HISTO-AL REVir' ^GMM
tmirmma mmarvoxm on Possible Modified Strategic Plans
1. n Bending you herewith theon the above subjectolunteered to do on the occasion of your laet neeting bore. It isentirely, aa yousee, on the report of yoorconversation elth VKmB aad ob ooternl cumrarsatlon In the meeting in VnXTXU's office. Ittherefore, add little to the towledge end eledo. you reeacimaly orderly form the line of thought that esavtad from those eoenwrcatlone end to crystallixa sore sharply tbe possibleln strategy which ve all undertook to study farther.
hould explain the states of this It was completed on fat* has WB read, but only hurriedly, by WOTTM end hie associates on thissaiewr to jjkt trnvt they are tn general acreiaaiit rtth theere expressed. On the other head, thisirst draft and there
awnosber of respects la which both tbeyould clarify it end improve it If a* wars aot lntarry to send it sloes to yon.
ran though ve are aot taking tine for any farther editing there are four points ofhsll mention briefly here, two of them are mentioned in the paper hat require more emphasis, ve aU agree, than they there receive. The other tao are really addWoncl to the
a. aa are grawely disturbed at what may turn out to be the extent of tbe dansme resulting tram the capture of sswtcc'S files. The reports ae haw* aaaa so far from sawkw sxpisss varying opinions as to the extent of this dsamns aat do net aa yet contain amy dear and deflnit evidence. Accordingly, aa foresee tba probability of considerable further daisy before the organisers aaa BbQb osn aove ftsvardistinct possibility that tba internal olTUlan arganiration sill have to ba largely rebuilt, seedless to say, theee cuusldainllone suggest that consldexQble further delay vlll be
b. He are smUoxly iavnwssed with the probable effect of increasingly etrlct aecartty controls being applied by tba tHBUBW governaent. We note that all private planes have bean groaned at one airport where they will ba easily subject to control. Me alao note the considerably increased difficulty of paaautiatloo through tha VBouOT/WBBXFS border and ths con-eeeseat increased reliance on penetrations by way of OTRCO. Tbls state of affair* not only imposes additional delays but strengthens the ease for testing oat the capabilities of CALLUBBUB' organisation to mount both Internally and externally based operations In the face of the enemy's pre-csntlons before committing It to ths major test of an attenpted rebellion.
gVJgjMto folio.Ud. IfidSe. Uni.
eport of thisthehaving lntanl better
fe sad* by CaliEHBTS or ourselves to try to datc^Trebellion.
cussed vith others here, that, If It la too late ln the same to dropt end find another leader, v* ahoall coosider trying to plueala bim to ililaaellsuihuiltl to aa ladivldaal of real coxpetence leeraialilj one of bis smUst supporters, brought into bis headgear teas to JaaWarn tia animtiB, adviser aad gagooder If gxcast conJd fUI thla role after eatlltraUan?)
iamiilset nf tbeIn Ths
could and would
for grrurtei that tha forward smeaante of eajalpaent and personnel nov In progreei vlll aot preladlee tba atredmgy dssislom. Bpecifssume that the severe! teams and tba shoek bwn wblah are mottof fcswaxd bo staging arena could an be asad foruiaadsset pperatlnae bastmrtng lanadlately. If thla
: scrnmrc lsaedlatoly.
aaai he musntsd from too staging areas eolacted aa the bases for aabo
far sabotage and IM
far more days for this reof strategy vithont la the
fll,al point let me esadieslae thatave said inoflaascad by OIWCXD policy eonsder*.
fbare that veUe .nr. that ve have tbe soundest
phsott suns aid *mmnmmm amssac flab job pbojict
f RSBCCKSS noalm too
PhMW, of four operation which
galnat the nreaent
A mjar FF offenalve.
ene cntnMo af WSBUEST,
of ftnl thft prorlsian of em for ano orannUatioocoeolr-oy At ^present tiao tbe firat of thai, otlooa la ao far to advance of any of the otbere that tha
T rwchedoint that it will bo tj5vlubc wwory to complete tbe other
ptaiauatury opera*tona. 3aa aaooad (trainingh..
an argftrrifji^icq, hoaatbaok of ao yet
reeuit of tba lag laioto VBUhBtt and tha cantaraan* tba ccaayarfw of at laaat
fourth operation,the one
anandat and that tha goaantlel, a*tar aay wlrtaalljexiata. Co tha other nasi, tbe criminal(ao acefct wlaely) for do effort* toonaplraay within tha ayajaj foreoo mtllmm fmaaitt into WTattm onlyayaay sal for no mens ot*lag witherter KBO'e wore ln place at aa ma laterthe aenethat haw delayed1 aaant ofOlreedy delayed, tbaof tba
mmMmMmaad la ccnammlcatlon wltt CkUJMBB rlth mm* nt^taDMalmmmZr.larvaa jit
. . -one para:
that thla mwertaltttg aa to tba tonot gnoxperted and woald have paralatad
firat by the dlacodera in
tiss7 ft enbanc incident have,leh; If all veil, hard intclllgonca con now be expected to ba aanllahin.
8. Aaabove, tho yjsssut strategic planreviouslyevolution which will loTolvai (a) tba defection of all or part of each of tba largur rarrlaosa (with tvo) the support of each rrroltlac garrison by an orgaalsad fare* of eraodaad (c) externally mounted IM and badba plan call* for tha do**of action aad of Using aaong tho arvaral aleaaata involved la each locality aod among alln tba country. In order to naxlsls* th* chance* offor thi* plan It haa aetaad tapartant toll assetsay and to try to prevent any violent aetlco vhiohrrrnaantart of tba rebellious farces nreamtnrely. It va* woveaary to depart from thi* general nil* tn th* sabotage attempt against the Alfhela's cargo. 1b* anssrtlon no* arl**a, however, as to whether it would sot be daairahl* to undertake forthwith sabotage and hm asaotlan* co, a*ola and to ante full ae* for tola purpoee of the external assets that bare been treined for SAB end PM operation*ny and of all elenent* of ta* internal civilian organisation that namln active after the captor* of dVNUBXC's file* haa had Its full effect. To pursueourse of action vould involve th* shaping of the internalto conduct longer tarn rwlBtaoeoho usualbJastiTva, methcdi, and organisation of true resistance It vould also Involve tha caarndtaant In advanceay of snot of th* external asaet* available to CALLIQSRI3ashion whloh vuold for the most part preclude their nee ln the eventllitary rebellion for th* ailoriginally planned.
3- So* following are per*ue*iv* argunsnta ln favor of this ooura* of action 1
In Tier of tba aft* cf tension and turmoil that haa already bean crested la VBBSBRrobable that on* of tvo jJwMpjB will ocean Zither there -illelaxation of tanaiOWallng off of temp* ior th* yiassiue will continue to kxjbo rapidlyoint which threaten* an explosion. Aaad cooling off will erect* aa tanreeaion In tba reglse, among tb* potential rebels, and in the general publlo that Arveas ha* *ur-vlved another aria is and Ms eneelae hare again deisonstrated their1and lack of organisation. inimum *ueh an ootoaae will dlasjaat* tb* effwota of tb* already successful pp campaign and. though It eight lead to sow* relaxation of precaution* by th* rmfim, wUl laor* all opposition fcj eventsl=id and dlaoouraeed state. If tb* cotrpLmcy against tb* reglae vara tightly organised and Its personnel subject to discipline (asypical Ccanunlet conspiracy) this outooae might sot be dlsedventageou*. But lt vould gravely Impair tba prospects of awhich will require, if
ttte totha quick andsupport af oany indi-
,aTCem tDB*haca aod cannot be builtoloaaly hnt *
ft* It lawd that success of anywill tarn oa tea behavior of the Amy. Aa atatadthe* tha Amy la strongly antd-Ooaaunlet
and is lisiisaalisjljelth Arbeas. aeverthelaea, tha ilfcaji'j of acst of the gett*gg tetoUlon* offleera on ehon
strength behind It sea tnat ftpod chance car success. It aey be that the urenalxatlffiml activities provided for in tbe preeeat
flan etllthis state of sdad and Induce easy
uffaaws to Join an rnasslail conspiracy la support ofs* the chance* of their ao doing vonld b* anch increeead by events vhich created th* liajila thedr adsd* that tba reels* *a* veak aadrisis *e* ajga'avftlag.pcrrUneons nllitary rssalllrsi by ilHaaiy tb* whole of tb* Amy acting on tb* initiativeQsabcr of it* *enlor officer* qalte Independently of say larger natlon-rldo conspiracy, and lijdapendoatly, too, of external leader-ship, aav he acre likelyjfi in/y caiiBDHOa. letpcBtaneou* nllitary rebellion vould surely be rendered bbv* likely by an aaws*af*aan1 ofndnourse of action vhichooatlng aanaa of ui**surs could esen likely to ianrovs th* chance* for either anllon by w
c. exlona defect of tba pmeenfc strategic plan Is that it allow for very little tta* tstsisa th* actual crgaalsaUoa of the nautary sal cirLUan conspiracy ln tba field and taa*
cfmmmmak liiaaiffita aiiovs little
A no ccc<Bteity Vhoduver to test out In actlw
. amiMiaiiiSl of extaer th* civilian iBgaalaatliii or the enttorml assets Intended for GAB andperation*, thlaof the plan la cwnpouoied by the cocnplexity of tl- operation called foray lt*elf and theof cults- precise eyn-
tb* lspedlate inception ofand
itlne? and their conductn anvaOA (if successful) both train andeaiateno* aorenent. la would both require and provide an oceanic* forpt iiiaaiiii
Of SUffJH tllll . and It VOUld certainly yieldaaoee a* to the Quality and roiiability at leant of tb* civilianaliewd to to availohle. Saw* an, of course, real dangers in any effortan*cceldereble period of
tlmo acgnanttatlca but It la Questionable whether anyii that cannot ataad thla test will hare the cspa-btllty to mount the operations presently planneday.
aaasj med)or efvsiitssas Boot, hcsvvsr, be weighedl SerS.tt*t totmd action
astswal assets and render
theaonejellehle for "apnrstloBS If andilitary rebellion
i^^S;tr5Lta*W' tht* this cost laeavy one for two reasons. Hut, If the sabotage teeaa that hst
JS^LS^"* into thi cowrtry, recruit noytlonal local persceniel, saim aoaend are .oosiislilj
tbey sill not be lost aa assets bat ecssiderablyMt mQJallty> Idaeelae, If tt la possible to set up tbroogh tha EEC's an InBroTed coammlMitlons net and to keen It futaAlonlng tn hostile territory, the chances of carrying
dissipated and rendered
dlltary rebellion rill be the personnel of the three IK shook forces, on tba tamest plan, theee vould be too
dectol"bajof these tbrso units vas latsadal to perfos
perform vfaat vould In
inland fron Pnerto Barrios),
> Tte principal risk that has deterred tho
detonatlMeballlw. fctnrally, if,to
S.ray, then ths sooner action Is detonated tba batter. If, hcavrsr, aa It la
bsbs, oo crganlaed conspiracy aa yet Arista, then a
aw of pressure In tha eosatry win bo anre likely to
ayofnoara to conspire with one another than to indue-
overt reballlcn, at least until shad been
To be sure, if tension remains
of PTcmtura action. Bot this la Inherent ln any revolutionary
higheeleesae of crisis develops, there vUleal risk
re acHm. An*. .
re tightlyO prospect of creating ina high degree of organization aad
discipline, geaaddbnfo tba choice ta betveen falling to create tt aecaa of crisis vhlch alone gives promise of success aadisk of
fJ? aoaaldaratioas, tba beleooa ofprasso^aasao of ^im tar sab^ac.aod
aiBBataBsoBsly to eppraoeh dafectabl* ailitary Isadora aa pWrd for tba parooaa ofilitary con-
9mJBa^ oatltaaa of this sodlfled strategy requirefurther elaborationar ao&testloos mmj be In order aa to its LeSlasentatioo ana Iratlnua*
a* fteiaaabXj' tba onlyhi laaafHaliiy amiiahla to undertake
beraaalog sod sabotagere tboaa nortXFB. ngly, the firat phase of tbe revised strategic plan soolderiessttcb voold bava to be acnntsd from UBBDCTB.least Use es it hod beea possible to lay the foundation, vlthlaaasdasobai aetlee
of ths recoil nam itsaring actives*ea to be far eaisasr aad more reliablethan are nev available aad expendablefor moving
To coot the firat of these needs, tba BSC* should prsessably asm foraard en soon as it baa baas pnssrTMs to identify civilian leader*
mm bare not beea conprxertsod Sawagbllea. he orsaolsers soaM move at tha easa time end their mission vould
beaodiflsd end expended lsto theft of Initiating necessaryJ* laae* aaal! Quantities of^Sart,
tho^provisioa of shelter for BAB teams to esabl* then to operate eithln
1 hia, the RBO. The cootisBung task af the residenteoaldbe to recruit addittosal Ucel parscannU forra-
tine of an open rebellion, flm fasMlilaeijii tveil be jiaajttle aad iharlieVle to supply ay assy of air drops.
eight of that the ebolaeainl sad, carrying oat seeot eould sot be a* la vartloe to Interfere the supplyostile military foroe or
that would otherwise be available
actfve taeas operating la aahe civilian leader la that area,
_ _Mjwf , nAlU
. ublic taw atCQt of aad tba inability of tbaoopa with it, aad ahova all, to oonvlnc* tba armyeaderovsavat of crisis aaa approaching. all IT ofajsetn**. The success of anylfie opcratloDbe measured by taa lien to whloh it produced ala tba ecnatry, oaaaed aoftlalano* likely toby tb* public or tb* amy, gar*
ion af th* power of tb* nuderuroond opposition, or teaied to break tha asrv* cf th* adadn-*tretlca. xargvte abould b* wary carefully selected withest* la mind. Operations whichla considerable Mfw4an*dt or vhich appeared to be venton acts of deotruotloB, or which seriously dsaaasd the property oflocal oltlsens or Injured tb* prid* of tb* arned force* would be apt to prodno* tb* exact reverae of the desired result. Above all, It vould be important toituation in which the pride and honor of tba amyto be at stake la itsto put down internal disorder.
ith thi* last ob>*Civ* inaapalgn of internal harassmentistanoo ehould be accompaniedP prceroa aland aainly at tb* amy.bly its thaae should be tbe unity af interest between tb* resiatence and the amy in their common de-Sim to oast tbe enawstnista. Another supportingight be theged evtstene*arge conspiracy within tb* amy friendly to and explleltly allied vith tb* civilian reel stance avians tit.
a. Couourieutly with the developmentrue internal resistanceament and vith lei easing operations, tha effort toilitary ouueplmey should go forward as rapidly a* possible. Far security mesons them should probablyinima*
,7 T 'nrwiin procanirinimiilitary officers and the odvlliaa resistance mcveaeat. Oartelnly, since tb* sain objectb* to defertlnStiry ctffioam^pJaeeT
amy is ecrreet,very advantag* in hen
op into a
cr kncuiedleeble of hncels^ if Ourin*tes of th* temper of tb*
baring the military
n enaao* that it would cerhSCtUJOSiaa* srny mbalUon end there lanitiated in this way would
wicmi oojaeuxus la not to brl
*n or any
Of tttlB militaryense of alliance with the
f. Tba revised strategic plan bare suggested vould have obvious tagdloatlaoa Tea- tba timing of PBSOCCESS. If it vara highly aaaaaaafal ona can hop*ense of pressure and crisis vould build ap fairly rapidly, andpontaneous military reran In*be liilmml vlthln the near future. In this event, of eoaree, there would neveray organised aad detonated from oatadde the eoantry. Bat If oppoaltlon vlthla the army Is still snsammiliMii'g*nlMiT, if so rebellion tomes abouteel rasTeteiaa msvemsmteal military coaapixaey has beea organizedlan of synchroniaed action developed aad put into effect. It Is difficult to avoid the lanreeaionay vould have to be postponed until atomber of vesica after that presently contemplated.
ofUafor the timing
Xf assetex* and
a. If sabotage aod harasssmnt operatlooa vara highly successful, and If ln fact tb* ermy is rip* for rebellion and la reasonably unified, one can hopefnd erlals vonld build up rapidly andpontaneousrebellion vonld be Induced vithla the near future. In thi* event, of course, thereay organised and detonated from outside tbe country. But it, as veil nay he the situation, opposition toithin the amy is and rnaulne uocrystelised and unorganised, it must ba aasuaud that no successful rebellion will cone abouteal nllitary conspiracy oaa been organised on the Initiative of CALLKOTtrs and his supporters cr on that of some other leader or group of officers vith vnem contact cen be established. Moreover in the absencepontaneous military rebellion, it will be desirable to have the supporteal resistance movement and nearly eeeentlal to have atoanunt ration* systea. far purely operational reasons,t seeee unlikely that th* preparatory build up for an externally directed rebellion could be completedlan of synchronised action developed, communicated, and put into effect, until atumber of weeks after the date originally contemplated.
b. It should be emphasised that, even if the remaining steps in the original strategic plan vera carried out withoutan the schedule previously laid out, some weeks poetpoanmast vould be necessary. The organisers seem not yet to have gone fervard as of the 1st of June snd th* HBO* have not even started forward. Presumably, tneae man vill have to welt atew nor* days until tb* extent ofmpi umln resulting from the capture of SMABTXC'e file has beenamelyed. Accordingly, they can hardly be in place with lessonth's delay behind tb* originally contemplated date. A* pointed out above, the original plan left very little tine far them to do their work and to ccaenmlcat* back to LIBCOIJ and ta GALLIOffllS firm, first hand estimates of the extent of the defeotlcn to be expected in each garrison. To try to teleaoope further the time allowed between the arrival of tb* organisers and RBOs at their stationsay vould gravely preyadlee both tha chances for tb* success of tbe operation and the availability of the intelligence on vhichinal decision can be made to launch lt. The conclusion appears Inescapable, therefore, that something closeonth's peotpenenmnt is unavoidable even la the absenc* of any change of the strategic plan.
o. Th* proposed aodlfled strategic plan dlffere free the original plan in tvo respects that are relevant for timing. First, lt callsore careful build upeelstance movement and for tho actual carrying out af sxternally and internally based harassment and sabotage operations prioray. Second, lt envisages the need for more time than allowed In the original plan toilitary conspiracy and farfirmer Intelligence on tbe state of the military conspiracy priorinal decision by any external headquartersIBCOIS, or heed quarters) to touchebellion. Accordingly the adoption of the modified strategy would probably require aoaevbat longer postponement of sn externallyay than that already rendered unavoidable by the delays that have been experienced to data.Original document.