Created: 4/12/1955

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The /otloKlng intelligence organizations participated in the preparation ol this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency end the intelligence crganisattohs o/ the Departments- o/ State, the Army, the Hazy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

OS, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director ol Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence. The Jointhe Atomic Energy( Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction. The Annexes to Vic Estimatew coordinated among thes^wBL^B





To appraise tlie intensity and scope ol dissidence and resistance in Sino-Soviet Bloc countries, and to estimate the resistance potential under cold and hot warin the Bloc.1


estimating the resistance potentialeople in relation to theirit is necessary to know the nature, extent, and depth of their discontent, the strength of their will to resist, and their capability for resistance compared with the will and capability of the regime to maintain control.

ommunist-ruled country the best known of these factors is the regime'sto preserve internal securityof cost; its capability ofelTective resistance; and its constant pressure to induce the individual tohimself to the Communist

Lacking any legal avenues fordissent, the population still canits discontentariety of actions and inactions unfavorable to the regime, ranging from individual actions to widespread opposition. These types of resistance are symptomatic of discontent, but do not necessarily reveal the extent, constancy, and specific causes ofdiscontent. The will to resist, the skill in doing so, the motivation, and the opportunities, vary from element toin the population, and from time to time.

In this estimate, the followingis used to describe these types of action:

1 ThU estimate covers resistance potential inSino-Soviet Bloc. More detailed cow ram of Individual Dloc countries is set forth In the attached Annexes on Albania, Bulgaria.East Oermany. Hungary, Rumania, the USSR, North Korea, and NorUl Vietnam. Poland and Communist China arc considered In the over-all csUmate, but no annexes are Included on these countries. For more detailedol these two countries see RJR I, "AnU-Communlst Resistance Activities and Potential Inatedndesistance AcUvltland Potential litovember IBM.

Dissidencetate of mind involving discontent or disaffection with the

Resistance is dissidence translated into action.

Organized resistance is that which is carried outroup of individuals who haveommon purpose, agreed

on leadership, and worked out asystem.

Unorganized resistance is that which is carried out by individuals or looselygroups which may have been formed spontaneously for certain limited objectives, without over-all plan or

Active resistance, organized oris that which expresses itself in positive acts against the regime. It may take such forms as intelligence collection, psychological warfare, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, assistance in escape and evasion, open defiance of authority, oractivity for any of the above. It may or may not involve violence, and may be conducted openly or clandestinely.

assive resistance, organized oris that which is conductedthe framework of the resisler's normal life and duties, and involves deliberate nonperformance or malperformance of acts which would benefit the regime, or deliberate nonconformity with standards of conduct established by the regime.


is evidence of widespread dissi-dence in all Communist Bloc countries. While in general dissidence is greatest among the peasantry, even the youth and industrial workers, two groups which might be expected to be most favorable to Communist indoctrination, haveincreasingly disaffected in theSatellites andesser extent in the USSR.

However, the intensity of dissidence varies considerably. It is probably least pronounced in the USSR, wherehas become more firmly established. In the Far East Bloc areas, whereis exploiting the new surge ofdissidence almost certainly is much less strong than in the EastSatellites, where national interests are being subordinated to those of the USSR.

Despite the existence of dissidence throughout the Bloc, active organizedis practicallyew isolated small guerrilla bands may still be operating in some Satellites,in Albania, but they are no moreocal nuisance which probably will be wiped out sooner or later by the security forces.

ven though dissidence within the Sino-Soviet Blocesistancewe believe that under continued cold war conditions active resistance is unlikely to develop. There mayew isolated acts of unorganized resistance, but the effectiveness of Communistcontrols and police state methods will probably remain such as to make active organized resistance virtuallyexceptew almostareas. Therefore, even in countries where dissidence is strongest, such as East Germany, we see no prospect of resistance activities developingcale sufficient to threaten the stability of the regimes.aximum such activities will tend to delay the achievement of Communist political and economic objectives.inimum they willuisance

XI r

the regimes and will raise the morale of anU-Communist elements. Increased active resistance would be likely only if the Communist security apparatus were greatly weakened, or if Sino-Soviet power and prestige were greatly decreased.

On the otherubstantialof passive resistance is likely toSuch resistance is unlikelyto threaten the political stability of the Communist regimes. However,in agriculture, it will probablyroublesome and even serious factor throughout the Bloc countries,the fulfillment of their political and economic programs. Nevertheless, we believe that the persistent pressures exercised by Communist regimes will eventually reduce the extent of evenresistance and will almost certainly prevent the emergence of coordinatedactivities.

In most of the USSR andesser extent in Communist China, theof open warfare would stimulate patriotic feelings in support of theWidespread destruction orhostilities, however, might lead to the emergence of resistance. In the newly acquired areas of the USSR, such as the Baltic States and tlie Western Ukraine, hopes of liberation would beat the outset, intensifying tliepotential. In the Europeanthe outbreak of war would not only stimulate hopes for liberation but would also increase popular unrest and passive resistance. We believe, however, that no active organized resistance would occur, unless the Bloc suffered severe military setbacks, and Western forces approached Satellite territory. military and security forces wouldcertainly remain sufficiently strong to prevent or check outbreaks. However, we estimate that major resistancein the Bloc, comparable to those of World War n, probably would not develop in areas still under Communist control until the local security organizations had been seriously weakened and the USSR and Communist China were unable lo enforce order in their respective orbits. Until such circumstances arose, activities of resistance elements would probably be confined to intelligence collection and transmission, surreptitious antiregime propaganda, aid to Western personnel in escape and evasion operations, andinducements.

In many countries of theworld there are organizations,of and led by persons who have emigrated from countries of the Soviet Bloc. In general these organizations have lost effective contact with their homelands and do not significantlyto resistance potential.all have suffered from internaland lack of funds and have beenby agents of Communist security forces. The people within the Bloc know very little about emigre organizations. With rare exceptions they would almost certainly not welcome leading emigres in positions of power after liberation.

In the event of war, tho nationality of invading forces probably would inhave little bearing on theoffered by resistance elements in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, provided these forces were clearly integratedroad anti-Communist military organization. In certain situations, however, long-stand-

national antipathies might outweigh an ti-Communist feelings. Thus, anti-Communist resistance activities might be adversely affected by the prominent use of: (a) German forces inPoland, and the USSR;reek, and Turkish units in(c) Greek, Italian, or Yugoslav units in Albania; and (d) Japanese forces in North Korea and Communist China.

he question of responsibility for the initiation of general war would probably not substantially affect the will to resist the regimes in the Bloc countries.11

The Special Assistant. Intelligence, Department of State, would substitute for this paragraph the following:

Thi- question of responsibility for the Initiation of general war will not affect the will to resist in the European Satellites, whose populations are so overwhelmingly against the exisUng regime as to be unaffected by considerations of war guilt, it will probably hove more significance in the USSR, where support for the regime by the war-weary population would be decreased orby popular Judgments as to theor defensive character of the war.


The following Annexes have been coordinated among the IAC Agencies:

widespread popular dlssidcnce tnsprings from political, social, cultural, and religious as well as economic causes. The ruthless efforts of the Communist regime to destroy individual freedoms, patriarchalpatterns, village autonomy, and religion are particularly resented. For many centuries, opposition to central authority has been an Albanian tradition. Local patriotism and rugged individualism have combined to create opposition to all authority, alien or native, beyond the confines of the immediate tribes or villages. This trait is particularlyin the northern areasinhabited by tho Ghegs, mountain tribes who until Worldad little contact with the modern world. The more accessibletribes, the Tosks. have been in closer touch with new ideas and modern techniques, and the Tosk intellectuals were the first to become interested in Marxism.

Moreover, tho present Communist regime is identified with the traditionally hated Slavs. Ever since the Slavs drove theback into the mountainous edges of the Adriatic, the Albanians have been anti-Slav. The massacre of Albanians by Serbs during2 Balkan War aggravated this feeling. Thus Communism, particularly for the Ghegs, has the handicap of its Slavicall the more so since the AlbaniaParty was founded1 byCommunists who directed the movement8 when Tito defected and Albanian Communist leader Hoxha cast his lost with the Cominform.

Another basic cause of dlssidcnce Isinterference with Albania's cultural heritage. After Albania became independentumber of French, English, and Italian schools were created, young Albanians were sent to Western universities, andcultural influence grew considerably. The regime's attempt lo enforce Soviet orientation has made Albania's few Intellectuals pay perfunctory lip service to Communism but they remain strongly opposed to SovietThe regime, apparently unable to change this situation, has frequently charged Its teachers with still beingndlow ideologicalhecrusade against religion has further increased popular discontent not onlyof interference in matters of belief but also because religion is regardedart of the national cultural heritage. Religious groups (Islamic, Greek Orthodox, and Roman Catholic) whichajor part in tlie country's cultural development have been brought under state control.

present inadequate standard ofa further cause of dissidenee.standards have always been low,between pre- and post-conditions is great enough towhich is considerably enhancedeconomic measures suchand forced loans.


Dlssidcnce toward the regime appears strong among all classes. With the exception of the top governmental bureaucracy, the ranking officers in the army, the national and local Party leaders, and the security forces, there is no groupeven within the Partywhich derives real benefits from the regime. The suppression of elements consideredand their internment in forcedcamps has exacerbated the widespread ill-feeling toward the government. Afterears of Communist rule approximatelyercent of the population is still in jails and labor camps. Annual amnesties have notthe prison population which indicated that new "enemies of the people" havethose freed,

The Peasantry. Albaniaountry of peasants, who comprise the largest and most formidable anti-Communist elemenl. The

principal reasons for peasant disaffection are crushing taxes, heavy obligatory delivery quotas for which tlie government pays low prices, seizure of livestock, imposition of(forced) labor and forced state loans, collectivization pressures and police terrorlza-tion, Mainly because of peasant opposition, onlyercent of the arable land has so far been collectivized. Poor and landlessin the south and central areas initially profited by the so-called agrarian reformsut were quickly disillusioned.and proud of their pastthe peasants arc indifferent to and care less for Communist ideology. Thepeasant antagonism against Communist policies largely accounts for lack of reliability of the armed forces and Industrial labor, both of which groups are recruited chiefly from the peasantry.

Youth. Albanian youth, both rural and urban, had joined the liberation movements against the Italian and German occupation, and the Communists, camouflagingin the National Liberationeriod in attracting largeof youth. However,0 Communist propaganda had become ineffective because of economic inequalities, "voluntary" labor, impositionoreign Ideology, and economic want.

Military. The rank and file of the Albanian Army cannot be considered loyal to theOne indication is the fact that units of tlie army have never been used to stamp out guerrilla activities. Fanaticalsecurity police were used instead. Only the security police, some noncommissioned officers, and ranking army officers who rose to their present position during the wartime partisan warfare or under the Communist regime are considered reliable. These groups, and the network of informers placed in every village, are the security backbone of theregime, and have preventedbands from overthrowing the Tirana government by force.

Intelligentsia and Clergy. Intellectuals and clergymenonsiderableleadership potential. Mast of theintelligentsia fought the rise ofduring the war. Haiti Kombetar (Nationalhe strongestnationalist organization during World War II, was founded by intellectualelements. Many of the intelligentsia were exiled, executed, or jailed after thecame to power. Oi the intellectuals remaining in Albania,ew can be trusted by the government. The clergy,the Roman Catholics, also hate the regime. While Moslem and Orthodox priests appear to liavc been cowed, the regime can probably not rely on them.


is evidence that Albanians havethe hope of eventual liberation, andacts of overt resistance arc stilloccur. However, mounting policebrutality have decreased activethe past five years. On the whole,of security forces in detecting andguerrillas has greatly weakenedscattered, and uncoordinatedoperating In mountain Yugoslavia and Greece and passivehave become the primaryopposition to the regime. Despitethere Is passive resistance inand agriculture such aswork of Soviet advisers, damagingproducing goods of poor quality,produce, and falling to meet farm quotas.


situation In Albania differs fromother Satellites In that much of theactivity that exists Is directed byin Greece, Yugoslavia, and Italy.four principal Albanian emigrethe West,Balli Kombetar),Movement (close to King Zog),of nonparty Individuals, and theIndependent Bloc, whose leaderswilh Fascist Italy. The firstbecame affiliated in the Nationalfor Free Albania (NCFA)the appearance of relative strengthmost of the emigre groups and


financial and moral support from the West. This Western support is theunifying factor in the emigration.whenhe National Independent Bloc and some other Individuals werein the NCFA. certain left-wingof BK split off and formed the National Democratic Committeeree Albania (NDCFA).

There have been some contacts between resistance elements in Albania and theNCFA affiliates. Most resistance groups, particularly those reportedly operating inand southern Albania, appear to have identified themselves with the NCFA.there Is still much political andfactionalism rending Albania emigre organizations, they appear Lo be in abetter shape and seem to have morewith their homeland than the emigres of the other Satellites.

There isugosluv-sponsored League of Albanian Political Refugees in Yugoslavia, which has the advantage of being closer to Albania than other emigre elements. Itswith certain resistance elements inthrough Yugoslav intelligence service cross-border operations, have probably been closer and more numerous than those of the Western-oriented elements with the NCFA emigres. At one time, arms, supplies, and money reportedly were supplied to theby this group. However, due to Yugoslavia's normalization of relations with the Bloc powers, the group's activities have reportedly been sharply curtailed.


few isolated resistance bands inmay continue for some time toattention of Communist securityinflict sporadic damage in the fieldsand transportation.the regime's security measures makeimpossible the organizationational, cohesive, andscale. Any guerrilla forcesalso be short of weaponsradual liquidation of these activities is likely.ubstantialof passive resistance will probablyto manifest itself.


Because most Albanians arc probablythat only an East-West war could bring them liberation, the outbreak of general war would almost certainly strengthen theirpotential. At the very least, it would probably stiffen the hostility of the peasantry toward the regime. Both peasants andwould probably try to sabotage thewar effort when they could do soundue risk to themselves. Furthermore, the feasibility of at least covert help fromGreece, and Italy, the geographic isolation of Albania from the Bloc, and the necessity for the regime to use all available manpower to secure Its frontiers from attack or infiltration would probably make it easier in Albania than anywhere else in the Bloc for guerrillas to prepare organized resistance. It is likely that well led and equipped anti-regime Albanians could infiltrate the country from Yugoslavia or Greece.

Although large-scale uprisings probably would not occur immediately upon theof war, Albanian resistance elements, if supported from the outside, might be able to organize some active resistance. However, the commencement of large-scale guerrilla warfare would depend upon suchas Western military successes, the weakening of the regime, the attitudes ofand Greece, and the ability of the West and the emigre groups to provideand aid. Unless tlie USSR were able to reinforce Albania with Soviet units soon after the war brokearge-scale uprising could develop, particularly in the northern andregions, before Western forces actually reached Albanian territory. Such awould presuppose, however, that large numbers of Albanian conscripts escaped to the mountains, even though many of their officers remained loyal to the regime.


tlirougli race, language,the Bulgarians have beenwith the Russians. Prior to theinhethe population favored friendship withBut the conduct of the invadingforces, the ruthless exploitation ofresources by the USSR, and thesovietization carried out byhave quickly spreadresentment. Bulgarians have longto political tyranny but thea system thatockery ofsovereignty has alienated mostThe regime's economic policiesby most of the population asto further Soviet interests ratherof Bulgaria. Extensive Sovietmadeirtual Sovietavailable evidence indicates thatare chafing under theirregime and loathe Soviet domination.


The Peasantry. The peasantry, someercent of the population, constitutes the strongest opposition element. In the past, there were comparatively few landlessmost peasantsmall tract of land which they tilled with the help of asystem. They are bitterly opposed to collectivization. While tbe regime lias maintained the facade of Alexander Stam-bolisky's Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, Communist collectivization policies havethis gesture. Tlie regime's extremely unpopular methods of implementingagricultural doctrine have arouseddissatisfaction on the part of most

Industrial workers, at one lime the staunchest supporters of Communism, have shown increasing dissatisfaction withconditions, totalitarian labor discipline,


and inadequate wages. So far, the "new course" and the return to Bulgarian control of some Soviet-Bulgarian joint companies have had little effect on depressed hungIndustrial workeis resent theharsh labor laws which bind them to their jobs by jienalty of imprisonment or confinementorced labor camp andmandatory transfers. Significantly, these laws have been created to preventabsenteeism, growing labor turnover, and deteriorating laborrasticare also being taken to prevent growing Industrial sabotage.

The clergy has been subverted orwith the help ot the"Union of Orthodox Priests" and other pro-CommunLst religious organizations. The formerly independent Bulgarian Orthodox Church, embracing nearly all Bulgarians, has been compelled to come under the Russian Patriarchate. The leadership of the small Catholic and Protestant communities has been virtually destroyed,arge part ot the Moslem minority deported to Turkey. Thenon-Communisl clergy is strongly opposed to the regime and constitutes aresistance potential Regimelo discourage religious practices have also contributed to dissidence.

Youth. There Is some evidence that anumber of Bulgarian youth may be gradually losing whatever initial enthusiasm il had for Communism. The restrictions and discipline Imposed upon it by the Party are probably increasingly resented. The regime's irksome methods of indoctrination probably have caused many young people to resistteachings and to look for liberation lo the West. Evidence suggests lhal anumber of university students arcto the regime. However, youth has Utile outlet for expressing Its resentment

Military. The majority of the officer corps is probably loyal to the regime. Most officers.

since the purges of older elements, havetheir rank through Communistand arc not anxious to lose theireven if they do not agree with thepolicies. The enlisted personnel arc recruited mainly from the peasantry, the strongest antiregimc element, but theof the Bulgarian Army Is probablyhigher than In the other Satellites. The close ethnic relationship of Bulgaria with Russia probably influences the attitude of the Army.


Although dissidence is strong ln almost every segment or Bulgarian society, fewhave dared to defy tho regimeThe regime has been able to suppress active resistance and little opportunity for it exists. At present there Is no evidence of organized resistance; acts of open resistance are few and reports describing them are often uncomflrmed. There have been twopurges of anti-Soviet elements: one broke up anti-Communist opposition4he other, mn Internal party affair, took place after8 break with the Cominform and resulted In removal of those Bulgarian Communists who favored greater independence of the USSR.

On the other hand, some degree of passive resistance against tlie regime has continued In spite of the purges, Instances such as subtle economic sabotage by jwasants and workers have occurred frequently, although they arc, qualitatively and quantitatively, less than in most of the other Satellites.hide livestock and grain, secretlylivestock, disregard sowing andregulations, avoid planting maximum amounts of grain, and fail to make use of the machine tractor stations. Office and factory workers neglect maintenance of machinery, refuse to attend conferences and meetings, interpret government regulationstrictness designed to show their absurdity, malinger, and practice absenteeism.who have the opportunity listen tobroadcasts which the government istoew Bulgars continue to escape across the frontiers or defect abroad.


few Bulgarian emigre groups arespilt and plagued by personalthe leaders.lieCommittee was regarded as thebut without tlie support ofCommittee for Free Europe, itshas waned. Tlie most widelyformer political leadereen unable or unwilling to ImproveDespite extravagant claims ofemigre leaders, there is no evidenceelements have In any way guidedorganized or unorganizedBulgaria. Although presentthat Bulgarians still rememberit is difficult to determine howhis following may be.


view of the regime's effectiveclose Soviet supervision, andof Bulgaria into the Sovietthere is little likelihood thatcan develop under cold warIsolated Instances of unorganizedresistance will probably continue towithout tangible outside help or aof the CommunLst apparatus, theydiminish. The average Bulgarianengrossed In the daily struggle oftoo cowed by the police state to haveenergy left for resistance resistance will be restrictedpropaganda, some intelligenceand performing isolated acts olnot necessarily recognizable aspassive resistance will probablyto be the only real outlet forSince agriculture is the main-stayBulgarian economy, peasantcontinue to create major problemsregime. However, if the "newcontinued and produces tangible results,the Bulgarians come to feel there isfor their liberation, passivedissidence may decrease.



pon outbreak of an East-West war, the resistance potential in Bulgaria would almost certainly increase. However, active resistance probably would be severely inhibited by the presence of Soviet forces, which could beto move into Bulgaria and establish bases for operations In the Near East and the Mediterranean area. Emergence of large-scale resistance could not be expected until the Communists had suffered major military defeats, transport and communicationswere disrupted, and above all, until West-era invasion were imminent.

n the event of such an invasion,if prior contacts had been established for guiding, coordinating and supplyingresistance groups, outbreak of somefighting would be likely. Escape andoperations for Western personnel could begin to function. The Rhodopc and Balkan mountains provide Ideal terrain for guerrilla bases. However, participation in suchprobably would not assume the characterass movement. Although Bulgarian history has been characterized by individual acts ofears of Turkish rule did not produce greatulgarian popular uprising against the Communistalmost certainly would not materialize unless the Soviet rule had broken down,victory appeared assured, and clear-cut Western policy statements appealing tohad been announced.


though the old Czechoslovaka more vigorous democratic traditionother Eastern European country andoriented toward the West.strength was greater inin the other present Satellites. Infree electionsommunistgotercent of theBohemia-Moravia andercent inSince8 coup, however,regime's drastic reshapingpolitical and economic life hasone-time sympathizers and evenmembers. Communist policethe dlscrlmlnation againstmembers, and the subordinationinterests lo those of the USSRsharp contrast to life under the BrstCzechoslovakia's new submissiondomination after its long struggleIs deeply resented onwell as political grounds. In addition,is created by Soviet economicand internal mismanagementsharply lowered living standards.scarce, agricultural production ishousing is Inadequate. Consumeroften either unavailable or poorlyexpensive. The "new course" has tolittle to ameliorate this situation.


Industrial workers, many of whom voted Communist6 and helped the regime in8 coup, are now one of the most disaffected groups In Czechoslovakia. They complain about too long work hours, unpaid overtime, "voluntary" Sunday shifts, and too many deductions from the paycheck. They dislike the severe labor discipline and the favoritism toward Parly members.

Youth is restless, disillusioned, andby government youth organizations. Children of non-Party members areagainst in education and restricted in the choice of career. Most dissatisfied are those who were denied advanced schooling on political grounds and sent into unpopular industries such as mining. The greatestof Czechs escaping into Germany and Austria consists of persons underears of age.

The peasantry, well aware of the regimes designs for eventual collectivization, are not deceived by the temporary reduction ofunder the "newostile toward the government and Party, they complain about high delivery quotas and low prices, lack of consumer goods, harassment by local Party officials, and unfair governmentof farm machinery and fertilizer.

Minorities. Communist attempts tothe thorny minority problem inhave so far failed. The Slovaks in particular appear dissatisfied with Prague's growing domination of local administration. They tend to place the blame for this, and8 coup, on the greater popular support given the Communist Party in Bohcmla-Mo-ravia duringeriod. They also recall past Czech incursions into Slovak affairs- The Communist Party continues to have less influence in Slovakia than inand the Slovak potential for active resistance is probably higher.the German wartime occupation provoked mainly passive resistance inandew isolated acts of defiance occurred, the Slovak active resistancewas demonstrated in the uprising at Banska Bystrica

The clergy, chiefly Roman Catholic, has been decimated by the regime. Many higher members of the hierarchy have been arrested and replaced by priests willing to collaborate with the Communists. The lower clergy Is under close surveillance and obliged tosermons for censorship. The Church has been denied the right to educate. Known be-

Hovers are harassed and are deprived of chances for improvement of their position. Ihe regime lias more recently taken steps designed to give the impression that It Is not undermining the Church, though in fact such steps are bringing it more under state control. These measures have greatly lessened the clergy's resistance potential.

The middle class, especially the professional and managerial groups, either has beenoutright and placed underor works under supervision of Party members whose professional background Ls almost Invariably inferior. In spite of recent attempts of the regime to enlist theirthe vast majority of these groups are thoroughly disaffected; they have last their social and financial status, are limited In their choice or Jobs and use of talents, and live In constant fear of being blamed for any failure of the regime.

Military. Since many officerstake in the continuation of the regime, and there were thorough purges of pro-Western officerslie over-all reliability of the officer corps has probably increased. However, there is evidence that its loyalty lo the regime leaves much to be desired. Unreliability Is even more pronounced among the rank-and-file whoresent the harsh discipline, closesupervision, lack of leave, and constant indoctrination.onscript force, the army reflects the low morale of the general population. The air force Is probably one of the least reliable in the Satellites. There have been several defections from the military services to the West in the past few years.


lthough dlssidcnce seems to be somewhat more pronounced In Slovakia than In Bohe-mia-Moiuvta, there is little evidence of active resistance In either area. Communist police controls arc so pervasive that people are afraid to voice their criticism of tlie regime, let alone engage in open resistance.thereonviction that Soviet troops, while not ul present stationed inwould come to the help of tlie regime to put down any revolt tliat could not be handled locally, and there is no hope that any uprising would receive Western help. The only open demonstration of Czechoccurred in the abortive Pllsen riots ofollowing the currency reform. Otherwise, the Czechoslovaks have been sullen and apathetic, passively expressing theirwith the regimeigh percentage of absenteeism (sometimes up toercent of the entire laborhoddy workmanship, high labor turnover, oppasi-tion to farm collectivization and crop delivery quotas, higher attendance at Church services, refusal to accept Eastern cultural orientation, etc.


There are numerous and voluble emigre groups with headquarters in the US, Canada, and Europe, but there is virtually no evidence that any of them play an active role inresistance. The most Important is the Council of Free Czechoslovakia,of Czechs and Slovaks and perhapsthe nearest approximation to the Mssaryk-Bcnes tradition. The CzechCouncil and the Slovak National Council Abroad are separatist organizations of minor importance. The extreme-rightist SlovakCommittee, led by Ferdinand Durcan-sky, who maintains contact with extreme-rightist Germans, probably has littlein Slovakia. Representatives of the old political [unties, andzech labor groupudeten-German group, also live abroad, but they have little personalamong the emigres in the West andless in Czechoslovakia itself, although the number of party followers Is probably still large.

It ls possible that some contacts between these organizations and their homo country were maintained8ut there have almost certainly been no contacts of significance since. According to defector reports, Internal Czechoslovak Interest in emigre groups is feeble and docs notesire to entrust future leadership to any of the emigre leaders. Therefore, It isthat emigres areosition to direct

resistance activities nor is there evidence that any one ol the factions would be acceptable for government leadershipiberated Czechoslovakia.


ia considerable resistanceCzechoslovakia, particularly amongworkers, and there might be anrecurrence of Isolated riots likeowever, active cold waris highly unlikely lo emerge on anyscale so long as there areand party controls. On the otherresistance will probably continueform of absenteeism, isolated acts ofindustrial and agricultural sabotage,the contents of Westernand escapes and defections to the West.


intensification of regimeupon the outbreak of generalEurope, and the active participation offorces, would make Immediateof large-scale resistance all butEven unorganized passiveprobably become more dangerous.If the West appeared to be wirming.In passive resistance andattempts at sabotage could bein the Czech lands wouldmostly passive, but ln Slovakia moremight develop. For example,guerrilla bands might beoperate successfully In the moreinaccessible areas of Slovakia. Theof such efforts would greatly depend upon the ability of the West to establish contacts and furnish arms.

If Western forces approached the Czech borders and the effectiveness of the security organization weakened, restlessness andwould probably IncreaseMore intelligence for the West would be forthcoming, more escape and evasionon behalf of Western personnel would be undertaken, and intensified untl-Commu-nlst propaganda could be expected. AnWestern invasion of Czechoslovakia would probably demoralize indigenousforces to such an extent that Soviet troops would largely have to take over. Atime, parts of the Czechoslovak Army and police would probably defect in growingSome of them probably would try to establish an anti-Communist record byln organized resistance. At tins point, the anti-Communist intelligentsia, freed political prisoners and displaced persons might contribute substantially to organizing resistance.

However, full-scale gucrrillu war inand open organized resLstancc instill could not be expecteda virtual breakdown of CommunistMoreover, there might be. at least for some time, conflict between antland pro-Communist guerrillas, diminishing the effect of resistance and confusing escape and evasion operations. Some antl regime resistance elements might also insist onferocious revenge for their sufferings at the expense of assisting the West inCommunist troops.


widespread popular disaffection in East Germany is intensified by the fact thatthe other Satellites, the "GermanRepublic"s not cut off from contact with the West. The specialof the occupation have made impossible the complete separation of the GDR from West Germany, and both the GDR and the Federal Republic have encouraged contacts between the two areas. Such contacts exist on an extensive scale. Moreover, the East Germans are tied to West Germany bybonds of national Identity and by the hope that eventual unification will mean

Most East Germans do not feel that they arc livingeparate country and do not look upon the GDR as permanent. Rather, they see itemporary administrativeimposed upon them by Communistbacked by Soviet guns. The abortiveof3 proved to the East Germans as well as to the Soviets thatthe backing of the Soviet Army, the GDR regime could not remain in power. Moreover, the Soviet occupation in East Germanybe disguised. Consequently, Communism is now identified with Soviet rule andaccordingly. The leaders of theSED (Socialist Unity Party) and the government are generally hated and detested. Police state measures to keep the people in line exacerbate these sentiments.

Economic hardships are another major cause of antiregime sentiment. Except for the Party hierarchy, government, and thenearly every East German has been adversely afTected by the practices of the regime. While the introduction of the "new course" innd some Sovietconcessions had somewhat improved living conditions, these improvements have

"For iho purposes of this estimate, tho GDR is assumed lo include East Berlin.

been insufficient to reduce popularAlthough tbc GDR's antireUgioushas not been as violent as those of other Satellites, it also contributes to popularFinally, the regime's attempts to orient East German culture eastward are much resented. The East Germans consider themselves culturally as belonging to the West, and believe their culture to be superior to that of the East. Communist attempts to change this outlook have contributed toagainsi the regime.

isaffection in Eust Germany Is very great, not only among the dLsalTected groups listed below but also among many rank-and-file members of the Parly and its massthe government bureaucracy, whiteworkers, and theast Germans fled to West Germany;he number of refugees decreased. It has been estimated that not more thanercent of the population actually support the regime, and it is almost certain that such support- is confined to people whoersonal stake in the regime's continuation. Very few are motivated by ideological conviction.


ndustrial Workers. In contrast to the other Satellites, where the peasantry is the chief dissident element, dLsafTection andin the GDR are greatest in thecenters. About one-third ofillion wage and salary earners in the GDR are industrial workers. Seventy percent of these are employed in the nationa-ized industries.vidence that many workers,ajority, are dissatisfied with the regime. Most East German workers have been traditionally social-democratic and strongly trade union minded. German social-democracy has always been evolutionary rather than revolutionary and, therefore, was the target of intensive Bolshevik hostility. Since the tradition of free trade unionism is


strong, the fact that under the GDR the unions have become Instruments ofcontrol has greatly contributed to the disaffection of tlie workers. Furthermore, the workers areith low wages, substandard living conditions, insufficient food supplies, lack of consumer goods, ever-present offensive propaganda, forcedat political rallies. Imposition of Soviet labor methods,onstant drive for more production without adequate rewards.

The Peasantry. There are still0 independent peasants in East Germany who cultivate about two-thirds of the arable land. Even though many of them benefited from the postwar land reform, themajority arc opposed to theesult of the collectivization program begun inpecial privileges were extended to members of the so-calledto the detriment of Independent farmers. Sincebout one-seventh of the arable land has been abandoned by its owners. The "new course" improvedwliat and the regime, in view of poor agricultural production, slowed down its collectivization program. However, peasant disaffection is still strong. Moreover, there are Indications that the collectivizationis being resumed.

Businessmen. Private industry stillforercent ot total Industrialprivate wholesale und retail trade account forndercentof trade turnover. Although this group received some reliefesult of the "newhey probably realize that this Isemporary reprieve and that their group will eventually be liquidated. The outlook or this group is of necessity antiregime, but many of its elements continue to beand cautious. Inclined only to passiveif any. and that only provided they see no risk.

The Clergy. The Protestant and Catholic clergy has been outspoken in assailingatheism and combat particularly the regime's effort to Indoctrinate youth.made by the regime to theinid not alter their attitude. The adverse effect of the regime's antirellgious campaignarge part of the imputation and the support received by the churches in East Germany from the West Germans have forced the regime toilder type of persecution Lhan practiced by other Satellite governments. Tlie resistance potential of the clergy Is considerable, though it is not at the point of open active resistance at this time.

Many officers ofarrisoned People's Police) andnaval and air contingents probablySoviet controls. They enjoybulroup, their basicthe regime is questionable. It Isthe GDR regime could rely ontime of war, especially If thereverses, but there is probablyIn this group than In anythe GDR, and their resistance potentialto be limited. The morale ofis low. Tbe general popularshared by most soldiers, many ofbeen pressured into service againstIn spite of some improvement ofconditionsost ofprobably not loyal to tlie regimeside with the West if given opportunity.

Croups. The regime hasefforts to control andThere are indications of supportregime by some young people, butbecome Indifferent or disillusioned.of parents, older workers, andteachers, and the nearness ofstill militate against success of theyouth program. In most cases,of East German youth is one ofAlthough the majority ofyouth almost certainly is notto the Communist regime, it hasor no efforts to resist the regime.small group of more maturemay eventually constitute abut just as many will proliublyCommunist enthusiasts unlessfor belter living improve greatly.


IJ. Despite the great extent of disaffection in the GDR, with the single exception of the3 uprisings it expressed itself only in defection, transmission of intelligence,resistance {without risk involved),propaganda activities, and apathy. Although unrest was growing beforehe intervention of the Soviet Army in the June uprisings, the lack of expected help from the West, and lack of progress towardweakened East German hopes for an early liberation and ledore passive attitude. The failure of theuneresulted in the arrest or flight to the West of many actual or potential resistance leaders and made it clear to those who remaineduccessful uprising against the regime is impossible so long as the Soviet Army controls East Germany. Some improvement in living conditions and such political concessions as more freedom of travel between East and West Germany, as well as East German reluctance to take risks against overwhelming odds, have contrived to keep resistance predominantly passive.

the feasibility of access tofrom West Berlin and Westfacilitated tlie organization of somegroups operating from thesegroups encourage cautious covertactivities; their main objectspropaganda, keeping flies ofin Communist prisons andof the prisoners, keeping trackcommitted by the Communists,alive the spirit of resistance, andas mucli information as possible.however, overt activestands little chance of escaping


rearmament of Westalmost certainly raise Eastfor eventual liberation fromstrengthened GDR police controls, and Soviet help if necessary, will probably forestall any attempt ut open resistance. So long as the USSR maintains sizeable forces In Eastresistance will almost certainly remain limited to Intelligence collection, antiregimc propaganda dissemination, and defection. The East Germans realize that the steadily improving infiltration methods of the regime's security organs render attempts utin GDR territory extremely dangerous. They probably also realize (afterhat under present conditions tangiblehelp for large-scale resistance will not be forthcoming during the cold war period.


The outbreakeneral war probably would not lead to organized resistance at once, although (depending upon the locution of battle fronts and the fortunes of war) there would probably be an increase ln Isolated acts of sabotage and violence. But so long aspower remained unimpaired, savagefor any act of resistance, coupledimited number of areas offeringwould make organized resistance virtually Impossible. Active resistance on an extensive scale would almost certainly not be initiated until Communist controls appeared to be weakening or breaking downesult of Soviet defeats and the proximity offorces.

If East Germanyombat area, many of those East German forces which could do so would probably seek to Join the West ln fighting the Bloc, Furthermore, if military operations were in progress within the ODR, organized resistance groups almost certainly would supply information, disrupt Soviet communications, sabotage warand assist Western soldiers in escape and evasioncale measured by Western successes. On the other hand. Westernwould immediately leadeduction in East German resistance activities.


which is very widespreadhas its roots in economicentrenched nationalism,orientations, historical andantagonism toward Slavs, andCatholic religious heritagethe Hungarians are Catholic).aggravated by recollection ofommunist regime which includedOcro, und other current leaders, byof Communism on the part of allnno by antagonism towardSatellites which have acquiredterritories. The inadequateof living is probably the mostof dlssidcnce. Work norms areare low, housing is poor, and foodThe people resentpolitical activities, and tholeisure time. They also resent thepolice state system which isthe slate security apparatus, by theand by the presence of two SovietApathy and cynicism are


The peasantry, with the exception of asmall number of collective farmwho were formerly landless, represents the largest single focus of opposition to the CommunLtt regime. The concessionsby the so-called "new course"3 have done little to alleviate peasantIn spite of the financial and social hardships connected with such action, about one-half of theIn collectives took advanluge of theofTer to withdraw if they so desired. Moreover, the continuation of the "new course" Is uncertain.

The majority of industrial workers, some of whom were among the few originalol Communism, now constitute adissident clement. ow living standard,


poor working conditions, the perversion of labor unions into instruments of the regime, the constant pressure for more production without adequate incentives, harsh laborand the regime's poor showing in labor protection and welfare have made tlieotential resistance element rather than the "spearhead of revolution."

Youth. One of the most conspicuousof the regime has been Its Inability to secure the firm support of youth. By Its own admission, tlie principal youth movement (DISZ) is plaguedeneral apathyParty work, which retards the recruiting of future Intellectual cadres for Communism. Open criticism of this organization has been rising steadilynd the "new course" lias so far failed to meet this situation. The majority of students in high undschools and universities remain negative or Indifferent toward Communism.

Military. Considerable resistance potential is believed to exist within the Hungarian armed forces. Their loyalty is generallyexcept for higher officers who have the greatest stake In the regime. Tlie Air Force Is believed to be predominantly loyal. However, since the majority of young army officers arc recruited from rural areas, they almost certainly share those antlrcgimewhich make the peasantry the greatest focus of dissidence. The rank-and-file of the army, who have none of the officers' privileges, have even less reason for allegiance. Soviet control of the Hungarian Army contributes to animosity and disaffection as does forcible alliance with neighboring Satellites who arc ancient enemies. This resistance potential of the armed forces, however, cannotarked deterioration of thecontrol system takes place.

Tlie clergy, both Catholic and Protestant, no longer show open defiance of the regime. They do, however, exercise considerableamong the people and, despite their lack

of aggressive leadership, maintain some covert and sporadic opposition. The clergy are cautious and adroit in the use of the "be-tween-the-lines" technique in sermons and statements. The government-sponsoredPeace Committee of Catholic Priests has repeatedly admitted failure in propagandizing Communism. But while the clergy'spotential, especially in the provinces, remains strong at present, it is bound toas more and more clergy are replaced by Communist supporters.


Hungary's recent history. Including World War II, abounds with resistance incidents, but no broad resistance movement emerged and no local groups achieved lasting success. During the German occupation, sporadic acts of sabotage were committed against the Axis powers. The much more effective Sovietsystem has restricted Hungarianto passive, unorganized manifestations. Other factors, such as physically andexhausting work norms, material want, and compulsory political activities have further discouraged active resistance.

However, passive resistance in Hungary appears to have been more widespread and effective than elsewhere In the Satellites.existing controls preclude openintensified passive resistance byand agricultural workers is Impeding the regime's efforts totrong and viable economy.


are three main Hungarianthe Hungarian Nationalin New York, General Andrasof Hungarian Veterans within Innsbruck, and theMovement, led by Generalwith headquartersThe leadership of the latterwas mergedlthough itthat these emigre groups havetouch with elements of unknownHungary, it is unlikely that theysometimes claimed, organized any resistance movements. they have gathered has proved of dubious value. Moreover, the politicaland the controversial background of many of their leaders has almost certainly discredited these emigre groups in the eyes of resisters inside Hungary. Besides the above mentioned emigre groups, there alsoumerically small but well-organized group of extreme rightists under General Arpad Hcnney. consisting of fanatical Nazi-typemost of whom were members orof the so-called Arrow Cross Party during Worldhis group will not cooperate with Westerners unless its conditions arc met; its political ideology, somewhat camouflaged, runs so counter to Western concepts us to make Its successful integrationeneral resistanceunlikely. There Is some evidence that Yugoslavia has had limited success withoperations to propagate Tttoism in Hungary.


internal security control andknow-how will continue to limit theof organized resistance, active orCold war activities, at best, willrestricted to Informationantireglme propaganda,of sabotage, and unorganized passivePoor terrain Impedes thenuclei for future guerrilla operations;of contacts for escape andwould be difficult, evenocalfactors militating against anbulld-up are: the vigilance ofthe presence of Soviet troops, lackresistance leaders, lack ofwith Western agencies that couldhelp them, and the absence of asecurity consciousness.capabilities for unorganizedresistance, especially in industrywill remain substantial.


conditions of open warfare,security measures would almost cer-

tainly be so greatly increased that noresistance could be expected untilforces had won major victories in Europe. In the event of such victories, passiveprobably would increase sharply, and clandestine organization of large-scalewould be attempted, possibly with the help of disaffected military or police elements. There would probably also be increasedwillingness to assist in escape andand defections would become moreHowever, premature guerrillaand sabotage would be likely to provoke reprisalsature which would retard, if not cripple, the development of effectiveIf Western military success broughteterioration of the Hungarian state and security apparatus, resistance activities would almost certainly sharply Increase. Their scope and effectiveness would depend upon the extent of Western aid, the ability to establish communications, and the degree of weakness in the state security Western forces probably would take the form of organized supi>ort of escape and evasion operations. Information collection, psychological warfare, sabotage and, possibly, limited guerrilla warfare. The most likely sources of defection under such circumstances would be: (a) army enlisted personnel; (b) the mass of political prisoners; <c) theIntelligentsia; (d) peasants andworkers in areas near the Western forces, and (e) youth.


the USSR occupied Rumania atof World War II, it quickly proceededNorthern Bukovlna andthe non-Communistthe King out of the country, andpoweruppet regime undercontrol.esult the vastRumanians, deprived Of their Westernand of self-determination, have comethat their country is virtually aThey have almost certainlywith their traditional fearMoreover, Soviet4 has been so great that evenas rich in natural resources ashad been chronically in want.reparations, and the operation ofmixed companies placedload on its economy. Theliving standards which resultedon Soviet exploitation. Addingfear and resentment onthe brutal methods of astate have Imposed an alien way of life.


The violent opposition ofcomprising aboutercent ofhas constrained the regime tovery slowly in collectivizingonly kulaks and small farmers butpeasants have resisted theis questionable whether even the poor,peasants who constituteercent ofmembership of collective farms,be induced to adopt the collectiveitself. By the regime's ownproduction is lower thanwar. Tho kulaks and small farmersalmost all the grain theand the regime has been unwillingdrastic steps in the face of theirThus the peasantry constitutesresistance potential.

Industrial workers are worse off than the peasants, who at least arc able to dodge forced deliveries and to acquire on the black market what is needed for their personalThe urban and industrialsuffersepressed living standard, poor housing, food shortages, and otherWorkers cannot obtain necessary consumer goods; they arc forbidden to leave their Jobs and are subject to constant political indoctrination and police surveillance. Those who supported the regime at the beginning of the Communist rule arconsiderable passivepotential is accumulating.

Youth. Large sections of Rumanian youth are opposed to the regime. Tradition, which is strong in Rumania, together with thetendencies of youth, militate against acceptance of regimented life and Communist group control techniques. Tlie regime has been far less successful In gaining the loyalty of youth thanad expected.

Military. With the exception of those higher officers who are good Communists (or who have survived the purges) and whotake in the regime's continuation, theof the armed forces is questionable. Opportunism hasredilection iningrained during centuries of foreign rule, and most of the officers are probably opportunists. Enlisted men. coming mainly from rural areas imbued with tlie antircgimc feeling, are almost certainly only bowing to force. If the regime were to lose its grip on the control apparatus and if Soviet supervision were withdrawn, very few of the enlisted men would prove reliable.

Intellectuals, clergymen, nationalIn addition to Ihe above, there arelesser groups which might haveresistance potential. The intellectual and professional elements in particular have generally resisted Communist indoctrination. There is evidence that not enough

nist-traincd teachers are available. Many members of tlie professions and almost all of the former higher and middle classes, nowof their property and displaced socially, are Intensely hostile to the regime. The top hierarchy of the Orthodox Church has been largely reoriented toward the Moscowand some of the leading anti-Soviet churchmen have been eliminated, but the rank-and-file of the lower clergy and the parish priests remain at heartTheyonsiderablepotential, as do tlie clergymen of the Catholic and Uniate Church whosehave been virtually destroyed. National minorities, particularly the Hungarians, are constantly dissatisfied, and, Indeed, would be opposed to any Rumanian government which would not cater to their national aspirations.


dissidence Is strung in almostof Rumanian society, includingechelons of the government andorganized resistance has steadilyin the past several years andbe virtually extinct at present. Isolatedof active unorganized resistancebeing reported, and are sometimesby the Communists. Moreover,has not succeeded in eliminatingresistance, which continues to expressmainly In economic sabotage.resistance is not exclusivelyin motivation, but reflectsdegree or self-interest or frustration.economic sabotage such asdamage to machinery,of trains, arson, workgeneral negligence may or may notmotivated. Whatever thethere does appear to be considerableImpeding agriculture,trade, industry, and theof the Communistfact Is openly admitted by the regime.


Mlhal, who could become aof the Rumanian emigration,accept factions of three exile parties as legal representatives of the Rumanian people. Factionul strife, however has greatlytheir Importance. The King Isthe only person who maintains aof continuityon-Communistgovcmment-in-exile. There Isroup of left Socialists, and some Iron Guard-ists, who are opposedestoration of the monarchy. Evidence exists that the King is still popular ln Rumania, particularly among the peasantry, but the problem ofsuccession to the Communist regime will probablyource of luctional strife.

if any, contacts seem to existemigres and the homeland.aie very precarious and censorshipAll borders are closely guardedRumanian languagethe West are jammed; they appearheard best In rural areas. Printedpropaganda which hasRumanians is reported to havesporadic manifestations of


cold war conditions, such activeas may still exist con be expectedas the regime's security controlsand us long as there is no clearof positive aid from the West.there may be sporadic, disjointedraids of no more than localparticularly from the lessof Rumania. Passive resistancealso continueariety ofeconomic sabotage. At best, suchwill retard the implementation ofpolitical and economic program;least, tliey willuisancenumbers of reliableperforming more useful work.


the event of open war, Rumanianforces would almost certainly be re-

inforced by Soviet troops. The resultingor security measures wouldmi mm Ire even passive resistance.some guerrilla activity might develop. The extent ot active organized resistance would depend on the military situation in Europe, notably the nearness of Western forces, the help mode available by the West.

and the attitude of the Balkan Pact countries, notably Yugoslavia. There might be some attempts at defection to Yugoslavia, if that country sided with the West. As Western troops approached Rumanian territory,warfare against local Communists and Soviet units might flare up even beforeforces actually entered the country.


L Russiaong history of resistance, but the revolution7 was the only successful act of resistance In modern times resulting in the overthrowovernment in power. It occurred only after the war had vlrlually destroyed central authority. The newleaders were careful to establishcontrols strong enough to prevent another popular revolt. Nevertheless, passivecontinued. It showed great strength durings when Stalin was forcing through collectivization of agriculture. At the beginning of World War II massoccurred and various national minorities were willing to collaborate with the Germans until harsh Nazi policies rebuffed them. The colossal devastation of World War II resulted in widespread discontent which necessitated powerful application of coercive measures. The most troublesome postwar areas proved to be those which the USSR had newlythe Baltic Stales, the western parts of the Ukraine and Helorussia, and Moldavia. Partisan movements flourished in all Ihese areas, especially hi the Baltic States and the western Ukraine, until mass deportations and police terror succeeded in subduing them. The continued strain imposed upon thepeople by Stalin's foreign and economic policies compelled the Politburo to retain most of the wartime controls and even tosome of them. However,rder had been restored throughout the country, and operations against the partisans Jn the troubled areas had eliminated nearly allresistance.

any Soviet citizens, largely convinced by Soviet propaganda of the improvements since Czarist days, probably feel that their lot has improved.ore of adherents of Communist ideology are willing to acceptin Its name. However, there appears to be some degree of discontent andat nearly every level of Soviet society. This dissidence is not based so much uponto Communist ideology per sc as upon neglect or denial by the Communistof basic popular rights and needs. Poor living conditions probably constitute the most significant cause. Tlie apparent unwillingness or inability of the Soviet Government to raise the standard of living is exacerbated by the knowledge, acquired by millions of Soviet soldiers during World War II, that things arc better abroad. All-pervading fear of the police also contributes greatly to dissidence as do the social stratification, nepotism, andwhich divide the ruling elements from the masses. Finally, antlreligious campaigns and the Russiflcation of the nationalhave created extensive resentment


Peasantry. Of all social groups, thehave suffered most under Soviet rule. Their living standard Is the lowest, except for that of tlie forced laborer. Soviet ruthlcss-ness in collectivization and pressure forproduction have provoked strongThe attempts by peasants to recover their status as individual land owners during the German occupation demonstrated their opposition to the collective system. Continued insufficiency of agricultural production since the war Is probably due in part to lack of peasant cooperation. The government hasumber of minor concessions to the peasants but not enough to stimulate their cooperation or to overcome their opposition to collectivism.

onsiderable segment of Soviet youth probably support the Soviet regime. Generally, they receive special consideration from tba government Their education andare carefully supervised.there arc elements among the youth whose loyalty is open to question. Among them are: (a) children of parents persecuted by the regime; (b) descendants of Czarist(c) offspring o! kulaks, of purge vicUms and of inmates of forced labor camps;

(d) the young itirn who have served in the armed forces abroad and were able totheir living standard with the much higher one outside the USSR; and (e) some students of higher educational institutions. There have been insistent reports of anti-Cominunist organ izut Ions among university students,roup was uncovered at the university of Moscow and allegedly at Kaunas. Constant admonitions in the Komsomolhave denounced youth's flouting oftaboos.

National Minorities. Aboutercent of the Soviet population consists of national minorities, someistinguished history of their own. Russiflcutlon of thoseunder the Tsars had little success.the Bolsheviks propagandized theand cultural autonomy of their component republics and autonomous regions. After the war, possiblyesult of the poor showing of loyalty to the Soviet state during the German occupation by certain minorities, they sharply restricted cultural autonomy. Some minorities were liquidated as such by dispersal of populations, and whateverother minorities still enjoyed wasended by intensified Russlfication and Soviet ization. Consequently, disaffection was rampant. During the first postwarartisans ln the Ukrainen Lithuania reportedly battled Soviet troops.he back of tlie revolt was broken. But even now tho Ukrainian Party Secretariat finds it necessary to call publicly for vigilance against infiltration by Ukrainian partisans.

Repressed Klemcnts. The millions ofcitizens who huve been sentenced to forced labor camps und exile ln remoteareasairly importantpotential. During World War II. many such individuals emerged as leaders of collaboration in German-occupied territories. Their hatred of Uic Soviet regime almosttranscends their patriotic feelings. Knowing this, the government keeps former inmates of labor camps under strict controls. There have been persistent rumors ofby forced laborers, supposed to have occurred between In the summertrikes occurred at the Vorkuta and Norilsk camps ln the Far North of Siberia. While the uprisings, from allwere nonpoUUcal, they speak for the desperation of these repressed elements.ntellectuals. In spite or the preferredof intellectuals in Soviet society,controls and restriction of theirto create have probably led toresentment.esult,ew intellectuals have withdrawn into themselves, refused to study Marxism, and turned tofields where Party control Is less pronounced. Exceptew Communist fanatics, those artists and scientists who find themselves frustrated by Furty ukases telling them what is correct, appear to beoutwardly while inwardlyreakdown In Soviet controls they will almost certainly maintain sufficient conformity to uvold losing their material ad-

Industrial Workers. There Is frequentof discontent among the mass ofworkers. 'Ihe very low living standard, constant pressure for production underconditions, lack of freedom ofand harsh labor discipline havecertainly caused widespread discontent. While there haslight increase in food and consumer goods in recent years, it is not nearly enough to satisfy the workers.the promises of increased consumer goods since Stalin's death, have recently been de-emphasized.

Armed Forces. In general the armed forcesulwark of the regime ratherhreat to it. Over-nil morale Isto be sufficiently high to insure the reliability of the armed foiccs. although there are many reports or low morale In individual instances. The officers, especially in theranks,avored economic group.the Kronstadthe purges in the. the low morale of the Red Army at the beginning of Worldass desertions and the establishment of aarmy under Vlasov in German-occupied territory, and the persistant postwarin Germany and Austria have caused the

Soviet Government to take extraordinaryincluding police and Partyand virtual isolation ol troops from native populations in occupiedew defections to the West are still occurring. Harshide cleavage betweenand men, inescapable indoctrination and surveillance by an all-prevading informercreate discontent in the service and tend to decrease the value of its materialof clothing, shelter, and food. Morale in the Soviet Navy and Air Forces appears to be liigher than that in the Army.


some dissidence exists atlevel of Soviet society, the regimein establishing such pervasivethat the people are forced toenergies to coping with the systemto conceiving an alternative solutionsteps lo achieveolution.resistance, such as occurred inacquired territories after the endWar II, had virtually ceased to existThe strikes and riots reported inlabor camps may not havemotivation and in any casesuppressed. Whether indicationsresistance In agriculture,the lower bureaucracy are not merelyof time-honored Russianor apathy cannot be estimatedconfidence. In sum, the gulfand resistance in the USSR isthan elsewhere in the Bloc (exceptin Communist China).


emigre organ bullions claimRussians and nationalthese, the Solidarists (NTS)Greatthe largest and mostformer Vlasov adherents andrecent defectors have joined tliisWhenever emigre groups areSoviet defectors or by listeners tobroadcasts, it is the NTS whichto have the pre-eminent place.


According to defector reports, there is little or no awareness among tbe Soviei people of the present activities of emigre groups. Defectors who admit familiarity with these groups acquired their knowledge in Germany and Austria. However, there are likely to be some memories from the war when many emigre groups, particularly the NTS. werenot only in German-occupied Sovietbut also among the millions of Russians deported to Germany for forced labor.the Soviei press itself keeps suchalive by occasional attacks on the emigre movement. During the early postwar years, there were some contacts between emigre groups and partisan groups in western areas of the USSR. Some tenuous connections may still exist but arc almost certainly negligible. The Soviet security apparatus has pacified the new Western territories and deported many of the inhabitants, partially replacing them with Great Russians. Some slightmay still exist between the West and members of the former Uniatc Church in the Ukraine which was forcibly amalgamated with the Russian Orthodox Church In the.

The minority emigre organizations are not nowosition to gain the sympathy of the Great Russians to any appreciable extent Tlie peoples of the recently incorporated areas, especially In the Baltic States and the Western Ukraine, mayhile be inclined to look to emigre organizations for support, But In those national minority areas which have long been under Soviet rule (the Ukraine, Georgia, Byelo-Russla,he people would almost certainly feel, like the Great Russians, that the emigres have been away from their homeland so long that Uiey have lost their grasp of Soviet realities. The people would also resent what they believe to be the"luxurious living" in the West and are still disillusioned over the connection of some emigre organizations with tlie Nazi regime. They probably are unaware of any acceptable political alternative to Soviet Communism. On Ihe other hand, the Soviet Governmenthas given signs of apprehension lestgroups be used for infiltration purposes and has indicated fear of their organization

and propaganda. This was demonstrated in the Khokhlov and other cases, where they did not shrink from elaborately preparing Uie murder of an emigre leader. Another aspect of the effort to neutralize emigre groups is the Soviet attempt to encourage emigres to return, promising them good treatment.


continued cold war conditions,resistance against the Soviet systemunlikely unless the regimesbecomes seriously weakened.ofresistance will probablyranging Trom camouflagedParty rules to agricultural andIt may also be expressed Intoward the regime, attemptsto Western broadcasts, lack ofworking for the objectives of theand defection.


the event of general warbe lightened, virtually all peopleemployed ln the defense effort, andappeals would be launched. We areto estimate the extent of or theresistance potential of such factors as:military action: (b) the popularreactions to such actions; orregime's ability to portray the war asand defensive one.

n the event of major Soviet reverses, some mass defections from the army might occur, particularly among members ofgroups. If the war were prolonged and hostilities carried to Soviet soil, chances for resistance activities would probably improve, and an invading army might meet with cautious, but at least partially sympathetic, response as soon at it became evident that Nazi methods of occupation would not beInituation. anti-Communist partisans, particularly In the minority areas, could probably be Induced to fight theirmasters. Nevertheless, even if hard pressed on the military fronts, the Sovietwouldetermined effort tosufficient control ln the hinterland to prevent resistance elements from becoming active behind their lines. Moreover, in event of an impending collupse of the Sovietanti-Soviet elements of thetogether with labor camp inmates and forced exiles, could attain significantcapabilities. Aside from such groups, resistance among the broad masses of the Great Russian population would be difficult to organize. Patriotism. Indoctrinated respect for Soviet authority, or apathy probably would render them passive and disinclined to active opposition. Unless the security apparatus were seriously weakened, little activity could be expected from the mass of the Great Russian population beyond local harassing operations, help to Western personnel inor evasion, dissemination of antircgime propaganda, limited intelligence activities, and defections.


the past, the main political factorscreated ill-will toward theof Vietnam (DRV) have been:of rigid ideological controls,or [wrsonal freedoms, terroristicpersecution of minority andand tlie rising influence of theChinese. More recentlyarisen from tlie transition lo peace oflong geared lo war; thenew territories (and large cities)increasingly feeling tlie weight ofoppression; and fromthe DRV for having sanctioned,temporarily, the division of thehostility has also been createdeconomic factors as: (a) heavy taxwhich deprive peasants of theirprevent merchants from(b) land reform measuresnumbers of families and creating(c) conscription of labor;f the currency; andice shortages in certain areasin DRV territory have alwaysbut they are now even worse, andlittle chancepeedy improvement.

DRV measures, includingDRV agreement on FrenchIn North Vietnam, and theaid agreement may, Ifsomewhat alleviate thenow reportedly prevailing inMoreover, discontent hasto some extent by thefactors: (a) the prestige accruing toas the result of its long successfultbc French; (b) its posture as aand determined government;the popular appeal of the regime'snationalism. The regime'sCommunism with nationalism Isnot recognized by the massommunist tactic, and mayfor some time to counteract


The Catholics, numbering some one and one-half million (of whom, however, atill have left for the south before, are probably the largest potential resistance element in North Vietnam. If the DRV honors its promise of religious tolerance, they may resign themselves to passivewith the regime. If, however, theshould decide to take strong measures against Catholic leaders and organizations, the Catholics might be provoked Into stronger opposition.

Ethnic minorities, numbering about one and one-half million, oppose domination by the Vietnamese Communists but theirIs Ineffective. The DRV Is now"autonomous administrative areas" for larger ethnic minorities under Communist control, such as tlie one million Thaithe same policy may also be applied to the Nungs, Muongs, Meos, Mans, and Thos. The resistance potential of these tribes is low, since they have no cohesion, leadership, or unity of purpose.

The peasants will almost certainly remain dissatisfied unless the regime can alleviate their grievances. However, no more than passive resistance can be expected so long as the regime exercises pervasive political and police controls.

The dispossessed elements, among whom can be counted non-Communist Chinese,of non-Communist political groups, merchants, and landlords, arc, of course, highly disaffected and, given an opportunity, would participate in resistance activities. In view of the regime's very tight securityhowever, these elements will almostbe gradually liquidated.


information, paucity ofsources, and the fluidity of thevirtually preclude an accurateof the character and intensity of re-

slstancc within DRV territory. Prior to the Geneva agreement there were indications of an anti-Vict Minh potential caused chiefly by Communist terrorism and persecution, and by fear of rising Chinese influence. Continued dissatisfaction with the regime is indicated by the flight of large numbers of civilian refugees from the DRVt the same time, the migration of these anti-Communist elements from North Vietnam has almost certainly weakened the resistance potential there as has the French withdrawal, and the increase of Viet Minh power and prestige since Geneva. Moreover, tlie regime's identification ofwith nationalism, may continue at least for some time to distract attention from grievances. The anticolonial attitude on the part of the ethnic Vietnamese will continue to be used by the regime to popularize its actions. However, some degree of continued passivemay be expected from Vietnamese Catholics and from nonethnic minorities.


uch organized resistance groups as may still exist are poorly equipped and poorly trained. The current capabilities of such groups arc probably limited to development of escape and evasion facilities, some training activities, and information collection.resistance probably is limited topassive opposition. Expansion and intensification of resistance activities would be largely dependent upon logistic support and training of personnel in the use ofi iii'k of coordination, caused chiefly by the mutual animosity of the various ethnic minorities, further reduces the already limited manpower available for guerrilla activities. The regime can be expected to use all methods at its disposal to reduce disaffection andvestiges of resistance. Even aof security measures would probably not bring forth an appreciable resistance

eople elected to leave the North betweennd


estimate of the resistance potentialDRV under conditions of open warfarespeculative. Resistance wouldthe ability to survive countermeasures,to which security controls wouldby military operations, andof training and material aidbe provided. Assuming thatmoderately successful in survivingwith new equipment, at leastsuch as the Thos and possiblyand Mans, would beositionmovements of overland supplyalong the routes from ChinaVietnam. However, the reluctanceguerrilla groups to move anydistance from their tribal areastheir effectiveness. No cohesiveguerrilla activities can beexisting groups would be unable tocontrol over large territorial areasTonkin as the Viet Minht is possible thatelements could be utilized todistribute pamphlets, and collectHowever, willingness ofto act against the DRV regimecontingent upon the military situation.

nationality of attacking forcesinfluence the willingness ofgroups to act. Tribal groups whichhelped by the French for manybe most receptive to Frenchwould prefer otherand the French last. Otheracceptable would be Thais,Americans. Participation ofmight seriously jeopardizecreate antagonism toward theA military government administeredin ethnic Vietnamesealutary effectrench occupationdistrusted by the majority of thepeople, and would adverselypartisan warfare.


decades of Japanese domination, which had aimed to wipe out Korea us aentity and to makeapanesethe Koreans were receptive to any type of government, provided it was Korean. Thus, it is not so much the form of governmentin North Korea after World War II as the exploitative and oppressive methods and foreign flavor of the Communist regime which have created discontent. Thehardships which the North Koreans had to endure during the Korean Warincreased dissatisfaction and frustration. Moreover, the burdens imposed by postwar(such as high taxes, forced labor, pressures to turn farmers into Industrialcontributions to politicalmilitary conscription, and over-all shortages) have almost certainly intensified dissidence. The continued presence of large Cliinese Communist forces in North Korea is probably also an important source of

Although the North Koreans have very little access to information on developments in the ROK, the very existence of the Republic of Korea (ROK)isible alternative to the North Korean Communist regime and thefor unification probably stimulate North Korean dissidence. In spite of the North Korean campaign of vilification against the ROK and the questionable popularity of the Rhee government, there is almostelief that conditions in South Korea are more satisfactory than in North Korea. Dissidence would probably grow if tlie advantages of living in the UN-backed ROK Instead ofsupported North Korea became more apparent.


exists in varying degreeselement of North Korean society,small Communist ruling group. It lsintense among the remnants of the Christian and former middle class elements. These constituted the main strength of the Korean Democratic Party which wasafter liberation from Japan andliquidated in North Korea by the Communists. Considerable dissatisfactionexists among the peasants, who feel that the regime is giving preferential treatment to industrial workers. There isand disillusionment even among the workers. Army morale probably is at least fair. Dissidence is probably most widespread in the enlisted ranks, which have been kept in service many years. Although thereischarge program, it probably does not provide for many early releases. Dissidence also extendsmall number of officers.


ven though the regime's methods andhave caused considerable ill-will, there is no evidence that such disaffection isinto resistance, probably because of tho Korean tendency toward apatheticand by identification of the regime with nationalist aspirations. Antiregime guerrilla activities, such as occurred earlier in theWar had declined greatlyince then, heavy punishment for UN collaborators, nationalist propaganda, severe politicaland stimulation of "anticolonialism" have been used to combat resistanceThere is no indication that the ROK aid to active North Korean resistors has been effective.


fter the establishmentommunist regime in North Korea. anti-Communistfled .south. One sizeable grouporthwestern Young Men's Association, which was absorbed by the ROK "Taehan Youth Corps" until it was assimilated into the South Korean Armed Forces. Many of

this group were either Christians or followers of the Chondokyo Churcli (an indigenous church strong in the northwestern areas ofhese two groupsackground of active resistance against the Japanese. Many thousands of their number were used as guerrilla forces by the UN Commandthe Korean War. Several smaller groups, cultural and political emigres, chief among wliich are the remnants of the KoreanParty, led resistance against theprior to the outbreak of the war. There are no current indications of guidance or assistance to resistance elements in North Korea except that given by the ROK itself, nor is there adequate information on theif any, made by the ROK.


ssuming continuation of the armistice, resistance in North Korea is unlikely to be of much significance. At best, it mayimited source of intelligence. The security forces and the army are capable of dealing with any opposition, whether from disgruntled peasants, Christian elements, or survivors of the domestic purges. Even though theof the country, the vulnerability of the North Korean transportation system, and the homogeneity of the Korean people (which facilitates ROK infiltration) would favoractivities, the regime is consideredof coping with them. It would have the support of nearby Soviet and Communistforces if it could not carry out the task alone.


Under conditions of open war, Northresistance potential would probablysomewhat but would probably be limited to isolated instances of sabotage, some passive resistance and defections, assistance to anti-Communist personnel in evasion and escape operations, and some intelligenceIncreased security measures andby the USSR and Communist China would make organized resistance virtuallyIn the eventloc defeatajor retreat of the Communist forces inthe populace still behind Communist lines might be encouraged to resist theirWhile such resistance would be anburden on the Communists, it istoecisive factor.

The responsibility for initiation ofwould not significantly affect resistance potential. The nationality of any allied forces invading North Korea also would not matter provided that no Japanese forces were cm-ployed. Unless political conditions in the ROK deteriorate sharply, the ROK would have no difficulty in establishing governmentalln North Korea which would have the initial support or acquiescence of the bulk of the population.


Original document.

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