrorism to the Sunni monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. It would also increase the risk of religious fundamentalist unrest in Syria and Turkey. |
No one wins, and full-scale civil war breaks out. The central government--with or without Saddam-could be too weak to defeat its enemies and rule effectively. The Kurds have seized on the Slua revolt to stage their own rebellion, but they arc too few in number (onlyerceni of the population) to lake power in Baghdad. If the army and security services collapsed,ebanon-style power vacuum would exist,eneral civil war involving Shias, Sunnts, and Kurds might develop. The Lebanonization of Iraq could
follow. As in Lebanon, the biggest danger would be foreign intervention. Iran, Syria, and Turkey would sec their national interests threatened and could be tempted to intervene. Even if Saddam defeats the Shia. he mayrolonged Kurdish uprising in the mountainous north which wouldource of instability for (he region. |
Removing Saddam: Scenariosoup
The prospecthia victory, or just prolonged internal strife, could also encourage disparate Sunni elements in Iraq, including anti-Ba'thist nationalists. pro-Syrian Ba'Uiists. and military elites to rally around Saddam as the only recourse to an Iranian-influenced Shia regime. It also could force political change on Saddam, including his overthrow. |
Saddam Survives but is Forced to Share Poweralaceew family members, senior Party officials, or senior miliiary officers could force Saddam to share power. They wouldeed to keep Saddam probably because he retained the loyalty of the security and intelligence forces and the Party. They might also fear that to remove him precipitously would trigger wider-scale revolt. Iraq has no "retirement plan" for its rulers and Saddam certainly assumes that, if he cannot flee-and we believe it uncharacteristic for him to runight-lhen he must compromise or be killed. Saddam could offer to share power with senior military leaders who may command popular respect and who he believes are closely identified wiih him and will, therefore, protect him. Most are likely to accept such an offer in order to protect themselves from more sweeping and dangerous change. There would be no fundamental change in Iraqi policies or intentions.
Cooperative military leaders would probably hope to control Saddam and would probably remain loyal to him as long as an external military threat exists. Saddam would probably view an arrangement with the militaryarriage of convenience to be dissolved when order had been restored and his position was secure again. Miliiary and Party officers in ihis arrangement would probablyimilar view of lhc relationship and hope lo remove Saddamater date.
Saddanf fa Removed By Insiders. Saddam could be removedember of his inner circle or senior miliiary figures who believe that his continued rule threatens their lives, families, and fortunes. If he were killed and his security apparatus remained cohesive, power would probably be seizedenior miliiary leader orommittee of surviving influential Tikritis. Ba'ih Party officials, and senior military officers assisted by the intelligence and security services. These pojiucal elites would probably jockey for position among themselves,ower struggle in this context would not necessarily involve foreign backers.
A successor government probably would make significant concessions to reduce regional tensions in order to consolidate its own position, but not because it disagreed with Saddam's claim that Kuwait belonged to Iraq, his vision of Iraq's regional hegemony, his tactics of brutality, or his style of strong-man rule. The new leaders would probably look to the United States for assurances of lacit acceptance, for example, that no war crimes trials would be held, no reparations levied, no limits placed on Iraq's military, and that all sanctions be lifted. No successor regime, however pro-Western its orientation or professed sympathies, is likely to agree voluntarily to further reduce Iraq's militaryilitary regime is especially unlikely to make concessions. And no successor regime, however desirous it might be for harmonious relations with the West or with neighboring regimes, will want to be perceived as acting on behalf of an outside power.
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In these scenarios, Syria. Iran, and Turkey would probably reaffirm their support for Iraq's territorial integrity, and probably would notrab for Iraqi territory. But they would continue to encourage the Iraqi dissidents they
host and eye the borders with Iraq more closely.
Revolution by Outsiders: Saddam and the Regime are Destroyed. Individuals involved in the insurrectionroup of military and poliiical officials who hold mid-level positions and blame Saddam and his generals for Iraq's destruction could trigger the overthrow the entire regime. Members of Saddam's family, the Party, government leaden, and even senior military leaders closely aligned with Saddam would be swept away. Military officers would sullprobably provide the bare bones of leadership, but it could very well be difficult to find someone torovisionaleak national front government would probably be formed. |
Rivals inside Iraq and outside the country would compete for power. Theparty coalition formed in Damascus last December would probably collapse, and competing factions would try to consolidate their hold on sections of the country and Baghdad. The Kurds would probably set up an autonomous government in the northern provinces and might even declare independence. Shia clerics in southern Iraq would demand aninfluenual voice for Iraq's majority Shia population in the new government. |
Under this scenario, Iraq's Arab neighbors would signal support for continuation of Sunni Arab government. Turkey would more openly covet land ceded decades ago to Iraq bui would probably not cross the border unless Kurdish unrest threatened Turkish internal security. Iran would probably seize key border posts and oil fields in border areas.
Power Centers
The miliiary and the Ba'th Party willole in determining Iraq's political future with or without Saddam. Other factors such as ambitions among influential extended families, age-old rivalries between Arab and Kurd, Sunni
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and Shia also clearly will persisi. bui etimic tensions may be muted initially if the anti-Saddam rebellion succeeds. |
Military. Iraq's military traditionally hasey role in determining the country's political leadership.7 when Iraq became independent8 when the Ba'th Party seized powerilitary coup, Iraqi mililary officers conducted six successful coups and countless failed attempts. No Iraqi regime has been able to ignore the military's political influence, particularly its penchant for corrective coups, and it will likelyecisive role in determining any successor lo Saddam. |
The military's independence has been restricted by the Ba'th regime. Saddam has used natural attrition-including death in the Iran-Iraq war-purges, arrests, and executions to eliminate an older, less politically reliable generation of military officers and create in iheirew cadre of military loyalists. He has also appointed family and clan members from Tikrit and other loyalists to key positions and frequently transferred or forced into retirement popular senior officers to prevent them from building independent power bases. Saddam also secured military loyalty by providing the lion's share of the budget for huge inventories of some of the best mililary equipment available and showering lavish rewards among the officer corps. Finally, Saddam built up the Republican Guardsoyalist Sunni praetorian guard to ensure the loyalty of the military to himself and the Sunm-Tikriii establishment. |
The wars with Iran and over Kuwait have almost certainly cost Saddam military support. We believe many officers and enlisted men must harbor considcrpble resentment against him for giving away the gains acquired in the costly war wiih Iran and for nearly destroying Iraq's military capability in the Kuwait war.
Tbe Party. Less is known about the status of Lhc Ba'th Party, its willingness to challenge Saddam for power, or its ability to surviveegime without him. Over the years. Saddam managed to eliminate Party theoreticians and popular figures who he believed were capable ofower base within the Party. The Party ruled Iraq through its control of ihe Revolutionary Command Council and government posts. Saddam gradually stripped lhc RCC and hence the Party of its ability to elect leaders, including the President, or debate policy. In many cases he made competence or personal loyalty the primary criteria for advancement over Party membership. i
The more extensive ihe coup in Baghdad, the less likely the Ba'th Party is loole in the new government Ba'thisl leaders who survived the coup would probably be irrelevant in determining policy. The Party's older generation has probably been effectively purged of any capable actors or thinkers, and its younger generation probably lacks the initiative necessary to shape an effective political force. Loyalty to family and sectarian tics would probably outweigh loyalty lo an outmoded political machine.
Army and the Party might deckle to work together to ease the transitionost-Saddam government and win acceptance by Iraqis anden is..
eventually, tradition!
conspiratorial Iraqi poliucalarticular the bloodyassert themselves, and one strong man would seek to control Baghdad. According to the Iraqi Constitution, the Revolutionary Command Council has the authority toew president should the post become vacant, but no "candidate" is likely to use this mechanism for iransferring power unless he is sure of his
Succession Without Destruction: The Legal Mechanisms
has no power base.
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Iraq has notuccession crisis since8 revolution which brought the Ba'th Party, General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and his 'deputy" Saddam Husayn to power. Bakr was eased out of officeut there was no serious opposition to Saddam. The interim constitution8 gave the RCC the power lo elect the president andew one if he resigned. Later revisions of the Constitution shifted power away from the RCC to the Presidency but shied away from the succession issue.0 Saddam proposed the Consutution be amended to allow the election of the Presidentopular referendum. As with most political "reforms" in Iraq, these were paper exercises intended to allay etltnic unrest and convince the West of Baghdad's liberal tendencies. Saddam never had any intention of widening the electoral franchise or moving Iraqore democraticera^Talia r
He certainly would not succeed Saddam. Prospects
We believe Saddam will do whatever is necessary to keep himself andin power and preserve his military capability. His position isas long as his intelligence and security services remain intact,backs him. he is seen to be wielding authority, and hisbelieve he mayeal which will ensure hisby Saddam in his recent speech to his "leadershiphe may already be allowing Revolutionary Commandperhaps some
seniormation.
Even these circumstances may not be enough to save him. Saddam may be forced to make further concessions to senior civilian officials and the military to ensure their cooperation in the brutal suppression of the insurrection and support for his continued rule. If so, his powers will be limited and Iraq couldrolonged period of instability after the end of the insurrection as military and political leaders around Saddam jockey for power. |
The economy willey factor. If UN sanctions continue and Saddam is unable to sell oil, his position internally will be at increasingly greater risk. Even if the embargo is lifted, the enormous reconstruction challenge facing Iraq will require Saddam to deal more energetically and efficiently with economic problems than he has ever done in the past. I
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