N ATJO.NAL INTELLI 3ENGE
PROBABLE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE RATIFICATION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENTS
. CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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PROBABLE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE RATIFICATION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENTS
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet courses of action in the event of ratification of the Paris Agreements.
CONCLUSIONS
believe that the Soviet leaders would regard the rearmament of West Gennany and its inclusion in NATOerious potential threat to their own security. They probably doubt that West German military forces would be kept within the proposed limits, and probably recognize that the net increase in the strength of the military combination which the USSR confronts in Europe would be greater than indicated by the simple additionarticular number it West German divisions. On the other band, the Soviet leaders probablythat it would require about three years lo complete the proposedprogram in West Germany. They would probably consider, therefore, that the potential threat involved in Westrearmament would not emerge at an early date and that there wouldtime for possible counterbalancing developments.
We believe it unlikely, therefore, that the initial Soviet response to ratification of the Paris Agreements would be based on the assumption that the security of
the USSR was immediately endangered. We believe that the USSR would take measures to improve its military position, including the strengthening of Eastand Satellite forces in connection with the formal establishment of anEuropean security organization. It would employ all political and subversive means to prevent or impede rearmament in West Germany, and to obstruct itswith its Western partners. It would attempt to make gains elsewhere, under conditions of limited risk, in order partially to offset the accretion tostrength resulting from GermanIn conjunction with this general line of strategy, we believe that the USSR might adopt,ore menacing posture, including harassment of the Western allies in Berlin andWe believe, however, that theleaders would be concerned not to allow any Increase of internationalarising from such demonstrations to get out of hand. We believe that the USSR would be willing, after an interval, to negotiate further on Germany, but
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bo highly unlikely to agree tounification on terms acceptable to the West. )
f at any stage in the process ofthe Paris Agreements thecourses of action described above did not, in the Soviet view, sufficiently offset the developing threat of Germanwc believe thc Soviet leaders would almost certainly take further measures in the attempt to counter this accretion to the strength of the West Thesewould includeharp build-up of Soviet and Satellite military capabilities. They might also include more threatening courses of action against Berlin, or in the Far East, orwith the purpose of arousing fear of nuclear war in the West and causing Western peoples to demand that their governmentsautious policy. We believe that, at this stage, the USSR would adopt bolder courses of action than it had previously, but would avoid those which in its Judgment clearly entailed the probability of general war.
t is possible that thc Soviet leaders may at any time decide that they cannot adequately offset the developing threat of German rearmament. In this case, they would be confronted with two broad alternatives: (a) to undertake an early showdown with the Western Powers on this subject, possibly including the use of force involving grave risks of general war; (b) to attempt to negotiate ain which both Western and Soviet troops would be withdrawn and aGermany would be neutralized with controlled armaments. We believe the USSR would reject thc first alternative as tooamble under currently prevailing circumstances. In view of the grave disadvantages entailed, we believe the second alternative is only abut it might be adopted if the Soviet leaders believed it offered the only means, short of general war, to preventritical threat to theof the USSR. We believe, however, that the Kremlin would be more likely to adopt thc courses of action described in paragraph 3. )
DISCUSSION
ROLE OF GERMANY IN POSTWAR SOVIET POUCY
he roleestored Germany would eventually come to play in Europe hasey Issue in thc postwar power struggle between tlie USSR and the Western Powers. Despite the tremendous postwar growth of Soviet power compared with that of Germany. Sovicl lear of Germany, sustained by the memory ofggression, hasowerful lorce. Soviet policy In Europeas been designed to prevent anysettlement which would permit thc alignmentearmed Germany on the side of the Western Powers. This policy has ap-
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parently been basedelief Uiat theof Gcrmun power to the Western alliance woulderious blow to Sovietwould seriously hamper furtherexpansion in Europe, threaten Sovietover the Satellites, and perhaps even jeopardize Die security of the USSR. The rearmament of even West Germany and its inclusion In the NATO alliance is almostviewed by the Soviet leaders in aof such risks and dangers.
II. PROBABLE SOVIET ESTIMATE OF THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF RATIFICATIONe believe that the Soviet leaders would regard Ow rearmament of West Germany and
inclusion In NATOerious potential threat to their own security. They would not take this view because of the Importance they attach lo the proposedermanplus appropriate air and naval units, but rather because they regard it as probable that German armed power would not be held to these levels. They almost certainly believe that the establishment of West German forces would be accompaniedeserve training system which would enable the Germanstouch larger force on war footing at short notice. They probably also believe that the Inclusion of German troops would improve the quality of the whole body of NATO forces deployed In Europe. When they take account further of the addition of West Germany's considerable Industrial and scientific resources to those ol NATO, thoy probably recognize that the net Increase In the strength of the military combination which thc USSR confronts in Europe would be greater than indicated by thearticular number of West German divisions.
hc USSR may estimate that considerable risks could arise from West Germanquite apart from the strength which it adds to NATO. The Soviet leaders may learearmed and relatively independent Germany would eventually embark on an aggressive policy to recover East Germany and might, through Inadvertence or design, and without tlie approval of itslash which could lead lo general war. Tliey probably have little (aith In the ability of the other Western powers to curb an independent and rearmed Germany if aggressive elements should come to power.
fl. Over and above the specific increase of Western miliiary strength resulting from West German rearmament, the Soviet leaders may feel that this development couldhave unfavorable strategic impliesearmed West Germany woulda serious additional obstacle to any Soviet attempl to overrun Western Europe.while the strategic flexibility of the USSR would be curtailed as the result of the appearanceocal threatital sector
of the Bloc's frontiers, tho NATO nations, once West German armed power acquiredproportions, would acquire Increased strategic flexibility in the disposition of their own forces. The Soviet leaders might also estimate that the US would instigate local aggressions In Eastern Europe by German forces without involvement of the US Itself. By thus applying the USSR's own technique of aggression by proxy the US couldateful choice for the USSR: whether to risk loss of Important positions piecemeal or to intervene with Soviet forces with the risk that general war would follow.
Soviet leaders probably alsothe rearmament of West Germanya serious political reversal,least for some tune wouldtheir capabilities fordevelopments In Europe. Theyfear that the existence of aGermany, growing In power andwould increase thc dl/Dculty ofInternal security In Eastparticular, West Germany wouldmagnetic attraction on Easterious resistance problemEast Germanhey maylhat the achievement of such aGermany would lend the West,to bolder action by the Germanin Western councils, to adoptwhich would threaten Sovietover its Satellites or at least proveSoviet prestige. Moreover, they maythat Soviet ability to Influence theof neutral and neutralist states inAsia would be reduced by thein Western strengthis thcBloc.
tlie other hand, the Soviclestimate that it would requireyears to complete the proposedprogram in West Germany.estimate that politicalprevent, or postpone indefinitely,tha adverse consequences ofThey probably calculatehave strong capabilities forsupporting the existing resistance to
remilitarization in West Oermany. They probably believe that, as West Oermanyable toore independent policy. It mayisruptive factor in the Western alliance, and that the Westthemselves would In consequence be more Inclined to consider alternatives to their association with the West. They mayUiat the Saar and other Franco-German conflicts will load to charges of bad fuith on both sides andreakdown of cooperation between these two powers. The Sovietmay also believe that Uie politicalof West Oermany will, under theof rearmament and the eventualof Adenauer from Uie scene, undergo changes favorable to their Interests. They may calculate that these changes will result In swinging the Internal political balance In Germany toward cither the Left or Bight, or both simultaneously, and that thcmayolitical climate more favorable to thc alternative which Soviet policy can pose for the Germans.
summary, we believe that Uiewouldost serious viewthe political and military implicationsfor their security, but thatnevertheless consider Uiat thethreat involved would not emerge atdate and Uiat there would remainpossible counterbalancing developments.
III. PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION
believe it unlikely, therefore, thatSoviet response to ralificaUon ofAgreements would be based onthat the securily of theImmediately endangered. Wethe USSR would take measures toIts military position, would employand subversive means to preventrearmament in Wesl Germany andits cooperation wiih its Westernand would attempt to compensateunder conditions of limited risk,accretion to Western strengthWest German rearmament. Thispattern of response would exclude aaction which, in the Soviet view,substantial risk ol general wai'. It
would also exclude major concessions which could provide Uie basisermanwith the Western Powers.
conjunction with this general Unewe do not believe Uiat thereany fundamental shift in Uie Sovietbut thc USSR mightimemore menacing atUtude. In view ofcampaign they have madeUie Soviet leaders wouldsome of the measures they havenotably the denunciation of thethe UK and France, and theof an East European defensivemight oven invoke the terms ofMutual Assistance Treaty
The Soviet leaders may believe that gains elsewhere, particularly in Asia, may partially, though by no means wholly, offset the loss of Soviet prestige and power in Europe. They probably will Intensify efforts toeace treaty with Japan, offering favorable terms, not only to encourage neutralist tendencies in that country, but also toto thc Germans Uie advantages of an accommodation with the USSR. They will of course continue their efforts lo isolate the US on the Issues of Formosa and Lhe Chinese offshore islands, or any other Issues in Asia on which the Western allies do notirm front
Attitude Toward Negotiations onWe believe it unlikely Uiat the USSR would participate in four-power negoUaUons on Oermany lor some time after ratification. The loss of prestige which the USSR would suffer by reversing Uie strong stand it has taken againsi the possibility of negotiations after ratification would in itself move the Soviet leaders againstourse.the Soviet leaders recognize that the German desire for unity will persist and Uiat, as long as the USSR retains the capability to grant or withhold unification, it may be able to inhibit the pace and reduce Uie scale of German rearmamenl through negotiations, or the promise of negotiation. For thesewc believe that the USSR would bealter an Interval, to negoUate further on
Germany. However. It is highly unlikely that the USSR would agree to German unification on terms that would be acceptable to thc West
erlin. Since we estimate that the Soviet response to ratification would not Include any moves which would entail substantial risk of war. we do not believe that the Sovietwould take strong measures to force the Western Powers out of Berlin. Nevertheless, In view of the new situation created inby ratification, they would regard the Western position in Berlin as politically even more intolerable than before. West Berlin border controls would probably be tightened to strengthen securily measures in Fastand East Berlin. There wouldbe some harassment of Western access to the city by way of probing Westernto maintain the Berlin position. Such moves might be associated with an Eastprogram to build up defenses, and would probably be carried out by the East German regime. In consequence there is likely to be some increase of tension over Berlin in the period immediately following ratification. We believe, however, that the Soviet leaders would be concerned not to allowituation to get out ol hand.
ustria. In the initial period following ratification the Soviet authorities, alleging violation of zonal agreements for Austria, may re-establish zonal border controls, and even threaten lo partition the country. Theseand threats would probably be based on charges that ratification of the Pariswould be followed by steps to convert western AustriaATO operations area and would Increase the likelihood of Anschluss with Germany. We believe It unlikely,that the Soviet leaders would permit any such actions to go beyond the stage ofor that they would take any course which would limit their freedom of action ln using thc Austrian Issue for future bargaining with the West.
loc Defense Measures. Among thewhich the USSR would probably take to improve its military posture would be the creation of the joint command structure for
Eastern Europe forecast at the recentconference of Bloc states. Although the USSR already has eelective indirect control of Satellite military establishments, the Soviet military would probably find It advantageous In the Interest of readiness ond efficiency to put these arrangements on an open basis. These formal defensive measures wouldbe supplemented by an additional arrangement restricted to Poland,and East Oermany as the states most directly threatened by West German The over-all structure thus created would probably be presented by Sovietas the nucleusuropean security organization open to participation by allstales. Wc also believe It possible that the USSR would strengthen Soviet forces In thc Satellites, particularly In East Germany. Satellite forces may likewise be strengthened. The East German forces are likely toational military establishment and strengthened somewhat possibly by the Introduction of conscription.
hc USSR would probably accelerate the strengthening of Its own armed forces ifrearmament showed signs of successful implementation However, we see noeven in thc most recent Soviet budget of an Intention to begin an early rapid build-up of Soviet armed strength. The Increased budgetary allocation to defense may be inemonstrative measure Intended to lend substance to Soviet threats thatof the Paris Agreements would Increase the danger of war. Since the Soviet leaders probably believe that ratification of the Paris Agreementsotential rather than an immediate threat to Soviet security, we believe that Soviet policy will continue to emphasize longer-term qualitative Improvement rather than short-term enlargement of Its military forces
f at nny stage ln the process ofthe Paris Agreements the various courses of action described above did not, ln the Soviet view, sufficiently offset thcthreat of German rearmament, we believe the Soviet leaders would almost certainly take further measures in the attempt to counter this accretion lo the strength of the West.
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These measures would includeharp bulld-up of Soviet and Satellite military capabilities. They might also include rnore tlireatenlng courses of action against Berlin, or in the Far East, or elsewhere, with theof arousing fear of nuclear war in the West and causing Western peoples to demand that their governmentsautiousWe believe that, at this stage, tho USSR would adopt bolder courses of action than it had previously, but would avoid those which ln its Judgment clearly entailed theof general war.
IV. AlTERNATlVE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION
It Is possible that the Soviet leaders may at any lime decide they cannot adequately offset the developing threat of GermanIn this case, they would bewith two broad alternatives: (a) to undertake an early showdown with thePowers on this subject, possibly including the use of force involving grave risks ofwar;ttempt to negotiate ain which both Western and Soviet troops would be withdrawneunified Germany would be neutralised with controlled
We believe that under currentlycircumstances the USSR would reject the first alternative. Wc continue to estimate that the USSR would finally decide thatwar was tooamble and would endanger thc survival of thc Soviet system.
There remains the possibility lhat at some stage the Soviet leaders would agree to settle thc German problom by simultaneousof Western and Soviet forces andby an electoral process acceptable to the Western Powers The USSR might see certain advantagesnified Germany if it could be kept neutralized with ils armaments under International control. As againsino conlrol over the rearmament of West
Germany, the USSR might thus hope totogether with lhe Western Powers, some measure of control over the armamentsnited Germany. Such an arrangement would necessitate the withdrawal of US forces from Germany, and possibly result In large reductions of US armed strength In the rest of Europe. It would allow Oermany, freed from the burdens of occupationarge rearmament program, to Intensify economic competition with other countries of Western Europe, and might lead to demands In those countrieseduction of their own burden of armaments. Thc fact that the USSR had agreed toettlement might In Itself tend to stimulate thc sentiments forand "coexistence" ln Western countries, probably Including thc US. In addition,ettlement for Germany might furtherJapan's willingness to rearm.
he Soviet leaders would, however, almost certainly see grave disadvantages inourse. Withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany wouldlow to Communist prestige, and might pose problems of control ln the Satellites. The USSR would be required to forfeit economic advantages,control of East German uraniumAbove all, withdrawal from Eastwould require the USSR to give up an area of forward deployment which addsto Soviet military capabilities, both in thc air and on the ground. In any case, theleaders would have profound misgivings about the permanence of any agreement to hold Germany neutralized and underarmament.
n view of the grave disadvantageswe believe the second alternative Isossibility, but it might be adopted if thc Soviet leaders believed it offered the only means, short of general war. to prevent the developmentritical threat to theof the USSR. We believe, however, that the Kremlin would be more likely lo adopt the courses of action described In20.
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Original document.
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