INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
OVIET AGRICULTURAL RESULTS FUTURE PLANS AND PROSPECTS
ClA/RR34
UAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECXltlG-TTTE NATIONALTTED SJL4SWrTl?TnIN THE MEANING OF THESC,NDTHEJTflANSMlSSION OR TfcVEfcATIpN OF WHICHTO AN UNAUTHORIZED FERSDhWa^ PROiHS^fKD BY LAW.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Research and Reports
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t.
The analyses and conclusions presented In thla memorandum are based on Soviet press material published during the period from3 throughU. The commodity and livestock number estimates are based on an analysis of published statistical material crop condition reports, and weather data. Previous evaluations of the new agricultural program by Embassy Moscow and the Department of State were also used.
Although additional Information on the general subject of this memorandum has become available since the completion of writing, ash none of that information materially alters the conclusions reached*
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awaits
I.
II. Crop Production and Livestock3
and
Numbers
III. Measures for Increasing Agricultural3
A. Changes in
D. Incentive
Implementation,h
Problems and Acreage
in Acreage
Tables
Production of Major Food Crops and Fibers in
the
Numbers in the
(ORRU|8)
OVIET AGRICULTURAL RESULTS. FLTURi. FLA-'S. AND PROSPECTS
Sumary
By the end3 the production of most crops and most species of livestock in the USSR had failed to roach prewar levels. The acreage sown to crops3 was lessercent larger than thatnd the yields of most crops had failed to3 production of major food crops, such as grain and potatoes, fell below that of the previous yoor, and livestock numbersonly slightly. In the face of these negative factors was the fact that the population had been increasingumber of years at the rate ofercent annually. Recognition of the fact that agricultural development has not kept pace withgrowth and of the need for Improving the quality of the diet of an industrially expanding society appears to be the basis of the new programs to increase agricultural production.
Within the first year after tho death of Stalin the USSR haderies of measures designed toapid improvement in Soviet agriculture. Theseeries of incentivea downward revision in the level of agriculturaleduction in delivery quotas levied on collective farmers, and increases in the prices paid by the state to collective farms and farmers for obligatory deliveries and for government purchases; increases in capital investment, largely in farm machinery and fertiliser; the establishment of pormanent cadres of technically trained personnel at machino tractor stations; and continuance of the pressure to improve farm practices.
In addition to the positive measures adopted by the governmentuch projects as tho shelter-belt programs and the Williams crop rotation system have been curtailed, and most, if not all, of the irrigation projects auxiliary to the "greatprojects* have been cancelled.
Throughall and winter, thereoncerted effort by the party and the government to expedite various parts of the new program, and inefinite grain-acreage
expansion prolan was publicly announced. The expansion of acreage into Ihe, virgin and unused lands is the most spectacular phase of the new program, but other phasesore significant. Apparently there will be large-scale changes in the structure of sown acreages for all important agricultural regions. The modification of the rotation system,eduction in sown grasses, and the partial abandonment of the principle of regional self-sufficiency will be the two most significant factors and will bring about sharp changes in inter-regional acreage patterns. In general, the emphasis will be on an increase in grain production.
It is still too early in the implementation stage of the "new course" to predict an upward trend in the productivity of land and labor in the agricultural economy of the USSR. Expansion of acreage willhort-term increase to over-all production, assuming no adverse weather conditions, but short-term measures can only delay the tamoeneral rise in crop yields and livestock productivity will be needed torowing population at present consumption rates. An even greater rise will be required to improve the diet. In order to bring about adequate long-termincreased inputs of machinery, fertilizer, and skilled manpower will be essential. Ultimate determination of the success of the "newowever, lies with the peasantthe actual producerand his reaction to the new incentive measures.
i. introduction.
Soviet propaganda has attempted to create the impression that ihe USSitand of vast and rich agricultural resources. .That the land mass is vast cannot be denied. That the agricultural resources are richlaim that is open to question. ittle more thanercent of the USStts classified as tillable, andmall proportion of the tillable landalance of the factors favoring high production. To generalize, the areas of adequate precipitation are also the areas of poor soil
cq-jirco territory.
shortseasons. The areas of uncertain or deficient precipitation are areas having the best soil. ast portion of Central Asia and Siberia has poor soil and is subject to various climatic extremes generally unfavorable to crop production. Circumscribed as it is by these natural limiting factors, the arable area of the USSR cannot be extended greatly beyond the currentlyillion hectares without encountering marginal or sulxnarginal growing conditions.
Soviet crop yields have always ranked among the lowest in the world, but the large acreage devoted to crops, especially the cereals, has always made theorld leader in the production of wheat, rye, barley, and oats.
In the pre-collectivisation period, Russia's requirements for nost agricultural products- were met from its own production. Small quantities of rico, tea, and some minor food products were imported. During the same period, Russia was the world's leading exporter of wheat, rye, barley, and oats.
The intorwar periodime of declining exports for the USSR. Collectivization had disrupted production in thos; war stocks were Increased in the0 "s; and to the present time tho growth of the population, especially the urban population, has put heavy demands on crop production. During the past hO years the population has grownreater rate than that at which the cultivated acreage has been enlarged. It has been estimated that the ares seeded to crops3 amounted to .Bit hectares per capita. It had declined8 and to
Production of agricultural crops may be increased by extending the cultivated area and by increasing the yield per unit of land. While the Soviet government has used both methods, tho extension of the area under cultivation has been the traditional and easiest way toemblance of balance between the production of crops and the needs of the population. The expansion of acreage is becoming increasingly more difficult and costly as the limits of cultivation are approached. Sinco thes, emphasis has bean put on increasing total production by raising yields through tho uso of improved strains of seed, greater use of fertilizer, and inproved techniques. Tho use of improved materials and the adoption of new
0
agricultural techniquesountry *sanii diverse as the USSHlow process. Even in the US there has been but little increase in the yields ofcrops in the pastears.
Although the USSR satisfies core than two-thirds of its caloric requirements with cereal crops, livestock and industrial crops are also important, and both have received considerable attention from the Soviet planners.
Under the Soviet regime, industrial development has been favored over agriculture. Capital investments, grants, subsidies, andpriorities have all been in favor of industry. This allocation of capital and labor has resultedisproportionately slow rate of growth in the output of agriculture. The disparity between the two sectors became particularly apparent as agriculture failed to provide the foodstuffs considered necessary for direct consumption and the raw materials for the operation of litfit industry.
II, Crop Production and Livestock
and Fibers.
Tablegives the estimated production of major food crops and fibers in the-
esult of relatively adverse weather3 production of the two most important food crops, grain and potatoes, fell below that Orain production suffered not only from anpercent drop in yields but alsolight drop in acreage. Cotton, the most important fiber, was favored by better growing conditions, and the estimated raw (unginned)wasostwar high.
Numbers.
Two of the three livestock categories showed some increase3ut cattle numbers had not recovered from the setback in the winter- Tablegives livestockin the-
Wheat, rye, barley, and oats, fi-c ollows on p.un* ollows on p. $.
Tabic 1
Estimated Production of Jlajor Food Crops and Fibers in the
Million Metric Ton3
Grain
Potatoes
Sugar Beets
Cotton (Raw)
Waol (Grease Basis)
0
5
Table 2
Livestock Numbers in the/
Million Head asan
Cattle Swine
Sheep and goats
?3 livestock numbers are official oen-sus figures from Soviet sources, but the USSR has changed the published livestock census dateanuaryctober, making it rather difficult to2 Summer and fall numbers are always considerably higher than winter numbers because of heavy slaughtering in the October-December period.anata are extraoolated estimatesctfficial data.
Ill. Measures for Increasing Agricultural
Vtithin the first year after Uie death of Stalin theeries of measures designed toapid improvement in Soviet arriculture. Without changing theframework of socialised agriculture as incorporated in thc collective farm, state farm, and machini tractor station, the Soviet government has abandoned certsin policies and modified others, but for the most pnrt the government has re-Intensified the drive to have the neasants produce more food, feed, and fiber within the broad institutional framework of the pastears by better use of many of the proviously approved techniques and methods.
The general tenor of tho "new course" was first Indicated ln Minister of Finance Zverev'a report to the Supreme Soviet Throe days later, before the same body, Halenkov gave additional details. pecific indictment of the inadequacy of agricultural production, Malenkov implied that current output is insufficient and that "our imciediate taskn the next two or three years to secure the creation in our country of an abundance of foodstuffs for the population and of raw materials for light
Malenkov then outlined the corrective mensures to be applied in bringing about anof production. Theseeries of incentive measures, suchownward revision in the level of agriculturaleduction in delivery quotas levied onfarmers, and Increases In prices paid by the state tofarms nnd farmers for obligatory deliveries and for government purchasos; increases in capital Investment in agriculturelargely in farm machinery and fertiliser; the establishment of permanent cadres of technically trained personnel at machine tractor stations; and, ofontinuance of the pressure to improvo farm practices.
Tne newly olectod First Secretary of tho Communist Porty,onth later filled in the general framework with an indictment of the agricultural economy and gave further details of thc new Incentive and capital investment programs.
In comparing tho slow growth of postwar agricultural production to the relatively rapid progress made in industry, Khrushchev claimed
an over-all production increase ofercent?. While this modest incroaso in itself indicates the lagging of the agricultural ocononiy, even this claim is belioved to be inflated.a
After the publication In early3ecree issued by tho Central Committee of the Party and *Olrushchev's report on which the decree was based, three supplementary decrees were Issued elaborating on particular se&nents of the original decree. Theso three supplementary decrees covered tha livestock, potatoes and vegetables, and machine tractor stations sectors with no further elaboration on the important grain and technical crop section of Khrushchev's report. It was not until February and Marchu that further details of plans for the expansion of production of grains snd technical crops were given.
A. Changes in Investment.
There can bo little doubt that there haswooping reappraisal in the past year by Soviet leaders of agricultural performance, plans, and prospects. Certain technical procedures that were considered dogma up to the time of Stalin's death novo boon abandoned or modified. The most spectacular negative changes have coma about from tho cancellation or modification of those two well-advertised programs, the plan for tho "transformation of nature" and the irrigation schemes of thc "great constructionhat drastic reductions have been made in these two programs is implied by tho conspicuous absence of reference in the press and is confirmed by all the measures adopted since last August.
The shelter-belt program, first announcednd publicizedeystone to increments in crop yields in the drier regions, has apparently now been curtailedargo investment in the planting ofillion hectares of trees. orollary to the "transformation" program, the use of the famous Williams
a Assuming that current procurement prices were used in weighing the individual commodity oroductlons in calculating the aggregate, tho high-value tochnical crops, such as cotton and su^ar beets, which have shown relatively large increasosiO would distort tho ovor-all index because of the low procurement prlcos for such an important commodity as grain.
crop rotation system that had been part of official dogma from ;toseou has recently been severely criticized and probably will be
nodifled.
At least part of the irrigation schencs of the "greatprojects" were dropped The largest of the irrigation projects, the Great Turkmen Canal, has definitely been eliminated, and there is evidence that work will be suspended on the irrigation notworks of the other four projects.
All of these hi^ily propagandised projects were parts of the over-all program for mitigating the effects of drought. ealistic appraisal of such costly and questionable inputs, the current recime was willing, apparently, to switch the allocated resources to more practical schemes that may raiae esricultural output in the immediate future. Most of these new Inputs are desired to arouse the Interest ofpeasant and to provide him with more of such items as tractors, machinery, ond fertiliser.
B. Incentive Measures.
One of the basic reasons for the low labor productivity and the consequent low output of agricultural workers is the lack of Zainti-resovannost1 (intorestedness) on the part of the peasant. To increase the initiative of the peasant, the government haseries of incentive measures.
Prices for obligatory deliveries for livestock, livestock products, and potatoes and vegetables have beenor certain vegetables ond up toercent for livestock on the hoof. Prices for livestock products sold to the government beyond obligatory deliveries are to be increased byo 50 Although these percentage increases will be applied to an extremely low base resulting ln the new procurement priceslow, the current prices may be high enough to encourage at least the individual collective farmer to sell to thereater proportion of the output from his private plot.
Apparently the price schedules for grain, the most important crop, have not boon changed, ond thus thc major source of income to agriculture remains at its previous low level. The rates ofdeliveries for livestock products from the privately owned sector
have also been lowered to give to individuals further encouragement to retain atow.
As farbligatory deliveries from the collective farms are concerned, the government will now "demand" that established norms for deliveries be strictly observed. In the past thishas been violated by state procurement organizations when, to compensate for the undorfulfillment of delivery goals by the lower producing collectives, higher rates were imposed upon the higher producing collectives despite fixed norms for given regions. Khrushchev previously implied that this practice had been carried on without the knowledge of Soviet officials, violation of tho hectare-norm principle was acenpted practice throughout tha postwar years, especially in grain. Every year uphe central press carried letters and telegrans, from various provinces and addressed to Stalin, announcing the fulfillment of grainand usually declaring that "voluntary'1 deliveries over and abovo the plan had been made. Thus the govornment was able tothe ovor-all delivery quotas by penalising higher yielding provinces toad crop year in other provinces. It remains to be seen if in the future Soviet officials do not ask for "voluntary" deliveries from thc bettor producing farms, rsyonn, and oblasts.
i To tho peasant tho first concrete indication, in terms of rubles and kopeks, that the government wan again changing its "attitude" came at the time of the Supreme Soviet Session in early August. ew tax law that reduced the over-all tax yield from 20
toillion collective faro households by hi percentii further reductionsh, was adopted at Uvat time.
Besides the reduction in tax rates on private holdings, there hasimplifying of assessment ncthods. Under the old law, collective farm households ware assessed on tho basis of tho typua of produce grown,oparate assessment for livestock. The now systemixed rate of assessment per one-hundredthectare of land in thc private plots, regardless of the type of crop, andmost important of alleliminates tho separate tax on livestock. This new method of assessment will encourage farmers to grow more valuable crops and to own livestock.
An added incentive Tor those peasants who do not own cowsercent ofhouseholds) conesa reduction of tax rates ofercent3 andercenth. This supposedly will give enough added incose to the individual household to permit tho purchasealf or young heifer.
The peasant working on the collective farm may decide that the new and less stringent policy concerning his private holding will resultreater return for his work time than will work for the collective farm. In order to discourageecision, the government hasenalty that increases byercent taxes and obligatory deliveries of livestock productsollective farm household if one of its members fails, without good roason, to work the minimum number of work days set by collective farm statutes.
C. Increased Inputa.
It has been pointed out that as part of the reappraisal of tho general agricultural situation, the government has curtailed or abandoned certain costly projects such as the shelter-bolt scheme and large-scale irrigation projects. Apparently the savings from such delayed or abandoned investments will now be directed tothe availability of other Inputs such as mechanised draft-power, machinery, fertilizer, and trained manpower.
Rates of delivery of tractorsh7 will average annually about U0 percent greater3 deliveries. In the last quarterhe annual rate of deliveries of both tractors and grain combines had increasedercent over3 ratehole. Besides .nore mechanised draftpower, the governmont wants to Increase labor productivity in such unmochanized sectors as potato and vegetable growing and animal husbandry by providing large amounts of specialized machinery used in those sectors. Hot only will there be the advantage of increased labor productivity from tho usearger tractor and form machinery park, but, probably most important of all, there will be improved timeliness of operations. The previous practice of completing certain field operations long after the initiating date has undoubtedly aggravated the harvest losses.
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One of the most realistic proposals of the "new course" is the provisionarge increaso in output of nineral fertilizer. Production goals were set9u atndillion tons respectively. While this planational appraisal of the type of input needed, it would mean an increase3 plant capacityimes9inesU. It is believed that such goals cannot be attained unless the USSR is willing to giveemphasis to construction of mineral fertilizerto the detriment of other areas of the economy. Production has already fallen behind the rate necessary to fulfill the modest goalillion tons set* the last year of thevo Year Plan. To meet the Plan, there will have toercent increase in production inUompared to increasesercent,ercent for the last three years. It is not considered likely that the Plan goal will be attpined.
In the manpower area, the new program points towardthe number of skilled personnel of the managing class of thc machine tractor stations and collective and state farms, of agronomic and animal husbandry specialists at the farm level, and of skilled and serai-skilled labor for machinery operation. All of the various manpower programs are claculated to reverse the tendency of the most skilled and best educated collective fain members to leave tho farms and take more lucrative jobs in industry, and also to move* specialists away from desk jobs "closer to productionlthough criticism of the personnel program was severe throughout1 fall and winter months, recent claims indicate that olans are being fulfilled, at least in gross numbers.
The government's attention is now centered on improvingality of the collective farm chainen, whoKhrushchev now readily admitsare selected or dismissed b/ Party and government organs. The oonfimation of this procedure, heretofore implied, in naming collective fam chairmen does away with the pretensein the collective farm statutes of "election" of the chairmen by vote of the collective farm rcccibers.
In the organizational sphere, the machine tractor station as an agency for technical assistance, political control, and
Excludes ground phosphorite and Thomas sla^ which, undoubtedly, have been included in9j ^roals.
mechanization of Sovietiias been considerably strengthened by the now program, "any sf Ihepolicies affecting xprhlM Tractor stations reflect the yer.ra cf government neglect of Hie wiiricultural economy. Such changese creationvjiumtnt staff of tractor drivers andachine operators, tlie payment of these workers directly by Ihe nachlnn 'racier stations Instead of by the collectivend the penvnent attachment to the machine tractor stations of *grcnoxlsi *tyl other rpeclalista will center xore than ever in the oac-iine tractor stations thefor the carrying out of production taste on tne collective fan-., besidesreater ooononlc responsibility, the rtichtn* tractor station is to be the center of political control. The reorganisation of the rayon';aratu3 nown will elace In oacn station one of tne rayon Party secretaries, who willroup of experienced party workers (instructors) carrying out political work In the collective farms served by the station. These moves Ln tho organizational field are intended to delineate bettor thc chain of responsible command snd to eliminate the oroblem of pinpointing the blame for production failures.
D. eaer.tation.h.
he date of the last supplemental agricultural decree, to early torchu, there hasonstant barrage of press commentary and conferencesrss effort by the Party and government to "explain theo the working people of towns and villages." Using the medium of editorials, conferences, and meetings, tho government has carriedampaign of badgering officials throughout the organizational pyramid, from Moscow to tne remote rayans, to carry out this or that part of the new program. Alt'iouriticism was rather severe, certain plans, particularly in the personnel area, were declared to have been completed after earlier press comment indicated that such programs as the transfer of specialists were not being carried out.
eeting of editors in latehrushchev took the opportunity to criticize officials in the lower echelons of the Party for shortcomings in carrying out the agricultural program. At this meeting Khrushchev probably set the tone for tha
* Although the latter still contributes to the wage fund.
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and intensity of criticism to be used by the control authorities in pushing the now program. The "new look" in criticism is more mundane ond free swinging than in the oast, retting to specific points more directly with less verbiage and ssneralization. ThLs is typical of tho more realistic attitude of thc Soviot leaders.
With unusualhrushchev accused some officials of having an "aristocratic attitude" toward agriculture and of underestimating its Importance. He also criticized tha party organs for not selecting the best available nen to be the chairmen of collective farms.
In January and, separate conferences of machine tractor stations and state farm workers and "foremost" apricultural workers of the RSFSR were held In tho Kremlin. These meetings were used as sounding boards to "disclose existingand to "propagate leading experience in tho struggle for carrying out tho decisions."
Inhe now deposed First Secretary of tho Kazakhstan Party,hayakhmetov, gave first indications that an expansion of acreaje in the dry steppelands was being considered. In an article in the Republic press, he said thereossibility of the expansionillion hectares of sownn the northern areas of Kazakhstan. An article in an agricultural weekly in earlyh olso discussed the problems involved in expanding acreage on virgin and unused lands.
In earlyecree adoptedlenum of the Central Comittee was published under the title, "For the Further Increase in Output of Grain in the USSR and the Bringing of Virgin and Unused Land Under Cultivation." Two weeks later Khrushchev's report, on which tho docas based, was published. The "decision" and the report were used as vehicles not onlyuller explanation of tho grain acreage expansion program but also to fill in the details on raising yields of ^rsin crops and yields and production of technical crops and on the changes in planning as well aa to bring up toeport on the progress, or lack of progress, made in the agricultural program.
In tho personnel field, Khrushchev claimed succosses in the transfer of engineers, technicians, and machine operators and
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in the posting of responsible party workers at the farm and machine tractor stationeduction in the death rate of livestock by one-third during the winter reason; acquisition by individual owners of .Tore livestock;3 rate of procuremente government of neat, ailk, wool, and
E. ^ra in Problems and_ Acreage Changes.
lastew ninutes after telling the Supreme Soviet that "our country is fully supplied withlalenkov ^sve an indirect interpretation of rtiat he leant by "fully supplied." He said, "He nca obliged tourther and more rf.pld increase in production of grain, bearing in nind that this is necessary for our country not only in order to satisfy the growing requirements of the population for bread, but alsoapid development ofhusbandry and the supply of grain to areas which produce industrial crops.'onth later rhrosncnevurther clue as to this Interpretation when he said, "In general, we meet the country's grain requirements in the sense that our country iswith bread, that we have tho necessary state reserves and that we are able to engage, within certain limits, in exportrashchev thon went on to describe current supplies of foed grains as inadequate.
Kwlenkov and Khrushchev were both obviously talkingtatic sense* when referring lo the solution of the grain problem, and then they switchedrame of reference that included the dynamics of population growth and the need for improving the quality of the diet by consumption of more animal products. As Soviet officials am now more pragmatic about agricultural affairs, they undoubtedly realize that the completely unrealistic plans for greatly increasing production of grain via the yield route could not be attainedew years.
Khrushchev's report, and the Plenum decree inpoke mostly in generalizations about tho needproduction of grain and technical crops and includedacreage patternsinor part of the
* Static in the sense that grain availabilities were sufficient to sustain tho population duringonsumption year with the present dietary pattern.
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total sown acroage. The factupplemental decree pertaining to grain and technical crops was not published last fall gave further indication that plans concerning acreage patterns In general and grain acreage specifically had not at that time been formulated.
remlin conference of agricultural workers inb, first indications were given that acreage patterns were to be changed, although earlier press references in December and January had referred to possible acreage expansion in the dry steppelands. Further data were given in the March reports.
Over-all grain acreage has remained about constant tho last three years and3 was stillercent belowhe government now plans to expand grain acreage, at least temporarily, someoercent until thereise In grain yields, whichaccording to Kh rush cit ov"has been and remains the main method of increasing the production of grain."
In indicating the need for more grain, Khrushchev alsoell-stated definition of what he neons when he says, "grain is the basis of the agricultural economy." In listing the needs, he gives
priority to tho following:
1. Bread, Bread Products, Flour, and Groats.
An important phase in the "new course" will bo theof the trend toward increased consumption of "white" bread produced from wheat in place of the coarse, black rye bread, the traditional bulk product in the Russian diet. This improvement of the quality of caloric intake from grain products also includes more wheat flour, which was placed on unrestricted sale for the first time last year, and more groats, consumed as porridges and cereals.
The planners must also reckon with the dynamics of population growth which will roquiroillionillion tons of food grains During the consumption year from
* Postwar boundaries. Total acreage0i million hectares andillion hoc tares.
ae Based on an estimated population0illionrain consumption rateilograms per capita.
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13 toulyas whs true thc two or threeconsumption years, thero was enough grain available totile currant estimated consumption rateilograms. Tho Soviet officials want to decrease thisate of consumption (usual tell-tale signoor diet) by making available more animal and vegetable products. At the same time they hope to Improve the quality of that part of the diet coming fron bread products by substituting ever increasing amounts of wheat bread, wheat flour, and groats for the coarse rye grain products. reater availability of bread grains will also allow tho lowering of flour extraction rates, which will increase the quality of the bread produced.
of State Grain Reserves.
The Fifth Five Tear Plan calls for the doubling of state reserves. It is assumed that grain reserves will also be increased proportionately as part of thc over-all reserve program. Because moot yield-stabilising projects such as shelter-belt and irrigation projects have been deflated or abandoned, the possibility of severe crop failures resulting from droughterious threat. The Soviet planners must then keep In reserve greater quantities of agricultural products Ln case of crop failureat least until new measures have been taken to give greater stability to grain production. Such measures would include increased acreages and yields of grain crops in the podzollc soil districts where amounts of precipitation are adequate.
for Livestock.
There isroat need for more grain both to sustain increasing numbers of livestock and to increaso the now low productivity rates of milk, meat, wool, eggs, and other products. While tha re haspercent increase in wheat acreago comparedeed-grain acreage (barley, oats, and corn) has decreasedercent; livestock numbers have remained about the same. Feed-grain screage will expand in the next two or three years, and most of this expansion will be the replacing of porormial grasses in the dry areas, there may be some substitution of feed groins for other grainsfor example, barley in place of rye in the Upper Volga Valley. This will bo particularly true if the scheme for expansion of spring wheat acreago on the virgin and unused lands is successful.
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In rationalising the substitution of feed grains for perennial grasses, Khrushchev said that? state farms1 grain yields amounted2 centners per hectareodder units per hectare, as comparedield of onlya,odder units per hectare, for perennial grasses sown on state farms. In order to arrive at an adequate balance of hay to feed grains, the planners will probably emphasise the relegation of sown grasses to the poorer yielding lands and also the more careful harvest of wild hay.
Il, Greater Grain Requirements for Regions Growing Tochnical and Othor Crops.
With the expansion of non-grain-crop acreage in those regions best suited for those crops, there will undoubtedly be some reduction in grain acreag'o. The planned expansion of acreages of such crops as cotton, flax, sugar beets, and vegetables will result in some grain-acreage substitution by those crops. These measures naturally willreater importing of food and feed grains into the deficit grain-producing regions. In effect, thisodification of the regional "self-sufficiency" principle.
5. Expending the Export of Grain.
The USSR will export anillion tons of grain duringrodo year as compared, million tons the previous year. This order of magnitude hns been tho general pattern for the last five years. In order to finance the large projected increases of consumer goods and other imports and to back up claims of intentions to incroase trade with the West, there willeed for greater quantities of grain, both wheat and feed grains, for export.
The most spectacular and widely publicised facet of the change in acreage patterns has been the program for expanding food-grain acreago in the areas of "inadequate U plan calls for the expansion of spring-wheat and millet acreageillion hectares of virgin and unused landb and onillion hectares? This expansion, by itself, willover-all grain acreageercentb. of this expansion will take place on state farms. Most of this acreage will
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rK-TnT-ft,!,
be sown along the southern and eastern periphery of the traditional spring-wheat belt, where both soil and climatic conditions are adverse for stable yields. In these dry steppelands of chestnut soil andonches of rainfall, the USSR canlmost complete crop failuresears, tn the first croprobable soil moisture reserve in this area will provide better than thepercent chance ofnormal" crop. Apparently Khrushchevield ofoentners per hectare to be the standard. The Plenum adopted the maximum variant of Hi toa, resulting in ait estimated production ofillion toillion ions Probably arealistic average yield would be on the orderotalillion tons, an increase from this part of thegrain programercent of the total grain output.
At best, the USSR can expect to sustain this part of the grain expansion program forew yoars. This general area of dry steppelsnds was the scene of the so-callod "grain factory" undertaking during the First Five Year Plan. Firstin the springhe state farm "grain factory" project was finally launched by the government After first-year success, the result of very good weather conditions, the project failed the two following years when very low yields were produced after "enormous Investments by the state" (Stalin,Party Congress). 3 the sown acreage on these large grain farms in the drier regions was greatly restricted. 9 there again was planned an expansion of grains ln the dry regions. Instead of in spring wheat, however, this venture was in winter grainsexpansion of winter wheat in the Kiddle and Lower Volga in the falllan for the increaso of the more drought-resistant winter rye ln Siberia and Kazakhstan Inhe government againear plan for the expansion of general grain acreageillion hectares Ln the eastern regions, mostly Ln the semi-arid cone. Evidence Is lacking as to the outcome of these expansion projects in the Immediate prewar period, although wartime exigencies required an expansion of winter rye acreage in this area.
In cultivating these new lands, tha inputs involved will have soma effect on the rest of the agricultural economy* most significantly in the machinery sector and perhaps in thc skilled manpower sector. In his report to the Plenum ot the end of
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February, Khrushchev said, "This year most tractors, combines, and other machines delivered to agricultural areas will be sent to the areas of new lands.* The tractors allocated to the now project will be the genorel-purpose caterpillar types, thelthough tho rest of the agricultural economy is relatively well supplied with this typecompared with the great need for the universal, or row-type, tractors, the traditional grain-growing regions such as the Ukraine could well use more of the caterpillar tractors to improve the timeliness of seasonal operations.
The totalillion tractor horsepower to be allocated to the "new areas" will constitute aboutercent of the horsepower ln the present tractor park but somewhat less thanercent of tho total tractor numbers.
There are two alternatives to the direct allocation of tractors from new production scheduled for agriculture or from the existing machine tractor stations and state farm tractorart ofillion horsepower could be obtained from the schedulednew-tractor allocationillion horsepower to the non-agriculture sectors or by transferring tractors fromprojects.
Probably of greater Importance in terms of machinery inputs will be the problem of utilization and maintenance of tractors in tho new areas. Apparently the task of obtaining spare partseak link in the operation of tractor and farm machinery parks. Throughout the agricultural economy therehortage of maintenance facilities, primarily of repair shops equipped with machine tools*
Tho other important input is the labor force. Although it is estimated that the total labor force required for the entire project will notlessercent of the total agricultural laborhere willerious drain on the skilled or sami-skilled labor force that will manage the farms and operate and repair the machinery. Although the badly deploted technician force of the existing network of machine tractor stations and tho collective and state farms has been "reinforced" since the last crop season, tho rest of the agricultural economy is hardlyosition to supply experienced machine operators, agronomists, or engineers without weakening their own operations. Khrushchev,
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however, not only calls on industry and urban centers to supply
he.alSO SEE? ttafarms and tractor
stations to supply qualified specialists even to the point of
"appointing to the new sUte farms the best directors chief engineers
and chief agronomists from the old state farms...
+k ! Abut probably more productivethe long run will be the "carrying out of theof largo areas of noadoMa( narshy * ducU
meadows, and pasture lands In the central and northwestern areas of the country." In these areas of adequate precipitation, real acMevements can be made if after reclaiming the land, sufficient inputs of lime {to correct the acidity of the soil) and of mineral and organic fertilisers are used.
The rationalization behind the expansion of groin
nuaed UndB* i* the dry area is open to
speculation. Probably one or more of the following factorsparamounti actors were
f" esi" to obtain greater quantities of wheata loss resulting from the re-
retiorSf Cr0pa of food-^a^ acreage in traditional
. a SeSdroduction substitute required
toPro")ects that were acheduS to result in an increase in wheat acreage.
. realisation that planned Increases in grain
eamed withand that, consequently, there mustemporarywheatn expansion which wouldtr ^ could ^erovm lnof adequate
-unused- or faUow lands are defined as those lands that have not been plowederiodoears and are now covered vlto wild grass; "virgin" lands are those lands abandoned for overears. It Is also claimed that lands will not be utilised that have an annual precipitation of lessnches) No official Indication has been given that tfaisis toemporary program.
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I.
ossible needapid increase in reserves
of food eraxns, an increase dictated by an undefined nationalsuch as preparation for hostilities.
F. Change in Acreage Patterns.
-JJf.needd^ftlc cha"ees in acreageesult8ombination of
"lanned increases in the yxelds of such important crops as grains, oilseeds, flax and perennial grasses,he necessity for more than Up se^ice
fWIf plan'Vin8ar announced, there have beentrends which indicate modification or abandonment ofaccepted. Those dogmas included the so-calledIVt * , non-irrigated agricultural
The doctrine of incorporating sown grasses in the crop-rotation system was adopted in the latebut did not become widely enforced until after the war. ts simplest fern,doctrineatter of setting-year rotation which included two or three years of grasses, preferably perennial
use of grasses was first emphasized because
as been
or, the allegedly beneficial effect of rotation grass on soil
structure and fertility and, thus, the raising of yields. Anparentlv ignoring the negative results of the use ofPparently climatically analagous areas of the US and Canada, the Soviet leaders endorsed the indiscriminate use of grass in rotations in dr^ areas as well as humid areas. esult, valuable feed-grain and food-grain acreage was replaced with grasses that supposedly would raise yields of grain and at the same time provide large quantities of high-quality hay for livestock. Neilher of these two "benefits" resulted. Not only have grain crops in rotation with grasses in the dry steppes of the Ukraine and North Caucasus not showf an upward trend in yields over the last ten years, but also there hasecrease in fecdstuffs available for livestock.
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Khrushchev indicated very low yields of hay and declared that perennial grasses yield "ouch less fodder than thecrops in the Southern Ukraine, North Caucasus, Volga Valley, Siberia, the Southern Urals and Northeastern oblasts of Kazakhstan."
According to the new program, there willharpof perennial grass acreage in those areas, which will allow the expansion of other cropsiUion hectares, most of which will probably bo sown to feed grains such as corn, oats, and barley.
Throughout the new programhange in sown acreages, there are indications that the princiole of regional self-sufficiency has been pushed to the background In favor of intensifying theof those crops best fitted to certain soil and climato areas. The modification of the principle of solf-sufficiency mayather sharp change in inter-regional acreage patterns.
Generally speaking, there appears to bearge increase in feed grain acreage; an increase in wheat acreage, butarge increase in vheat production) increases In acreage of potatoes and vegetables and of most technical crops;ecrease in low-yielding perennial grass acreage. This scheme of acreages is hopefully geared to provide the countryetter quality diet in the next two or three years without waiting for crop yields to rise. ,
In the final analysisregardless of the technical accuracy of tho planningthe success of the new agricultural program will mostly depend upon thc peasantthe actual producerand his reaction to the incentives offered by the government.
Original document.
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