USSR: JUNTA FACES FORMIDABLE CHALLENGES

Created: 8/20/1991

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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Special Analysis

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Faces Formidable Challenges

The beharior of Ihe coup leaders and Ihe limiled public support other members of the Soviet political elite hare so far given them suggest they face significant obstacles lo consolidating iheir power in the near term. Although Ihe coup iras preceded by much interaction among reactionary political, military, and security leaders and by some preparation of selected military urths^theriievidtntly was no broad orchestration of extremist forces. I

The coup leaders must now weaken and isolate prodcmocrocxlforces, prevent mass popular resistance, gain the compliance of republic and local authorities, and maintain cohesion in ihe armed forces arid security services. The needs lo avoid disrupting the harvest, cncigy production, transport, and food imports limit the coup leaders'maneuveringtrategy of massive intimidation with bloodshed might stun the opposition, but it also could easily backfire, inciling resistance and leading to militarytrategy of tailored repression might avoid radicalizing the general population, bul it would give ibe opposition time to organize.!

Repression Limited So Tar

Coup leaders appear lo betralcgy oflimiicdarc seizing conirol of the media, moving to restore fullihe security forces, demanding the compliance of officialsndlate of emergency in some regions,

in the Baltic republics, Moscow, and Leningrad so far.

Coup leaders have not yet arrested republic leaders, bul they are moving lo shut down the Bailie governments altogether. Although they arc banning strikes and political demonstrations, they arc trying toensitivity lo political legitimacy by pledging to submit ihe slate of emergency decree io the USSR Supreme Soviet, which is io convene next Monday.

Success Unlikely

llic coup leaders arcifficult position. They arc living to parlay the popular desire for security and economic improvement into Ihe support and legitimacy they lack. By undertaking limited repression, they have given Yel'tsin time to brand their action unconstitutional, lo call for civil disobedienceeneral strike, to demand lhat

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be allowed la address ihc Supreme Soviel, lo appeal lo servicemen lo disobey orders lo shooi dcmonslraiors, and lo ihrcaicn io prosecute lliosc who comply wilh ihe coup leaders* commands. Yel'tsin also hasecree demanding thai Interior Ministry, KGB, and Defense Ministry unils on Russian territory obey him. Major strikes in key sectors of Ihc economy such as mining, civil disobedience, and confrontations bclwccn the public and security forces arc likely and will jeopardize Ihc coup leaders" hopes of quelling resistance while restoring economic "order/

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the coup leaders sense lhal time is working against tltcm or thai they have gained control of the levers of power, Ihey may lurn very soon to more violent repression.ove is unlikely lo prevent an escalation of resistance in ihc Russian Republicmosi other republics outside Central Asia. 'Ihc most likely scenarios now arcapid collapse of ihc coup or an extended struggle of popular rcsisiancc againsi armed slrength, with the oulcome depending on the loyalty to the center of the armed forces. Under the latter scenario, the chance lhal divisions will open in ihc Soviet armed forces is quite high. Over the longer term, Ihc coup leaders probably will not succeed inurable authoritarian regime able lo stabilize the economy and introduce even modest economic inform.ilic coup will accelerate Ihc breakup of the union.

Original document.

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