BEST COPY AVAILABLE
AND KEY OVERSEASi: llSTSTAl^TlQNa
CIA HISTORICAL REVJEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL
;pu(ECTOR or cf-vtoal iktelm(;kxck The fotlourtng Intelligence organization! participated in the preparation al IhU tittmate: The Central Intelligence Agency and .the'Intelligence orgaiiUattom ol Mttate; the Army, the Navy, the Atr Force, and Theoncurredy the
EMJdENce Advisory committee
nd amended bv IAC action'on NIE
tl*inert the Special Autilant.
IntcUtgencii'-Department ol State; the AnUtant Chiel ol, Department ol the Army; Vie Director ol ttaoalhe Director ol Intelligence, VSAr; the Deputy
Director foF Intelligence. The Joint Staff; tht Atomic Energy Cdmtrtiiiion. Rtpresenlathe to the IAC; and the Aulitant to
he Director. Federal Bureau ol
NOTEt'TliU test 'tSNIE ll-IA-UI It identical withS4 tseept lor the TABUS on pages 7
and.iand, e. and J.
SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACKS ON THE US AND KEY OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS'7
To estimate gross Soviet capabilities for attacks on the US and key
In planning the actual scale of attack on the US and key US installationsUie Soviet rulers wouldhat such an attack would inevitably Involve general war. Accordingly, some portion of the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile and delivery capabilities would almost certainly be allocated for use against US allies and for reserve. This estimate does not consider Uie problem of such allocation, butitself to the gross capabilities for attack on the US and key US installationsas indicated by the estimated state of Soviet weapons, equipment, and facilities during the period of the estimate.
In attacking the US and key USinstallations the major Sovietwould be to: (a) destroy or cripple as quickly as possible US capabilities for
attack on urban, industrial, andtargets Ln the US as would prevent, or at least hinder, the mobilization of US war potential; (c) inflict such destruction
Key US Overseasal Unitedstrategic air bases and forces; (blEuropestrategic air bases and forces;air bases and forces for NATO support; bases and forces ror support of naval opcraUons; army forces, depot and port complexes, major headquarters and Key bridges and tunnels; (e> rar East (Including Okinawa)strategic air bases and forces: tactical air support bases and forces; naval and naval air forces and army and navy InstallaUons; port complexes for aupport of US and allied forces; (di French north Afrtca-Libyastrategic rtr bases and forces; naval air facilities; (el Pacific (Including Hawaii andair bases and fortes;
LOC support bases; army bases; naval and naval air bases and forces; (fi Middle Eaststralegic air bases and. forces; naval air faelllUes; (g) Horth Atlantic (Including Newfoundland, Oreen-land. Labrador. Iceland)air bases and forces; naval and naval air faculUes; LOC support faelUUes; (h)oresair bases; naval andir faculties; (I) Alaskastrategic *'r bases and forces; ports; army base; naval air facility; (J> tanama Canal andLOC link; naval and naval air facilities; and (k) VS Fleet Units -elements of Sixth. Seventh, Second and FlrlkUVeetsimmediate threats to the USSR.
necessary lo hamper or prevent the US from reinforcing or resupplying its forces.
The Soviet leaders would probablythat in order to achieve success such an attack would have to beunder conditions of maximum surprise. Therefore the USSR would probably launch its initial attacks from such bases and under such conditions as would offer the greatest security from
In order to achieve both maximum surprise and maximum weight in anon the US and its overseaswc believe that the USSR would place chief reliance on nuclear airSuch attacks would probablythe highest priority because of: (a) the limited capabilities of naval, ground, and airborne forces against theUS; (b) the security difficultiesin thc delivery of large numbers of nuclear weapons by clandestine means; (c) the insufficient development of other methods of delivery of nuclear weaponsarge scale; (d) the insufficientof other mass destruction weapons, or handicaps to their large-scale use; and (e) thc availability of far north-em air bases, from which air operations against the US are least susceptible to
areas most suitablelaunching long-range airthe US are the Kolathe Leningrad complex; theand Kamchatka areas inSiberia; and the Baltic-Eastarea. The Chukotski, Kola,areas are particularlyas bases for surprise attackscircle routes would initiallyof nations friendly to the US.
resent Soviet capabilities for airon the continental US are limited by dependence on theomber, by the apparent lackeveloped inflight refueling capabilily, and by the relatively undeveloped character of the Kola,and Kamchatka base areas.missions or such range extension techniques as inflight refueling would be required to enable Soviet bomber aircraft to strike important targets in theUS. We estimate that the capacity of air bases in these areas would permitaximum ofin an initial attack against the US. If all were committed to one-waymissions,ight reach US target areas not considering combat losses.orce couldall or atubstantialof the nuclear weapons estimated to be available to the USSRhile stillortion of the striking force to be used for electronic counter-measures, escort, or diversionary tasks.'
Director Ol Naval intelligence and UieChief of. DeparUnent of the Army, believe lhat available Intelligence on over-all Soviet capabilities fot ion*-range airIs Insufficient loinite estimate of the number of aircraft which might be launched Irom lhe Kola. Kamchatka andareashey therefore believe thathould read as follows:
"Soviet gross capabiliUes for air altack onin the conUnenlal Uniied States arclimited by dependence on theby the apparent lackevelopedrefueling capability, and by thecharacter ot the Chukotskibase areas. The Soviets havelo attempt Uie delivery of all or apart of their atomic stockpile (lhedepending upon types of weaponsthe United Stales from bases Interritory, even though some of thereaching target areas probably wouldbomb carriersumber would beelectronic counlermeasurea. escort, orcontinued on page 3
the USSR elected to utilize thebases in the Baltic-East German and Leningrad areas and thus lessen its chances of achieving surprise it couldaximum ofircraft4 in an initial attack on the US. However, the great bulk of these aircraft would have to fly one-waymissions.ight reach target areas not considering combat losses. Wc consider such anhighly unlikely.
Assuming an allocationU-4's against the continental US, the USSR could in addition launchedium bombers against such other targets as key US and allied installations overseas. Not considering combat lossesight reach target areas. However, the USSR will probably rely more onet light bombers available4 to attack keywithin operational radius of these aircraft because of the greater capability of the jet bomber to penetrate allied air defenses.
7 we estimate that the USSR could,ajor efiort, develop theof the air bases in the Kola,Chukotski, and Kamchatka areas
Footnote continued Irom page 2
The ImplementaUon of this capability Isupon;
heir willingness to accept Uie loss on one-way missionsubstantial portion of their long-range air lorce.
il) Their willingness to accept theol nilubstanUal portion ol theirstockpile and to entrust Its delivery to thelrcralt.
he development and employment of range extension techniques
se ol Leningrad base areas that would considerably decrease the range of alrcralt II surprise is to be achieved by not overflying non-Sovlel territory."
to permit the launching ofircraft in an initial air operation against the US If all of these aircraft were committed to one-way unrefueled missions (or two-way unrefueledwheren the orderircraft might reach target areas not considering combat losses. Theof this maximum capability would involve the expenditure on one-wayof most of Soviet Long-Range
consider it more likely,the USSR would elect tofewer mission aircraft.launchankersaircraft. Ofissiontwo-thirds would possiblyfrom the Kola-Leningradone-third fromircraft might arrive overareas not considering combat losses.exercise of this capabilitydifficult operational andparticularly those pertainingcreationanker fleet.exercise of this capability wouldthe loss on one-way missionsone-third ofumber of theaircraft would probably be usedcountermeasures, escort, ortasks.
the scale of atlack In9 above, the USSR would haveand heavy aircraft left forOf thisercent would be immediatelyfor attack against key USoverseas installations, forfor reserve. Notapproximatelyercent of these
would probably arrive overareas. Wc also estimate that7et light bombers will befor attacks on targets within thecapabilities of these aircraft.
Throughout the period of thisthe Soviet rulers probably would employ other methods of attacking the US or US installations overseaswith or immediatelyurprise nuclear air attack. They could attack US overseas installations with guided missiles up to rangesiles and could employ airborne andforces, ground forces, and chemical warfare, Clandestine attack on the US itself by sabotage, biological warfare, and placement of nuclear weapons, might occur against specially selected targets.
The submarine force of the USSR could, at least in the initial phases of an
attack, inflict serious damage on UScommunications and carry outmining in the shippingto harbors and ports of the US and itsn addition to its potential for launching mass destruction weapons against the US or key US overseaswithin range.
he USSR would probably employ ground, airborne, and amphibious forces in attacks that occur simultaneously with or immediately after the initial attacks. Soviet ground forces, particularly in Western Europe,igh capability for attacking Allied forces andlocated in forward areas. Theemployment of airborne orforces would enable the Soviet Ground Forces to attack more distant forces and installations.
AVAILABILITY Of SOVIET /AASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS
Nuclear Weapons. The Soviet atomicprogram, directed primarily toward the production of nuclear weapons, will continue to receive special emphasisxtensive reserves of uranium exist within thc USSR and current rales of exploitation of domestic and Satellite uranium deposits will probably continue to be more than sufficient to support estimated fissionable materialIt is believed that the other basic materials required for nuclear energyup tore available ih sufficient quantity as not to cause curtailment of other Important Soviet efforts If nuclear program needs are to be met
In thc light of technological capabilities as of the endoviet militarywill govern the allocation of available fissionable material to various types of weap-
ons, consideration being given to the total energy yields attainable from the weapons stockpile. Dy the end3 thc USSR had tested small, medium, and large-yield weapons and had employed thermonuclear boosting principles to produce energy yields In the range of the equivalentew thousand to at least one million tons of TNT. During the immediate future, thc types of weaponswill probably have Uie generaland the explosive powers of weaponstested. On this basis, one of the ways in which the USSR might allocate Itsof fissionable material ls as follows:'
' In view of the range of error applicable to Uie estimate of Soviet fissionable materialthe actual figures foray be as much as one-third lower or higher than thegiven above. Uncertainty Increases as esU-mates are proiected Into the future and thc actual figure foraylow as one-half or as high as twice the flEuirWvcn In the table.
Large-yield0 KT each)
Medium-yield weaponsT each!
Small-yield weaponsT each)
USSR will probably continueweapons with equivalent yields wellof one million tons of TNT as wellsmall-yield and small-dimensiondevelopments along these linestesteduch developmentsmore flexibility in the use ofWe esUmate that7 thehave weapons with the followingyields:
Utge-ylcld0 KT or more Medium-yieldT Small-yield weaponsOST
Radiological Warfare. It is most unlikely, for technological reasons, that the USSR will be able to stockpile militarily significant quantities of .radiological warfare weapons during the period of this estimate. Although not strictly within the category of radiological warfare, the significance of radio-activefollowing large nuclear explosions becomes greater as the yield of nuclear weaponsThis factor should be considered In connection with Soviet capabilities to produce explosions in Uie megaton range.
Biological Warfare. The USSR Is inof all Uie necessary basic knowledge for the production of most BW agents anddlsseminaUon devices, If the Soviets chose to do so, they would be able to construct and operate plants for BW agent producUon and devices for dissemination could bein adequate numbers. However, there Is no evidence that the USSR is engaged ln liw agent production or possesses production facilities designed specifically for BW agents. There is also no evidence of Soviet stockpiles of BW agents or munitions. Since it is not feasible to stockpile large quantities of most BW agents in prolonged storage, mostrequirements would have to be supplied directly from producUon facilities.
Warfare. Wc assume thatof standard agents andduring World War II hasand will be available for useUie period of this estimate,Uiat the Soviets could haveat least one of the nerve gasesand we estimate Uiat Uie USSR willOf employing nerve gases duringof this estimate.
II. DELIVERY Of CONVENTIONAL AND MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS BY AIRCRAFT
TheSoviet Long-Range Avialion constitutes the long-range sUtking force of the USSR. It consistsirn thc Far Eastn thc western USSR,orps of undetermined subordination In the western USSR. Theedium bomber, which was copied from thes the only bomber available to the Soviets in large numbers and capable of carryingweapons to distantsotal ofas estimated to be available In operational units. (Table of Equipment Strength of Soviet air regiments known lo be equipped with or in process of being equipped withircraftut theegiments areestimated to be at onlysU-4's (eight regimentstrength) were located In the Soviet Far East. It is believed that deliveries Of TU-4's to operaUonal units have virtually ceased and that with the gradual phasing out of these aircraft as new Jel models become availableill remain In operational units by
Jet Medium Bomber. In the past four months there have been conclusive indicationset medium bomber equipment program has been Initiated in Soviet Long-RangeDuring4 Soviet May Day fly by and thc rehearsals preceding1 twin Jet medium bombers, designalcd"tt)tCaLliedas thearticipated. Sub-
Intelligence has associated this typenownng-Range Aviation unit. We estimate that as4 at least two regiments of Soviet Long-Range Aviationtrength ofircraft were in process of equipment with Typeet medium bombers. Total actual strength of these units is estimated at approximatelyircraft Series production of the Types estimated to have begun innd total production as4 Is estimated at aboutircraft. Byl isthat Soviet Long-Range Aviation will contain an actual strengthet medium bombers.
et Heavy Bomber. Thehich was initially observed on3 and later observed in flight on seven different occasions in connection with4 May Day celebration,wept wing, four engine, jet heavy bomber with an estimated gross weightounds. Thc aircraft, con-
SUMMARV OP ESTIMATED OPERATIONAL STRENGTH OF SOVIET LO HO-RANOE
sidered presently to be In thc prototype stage, Is expected to appear ir. operational units by Uie end6 building up lo an actual strength of aboutircraft by
lass Heavy Bomber. Theresome evidence of Uie existence of adesignated Uien thepresent evidence, it Is highly doubtfulsubstantial re-equipment ofunits with Typelass aircraflto dale, though possiblyeen Introduced. The Long Rangereequipment program lo replaceis more likely to be accomplished byof the Jet bomber aircraftnow appeared, and Uieill not be Introduced InesUmated radius/range of this aircraftnautical milesoadauticalound bomb load.
Aircraft Characteristics of Soviet long-Range Aircraft
of Soviet Long-Rangeare shown in lhe following tables. Table
capabilities calculated Inwith US military mission piofiles. Table
maximum performance undermission profile.
APABILITIES OF SOVIET LONO-RANGE AIRCRAFT (Calculated In accordance wllh US Military Mission profiles.)
* The Director of Naval Intelligence believes lhat the operating performance capabiliUes of these aircraft could be approximately aa Indicated. However, he desires lo note thai these data are based primarily on inflight photographserifs ol luswmptlons. Therefore, they may be subject lo some revision cither upwards or downwards, as more subsUnUal direct evidence becomes available. m
"The altitude at which rate of climbl/mln can be maintained at the end of the given*combat radius of the aircraft
OVIET LONO-RANOE AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIESODIFIED MISSION PROFILE
(Calculated In accordance with US Military Mission Profile* except Uiat fuel reserves are reduced andoperate at aiuiudes permlttlne. maximum radius/range)
Combat Radius/ Range (nml
a 0 Ib. load one refuel.
b. load one refuel.
Estimated maximum target0 ft/mln rale of climb) for the Typend Typenmissions, one hour ot fuel remaining, bombload aboard and with maximum power, are as follows:
' The Director of Naval IntelUgence believes that the opcratlm; performance capabilities of thise alreralt could be approximately as Indicated. However, he desires to note that these data are based primarily on Inflight photographseries Of assumptions. Therefore, they may be subject to some revision, either upwards or downwards, as more substantial direct evidence becomes available. - _
"The altitude at whleh rate of climbt/mln can be maintained at the end of UstVrtan combat radius o( thc nlrcraft
nflight Rejutling. We have nothat the USSR ts actually employing Inflight refueling. However, inflighttechniques do not impose serious technical problems and the USSR has had access lo the wartime techniques and equipment employed by the US in this field. The USSR is known to have evinced Interest ln Westernof refueling techniques, andmethods have been discussed in Soviet technical literature. It is therefore necessary to consider the effect of inflight refueling in extending thc range of Soviet bomberleet of tanker aircrafl, appreciablein their operational use. and theof mission aircraft fuel systems, would be necessary before two way missions against the US could be conductedarge scale. The establishment of tanker units wouldthe conversion of TU-4's or producUon of new tanker aircraft Sincetrength in operaUonal units Is estimated la decrease from Uie present figureoyufficient TU-4's could befor conversion to tanker aircrafl during the period of this estimate With onethe combat radius/range of USSR's long-range aircraft could be increased as shown Innd II.
Base Areas for Direct Air Atiack on tho US
ive areas within Soviet dominatedare most suitable geographically for launching long-range air operations against the United Slates: the Kola Peninsula area; the Leningrad complex; the Chukotski and Kamchatka areas In northeastern Siberia; and Uie Baltic-East German area. Tlie Chukotski. Kola, and Kamchatka areas are particularly advantageous as bases forattacks since great circle routes would avoid initial overflight of nations friendly to Uie US. The extension of bomber ranges byill not be great enough to allow the enemy to dispense with these areas iftargets In lhe whole of the United States are to be reached on oUier thanmissions. II Is therefore reasonable to suppose that at least until Uie end of Uie period of this estimate any large-scale attacks would involve use of these areas.
CAvJeofski Area. This area Is not known to contain any bases suitable forake-offs at maximum gross weightsoundsfoot obstacle, but does have at least four bases which have undergone post-World War II runway development which would probably make them suitable forunder conditions of either reduced Lake off or acceptance of lower safety margins Among these are: Tanyurerndvailable intelligence docs not permit conclusive determination of the current status of these facilities. It does indicateew hard-surfaced runway was built al Tanyurer after World Wax II.ateet In length Available Inlelligence also indicates that de velopment work occurred at Markovo,oot runway extensibleaximumeet existedue to this limitation on extensibility of this runway, however, piston medium bomber operalions from it would be severely restricted. The runway at Provideniya/Urelik was developed to Its present length ofeet between lhe spring2irfield development work has also beenon at Velkal and at some olher locations in Uie Chukotski area in the postwar period. Such work could be earned out in the area without detection. It is ei Li ma ted lhat Uie construction capability of elements presently In Uie Chukotski area could provide oneImproved0oot runway) each year between nowonstruction of permanent-surfaced runways suitable for long-range bomber operations may have been retarded in this area due to Uie permafrost problem, but Uie USSRhas learned to solve this difficulty through froten soil studies conducted since World War U. The Soviets have had aInterest In ice and snow-impacted runways.
Long-range air operations from thcarea would encounter many diffkulUes because of basic logistic limitations andclimatic conditions- However, the USSRund of Arctic OyingVfpenence
which could be exploited for operations from this area. Logistlcaily. the area Is served principally by sea-lift limited to the ice-free months of the year. The status of basesupport facilities in this area isThe supply problem inherent in the support of air operations in the Chukotski area would be difficult; however, theof thc supplies necessary to sustain limited air operations could be accomplished prior lo initiating such operations. Cold, wind, snow, and log in the area would make air operations difficult and hazardous attimes of the year. The lack of modern navigational aids would also hamperbut there are indications that the USSR is steadily improving ils air operationalin this area through the installation of modern radio navigational facilities. It isthat no long-range bomber units are presently stationed in this area, althoughights have been made to the area.
Koto. Peninsula Area. The Kolahas six known bases which would befor operations of the standard and/or modified versions of lhet maximum gross0 poundsoundsrovided the Sovietsa reduced safety margin. These are Murmansk/Vaycnga..oot graded earth surfaced runway; AlakurtU,0oot concrete surfaced runway;oot graded earth surfaced runway; Ponoy.oot graded earth surfaced runway; Pcchcnga,1oot concrete surfaced runway; and Nivskiy;, where recentis believed to have provided atoot hard surfaced runway. Thereack of recent Intelligence on the current status of runway surfaces at the above fields other than Nivskiy, although there have been some Indications of runway development at several of these installations. .
In addition lo these six airfields there are other fields in the area which could beand which may already have beento accommodate medium/heavy bomber operations. Such development could
now be in progress or could have beenout without detection. We estimate that construction elements In the area would be capable of completing at least one Improved installation each year between nowermanent surfaced runways can bewithout difficulty throughout the Kola area -as lt Is relatively free ofPrevailing climatic conditions,estrictive factor on air operations, arcmore favorable in this area than In other portions of the Soviet Par North.routes by rail and sea are open to thc Kola Peninsulacar-around basis. Thc status of base logistical support facilities which would be required to conduct long-range nuclear attacks from airfields In this area Is unknown. At least four of the six fields named above arc now used by other Soviet air components. These units would have to be relocated lo permit maximum use of the fields by long-range bomber aircraft. However, the airfield syslem In the Kola area would permit such relocation if required.
Area. This area. Inbomber units are probablycontains at least oneithconcrete runway. In addition,four airfields in the area,E) have runwayseet. Seven additionalthe area have runways in excess OfOpcraUons from this area by strikewould offer advantages ofemperate climate withsupport. However, if overflightwere to be avoided, aover thc Kola Peninsula wouldon an attempted attack againstStates.
Area. At present,the Kamchatka area are not consideredsuitable forake-offs atweightounds over aHowever, there arc four airfieldsarea which would permit ground runsfeet and could be used by^aoBifledof theroviding lower safety
margins were accepted. Tnese are Petropav-lovsk iWnd
Baltic-Kail Cerman Area This area, which includes the Soviet zone of Germany and Poland, now has at leastirfieldsfor long-range bomber operations. These bases are favorably situated with respect to communications and weather and areserved by existing transportationajor disadvantage is that great circle routes to the Uniied States from these bases pass over portions of Western Europe or Scandinavia, and any attempted air strike would probably be detected early enough to provide warning. In addition, security of preparations would be lower In this area Ihan in other forward base areas.
The capabilities of Soviet bombersfrom these base areas against the US and key US overseas installations are shown in the charts annexed to this estimate
Navigation and Bombing Accuracy.long-range aviation has available through open sources virtually complete target and navigation data on North America and its approach routes It is even probable that in the eventurprise attack, certain Western electronic navigational aids would beduring at least part of Ihe flight.meteorological reports, Includingdata at all altitudes, are regularlyin the United States and Canada incipher We esUmate that Soviet blind-bombing and navigational radar equipment is capable of equal or better performance than the US World War II equipment which the USSR acquired. It is also possible lhat clandestinely placed navigational beacons may be used for aircraft homing. TheSoviel training program pouits toimprovement in air crew proficiency. In view of these factors and Soviet ability toime of attack with respect toroute and target weather conditions. It Is almost certain that Soviet air crews would be able lo navigate with sufficient accuracy to reach lhe major population and Industrial centers of the United States and In bombing
to achieve CEP accuracieseet for visual bombing0 feet,eet for radar bombing from the sarrfe altitude. However, the effectiveness of attack delivered by radar alone might bereduced by defensive electronic
vailability and Abort Rate.of Soviet aircraft, although below US standards, has improved since World War II. By the end7 the Soviets should be capable of achieving in Ihe forward stagingerviceability rale ofercent for an initial, deliberately prepared surpriseagainst North America. The sustained serviceability rate for bombers Ls estimated at aboutercent for normal operations. Cold weather operaUons might cause somein Uie foregoing figures. In addition, some of Uie aircraft taking off would abort and fail lo reach target areas for reasons other than our air defense activity. The allowance for aborts and for all causes other thanattrition Is estimated at aboutercent for nonrefuelcd andercent for refueled missions.
Replacement Rate No appreciableot TU-4's are believed to exist at Uie present time.anker fleet Is created, or TU-4's are converted for other specialappreciable numbers of TU-4's. phased out of operaUonal bomber units during the period of this estimate, would probably not be availableeserve. There will be no appreciable reserves of any new types ofintroduced during the period of this estimate.
Weather. The USSR has for many years devoted considerable emphasis to both short-period and long-pcrlcd meteorologicaland hasigh degree of success In this field We believe that Uie USSR has the forecasting capability tolong-range air operations. Thisplus extensive experience inresearch in the extreme northernweather reporting facilities In Siberia, and constant access lo current Northweather reports and forecasts shouldthe USSR to predict bolh route and target
with reasonable accuracy. Wethat Soviet capabilities in upper air research and in the more complex phases of meteorological instrumentation are somewhat less than those of the US; however, tlie Soviets have the technical capability to overcome these deficienciesew years.
Countermeasures. Thchad accesside variety of WorldUS defensive radar and to some USequipment. Il is apparently wellthe tactical advantage to be gaineddefensive radar and oilierWe believe lhat the USSR iscapable of pioducingOf ground based andequipment toegacycles, and, by useequipment, can seriouslylong-range radio communicationsthc continental US and itsWe further believe that theincrease the effectiveness of itsas well as the proficiency andof Its trained personnel throughoutof this estimate. Airbornearc likely to be available fordefensive radars andcontrol communications in use atlime for the delense of Northeffectiveness of the future Sovielwill depend on their degree ofIn analysis of signal radiations andmeans of obtaining technical datadefense radar that will then be inUSSR has probably producedcountermeasures devices toaircraft, but we do not know howthose devices would be against USradar. Use of jammingwould require the employmentaircraft equipped specially for
Aircraft Available for Attacks Agoinst Key US Overseas Installations
long-range aircraft discussedalso be used for attacks on In addition, thend Type 35
Jet light bombers are estimated lo be capable of carrying out attacks on many of theseThes the standard Ught bomber of the Air Force of the Soviet Army. It is powered by two centrifugal flow gaseach deliveringounds thrust.ormal bomb loadounds andallon external wing tanks the high altitude combat radius Lsloautical miles.ow level attack bomber Its radius is estimated toauttcal miles.
Types believed lo bein Soviet Naval Aviation into thehis aircraft Is believedspecial features to permit ltout naval missions such as torpedoand mine-laying as well as highThe Types believed toby twoentrifugal flowrated at approximatelyIts combat radius carrying abomb load Is estimated
ESTIMATED JET UGHT BOMBER STRENGTH
Air Force of Soviet
he USSR may also have anJet light bomber with Improvedcharacteristics. This aircrafta twin-turbojet swept-wing bomberautical milesangenautical miles carrying aload. Moreover, the performance ofand Typeircraft may improvethe period of this estimate tj^cause ofof higher-thrust engines
fty p* s
IWT PERFORMANCE CIJARACTRHI8TICS OrLIOHT
Combat Radlui/Ranrc/ Load (nm/nm/lbal
Combat Celling (fl)
Areas for Direct Altack on Key US Installations Overseas
Sovtet Base Areas. In thc Soviet Union, the European Satellites, Communist China, and North Korea, there areirfields with hard-surfaced runwayseet or over which are estimated to be suitable for operaUons by Jet light bombers, medium bombers, and heavy bombers. Of thisapproximately one-third are located In Uie European Satellites and one-fourth InChina and North Korea. Theare located chiefly in the western and southern USSR and in mariUme provinces of the Soviet Par East. In addition, there areirfields in the Soviet Bloc which are estimated to be potentially capable of accommodaUng Jet light bomber andand heavy bomber operations. We believe that the large number of suitable airfields available could adequately support Soviet bomber attacks against most key US overseas installations.
Soviet Capabilities tor Attack on Key US Overseas Installations. Prom bases In East Germany. Soviet Jet light bombers on two-way missions could reach Uie entire North Sea area, Uie UK and its northern and western approaches (Including therance and ils western approaches, and northeastern Spain. From bases In Hungary thesecould reach the Mediterranean area up to an arc drawn south of Sardinia and Sicily. From bases In Uie southern USSR, they could
reach an area north of an arc Crelc-Israel-Kuwalt, Jet light bombers based In the Vladivostok and Dairen areas could reach all of Japan. To reach Ol.inawa and Luzon on two-way missions, Uicy would have to stage from bases In Communist China.
rom bases in the USSR, Soviet stripped-downon two-way missions could reach key US installaUons in the UK, WesternIceland. Greenland. Ihe Aaores. French North Africa. Libya, the Middle East. Japan, Okinawa. Alaska, Guam, and the northern Philippines. To reach key installationsthese areas. IUwould have lo resort to inflight refueling or one-way missions. Jet medium bombers from bases In the USSR could reach all lhe above areas exceptGreenland (marginal against Thulej. Uie Axores, Guam, and the Philippines.7 jet heavy bombers on two-way missions could reach key US installations in the UK. Western Europe. Far East Including Okinawa. Flench North Africa-Libya, lhe Philippine andIslands, Middle East, Greenland. Iceland, and the northeastern coastrador, Uie Azores, and Alaska. Thend Jet heavy bombers could reach the Panama Canal on one-way missions only If inflight refueling were employed.
argeting and Bombing Accuracy. The factors discussed in Paragraphor long-range operations apply equally to Soviet air attacks against key US lnstalaflons overseas. In addition, It has been established thai radar
bombing byet light bombers has been carried out Qsrktg equipment withsimilar to the USype radar.nits in Eastern Germany are known to have practiced bombing at night and during instrument weather conditions and such practice is probably included In other jet light bomber units. In the absence of definiteon Soviet radar and visual bombing proficiency, it is assumed that accuracies for trained units approach the limitations of the equipment. II is estimated, therefore, that jet light bomber crews could achieveeet for visual bombing0 feel,eet for radar bombing from the same alUtude.
AvailabtUtu, Abort RaU. Replacement Factors. The factors discussed in Paragraphor long-range bombers attacking the-US apply generally to bomber aircraft attacking key US installations overseas. Arale ofercent byor initial atucks from other than the forward northern bases, is considered possible because of the better facilities and logistic support In these areas. The sustained serviceability rate for jet light bombers is estimated to be aboutercent. No reserves of Jet light bombers are believed to exist at present, nor do we estimate an appreciable reserve of this type of aircraft will exist during the period of this estimate.
Electronic Countermeasures. The Soviet ECM capabiliUes discussed in Paragraphpply also to bomber allacks against key US overseas InstallaUons. However, Sovietfor ECM would probably be less because of the less elaborate defenses around most of these installations and Uie shorter limes required lo penetrate defenses before targets arc reached. Space and weightwould probably preclude Soviel jet light bombers from carrying ECM equipmentfor Chaff) In addition to bomb loads. However, Uie USSR has the technicalto produce andet light bomber wiih both passive listening and activeelectronic equipment. No evidence Is available of Soviet inlenUons In this regard.
"i. PROBABLE MAXIMUM SCAIE OF SOVIET AIR ATTACK4
Altock Against Continental US with
Maximum Effort to Achieveoviel capabilities for air attacks on the continental US are presenUy limited by*on theomber, by thelackeveloped Inflight refueling capability, and by the relatively undeveloped character of lhe Kola, Chukotski, andbase areas. These three base areas are the closest to lhc US and are so situated asffer the best possibilities for launchingwithout allied delecUon. We believe, therefore, Uiat if the USSRur-prise attack against the US, aircraft would probably be launched from bases In the Kola, Chukotski, and Kamchatka areas.4 the estimated capacity of air bases In these areas would permit launchingircraft in an initial attack against the us. if all these aircraft were committed to one-way unrefueled missions,ight reach target areas, not considering combatortion of these aircraft would probably be used for electronic counter-measures, escort, or diversionary tasks. If the USSR were lo use inflight refueling lo ex-lend the radius/range of some of the mission aircraft, the size of the striking force from forward bases would be reduced by theof tanker aircraft launched from these bases.'
Direclor ol Nival Inlelligence and the Assistant Chief of. Department of the Army, believe that available Inlelligence onSoviet capabilities for long-range air attack is Insuflleient toinite estimate of the number of aircraft which might be launched from the Kola. Kamchatka and ChukoUkl areashey therefore believe that paragraphhould read as follows:
"Soviet gross capabilities for air attack onin the continental United States arelimited by dependence on theomber, by the apparent lackeveloped Inflightcapability, and by the rcIeUvelycharacter of the ChukoUW and Kola base areas. The Soviet have sufficient TU-4'a to attempt the delivery of allubstantial part Footnote continued oo Page 15
ln the Leningrad area couldused to launch additional long-rangeon one-way missionsurprisethe US4 provided aircraftnorth of Scandinavia. However,these bases by the USSR Is unlikelycapacity of the more advanced baseestimated to be adequate to launch aofubstantialperhaps all, of the estimated Sovietof nuclear weapons.
Full-Scole Altack Against Continental US
the USSR elected to utilize thebases In the Baltic-East German andareas, thus lessening chances ofit could, using its entireaximum ofaircraP. in the initial attack on thepractically all of these aircraftto fly one-way missions.might reach target areas, notlosses. We consider such anunlikely, since It would involve thepractically the entire Soviet long-rangeand since the considerably smallerof aircraft described to paragraphprobably be great enough to deliveratubstantial proportion, of the
roolnolc continued from Page 14
of their atomic stockpile (the number depending upon types of weapons stockpiled) against the United States from bases In Soviet-controlled territory, even though some of the aircrafttaiget areas piobably would not be bomb carriersumber would be used forcountermeasures, escort, or diversionary tasks.
The Implementation ot this capability Isupon:
heir willingness to accept the toss on one-way missionsubstantial portion of their long-range air force,
heir willingness to accept theof allubstanUal portion of theirslocxpilc and lo entrust Its delivery to thcircraft
The development and employment of range extension techniques.
Use ofbase areas that would considerably decrease the range of aire raft If surprise Is to be achieved by not overflying non-Soviet territory."
nuclear weapons available to the USSRt the USSR ahould wish to do so.
Attadtt Against Ovorsoas Installations
urprise attack against the continental US as outlined In paragraphbove, thc remaining force ofedium bombers Ln Soviet Long-Range Aviation would be available for re-attackfor attacks against targets Ln olher areas, and for reserve. If the USSR made no provision for re attack or for reserve it could launch all remaining serviceable mediumagainst key US and allied Installations overseas. Notcombat lossesf these mission aircraft might reach target areas. In addition the USSR could employ jet light bombers to attack those keywithin the operational radius of these aircraft. In fact, the USSR would probably rely more on Jel light bombers than on piston medium bombers to attack such Installations because of the greater capability of the jet bomber to penetrate allied air defenses.Soviet Jet light bombers would also be engaged in close ground support,air superiority, and mining and torpedo missions in support of other Soviet campaigns, the USSR could probablyufficient number ofet light bombers available4 to attempt to neutralize or destroy with HE or nuclear weapons selected allied forces and installations within range.
IV. PROBABLE SCALE Of SOVIEI AIR
ATTACK IN3 If the USSRurprise attack against the USll aircraft could be launched from bases In the Kola. Leningrad, Chukotski, and Kamchatka areas In order to reduce the possibility of detection. Wethat7 the USSR could,ajor effort, develop the capacily of the air bases In these areas to permit the launchingircraft In an Initial air operation against the US. If all of thesewere committed to one-way unrefueled missions (or Iwo way unrefueled missions, wherehe magnitude of the attack
might be on Uie orderircraft reaching target areas not considering combat losses. This would probably be the maximum Soviet long-range bomber capability against the US and ita exercise would involve theof one-way missions of most ofLong-Rangeumber of these aircraft would probably be used ior electronic countermeasures. diversionary, and escort missions.
consider it more likely, however,USSR would elect to commitmission aircraft. It might launchaircraft, which couldission aircraft. Ofaboutwould possiblyfrom thc Kola-Leningrad areafrom northeastern Siberia.aircraft might arrive over target areascombat losses. However,this capability would involve difficultand logistical problems,pertaining to the creaUon of aMoreover, the exercise of thiswould Involve Uie loss on one-wayabout one-third of Soviet long-rangeA number of the missionprobably be used for electronicescort, or diversionary tasks.
Allack Against Key US Overseas Installations
Uie USSR launched abomber aitack against lhcircraft (mostly oness thanercent of
*Of these SSO mission aircraft aboutercent would be used in one-way missions. Itotal ofS could be launched from Chukotski ud Kamchatka base areas; of this number approximately US would be one-way missions. From the Leningrad and Kola areasf the SSO mission aircraft could be launched. Of thi* Dumberould be TU-4's, SOndt the mission aircraft launched from the Kola and Leningrad areasould be one-way missions. This distribution shows one of several posslblHUes. It represent* what might beas the opUmum striking force to insure target coverage In various US area*.
Soviet long-range bombers would remain and these would probably not be immediatelyIf, as we consider more likely, the USSRission aircraft against the US. it wouldong-range aircraft available for re-attack, for attack In other areas, and for reserve. Assuming nofor re-attack or reserve, the USSR could launch all serviceableagainst key US and allied InstallationsNot considering combatercent would probably arrive over target areas. Since Uie probable number of long-range aircraft estimated to be Involved in initial air attacks against the US7 would stillajor porUon of Soviet Long-Range Aviation available for other uses. It Is considered unlikely thai the estimated force striking Uie US would be decreased to make available additional long-range aircraft to aitack key US installations overseas. Such diversion of long-range aircraft Is alsoin view of the great number of jet light bombers which could be employed against key installations within their radius.
We estimate Uiat7 the USSR will haveet light bombers which could also be available for attacks against key US and allied installations within Uie operaUonal capabilities of these aircraft. We believe that Uie USSR couldufficient number of these jet light bombers lo attempt toor destroy with UK or nuclear weapons selected allied forces and installations within range.
Soviet air attacks against key US and allied overseas Installations could achieve varying degrees of surprise depending on the location of such Installation* with respect to base areas from which Uie USSR could launch attacks. Soviet aircrafl attempting tokey installations In Western France. Spain, the UK. North Africa, and lhe Azores would initially have to overfly lhe Western zones of Germany or Austria or other friendly allied areas and It to probable that defenses would be alerted some lime before aircraft reached target areas. Therefore, surprise would probably notrimary considers-Uon in determining the scale of attack against installations in these areas, since allied de-
tenses would probablymall as veilarge number of. attacking aircraft. On tbe other hand key Installations InGreenland, Labrador, andcould be reached from Soviet base areas without overflying areas friendly to the allies. Attacks against key US Installations In the Middle East could probably be launchedfrom the southern USSR but might be detected approaching or over Turkey, Iraq, or Iran. From bases In the Soviet Far East the USSR could make direct attacks across Uie open Pacific against Midway, Wake, and Guam. To attack Okinawa andirect course from bases in Uie Vladivostok area, Soviet aircraft would have to overfly early warning radar areas In Japan and South Korea.
V. DELIVERY OF CONVENTIONAL AND MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS BY OTHER MEANS
eneral aUve Soviet guided missile esearch and development program isxist. The extent of Soviet exploitation of he German wartime guided missile program 'as comparable to their exploitation of suchprograms as electronics and aircraft, lowever, we are unable to assess Uie prioritythe Soviel guided missile programis ther weapons programs, or to assess the pri-rlties accorded the various guided missile atcgories within this program. Indications re lhat thc Soviet exploitation of German uided missile developments resulted in the SSR acquiringhoroughith the German program and thatie USSR was capable of continuing .dependent guided missile development, ex--pt possibly in lhe field of advanced guid-ice and control systems. The types and laraeteristics of the missiles which might produced by the USSR would dependoviet assessment of military require-
Detalled iujim of this subject are currently ln progress and will provide the basis of6 M. -Soviet Capabilities and Probable Program* in the Field of Ouldedcheduled for iroducUUti In the third quarter
ments and upon Uie allocation of priority among the many possible types which might be developed. To avoid spreading Its talent thinly, Uie USSR may be concentratingmall number of missile projects.it is well within Soviet capabiliUes to develop numerous types of missiles within the period of this estimate.
Present Capabiltties. We believe Uiat Uie USSR could now have an Improved version of theulse-jet winged missile with ranges upautical miles,oundsEPautical miles. The USSR also could now have an Improved version of theith ranges upauticalarheadounds,EPautical miles. Such missiles could be launched from advanced bases in Communist territory against key US installations in West Germany. However, we have no Annthat the USSR has these weaponsIn operational quantities. In addlUon. Uie USSR is now technically capable oftargets within Uie US with rocket-propelled glide bombs launched from long-range aircraftype missiles from submarines; however, we have no evidence that thc USSR has developed theseeither as to production of the missiles or as to conversion of submarines to missile launchers.
Capabilitiesntelligence confirms that at least as early8 the USSResearch and developmentfor guided missiles. The dates at which various missiles are estimated to becomeLn future are based on the assumptiononcerted and conUnuous effort startedhese dates of estimatedare the earliest prooaol* dates at which each missile type could be brought by Uie USSR into limited operaUonal use.'
' "Limited operaUonal use" Is defined for theof this estimatetage of development where small quantities of guided missile systems have been produced snd are In the hands of trained personnel of at least one operaUonal unit.
5 th* USSR could have In limited operational use anype missileangeauticalarheadounds,EPautical miles. Subsonic, turbojet poweredircraft missilesaximum rangeautical milesarheadounds could also become availableaunched from advanced Bloc bases InEurope, such weapons could be used to attack targets In Western Europe as far west as London, Paris, and Rome. In the Far Easi. if launched from Soviet or North Koreanthese weapons could be used to atiack targets in Weslern Japan; if launched from Chinese territory, they could be used lotargets In the Ryukyu Islands. The pilotless-aircraft missiles could also be launched from submarines against the US or key US overseas Installations within range.
We believe thathe USSR could have in limited operational use single stage guided missiles capable of ranges upautical miles carrying aandEPauticalaunched from Bloc bases, suchcould reach all of the UK, France. Italy. Scandinavia, and Turkey. In the Far East, If launched from Soviet or North Koreanthese weapons could reach all of the Japanese islands, and if launched from China, they could reach all of Luzon.
Weapons. We have noto any Soviet plans or preparationsdelivery of nuclearthc US. However, during the period
Director of intelllcence, USAF. believe* mi. missile couldIn limited operaUonal uae InndallUUc missileange of about IJO0 nm could be In limited operational use InThis belief Is based on Intelligence of earlyexploitation In Germany, onInterest In guided missiles op through IfSl and the demonstrated ability to follow adevelopment program ts witnessed by rapid dtTelopmenU In aircraft, armament, and electronics In theears. It Is alsothat accuracies better lhan those quoted will be within Soviet capability.
of this estimate the USSR will be capable of producing nuclear weapons which could be smuggled into the US either as complete assemblies or as component parts or These could range from small-yield weapons (equivalentons of TNT or less)ew hundred pounds lo larger-yield weapons (possibly up lo the equivalentons of TNT) weighing less than ten thousand pounds. Their site could range from thaiackage small enough to fit into lhe luggage compartment of an automobile lo thatacking case large enough lo conUin an automobile. All of these weapons could be designed to break downumber of relatively simple and readily transportable components. Thosetoelatively low yield would not require much labor or technical training for assembly. Somewhat more labor andwould be required to assemble weapons designed to give high yields, and, oncethey would be more difficult to It Is conceivable that only thematerial, in small pieces, need beinto the US. since olher components could be fabricated or procured in this This scheme, however, would require careful advance planning and coordinaUon by supervisory personnel with engineering skill and familiarity with the US sources of needed components, and wouldonger tune to carry out It would probably result in ayieldiven amount of fissionable material. It would alaoubstantially greater security risk lhan the clandestineof all components.
onsidering the known JimitaUons of thc means of physical detection, the USSR could probably introduce Into the US and detonate inonsiderable number of nuclear weapons by clandestineariety of methods of clandestine delivery suggestAssembled weapons could be dropped by apparenUy friendly aircraft, detonated In lhe holderchant ship, or sown asmines. Either components or assembled weapons could be brought In under diplomatic immunity, smuggled across land or seaIntroduced Uirough normal Importor brought in as bonded merchandise
awaiting transshipment Thc selection ol tlic method ol introduction and of transport and and assembly within the US would depend on the Soviet objective and the risk ofwhich the USSR was willing lo accept. Satellite agents and merchant ships could be utilized for such attacks as could Communists in other countries. There are atommunists In Mexico0 In Canada together with thousands of other personslo Communist led labor unions and front organizations that could be instrumental in clandestine attacks against the US. In addition, Mexico israffic center for Communists in North and South America giving Communists from other countriesto the US borders. Although theseelements of other countries could be used, it is doubtful If the Soviets would Incur the risk of using them In surprise clandestine attack against thc US prior to overt military attack.
In Introducing nuclear weaponsinto thc US, however, the USSR would have to take into account not only thechances of detection, but also theof such detection In forfeiting the element of surprise in any Intended overt attack and provoking US counteraction. As the number of weapons clandestinelywas increased, the risk of compromise would increase. This Increased risk would beunction of US capabilities for physical detection then of the scope and complexity of the clandestine operations, particularlyas larger numbers of Soviet agents became involved. Considering the consequencesreach of security, the USSR would probably be unwilling to risk the use of even selected and trained agents in such numbers as would be Involved in the clandestine delivery of large numbers of nuclear weapons. We conclude, therefore, that, although clandestine attack with nuclear weapons might occur against specially selected targetsupplement to overt delivery by air, such attack, with large numbers of weapons, would probably beby security considerations.
Biological Weapons. Most biological<BW> agents are peculiarly adaptable to
clandestine utilization, since the introduction of small amounts of BW agents would beto detect. Small-scale employment of biological warfare agents against livestock could be highly effective. BW attacks against key personnel concentrated In selectedcould be effective. There is littlethat effective antlcrop BW operations can be carried out clandestinely.
Weapons. CW agents areadaptable to clandestine use. Theyidentifiable by their Immediateit probably would not be feasible tosufficient supplies or to procure thein the required areas foragainst large populationThe most practicable use wouldpersonnel In key installations,this would be difficult.
VI. ATTACK WITH CONVENTIONAL FORCES
Atlacks by Ground Forces and Tactical Air Forces
Many key US installations overseas, such as those in Western Europe, the Middle and Par East, are subject to attack by Soviet ground and tactical air forces. Suchhowever, would almost certainly be an integral part of the over-all Soviet campaign in these areas, and it would be impossible to separate the specific scale of attack on key US installations from the over-all scale of Soviet campaigns.*
The peacetime establishment of theArmy probably will continueand supporting troops, which can be expected to be combat-readyay.his force can be expanded toine divisions. These forces would be capable of overrunning large areas of Western Europe, thc Middle East, and Far Easttoigh capability forof most key US Installations In these areas the Soviet Army probably would have lo be reinforced In peripheral areas or toairborne or amphibious forces In connec-
'See, "Soviet Capabilities aadCourses ol AcUon throughor Soviet ground and lacUcal air capabWUes.
lionround attack. It is estimated that lor air aupport ol these attacks4 the USSR has an actual strengthombat aircraft in the Air Force of the Soviet Army and Naval Aviation. Of this total,re jet aircraft.7 actual combat aircraft In operational units Is estimated at0 of which0 will be Jets.
oviet submanne forces could, at least in the initial phases of an attack. Inflict serious damage on US, overseas communications and carry out offensive mining In the approaches to harbors and ports of the US and Its allies. In addition lo its potential for launching mass destruction weapons against the US or key US overseas installations within range.the period of this estimate the Sovietforce will probably be enlarged and strengthened by the addition of aboutong-range submarines per year,imitedof older classes (includingofnd by the possibleof submarines to missile launching. It is estimated that4 the Soviet Navy willotalong and medium-range submarines, of whichill be snorkel-equipped boats of the long-range typesince World War n.aximum effort, as manyf the long and medium-range submarines located In the Baltic-Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleetndespectivelycould be made available lor attacks against thc continental US and key Installations overseas.heof long- and medium-rangein the two Soviet fleet areas would increase tondespectively. Assuming that egress from the Black Sea would be denied Soviet submarines at least in the initial stagesar, Uie Black Sea submarine force Is not considered anthreat to US installations
he capabilities of surface naval forces for attack on the US are low. The Soviet surface fleet Is geographically divided, lacks advance bases and docs not possess aair arm. Sporadic raider operations are possible, but lhe surface fleet, in general.
lacking aircraft carriers, ls unsuitable for transoceanic naval attack on any signiflcent
ecause of the lack of long-rangetype vessels and aircraft carriers, large-scale Soviet amphibious attacks will be limited to areas where air cover can befrom Communlst-conUolIed territory. However, amphibious raids by submarine-borne forces for the purpose of attempting the destruction or neutralization of key USinstallations are possibleadiusiles from Soviet submarine bases Amphibious assault against Uie continental US (except Alaska) is beyond SovietIn assaults against Alaska, logistic problems, weather, and Uie requirement for air cover would probably limit the scale and duration of such attacks to raids in force to destroy or neutralize US Installations In Uie Aleutian Islands or along the Bering Sea coast. Amphibious attacks against key US overseas installations, except in the Far East, would probably be limited to amphibious raids by submarine borne forces. Amphibiousin considerable force could be made against US Installations In Japan. Okinawa, and Formosa
he USSR hasO0 trained paratroopers, organizedirborne divisions, plusrained airborne reserves. The capability of these forces to seize and destroy key USoverseas Is limited by the availability of transport aircraft. The USSR can utilizewo-engine transports which could lift0 paratroopersaximum Initial assault and0 troopsive-day assault operation in Western Europe. The operaUonal radius of such assaulU would beauU-cal miles This capability will7 with Uie addition of new medium transports The most likelyof airborne assaults would be theof key US Installations, the seizure of bases, nnd the securing of important com-
features in Western Europe. Japan, and Alaska. Because of air transport limitations, the USSR will not be capable of launching major airborne operations against the continental US during the period of this estimate. However, small, highly-trained assault groups probably could be delivered to some targets Ln the US.
VII. SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR SABOTAGE OTHER THAN BY CLANDESTINE PLACEMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
The USSR Is capable of widespreadin thc US through the use of existingelements and the placement of foreign agents, However, such sabotage effortswould not be initiatedarge scale prior to an all-out attack on thc US since such efforts would nullify the advantage of surprise. Large-scale sabotage of USindustrial, and communicationsand military Installations could be expected with and immediately followingaltack by the USSR. Communist party members and adherents are capable ofsaboteur unils or teams of varying sizes equipped with small arms and other suitable material which could strike at especiallyand widely separated targetsand without warning. Whether such attacks would be timedurpriseattack or carried out after such anwould be dependent upon the Sovietof thc relative advantages of such action.
Soviet capabilities for widespread sabotage attacks againsi key overseas bases are greater than against the continental US. because of the much larger percentage of Communist elements, widespread political discontent, and lack of adequate security measures In certain foreign nations. Those areas in which such capabilities are now greatest are France. Italy. Japan, and the Philippines. However, in numerous other countries the Communists almost certainly have capabilities for acts of sabotage. The populations of these areas arc experienced in such operations and sabotage
efforts timed with large-scale military attacks could materially reduce the capability of US military forces overseas.
VIII. PROBABIE SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND METHODS OF ATTACK
Probable Soviet Strategic Objectives
n determining the scale and type ofattacks on the US and key US overseas installations to be adopted in event of general war. the Soviet leaders would be influenced by the following factors:
power of the US is the mainFree World opposition to theand the main obstacle todomination. The USSR wouldthat if US war-makingbe sufficiently reduced lnar, organizedthroughout the world wouldcollapse.
chief Immediate threat to theevent of general warS strategicThe Soviet rulers havetheir sensitivity to the danger ofattack with nuclear weapons by thewhich they have given to theof defenses against such an atlack.the substantial progress alreadybuilding up their defenses. It Isthey would regard their defensiveas adequate to preventof attacking aircraft fromtargets in the USSR.
major proportion of facilities,and forces which together constitutecapabilities are located In theUS, Soviet destruction of all keyand forces overseas whichcapabilily for employing nucleargreatly handicap but would notdelivery of nuclear weapons onthe USSR.
the same time, however, certainInstallations overseas arc essential tostrategic air offensive againstThe Soviet leaders wouldlhat destruction or neutralization of
Installations, as well as those In the US, would be essential to neutralize the USair capability.
e. Soviet leaders also must realize thatforces and Installations, as well asUS allies particularly In Eurasia,obstacles to Soviet success Inthat will occur simultaneously withafter the Initial attacks,
In view ol the above factors il is likely that the USSR in attacking lhe US and key overseas installations would have themajor objectives: (a) to destroy swiftly or cripple US capabilities for nuclear retaliation; (b) lo deliver such an attack on urban.and psychological targets In the US as would prevent, or at least hinder, theof the US war potential and itsoverseas; and (c) to inflict suchon US overseas installations as to hamper or prevent US reinforcement andsupport of overseas forces. To achieve these objectives we consider it almost certainortion of the Soviet nuclear stockpile would be employed against certain key USoutside the continental US. We believe that these Soviet objectives wouldthe same throughout the period of this estimate although Soviet capabilities for achieving them will obviously Increase
Desirability of Surprise. In order to be successful, an attack on US nuclearwould have to be accomplished with almost complete surprise. It is therefore probable that the USSR would launch initial attacks against the US and key overseasIn size and from base areas which would offer tbc greatest security fromwith attacks by other forces against other areas after the element of surprise had lost its significance.
A maximum Soviet attack on theUS, and key overseas Installations,utilization of all or most of thediscussed in this estimate, wouldpreparations that would almostresult In the toss of surprise. Therefore, if the USSR attempts to achieve maximum
surprise it will probably be forced to accept the following major limitations: (a) no large-scale mobilization of additional units; (b) no large-scale redeployment of Soviet air, naval, or ground forces to reinforce peripheraland (c> no unusual movement of Soviet air, naval, or ground forces In such areas as would be likely to Indicate theof attacks
Probable Methods of Attack Against the US
Nuclear Attacks by Aircraft. In view of the desirability of achieving both maximum surprise and maximum weight In any atiack on thc US, we believe that the USSR would place chief reliance on nuclear air attacks. Among thc forces and weapons available, the USSR's greatest capability lies in overtattack with nuclear weapons delivered by long-range aircrafl. It is probable that such attack would receive the highest priority because) the limited capabilities ofnaval forces, ground forces, andforces against the US; (b) thc security difficulties inherent In the delivery of large numbers of nuclear weapons by clandestine means; (c) the insufficient development of other methods of delivery of nuclear weaponsarge scale; (d) the Insufficientof other mass destruction weapons, or handicaps to their large-scale use; and (e) the availability of far northern air bases, from which air operations against the US are least susceptible to detection.
Other Methods of Attack. The Soviet rulers might, however, employ other methods ot attacking the US concurrenUy withurprise nuclear air atiack. Soviet capabilities for airborneand chemical and biological warfare, againsi the continental US. appear lo beslight, aandestine attack In the form of sabotage, biological warfare, or use of nuclear weapons might occur againstselected targets. Guided missiles could be launched from submarines against US ports and coastal installations.
Probable Methods of Attacks Against Key US Overseas Installations
The USSR woulduch wider range of capabilities for effective attack on many key US Installations overseas than on the US Itself because of the shorter ranges, greater possibilities for clandestine action, and other factors Involved. However, wethat If the USSRurprise attack on thc US Itself. It would time its attacks on US Installations overseas so as not to compromise the achievement of surprise against the US. Thus Initial attacks on these installations would probably take place simultaneously with or shortly after theon the US. and prior detectablewould be avoided to the maximum extent These considerations wouldaffect thc scale and timing of tlie attacks discussed below.
Western Europe and the Middle East. Attacks on tlie majority of key USIn these areas (except the UK and Spain) probably could most profitably beout primarily by ground and tactical air forces. The SovieU have the capability to launch attacks on these areas from Soviet-controlled territory without Increasing their forces, but might elect to carry out at least partial mobilization to insure the decisive success of the operations.
Other Overut alia lions. Except for Japan, Okinawa, and Formosa. USin other areas would be subjectto air attacks with nuclear andweapons. Sufficient Soviet jet light bombers nrc now available in peripheral areas occupied by or under the Influence of
the USSR to permit large-scale attacks on [retaliations in the UK. Turkey, and theEast. Attacks In considerable force could be launched by amphibious and airborne forces against Japan. Okinawa, and Formosa. Overseas Installationsoues of Soviet submarine bases could be subjected to amphibious raids by submarine forces and virtually all overseas Installations are subject to nuclear attacks by long-range aircraft. In addition thc Soviels possess the capability of making atlacks on selected overseasby special small airborne teams and could mount large-scale airborne attacks on Installationsadiusaulical miles of Soviet bases.
ikelihood of Change In Primary Methods of Attack throughovietfor all methods of attack will Increase considerably by7 asresult ofaircraft, an enlarged stockpile ofweapons. Increased naval strengthpossible utilization of submarine launched guidednd ground forces probably supported by weapons employing nuclear warheads. However, the choice of pnmary method of altack will be unlikely to change materially because the Improvement of Soviet capabilities In any particular field will probably not be sufficient to guarantee success against the US or key US Installations overseas. If anything. Soviet capabilities for large-scale nuclear air attack on the US will increase more during this period than Soviet capabilities for use of any other weaponsagainst the US. In addition, however,7 thc USSR could have substantially Increased capabilities for use ot guidedparticularly against US coastal areas and key Installations overseas.
TANDARD AND MODIFIED
TYPEND TYPE 37
TANDARD AHD MODIFIED
TYPEND TYPE 37