GENERAL- K-PROGRAM - SPECIFIC - (DELETED) (W/ATTACHMENT)

Created: 6/1/1954

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

cia historical review program

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LINCOLN

hief of Station,ubject: general rograra

INFO: Chief, WHD, tegu

Attached herewitheport prepared by PAGE.

Earle N. Bannister

Attachment: report

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SMKA Rl.OOA

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Subjecti |7

The meeting ooay yielded soae data relative to the area shipment wbich were cabled to yon that samo day. There waa one additional pleoe of information which we forewent paaaing on baoauoe it struck ua as either incorrect or garbled.claims that the shipment0 cases of ammunition per rifle-.

SMILAX was involved four or five days ago in an incident with t

Both had been dining together. fs. drather inebriated state

accused SMILAX of being "may tiblo en deaarrollo en sunsultsand SMILAX according to one version reached for hie gun. Es had to I hinks that SMILAX was merely hitching his panto, ais very typical of him and which is similar to reachingun).Colonel olc L SKLLAXesta

mostrando may ineapax*. L Jon the baele of this information, ia wondering whether the Army High Command is laying the groundwork for firing SMILAX, but doesn't think that they ereosition to do it Just yet-

broadcast delivered by SMILAX had been written for hia (ESQDTREj thethat itovernmento special significance ahould be read

into his having delivered it. Being the he wes

the right man for the job.

l romised to naka another attempt at talking SMILAXeetingonsejo representative as soon as the opportunity offers. Be vill tell SMILAX in substance that it not intended to compromise hia or force hia hand, all the censejo wants him to do at thiss to listen.

ong talk withQ fter the letter's roturn from Puerto

Barrios. During this talk L eveloped certain theories on what might happen in

the futureiven certainhat rolebe

be culled upon to ploy. ound dorame ofand indifferent. In reference to the shipment and tbeits arrival in Guatemala,he would

have done in ifferent

the following remark* "Do you know what we are afraid of? That the Army mayus*.mentioned that the

had taken dynamite to Puerto Barrios which was later usedabotagea freight train moving the armaments to Guatemala City*

characterized thisather stupid way of doing business. "After all,have gotten other types of people to do this job forccordingmorale of the Army is very high, presumablyesult of

the arms ahipramt. C eels certain that these arms will never got out of the hands of tho Army. AKBFHZ understands the Army's attitude andare order them to aot otherwise).

r

he group

conspired against L s many as fifty officers met inon

that occasion. During the uprising following the assassinationwas

as supposed to take over

[

3 After the upr

Influence thatthe position

conduct yieldodreat many personal enmities. One of his

sworn enemies isa delegate to the

inriend of ARBfcKZ).

rosent Job without reference loau

result of skinful political manipulations and intrigue. Tho members

I 3feol that hla actions arc completely out of lino. He usos his pro3ant jobspringboard to the Presidency. In speochos before Congress be butters upInstead of sticking to his knitting. Tho constitutionon holding his position lo supposed to do. C the inside track for the Presidency,

confirmed this. To us

neens nothing; ho oonnts for nothing within ourSQUTBE Inferenceyou felloWidooide to bump him off, it's OK with ua". C 3ls afraid v.cconvinced thatwill sooner or later make an attempt to

have him und his friends liquidated.

s you have gathered from previousarm spot in hie

hoart forwho is one of bis closest friends. If there ia

ould bog you not tot ia s actively

lan to win over.ourut on tor tains few illnuiou

aa to tho likelihood of success. His reasoning is based essentially on the following estimate of the situation!

Army can be controlled through C nd SMILAX, onceto *

t j is removed, automatically boooaes

c J

of the cost icportant garrison commanders are undsia! ce C 3c0riend of J

work is being conducted mainly among L moro roason why it wouldn't pay to ^itagonlse Una him.

ao CALLIGUUS is on enemy of both>ind c

ln making any approaches would have to stress the importance of local

action ond mention CALLIGERIS onlyossibility "on Ihe horizon" if local notion should fail.

casting about for aa Issue enabling hie to win over & o the basic concept of an overthrow of the ARBarz regime, "but without revealing anything real to bin".

ef. What C 3 haa in mind la the following: C 3anto only if some external event brings home to hiaorcefulconclusive manner that the foroes ranged against the regimeand that Quatemale le Indeed ln Jeopardy.ho C- idthis in so many words, any conclusive mmlfestation of Unitedto do away with the ABB2BZ regime (something goingconferences and commnnlques) would furnish himonvenient pegto hang bis argument thathas to aaeert his leadership. What

t ss in mind osn beat ba illustrated by passing to" which he presented in full knowlodge of the faot that its implementation mightlane over Aurora racetrack at sayM when no one is around to get hurt andall0 lbs) In the center of the infield.

iscellaneous Intelligence

SMTI.iI accepted i

from ARBlMZ.

is the only man withtalks completely freely.

Colonel C friend) is assigned to the

C e holds no significantittle guy.o older generation of Army officera. Is an embittered man. HatesRemoved from that post, presumably at the instigation

of ARBENZ.

serves on the General Staff (see "

"Ea un lnrgazo, un tlpo comerclante"

report about aa alleged meeting betweenSIQLAX and

n the morning ofay is completely unfounded. No ouch meeting took place then or at any other time.

Field Comment! eems to bear out the belief of theStation that 3is peddling "snow".

U. Ihe next meeting between ESQUIRE andis scheduled for Wednesday.

Junen alternate meeting has been set forM. The results ofwith SMILAX may be known by

then.

* oBFKJits regarding some of the issues raised in this despatch will be submittedeparate memorandum. While your desire to see these exchanges brought down to brasstacks as soon as possible is fully shared here, the extraction of iron clad military commitments is predicated upon the prior resolution of rather involved personal and political problems which lt la quite impossible to detour. The weakness of our position in approaching members of the Army High Command in quest for active support stems os son ti ally from the fact that the interrelationship between them and CALLIGERIS has never been thought thru to its logical conclusion ond that the ad hoc formula devised by the field to take care of this situationather transparent expedient at best.

Original document.

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