Directorate of Intelligence
Yugoslavia: Military Dynamicsotential Civil WarfjHffS>
Yugoslavia: Military Dynamicsotential Civil Warffffm
An Intelligence Assessment
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Yugoslavia: Military Dvruiiics
a Potential OtQ WirM
Keywaristinct possibility in Yugoslavia. Although tensions
Intonationebbed and flowed in recent weeks, deep ethnic divisions, economic
weakness, political paralysis, and senior army leaders' skepticism about
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democratization continue as firm features of the political landscape. Full-scale civil war, if it comes, will probably be disorganized and prulracted,talemate the most likely outcome. With neither side able to impose its will by force ofoliticalbrokeredbe required, possibly offering the first real test of CSCE
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Militarily, conflict would pit the strengths of armored and air forces under national control against republic infantry forces trained in guerrilla warfare. The contending forces are already in place, the unintended consequence of long-held Yugoslav military doctrine that emphasizesnitial short conventional defense by the national forces followed by an extended guerrilla war led by republic-based forces. Both sides have boosted their defense preparedness and are ready to act quickly if necessary, but neither side couldapid military victory:
better-armed national forces would enjoy pronounced military advantages against republic forces in Slovenia and Croatia, butroader war their advantages would be sharply undermined bylogistic, and transportation shortfalls.
forces, equipped and trained to conduct guerrilla warfare, could
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advantage of rugged terrain inampaign and wouldredible military force
Foreign arms have been entering the Yugoslav republics for months, the product of smuggling, gray arms market transactions, and at least one confirmed governrnent-to-rcpubhc sale. The acquisition of foreign weapons Is extremely sensitive in Yugoslavia's supercharged political atmosphere, and Belgrade reacted sharply to Hungary's government authorized sale of t. assault rifles to tbe Croatian government. Political sensitivity may limit future official sales, but republics threatened by the prospect of Army intervention probably will continue to acquire the arms they needj
Tbe course and outcomeivil war would be heavily colored by ethnic tensions, evident even within the Army. In tbe face of heavy fighting, military discipline and cohesion would evaporate, leading to fragmentation
of the Army along ethnic lines. The Army's transformationump Serbian force would resultarked decrease in military effectiveness Recent political tensions and antigovcrarncnt demonstrations in Serbia suggest that not even all Serbs would be united behind sucharmy. Moreover, given the fissures within Yugoslav society, organized violence between military units would probably trigger smaller scale, butcommunal violence. Refugee Rows probably would be substantial.
With the dangerpillover of the violence into neighboringugoslav civil war would rapidlyEuropean" problem. But the major Pan-European Institution, CSCE. is currently not structured to grapple effectively with internal conflicts. Major violence in Yugoslavia would lead CSCE members to consider creating new mechanisms to resolve conflict In any conflict, the US and European nations will come under pressure to provide political and military support to the different comba la nts B
Yugoslavia: Military Dynamicsotential Civil Win""
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Yugoslavia'* political fabric is badly frayed and may unravelheretrong chance this process will be accompanied by some level of violence,if, asxpect, federal leaders insist on maintaining oenira) authority and final say on key policy questions. In public and private statements, some senior military officers have already advocatedlo reverse Ibe republics' steady usurpationarticularly over defense matters.
Political flexibility bat not wholly not tneKapubli ihe learii
! polilical passions. Nevertheless, full-scale civil war itriisiincl possibility and several reccnlIncluding aimed violence In Serb-dominated region! of Croatia, ihe growingof renewed Albanian unrest in Kosovo. Ihe near clash of Croatian nnd federal forces in January, and Slovene and Croat move* towardthe strong centnfugal forces at work in Yugoslavia.
Yuj;asU< Military Force*
We bclrcte the dual nature of Yugoslavia's military structureederally based army. navy, and air force and regionally organisedia forces, providesa Tor cm) war in the current crisis. For more thanears Belgrade has bucd il> rruliia-'y pohcy oa the doctrine of "All People'sshon coaventioaal defense agamn bp invading force followedrotracted guerrilla war. The regularateral force under the conunaaderb-Oominaicd officer ccrps. traditionally hat had ihe mission of conducting initial armored and air opera-lions agaimt an invader The more numerous bot tightly armed Tcrnioiial Defense Forces fTDFi,republic command, have been organized, equipped, and trained lot guerrilla warfare. As a
result, the keys to Belgrade's strategy--universal military training, mass mobilization, redundantand control structures, and widely distributedequipped the entire society for wa. and created two potential contenders.!
vc oecn suooromaicational auinoruy
forces
Historically, both tbe national forces and the TDF have been subordinate to national authority as<oli
now ranges from little to none, depending on the region of the country:
Forces in Monlcnegro, closely allied to Serbia, might follow orders from JNA officers assigned lo tbe republic defense ministry staff.
Both Slovenia and Croatia have severed command links between their forces and the JNA. In both,
allforces respond solely to republic authori-
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National Forces
The JNA consists of separate Ground, Naval, Air. and Air Detenu Forces. The Grounden,onventional armored force organizedull range of combai arms and support services, lis arms inventory comesariety of sources and the Army generally lacks modern weapons and support equipment. The Ground forces have limited logistic and communicationsand little, if any. offensive capabilityeighboring countries. They arc, nonetheless.
more heavily aimed, more mobile, and belter
and trained than the territorial forces.J|
The national Air and Air Defense Forces have0 personnel and are equipped withoviet and domestically produced fighter, ground aiuck. and reconnaissance aircraft. The bulk ofattack helicopters are also under Air Force control. Although almost certainly no match for the
NATOoviet air forces, the Aii Force ha*uck capsn that could be effectiveivil war'
Territorial Dffraw Force*
Despite repeated efforts by Belgrade in recentdisarm and degrade territorial forces,Sknteii and Croaiia.believeossess tabic military forcessmall trim and light aatlarmor and airRepublic-beard TDF forces prirnaiilyinfantry units organised byandful uf brigade-site TDF unitsand control arrangements forhave been only loosely defined In theory.would operate under the control ofuntil these command centers wereIroycd. Thereafter, TDF units would operatecombat units. Trained inTDF units wouldapable guerrillaurban areas or in Yugoslavia't ruggedthese units iick armor and air assetsonly limited rnobibiy.JNA
ho have come toroen^lsTuaHeVarmies, especially in mfli.ii rnVii minded Storms and Croaiia JNA leaden mcned last springisarm Ihe TDF, seizing weapons stocks at the republic level Tbesc seizures seriously depleted TDK arms stocks, although the degree varies in each republic. Since then. Slovenia and Croatia havein vigorous arms acquisition
As political tensions have increased over iheears. Army olhectt have grown Increasinglyb> tbeir loss of control over Ihe republics" *mtnary fates, andr those forces hasey issue in the crisis With lac itining power ai the federal government's expense, the Army hase- the TDFhreat to
Ing first noted federal Army plans foTransiorrn TDF units ininj'arca
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^Rin Octoberan wherebv the TDF would kssr iu military rote andivil defense force- lear attempt to eliminate thefighting capability More recently, with ihe com-pietc breakdown of federal control over Slovene and
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Wilkin the Military
We believe the regular Army has Ihe militaryto ocl against the republics, but political devetop-menti in reeeni months have undermined Its elTeciive-neas as an armed force Yugoslavia's longstanding system of parallel command structures atfederal and republic level, with bcUi the regular Army and TDF forces ultimately answering to the Federal civil no presidency, bas collapsed. Rising ethnic nationalism, and declining federal aul
iroops and raised serious questions about how long ihe Army would remain Intact in the eventivil wi asaBaaaWa
The Army, in our view, is neither unified not are its troops unquestionably reliable. TV sentcr officer corps is aorrunaUy balanced along ethnic lines and these officersan-Yugoslav orientation. Serbs, however, have long dominated the middle and lower officer ranks, making line officers, at least, broadly sympathetic to the Communist government in Serbia. Although Serbs make up onlyercent of the population. Ihey and their close Montenegrin cousins make uperccai o( the total "finer corps.
lethnie rivalries exist wlth-ranks bet ween Serbs and other nationalities. At lower ranks, the bulk of the Army consuls of0 coascripls whose ethnic makeup more closely reflects the oaosposirioa ofsociety Taeir principal loyalties are likely to remain with their own ethnic group and native(set:
We believe the discipline of enlisted men would be gravely tested by orders to lire on civilians or even on TDF units,imited military action, we believe the troops would inflict and receive ai least some casualties without breaking. For example, if the Army were used to seite Slovene draftrhow of force lo
Foreign Military Animate
It is difficult to assess precisely Ihe
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of supply,ssue Is highly. officers have repeatedly complained of outside plotting to destabilizeand cited the republics' acquisition of weapons as proof. In addition. Serbian media have made frequent, uniubsianiiated charges of foreign military and financial support for the breakaway republics. Under the circumstances. It is hard to separate fact from propaganda, but it is quite likely that erms dealers from Israel. Europe, and the Middle East have approached republic officials In Yu concluded agreements with some of t
flow of
foreign armsrale last year as Slovenia and Croatia began toore Immediate threat of Army intervention. Private Slovene groups covertly
pons last falll
and we believe the repubile fBi (IHHHM has been buying arms tammerclally an the gray arms market Croatian representatives directly solicited US and European military support late last year, and senior republic officials have publicly acknowledged their efforts lo acquire weapons In International arms markets. The Croats were rebuffed by Westernbut the Hungarian Government responded byontroversial salt of severalassault rifles Hungarian officials and Yugoslav press reports claim they may also have received Czech weapons. At leas' one report indicates some Croatian paramilitary force! have beeniecn*ith wrapons from Singapore andjW
The Yugoslav Government hat tightened its arms import regulations in response to the Hungarian arms sale, but its efforts to restrict theflo*rms are likely to haveimited effect. Belgrade'srebuke of Budapest may undercut further official sales to the republics. Weapons ihe republics may require, however, are readily available on the gray arms market where cuitomi regulations carry limit-ed force. Moreover. If conflict erupts, emigre groups elsewhere in Europe wtll almost certainly step up efforts to provide military support to theirin YugoslaviaH Wkm
clhnic fighting and restore order In Bosnia and Htrcegflvma ot Kotow, the units most likely would rcsponc to authority and enforce ihe government's policy as they have donetheuell outbreaks' of nationalist unrest, or. more recently, as they did to contain ami -Serbian protests us Belgrade Sustained or large-scale violence, as would probably occur ie fighting agamst Slovene or Croatian force, would, in our view, shatter ihe troops* discipline ^JBJRj^
With the breakdown of unit cohesion and discipline that would most likely accompany organized violence, the Arm* would probably fracture along ethnic lines, leadingholesale desertions and inira-unitSome troops probably would lake their personal
weapons and join ihe TDF or paramilitary forces in their home republics. What would be left would beump Serbian army. We believe officers and troop* sympatheticoercent oferbian TDF
'lose SO to eOiKrccni of lis active duty and ready reserve itrcafth FcOowine factions lira ttnn ol ihi force, miita loutrvi* war. We esUnste On Sr.ban TDF to be. If potwlunn the Sotnaa tortm-mem derpcra. tower, it it astlkrly lln Serbian TDF would reach iufutiinhorued uremia. EHoaive ferora in Slmcnli aadOOOCCroatia'1 itulilynrsemns could eventually eipanfl :hli
disposition and composition of ftdrrat and ifrpublic fereei
forces. the regular army's strikingcombat vehicles, andamongrigades and independent regiments deployed throughout the country. as politicalincreased inhese units were ordered toigh state of combat readiness. theyar footing in late january,lash in croatia appeared imminent, and they werefor immediate action in the face of early march demonstrations in belgrade. we believe commanders have mode particular efforts to maintain ihdrin the fifth military region encompassing slovenia and man of croatia (seehe jna. in our vircould quicklyosture threatening either republic.
many memoirs oj inosr einntca fha'X' the militaryfarce.
two regular army corps, comprisingechanized, and infantry brigades and four infantry regiments and support units are currently stationed in the fifth military region. croats and slovenesfor about one-third of the conscript force in the region. political leaders in both republics, however, have recently charged the military with transferring many members of those ethnic groups out of the
claims is exaggerated. iff the fifthrmy's most capable units and probably could seize key republic facilities, tuch at government buildings and communications facilities, within hours. remaining.
iheolice units under interior ministry control to maintain order in trouble spots like kosovo province, or. as they did recently in belgrade, to contain antigovernment unrest. interior ministry units in kosovo are bogged down, their capabilities undercut by slovenia and croatia'slast year io withdraw their nationals from the force. mocedonia. moreover, has announced plans to withdraw its personnel in the near future.
territorial forces. according to multiple sources, authorities in slovenia and croatia began bolstering their defenses late last year, organising new units and acquiring substantial numbers of weapons on the international arms market.strong tdf units, according to republic defense officials, lost only half their weapons during arms seizures by the jna early in the year. we believe the force subsequently has been retquipped with automatic weapons and light antiaircraft and antitank arms. slovene authorities boosted the readiness of their forces in the face of jna hostility last year, and we believe slovene forces remain on guard against the possibility of army intervention. special republic police and interior ministry units, armed withweapons, are guarding government facilities, and the republic's defense minister has publicly claimed the ability to quickly mobilize tens ofof armed men.
embrr tof was effectivelyby the0 arms roundup. in response, according to various sources, croatian authorities organlted aforce of ai0 built on local police and republic interior ministry units. multiple reports indicate they have acquired thousands of automatic weapons, and possibly light antiarmor and antiaircraft weapons as well, over the past several months. senior jna officers are so the development of what they term "illegal armed bands" in croatia thai the two sides
lost-minute0
reservists ti had just called to active service. we believe thai croatian authorities retained the weap-mi arm ik
miulil combine wilh (he remnants ol the regularfleC1 Mc military force.
ion of the regular Army would markedly decrease its military effectiveness. It probably would retain control over most, but not all, of its heavy equipment. Wilh ranks thinned by desertion, however, combatwell as combat support and serviceall be inefleclivc until they were reformed. Logistic support and maintenancewould probably deiiine, which would most likely undercut air operajjom by cither the regular Aimy or the Air ForccAj V
MUllary Stalemate likely
Wheiher localised in one or (wo republics or nation wide, civil war in Yugoslavia, in our view, would be bloody, disjointed, and protr acted, with ncilber side able to impose its win by force of arms. Republic forces could not prevail in filed. Uigc-scalc tallies againsi much more mobile and belter equippedArmy units, but the Army alio could notpacify the republicsuerrilla war.(he dimensions of the conflict, the regular Army is likely to bold sway over (hose aicas of tbe country in which iu military strengths can be employed effective) y. Control over (he northern plains,ibe na(iofi't principal cities, much of its industry, and the bulk of iu railighways, and tines of comma sica lion, would almost certainly be one of the Army's key oojectrvej and would probably be within iu grasp. We would cspcci the Army lo make forays againsi. or be in uneasy control of, major cities and to be bunting for republic units Republic forces,on popular support and active in the bills, idoub-tains. and lowlands beyond ihe reach of the regular Army, would attack lit unlti wherever possi
Conflict In Sloienia and Croatia Although ihe national Army would enjoy decided military advantagesonflict limited to Slovenia and Croatia, we believe the two republics havemilitary and nonmilitary means to resist armed intervention andolitical solution. Both Slovenia and Croatia have rudimentary republic
armies, based on their police and Territon.ilalthough the Qualify of Croal forcessuffer* from limited training anilemerier-ceO wu.'j'-^bhe two republics
of political steps lo be taken if cither to attacked. Including Immediair secession and calls on their troop* to desert tbe JNA. In addition, work itoppages. economic sabotage, and inter iu pi ion* of power and communications would be likelyH Mf
Even after iu transformationump Serbian army, the regular Army still would be stronger and better equipped (ban TDF forces functioning asarmies. Moreover, geography largely favors the regular Armyonflict against republican armies in Slovenia and Croatia The northernacross pontons of Serbia. Croatia,encompassing Belgrade and Zagreb, and reaching almostjubljana are sorts bit for mobile warfare and armoicd operation* (tee map) The extensive road network would restrict guerrilla operations of (he sort for which the TDF is trained, and the Army's all power eoukl be more effeciiveli
The republic forces, on the olher hand, would have (be au*anisgc ofedicated irregular forceefensive battle on home terrain, and we believe republic nniu would fare reasonably well, especial'- in areas unsuiled to armored operations such as the western regions of Slovenia and Croatia. Tbe regular Army is clearly more capable militarily, but it would find itself fighting guerrilla bands, an opponent entirety different from the massed armor formations againstas been trained to mourn defensive operations The Army also is heavilyon swinging phone linos for command, control, and communica lions, and these facilities would be especially vulnerable Moreover, taking and holding
Figure 2
Yuguslavta's Elbjik Composition
I" Prtent
MonifMirnav 13 "
S 9.
cities io hostile republics could bebut only at the risk of heavy losses. Urban areas strongly favor the defense; in built-up areas even armor is vulnerable to guerrilla at
A Wider War
With teniioiu running high within andocalized conflict between federal forces and the republic armies will take on the character of an ethnic quarrel and could spread rapidly to other areas Organized conflict anywhere and oe almost any scale is likely to trigger bloody, widespread coaninunal vie
We believe the Army would lack the capability lo assert umuluncoui military' control arrom the length and hroadth of Yugoslavia.ull-scale civil war. involving JNA operations against Croatia andintervention in ihe face of communal violence in Bosnia and llcrcegovina, fighting an Albanian uprising
iSUici mobile anrwt
1:
in Kosovo, and moving to control Macedonia, the military equation between the national and thearmies would be more nearly equal.difficulties, logistic shortfalls, and the presumed impact of desertions ami casualties would all tend to limitanpower limitations alone would tend to force ihe Army to choose its militarycarefully Moreover. Yugoslavia Isa country of hilts andthat restrict mobile armored operations in percent of the 1
Implication* for Europe and the United States
If conditions id Yugoslavia degenerate into civil war, we believe ihe combatants would pressure the United States and European nations to take sides and provide
military end political support. Croatian and Slovene authorities would probably repeat their requests for military assistance portrayine their struggle as one ot newly democratized, independent states against an aggressive. Communistivil war inalso is likely to reopen similar issues orand ethnicity in other Balkan stales.!
A Yugoslav civil war, in our view, would quicklyFuropean" problemoliticalnegotiated under internationalajor conflict almost certainly would leadubstantial refugee flows and raise inletuman rights concerns Emigre groups might become involved in an attempt to provide cross-bordersupport for their compatriots, and there is an additional dangerpillover of violence intones boring states, especially Greece and Albania.
CSCE members undoubtedly would iry to use the forum to help Yugoslavia through arbitration oreacekeeping farce. CSCE. however, is not currently structured to address internal problems and
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been use of its consensus rule, tbe government in Belgrade would be able to veto any of Ihe ioaoms decisions regarding the crisis.ajor conflict inbab!;'lead CSCE members to consider creating new conflict resolution mechanisms that could be directed toward internal matters and which would weaken the consensus rule by permitting CSCE emergency meetings to be held without ibe con lent of all members j
Appendix
Yugoslav Military Doctrine, Ground, and Air Forces
Military Doctrine
The presence in Yugoslavia of mutually hostileand republic armed forces is anhe military doctrtac that for years has underpinned Belgrade's defense policy Ofhcullyswrrowrsded by potential foes, and with limned money and manpower. Belgrade has focusedon mamtaininc credible defenses at acceptable cost. "Allerritorial defense doctrine predicated on the participation of every ciiiian in Armed or civil resistance, has been Ihe basis of Yugoslav defease policy for moreo decades.
The Army
The Army has been restructured and reorganized in recent years lo boost its operational hcalbility. but also, in large part, lo reduce defense outlays. In9 Belgrade redrew and (educed from six lo four tbe number of military regions and shiftedivision-based organization to one employing brigades as the largest independent combat formations The rational Army now consists oforps subordiaaied to four regional headquarters controllingank, mechanized Infantry, and infantry brigades; two mountain brigades; and independent Infantry,and antitank' regiments'fl
planners have presupposed Yugoslavia would be outmanned and outgunned in any attack, and they developed the concept of "Ail People's Defense'" lo take advantage of the defensiveeeded by Yugoslavia's rugged terrain. This doetnnelassic guerrilla war of attrition; wear down enemy forces through long-term, hit-and-run actions; seize the strategic Initiative by striking whenever andpossible: and fighi until the enemy's political will is broken.rmored for-nations and airblunt the initial attack and inflict mas imam casualties la cede* to buy time for mats mobilization Planners aasemc these forces would largely be destroyed and the brunt of the war would shift to reserve forces mobilized from tbe civilianhe Territorial Defense Force.
Yugoslavia's armed forces have been consciously tuied to provide the mililary capabilities required to make "All People's Defense" workable. The national Army has been equipped wilh tbe heavy weapons, air power,nd ecarabat suppoet serocea needed ti
-en lote-fense Forces necessarily have been organized to arm and integrate into combat formations the citiren-soldiers on whom Yugoslav doctrincultiiiiatcli relies to providecredible national defc
Tbb reorganization simultaneously has achievedimportant objectives. Militarily, the shiftrigade structure has enhanced the combat power available to corps commanders, better enabling them to tailor forces to specifiche owe further ensures the Army wouldignificant military forceomestic opponent. Politically, by divorcing military regions from republic boundaries, the Army hat further insulated republic authorities from control over theconomically, thehas generated manpower savings,jy^Wf ing resources for eerily needed equipment.
The Army has been ail severelyong term decline in defense spending fueled by theinability to cope with hyperinflation, declining production, and rising unemployment and foreign debt. Inears' lime, spending declinedercentercent of GNP inAs athe armed forces generally lagoears la the introduction of new arm* equipment The corrosive effects of financial short fa lb are widely
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'swnss. aaaae ustw US oast NATO ntiaiiraartv are ma nceufct caMioi tmiiio tin if
inww ofaiiuoai Tinio>
mandi and anud intiMiak-iuc
ttMitifi only ahn nvibiuialionl
evident Although the At my ha* tulislanlial heavy aims and equipment, inIfcmclyaming A]
idi men tat) foi
wsc technologies
Anna production, logistic support, and maintenanceixed picture Hundreds ot* depots around the country maintain trap* sappl) Items (forarms, ammunition, equipment, fuels, andn storage Idut> and rusnawfrarca We believe the logistics and maintenance systems ate adequatehon conflict but would almostbe substantially degradedrotracted fight. Weapons product inn facilities (sec graphic) arebin Yugoslavia has only limiied capabilities lo produce Ihe laical defense technologies and must rely on foreign licensing or
Territorial Defense Forces
The TDFart-time mililary organization whose capabilities lag those of Ihe Armyeace-lime strength consists of various caicfoncs of reserv-nii who have recently completed regular service. While the federal Army is orgamrcd and deployed In standard military formations, the TDF has the casiocal defense force0 Territorial Defense nnils. icaltend across Yugoslavia, arc organized on the basil of regional political structure" (republics, districts, cities, and lowns) and economic entitles (large enterprise* and individualarger TDFihe republic level- arc in brigade strength, have some limited mobility, andinimal maneuver capability. The overwnetming ma-tortty of TDF units, however, are small infantrycompanies, andnsobility. They are designedrovide pouii dcicfrK for specific instaUuhoRS andack up tocalora, and conduct independent opera-tuns behind enemy lines. The TDF alsoumber ol units trained and equipped lo perform speeialired tasks-river crossing, sabotage, and (he
Arms and equipment vary from unit to unit but are widely available, and TDF units generally would be well-equipped guerrillaorld War II-era German weapons or Soviet arms phased oui of Army service have traditionally comprised the bulk of the
Major Items in Army Inventory Main Battle tank*
Atmired Vehicles
BTR
Artillery
m gun
m gun
m
m multiple rocket
m howltter
m howitier,
Antitank Weapons
ntitank guided
tn antitank gunocket-propelled 0
Air Defense Missiles
SA-9
SA-7
SA-6
TDFs arms inventory, and we believe many of these weapons are still in tbe hundreds of TDF arms depots and caches around tbe country. Numerous reports indicate republic forces in Slovenia and Croatia, and perhaps other republics, have smuggled in modern automatic weapons and it is quite likely they have ati armor and antiaircraftas well]
i 2.
Figure 4
Major Weapons Production Facilities
Austria
OOilhts
AND
HERCEGoviNA Yugoslavia ^
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MAC-ZOOM*
ownnt
Worn voliii>o ddwi ram) mna% mm
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ronsw mas. nue pan mm ae Wd id one
on otntM tow. <caaw eiro tuilarnanrnir IIili fliWIi
nfi* ini* 'Ui mowidm idctmai
Estimated Territorial Defense Wartime Strength
Yugoslav Aircraft by Role
Slovenia
Croatia
Serbia
Bosnia Hertrgovina
Macedonia
Montenegro
Fighter*
FtshbedVl Fulcrumaleb-4
Jroo Mongol
A Caleb
Ground Attackraoraguj UTVA-TS
Attack Helicopter
oselle
200
Original document.
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