2 April 5
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER
OMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
Submitted by the
DIKECTOB OF CENTRAL DTTH-LIGBN'CK
Tht following Intelligence organization! participated inof this extUnaU: The Central Ir.Ulligrr.trthe IntrlHgenct organizations of tht Departmentstht Army, the Naey, the Air force, and The Jointtn byADVTSOBYttwere the Special Aiiutant.
Inttttiotrut. Department of State; tht Assistant Chief of. Department of the Army; tht Director of Naval InteUigence, tht Director of InUUtgence. USAF, and tha Deputy Director for InteUigence. The Joint Staff. The Atomic energy Commission Representative to the IAC. and the Atmtant to the Director. Federal Bureau of investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction. The Annexes to the tsUmatel. mere coordinated among tha IAC Agencies.
0CCRLT assisi*ouc
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AOENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. Thislor the Information and use of the recipient Indicated on the front cover and ofunder his Jurisdictioneed to know basis. Additional essentialbe authorized by the following officials within their respective department*:
Assistant to the Secretary (or Intelligence, for the Department
Clilof of, for tho Department of the Army
of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
of Intelligence. USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
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Tills copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance withsecurity regulations, or relumed to the Central Intelligence Agency bywith the Office of Collection and Dissemination. CIA.
When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain iteriod not In excess of onehe end of this period, the estimate should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should beol the forwarding agency to retain It In accordance with2
Fj VC V
ttittJVX.EV"'-, C*6nCG kfjLSi
ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCEN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
THE PROBLEM
To appraise tlie intensity and scope of dissidence and resistance in Sino-Soviet Bloc countries, and to estimate the resistance potential under cold and hot warin thc Bloc.1
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
estimating the resistance potentialeople in relation to theirit Is necessary to know the nature, extent, and depth of their discontent, the strength of their will to resist, and their capability for resistance compared with the will and capability of the regime to maintain control.
ommunist -ruled country the best known of these factors is the regime'sto preserve internal securityof cost; its capability ofeffective resistance; and its constant pressure to induce thc individual tohimself to thc Communist
Lacking any legal avenues fordissent, thc population still canits discontentariety of actions and inactions unfavorable to the regime, ranging from individual actions to widespread opposition. These types of resistance are symptomatic of discontent, but do not necessarily reveal the extent, constancy, and specific causes ofdiscontent Thc will to resist, the
skill in doing so, thc motivation, and thc opportunities, vary from element toin the population, and from time to time.
In this esUmate, the followingis used to describe these types of action:
Dissidencetate of mind involving discontent or disaffection with the
Resistance is dissidence translated into action.
Organized resistance is that which is carried outroup of individuals who haveommon purpose, agreed
estimate coven leitlatance potential InSlno-Sovlet nioc Moro detailed coverage ol individual Blocet forth In the attached Annexei on Albania, DulEaria.East Oermunj,umania, the USSR. North Korea, and North Vietnam Poland and Communist China are considered In the over-all estimate, bat no annexei are Included on these countries For more detailedof these two countries aeeAnU-Communlstnd Potential inateduly HH. "Antl-Coramuntat Resistance Activities and Potential inovember 1M4
on leadership, and worked out asystem,
Unorganized resistance is that which is carried out by individuals or looselygroups which may have been formed spontaneously for certain limited sbjectives, without over-all plan or
Active resistance, organized oris that which expresses itself in positive acts against the regime. It may ake such forms as intelligence collection, jsychological warfare, sabotage, guerrilla
warfare, assistance in escape and evasion, open defiance of authority, oractivity for any of the above. It may or may not involve violence, and may be conducted openly or clandestinely.assive resistance, organized oris that which is conductedthe framework of the register's normal life and duties, and involves deliberate nonperformance or malpcrformance of acts which would benefit the regime, or deliberate nonconformity with standards of conduct established by the regime.
There is evidence of widespread dissi-encc in all Communist Bloc countries. Vhile in general dissidence is greatest mong the peasantry, even the youth and ldustrial workers, two groups which light be expected to be mostommunist indoctrination, haveincreasingly disaffected in thc Euro-ean Satellites andesser extent Ln le USSR.
However, thc intensity of dissidence iries considerably. It is probably least 'onounced in thc USSR, where Commu-ism has become more firmlyhc Far East Bloc areas, where Com-unistn is exploiting thc new surge of na-inalism, dissidence almost certainly is uch less strong than in the EastSatellites, where nationaleing subordinated to those of the SSR.
Despite thc existence of dissidence roughout the Bloc, active organized re-tance is practicallysolated small guerrilla bands may
still be operating In some Satellites,in Albania, but they are no moreocal nuisance which probably will be wiped out sooner or later by the security forces.
ven though dissidence within the Sino-Soviet Blocesistancewc believe that under continued cold war conditions active resistance is unlikely to develop. There mayew isolated acts of unorganized resistance, but the effectiveness of Communistcontrols and police state methods will probably remain such as to make active organized resistance virtuallyexceptew almostareas. Therefore, even in countries where dissidence Is strongest, such as East Germany, we see no prospect of resistance activities developingcale sufficient to threaten the stability of the regimes.aximum such activities will tend to delay the achievement of Communist political and economic objectives. inimum they willuisance
to Uie regimes und will raise the morale of an ti-Communist elements. Increased active resistance would be likely only ii the Communist security apparatus were greatly weakened, or if Sino-Soviet power and prestige were greatly decreased.
n the otherubstantialof passive resistance is likely toSuch resistance is unlikelyto threaten the political stability of the CorruTiunist regimes. However,in agriculture, it will probablyroublesome and even serious factor throughout the Bloc countries,thc fulfillment of their political ind economic programs. Nevertheless, ve believe that the persistent pressures ixercised by Communist regimes will eventually reduce the extent of even pas-jve resistance and will almost certainly irevent thc emergence of coordinated rc-istuncc activities.
. In most of the USSR andesser xtcnt in Communist China, the out-reak of open warfare would stimulate atriotic feelings in support of the rc-imes. Widespread destruction or pro--acted hostilities, however, mighthc emergence of resistance. In the ewly acquired areas of the USSR,he Baltic States and thc Western kralne, hopes of liberation would be rc-indled at the outset, intensifying thc re-stance potential. In thc Europeanthe outbreak of war would not lly stimulate hopes for liberation but Duld also increase popular unrest and issive resistance. We believe, however, at no active organized resistance would cur, unless the Bloc suffered severe Uitary setbacks, and Western forcesSatellite territory. Commu-
nist military and security forces wouldcertainly remain sufficiently strong to prevent or check outbreaks. However, wc estimate that major resistancein the Bloc, comparable to those of World War II, probably would not develop in areas still under Communist control until thc local security organizations had been seriously weakened and the USSR and Communist China were unable to enforce order In their respective orbits. Until such circumstances arose, activities of resistance elements would probably be confined to intelligence collection and transmission, surreptitious antircglme propaganda, aid to Western personnel in escape and evasion operations, andinducements.
n many countries of thcworld there are organizations,of and led by persons who have emigrated from countries of the Soviet Bloc. In general these organizations have lost effective contact with their homelands and do not significantlyto resistance potential. all have suffered from internaland lack of funds and have beenby agents of Communist security foices. The people within the Bloc know very little about emigre organizations. With rare exceptions they would almost certainly not welcome leading emigres in positions of power after liberation.
n the event of war, the nationality of invading forces probably would inhave little bearing on theoffered by resistance elements in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, provided these forces were clearly integratedroad anti-Communist military organization. In certain situations, however, long-stand-
ing national antipathies might outweigh anti-Communist feelings. Thus, anti-Communist resistance activities might be adversely affected by the prominent use of: (a) German forces inPoland, and the USSR;reek, and Turkish units in(c) Greek, Italian, or Yugoslav units in Albania; and (d) Japanese forces in North Korea and Communist China.
he question of responsibility for the initiation of general war would probably
not substantially affect the will to resist the regimes in the Bloc countries.'
"Tlte Special Assistant, Inielligence, Department of Stale, would substitute for this paragraph tho
following:
The question of responsibility loe tbe Initiation ot general war* affect the will to resist In the European Satelliles, whose populations are so overwhelmingly against the existing regime as to be unaffected by considerations of war guilt. It will probably have more significance in the USSR, where support fo: Uie regime by the war-weary nopulaUon would be decreased orby popular Judgments as to theor defensive character of the war.
ANNEXES TO
The following Annexes have been coordinated among the IAC Agencies:
, . .
Annex . . .
Annex
Annex GERMANY.
Annex . . .
Annex . . .
Annex
Annex VIETNAM
Annex KOREA .
6
9S 18
21
24
28
ANNEX A: ALBANIA
CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE
he widespread popular dissidence Insprings from political, social, cultural, and religious as well as economic causes. The ruthless efforts of the Communist regime to destroy Individual freedoms, patriarchalpatterns, village autonomy, and religion are particularly resented. For many centuries, opposition to central authority has been an Albanian tradition. local patriotism and rugged Individualism have combined to create opposition to nil authority, alien or native, beyond the confines of thc immediate tribes or villages. This trait ls particularlyounced tn the northern areasinhabited by the Ghegs, mountain tribes who until Worldad little contact with the modern world. The more accessibletribes, the Tasks, have been in closer touch with new ideas and modem techniques, and thc Tosk intellectuals were thc first to become interested in Marxism.
Moreover, the present Communist regime is Identified with the traditionally hated Slavs. Ever since the Slavs drove thcback into the mountainous edges of the Adriatic, thc Albanians have been anti-Slav. Thc massacre of Albanians by Serbs during2 Balkan War aggravated this feeling. Thus Communism, particularly for the Ghegs. has the handicap of its Slavicail the more so since the AlbaniaParty was founded1 byCommunists who directed the movement8 when Tito defected and Albanian Communist leader Hoxha cast his lost with the Comlnform.
Another basic cause of dissidence IsInterference with Albania's cultural heritage. After Albania became independentumber of French. English, and Italian .schools were created, young Albanians were sent to Western universities, and West-em cultural influence grew considerably. The regime's attempt to enforce Soviet orientation
has made Albania's few IntcllectuaLi pay perfunctory Up service to Communism but they remain strongly opposed to SovietThe regime, apparently unable to change this situation, has frequently charged Its teachers with still beingndlow ideologicalhecrusade against religion has further increased popular discontent not onlyot Interference In matters of belief but also because religion Is regardedart of thc national cultural heritage. Religious groups (Islamic, Greek Orthodox, and Roman Catholic) whichajor part In the country's cultural development have been brought under state control.
preseni Inadequate standard ofa further cause of dissidence.standards have always been low.between pre- and post-conditions Is great enough towhich is considerably enhancedeconomic measures suchand forced loans.
MAJOR DISSIOENI ELEMENTS
toward the regimeamong all classes. With thetlic top governmental bureaucracy,officers ln the army, the nationalParly leaders, and the securilyIs no groupeven within the Partyderives real benefits from thesuppression of elements consideredand their internment in forcedcamps has exacerbated the widespreadtoward the government. Afterof Communist rule approximatelyof the population is still In Jailscamps. Annual amnesties have notthe prison population whichnew "enemies ot the people" havethose freed.
he Peasantry. Albaniaountry of peasants, who comprise lhc largest and most formidable anti-Communist clement Thc
;
7
reasonsn.sant dlsaiTeclion are crushing taxes, heavy obligatory delivery quotas for winch lhe government pays low prices, seizure ol livestock, Imposition of(forced) labor and forced slate loans, collectivization pressures and police terroriza-tion. Mainly becau.se of peasant opposition, onlyercent of the arable land has so far been collectivized. Poor and landlessin the soulh and central areas initially profited by lhc so called agrarian reformsut were quickly disillusioned.and proud of their pastthe peasants are Indifferent to and care less for Communist ideology. Thepeasant antagonism against Communist policies largely accounts for lack of reliability of thc armed forces and Industrial labor, both of which groups are recruited chiefly from thc peasantry.
Youth. Albanian youth, both rural and urban, had joined thc liberation movements against Uie Italian and German occupation, and the Communists, camouflagingin thc National Liberationeriod In attracUng largeof youth. However,0 Communist propaganda had become Ineffective because of economic inequalities, "voluntary" labor. Impositionoreign ideology, and economic want.
Military. The rank and flic of the Albanian Army cannot be considered loyal to theOne indication Is lhe fact Uiat units of Uie army have never been used to stamp out guerrilla activities. FanaUcalsecurity police Ml used instead Only the security police, some noncommissioned officers, and ranking army officers who rose to their present position during the wartime partisan warfare or under the Communist regime are considered reliable. These groups, and Uie network of informers placed in every village, arc the security backbone of theregime,rovrnU-dbands from overthrowing the Tirana govenunenl by force.
Intelligentsia and Clergy. Intellectuals and clergymenonsiderable resist-
ance leadership potential. Most of theintelligentsia fought the rise ofduring the war, BalU Kombetar (Nationalhe strongest anU-Commu-nlst nationalist organization during World War II. was founded by inteUectualelements. Many of the intelligentsia were exUed, executed, or Jailed after thecame to power. Ot thc Intellectuals remaining in Albania,ew can be trusted by the government. The clergy,the Roman Catholics, also hate the regime. While Moslem and Orthodox priests appear to have been cowed, thc regime can probably not rely on them.
INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE
is evidence that Albanians havethe hope of eventual liberation, andacts of overt resistance are stilloccur. However, mounting policebrutality have decreased activethe past five years. On the whole,of security forces in detecting andguerrillas has greatly weakenedscattered, and uncoordinatedoperating in mountain redoubts.to Yugoslavia and Greece and passivehave become the primaryopposition to thc regime. Despitethere is passive resistance Inand agriculture such aswork of Soviet advisers, damagingproducing goods of poor quality,produce, and failing lo meet farm quotas.
EMIGRE GROUPS
situation in Albania diners fromother Satellites in that much of theactivity lhat exists is directed byin Greece, Yugoslavia, and Italy.four principal Albanian emigrethe West, thc BK (Balli Kombetar).Movement (close to King Zog).of nonparty individuals, and LheIndependent Bloc, whose leaderswith Fascist Italy. The firstbecame affiliated in the Nationalfor Free Albania (NCFA)the appearance of relative strengthmost of the emigre groups and
obtaining financial and moral support from thc West. This Western support ts theunifying (actor In the emigration.when3 the National Independent Bloc and some other individuals werein the NCFA, certain left-wingof BK split oUand formed the National Democratic Committeeree Albania (NDCFA)..
There have been some contacts between resistance elements in Albania and tlieNCFA affiliates. Most resistance groups, particularly those reportedly operating inand southern Albania, appear to have identified themselves with the NCFA.there is still much political andfactionalism rending Albania emigre organizations, they appear to be in abetter shape and seem to have morewith their homeland than the emigres of the other Satellites.
There lsugoslav-sponsored league of Albanian Political Refugees In Yugoslavia, which has the advantage of being closer to Albania than olher emigre elements. Itswith certain resistance elements inthrough Yugoslav intelligence service cross-border operations, have probably been closer and more numerous than those of the Western-oriented elements with the NCFA emigres. At one lime, arms, supplies, and money reportedly were supplied to thcby this group. However, due to Yugoslavia's normalization of relations with lhe Bloc powers, the group's activities have reportedly been sharply curtailed.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLO WAR CONDITIONS
few isolated resistance bands inmay continue for some time toattention of Communist securityinflict sporadic damage in the fieldsand transportation.the regime's security measures makeimpossible the organizationational, cohesive, andscale. Any guerrilla forcesalso be short of weapons and sup-
plies.radual liquidation of these activities is likely.ubstantialof passive resistance will probablyto manifest Itself.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME CONDITIONS
ecause most Albanians are probablythat only an East-West war could bring ihem liberation, the outbreak of general war would almost certainly strengthen Iheirpotential. At the very least, it would probably stiffen the hostility of the peasantry toward the regime. Both peasants andwould probably try lo sabotage thewar cflort when Ihey could do soundue risk to themselves. Furthermore, thc feasibility of at least covert help fromGreece, and Italy, the geographic isolation of Albania from the Bloc, and the necessity for the regime to use all available manpower to secure Its frontiers from attack or Infiltration would probably make it easier In Albania than anywhere else In the Bloc for guerrillas to prepare organized resistance. It is likely that well led and equipped anti-regime Albanians could infiltrate the country from Yugoslavia or Greece.
lthough large-scale uprisings probably would not occur Immediately upon theof war, Albanian resistance elements, if supported from the outside, might be able to organize some active resistance. However, the commencement of large-scale guerrilla warfare would depend upon suchas Western military successes, the weakening of the regime, the attitudes ofand Greece, and the ability of the West and thc emigre groups to provideand aid. Unless the USSR were able to reinforce Albania with Soviet units soon after the war brokearge-scale uprising could develop, particularly In the northern andregions, before Weslern forces actually reached Albanian territory Such awould presuppose, however, that large numbers of Albanian conscripts escaped to the mountains, even though many of their officers remained loyal to the regime.
ANNEX B: BULGARIA
CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE
raditionally, through race, language, and culture the Bulgarians have been closely linked with the Russians Prior to the Soviel occupation Inhe majority of the population favored friendship with the USSR. But thc conduct of the invadingforces, the ruthless exploitation ofresources by the USSR, and thesovletltatlon carried out by Communist puppets have quickly spread disillusionment and resentment. Bulgarians have long been used lo political tyranny but the Impositionystem thatockery of their national sovereignty has alienated mostThe regime's economic policies are regarded by most of the population asto further Soviet interests rather than those of Bulgaria. Extensive Soviet controls have madeirtual Soviet colony, but available evidence indicates that most Bulgarians arc chafing under theirregime and loathe Soviet domination.
MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS
he Peasantry. The peasantry, someercent of the population, constitutes the strongest opposition element. In the past.
there were comparatively lew landlessmost peasantsmall Iract of land which they tilled with the help of asystem. They are bitterly opposed to collectivization. While the regime has maintained the facade of Alexander Stam-bolisky's Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, Communist collectivization policies havethis gesture. The regime's extremely unpopular methods of implementingagricultural doctrine have arouseddissatisfaction on the pari of most
3 Industrial workers, at one lime the slaunchest supporters of Communism, have shown increasing dissatisfaction withconditions, totalitarian labor discipline,
and inadequate wages. So far, thc "new course" and the return lo Bulgarian control of some Soviet-Bulgarian joint companies have had little effect on depressed livingIndustrial workers resent thcharsh labor laws which bind them to their jobs by penalty of imprisonment or confinementorced labor camp andmandatory transfers. Significantly, these laws have been created to preventabsenteeism, growing labor turnover, and deteriorating labor discipline" Drasticare also being taken lo prevent growing industrial sabotage.
clergy has been subverted orwith the help of the"Union of Orlhodox Priests" andreligious organizations.independent Bulgarianembracing nearly all Bulgarians,compelled to come under thcThe leadership of theand Protestant communities hasdestroyed,arge part ofminority deported to Turkey. Thenon-Communist clergy islo the regime and constitutes aresistance potential Regimeto discourage religious practicescontributed to dissidence.
There Is some evidence that anumber of Bulgarian youth maylosing whatever initialhad for Communism. The restrictionsimposed upon it by the Partyincreasingly resented Themethod* of indoctrinationcaused many young people to resistteachings and to look forUie West Evidence suggests that anumber of university students arevi the regime. However, youthoutlet for expressing its resentment.
6 Military. The majority of tlie officer corps is probably loyal lo the regime Most officers,
since the purges of older elements, havetheir rank through Communistand are not anxious to lose theireven if they do not agree with thepolicies. The enlisted personnel are recruited mainly from lhc peasantry, thc strongest antiregimc element, but theof the Bulgarian Army is probablyhigher than in lhe other Satellites. Thc close ethnic relationship of Bulgaria with Russia probably influences the attitude of the Army.
INTENSITY Of RESISTANCE
Although dissidence is strong in almost every segment of Bulgarian society, fewhave dared to defy thc regimeThe regime has been able to suppress aclivc resistance and little opportunity for it exists. At present Ihcre is no evidence of organized resistance; acts of open resistance arc few and reports describing them are often uncomfirmed. There have been twopurges of anti-Soviet elements: one broke up anti-Communist opposition4he other, an internal party affair, look place after8 break with the Comintorm and resulted in removal of those Bulgarian Communists who favored greater independence of lhe USSR.
On the other hand, some degree of passive resistance against the regime has continued in spite of the purges. Instances such as subtle economic sabotage by peasants and workers have occurred frequently, allhough they arc. qualitatively and quantitatively, less than in most of the other Satellites.hide livestock and grain, secretlylivestock, disregard sowing andregulations, avoid planting maximum amounts of grain, and fail to make use of the machine tractor stations. Office and factory workers neglect maintenance of machinery, refuse to attend conferences and meetings, interpret governmeni regulationstrictness designed lo show their absurdity, malinger, and practice absenteeism.who have the opportunity listen tobroadcasts which Lhe government istoew Bulgars continue to escape across the frontiers or defect abroad.
E/UGRE GROUPS
few Bulgarian emigre groups arcsplit and plagued by personalthe leaders.lteCommittee was regarded as thebut without the support ofCommittee for Free Europe. Itshas waned. The most widelyformer political leadereen unable or unwilling to ImproveDespite extravagant claims ofemigre leaders, there is no evidenceelements have in any way guidedorganized or unorganizedBulgaria. Although presentthat Bulgarians still rememberit is dtflicult lo determine howhis* following may be.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR CONDITIONS
view of the regime's effectiveclose Soviet supervision, andof Bulgaria into the Sovietthere is little likelihood thatcan develop under cold warIsolated instances of unorganizedresistance will probably continue towithout tangible outside help or aof the Communist apparatus, theydiminish. The average Bulgarianengrossed In the daily struggle ofloo cowed by the police stale to haveenergy left for resistance activities.active resistance will be restrictedregime propaganda, some intelligenceand performing isolated acts olnot necessarily recognizable aspassive resistance will probablyto be the only real outlet forSince agriculture is the main-stayBulgarian economy, peasantcontinue to create major problemsregime. However, if the "newcontinued and produces tangible results,the Bulgarians come to feel there isfor their liberation, passivedissidence may decrease.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME CONDITIONS
Upon outbreak of an East-West war, the resistance potential in Bulgaria would almost certainly increase. However, active resistance probably would be severely inlilbiled by the presence ol Soviet forces, which could beto. move into Bulgaria and establish bases for operations in thc Near East and the Mediterranean area. Emergence of large-scale resistance could not be expected until the Communists had suffered major military defeats, transport and communicationswere disrupted, and above all, untilinvasion were imminent.
In thc event of such an invasion,If prior contacts had been established for
guiding, coordinating and supplyingresistance groups, outbreak of somerighting would be likely. Escape andoperations for Western personnelto function. The Rhodope andprovide ideal terrain forHowever, participation in suchprobably would not assume thea mass movement. Althoughlias been characterized byofears of Turkish ruleproduce great rebellions. Auprising against the Communistalmost certainly would notthe Soviet rule had broken down,victory appeared assured, andpolicy statements appealing tohad been
? v
ANNEX C: CZECHOSLOVAKIA
CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE
though the old Czechoslovaka more vigorous democratic traditionother Eastern European country andoriented toward thc West.strength was greater lnin thc other present Satellites. Infree electionsommunistgotercent of theBohemia-Mora via andercent inSince8 coup, however,regime's drastic reshapingpolitical and economic life hasone-time sympathizers and evenmembers. Communist policethe discrimination againstmembers, and the subordinationinterests to those of the USSRsharp contrast to life under the firstCzechoslovakia's new submissiondomination after its long struggleis deeply resented onwell as political grounds. In addition,is created by Soviet economicand internal mismanagementsharply lowered living standards.scarce, agricultural production ishousing is Inadequate. Consumeroften either unavailable or poorlyexpensive. Thc "new course" has tolittle to ameliorate this situation.
MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS
workers, many of6 and helped8 coup, are now one of thegroups in Czechoslovakia.about too long work hours,"voluntary" Sunday shifts, anddeductions from the paycheck.the severe labor discipline andtoward Party members.
is restless, disillusioned, andby government youthof non-Party members arc discrim-
inated against in education and restricted in the choice of career. Most dissatisfied are those who were denied advanced schooling on political grounds and sent Into unpopular industries such as mining. The greatestof Czechs escaping into Germany and Austria consists of persons underears of age.
Thc peasantry, well aware of thc regime's designs for eventual collectivization, are not deceived by the temporary reduction ofunder the "newostile toward lhe government and Party, they complain about high delivery quotas and low prices, lack of consumer goods, harassment by local Party officials, and unfair governmentof farm macliinery and fertilizer.
Minorities. Communist attempts tothe thorny minority problem inhave so far failed. The Slovaks in particular appear dissatisfied with Prague's growing domination of local administration. They lend to place the blame for this, and8 coup, on the greater popular support given the Communist Party induringeriod. They also recall past Czech incursions into Slovak affairs. The Communist Party continues to have less influence in Slovakia than lnand the Slovak potential for active resistance is probably higher.the German warLimc occupation provoked mainly passive resistance inandew isolated acts of defiance occurred, the Slovak active resistancewas demonstrated in the uprising at Banska Bystrica
C. The clergy, chiefly Roman Catholic, has been decimated by thc regime. Many higher members ot the hierarchy have been arrested and replaced by priests willing to collaborate with the Communists. Thc lower clergy is under close surveillance and obliged tosermons for censorship. The Church has been denied the right to educate Known bc-
mi-
P. It M
vers arc harassed and arc deprived of chances for Improvement of Iheir position Thc regime has more recently taken steps designed to give the Impression that it is not undermining thc Church, though in fact such steps are bringing It more under state control. Then measures have greatly lessened the clergy's resistance potential.
The middle class, especially thc professional and managerial groups, either has beenoutright and placed underor works under supervision of Party members whose professional background is almost Invariably inferior. In aplte of receni attempts of the regime to enlist theirthe vast majority of these groups are thoroughly disaffected. Ihey have lost their social and financial status, are limited in their choice of jobs and use of talents, and live In constant fear of being blamed for any failure of lhc regime.
Military. Since many officerstake In lhc continuation of the regime, and there were thorough purges of pro-Western officershe over-all reliability of the officer corps has probably increased. However, there is evidence that its loyalty to thc regime leaves much to be desired. Unreliability Is even more pronounced among the rank-and-file whoresent the harsh discipline, closesupervision, lack of leave, and constant Indoctrination.onscript force, the army reflects the low morale of the general population. Tlie air force Is probably one ol the least reliable In thc Satellites. There have been several defections from thc military services lo thc West In the past few years.
INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE
9 Although dissidence seems lo be somewhat more pronounced in Slovakia ihan inthere Is little evidence of active resistance in either area. Communist police controls are so pervasive that people are afraid to voice their criticism of thc regime, let alone engage in open resistance.thereonviction that Soviet tronps. while not at preseni stationed inwould come to the help of the regime to put down any revolt thai could not be
handled locally, and there is no hope lhat any uprising would receive Western help. The only open demonstration of Czechoccurred in the abortive Pilsen riots ofollowing the currency reform. Otherwise, the Czechoslovaks have been sullen and apathetic, passively expressing theirwith the regimeigh percentage of absenteeism (sometimes up loercent of the entire laborhoddy workmanship, high labor turnover,to farm collectivization and crop delivery quotas, higher attendance al Church services, refusal to accept Eastern cultural orientation, etc
EMIGRE GROUPS
There are numerous and voluble emigre groups wiih headquarters in the US, Canada, and Europe, but there Is virtually no evidence lhal any of them play an active role Inresistance. The most important is the Council of Free Czechoslovakia,ol Czechs and Slovaks and perhapsthe nearest approximation to tlie Masaryk-Bcnes tradition. Thc CzechCouncil and the Slovak National Council Abroad are separatist organizations of minor importance. The extreme-rightist SlovakCommittee. led by Ferdinand Durcan-sky, who maintains contact with extreme-rightist Germans, probably has littleIn Slovakia. Representatives of the old political parties, andzech labor groupudeten-Germ an group, also live abroad, but they have little personalamong the emigres in the West andless ln Czechoslovakia itself, although thc number of party followers is probably still large.
It Is possible that some contacts between these organizations and their home country were maintained8ut there have almost certainly been no contacts of significance since. According lo defector reports, Internal Czechoslovak Interest In emigre groups is feeble and docs notesire to entrust future leadership lo any of the emigre leaders. Therefore, it Isthai emigres areosiUon lo direct
resistance activities nor is there evidence that any one of the facliuns would be acceptable for government leadershipiberated Czechoslovakia.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR CONDITIONS
is considerable resistanceCzechoslovakia, particularly amongworkers, and there might be anrecurrence of isolated riots likeowever, active cold waris highly unlikely to emerge on anyscale so long as there arcand party controls. On the otherresistance will probably continueform of absenteeism, isolated acts of sub-
, tic industrial and agricultural sabotage,the contents of Westernand escapes and defections to thc West
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME CONDITIONS
intensification of regimeupon the outbreak of generalEurope, and the active participation offorces, would make immediateof large-scale resistance all butEven unorganized passiveprobably become more dangerous.if the West appeared to be winning,in passive resistance andattempts at sabotage could bein the Czech lands wouldmostly passive, bul in Slovakia moremight develop. For example,guerrilla bands might beoperate successfully in the moreinaccessible areas of Slovakia. Thc suc-
cess of such cfTorls would greatly depend upon lhc ability of the West to establish contacts and furnish arms.
If Western forces approached the Czech borders and the effectiveness of the securily organization weakened, restlessness andwould probably increaseMore Intelligence for the West would be forthcoming, more escape and evasionon behalf of Western personnel would be undertaken, and Intensifiedpropaganda could be expected. AnWestern invasion of Czechoslovakia would probably demoralize indigenousforces to such an extent that Soviet troops would largely have to take over. Atime, parti of the Czechoslovak Army and police would probably defect in growingSome of them probably would try to establish an anti-Communist record byin organized resistance. At this point, tlie anti-Communist Intelligentsia, freed political prisoners and displaced persons might contribute substantially to organising resistance.
However, full-scale guerrilla war inand open organized resistance instill could not be expecteda virtual breakdown of CommunistMoreover, there might be, at least for some lime, conflict between anil-Communist and pro-Communist guerrillas, diminishing the eflect of resistance and confusing escape and evasion operations. Some antircgfmc resistance elements might also Insist onfciocious revenge for their sufferings at the expense of assisting the West inCommunist troops.
f-ft-
ANNEX D: EAST GERMANY
CAUSES OF DISSIDENCEhe widespread popular disaffection In East Germany Is Intensified by the fact lhatthc other Satellites, the "GermanRepublic"s not cut off from contact willi the West. The specialof thc occupation have made impossible the complete separation of the GDR from West Germany, and both the GDR and the Federal Republic have encouraged contacts between thc two areas. Such contacts exist on an extensive scale. Moreover, the East Germans are tied lo West Germany bybonds of national Identity and by the hope that eventual unification will mean
ost East Germans do not feel that they arc livingeparate country and do not look upon the GDR as permanent. Rather, they see itemporary administrativeimposed upon them by Communistbacked by Soviet guns. The abortiveof3 proved to the East Germans as well ai lo the Soviets lhatthe backing of lhc Soviet Army, the GDR regime could not remain in power. Moreover, the Soviel occupation in East Gennanybe disguised. Consequently, Communism is now identified with Soviet rule andaccordingly Thc leaders of theSED (Socialist Unity Party) and the government are generally hated and detested. Police slate measures to keep thc people In line exacerbate these sentiments.
conomic hardships are another major cause of antireglme sentiment. Except for the Parly hierarchy, government, and thenearly every East German has been adversely afTectcd by the practices oi the regime. While the introduction of the "new course" innd some Sovietconcessions had somewhat Improved living conditions, these Improvements have
For the purposes <if this esUnuile, the GDR Is assumed lo include East Ilerlln.
been Insufficient to reduce popularAlthough the ODR's antireligioushas not been as violent as those of other Satellites, It also contributes lo popularFinally, the regime's attempts to orient East German culture eastward are much resented. The East Germans consider themselves culturally as belonging to lhe West, and believe their culture to be superior to that of the East. Communist attempts lo change this outlook have contributed toagainst the regime.
isaffection in East Gennany Is very great, not only among the disaffected groups listed below but also among many rank-and-file members of the Party and its massthe government bureaucracy, whiteworkers, and theast Germans fled to West Germany;lie number of refugees decreased. It has been estimated that not more thanercent of the population actually support the regime, and it is almost certain that such support is confined to people whoersonal slake in lhe regime's continuation. Very few arc motivated by ideological conviction.
MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTSndutlrvsl Workers. In contrast lo the olher Satellites, where the peasantry is the chief dissident clement, disaffection andin the GDR are greatest in thecenters About one-third of tlieillion wage and salary earners in the GDR are Industrial workers Seventy percent of these ore employed in thc nationa-ized Industries. There Is evidence thai many workers,ajority, are dissatisfied with the regime. Most East German workers have been traditionally social-demoeralic and strongly trade union minded. Germun social-democracy has always been evolutionary rather than revolutionary and. therefore, was the target of intensive Bolshevik hostility. Since thc tradition of free trade unionism is
so strong, thc fact that under the GDR the unions have become Instruments ofcontrol has greatly contributed to the disaffection of the workers. Furthermore, the workers are disgruntled with low wages, substandard living conditions, insufficient food supplies, lack of consumer goods, evcr-prescnl offensive propaganda, forcedat political rallies, imposition of Soviet labor methods,onstant drive for more production without adequate rewards.
The Peasantry. There arc still0 independent peasants in East Germany who cultivate about two-thirds of the arable land. Even though many of them benefited from the postwar land reform, themajority arc opposed to theesult, of the collectivisation program begun Inpecial privileges were extended to members of thc so-calledto the detriment of independent farmers. Sincebout one-seventh of the arable land has been abandoned by its owners. The "new course" improvedsomewhat and Lhe regime, in view of poor agricultural production, slowed down its collectivization program. However, peasant disaffection is stilt strong. Moreover, there are indications that thc collectivizationis being resumed.
Businessmen. Private Industry stillforercent of total Industrialprivate wholesale and retail trade account forndercentof trade turnover. Although this group received some reliefesult of the "newhey probably realize that this isemporary reprieve and that their group will eventually be liquidated. The outlook of this group is of necessity antlregime, but many of its elements continue to beand cautious, inclined only to passiveif any, and that only provided they see no risk.
The Clergy. The Protestant and Catholic Clergy has been outspoken in assailingatheism and combat particularly the regime's effort to indoctrinate youth.made by the regime to the Protest-
ants Inid not alter their altitude. The adverse cllect of the regime's antlreligious campaignarge part of thc population and thc support received by the churches in East Germany from the West Germans have forced Uie regime toilder type of persecution than practiced by oUier Satellite governments. The resistance potential of Uie clergy Is considerable, though it ls not at Uie point of open active resistance at this time.
Many officers ofarrisoned People's Police) andnaval and air contingents probablySoviet controls. They enjoybutroup, their basicthe regime is questionable. It tsUie GDR regime could rely ontime of war, especially if thereverses, but there Is probablyIn this group than In anylhe GDR, and their resistance potentialto be limited. The morale ofLs low. The general popularshared by most soldiers, many ofbeen pressured into service againstIn spile of some improvement ofconditionsost ofprobably not loyal to the regimeside with the Wesl if given opportunity.
Croups. Thc regime hasefforts to control andThere are indications of supportreg;me by some young people, butbecome indifferent or disillusioned.of parents, older workers', andteachers, and thc nearness ofstill inllllate againsi success of thcyouth program. In most cases,of East German youth Is one ofAlthough the majority ofyouth almost certainly Is notto the Communist regime. It hasor no efforts to resist Uie regimesmall group of more maturemay eventually constitute abut just as many will probablyCommunist enthusiasts unlessfor better living improve greatly.
17
rule, strengthened GDR police controls, and Soviet help If necessary, will probably forestall any attempt at open resistance. So long as the USSR maintains sizeable forces Ln Eastresistance will almost certainly remain limited to Uitclllgence collection, antiregime propaganda dissemination, and defection The East Germans realize lhat thc steadily Improving Infiltration methods of the regime's security organs render attempts atin GDR territory extremely dangerous They probably also realize (afterhat under present conditions tangiblehelp for large-scale resistance will not be forthcoming during the cold war period
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME CONDITIONS
he outbreakeneral war probably would not lead to organized resistance at once, although (depending upon the location of battle fronts and the fortunes of war) there would probably be an Increase In Isolated acts of sabotage and violence. But so long aspower remained unimpaired, savagefor any act of resistance, coupledimited number of areas offeringwould make organized resistance virtually Impossible. Active resistance on an extensive scale would almost certainly not bo initiated until Communist controls appeared lo be weakening or breaking downesult of Soviet defeats and the proximity offorces.
f East Germanyombat area, many of Uiose East German forces which could do so would probably seek to join the Wesl in fighting the Bloc Furthermore, if military operations were In progress within the ODR, organized resistance groups almost certainly would supply information, disrupt Soviet communications, sabotage war ma leriat. nnd assist Western soldiers in escape and evasioncale measured by Western successes. On the other hand. Westernwould immediately leadeduction in East German resistance activities
IA
ANNEX E: HUNGARY
CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE
issidence, which is very widespread in Hungary, has its roots In economic discontent, deeply entrenched nationalism, traditional western orientations, historical andantagonism toward Slavs, and strong Roman Catholic religious heritage (two-thirds
Hungarians arc Catholic).aggravated by recollection ofommunist regime which' includedGcro, and other current leaders, byof Communism on the part of alland by antagonism towardSatellites which have acquiredterritories. Thc inadequateof living is probably the mostof dissidence. Work norms arcare low. housing Is poor, and foodThe people resentpolitical activities, and theleisure lime. They also resent thcpolice state system which isthe stale security apparatus, by theand by the presence of two SovietApathy and cynicism are
MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS
peasantry, with thc exception of asmall number of collective farmwho were formerly landless, represents the largest single focus of opposition la thc Communist regime. The concessionsby the so-called "new course"3 have done little to alleviate peasantIn spite of the financial and social hardships connected wllh such action, aboul one-half of theIn collectives took advantage of theoffer to withdraw If they so desired. Moreover, the continuation of lhc "new course" Is uncertain.
he majority of industrial workers, some of whom were among the few originalof Communism, now constitute adissident clement ow living standard.
poor working conditions, the perversion of labor unions Into instruments of the regime, the constant pressure for more producUon without adequate incenUves. harsh laborand the regime's poor showing in labor protection and welfare have made theotential resistance element rather ihan the "spearhead of revolution."
Youth. One of the most conspicuousof the regime has been lis Inability to secure the Arm support of youth. By Its own admission, the principal youth movement (DISZ) is plaguedeneral apathyParly work, which retards the recruiting of future intellectual cadres for Communism.Open criticism of tills organization has been rising steadilynd the "new course" has so far failed to meet this situation. The majority of students in high andschools and universities remain negative or indifferent loward Communism.
Military, Considerable resistance potential is believed to exist witldn the Hungarian armed forces Their loyalty Is generallyexcept for higher officers who have the greatest slake in the regime The Air Force is believed to be predominantly loyal. However, since the majority of young army officers are recruited from rural areas, they almost certainly share those antln-glmewhich make the peasanUy the greatest focus of dissidence. Thc rank-und-nle of thc army, who have none of the officers' privileges, have even less reason for allegiance. Soviet control uf the Hungarian Army contributes to animosity and disaffection as does forcible alliance wiUi neighboring Satellites who are ancient enemies. This resistance potential of Uie armed forces, however, cannotarked deterioration of thecontrol system takes place.
clergy, both Catholic andlonger show open defiance of thedo. however, exercise considerableamong the people and, despite their lack
ii
aggressive leadership, maintain some covert and sporadic opposition. The clergy arc cautious and adroit in uie use of the "be-tween-the-llnes" technique in sermons and statements. The government-sponsoredPeace Committee of Catholic Priests lias repeatedly admitted failure in propagandizing Communism. But while thc clergy'spotential, especially in the provinces, remains strong at present, it is bound toas more and more clergy are replaced by Communist supporters.
INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE
Hungary's recent history, including World War II, abounds with resistance incidents, but no broad resistance movement emerged and no local groups achieved lasting success. During the German occupation, sporadic acts of sabotage were committed against the Axis powers. Tlic much more effective Sovietsyslem has restricted Hungarianto passive, unorganized manifestations. Other factors, such as physically andexhausting work norms, material want, and compulsory political activities have further discouraged active resistance.
However, passive resistance in Hungaryrs to have been more widespread and effective than elsewhere in the Satellites.existing controls preclude openintensified passive resistance byand agricultural workers is impeding the regime's efforts totrong and viable economy.
EMIGRE GROUPS
are three main Hungarianthe Hungarian Nationalin New York, General Andrasof Hungarian Veterans within Innsbruck, and theMovement, led by GeneralFarkas,ur;,The leadership of the latterwas mergedlthough itthat these emigre groups havetouch with elements of unknownHungary, il is unlikely that theysometimes claimed, organized any resistance movements. Information
which they have gathered has proved of dubious value. Moreover, lhe politicaland tlte controversial background of many of Iheir leaders has almost certainly discredited these emigre groups in the eyes of resisters inside Hungary. Besides the above mentioned emigre groups, there alsoumerically small but well-organized group of extreme rightists under General Arpad Henney, consisting of fanatical Nazi-typemost of whom were members orof the so-called Arrow Cross Party during World War II. This group will not cooperate with Western powers unless its conditions are met; ils political ideology, somewhat camouflaged, runs so counter to Western concepts as to make its successful integrationeneral resistanceunlikely. There is some evidence 'that Yugoslavia has had limited success withoperations to propagate Titoism in Hungary.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR CONDITIONS
internal security control andknow-how will continue to limit theof organized resistance, active orCold war activities, at best, willrestricted to informationantiregime propaganda,of sabotage, and unorganized passivePoor terrain impedes thenuclei for future guerrilla operations;of contacts for escape andwould be difficult, evenocalfactors militating against anbuild-up are: the vigilance oflhe presence of Soviet troops, lackresistance leaders, lack ofwith Western agencies that couldhelp them, and the absence of asecurity consciousness.capabilities for unorganizedresistance, especially in industrywill remain substantial.
RESISIANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME CONDITIONS
conditions of open warfare,securily measures would almost ccr-
20
be so greatly increased that noresistance could be expected untilforces had won major victories in Europe, tn the event of such victories, passive resist-ince probably would Increase sharply, and ;landestlne organization of large-scale resist-uice would be attempted, possibly with the lelp of disaffected military or police elements, rhere would probably also be increased pop-ilar wilUngncss to assist in escape and cva-ion, and defections would become more num-rous. However, premature guerrilla war-ire and sabotage would be likely to provoke eprisalsature wliich would retard, if ot cripple, the development of effective re-stance. If Western military success broughteterioration of the Hungarian state
and security apparatus, resistance activities would almost certainly sharply Increase. Their scope and effectiveness would depend upon lhe extent of Western aid, the ability to establish communications, and thc degree of weakness In the state security controls.to Western forces probably would take thc form of organized support of escape and evasion operations, information collection, psychological warfare, sabotage and, possibly, limited guerrilla warfare. The most likely sources of defection under such circumstances would be: (a) army enlisted personnel; (b) the mass of political prisoners; (c) theIntelligentsia; (d> peasants andworkers in areas near the Western forces; and (e) youth.
fT
Ft
BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE
fter lhc USSR occupied Rumania at the cud of World War II, ll quickly proceeded to re-annex Northern Bukovtna and Bessarabia, liquidate the non-Communist government, dure the King out of the country, andpoweruppet regime under absolute Soviet control.esult lhe vasl majority of Rumanians, deprived of their Westernond of self-determination, have come to Ice) that Iheir country Isoviet colony. They have almost certainly Identified Communism with their traditional fear of Russia. Moreover, Soviet4 has been so great thatountry as rich In natural resources ashad been chronically in want. War booly, reparations, and the operation ofmixed companiesUggering load on Its economy. The sharply depressed living standards which resulted are blamed on Soviet exploitation. Adding to Rumanian fear and resentment on these scores, the brulal methodsommunist police state have imposed an alien way of life.
MAJOR DISSIDENT EtEMENTS
i Peasantry The violent opposition of thc [icasaiilry, comprising aboutercent of the population, has constrained the regime tovery slowly in collectivizing agriculture. Vol only kulaks and small farmers but also andless peasants have resisted the process, it is questionable whether even thc poor, land-oss peasants who constituteercent of thc >resent membership of collective farms, canbe induced to adopt the collective prin-iple itself. By the regimes own admission gricullural producUon is lower than before he war. Thc kulaks and small farmers are roducing almost all Uie grain the country rows, and the regime has been unwilling to ike drastic steps in the face of their apparent >lidarity. Thus the peasantryrmldablc resistance potential.
RUMANIA
ndustrial workers are worse off than lhe peasants, who at least are able to dodge forced deliveries and to acquire on the black market what is needed for Iheir personalThe urban and industrialsuffersepressed living standard, poor housing, food shortages, and otherWorkers cannot obtain necessary consumer goods; they are forbidden to leave their Jobs and arc subject to constant political indoctrination and police surveillance. Those who supported the regime at thc beginning of lhc Communist rule are becominga considerable passivepotential Is accumulating.
Youth. Large sections ot Rumanian youth are opposed to the regime. Tradition, which is strong In Rumania, together with the In-dividuahsUc tendencies of youth, militate against acceptance of regimented life and Communist group control techniques. The regime has been far less successful in gaining the loyalty of youth than lt had expected.
Military. With the excepUon of those higher officers who arc good Communists (or who have survived the purges) and whotake in the regime's continuation. Uieof the armed forces is questionable. Opportunism hasredilection iningrained during centuries of foreign rule, and most of the officers are probably opportunists Enlisted men, coming mainly from rural areas imbued with Uie antireglme feeling, are almost certainly only bowing to force If Uie regime were to lose ils grip on the control apparatus and if Soviet supervision were withdrawn, very few of the enlisted men would prove reliable.
6 Intellectuals, clergymen, nationalTn addition to the above, Uiere arclesser groups which might haveresistance potential. The Intellectual and professional elements in particular have generally resisted Communist Indoctrination. There is evidence that not enough Commu-
nist-trained teachers are available. Many members o( thc professions and almost all of lhc former higher and middle classes, nowof their property and displaced socially, are intensely hostile lo the regime. The top hierarchy of the Orthodox Church has been largely reoriented toward the Moscowand some of thc leading anti-Soviet churchmen have been eliminated, but the rank-and-file of thc lower clergy and thc parish priests remain at heartTheyonsiderablepotential, as do the clergymen of the Catholic and Uniatc Church whosehave been virtually destroyed. Nalional minorities, particularly thc Hungarians, are constantly dissatisfied, and, Indeed, would be opposed to nny Rumanian government which would not cater to thetr national aspirations.
INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE
lthough dissidence is strong In almosi all segments of Rumanian society, Including the lower echelons of the government and Party, active organized resistance has steadilyin the past several years and appears to be virtually extinct at present. Isolatedof active unorganized resistance arc still being reported, and are sometimesby the Communists. Moreover, the regime has not succeeded In eliminatingresistance, which continues to expressmainly in economic sabotage However, such resistance Is not exclusively antl-Com-munist in motivation, bul reflectsdegree of self-interest or fruslration. Acts of economic sabotage such as absenteeism, deliberate damage to machinery, occasional derailing of trains, arson, work slowdowns, and general negligence may or may not be politically motivated. Whatever thethere does appear to be considerableImpeding agriculture, government-sponsored Irade, industry, and the over-all Implementation of thc Communist program. This fact It openly admitted by the regime.
EMIGRE GROUPS
8 King Mlhal. who couldallying poinl of the Rumanian emigration, appears
to accept factions of three exile parties as legal representatives of the Rumanian people. Factional strife, however has greatlytheir Importance. The King Isthe only person who maintains aof continuityon-Communistgovernment-In-exile. There Isroup of left Socialists, and some Iron Ouard-Ists. who are opposedestoration of the monarchy. Evidence exists that the King is still popular in Rumania, particularly among the peasantry, but the problem ofsuccession to thc Communist regime will probablyource of factional strife.
if any. contacts seem to existemigres and the homeland.are very precarious and censorshipAll borders are closely guardedRumanian languagethe West arc Jammed; they appearheard best in rural areas. Printedpropaganda which hasRumanians Is reported to havesporadic manifestations of
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR CONDITIONS
cold war conditions, such activeas may still exist can be expectedas the regime's security controlsund as long as there is no clearof positive aid from the West.there may be sporadic, disjointedtype raids of no more than localparticularly from the lessof Rumania. Passive resistancealso continueariety ofeconomic sabotage. At best, suchwill retard the implementation ofpolitical and economic program;least, they willuisancenumbers of reliableperforming more useful work.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME CONDITIONS
n the event of open war. Rumanianforces would almost certainly be re-
23
by Soviet troops. The resulting in-enstflcation of securily measures would prob-hly minimize even passive resistance. Ncvcr-heless some guerrilla activity might develop. Tie extent of active organized resistance 'ould depend on the military situation in urope. notably the nearness of Western >rccs, thc help made available by the West,
and the attitude of the Balkan Pact countries, notably Yugoslavia. There might be some attempts at defection to Yugoslavia, if that country sided with the West. As Western troops approached Rumanian territory,warfare against local Communists and Soviet units might flare up even beforeforces actually entered the country.
24
ANNEX G: USSR
CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE
Russiaong history of resistance, but the revolution7 was the only successful act of resistance in modern times resulting in the overthrowovernment In power. It occurred only after the war had virtually destroyed central authority. The newleaders were careful lo establishcontrols strong enough to prevent another popular revolt. Nevertheless, passivecontinued. It showed great strength durings when Stalin was forcing through collectivization of agriculture. Al thc beginning of World War II massoccurred and various national minorities were willing to collaborate with the Germans until harsh Nazi policies rebuffed them. The colossal devastation of World War II resulted in widespread discontent which necessitated powerful application of coercive measures. The most troublesome postwar areas proved to be those which the USSR had newlythe Baltic States, the western parts of the Ukraine and Belorussia, and Moldavia. Parlisan movements flourished ln all these areas, especially in the Baltic States and the western Ukraine, until mass deportations and police terror succeeded in subduing them. Thc continued strain imposed upon thepeople by Stalin's loreign and economic policies compelled the Politburo to retain most of thc wartime controls and even tosome ot them. However,rder had been restored throughout thc country, and operations against the partisans in the troubled areas had eliminated nearly allresistance.
Many Soviet citizens, largely convinced by Soviet propaganda of lhe improvements since Czarist days, probably feel that their lol has improved.ore of adherents of Communist ideology are willing to acceptin its name. However, there appears to be some degree ol discontent andat nearly every level of Soviet society. This dissidence is not based so much upon op-
position to Communist ideology per te as upon neglect or denial by the Communistof basic popular rights and needs. Poor living conditions probably constitute the most significant cause The apparent unwillingness or inability of the Soviet Government to raise the standard of living ls exacerbated by the knowledge, acquired by millions of Soviet soldiers during World War II. that things are better abroad. All-pcrvadlng fear of the police also contributes greatly lo dissidence as do the social stratification, nepotism, andwhich divide the ruling elements from the masses. Finally. anUrellgious campaigns and thc RussificaUon of the nationalhave created extensive resentment.
DISTRIBUTION OF DISSIDENCE
Peasantry. Of all social groups, thehave suffered most under Soviet rule. Their living standard Is the lowest, except for thai of the forced laborer. Soviet ruthless-ncss in collectivization and pressure torproduction have provoked strongThe attempts by peasants to recover their status as Individual land owners during thc German occupation demonstrated thcir opposition to the collective system Continued insufficiency of agricultural production since thc war is probably due In part to lack of peasant cooperation. The government, hasumber of minor concessions lo the peasants but not enough to stimulate their cooperation or to overcome their opposiUon to collecUvism.
onsiderable segment of Soviet youth probably support Uie Sonet regime. Generally, they receive special consideration from the government. Their cducaiion andare carefully supervised.there are elements among the youth whose loyalty Is open lo question. Among them are: (a) children of parents persecuted by thc regime; (bj descendants of Czarist(c) onspriiiR of kulaks, or purge victims and of inmates of forced labor camps;
(d) the young men who have served In the armed forces abroad and were able totheir living standard with the much higher one outside thc USSR; and (e) some students of higher educational institutions. There have been persistent reports of anti-Communist organizations among university students;roup was uncovered at thc university of Moscow and allegedly at Kaunas. Constant admonitions in the Komsomolhave denounced youth's flouting oftaboos.
ational Minorities. Aboutercent of the Soviet population consists of national minorities, someistinguished history of their own. Russilicatlon of theseunder the Tsars had little success.thc Bolsheviks propagandized theand cultural autonomy of their component republics and autonomous regions. After thc war. possiblyesult of the poor showing of loyalty to the Soviet state during the German occupation by certain minorities, they sharply restricted cultural autonomy. Some minorities were liquidated as such by dispersal of populations, and whateverother minorities still enjoyed wasended by Intensified Russlncatlon and SovieUzatlon. Consequently, disaffection was rampant During thc first postwarartisans in the Ukrainen Lithuania reportedly battled Soviet troops.he back ot the revolt was broken. But even now the Ukrainian Party Secretariat finds It necessary to call publicly for vigilance against infiltration by Ukrainian partisans
epressed Elements. The millions ofcitizens who have been sentenced to forced labor camps and exile in remoteareasairly importantpotential. During World War n, many such individuals emerged as leaders of collaboration in German-occupied territories. Their hatred of the Soviet regime almosttranscends their patriotic feelings. Knowing this, lhc government keeps former inmates of labor canpt under strict controls There have been persistent rumors ofby forced laborers, supposed lo have occurred between 8 and In thc
summertrikes occurred at the Vorkuta and Norilsk camps In the Far North ol Siberia. While the uprisings, from allwere nonpolitlcal, they speak for thc desperation of these repressed elements.
fnfellecfuals. In spite of the preferredof Intellectuals in Soviet society, Weo logical controls and restriction of theirlo create have probably led toresentment.esult,ew intellectuals have withdrawn Into themselves, refused to study Marxism, and turned tofields where Party control Is less pronounced. Exceptew Communist fanatics, those artists and scientists who find themselves frustrated by Party ukases telling them what is correct, appear to beoutwardly while inwardlyreakdown in Soviet controls they will almost certainly maintain sufficient conformity to avoid losing their material
Industrial Workers. There is frequentof discontent among the mass ofworkers. The very low living standard, constant pressure for production underconditions, lack of freedom ofand harsh labor discipline havecertainly caused widespread discontent While there haslight increase in food and consumer goods in recent years, it Ls not nearly enough to satisfy the workers.the promises of increased consumer goods since Stalin's death, have recently been
Armed Forces. In general the armed forcesulwark of the regime ratherhreal to it Over-alt morale Lslo be sufficiently high lo insure the reliability of the armed forces, although there are many reports of low morale In individual instances. The officers, especially in theranks,avored economic group.thc Kronstadlhe purges in the, the low morale of the Red Army at the beginning of Woild War II, mass desertions and the establishmenl of aarmy under viasuv in German-occupied territory, und the persistant postwarin Germany and Austria have caused thc
26
Government to take extraordinaryIncluding police and Partyand virtual isolation of troops from native populations in occupiedew defections to the West are still occurring. Harshide cleavage betweenand men, inescapable indoctrination and surveillance by an all-prevading informercreate discontent in the service and tend to decrease the value of Its materialof clothing, shelter, and food. Morale in thc Soviet Navy and Air Forces appears to be higher than that In the Army.
INTENSITY Of RESISTANCE
some dissidence exists atlevel of Soviet society, thc regimein establishing such pervasivethat the people are forced toenergies to coping with the systemto conceiving an alternative solutionsteps to achieveolution.resistance, such as occurred inacquired territories after the endWar II, had virtually ceased to existThe strikes and riots reported inlabor camps may not havemotivation and in any casesuppressed. Whether indicationsresistance in agriculture,the lower bureaucracy ore not merelyof time-honored Russianor apathy cannot be estimatedconfidence, in sum. the gulfand resistance in the USSR isthan elsewhere in the Hloc (exceptin Communist China).
EMIGRE GROUPS
emigre organizations claimRussians and nationalthese, the Solidarists (NTS)Greatare the largest and mostformer Vlasov adherents andrecent defectors have joined thisWhenever emigre groups arcSoviet defectors or by listeners tobroadcasts, it is the NTS whichlo have the pre-eminent place.
According to defector reports, there Is little or no awareness among the Soviet people of the present activities of emigre groups. Defectors who admit familiarity with these groups acquired their knowledge In Germany and Austria. However, there are likely to be some memories from the war when many emigre groups, particularly the NTS, werenot only In German-occupied Sovietbut also among the millions of Russians deported to Germany for forced labor.the Soviet press itself keeps suchalive by occasional attacks on the emigre movement. During the early postwar years, there were some contacts between emigre groups and partisan groups in western areas of the USSR. Some tenuous connections may still exist but arc almost certainly negligible. The Soviet security apparatus has pacified the new Western territories and deported many of the inhabitants, partially replacing them with Great Russians. Some slightmay still exist between the West and members of the former Uniate Church in the Ukraine which was forcibly amalgamated with the Russian Orthodox Church in thc.
Thc minorily emigre organizations arc not nowosition to gain the sympathy of thc Grcal Russians to any appreciable extent. Tlte peoples of the recently incorporated areas, especially in the Ualtlc States and the Western Ukraine, mayhile be inclined to look to emigre organizations for support. Rut in those national minority areas which have long been under Soviet rule (the Ukraine.elo-Russia.he people would almost certainly feel, like the Great Russians, thai the emigres have been away from their homeland so long thai they have lost their grasp of Soviet realities. Thc people would also resent what they believe to be the"luxurious living" in the West and are still disillusioned over the connection of some emigre organizations with the Nazi regime. They probably are unaware of any acceptable political alternative to Soviet Communism. On the other hand, Uie Soviel Governmenthas given signs of apprehension lestgroups be used for infiltration purposes and has indicated tear of their organization
a cm it
propaganda This was demonstrated in the Khokhlov and other eases, wlicre they did not shrink from elaborately preparing the murder of an emigre leader. Another aspect of the effort to neutralize emigre groups is the Soviet attempt to encourage emigres to return, promising them good treatment.
RESISTANCE-POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR CONDITIONS
continued cold war conditions,resistance against thc Soviet systemunlikely unless the regime'sbecomes seriously weakened.of passive resistance will probablyranging from camouflagedParly rules to agricultural andIt may also lie expressed Intoward the regime, attemptsto Western broadcasts, lack ofworking for thc objectives of theand defection.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME CONDITIONS
lhe event of general warbe tightened, virtually all peopleemployed in thc defense effort, andappeals would be launched. We areto estimate the extent of or thcresistance potential of such factors as:military action; (b) tbe popularreactions lo such actions; orregime's ability lo portray the war asand defensive one.
n the event of major Sovietmass detections from the armyparticularly among members ofgroups. If the war were prolongedcarried to Soviel soil, chancesactivities would probablyan invading army might meetbut at least partiallyas soon at it became evidentmethods of occupation would not be Inituation,particularly in the minorityprobably be induced to fight their masters. Nevertheless, even if on the military fronts, the Sovietwouldetermined effort tosufficient control in the hinterlandresistance elements frombehind their lines. Moreover, Inan Unpending collapse of the Sovietanti-Soviet elements of thetogether with labor camp Inmatesexiles, could attain significantcapabilities. Aside from suchamong the broad masses ofRussian population would beorganize. Patriotism, indoctrinatedSoviet aulhorlly, or apathy probablythem passive and disinclined lo Unless the securityseriously weakened, little activityexjiected from the mass of thopopulation beyond localhelp to Western personnel Inor evasion, dissemination of an tilimited intelligence
ANNEX H: NORTH VIETNAM
CAUSES OF DISSIDENCEn the past, the main political (actors which have created ill-will toward Uie Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) have been:of rigid Ideological controls,of personal freedoms, terroristic police controls, persecution of minority and religious groups, and the rising influence of theChinese. More recently disaffection has arisen from the transition to peaceociety long geared to war; tho absorption of new territories (and large cities) which arc increasingly feeling the weight ofoppression; and from resentment against Uie DRV for having sanctioned, at least temporarily, Uie division of Uie country. Popular hostility has also been created by such economic factors as: (a) heavy taxwhich deprive peasants of their surplus and prevent merchants from accumulating capital; (b) land reform measures displacing large numbers of families and creating severe dlslocaUotu; (c) conscription of labor;f the currency; and (e) occasional acute rice shortages in certain areas. Living standards in DRV territory have always been poor but thoy arc now even worse, and there is IllUe chancepeedy improvement.
ecent DRV measures, Includingagreement on FrenchIn North Vietnam, and theiaid agreement may. ifsomewhat alleviate thenow reportedly prevailing inMoreover, discontent hasto some extent by thefactors: (a) thc prestige accruing toas the result of Its long successfulthe French; (b) Ils posture as aand determined government,the popular appeal of the regime'snationalism. The regime'sCommunism with nationalism Isnoid by Uie mass of Uie
peopleommunist lactic, and mayfor some time to counteract popular grievances.
MAJOR OISSIDENT ELEMENTShe Catholics, numbering some one and one-half million (of whom, however, at least iOO.OOO will have left for Uie souUi before, are probably thc largest potential resistance element in North Vietnam. If the DRV honors its promise of religious tolerance, they may resign themselves to passivewith the regime. If. however, theshould decide to take strong measures against Catholic leaders and organizations, thc Catholics might be provoked into stronger opposition.
inorities, numbering about one and one-half million, oppose domination by the Vietnamese Communists but theiris Ineffective. The DRV is now"autonomous administrative areas" for larger ethnic minorities under Communist control, such as thc one million Thaitho same policy may also be applied to the Nungs. Muongs. Meos, Mans, and Thos.
The resistance potential of these tribes is low.
since they have no cohesion, leadership, or
unity of purpose.
hc peasants will almost certainly remain dissatisfied unless Uie regime can alleviate their grievances. However, no more than passive resistance can be expected so long as the regime exercises pervasive political and police controls
6 The dispossessed elements, among whom can be counted non-Communist Chinese,of non-Communist political groups, merchants, and landlords, are, of course, highly disaffected and. given an opportunity, would participate in resistance activities. In view of the regime's very tight securityhowever, these elements will almostbe gradually llqutdaled.
INTENSITY OF RESISTANCEncomplete Information, paucity ofsources, and the fluidity of lhc present situation virtually preclude an accurateof Uie character and Intensity of re-
20
POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME CONDITIONS
9 Any estimate of thc resistance potential ln the DRV under conditions of open warfare is highly speculative. Resistance would depend on the ability to survive countermeasures. the extent to which security controls would be disrupted by military operations, and the amount of training and material aid Uiat could be provided. Assuming Uiat guerrillas were moderately successful In surviving and training with new equipment, at least some groups, such as the Thos and possibly the Nungs. and Mans, would beosition to disrupt movements of overland supplyalong the routes from China Into North Vlelnam. However, Uie reluctance ofmost guerrilla groups to move anydistance from their tribal areas would limit their effectiveness. No cohesive and large-scale guerrilla activities can be expected, and existing groups would be unable to gain such control over large territorial areas In northern Tonkin as the Vict Minh4 It is possible Uiat some resistance elements could be utilized to spread rumors, distribute pamphlets, and collect However, willingness of resistance groups to act againsi the DRV regime would be contingent ujKin the military situation.
he nationality of attacking forces would probably Influence thc willingness ofgroups to act. Tribal groups which have been helped by the French for many years, would be most receptive to French invaders. Vietnamese would prefer other Vietnamese first and the French last Oilier nationalities prohabiy acceptable would be Thais, Filipinos, and Americans Participation of Nationalist Chinese might seriously Jeopardize resistance and create antagonism towardilitary government administered by Vietnamese hi ethnic Vietnamese areas would probablyalutary effect uponactivities rench occupation would be distrusted by the majority of Uiepeople, and would adversely affect anll-CommuiiisL partisan warfare,
ANNEX I: NORTH KOREA
CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE
After decades of Japanese domination, which had aimed to wipe out Korea as aen'.ity and to makeapanesethe Koreans were recepUvc to any type of government, provided it was Korean. Thus, it is not so much the form of governmentIn North Korea after Worlds the exploitative and oppressive methods and foreign flavor of Uie Communist regime which have created discontent. Thehardships which thc North Koreans had to endure during the Korean Warincreased dissatisfaction and frustraUon. Moreover, the burdens imposed by postwar(such as high taxes, forced labor, pressures to turn farmers into industrialcontributions to poliUcalmilitary conscripUon, and over-all shortages) have almost certainly intensified dissidence. The continued presence of large Chinese Communist forces In North Korea ts probably also an important source of
Although the North Koreans have very little access to information on developments in the ROK, the very existence of Uie Republic of Korea (ROK)isible alternative to the North Korean Communist regime and thefor unification probably stimulate North Koican dissidence. In spile of Uie North Korean campaign ot vilification against the ROK and the questionable popularity of the Rhee government, there is almostelief that conditions in South Korea are more satisfactory than in Noith Korea Dissidence would probably glow if the advantages of living In the UN-backed ROK instead ofsuppoi led North Korea became more apparent
MAJOR DISS1DFNT EiCMtNTS
exists in varying degreeselement of North Korean society,small Communist ruling group. s par-
ticularly Intense among the remnants of lhe Christian and former middle class elements. These consUtuted the main strength of Uie Korean Democratic Party which wasafter liberaUon from Japan andliquidated in North Korea by the Communists. Considerable dissatisfactionexists among Uie peasants, who feel that the regime Is giving preferential treatment to Industrial workers. There isand disillusionment even among the workers. Army morale probably is at least fair. Dissidence Is probably most widespread In Uie enlisted ranks, which have been kept In service many ycais. Although thereischarge program, It probably docs not provide for many early releases. Dissidence also extendsmall number of officer*.
INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE
ven though the regime's methods andhave caused considerable lU-will. there is no evidence that auch disaffection isInto resistance, probably because of thc Korean tendency toward ajialheticand by identification of the regime with nationalist aspirations. AnUregime guerrilla activities, such as occurred earlier in thcWar had declined greatlyince Uicn, heavy punishment for UN collaborators. nationalist propaganda, severe politicaland stimulation of "anUcolonlallsm" have been used to combat resistancehere Is no indicaUon that Uie ROK aid to active North Korean resistors has been effective.
EMIGRE ORGANZIATK3NS
6 After the establishmentommunist regime in North Korea, anti-Communistfled south. One sizeable grouporthwestern Young Men's Association, which was abwbed by the ROK "Tachan Youth Corps" until it was assimilated into the South Korean Armed Forces. Many of
this group were either Christians or followers of the Chondokyo Church (an indigenous church strong in the northwestern areas ofhese two groupsackground of active resistance against the Japanese. Many thousands of their number were used as guerrilla forces by Uie UN CommandUie Korean War. Several smaller groups, cultural and political emigres, chief among which are thc remnants of the KoreanParty, led resistance against theprior to thc outbreak of the war. There arc no current indications of guidance or assistance to resistance elements In North Korea except that given by thc ROK itself, nor is there adequate information on theif any, made by thc ROK.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR CONDITIONS
ssuming continuation of the armistice, resistance In North Korea is unlikely to be of much significance. At best, it mayimited source of intelligence. Thc security forces and thc army are capable of dealing with any opposition, whether from disgruntled peasants. Christian elements, or survivors of Uie domestic purges. Even though Uieof the country. Uie vulnerability of the North Koiean transportation system, and the homogeneity of the Korean people (which facilitates ROK infiltration) would fnvoractivities, the regime is consideredof coping with them. It would have the
support of nearby Soviet and Communistforces if it could not carry out thc task alone.
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME CONDITIONS
Under conditions of open war, Northresistance potential would probablysomewhat but would probably be limited to isolated Instances of sabotage, some passive resistance and defections, assistance to anU'Communist personnel in evasion and escape operations, and some intelligenceIncreased security measures andby the USSR and Communist Cliina would make organized resistance virtuallyIn Uie eventloc defeatn_pr retreat of Uie Communist forces Inthe populace sUll behind Communist lines might be encouraged to resist theirWhile such resistance would be nnburden on the Communists, It Istoecisive factor.
The responsibility for initiation ofwould not significantly affect resistance potential. The nationality of any allied forces invading North Korea also would not matter provided that no Japanese forces wereUnless political conditions in the ROK deteriorate sharply, the ROK would have no difficully In establishing governmentalin North Korea which would have lhe Initial support or acquiescence of thc bulk of the population.
Original document.
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