WEEKLY PBSUCCESS MEETING WITH (DELETED)

Created: 3/9/1954

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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Present:' Mr.of Stale);

' 3'

1. Mr-L ^opened the neeting with cosswntsaperfor coosiaeration concerning informant". It vis agreed thatof Kr. X, vho is in contact with hould not beat this tiwc excepttrictly need-tO-Know basis. that this contact fellague and shadowy field where it iswhen doe's such a. case* coo* into the tone ofureau ^suggested getting in touch with eputy the Department of State because i, cc^eaostilenas ocgun to talk. It is suggested that the Bureau be notified offor the protection of Kr.f_ Jand in order to prevent thentingafter false scents. If by any chance the Bureau has. at-the Department of State would not want to cross wires. It is ourthe Bureau vould not wish to assert total jurisdiction. froms cxtre.-aely interesting. Details are coveredreferred to. Since the line nay lead I

^throughwe ire too is the Pentagon's

f

how reliable and discreet is he. aper for Kr.

Jbased on reportsto be prepared.

2. stated that he and rir.f_ Jv-Mre there-to take

stock of the present situation, to determine where we stand now andthe future prospects. Are things going downhill so fast LiPBSUCCESS as it new stands may not be enough. Consideration nustto the much greater pressure which may come fron Congress andon the present Administration Lf the situation in Guatemala It nay be necessary to take more calculated risks thenthe end of the Caracas Conference we shouldlearer viewe-assessment of the situation should be made at adiscussion with the new Assistant Secretary of

Sni.th and Mr. Dulles. "Let Caracas run its course and see

what comes out of it". Ve agree to the need ofprogress reportschiefs of thist so that we may obtain additionalthe nig will not be polled frox un4er us in the future as occurred asked Kr.. anl "W

possible additional calculated risks. Kessrsf. Replied: (a) We night reconsider exploiting tha conclusion arrived at by Trujillo last year and transmitted to Perez Jimlnez that the best way to bring about the fall of the Arbenz government would be to eliminatef its leaders with Trujillo's trained pistoleros. (b) State night consider overt action along

the lines of no laore shipping to Guatemala, no mora oil, do more air re5servers

or transport, (c) PBSUCCESS program through Phase IV appears-insufficient

to do tbe job and it ia feared thathows the. hand. <said .that in hia opinion the "gut point" ofrwhoCuaWOa. City garrison eland, andhe could answer that

replied that be thought tho operation could be brought

onclusion byune; that theas complex but that weAgency has the capability of doing the job. The radio prograa is to1 April and the last part of it,error program, is basedWelles and is most effective.build-up by training, equip-

DODt,soiler under steam pressure; it cannot be stoppedgetsertain point. hr.rj epeated that the importantwhere does the Guatemala. City garrison stand, and

'knew.replied that PBSUCCESSomplex, top secret prograr. which

includes-ghost voicing, deception, wines, bazookas, and fire'ifficult to explain without tho wall tap and charts available at Lincoln. Thereot to be done but it is believed it can be done by June. While it is fine to talk about the OAS Conference and the neede-assessment of its conclusion, otica we getertain point we do not believe that we can stop the operation. Kr.f hisjch.aore. optimistic resume than we had airy reason to believe hased on reports so far".'

"We have not yet come to the point of any reasonable assurance

ofc

Kr.L J- "What, is the chance of U. S.

' "Thereno official esti-ute yet. Ka nave been concerned fronvery welnrong about keeping so ituch activityasket. There hasbeen one flap, although not the fault of anyone at this table.

havo to be concerned and would like to know what is the position of highauthority if things go wrong."

"Once arms are in the forward area, and according to present

plans uus vrill beUO days, wc are practically coconut ted. All thewe have are not adequate to ass-^re complete control fron that point on. pril we will be too far coamilted to call off the

r

lir-L *

lour job is to carry out instructions. You are to

get the job done-.

to Vir.Q jj- "Svcrything we do ncy ct plausibly denied if

unccverea" .

We nust bring our top-level people up to date one aionth fron"Watch out for conprOHising pieces of paper."

Hr.f_ Because of disclosures by the Guatemalan Covemaent and the appointmentew Assistant Secretary of State, st consider the 'broad'

approachhe viewpoint of the Denartrant. Weeneralroundeing given to (a) is PbSUCCESS the way to handle this operation (b) if it is the way to handle it are wc using all possible

noans not attributable to tbe United States to carry the operation to aconclusion. If attributable to the United States, it should not be

done. gh level State thinking is that an act which can be pinned on the

United States will set us back in ear relations with Lilin African countries

by fifty years."

s Oj>poscd to the elimination of

cadcroossible solution to the problem,that such eli'tdnation vas part of the plan and could be done. tltben said tbrnt tatockirjr off tl* leaders might make it possible forto take ovor.replied that it is an illusion to believe

the Amy lias control. The Ai-rjy is losing control to organised and armedpolice. evolution in Bolivia could be repeated, where fortine in Latin American historylabor defeated tbe Army. >tf. C that itot cert-tin that tho Ai-my has lost control. Kr. hech uurpriscdstatement about the armed strength p

of labor because according to an tebassy report of tuo weeks ago there is notraining of labor groups and it Bust be that the Embassy needs Sackingin its reporting.that our information came via RUfOS'

nets andhird country operation.Jthen asked is It feasiblebuy uo the top Arm*m'

nr. replied thisnto, but in hla opinion the cnauasca of defc-ccing^ Afe.ncwdelid Kr.{, praised" the

qucsU.orfwtat vould hoppen to ihe KbfUS forces who already have an*ss^cec-sf ol defectnside GjiatoTsalns overthrown. Jsaid hewas S.

When wo get to tho point ol

ecision wiere our action will successfully attributa to thetates. Government the supportevolution, it is our thinking at this tim? os that we should not get on with it. HeIs it possible to provoke anincident vhere OAS will intervene?"

Original document.

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