PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES, PBSUCCESS, JUNE, 1954

Created: 7/7/1954

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

7A

HISTORICAL REVIEWELEASE AS SA^iTF?!'

MKMQ5UHDUH FCBt CHIEF CF PROJECT

ftosnllltary Activities, FBSKCESS,

a. Departure from LUCOLH was made early In June with several pur poena la clod to be accomplished upon arrival In Tegucigalpa. They werei

the shock troopstate of preparednesspermit the initiation of the campaign at an early datethe same time would permit supportingrematuremight be caused by any oneumber of actionstargot country.

five man "Hornet" teams for tbe harassmentenemy in localities far removed from the obvious area

o. launch the remaining resident radio operators to their respective points.

all shock troop equipment to selected stagingthe

by all possible nethoda, land, sea and air, armsinner organisations.

sabotage plans to the final stages. Ready thefor launching to their areas.

o turned out to be GUZMAN, not C launching to nis targets.

b. Check the final military plans snd modify then to suit the latest analysis of the situation.

2. Upon arrival and after meeting with OSTRICH and rTVALL as well as with all the leaders of the CALLIGERIS organisation, it was obvious tbat much of tho above would be very difficult to accomplish In the short tine remaining. It was apparent that CALLXGSRIS had very littls knowledge

rage Two

of tbe numerical strength of hie own organisation. At various Uau he claiaed to hereec in Tegucigalpa. It waa on th* basis of theee figures that tbe decialor, to fora the five-earn teeas waa Bade. During the attsapte to form thsse groups CALLIGSSISumber of excusee as to why this oouldn't be done. It waa finally apparent that he undoubtedly did act hare the aea that he claiaed to hareat OX all aac In Tegucigalpa was daaandedjjaae.. Heilt of aea far below the nuaber that ws had hoped was present. The listdd names. This not only did not permit the formation of the five-man teems, but It also did not furniah the required numbers for the shock troop organisation. This information cameeek before thesy.

the receipt of this information, ay first inclinationrelay the shooting facta to UATJCU with an urgent plea to postpone

the initiation of the oaapeign. After auoh careful consideration, however, it was ay decision that due to the possibility of gathering consider able sympathisers along the way, we could launch tha oaapeign as planned. elt that any relaying of such Information would have the effect of detracting from end dampening the sothuaiasB of the GALLICERIS organisation as well ea having the effect of possiblyampaign which might bog down hopelessly if not permitted to begin on schedule.

of the preparation for the oaapeign waa made verythe turn of event* within the target country. The crack-down afterleaflet drop aade arms Ingresi elaoat impossible. t ofbroke down coapletely end we had to rely on auoh aethoda aa

i_ lane delivering arms to hie personal finoa. We vere ewe to send individuals across the line with arms In suitcases and bags. It ie not known at tola tlae how auoh of that waa effective. Us tried every method imaginable and we are confidant that some of them worked. Even the launching of the radio operators waa extremely difficult and baaardcua for them. We ere sureumber of then vere picked up and of those who did get to their respective areasew cane on the air.

hadine Job of preparing the sabotage Isadoraware eager to get in and begin their work. There rear In ad thepetting the proper equipaent in for them to work with. Some waa sentU and acme was token In by hand. While nan timing PIT ALL, it

ml got oe aoded that be bad done wonders in organising CALLICERIS' ataff into the proper sections. All hands had the utmost respect for FIT ALL snd bis casnand presence as well ee hie language qualifications aada hia invaluable.

looking over the final military plans. It struck me thatof our HANI troope by way of GUALAM would not only give thewarning of tho movement but the concentration of CommunistGDALAS would hinder our advance toegree ithat the BASK enemy forces

Page Three

Bightuccessful ccounterattack. It appeared to meincers movement on HAM would be more likely to succeed. lan was worked,out to bring an additional force from COPAH RUINAS down through CAMOTAH and JOCOTAH for an attack upon CHIQDTKOLA and thence to BARE. The mission of this force was l) to aid in tbe capture of HAfiX in the event that the BABE team experienced difficulty, andf BASK fell to us early, to move rapidly through the JALAP* area to the capital. In the latter case, the BAMS forces would protect tbe rear of this column. CALLJQKRIS' staff took to tola plan with alacrity and it was decided tbat the CP would be with this group.

of my time was taken up with interviews ofDHMT, both military end civilian. Open the arrivaland following an interview withecommended

oe piacea in command of the RARE force, replacing

I felt that as ^ bad been in command of the garrison ox sua at one time along withhigher rank and greater experience he should be commander of this very Important force.

Another arrival was as vary much im-

pressed with his force and booing mua ruouanenaed him for some command. In this case it was command of the force which was to cross from HUEYA CCOISPEQUE.

the absence of the five-man teams for harassment, itto utilise the talents o: c his line. He hadanxious to do something other man aeJiver arms to his flncato be able to perform bombing missions with"3frankly skeptical about the eccuraoy of such bombing, uuv uotbat it was feasible. PIVALL constructed bombs of THT blocksconcussion grenades, armed that they would detonate ook off on his initial flight of this type headedJOSS. He nan with him two men, one for Be flewon the ground toward tbe gasoline tanks at SAH JOSE. As hethe tanks, he pulledemi-stall and the bombardierbomb. His first attemptirect hit and the tank burst He then flew to RETALUEHUE and did the same thing to tbeESSO tanks there. He ran out of bombs but "strafed" tho PEHSXa Madsen gun, successfully puncturing them snd then set themgrenades. lew another of these missiona to BOHD. was iliustrabea by bis calling the field tower at BOHD,be was an air force plane wishing to land. The tower gave himinstructions and he came in to his bombing mission on the He received much AA fire as he tried to bomb ann thetbe field. In eluding the fire he divedroup of treesa branch of one of them in his control surfaces. He had tothe first available field in WSHOOPS to remove it.

Cl as very anxious to perform very hasardous missions at all times ana was invaluable to our efforts.

fhge Four

V. Our sofo bouse facilities in Tegucigalpaouse where tho CALLIGERIS staff could functionnit. There wo had naps, tables, aonfsrence rooms snd briefing rooas. ITVALLet there every day aarly in the morning and worked there all day with the staff. PIVALL also worked in another safe bouse which served alsotorehouse for our supplies. Re worked with his sabotage leaders there. The latter house was located high on tbe Mountainside outside of the dty. Open the arrival of the TCP radio personnel, vs activated another safe house about halfway between Tegucigalpa and TQNCOoTLB field. This bouse was ideal for the radio station aa It waa well into the suburbs and ooodngs snd goings were not noticed. After this house was opened, we spent auoh of our time there.

the arrival of CADICK the final touches ware put onand very shortly after he came the campaign waa initiated. be noted here that the entire CALLIGERIS organisation hadin CADICK and in his leadership. So farould tell,his decisions were ever questioned and for that Batter neitherof mine, before he came. CALLIGERIS made the aame plea forattacks to CADICK that he had mads to me previously and of coursenot given eny assurance whatever that air eupport would beother than air delivery of supplies, which we felt would be a All of the personnel who cams out of the country to us inwere of the firm opinion that should powerful air blowson the city in the early phases, tha campaign would not beone. The concensus was that if several bombs werene

on the Guordia de Honor, one on the Aurora airfield. Baas Mllitar,one otherelected target, tho Government wouldinsisted

that theeu witn tne rirat lealxeb orup.

Juatp before the arrival of GADICX our BOSD organiser returned to Tegucigalpa. He had been captured by several soldiers who recognized himormer association in the army. Re waa tortured but escaped to return with valuable information. People were coming and going along the border at thfea time without interference, particularly in the BOBD and HAKE areas.

Che of our big probleaiuvas movement of wan snd supplies through Salvador. We had cooperation with thein WSHOOTS to the extent of hie agreeing tocvuoeC oi armsthe country as his personal effects. Thia uiri not work, however. We did send several loads of eras in specially constructed private automobllee with falfe compartments. We had no cooperation from the president.

hbvement of shock troops to the staging areas began in small numbers. Receiving parties were sent ahead and when we got word that the areas wore ready, we initiated the movement. Tho movement was very alow and in very small numbers. Finally, when tine became abortay approached, much speed was necessary and troops moved in larger snd leas

,

clandestine groups. Thin movementlood of newspaperman to descend upon Tegucigalpa, aaldog operations all the more difficult. Final movement ofshock troops brought tbe operation folly into tbe open, es it beoeae necessary to aore the troops by nnaaarnlsllj chartered alrplanee. This was in order to eaeeable thea at the steglng areas at the proper tlae for the attack.

(itch difficulty was encountered in the plans for the seaborne operation for BOND in which we hadoat at LA CBXBA on the North Coast of WSHOOFS. The boat was loaded by aeana of delivery Of equipaent to LA CEZBA in cooperation withIncidentally was of tremendous help in aany ways. Be truqw-Ma equipaent inVSH0OF3 airplanes for us to Tarious points, into fields which were not well suited to his plenee. rcyp was diapatched to LA CEXBA to aan the boat, only to find that the boat waa Biasing. It bad presunablyun to the islands for cover purposes. Tbe team finally oanght up with the boat and boarded it for the operation. It ia not entirely olear at this data what developed from this operation. It is known that the boat was picked up but aore then that is not known.

CoaaaaicaUona were good with the exception that at night all contact was lost between SALAL end 8RERW00D, therebyerrific pile-up of messages in the morning and bogging down of those messages. There waa considerable Una lag between tho sending of messages from the field and their reception at SALAL, For this reason, it was decided to aove the FCP (SALAL) back to SOMERSET in order to give aore adequate service to tbe field. With regard to the answering of some messages which oame In froa the field, it waa frequently impossible to gain contact with those stations for some hours. More orgeat messages would follow and aoae of

the original messages went unanswered.

With regard to security, it Is obvious that auoh of the desirable security Beasures which would normally be employedruly clandestine operation were disregarded in thin instance. In order to do the job, auoh of the clandestinlty had to be abandoned. We had to move openly In the city of Tegucigalpa to end froa eafehousea, thereby undoubtedly identifying ourselves with the CALLIGERIS organisation. It can be said that this covenant was kept to the absolute ajnlaua but some of It was absolutely necceasary to accomplish the taek. The safe house whore the FCP was located wao by far the beat and kept the aost clandestine.

After tho aovoment t; C ho FCP functioned much aoreand was able to offer tbe desired support to the field. The fact that PH Staff worked right with Air Ope facilitated this support, plus keeping everyone informed es to the situation in thethey had not been up to that time.

SECRET

Page Six

iaayott)

Other than the numerous email lessons learned during tbe campaign, there are* in my opinion, two main lessons to be learned from tha overall situation. First, at the vary outaet of the planning for an operaiion'of thisecision should be made as to the importance of the success of the thing, upon reachingol si on, the amount of power to be utlllsod and the method of employment of this power should also ba decided. This power (and In this case it was air bombardment) should not be withheld. It should be utilised et the very beginning of the operation. It is ay considered opinion that if tha air power which was. used in the final phases of tha operation had been used on the first day in the same manner, the campaign would not have lastedours, eu lives would have been lost in the bombing, but many more Uvea could hava been saved by shortening the campaign. This opinion is based upon both the reporte of persona who cane out of VSBURsT and ay previous knowledge of the Latin people.

elieve that the FF program could have been better coordinated with the PM program. Byefer to the leaflet drops. The reaction to these drops was terrific. The resolta, however, were definitely detrimental to tbe PM effort, and the reaction of the CALLIGERIS staff in Tegucigalpa was one of dejection. It waa the opinion of all of us, including OaTHICR, that it would have been wall if the field had been consulted before tbe decision to make the drop bad been made. The leaflet dropsrackdownHT which would have come eventually when the movement of our troops to the border was noticed, but it cemeime whan we were still able to make delivery of arms, radio operators and sabotage personnel into the oountry. After tbe crackdown, it was virtually Impouaible to noconpUsh this. C leaded with us to permit no moro leaflet drops as every one reduced the effectiveness of bis air operations. The overall affect of such PP activity cannot be underestimated, but it ia reccoawnded that in the future they be coordinated with the PM activity ao that they can be mutually supporting.

With regard to communications, as in oporationc inave baen involved in tho military aerrioe, such of theplannlng Is based upon split eeoond contact between units and command by radio. ave never seentact work out completely aa planned, evun with highly trained operators. In this case, with Indigenous operators and difficult conditions, while the results ware snailng, they did not work out aa planned. Only In the final phases did the radio comae begin to work properly.

finally, while an operation of this type Is most difficult toclandestine, it would havo been much mora easily accomplished if the enemy had not been fully alerted soma weeksay. Itad not martial law boon proclaimed and tho curfews, pollco patrols,ot been In effoat, our movement and sabotage plans uould have been much moro likely to succeed. It isknown at this time how much of our sabotage was completed, but so for nott has been reported.

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA