AQUATONE OPERATIONAL PLANS

Created: 5/31/1956

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

6 AQUATONE OPERATIONAL PLANS

1. In the light of the discussion of AQUATONE and related mattera onay, we have reviewed operational plans and possibilities In consultation with the Air Force. The following factsajor bearing on our conclusions:

is going forward as rapidly as possible toin Turkey but theae cannot be ready much before 1could be initiated in Germany byune.

six weeks from mid-June to late July that can bestarting operations in Germany are of especial importanceweather is at Ita best and tho days are longest at that time of theover all target areas can be conducted more frequentlyproductively in June and July than during the autumn andmonths acquire added importance from the fact that operatione

can be usefully conducted over northern target areas only during the summer months.

second unit will be ready for deployment overseasAugust and faculties should be ready to receive it. There wouldroom for both units at Adana. Turkey. In any ovent it is desirableoperations at two or more locations so as to secureand to preserve our flexibility In the face of changingHill

reasonably good security can bethe operation of our equipmenterman base shouldgreater risk of compromise than itapersons are given the same opportunity to see It from aany overseas base. Its appearance at several locations in Europethe cover story that is being used and might help toair of mystery about the activity.

a. We are actively planning for operations In the Far East and expect shortly toase In that area and move forward with the preparation of any specialized facilities. However, in terms of numbers, some four-fifths of our intelligence targets In the USSR, and in terms of

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igher percentage of really important targets, arethan from the Far East. Moreover, many of the .

Far Eastern targets have been, or can more readily be, coveredmeans. It is for this reason that we propose to use the firstthe third in tho Far East.

2. The major task to which all of our preparations have beenis the performance of long-range missions over areaa hitherto inaccessible with any degree of safety. Such missions promise to yield decisively valuable intelligence obtainable in no other way. Time is of the essence in the performance of this task since the technical advantage that has been gained is only temporary and the security that cloaks itasting asset. Before long, the Russians will develop the capability consistently to track and somewhat later to intercept high altitude We must assume that they will soon have photographs of our equipment which will allow them to guess at ita performance and will stimulate their efforts. Meanwhile, with the mere passage of time, the maintenance of tight security grows more difficult. Accordingly, it ia our conviction that the sooner we are able to embark upon our major task the more securely it can be accomplished.

3. On the bsais of the above considerations we propose to proceed as follows:

are making preparations to start operationspossible byune.

we will limit ourselves to missions over These fall within the pattern of operations already Inby the Air Force.

a few such missions have been flown, we will, ifwell, seek permission to undertake longer-range mieelons.

accordance with already established practices, weconsult with the German Government with respect to our Initial Prior to the start of our long-range operations, however,inform Chancellor Adenauer of our plana. We will not specificallyapproval In order to avoid placing an unwelcome responsibility If, however, he raises any objections or feels theae operations

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might provo embarrassing to him, we will consult further before embarking upon them.

e. Depending upon the Chancellor's reaction, we will either plan to continue operations from Germany for the life of the project (as we hope) or operate only temporarily from Germany until facilities can' be made ready in other locations.

4. The Chief of Air Staff concurs in the above conclusions as far as they concern operational matters. (Specifically he concurs. b,ut makes no commentsndhe Secretary of State also concurs in the above conclusions.

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