USSR: FALLOUT FROM THE FAILED COUP

Created: 8/22/1991

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Special Analysis

From the Failed Coup

MlCl'IOYrs IUI

coup's failure will accelerate the very developments in Soviet society that the plotters sought to reverse. It will shift power to democrats front traditionalists and to republics from the center. In the near term, it probably will exacerbate the USSR's profound economic and social problems, bat it may lead to veaeefal^emocrutic progress toward 'heir in the longer run. I

lCl<1QYrs IUI

coup attempt and the way it was defeated will significantly reduce Gorbachev's power, which has depended greatly on the buieaucritic clout of the central institutions and on the perception that he alone has been able to protect democrats and traditionalists from each other. The center will now be limited primarily to security and foreign policy, and even there it will have to share authority with the republics. The coup's failure has thoroughly compromised the extreme traditionalists, has sharply diminished Ihe political influence of the Defense Ministry, the KGB. the central economic bureaucracy, and the Communist Parly apparatus: and has undermined the "broker" role Gorbacbev had played. Questions about his own equivocal attitude toward the reactionaries over the past year and popular awareness that he himself appointed the key plotters lo office arc likely to further reduce Gorbachev's public esteem. Yel'tsin's role in defeating the coup and his enhanced political authority guarantee thai whatever new accommodation he reaches with Gorbachev will be largely on Yel'tsin's Icrms.|

Domestic Impact

rs IUI

APPROVED FOB RELEASE DATE:1

defeat of the coup will not eliminate traditionalist foot-dragging and resistance lo reform, but it will eliminate hope of political revenge. The immediate question is the severity of measures to be taken against leaders who sided with the junta. The institutional missions and prerogatives of the military, tbe KGB. and the Interior Ministry are likely to be further constrained. At the national level, the coup failure probably will acceleraie the adoptionew constitution and the subsequent elections for new representative bodies and the Presidency. En Russia, it should significantly strengthen Yel'tsin's abilily lo get his way with the republic's legislature, lo dismantle Communist Party conirol at the local level, to enforce compliance with Russian law. and loarket economy.

continued

IUI

^Wkcret

Z2Au(UiU9vS

rs (CI

cMIYrs (Ul

rs (U)

that wish to remain in the union will be better able to expand their autonomy, and republics that wish to leave will be further resolved to do so rapidly. Even if its language is not renegotiated, the draft union treaty's adoption, implementation, and further codification in the future USSR constitution will narrow the powers of the center and strengthen the republics. Russia's role in defeating the junta will weaken the center's ability to gain leverage by playing off the Central Asian and other republics against Russia. The center probably must now begin good-faith negotiations with the Baltic republics and may not be able to avoid granting them independence fairly soon. |

The demise of Prime Minister Pavlov's leadership leaves the center without an economic policy and in full disarray; such problems as ensuring ihe harvest and coping with fuel and energy shortages are rapidly closing in on Moscow. With the coup's failure, however, the (low of economic authority to the republics will accelerate, and control over some economic decision making may simply dissipate. The transfer of economic power to the republics will facilitate market reform in some areas, particularly Russia, and will produce steeper military spending cuts; bul this process is likely to intensify the republics' tendency to act independently of each other and probably will hinder the elaboration of common monetary and fiscal policies. The economic crisis will deepen and will increase the Soviet need for Western aid, credits, and food imi

1 (U)

.IfxMIYrs

on Foreign Policy

With the defeat of the coup. Gorbachev will have more freedom to pursue progressive goals in foreign policy, but he will have to accommodate new pressures from republic leaders, who may push him even further on key issues. They will favor additional efforts to secure Western aid delivered directly to the republics, arms control agreements that encourage further defense cuts, and regional policies lhat enhance ties to the West and more quickly reduce the burden of Third World commitments. The republics may also push for greater participation in international forums, which the center may accept. In such areas as the withdrawal of troops from Poland and compensation from Germany, Moscow still faces social problems associated with the return of Soviet forces, but compromises may be easier now for Gorbachev.r

rs (Ul

rs IC1

European Views of Gorbachev and Yel'tsin

West European politicians and media are hailing, Gorbachev's return to office, and interest in his political future will remain intense. Bul European leaders view Yel'tsin's statusore relevant gauge of the USSR's future. Europeans are likely to attribute the defeat of the plotters and the restoration of Gorbachev mainly to Yel'tsin's actions and thus will see him as the decisive force in the country. Europeans probably still fear that the USSR facet prolonged turmoil, and in the near term tho will be inclined to witch how the Yel'tsin-Gorbachev relationship develops. They probably will see little alternative, however, to competing for Yel'tsin's favor and significantly increasing parly and government tics to the republics.

rs IUI

ICl<1BYrs IU)

Original document.

---

---