.Summary
Declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia probably will be the preludeonfrontation wilh Serbia thai could lead to an escalation of violence. The decisions of polinc.il leaders in Croatia and Serbia will have the major impact on the scope and severity of any violence, but events could spiral out of the control of any leader. Any eruption of significant violence is likely to involve Serb-populated areas of Croatia, ethnically-mixed regions in Bosnia-Hercegovina, or
The potential combatants are well enough armed to carryfrom scattered bombings and shootings to full-scaleCivil war is the less likely outcome, but we believe thatthe best of circumstances, escalating communal violencecoming weeks or months will probably produce casualties inIf republic paramilitary and federal Armyin, the scale of fighting could expand
DbCILUIOD
Of the two impending declarations ot inde^.dencc, itCroatia's which is the potential fuse to an explosion. In contrast to Croatia. Slovenia lacks significant ethnic or political minorities opposed to independence. Moreover. Slovenia probably will couple its indcrxaidencc declaration with an acknowledgment of the need for further talks with federal authorities over details ofid to deflect any violent federal reaction. The federal Army, for its part, has shown no interest in directly contesting Slovenian separation or going beyond such harassing actions as its seizure last weekend oflovenian national guard trainer aircraft. Theseowever, are likelyontinue.
The Fuse: Croatia
Croatia,erbian minority equivalent toercent of its population, isuch more precarious situation and Croatian leaders know it On the one hand, they fear being left isolated by Slovenian secession, which has the tacit concurrence of most Yugoslav factions. On the other hand, they know that outright secession would spark an armed conflict with the Serbs, who might have the support of much of the federal Army. Unlike SJovcrua. Croat de facto federal Army occupation of large pieces of its territory.
Croatia'!declaration today fell short of full separation from Yugoslavia, as Croat leaders maneuvered to sidestep an immediate showdown with the Serbs.
The declaration said that Croatia is beginning the process of separation, andill of minority rights.
The Croatians have done little of the legal groundwork for independence already finished by Slovenia.
For example, they resorted this week to adopting near duplicatesfederal laws to fill the gaps. "
Croatian President Franjo Tudjman must decide between trying to regain Serb-occupied territories by force and Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic's offer toew territorial settlement on terms likely to be unfavorable to Croatia. Tempers are runninj high and there is no assurance Tudjman will feel able to opt for low-risk actions.
- Croatian security forces have completed contingency plans to useradicals from eastern Croatia,
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imited move against the Serbs by Croatian security forceswould spark significant fighting thai could spread intofederal Army
The Flame: The Serb*
We believe that Serbian strongman Milosevic remains committed to hb goal of incorporating all Serb-occupied territory into Serbia. Milosevic-allied leaders in the Serb enclave of Krajina in Croatia have announced plans to unite on Fridayeighboring Serb enclave in Bosnia-Hcrcegovina, effectively erasing the border between the republics. At the behest of the legislature of Serbia's Vojvodinarequent stalking horse forSerbian republic assemblyisto meet this weekend to debate annexation of Serb lands in Croatia, fl
iwed that no Serbs can be forced to leave the federation against their will, and the Serb moves in Croatia and Boxnia-Hcrccgovina suggest that he means what he says. Given the risks involved, however, he probably will wait to assess Cnntia'sdecJaQtion before committing himself to an armed confrontation. Jfl
Tbe Powder: Well-Armed Antagonists
The potential combatants in Yugoslavia are sufficiently well armed to engageviolence ranging from scattered shootings and bombings--already daily fare in Serb-populated areas offull scale civil war.
The main factions include the loosely organized ethnic militias, republic national guard forces, and the federal Army. J| 0
The least predictable groupthat composed of local ethnic militias. These groups so far appear to be under control of their ethnic leaders, but they almost certainly have the potential to get out of hand. Serb militants in the Slavonian region of Croatia, for example, this spring tortured captured Croatian police officers before exectn^int^hem-almost certainly without the approval of Serb political leaders. M
Yugoslaviaun-toting society, and weapons were easy to obtain legally even under Communistecent report by the federal police to parliament revealed that asillion Yugoslavs legally owned guns-roughlyercent of the adult male population. In Bosnia-HcrcegCAona. where ethnic Muslim. Serb, and Croat groups reportedly arendividualseapons, according to the police.
These figures almost certainly have risen significantlyesult of feverish black market arms purchasingth.il federal officials say is taking place throughout the country .A ^
Slovenia and Croatia have both formed well-armed parainililary national guards under tbe dirrcl control of republic authorities. These forces include many personnel from the Territorial Defense Forces, which have been trained touerilla war against the conventional forces of foreigr. invader--skiUs which can be turned against the Serbs or Army.
unilaterally putman territorial forces under republic control early last year.
** Croatia's Interior Ministry established paramilitary units last year and
eserve force of00 men drawn largely from the territorial defense rolls. In April, the republic legislature created the "National Guarde facto republic army, by transferring command of the paramilitary forces to the Defense Ministry. Press reports indicate that Croatia also has an elite Special Forces unit ofen. Wkwf
The federal Army hasen la Us ground forces, with over one-third of them stationed In Slovenia and Croatia. The Army is well-equipped with modem weaponry, and the supporting air forceround attack capability. The Army, however, is trained toonventional war against an invader--oot to deal with the kind of partisan warfare for which republic forces are trained ^Jj^
Scenarios for Violence
Almost any scenario involving significant violence will unfold in one of the following hots pots:
Slavonian area la eastern Croatia, where Serb-rnajority towns are scatteredroat-majority region. Serbs in this area say publicly that they already have organized an armed underground, and Croatian contingency planning for the use of its security forces focuses on this region.
The Serb-majorily "KriJlnV region or Croatia. The Krajina fieldswell organized, if ppnrjvjrained. Serb militia huili on
paramilitary commandos are closel^vattJung^ebc*ders, and Croatian President Tudjman has threatened on several occasions to send them in to reestablish control.
militias and concede thai republic police have lost control. KuSQYO, "here Albanianu the rise againear of
We believe thai these circumstancesignificant elevation of intcrethnic communal violence likely in the coming weeksonths.
It probably would be limited to relatively contained geographic areas and fall short of conventional civil war if JNA commanders remain cautious and republic leaders avoid major blunders.
Casualties probably will still range into the hundreds.
It would be more serious if, as is likely, republic security forces and federal military units become involved. This could set off more .violence, and clashes between republic and federal forces could ensue.
Several developments probably would trigger communal fighting.
Croatian leaders have not yet accepted that they have lost control over the Krajina. Serbs probably will resort to further violence to drive home the point. If Croatia sends in securitylash with local Serbs is inevitable,irect confrontation withossibility.
Pressure from nationalists is building in Croatia to deal with the Serb rebellion and probably will result in at least some security sweeps aimed at clamping down on Serbs in Slavonia, whichroatian majority.
icd Bosnia-Mcrccgoviruotentialgs also the potential basiseal between Tudjman and Milosevic. Any deal, however, would probably require significant populationosnian Muslim leader recently estimatedouldffected-that almost certainly would provoke ethnic violence. M W
We believe that escalation to full-scale civil war-marked by combat between organised military unils-cannol be discounted but is less likely In Ihe Dear future. Civil war would probably pit the federal Army against Croatian and possibly Slovene national guard forces. Serbian officials have said publicly
that lltcy will considerepublic Army if any other republic secedesai of republic againsi republic is possible. MmtWrnW
The Army would have many advantagesivil war-incl-ing superior firepower and mobility-out, in our view, probably could not suppress republic lorccs fighting with guerrilla tactics, as they are trained to do. Fighting would likely be protracted, and the Army probably would frartun? eventual ethnic lines under the strain.
Wc believe that several developments nonetheless could lead to civil war. Military efforts to contain communal violence, for example, could result in clashes with republic security forces that escalate out of hand. Pro-Serb mjhiary leaders such as Chief of Staff Btagoje Adzic could gain control of the Army and throw their lot with ethnic Serb combatants. Even current military leaden, including the relatively moderate Kadijevic. could decide to move
' the leaders in seceding republicsast effort to save the federation.
Although we believe it unlikely, it is still possible that the Yugoslav factions will avoid any escalation of violence. The republics could simply "muddleith republic leaden avoiding any expansion of their conflicts despite low-level violence. This outcome would require great -and uncharacteristic-forbcaiance on all parts. Croatian leaden, for example, would need to accept tacitly that they do notarge chunk of their territory. And the Serbs for their pan, would have to show restraint in the absence of Croatian attempts to assert control fk^aaaamm
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Original document.
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