5ST0RICAL REVIEW
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
, Qg7^
No.
classification
FROM
i Wa
Chief,JAM
Chief of Station, Guatemala!
_J Info: usiii vton
SUBJECT:Program
c^tTtwill be handedJIRE by
Graham L. Page on4 and which ahould serve himeneral guide in further developing this operation. The main topics of thTbrief wore discussed with tJUTTlM} on4 in WSHJRNT.
8'athe USt rEferred to contains the names oftargets. As soon asevaluations have been received th*
names of individuals considered responsive to furSerto us stops hadto
factory^ee^eTsaSs.
D win bftollor-aode
Graham L. Page
Encl: as noted4
ncl
RYBAT/PBSUCCESS/peflff classification
4
In order to derive naximum benefit from tne consejo's aaaoclation with Clines laid down In our first two nee tings should be vigorouslyJwas told that we are weak in the capital and that at this stage wechoice left but to execute the plans of tbe Junta which call for adoubtlessly entailing prolonged bloodshed. ave hinted, asas possible, that this will be tantamount to turning the capitalMr. Castle, placing himosition of political ascendency frombe easy to dislodge him. Tou can afford to be more forthright inthis aspect than, for obvious- reasons,coinhcvever, leave no doubt whatsoever in C ind that thethe plans of tho Junta, as they now stand, practicable andconcrete assurances of support in the capital could conceivably leadmodification. Aa we see it, the issuesone in the so ice that vague promisesast-edhuto attempt toscales against Hr. Big, while acceptable, lack sufficient substancethe consejo's strategic concept one way or thea practical example, the consejo wishes to establishcommanders in the capital can firmly be depended upon to sideinsurrection. We are using the termompander in theeense, not ruling. the second in oommand or In broaching this toJ bear in mi ad Mat hobis question of whether our plans call for tho removal by forcetroop oomsnndors by their subordinates. This, ss you wells ticklish question, and we would suggest you play it by ear,fnswering it bluntly in ths affirmative. the "honor" outfit, whose CO appears irrevocably oo ami ft tod to the causeBig, this may become an acute issue. Too are specifically Instructed to
ask
he can recommend any d" fleers in sabordirwite positions in tlat
unit who can be counted upon in an emergency. As you knew, there are three military units in the capital with whose basic allegiance we are concerned. We wish to obtain "conerote assurances"ranking officers (not necessarily tbe commanding officers) ln those units.
etaff) stationed in the capital into roughly the following categories. A. Anti-^oamunist, but for certain reasons undecided and thereforeto make up their mindsay.
convinced their cooperation is to be enlistederious, well-planned and strongly supported enterprise, could be prevailed up oh to align
themselves with our cause. C. Anti-communist, in their own minds firmly committed to participate in
any serious attempt to unseat Mr. Big, Waiting to bo appr^ohed. You ahould point outhat wo are primarily interestednd that the consejo is prepared at any time to delegate an emiasary who vill contact tbe individuals involved for tbe necessary deliberations. Possible risks involved are primarily the dangerisclosure of our plans to the government and tho physical security of the emissary. The approach wouldeneral rule not be made on the strength of an introduction by
The payoff of this operation, as far as the consejo is concerned, aro "re-
cruitmentperational data enabling the consejo to map and
ecruitment approachanking officer, preferably an officer in comand of troops. Tour main responsibility at this stage of the operation is to sell f. ^on this concept. We cannot settle forshort of this. This should involve the disclosure of (ho identities the officers who, according tcre bound by special oath to defend th country. We are particularly interested in those identities.uay bridle at thia, because (a) such disclosure would in effect violate the oath, and (b) Mr. Castle may get hold of the information. We leave it entirely up to you bow you wish to handle this ma tter and what assurances have tc be given in order to allay L bear in mindthese identities would be invaluable to the consejo.
6. You are hereby Instructed to query ^ ^regarding ranking
officers'known Co him who are stationed In ths following garrison towns:
HAZATEKAKGO ^USZALTENA>>GO QUICHE SAM JOSE
For your information only: We are not too strong In those garrisons and are anxious to enlist some additional support. Any recruitment lead would be most welcome. The main criteria
some who can be presumed fully responsive to indoctrination by^himself. In other words: no independent approach by the consejo would be needed and we could just leave it up to
L andle; those dasea. We shall, of course, require
detailed information on what reaction was encountered on the part of the individuals involved. 8. The attached list of name3 pertains to certain officers in
whom the conaejo Is interested. You are instructed to question C ^about theniew toward determining where they stand and whether an approach is feaaible. thinks he himself can indoctrinate one orencourage him to do so even if thisrip to tho provinces. (Needless to stress, any travel expenses would be borne by us). Since some of the individuals listed may already have been approached in Castle's behalf, they in fact may aftere L ualms about Castle. Tell fc-hat for the purpoae of swaying them it will be quite all right if he stresses the fact that this is essentially an
American enterprise. Of course he will have to use his judgment on how ftr to go. he consejo is prepared tox independent approach If C riGlders thisand secure.
You are hereby requested to tell C J'..hat,tandinghe should collect all available date regarding:
obtained by the government regarding theactivites of the Junta, We arc particulariy anxiouswho has obtained this information and whatof the government was involved in collecting it. words, any informationy lead to theof governnent agents in our camp, would be of lready mentioned certain inf orrr.aticnthe Military Attache in San Salvador). For your Ruidance:
t- ill be prone to exaggerate thc extent of compromisein some of these disclosures. Your tactics should be never to share his anxieties, but tb point out that in anas vast as ours leakages simply cannot be avoided altogeti;
ernment planspe with art internalor an "invasion." No doubt the government has forbeen working on such plans, premised mainly on theof an "invasion." We do not wish to disabuse thethat notion. By way of illustrating the type ofhave ir. mind, mentionJ that certain shifts ofbeen rumored,trengthening of the garrisons
in Puerto Barrios and in Jutiapa. We wish to be kept posted on any such moves as soon as they occur.
We want you to keep after C o get the Informationurrent basis. It is of the greatest importance to us. Ke should beable to get most, of itho is doubtlessly conversant with the ideas of the government. Of secondary importance, but still useful, would bo political Information, even if unconfirmed or merely rumored.
lla Please reaffirmthat the plans of the consejo
are firmly set. lay rumors, therefore, suggesting behind the ecenes negotiations or approaches to Hr. Big, whether originating with esx-starved females or with unemployed army colonels can safely be discounted. As far as the United States is concerned, Kr. Big is in the communist canp and no longer susceptlbls to rational argument. The United Statesatter of considered policy le firmly decided to meet the challenge of cceenmlea ia Q. If Mr. Big laled to believe that the united States la wavering in its resolve, we shall do nothing to convince aim of the he willude awakening.
12, hathas communicated his views regarding localiand
concerted csmpesino uprisings to the consejo. The Junta is oonfident that it can effectively cope with sny cosssanlbt attempts to move csmpesinoespecially from the Eeqalntla area, to the capital. local uprisings, it is patently impossibls and mold lsadeedle so dissipation of strength, to keep them ia check. Everything in the conssjo't power will be done, however, to convince the esmpeslnoe that theof their social and economic status will continue under the new regime,
IS. Toe are requested to point out to"^hst the consejo Is disappointed at P's obvious indecision. The consejo is convencedill, (hiring the next two weeks, be provided with ample evidence of largs forces at work in sn attempt to overthrow Mr. Big and bis regime. The consejo trusts that under the impact of thoseill formally decide to join tho osussreedom. Until suoh time, the consejo wishes L o ess his own Judgment in determining to whats to be let in
hat the consejo Is workingrogrsmatio declaration, to be broadcast in the rerj near future to the officers' corps of the G The ooasejonxious to solicit C dvice on what to say and how to say it. Plesss debrief hist in detail on what his views are. Seedless to stress these views will never be attributed to hie. Ask bin specifically, what kknd of an appeal can be directed to those officers who are bound by special oath to defend 0. What us have in sdnd is toormula of appeal which will convey to all officers belonging te that group thatee of sn uprising against Mr. Big their oath will beoone operative. We realise that thisery delicate matter to raisendit will be up to your persuasion to have him see the light.
Wewe reason for believingnowsand that they are on fairly close teres. In fact, he soy be theoalluded on repeated occasions. Ba soybe the "friend" who urgedJto go to work on P. Ws would advise you to start off byoutine question regarding L hoegular army officer L 3. If you consider this politic, you can pursue the issue to the point of puttingthe blnnt question whether L lose snd trusted friend of his. Too might also drop, more as au aslds, the questionss ever tried to establish contact with the gringos. The consejo is definitely interested in *T
Original document.
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