Yel'tsin's Political Objectives (u)
Yel'tsin's Political objectives (UJ
Key Judgments
Information available as of1 was uied in this teport.
Boris Yel'tsin's goalsoherent Russian democratic alternative to the imperial authoritarianism of the traditionalists. These goals include promotion of the material well-being and moral regeneration of the Russian people; an approach to marketization that is little different from capitalism; constitutional democracy; national self-determination; and insistence on nonviolent solution of societal conflicts. Yel'tsin understands how these goals are interrelated and what their implications are, and he has Integrated them closely with strategies of implementation. Moreover, in test situations he has consistently pursued them in practice, even at substantial political cost. The often-heard charge that Yel'tsin is an unprincipled opportunist whose future behavior Is thoroughly unpredictable is not borne out bytions. |
Yel'tsinajor part in turningituation that looked grim in January, and he has made significant steps toward realizing his strategic objectives. Be has helped avert repression of the democrats by Soviet military and security forces and has initiated processes that may in time give the Russianhare of control over military and KGB elements based in the Russian Republic. He has overcome traditionalist resistance to creation of the post of an elective president of Russia and looks nearly certain to become the first such president. He has also had some success in beginning to build Russian Republic power in the economic sphere. Finally, he has apparently managed to maintain momentum inorizontal" ties between the RSFSR and other republics despite differences of political and economic Interests with various republics and their leaders. |
Once he is elected president of Russia, Yel'tsin will seek to move ahead with rapid marketization in an environment of accelerating economic chaos, social turmoil, and political struggle with the Communist Party apparatus. He has expressed interest in the talks now under wayajor, "Marshall Plan" type of Western assistance package in return for radical economic reform and might welcome IMF conditionally that placed some of the responsibility for
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painful steps on someone else's shoulders. He is certain to Emphasize that aid should be channeled primarily through the republics and to specific projects, not open-endedly to the center.
Yel'tsinundamentallyunion because he believes this is inBut his approach to the union is also groundedjudgment that non-Russian nationalismealitynot disappear, that attempts to suppress it willand that such attempts willto the RSfSR and have other pernicious
Mlel>ll<7IYr3 consequences. The "order" and *'stability" projectedGorbachev's vision of the unionYel'tsin's
unstable because it denies the striving for national self-determination. True stability now will coma onlyenuinely voluntary association of republics, and this inevitablyajor devolution of power andce of secession for those union republics that want
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to handle nationalism isardinal concern of the central and Russian governments. The problem is how toourse between the reimposition of repressive imperial rule and the possible *'Lebanon!zatlon" of the Soviet Union.ey aspect of this problem is the "autonomies" issue in the RSFSR. This spring, in attempting to stop Yel'tsin, Gorbachev and his allies were preparedhile to apply to the Russian Republic the "divide and conquer" tactic of exploiting minority nationality aspirations already practiced by them in the non-Russian republics. By promoting tht possible separate membership of current "autonomous" ethnic components of the RSFSRuture "renewed" union, they were in effect calling into question the territorial-administrative integrity of the Russianinvitation to endless ethnoviolence. At the moment it appears that Gorbachev and Yel'tsin may haveompromise political solution to the problem. Gorbachev himself may either have come to appreciate the danger of playing with fire, or simply have been forced to give in to reach accord with Yel'tsin and other republic leaders onpril in the *'nine-plus-one" agreement. Nevertheless, the "autonomies" issue willossible source of major trouble in the RSFSR for the foreseeable future.
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An even more explosive dimension of the "Lebanon" problem for Soviet leaders is protecting Russian and other
minorities living outside their "native" republics. Success or failure on this score will go far toward determining whether endemic communal violence is the future of Eurasia, or whether there will comeore peaceful dismantlement of the empire and the establishmentelatively large and stable successor formation to the present USSR. One approach, toward which Gorbachev has leaned, is the wager on external intimidation, provocation, and limited intervention. Yel'tsin argues that this tactic will not work, offering instead an approach based on legal protection of minorities through treaties signed between republics. Such an approach, which accepts rather than denies republic sovereignty, offers at least adealing with the ethnic minority problemay that does notycle of repression, retaliation, and flight of refugees. The costs of miscalculation and failure here are very high indeed, for the West as well as Moscow.|
How the process of arrivingew division of power in the USSR comes out will be determined above all by negotiations between republic leaders and Gorbachev begun onpril, which are intended to lead to signaturenion treaty. These negotiations represent the most recent and important elementtrategic retreat by Gorbachev to positions that may permit him to defend his type of union and the "'socialist choice" more effectively than would continued adherence to inflexible unitarism. Gorbachev apparently made this latest move because he had become convinced that he would have no chance of preventing economic disaster and social upheaval unless he obtained cooperation from the republics and aid from the West, while Yel'tsin came out somewhat ahead, perhaps, in the Joint Statement ofpril, much of what he claims to have gotten from the talks took the form of promises not recorded in the text. Gorbachev has not agreed with Yel'tsin's characterization of the talksorm of *'roundtable" negotiation, and Yel'tsin's success will depend greatlyon the results of the hard bargaining that lies ahead. I
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Yel'tsin's Political Objectives (U) introduction
More than any current leader, Boris Yel'tsin has inspired passionate feelings of approval or reprobation among Soviet elites. His supporters see him as tha best hope for democracyeaceful dismantling of the Soviet empire. They acknowledge certain personality flaws, his socialization in the authoritarian milieu of the Communist Party apparatus, and his penchant for impetuous action at home and contretemps abroad; but they point to his capacity to learn, to maneuver skillfully in the new Russian parliamentary arena, and to assemble and listen to
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and advisersthose of
Mikhail Gorbachev. Yet, even among those closest to hln programaatically and politically, some are bothered by what they see as his readiness to compromise unwisely. Others have doubted his commitment to democratic values and detected lurking authoritarian tendencies. Yel'tsin's pastommunist Party boss, and fear of an unhealthy yearning to: a strong leader they attribute to the pubUcat weigh heavily on the thinking of thia group.I
Detractors criticize Yel'tsin as overlyvolatile, intellectuallyopportunistic, and lacking in any stable policy
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llOlkWiTrs orientation besides opposition to the powers-that-be.that haloset Russian chauvinist who will reveal
his true colors once he has the opportunity of replacing Gorbachev. Most of his critics characterize as "'demagogy" what is seen by large numbers of ordinary citizens as that rarest of qualities among Soviet politicians, the capacity to speak the truth. Weighing heavily on the thinking of detractorsossible future of popular upheaval and anti-Communist retribution they believe they see reflected in the image of Yel'tsin.I
Most of the journalistic and analytical attention devoted to Yel'tsin has focused on his personality, his conflict with Gorbachev, and his tactical maneuvering; his larger-than-life persona and remarkable political odyssey invite this. Yet, important as the personality and behavioral issues are, no less Important are Yel'tsin's goals andtend to be overlooked. The present paper takesiven that Yel'tsinomplex individual who is personally ambitious, egocentric. Impulsive, perhaps Insecure, and sometimes 'difficult to deal
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with, and concentrates instead on his political objectives. Contrary to the stereotype, Yel'tsin does have goals that he has been consistently pursuing, and strategies for realizing them- These are important not only because they drive his actions, but also because they reflect in broadoherent Russian democratic alternative to the imperial authoritarianism of the traditionalists
Goals
public statements over the past year, his political behavior, and intelligence information suggest that he has beenour or five major interrelated
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Russian Welfare
Yel'tsin's paramount objective has been to promotewell-being and moral regeneration of theliving within the boundaries of what is nowRepublicis brand of Russiannot seek to impose Russian domination onor on the other republics, nor tothe non-Russian nationalities living inethnic regions and elsewhere in theit does imply the incorporation ofwithin an integral "Russian"promotion of Russian welfare means rejectingof empire; where conflicts of economic interestrepublics are concerned, it opposes republics at the expense of Russia, internally,of Russian welfare means more butter, fewer
externally, it implies integration with the West.j
Effective Marketization
Yel'tsin's record of supportapid approach to marketization involving major privatization and not simply "destatization" is clear. He backed the Shatalin Plan, and he helped push through the Russianaw on landownership,not as radical asajor breakthrough. He has been campaigning vigorously for the establishment of private farms. He has avoided bashing the co-ops ands supporting the legal reform necessaryarket economy, and has encouraged the creation of free economic zones in various parts of the RSFSR. He hasventures with the west. And he is currently pushing, with Chairman of
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the Russian Council of Ministersenewed radicalinitiative keyed to entrepreneurship. I
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Political Union
Yel'tsin's critics, who accuse him of seekingthe union of Soviet republics, are both rightYel'tsin believes that the existingby the present power structure in Moscow andeconomic and security bureaucracies, is based is incompatible with the welfare of RussiaSoviet nations, and is doomed to extinction soonerby the dynamics of national self-assertion. Heliquidate this union now. But, he also favors creatingpolitical union that meets certain conditions.block of this structure is thewhich voluntarily agrees to associateother republic/statesompact formed bylegitimately elected governments of theunion is formed "from the bottomhe powersunion authority at the center are delegated to it bystates and are carefully delimited. The naturea union, implicitly, is basicallyhas avoided this terminology,
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Prom Yel'tsin's perspective, establishing democracy in Russia and the union requires first dismantling the still-existing totalitarian political structures and defeating the traditionalist forces thatintent on destroying him and his pluralist allies. Yel'tsin's subjection of himself to three elections already is prima facie evidenceommitment to democracy more impressive than that of leaders who have avoidedest. Yel'tsin has, to be sure,eadiness to exploit the opportunities provided by an embryonic parliamentary culture to weaken his opponents, but probably not as much as others--such as Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Anatoliy Luk'yanov. The special provisional powers he sought and obtained early in April, which his enemies claim areave controls on them and are not comparable to those enjoyed at the union level by Gorbachev. And his approach to reshaping the central and local government of Russia indicates an appreciation of the need to balance strongereadership and hierarchical authority with enhanced democratic checks and balances and institutionalization of the rule of law. '
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Nonviolence
Ctosscutting his other major political goals is Yel'tsin's systematic commitment to avoiding violence and seeking consent in the solution of societal problems. Trom his standpoint, state violence and intimidation generally have highly counterproductive effects. |
Strategies
Yel'tsin has pursued strategic objectives that follow logically from the goals sketched above. Grouped under the appropriate goals, these strategies are as follows:
promote Russian interests:
to reconfigure the unionoluntary basis.
a federal solution to the problem of "autonomous" ethnic components in tht Russian Republic.
ownership of natural wealthominant degree of government supervision of the economy from the center to the republics.
resources from military spending to consumption.
--Reduce Russian Republic transfer payments to other republics and channel them directly to recipient republics rather than through the center ln order to enhance Russian negotiating leverage.
foreign policy initiatives to the promotion of Russian "sovereignty" without feeding foreign suspicions that the Russian government is "breaking up" the union; emphasize the economic component of foreign relations; and concentrate geographically on three concentric fields of activltyi the other republics of the USSR; East Central Europe {includinghina, Japan, and South Korea; and the united States.
promote marketization:
the central command-economic bureaucracy through fiscal nonsupport and avoid re-creationimilar structure at the republic level.
taxation and other financial mechanisms to steer the economy.
rapid privatization of production propertyegulated and democratic process rather than through spontaneous arrogation of property by Communist Party officials and incumbent economic managers.
government price setting exceotery small class of goods; rapidly allow market-determined prices.
foreign sellers to enter the domestic marketeans of combating monopolistic pricing.
to retain existing interrepublic production ties and expand the "common economic space" by distinguishing between economic union and political union and encouraging the former without requiring the latter.
encourage economic ties .to the West.promote new political union:
to assert the principle of republic sovereignty.
secession that is supported by the majorityepublic's population and demanded by the republic's legitimate government, and move on to economic and other forms of cooperation.
with the "minority" problematter of second-order importance. Renounce transrepublic intimidation to "defend" minorities, and rely instead on bilateral treaties among republics to protect minority rights.
"horizontal" political and economic ties between the RSFSR and other republics.
to prevent the center from dominating the framing of the union treaty, and insist on final approval of the treaty by the supreme elected republic authorities.
agreement between the center and the republicsivision of powers and property before signature of the treaty.
the postopularly elected president of the RSFSR to serveocal point for the assertion of Russian national interests.
toairly weak, republic-dominated leadership structure at the center in the new union.
promote democratization:
off repression by the army and security services.
establish some RSFSR control over military, KGB, and MVD forces based in Russia.
access by democrats to radio and TV.
the mechanisms of residual Communist Party control over the Soviet system through liquidating the party structure in key security bureaucracies and even workplaces in general, terminating combined occupancy of party and state leadership posts, and encouraging fractionation within the party membership at large.
the removal of traditionalists from elective office at all levels of authority: union, republic, and local.
Introduce direct popular election not only for the Russian president, but also of the chairmen of Soviets at all levels. This step would stiffen resistance to Communist attempts to reassert lateral control over government bodies and strengthen responsiveness by these local officials to laws enacted by the Russian government.
pressure for real power sharing between Gorbachev's regime and pluralist forces in Soviet society.
Achievements
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Yel tsin hasajor part in turning around situation that looked forbidding in January and has made ,U| some progress toward realizing his strategiceven apart from the gains that flowed from the process initiated by the Joint Statement of nine republic leaders and Gorbachev onpril. Of five major achievements this spring that Yel'tsin can pointey one in his eyes is probably helping avert large-scale repression of the democrats by Soviet military and security forces.
Closely associated with this achievement is his success in initiating processes that may in time give the Russianhare of control over military and KGB forces
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in the Russian Republic, in late January Yel'tsin managed to gain the appointment of Col. Gen. Konstantineputy chief of the General Staff and RSFSR people's deputy, as chairman of the new RSFSR Council of Ministers State Committee for Defense and Security. Along with this appointment went agreement in principle by the center to allow Russia (and other republics) to participate in certain functions heretofore monopolised by union authorities.alks that had been going on for some months between Yel'tsin and KGB Chairman Kryuchkov and between Yel'tsin's security adviser, Col. Gen. Dmitriy volkogonov, and Kryuchkov over shifting KGB assets to RSFSR control culminatedreliminary agreement signed by Yel'tsin and Kryuchkovayussian State Securityareer KGB officer, Maj. Gen. Viktor Ivanenko, was appointed acting head of thisnion-republic" (that is, jointly subordinated) body. Commentary suggested that basic issues ofecurity" and delineating powers and functions between the RSFSR and union KGB organizations remained to be settled. |
Yel'tsin's third area of achievement lay in his remarkably successful campaign to overcome traditionalist resistance to creation of the post of elective president of Russia, and to what now appears to be his near-certain success in gaining election as president. The legitimacy he will gain with election, and the major powers with which the
position has now been vested by law, should give him
significant new leverage to accomplish his objectives. I
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has also had some success in beginning to build Russian Republic power in the economic sphere. He forced the center to allow the Russian Republic to draft its own budget and retain major tax revenues. He has increased Russia's input to spending decisions by assuming financial responsibility for funding republic education and science programs and byreater voice in allocating funds for maintaining Soviet troops in the republic. And his efforts persuaded some union enterprises, including several major metallurgical plants and mines, to "defect" to republic jurisdiction even before th* miners' strike. The resolution of that strikeey sector of industry (together with its massive financial and social problems) to Russian control and accelerated the transfer process in other sectors as well.
Yel'tsin has apparently managed to maintain momentum in cementing "horizontal"between the RSFSR and other republics. There have been tensions in
relations, reflecting the different political and economic interests of various republics and their leaders in such areas as budgetary policy, retail price increases, and the status of Russian minorities. There was sharp disagreement over Yel'tsin's demand onebruary for Gorbachev's resignation and transfer of power to the Federation Council. Yet by Hay it seemed that Yel'tsin had managed to reach substantial agreement on the centralfuture unionthe four other key republics (the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan).
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balance sheet on Yel'tsin's recentdepends, however, on one's view of what heconceded in the process that began with theofpril, which is intended to lead tothe union treaty in July. Yel'tsin's critics onside have attacked him for endorsing anthey say, sacrifices the workers' movementan antistrikereserveseconomy, commits the RSFSR to cough up funds formainly to support military spending, and guarantees of power by Gorbachev and his team for
potentially endless "transition"for smoke nj] from Gorbachev. Yel'tsin, not surprisingly, pictures himself as the winner.
In the text of the agreement itself, Gorbachev didup-front commitments by the republics toaction that the center desperatelyin the economic sphere: to fulfillto the all-union budget and extra-budgetsupport "anticrisis" measures; to consent towork regime" in key sectors of the economy;agreean on strikes and on incitement of civil and appeals for the removal of the
Government. He also got the symbolic concession ofeference to his referendum on the union.
On his part, Yel'tsin got from the text of the agreement at least Gorbachev's implicit agreement on three important issues: that there would be no impositiontate of "presidential rule" while the union treaty was being negotiated; that Gorbachev would reverse his attempt to weaken the Russian government's hand by playing the "autonomies" card; and that Gorbachev would no longer insist on the priority of USSR law over republic law. Yel'tsin also got two major symbolic concessions in the text: acknowledgement of republicnd use
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of the word "state" in place of "republic" in the title of the proposed agreement. He also got promises by Gorbachev of actiononger time horizon that could have profound consequences: namely, "radical enhancement of the union republics' estructuring of the USSR Government with nationalelections, contingent on signature of the union
It has also been argued, not least by Yel'tsin, committed himself verbally at theprila number of other points, including: the sovereigntyto secede of th* six republics that chos* not toagreement; nonintervention by th* canter ln theof republics; acceptance of th* need tobetween th* republics and th* center; an accordup hard currency and gold reserves; th*t with decisions by th* center tocurrency; assignment to republics of the rightlicensing of products for export; th* right
republics to retain hard currencyn th*ir territory;hindrance to anterprises shifting from all-union
republic subordination; and th* right of republics to adopt their own programs of marketization. |
In th* time that has elapsed sine*pril it has become apparent that Gorbachev has indeed given up ground and Yel'tsin has made some gains, but it also has becom* clear that th*till fundamentally differ on wher* the whole process is leading, and critical questions ar* still under negotiation. Press commentaryeetingorbachev and theders onay suggests thatssues of th* division of powersnd th* republics, th* center's capacity to tax, and th* [ougil status oftonomies" in the future union are still rs unresolved. I
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Reasons for Yel'tsin's Success
Th* critical factor behind Yel'tsin's relativ* success this past spring has been the great political skill he has displayed in building popular support for his cause, maneuvering in what initiallyighly adverse parliamentary situation, rallying democratic forces, dividing his opponents, and capitalizing on
counterproductive moves against him by th* traditionalists. Bis charisma, candor, capacity to communicate credible moral outrage, *mpathy with th* disadvantaged, and ability topublic sympathy for his own perceived human
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weaknesses ate well-known aspects of his leadership. Less obvious but very important has been his ability to combine accurate political analysis, clear thinking about his objectives, and political strategy. Yel'tsin haseen and hardheaded understanding of the shifting political dynamics of the domestic environment in which he has been operating. This realism, in turn, has contributed to an appreciation of the interdependency of goals that provides coherence and balance to his political strategies and tactics.inally, Yel'tsin has repeatedlyillingness to seek compromise, whether the issue has been dealing with the strikers, the extent of Russian presidential authority, the transfer of powers from the center to the Russian government, or even the final character of the future union.
Second, as Yel'tsin himself asserts, histhose of the Russian democrats this spring haveto no small degree on the deterrent influenceof mass organized resistance to thetheir fear of what might follow. Demonstrationsof Yel'tsin, such as that ofarch in
were significant. But it was clearly the persistence of the rs coal miners' strike, and the strike activity in Minsk, that mi brought home to traditionalists the magnitude of repression that would be requireduccessful "crackdown" and theandwould have to be paid.
Third, Yel'tsin was aided in no small measure by the intrinsic weakness of the traditionalists, their lack of popular legitimacy, their absenceompetitive program and strong leadership, and their own inner divisions. This weakness was graphically displayed at the CPSU Central Committee plenum in late April when the Latvian Communist Party boss Alfred Rubiks--no friend ofacknowledged that "Mikhail Sergeyevich's departure from either of the posts he holds would lead to the devastation of the Communist Party in the countryo the revivalational bourgeois dictatorship in the republic and the completion of the restoration ofravda article onardline secretary of the Russian Communist Party, Aleksandr Mel'nikov, observed! "The situation within the CPSU is, certainly, critical. The poisoned fragments of political pluralism are doing their work. Organizationally the party has been reduced to the state of 'jelly'. There is no end to the breaches of partyel'nikov may well have had in mind the
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formation by Col. Aleksandr RutskoyCommunists for Democracy" faction that helped fracture the Communist vote and promote Yel'tsin's strategic victory at the Third RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies in early April.
Fourth, Yel'tsin's success has .hinged onshown by other republics to protect theirFor example, despite conflicts ofambition with Yel'tsin, the Kazakh leadercriticized Gorbachev for the "dishonesty'* ofto manipulate the "autonomies" issue againstleadership (which also cut against the interestsotherel'tsin has stated onrecently that the solidarity of Russia and the four big republicsey role In
Gorbachev to compromise at his meetings with republic leaders onpril anday
A last factor, but not the least, inachievements has been an evolving recognitionand other Soviet leaders of theistrategic retreatthat may permit them to defend their type ofthe "socialist choice" more effectively. Thus,Kobets appointment as chairman of the RSFSRfor Defense and Security in January evidentlypolicy decision by Gorbachev, Minister of DefenseChief of the General Staff Moissyev to seek tocreation of republic armies and achieveby agreeing to the formation ofertain division of power betweenthe center in military affairs, and to the creationcouncils" at the republic and localby republic presidents and chairmen of Soviets. preemptive motive is probably even stronger into permit the creationussian KGB.made no secret of his intention to preserve a
security system, and this objective is clearly expressed"m
the Law on State Security Bodies signed by Gorbachev onay: "The USSR State Security Committee, the republics' state security bodies, and the bodies subordinate to themingle system of the country's state security^
The crucial phenomenon inducing Gorbachev to agree to what Yel'tsin has characterizedorm of "roundtable" negotiation, however, has unquestionably been the mounting
roblem appear^ Prime Minister Pavlov's speeches over the last two months.
They include a:
shortfall in agreed republic contributions to the USSR budget, leaving planned income for the first quarter less thanercent of the target,eficit for the same period equal to that projected for the entire year.
and accelerating decline in industrial and food production.
drop in hard currency earnings, jeopardizing imports of foodstuffs and light industry supplies, andritical debt position.
--Projectionituation by year's end marked
ji.a consumption or ac least 15 '
harp rise of unemployment leaving up toillion people without means of subsistence,socii fxplosion [that! will take place long before the calendar 'ear expires."
drop in national income accelerating too 25
ecline in per capita consumption of at least
20
ex, ye.
has repeatedly acknowledged that,will not solve these problems. The twodealing with then are an accord with thewhich there is no hope of restoringbelatedly
maaamaaasai Problems and Prospects
Despite his achievements, and even with th*in hand, Yel'tsinifficult path. Heconfront an enemy that has dominant influencerepressive machinery of the military, KGB, and MVD, and within the partyhis Inroadsthese organizations. He and his democratic allies
physically still terribly vulnerable: 1'We are completely unprotected inardline elements in the military could still overwhelm moderates. And, of course. Yel'tsinheassassinated.
After the election onune, Yel'tsin's battle with the traditionalists is likely to sharpen. The fact that the Communist Party apparatus has come out foursquare against him in the election will simply intensify his interest in eradicating its political influence. And his effort to
promote the privatization of agriculture, where thesome of its strongest roots, will accentuatewith it. Meanwhile, he has already given noticehe intends afterune to proceed
the process of liquidating Communist wi Party organizations and party diktat in all government bodies and law enforcement agepcies (the MVD, RGB, procuracy, courts, and so forth) and granting enterprises and other workplaces the right to decide themselves whether to evict partywould lead to the collapse of party influence and disintegration of the party. The apparatus understands the mortal implications of "departyization" and will fight it tooth and nail.
assessment appears to be that Gorbachev's behavior isnotby whatever political pressures are most threatening to his continued tenure of office at any**given moment. Re also probably believes that Gorbachev's power, despite short-term ups and downs, is programmed for longer term decline. Yet, at the same time he appreciates the fact that Gorbachev's presence may provide the democratsertain element of protection against the extreme hardliners. Also, he has taken aboard the public's revulsion with what it sees as personally motivated "squabbling" between himself and Gorbachev. Bis handling of the Gorbachev factor, thus, has been highly tactical in nature. He believes that Gorbachev was forced to shift course in April, and he is prepared to work with this rapprochement as long as ituntil he gains the Russian presidency. But he certainly tqiimi understands that Gorbachev's vision of the future union ri remains radically different from his own. And he can see |U] that Gorbachev continues, even in the new "cooperative' setting, to seek to advance this vision.
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There is every prospect that the economic situation will continue to nosedive over the next six months, and public discontent will rise. Even if Gorbachev accedes major transfer of economic administrative authority to the RSPSR, the Russian government will not control all the levers it needs to cope with the problems it will face. Moreover, if the Russian government proceeds with the new version of the Shatalin Plan that premier Silayev has been talking about, the dislocation Is likely to be stillYel'tsin has not prepared the population for what is in store during the transitionarket economy. Before all of this comesead, however, Yel'tsin is very likely to confront major renewed industrial unrest for
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failing to fulfill promises he will now be held accountable foe by miners and others whose trust in hia was significantly undercut by his endorsement of the antistrike pledge and his reversal on the demand for Gorbachev's removal.
Once the election is over, Yel'tsin will still lackorganized, united, extraparliamentary massCompromises he made in negotiating the terms of theagreement with Gorbachev, and the expediencyhis selectioniberal Communist as hisrunning mate, have alienated some ofwithin the Democratic Russia umbrella groupprovides his main backing. This group itselfto fractionate as politicalwithin it. The absence of disciplinedwill continue to make it difficult toof republic decisions by localYel'tsin has contributed to this problemto support the principle that the presidentsoviet chiefs must not hold leadership positionspoliticaloutactical concernthe Communist Party's influence. Thus he
himself in the contradictory position of seeking
strengthen hierarchical responsiveness by local officials (U, who are in principle accountable to popularly elected Soviets.
Yel'tsin cannot expect smooth sailing witheither. Despite efforts to fulfill the termseconomic agreements, tensions are likely tononcompliance continues. Different approacheswill produce new strains. There Is anof interest between the RSPSR and thosethe Central Asian bloc, that are highlyassistance from "thend the status ofin other republics, whom he must defend,certain to get worse before it gets betterYel'tsin is in signing treaties protecting
Implications for the west
The political values espoused by Yel'tsin are closer to Western values than those of any other major Russian leader: nonxenophobic, nonaggrandizing nationalism; constitutional democracy; an approach to marketization that is little different from capitalism; national self-determination; and
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nonviolent solution of societal conflict. Theolitical "opportunist" whose
behavior is totallyhis behavior
uninfluenced by thesebeen disproved by his actions to date; he hasommitment to these values in situations that have involved political loss. He haspportunistic" on promises to the electorate and on some tactical issues, however, where he has alsoenchant for snap decisions sometimes influenced by emotion.
Because of the coincidence of his values with western values, Yel'tsin looks to the West for support. Once elected president of Russia, Yel'tsin will almost certainly use this victory to underscore to the West that:
reservations the West may earlier have had about treating him as an important state fiqure now lack justification.
republics are now where th* action is. And th* on* republic whose future is truly critical to global security and western interests is Russia.
has, in any event,eal willingness to compromise and work with Gorbachev.
Western contact with Russia need notof Gorbachev and sacrifice of immediatepolicy interests. On the contrary, such contact strengthen Gorbachev's resistance to traditionalist
Yel'tsin and his government are likely to attempt to introduce radical economic reform measures soon. He has already expressed interest in the current Yavlinskly-brokered negotiationestern assistance package, but only if there is strong conditionally. He is certain to [Sims emphasize that aid should be channeled primarily throughrepublics and to specific projects, not open-endedly to the III center. He may welcome IttT "directives" that would absorb some of the heat generated by painful steps required bv marketization.
Yel'tsinundamentally reconstituted union in which the republics act independently within broad areas and delegate only limited powers to the center because he believes it is in Russia's interest. But this position does
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not mean, from his standpoint, that Gorbachev shouldfor preserving "order" and "stability" inand that he (Yel'tsin) should be attackedwhat the West sees as its interest inAnalytically, Yel'tsin's approach to theis groundedudgment that non-Russiana reality that willmany well-meaningtoaway, that attempts to suppress it willand that such attempts will onlyto the RSFSR and have otherThe slightly altered union "order"GorbachevYel'tsin'sit denies the striving for nationalTrue stability will come only withvoluntary association of republics, andimplies major devolution of power andsecession for those union republics that want it.the point of equilibrium lies appears tofor Yel'tsin and probably depends in part onadopted by the representatives of the other In theay round oftoelectoralagreed to the formulation that union shouldfederation" rather than
confederation, suggesting that he may believe he can
workable arrangementsomewhat less decentralized configuration than he was earlier demanding. |
A central concern of the west in the future of the Soviet Union is the possibility ofhich Is already occurring both across republic boundaries and within republics and could easily expand to include many areas in the RSFSR. One aspect of this problem, as already noted, is the "autonomies" issue in the RSFSR. This spring, in attempting to stop Yel'tsin, Gorbachev and his allies were preparedhile to extend to the Russian Republic the "divide and conquer" tactic of exploiting minority nationality aspirations already practiced by them in the non-Russian republics. By promoting the possible separate membership of current "autonomous" ethnic components of the RSFSRuture "renewed"thus outbidding Yel'tsin onwere in effect calling into question the territorial-administrative integrity of the Russian Republic. At the moment, it appears that Yel'tsin has been able toolitical solution to this problem, whichifficult one for him both because he had to explain why what is necessary for union republics is not applicable to "autonomous" republics, and because it was unclear in a
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number of cases how much ethnic grievances were simplyby traditionalist local -leaders on cue fromCommunist Party and the canter. Gorbachevalso have come to appreciate the danger of playingpotentially dreadful invitation to ethnic violence,may simply have been forced to give in to reachYel'tsin and other republic leaders onpril. the "autonomies" issue will remain
possible source of ma^crr^rouble in the RSFSR for the im foreseeable future.
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An even more explosive dimension of the "Lebanon" problem for Soviet leaders is ho* to protect minorities living outside their *'native" borders. Success or failure on this score will go far toward determining whether endemic communal violence lies in store for Eurasia, or whether the West will be dealingore peaceful dismantlement of the empire and the establishmentelatively large and stable successor formation to the present USSR. Onehas been linked tonitarythe wager on external Intimidation, provocation, and limited intervention. For reasons noted above, Yel'tsin argues simply on empirical grounds that this approach will not work. Instead, hereaty approach that accepts republic sovereigntyathance of coping with the ethnic minority problemay that does not reinforce the cycle of repression, retaliation, and mass flight of refugees. Theiscalculation and failure here^are very high indeed, the West as well as Moscow.
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has asserted not only Russian sovereignty,that of the other republics. This was thethe Shatalin Plan, which he publiclyit is incorporated in the treaties he hasotherthe Ukraine. Forvisit to Kiev in0 hadsignificance, because it represented the firstthe historyussian head of state had acceptedof the Ukraine and Russia. Moreagreement in late March with the GeorgianGamsakhurdiya to cooperate in pacifying "allon the territory of the former [siclAutonomous Oblast" was premised on'sovereignty despite predictable politicalto Yel'tsin across the border in the Northof the Russian Republic and among others in
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Yel'tsin's immediate response to the Baltic crackdown in January was to go to Estonia and sign documents that in effect publicly recognized Baltic independence. He accepted the decision of legally elected representative assemblies as final. This step foreseeably involved major political costs for him: heavy criticism within the military; attacks on his patriotism by Russians in the RSFSR; and cries of betrayal from some Russians living in the BalticJ
This approach implies four imperatives:ttempt to convince the non-Russian republics of the RSFSR's good faith by accepting their declarations of independence/sovereignty and by accepting existing borders;eek to protect Russian minority rights by entrenching them in obligations of bilateral treaties between the RSFSR and other republics,
and use reciprocal treaty rights protecting the
party's nationals in the RSFSRas an inducement tottempt
convince the Russian minority that the likely outcome of an attempt to defend their status through force will be an intensification of anti-Russian persecution, bloodshed,own flight as refugees back to Russia;ry to head off provocation and conflict that will undermine the possibilityeaceful, negotiated outcome.
uch of Yel'tsin's tactical behavior between January and1 can be explained by his perception that the traditionalists, abetted by Gorbachev, were conducting an
orchestrated attack against him and the other democrats, of which was prefigured in the Baltica physical crackdown was intended, and by whom, entirely"considerable evidencethe proposition that there was planning for suchWhat is clear is that thereajorcharging Yel'tsin with seeking to dismembera concentrated effort to deny access by democratsmedia; mobilization of opposition to Yel'tsin withinespecially the military and theof opposition to Yel'tsin within the Russian
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Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet; activation of efforts by provincial organs of the Russian Communist Party to undercut Yel'tsin and democratic forces; various domestic KGB operations to undermine Yel'tsin and his allies; manipulation of politics in the "autonomous" regions to weaken the political cohesion of the RSPSR; and the conduct of "active measures" abroad designed to weaken foreign sympathy for Yel'tsin.
General Moiseyev stated In Krasnaya zvezda onebruary that the union treaty "must clearly state that questions of ensuring USSR state security, organizing defense and the leadership of the USSR armed forces and USSR border guard troops, internal troops, and railroad troops, declaring war, and concluding peace are exclusively within the USSR'sut the republics would enjoy competence by
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in "elaborating the union's military policy,
rs implementing measures to organize and ensure defense,
resolving questions of the deployment and activity of troops and military installations on their republic's territory,nified procedure for the draft and the performance of military service, organizing the national economy's preparation for mobilization, shaping the union's defense budget, and allotting material and technical resources for defense needs.'*
review of Yel'tsin's statements Jindicates his awareness of
'ng of goals and analysis:ne cannot promote Russian welfare without (a) dropping the burden of empire, (b) marketizing the economy, and (c) cutting military expenditures;ne cannot marketize If one does not (a) dismantle the Stalinist system andlimate of legality, (b) cut back the military-industrial complex, (c) resolve societal problems peacefully, and (d) gain Western economic collaboration;ne cannot achieve solutions to societal problems without (a) eliminating
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totalitarian structures, (b) gaining voluntary resolution of ethnic conflicts, and (c) improving living standards;ne cannot achieve voluntary resolution of ethnic conflicts without (a) genuine self-determination, which implies (b) accepting the secession of those republics that wish to secede;ne cannot conduct foreign relations that successfully promote Russian welfare without (a) marketization, (b) democratization, (c) nonviolent solution of societal issues, and (d) voluntary resolution of ethnic conflict.
obots has publicly observed that "it is virtually impossible to resolve the tasks that will,esult of the union treaty, be placed under the joint jurisdiction of the union and the republics, without creating structures of this kind."
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Original document.
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