Created: 10/1/1955

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prcpared by

ci* HISrOBICAL staff october9




Frepared by CIA Historical Staff,5


Text of "Study of CIA Reporting on Chinese Coaminist Intervention in the Korean Mar,0 P

Exhibits (classified as indicated below):

C. D. S.


H. I. J.

K. L.

. Q. R. S.




Probable Developments in China,he USSR and the Korean Invasion,uneonsequences of the Koreanuly Review of the World Situation,0 Factors Affecting the DesirabilityN Military Conquest of All of Korea,robability of Direct Chinese Communist JnZf ineview of the h'orld Situation,o Critical Situations in the Far East,ctober ll Review of the World Situation,or the President, "Chinese Communist Interven


0 |

Chinese Communist Intervention inC

Soviet Capabilities and Intentions,0 Review of tne World Situation,0 Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea,f Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea,0s reported and evaluated in CIA Daily Sur.maryCIA Estijnates of CHICCr. Intervention in Korea,0 in CIA Weekly Summary HI

-C, bearing on

Treatment of Chinese Couaunist Intervention Issue in CIA's Daily Korean Sumary,umnary of CIA-Collected Information, Communist China's Intentions in Korea

Public Controversy ins to theAdequacy of U. S. Intelligence Estimating,0 I

Appendixes {classified as indicated below):

of Korean0 Key to CIA Publications Consult"dditional Relevant CIA Estimates Cther thrn Those listed inM



cud;ese ccmuhist :iimEVEmcH ffl the xoreak war

Frepared by CIA Historical Staff,5

Toistorical survey of CIA's record la estimating and reporting on the probability of Chinese Communist intervention inr oan War.


This study considers CIA written furnished betweennd Deceaber0 to Wis President and his principalon military and diplomatic policy.

These publications were in two forms: stimates andestimatesE'aj SE's; li-.'a; the Review of the Tsorld Situation; and various memoranda to the Director)urrent intelligence (the Dallyeeklyary; and the Daily Korean Smeary). (Seaor explanation of these titloa.J

atter of interest, germane to this study, there is added an analysis of the public controversy that broke outver tho issue of Chinese Communist intervention. This was taken fron the press and other public sources. It is Limited to concertc bearing upon CIA and havim towith intervention. (See


1. During the period discussed, CIA was at all times aware of the threat of Chinese Cowiunist intervention.



CIA reports and estimates left no doubt, during thehinese Consunist (and Soviet) capability to intervene ot any time vith powerful or decisive force.

Indications that can now be seen to disclose an intention to intervene were frequently misinterpreted by CIA.

ll. The principal reason Car these misinterpretationsailuro to gauge Chlneso Corsrunist and, no re particularly, Soviet strategr with respect to theor accurately in the context of the world

5. Although those responsible for United States strategy in ths Korean War during lieptcraber to0 "ere made fully aware by CIA that Coiorauilst Chinarave potential danger to tho DM cause, the tenor of CIA reporting was such as to suggest that tha danger would not materialise.


Most of ths intelligence cited in this atudy was "unccordinoted" and therefore represented the views of CIA only, though based onreceived frcti all agencies, 'ibis was not, houevsr, nomal prccadurc for CIA before It is explainable for this period in terms of (a) the urgencyn avis for intelligencerea, which cften did net permit time for coordination, and (b) the circumstances outlinedelow.

During the period in question, the organisation in CXA for furnishing "national" intelligence wasransitional stage. Jt was recrgisiised in Octoberin answer to the Dulles aey.ort and again ir.


0esult of denprds for intelligence created by tbe Korean War. Cn Novembern even more complete reorganisation took place in conjunction with the arrivalew administration for CIA.

In consequence of these changes, responsibility for CIA estimates on the Korea, situation between July and October fallomewhat hastily contrived "Special Staff" within the Cffice ofrto and Sstd/nates; while aftert wa3 carried by the newly created Cffice of National Estimates. urthermore, General Smith had begun sibling estimates transmitted to the President, indicating that the new ailainistrfltioii lied taken chargeesponsibility foronth before therganisation of the Cffice of national Estiiintos.

(3) Tho course of events in thear clearly affected the nature cf intelligence estijutoa. During the fii*st jerlod (Juneouccess of the North "cztans aicne was such as to nako Chinese Coijminist intervention soqm unlikely because unnecessary. During the second period (mid-September to late flovembor) tho *'orth Koreans were routedltimate victory seemed assured. iSien Chinese/Scvist forces did not intervene (a) at Inchon; (bj at the crossing cfh Parallelr (c) at the ucmcnt vaienforces reached the YaluIA appeared to adopt the assumption that they would not do zo at all.

(U) 0 CIA estimates, *en readM aaji^uous. Thoy frequently speak of Chinese ir.tcrvontion through the use of "voluntoars" ornchurionnd this was, of course, tho


guise under which the Chinese CorRunist amy actually did conduct itsin ths .Korean Var. It aeons clear, however, fron the estimates discussed below, that these terms ware not used at tho time with quits this poMibility in mind. The estimators apparently thought of Chinese(who were present all through the war) as relativelyadditions to regular ltorth Korean forces, 'bore is no evidence that the estimators exactly foresaw Chinese Comaainist employment of full-scale military forces under the tacitly-accepted fiction that they were !lvolunteora" not under direct Chinese Communist control.

The failure to perceive this possibility probably to some extent explains the persisteit assnnption in the estimates that the Chinese CoiniTunlsta could notecisive part in the war without Inevitably leading themselves and the Russiansorld conflict.


When the Chinese Civil War ended at the closo ofthe Coanonists hocen under ams with anotner two million in re5crvo. (ieoany of these troops were then, and remained, concentrated along the Korean border.oiw-unist armies also reached tne srea opposite Taiwan and moved south to the borders of Hongkong and Indochina-lurna. It was evident, therefore,nward, that ail these areas wore facedow threat. This was quickly recogiised by CIA. sample.)

The beginning of the Korean "war was seer, by Central Intelligence asoviet cove in teres of world strategy. Such an analysis

aacimed irrefutable in terns of the veil recogiized fact that tha Korth Korean government existed only by virtue of Soviet support and wassubject to Soviet influence.

3. Consequently, estimates concerned with tha Korean situation immediately after Juneere written in terms of Soviet motives and (See Exhibit) It was recognised, nevertheless (on tlia assumption that the USSR wasethod of attrition against the United Statos in prolonging US involvement in thehat Chinese Coraamist troops nl^ht be en cloyed "either covertly or overtly." (See Exhibit C, Df-JOB, July)

U. Iteanwhile, however, in view of the US situation in Asia, and the military strength and disposition on the Asiatic mainland of both Communist China end the ussr, the possibility had always to be taken into account that the Korean 'Jar might be in the natureiversionary move. The principal fears in this regard wore directed toward Taiwan and Japan with secondary er^hasis cn Indochina, "urna and Hor.-kong-^acao.

rain forced by the tenor cf ChineseChinese Comuurist military cUspcsiticr.s, and thefinal overthrow of the Chinese Nationalists. In spite of theinvolved for the Commirlsts in attacking Japan,In Japan0 feared Cor its 3afety because ofstrength in the area and the weakening of the islands Incident

to tha Korean campaign.

estiaatos were written with reference to allioviet-inspired coves. (Sae Taken together, they


represented an alternative that tended to distract attention from the more direct use of Chinese Communist forces in the Korean War itself.

s early asIA gave special notice to theof Chinese Coanunist intervention in these statements: nChinese Communist troops can be brought into action covertly and, if necessary,nd "It is not yet clear whether the USSR will force the Chinese .CoirsMnists to give open military support to the Korean operations or toew oporation elsewhere in the area. The Feiping regime almost certainly uculd complyoviet request for military action." (See

Exhibit D,)

8, On- CIA again discussed the possibility, but in andifferent context. In this case, the discussion was of the desirability of extending the Korean Warilitary conquest of the ;iholo peninsula. In enumerating the preponderance of adverse ccnsidera-

tions forlan, CIA said, among otherhe invading

forces might become involved In hostilities with the Chinese Communists. As it became apparent that the tforth Koreans were being defeated in South Korea, the Chinese might well take up defensive positions north ofh Parallel. The USSR might use Chinese Communist troops at any stage in the fighting, but their participation would be especially useful ath Parallel where UH members could legally discontinue their support of the US policy." (See Exhibit E, "Memorandum" of

9. Onnder the title, "Iinpii cationslitary Advance in Korea beyondhIA seems further to have

discussed the factorsecision to cross or not to cros3h Faraliel. Thisemorandum, probably to tho Director, prsoared by the "Special Staff" of the Office of Reports and Estimates. It could not be found, however, in connection with this study.

Septembereek before tho Inchon landings, CIAthe "Probability of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention (See Exhibit F,i,oi* September) Thi3of somehinese Communist troops near or coving towardbordertatod: "It is clear that intervention in Koreawithin immediate Chinese Communist capabilities." It furtherthati (a) itiijitary construction had been observed along thoChinese Communist aircraft had arrived lr. the some area;ropaganda "may be stage-setting for an imminent overt(d) replace&wnts must bo supplied torth Koreans if theyachieve coai-.lete control over South Korea before the end of the year."

The estimate ofoncluded, however: "In view of tha momentous repercussions from such an overtt appears more probable that the Chinese Communist participation in the Korean conflict will be more indirect, although significant, and will be limited tointo the Korth Korean forcesvolunteers', perhaps including air units as well ss ground forces."

September fcO, CIA again took up this theme:

"The concentration of Chinese Coaiunist troops near the Korean border in Manchuriaowerful secondary


reserve for the Ilorth Korean forces, which, if }loscow end Peiping should agree on it despite the attendant risks, could enter tiie battle and materially change its course at any time.

is doubtful that either Soviet or Chinese Communist forces will be committed south ofh parallel. lioscow andre much nor* likely to aid the Communist cause In Korea by releasing large numbers of trained Chinese Communist'volunteer') units, perhaps inducing small air units, for incorporation In the Korth Screen forces." (See Exhibit G,)

nhroe days before President Truman'swith General MacArthur on Wake Island and five days after the O! decision tc crossh Parallel as well as five daysew administration had taken control of the Agency, CIA gave what might be termed its most official view to date on the subject of ir.tervention, In that tha estimate had the of ail members of the IAC. Cr. this date, reporting directly to the President, CIA said:

"The Chinese Coraaonist ground forces, currently lacking requisite air and naval support, are capable of intervening effectively, but not necessarily decisively, in the Korean conflict. There are no convincing indications of an actual Chinese Communist intention to resort to full-scalein Korea. Aftor reviewing the factors favoring, and those opposing, Chinese Communist intervention, it Is concluded that while full-scale Chinese Communist intervention In Korea

ftrriovui for release

IATI: Jill Illl

naat be regardedor tinningoMideration of ail known factors leads to the conclusion thatoviet decision for global war, such actionot probable Curing this period, intervention will probably be confined to continued covert assistance to the NorthSee Exhibit H,,) Because this conclusion was made to depend on an assumption that tho USSR did not wish to become involved in global war, thisis bolstered with an elaborate discussion of Soviet intentions from the IAC point of view. Primarily or the basis of this assumption, tho estimators discounted hanchurian troop movements, Chou En-lai's threats, factors enumerated by themselves said to favor intervention from the Communist point of view and various other indicators. (See, for example, Exhibits, Q,

The estimate of Octoberight be considered crucial in terms of theof publication (the Chinese Coeeunists had apparently not reacted to the crossing ofhnd the fully official nature of tho statement. Thereafter, CIA could not vory wellontrary statement unless this one was revised.

13. Cnhe day beforeapture of Pyongyang, CIA wrote optimistically that, "The Soviet Korean venture has ended in failure. Consequently, it appeared that tho Communists would accept this failure by aiding the liorth Koreans to hold on as long as possible and then to turn to harassing guerrilla warfare.

Chinose Ccjuounist capabilities vera noted again, together with amoral RELEASE


the fact that "Forty to sixty thousand Chinese-trained ComBunist troops have, in fact, already been fighting in the North Korean amy.1' It was "becoming less and leasowever, that Chinese Communist troops would enter the war "openly." The estimate about Soviet intentions toward global war is repeated in support of the statement. (See Exhibit I,,

1U. CIA's statements of Octoberust have been questioned, for on Novemberhe Director of Central Intelligence signed an apparently uncoordinated "Memorandum for tha Froaxdent" on the subject: "Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea." This memorandum admitted that0OCO Chinese Communist troops, organized in task forcere operating in I'orth Korea while the parent units remainargely on the basis of current Chinese Communist propaganda regarding protection of the Suiho Hydroelectric Zone, however, the memorandumthat: "Although the possibility cannot be excluded that the Chinese Communists, under Soviet direction, are committing themselves to full-scale intervention in Korea, their main motivation at present appears to be to establish inimited 'cordon sanitaire' south of the Xalu River.1' The emphasis of the memorandum was on the Si no-Soviet desire to protect the Suiho hydroelectric system. Their strategy, the memorandum noted: "would also be in line with the general desire to furtherCommunism by helping the North Koreans prolong theirSee Exhibit J, Memorandum for the President,)

15- On Novembert least four days alter sign3 of actualhad been observed elsewhere than in CIA (seeIA,

ully concurred National Intelligence iistlmote, stated that the Chinese Communists had the capability of (a) halting further DM advance northward, "through piecemeal ccraitment ofr (b) "forcing UK withdrawal to defensive positions farther southowerful

The estimate seemed inclined to the opinion, however, that the situation would be stabilised for the winter aa both sides built up forces. It pointed out that (a) the situation was filled with risks of worldj (b) the Chinese realized the danger of retaliation; and (c) they would enter Korea in full force if their territory were attacked. (See Exhibit K,ovecber)

ByIA was conceding intervention by implication at least, but interpreted it in termsoviet decision to accept the risk of global war, Wiich CIA still considered improbable. Kcr.ce, the inference was left that intervention would not reach dangerous proportions. (Seend Hjnd)

On Hot ember 2k, two days before the Chinese Coraunist-North Korean offensive was boyin, tfiich one month later had driven UN forces from the Yolu to positions south ofh Parallel, CIA estimated that the enemy would!iirailtaneously! (a) Maintain Chinese-North Korean holding operations in Jlorth Korea; (bj Kalntain or Increase their military strength in llanchuria; and (c) Seek to obtain Ull withdrawal from Korea byand diplomatic means.u The estimate added that; "Eventually they may undertake operations designed to bring about the withdrawal of UN forces from Korea. It is estimated that they do net have the military


mmno m


capability of drivingorces from the peninsula, but that they do have the capability of forcing them to withdraw to defensive positions for prolonged and inconclusive operations, vhich, the Coraaunists might calculate, would lead to eventual UN withdrawal from Korea." (See Exhibit H, NIE 2A, November)

18. In addition to CIA's several formal estimates and evaluations on Korea between July aidIA reported some IjO items of current intelligence bearing on the capabilities and intentions of Communist China in Korea. These items appeared in its two regular bulletinsmost of them in the CIA Doily Suroary, but slpxificant other items exclusively in the CIA Weekly Summary. Host of these current reports were quoted from IAC agency non-clandestine sources and most of them were followed by CIA comments, usually phrasod in estimative lanpioge. These cocnents, *hich, of course, iJere not coordinated with the IAC agencies, were nevertheless not inconsistent with the formal estimates discussed above.

In retrospect, however, tilth the benefit of historical hindsight, these items ore astonishing in the persistenceumber of conclusions which proved to be wrong, Thus, CIA seemed to regard the alleged Soviet and Chinese fear of "general war" as the all-important factor of restraint against intervention in Korea. CIA consistently discounted reports of war conferences and intervention decisions in Felping between August and Cctoberj and repeatedly discounted specific indications of Chinese Communist war preparations and troop movements, up to as lateovember. Finally, once intervention was actually accomplished in November, CIA tended to regard China's moves as largely "defensive" and based on its fears for the

Yalu hydroelectric area; and predicted that tho Chinese night soon

Digests of CIA's current intelligence reporting on Cormunist China and Korea,re appended below. (See

The Chinese Communist intervention issue was also treated in anotner CIA publicationthe Daily Korean Summary (seehich is surveyed more fully in Exhibit Q. in this publication there are occasional (but lessstimative conclusions on Chinese Cocrnmist intentions in North Korea, together with numerous on-the-spot indications of CHICCvI troop movements and actions quoted (usually without CIA comment) from estimates by US Embassy Seoul, by UM Command Headquarters in Tokyo, Far East Command Headquarters, 8th Army Headquarters, and the various US Corps operating in that area. While the latter four military echelons sometimes appear to be disagreeing with each other, their(in the Daily Korean Summary) are not in general inconsistent with estimates (see Exhibits

Relevant reports, totalling Eore, were collected by CIA from its ovai sources, during tho critical period (See Exhibit R, "Summary of CIA-Collected Information,earing on Coamuniet China's Intentions in Korea.") Figuring in this broad coverage by CIA were the following: CO/C's contacts (some of then with indirect access behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains)jregular and special analyses of Soviet and CHICCli propaganda broadcasts;

OC/FDD's extorsive analysis ot* Par Eastern newspapers and other public media (somalant and others oriented tond finally (and nost numerous) CSC's reports from clwidestice sources. All of these items of information added upariety of military, economic, and political indications of Chinese movesincluding moves which today. In retrospect, can be regarded as indicatiens of tne coming military

ZU CIA's record of reporting and estimating on the threat cf Chinese intervention waa drawn into public controversy, in the Senate and the press, between April andn connection withruman's dismissal of General -lacArthur. tlhlle only one of the three DCI's involved (Admiral HiUenkootter) was prevailed on to comment publicly on CIA'3 record, the heads of the two major LAC agencies (the Secretaries of State and Defense) wore each quesxioned at seme length In the Senate hearings.cArthur and members of his immediate staff also commcntfld at length, bothl and in subsequent memoirs published on I'acArthur's behalfU Fresident Truman was also draw into the

Uhllo Admiral Hillenkoetter and Fresldent Truman could not recall that CIA had disseminated any advance indications cf tha Chinese threat, it is clear, from the comments by the ether principals, that both CIA and the several 1AC agencies, together with KacArthur's command in the Far East, were collecting andariety of intervention indications well before ths overt attack, was launched. Conversely, it seams clear from the public record that CIA, the several

- lit -


IAC agencies,om and were all in essential agreement, in the considered estimates tfiich each produced, that intervention would not como, s less clear, however, from the record of the publicwhat prompted those negative conclusions in the face of these positive indications.



9 publmwd9


m foimluse mil1


copy of this publication Is for the Information and use of theon the front cover and of individuals under the Jurisdiction of thewho require the information for the performance of their officialhe department to other offices which require thefor the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:

a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, for the Department of State

irector of Intelligence, OS, OSA, for the Department of the Army

Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy

of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force

of Security and Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy

eputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff

g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other Department or Agency

copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning In accordancesecurity regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agencywith the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.

DISTRIBUTION: Office of the President

National Security

National Security Resources Board

Department of State

Office of Secretary of Defense

Deportment of tbe Army

Deportment of the Navy

Department of the Air Force

State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee Joint Chiefs of Staff Atomic Energy Commission Research and Development Board

probable developments in china

table of ,

Problems for tbe US Arising out of Developments in

e. Western Possessions of Hong Kong and.

Aid to antl-Communlst

Need for Foreign

Communist Desire for International

Communist Influences throughout the Far

Extension of

Transfer of Political




and Future






Note: The purpose of thediscussion Is to present probablein China which will affect US Interests during the next six to twelve months.

Communist military forces are capable during the summer months9 otall semblance of unity In the Nationalof China; and before the year la out, the Communists will haveentral government which wHl seek International

The US cannot reverse or significantly check this course of events, nor la thcro any prospect that the Soviet orientation of the Chinese Communists can be altered In thefuture. However, during the coming months, developments In China willumber of problems on which the US may either take action advancing, or avoid action compromising, Its Interests In China andChief among these are the formationommunist central government claiming International recognition, Communist alms regarding Taiwan and Hong Kong, theneed for foreign trade, and US aid to anti-Communist groups In China. InUS Interests probably will be affectedby the expansion of Communistthroughout the Far East, particularlyhinese Communist regime gains seats on the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan, and acquires China's claimsuture Japanese peace treaty.

government to be organized byCommunists will be proclaimed asbut actually will be aIn foreign affairs theduring the coming months willbe solidly aligned with the USSR. Thewill honor tho Slno-Soviet Treatyand Its attitude In Internationalbe governed by the Moscow line. Itmaintain an unfriendly attitudethe US In particular and all otherthat impede the worldas well as denounce China'sInternational agreements with those

armed forces, nowto the Nationalists, will continueof area-by-area acquisition.capable of eliminating all effectivein the south, southwest, andby tbe end

he Chinese Communists will probably not be faced with serious food shortagesthe next year. Some progress will be made In reviving transportation and industry, and the Communists willelatively stable currency. The Communists' principal economic problem In the coming months will bo that of acquiring petroleum, machinery, and perhaps cotton. There is little prospect of substantial Soviet aid, and domesticmust be supplemented by theseal Imports. Therefore, China's economicduring the next year will probablyon active Western trade and close ties with occupied Japan.

Mote: The Intelligence organisations of the Departments of Army. Nary, and the Air Force have concurred In this report;issent of the Intelligence Organization of the Department of State, see Enclosure A,his report contains informationto CIA as


Note: The purpose of thediscussion, is to present probableIn China which will affect US Interests during the next six to twelve months.

mminent Problem* lor the US Arising out of Developments in China.

The Chinese Communist armies have theduring the lummer monthsf completing their campaign In the Yangtze Valley, from tbe eastern border of Szechwan. to the sea. and of dislodging the Nationalists from Canton and other ports on the southeast coast during this same period. Their military operations In this period will destroy allof unity in the present Nationalthe remnants of which will seekin Taiwan, southwest and northwest China, or In flight abroad. In late summer or early autumn, the Chinese Communist Party willolitical Consultativeto form and proclaim agovernment for all China before the endt that time, Communist China will contain more than half of China's people, and, If not more than half of China's territory, at least the larger part of Its most productive areas. The Communist Government then will seek recognition aa the national government of China.

The US cannot reverse the course of thecivil conflict nor induce the Chineseto modify their Intention toommunist dictatorship over China Also, there Is no prospect that the US can alter the Soviet orientation of the Chinese Communists in the Immediate future. During the next few months, however, there willumber of developments In China affecting US Interests such as: (l) possible Incidents Involving US armed forces, officials, andharpening of the Communist-Nationalist struggle for Taiwan, where US strategicarehinese Communiston Hong Kong andS aid to antl-Communist groups Inhe

Communist need for foreignommunist central regime seeking international recognition,he expansion of Chinese Communist Influence throughout the Far East.

It Is known that the leaders of the Chinese Communists desire international recognition for their regime, and that they also desire commercial relations with the West and with Japan. These facta may permit the US, In the course of the next several months, either to take action advancing or to avoid action compromising certain of its Interests in China and elsewhere In the Far East


In firing upon British warships In the Yangtze, the Communists demonstrated that they are prepared to risk reprisals In order to substantiate their promise to protect China from "Imperialisthe Chinese Communist Party (CCP) undoubtedly gained face within China and elsewhere In Asia by this action, and It is possible that thewill again take advantage of an;which arise for military action against foreign armed forces. The opportunities for local Incidents Involving foreign officials and nationals have become much more numerous with the CCP occupation of majorsuggested by the forced entry of the USresidence by Communist soldiers during their occupation of Nanking.Involving the mistreatment of foreign nationals and the destruction or seizure of foreign property are likely. If the Communist regime should request, and be refusedit is highly probable that such incidents will multiply, with CCP connivance. If the US should extend further support to thesuch Incidents can reach serious proportions.

There is no doubt that the CCP desires to extend its control over the island of Taiwan.


US Aid to Anti-Communist Groups. The US Is the best available source for the small arms, artillery and ammunition desired by the remaining antl-Communlst forces, and It may be anticipated that such forces,or In the name of the Nationalwill appeal to the US to supply such materiel. However, major anti-Communist forces controlled by Chiang Kai-shek, Chang Chun, and tbe Moslem leaders of theMa Pu-fang and Ma Hung-kuel, even now are located either off the mainland or in the peripheral areas of China. In addition, there Is some doubt as to whether any of those forces, except those of the two Mas, could usefully employ further US aid. Chiang's forces on Taiwan already have extensiveand economic resources. Chang Chun's forces In Szechwan do not need economic aid. Moreover, it is Improbable that military aid to these forces can prevent the Communists from extending their control over Szechwan at any time they choose to do so.

The Mas of the Northwest (the provinces of Ningsla, Kansu, and Tslnghai) with the advantages of forbidding terrain, excellent organization, and hardy troops, are In the strongest defensive position of any of theanti-Communist forces in China. Moreover, on the basis of past performance, the Mas, as compared with othergroups, would make the most effective use of any aid which they might be given. However, their bases in the provinces of Tslnghai and Nlnghsla are the most difficult to reach with US aid, which probably would have to be transported by air. The Northwest area is self-sufficient In food, and may hold out for several years even without US aid, either because the Communists will beant to attack or will favor Its developmentuffer against the expansion of the USSR into China through Sinkiang.

Overt US aid to anti-Communist forces In China would compromise the maintenance of normal diplomatic and commercial relations with the Communist-controlled regime. In the event that the US should choose toolicy of recognizingegime.US military aid to any anti-Communist forces other than the Mas, might well go the way of the bulk of US aid supplied to the NaUonahsta In thethe Communists. Aid of the type and proportions extended hitherto to the National Government, at best, could delay but will fall to prevent the extension of Communist rule through all China.

A further consideration is tho continuation of US aid to Nationalist China, as provided for in the China Aid Program. Withareas soon to be limited toand the western provinces of China, It will be difficult to Justify the US program on humanitarian grounds as aid to the Chinese peoplehole. Thus the US wouldincreasingly vulnerable to Communist propaganda, attacking tbe US aid program as designed solely to bolster and prolongon the part of antl-Communlst remnants.

e. Communist Seed for Foreign Trade.

Communist Import requirements provide the USossible weapon againstChina. Depriving the Communists of essential Imports would retard theof China and Increase the economic difficulties that will confront the CCP. Seme essential Imports, chiefly petroleum products and Items of capital equipment, can beIn quantity only from the US or UK. The USSR, without some sacrifices In Itseconomy, will be unable to supply many kinds of equipment, will provide Inferior goods in other cases, and will probably make heavy demands on China In exchange for its assistance.

The controls to be used would probably not be effective If they were so severe as to be in fact an embargo. It Is doubtful If the US could arrange for concerted support for an embargo among the Western Powers, and the Communists would gain sympathy andwithin China by representing an embargo aspersecution. Limited export controls on selected commodities such asand capital goods probably would be acceptable to the UK, which has the largest economic interests of any Western Power In China, and would probably serve US purposes Just as wellomplete embargo.

elayed Recognition.

Should the TJS delay,eriod of several monthsear or more. In according de jure recognition to the Communist regime In China, some of the disadvantages of both non-recognition and immediate recognition might be obviated. Since the Communists are interested in obtaining de jure recognition as soon as possible, they might be inclined to discuss, and to reach some priorwith the TJS regarding present and future treaties and the number and location of TJS consular offices in China. This period would also afford other Western governments anto bring political and economicon the Communist regime. Concerted action by Atlantic Pact powers, which haveesire toommon front, can be anticipated if the delay Inde jure recognition is not prolonged to the point where it would become Inlmlcable to their Interests. Through the periodommon front, however, there would always be the risk that other governments, seeking special advantage by early action, wouldunilaterally to extend de jure The Communists can be expected to follow, and probably to Improve upon, the traditional Chinese diplomatic practice of playing one power against another.

g. Chinese Communist Influencethe far Bast.

The CCP has indicated its interest Inone billion Orientalsommunist Asia. To thia end, the CCP industriously propagates the view that Communism is inevitable in Asia, and that only the Communists are the champions of Asianhe prestige of Communism wOl increaseas the CCP extends its control over all of China.

apan and Korea.

The CCP has stated that China and Japan "can and should establish close friendship" and has warned that Japan musteace treatyommunist-controlled government of China. The CCP Isto open trade with Japan, and theCommunist Party echoes the CCP line that only "democratic" forces can successfully conduct commercial and political relations with China. In Korea, the CCP's successes have contributed greatly to the confidence of the North Korean regime and to the feeling of defeatism in the Republic of Korea Through ltd relationship with North Korean leaders, the CCP Is capable of providing significantand economic aid to North Korea. The opportunity of South Korean leaders to offset tho development of such an adverse trend has largely passed and it now appears that South Korea can do little to forestallecognition by the Western Powers of the CCP's regime would be to the advantage of Communist China both politically andInsofar as it permitted tradeChina and Japan. De jure recognition would give the Chinese Communists further opportunity to claim seats on the Far Eastern Commission and on the Allied Council for Japan, as well as weaken further the position of the Korean Republic's government.

outheast Asia.

The CCP is extending its influenceSoutheast Asia by identifying itself with native Independence movements, by"reactionary" colonialy threatening "fascist" non-colonialand by promising protection toChinese communities. De factoof the Communist regime by thePowers would tend to increase theand economic influence of the CCP in Southeast Asia. To withhold de jurewould make the CCP's work in Southeast Asia somewhat more difficult, but theand the Chinese overseas communities In that area would pay little heed toegalism. The Chinese communities willo orient themselves toward the CCP as itcontrol of China although there may be significant resistance elements among the overseas Chinese. Likewise the governments In Southeast Asia win adjust themselves to theae new circumstances, whether loror resistance. Tho CCP willnot employ military force to gain itsin Southeast Asia and it has noeconomic resources with which to maneuver. Its success in China, however, will


citizens, they must give at least de factoto the regime.

"Coalition" Pattern. Thepromised tooliticalConference9 to form and"coalition" government. Thea Party will be excluded from thisThe CCP has frankly statedIntended "coalition" government willthe firm leadership of the CCP."of "coalition" derives from theof Chairman Mao's "newname given to tne transitional stage"capitalist" society to the latersociety. In structure, theInclude three majorhenon-Communist "democraticfollow the CCP line, auch as tbeLeague and the KuomlntangCommitteedemocraticoccupational and functionalInvariably support the CCP'sthis government will permit someof popular participation in therepresentative bodies, all real power willin the CCP, whose function It"guide" the backward masses.

Consultative Conference.Consultative Conference will beforew constitutionaland for obtaining some degree ofsanction for the new regime, just aaConsultative Conference held Ina symbol of potential NationalChinese Communist Party willConference In its own name and Inof minority parties andwhich follow the Communist line,in the late summer or early autumnafter they have consolidated theirof the Yangtze valley. It is notthe Conference will consist of aor several hundred persons; inthe Communists will control itConference will either draft and ratifyor, possibly working throughestablished for that purpose,constitution andate for elections"constitutionaln thepromulgation of the constitutionestablishmentonstitutionalwould be delayedn any case, the Conference will simplyubber-stamp congress summoned to approve In the name of "the people" policies predetermined by the Communists while its constitution,providing for various rights, will, in fact, bestow no rights which the Communists cannot take away.

(d) Domestic Sanction for the Sew Order. In order to gain domestic sanction for the Communist-controlled regime, the CCP, in conjunction with tho Political Consultative Conference, will probably exploit the alleged affinities of Communist doctrine and practice with the theories of Sun Yat-sen, generally regarded within China as the "father" of the Republic. The CCP claims that Sun's famous Three People'sbeen more closely followed by the Communists than by theIt points to Sun's advocacy, ins, of "alliance with the Soviet Union,with the Communists, alliance with the workers andhe CCP may also citeeriod, when the Communists were admitted to the Kuomintang by Sun himself, and insist that only the CCP has truly carried out the terms of Sun's will by ushering in the constitutional stage of government which he demanded. The CCP will by no means deify Sun Yat-sen, but his tradition can be very useful in smoothing the Party's path.

oreign Relations. (a) Smo-Asian.

apan and Korea. Tbe CCP,roadcast attempting to influence theelections oftated that China and Japan "can and should establish closend pointed out that Japan musteace treaty with agovernment of China and establish economic and political relations with It. Moro recently, the CCP has beento open trade with Japan. There is little doubt that China will exert economic pressure and political influence on both Japan and Korea, possiblyiew to subordinating those countries to Itselfommunist Asia, The CCP maintains close relations with Com-


as China's outstanding enemy. The CCP has represented the US as the leader and supporter of all "Imperialist" andforces In the world, as forcingtreaties upon China In exchange for financing tbe Nationalists in the civil conflict, as directing the military operations of theand encouraging them to reject the Communist-dictated "peacend as plotting with forces Inside and outside China to destroy the CCP and keep the Orient in permanent slavery.

While the CCP has understandable grounds for resenting the US contribution to themilitary operations, the CCP'santi-Americanism Is primarily dictated by the opposite CCP and US positions regarding the USSR and world Communism. US official representatives and private citizens InChina, although not subjected to physical violence, have been restricted In their movements and in the discharge of theircommercial, or educational functions, while the CCP Is exploiting the US loss of prestige In China and enhancing Its ownby an Intransigent attitude toward the Western Powers. The "coalition"will presumably invite US recognition and attempt to conclude commercial treaties with the US but the CCP can bc expected to give aggressive support to Soviet and satellite diplomacy, to continue Its vigorous andanti-American propaganda, to bring pressure upon the US to withdraw itsto Nationalist remnants on Taiwan and to make the work of US diplomatic missions difficult. At present, there Is little chance of orienting the CCP away from the USSR.

(d) Other Foreign Relations. The CCP has adopted an attitude toward foreignhostile in proportion to the degree that those governments are Impeding the world Communist movement, regardless of whether such governments have or have not supported the Nationalists In the Chinese civil conflict- The fact that the UK has been of service to the CCP, in affording sanctuary and an operating base to CCP leaders In Hong Kong, did not restrain Communist forces from firing upon British warships In the Yangtze Neither will It prevent the CCP fromthe return of Hong Kong to China nor will it obviate tbe possibility of giving support to terrorist bands operating against the British in Malaya.

Tbe CCP undoubtedly intends to deprive Portugal of the colony of Macao, byif possible, but by military action if necessary. The French Oovemment has been denounced by the CCP for encouraging US "imperialism" in China and for Its actions in Indochina. The Netherlands Government has been similarly castigated by tho CCP In regard to Indonesia. All other Atlantic Pact states have been the targets of CCPabuse, both for joining the Pact and for other "reactionary" activities. India, which is probably recognized by the CCP as Itsrival for leadership in Asia, Isas remaining under the influence of British "imperialism "

Representatives of the Commonwealth countries andumber of Europeanin China haveesire to become accredited to the Communist regime soon after it Is proclaimed. Thesewould like to regularize their status by early recognition of the Communists In order to protect and perhaps expand their present Interests in China. They have not regarded the prospect of applying economic sanctions to China with favor and they apparentlyprofitable commercial relations with the new regime In varying degrees. At the same time, the governments of mostand Atlantic Pact nations havethe desirability ofnited front on the question of recognition.

' b. Nationalist China.

Nationalist China Is virtually bankrupt and the National Government Is In its death-throes. The process of disintegration and frag mentation is so far advanced as to render almost Impossible the establishmentunctioning government orooselycoalition capable of offering resistance to the Communists.

The National Government no longeras an organized administration even on



such antagonistic measures might be directed against the USSR on the one hand, the National Government might at tha seme time effect an apparent rapprochement with the Soviet Union and conclude agreementsfurther concessions, particularly in Sinklang and the Northwest provinces.

In Its last stages of existence, Nationalist China may turn Its wrath against the US. In Nationalist thinking, the US is largelyfor the Yalta agreement, and the US postwar policy of mediation in the civil war and Intermittent limited assistance havethe Communist triumph. Suchwill be intensified If the US rejects further appeals for aid and evidences interest ina future Ccmmunlst-domlnatedGovernment

3. Milhory Situation, a. General Strategy.

The objective of the Chinese Communist forces is the elimination of all anti-Communist armed resistance in China. To attain thisthe Chinese Communist Party has cm-ployed the strategy of using military forceedium of realizing their political objectives. Communist control over the remainder of China will be accomplished by means of an area-by-area program of military acquisition, dictatedarge degree by the state of their political preparedness for administering these areas.

The remaining NaUonahst orforces have now adopted the strategy of avoiding decisive military action, while at the some time attempting to deny territory to the Chinese Communists as long as possible.

ommunist Armed Forces,

The Chinese Communist Forces possesswealth in material and manpower to overcome all anti-Communist remnants In China. Having already eliminated thoof the best Nationalist armies, the CCP Is now in the process of consolidating Its recent virtually unopposed military conquest of the Yangtze valley. In consequence, Communist armies, free to accelerate their movements to the south and the west, appear to be headed toward Kwangtung. As elsewhere, however, the speed and magnitude of this operation probably will bo limited In some degree by the abilities of the CCP political organization to assume the additional administrative

Recent CCF victories have brought with them the new responsibility of protectingurban life, andonsiderable portion of CCF must be utilized to garrison "liberated" areas and maintain lines of communication.

and Disposition ofForces.

The Communist regular forces comprised of the field forces and Military District troops now totalsee Table,, thus giving theecisivesuperiority over the Nationalists In combat strength. These regular forces,the field forces, are characterized by good leadership, good equipment, high morale and discipline, as well as excellence Inand the employment of propaganda. In addition to the regulars, there are irregular forces, known as tne People's Militia, generally local in character and function,uch forces, on occasion in the past, have supplemented the regularsa campaign. In the future, they will probably be occupied largely with the task of policing CCPhird potential source of manpower comes from Nationalist troops which have fallen into Communist hands. Of these,0 have beenInto the CCF. Communist regulars will also be greatly assisted in their drive south by dissidents, bandits, and Irregular Communist bonds, already in control of wide rural stretches In the southern provinces.


The Chinese Communist Air Force made its first public appearance9 May Day celebrations in the Mukden area.51 type aircraft participated in the air parade. The Communists are known to have obtained by defection or capture at leastperational aircraft including bombers,transports, and trainers. The actual number of pilot defections is believed to be substantially greater than thenown cases although the Communist claims con-

water tranaportorth-south rail line from Manchuria to the Yangtze has already been opened.

c. Anti-Communist Armed Forces.

The Chinese Nationalist armed forces,defeated by the Communists andcohesive command structure at present, were not beaten by the sheer force of arms. Very few major battles, such as thosein World War H, were fought From the resumption of Nationalist-Communistin6 untilhe Chinese Communists employed guerrillaof hit, ruin and run, with resultant minor but effective actions. Inhe Chinese Communists stormed Nationalistwhere, much to the Communists'key Nationalist defections brought about by the disintegration of local troop morale led to the collapse of government resistance. The debacle at Tainan established the pattern for subsequent defections; from8 toising wave of mass defections, sell-outs, and general unwillingness to fight swept through the Nationalist armed forces. Tbe defeat of the Chinese Nationalist Army, therefore, can be attributed basically todecay. Although the strategic error of over-extension of forces contributed In part, the basic reasons for Nationalist defeat were, and continue tormy politics, which kept militarily Incompetent officers Inof highhe personalof all combat areas exercised by Chiang Kai-shek, which prevented Independentaction by fieldeconomic decay, which resulted Inpay, food, clothing, and equipment for the troops;raft and corruption, practiced by senior officers at the expense of their troops.

In consequence of these conditions.morale disintegrated from top to bottom and Nationalist forces lost the all-Important "will toationalist armed forces,have ceased to be on organised, cohesive and centrally directed military machine. They now existroup of widely scattered,and uncoordinated regional antl-Communlst "warlord" forces.

and Disposition ofForces.

The strength of the remainingarmies In China totals0 regular combat troops. In addition, there areervice troops dispersed throughout the remaining areas ofoperation (see Table,.

Tho "combat" forces listed In thetableigh percentage of poorly trained and Ill-equipped provincial levies. Not included are an undetermined number of local (Peace Preservation Corps) troops.

At present, there are basically four separate centers of potential anti-Communist resistance in China. These ore: (l) the southeastTaiwan) directly underhe southern provinces of Kwangtung and Kwang-sL under Li Tsung-Jen andhe southwest, under Chang Chun (possiblythe troops of;heunder Ma Pu-fang and Maapproximate.


The Nationalist Air Force has0 men and0 aircraft, ofre reportedly operational. The potential of the CAF has also been reduced by losses through defection and capture. Five-sixths of the CAF's totalircraft have been transferred to Taiwan. Because of maintenance difficulties and operationalonlyercent of the operationalare effective. The morale of the air forces, although somewhat higher than the ground forces due to differences in pay scales, is still very low. Consequently, CCPhas found and continues to find aaudience In the ranks of the air force.

The Nationalist Navy, lately weakened by the loss of upwards ofraft (of which atight cruiser, destroyer escort,unboat have been destroyed or disabled) haships, not Including harbor craft, and0 men. Navy morale, as

churla .viulh to Kwangtung and from the eastern border of Szechwan to the sea.

unitarythe Communist forces hare all

the advantages at present, when they move to eliminate the last areas of resistance they will face certain entirely new problems. The Communist armies will be moving intorough mountainous terrain in their drive to the southwest and the northwest. In order to support their occupation armiesthey must of necessity greatly extend their lines of supply and communication Into these food-deflcit areas. Althoughforcea will be greatly assisted bybandits, and irregular CCP bands in the south and southwest provinces, they will, particularly in the northwest, be movingreat expanse of territory where the local populace Is either actively or potentiallyTho expanding Communist armies win also face the problem of how to feed, clothe, Indoctrinate, and otherwise dispose of captured or defected anti-Communist forces.

The acquisition of Taiwan Is anotherfor the CCP: The Communist armies have no amphibious experience or training. At present, they lack the requisite shipping to undertake an assault on Taiwan. The lock of amphibious experience, moreover, may force the CCP to be satisfied with tho much slower political methods of underground action to accomplish their conquest of the Island.

Perhaps the largest problem facing the CCP lies In preventing the military machine from outrunning their abilities for politicalTo halt their victorious armies would not only belle CCP propaganda but would probably shake troop morale from top to bottom. Over-all success, therefore,upon the maintenanceery delicate balance botween CCP military acquisitions and political preparedness.


Problems currently facing the remaining Nationalist Armed Forces appear to beThe present centrifugal tendency In Nationalist Chinaecreation ofonce almost nation-wide, which thewarlords understand well, but which makes central planning and control virtually Impossible. The remaining Nationalist troops are desperately in need of re-ec^ and re-organizingompetent and effective central command. It appears iinllkely that these basicneeds will be fulfilled. Consequently, anti-Communist forces In China when threatened by the Communist armies, must furthercapitulate, or be annihilated.

stimate of Capabilities.

Nationalist. Remaining Nationalists or antl-Communlst forces cannot, in thefuture, effectively resist the Communist military machine. Even If It were possible to cure existing military Ills by means of outside assistance, superficial reforms would beunless the ailment Is alsotroops must be re-instilled with the will to fight. This can only be accomplished bythe troops In accordance with the cost of living, by feeding and clothing them properly and,y giving them something to fight for. This obviously Is impossible under present conditions. Tho CCP, therefore, can and probably will eradicate any and allantl-Communlst armed resistance whenever It chooses to do so.

Communist. The CCP Is currently capable of launching simultaneous operations to the south, southwest, and northwest and eliminating all effective military resistance by the endowever, in view oflogistic and morale problems whichwould result from too fast athe CCP will probably continue Itsarea-by-area conquest and it mayears before the final liquidation of all antl-Communlst resistance in China. The south and southwest will probably be the first two entries on the CCP military time-table and the coup de grace reserved for the Mas In the Northwest

A. Economic Situation. a. Nationalist China.

The economic activities of the National Government in Canton and of each provincial government (except Taiwan and Szechwan) are largely confined to the scorch for sufficient

dnctlon. While these promises have largely remained unfulfilled, they have gained wide support for the CCP among Shanghai and Nanking businessmen. Among the middle classes, those most actively wooed by theare the technicians. They arehigh pay (in Mukden reportedly twice that of government officials) and the chance to be leaders In China's reconstruction. The CCP has apparently gained the support oftechnical and managerial groups in other Communist areas in China and may do so in Central China as well.

Urban workers and the farmers may not be as strenuously recruited, both because their support Is already assumed and becauserewards to the middle classes must frequently be made at the expense of the lower income groups. While continued Up service will be paid to better living standards, workers will be told that, as the "leading" political group, they must carry the burden of economic reconstruction and development. Similarly, few promises, other than reduced rents and interest rates, may be made to the tenant farmers, since landlords have already been promised that the country is tooeconomically" for Immediate drastic land redistribution.

(e) Financial and Commercialhe CCP has shown considerable concern over the establishment of internal financialand the resumption of domesticThe lack of financial experts willhinder the Communists intable and flexible currency which will be adequate for the commercial and Industrial needs of North and Central China. Conditioned by the recentexperience with paper currency, thein the immediate present mayto relyess flexible exchangebased on barter and tax payment* in grain and other commodities. To date, the Communists havo been sufficiently successful in collecting agricultural output, which has provided themubstantial source of revenue.

Although transportation and marketing difficulties will hinder domestic trade, both state and,easer degree, private commerce has been encouraged by the CCP'spolicy and probably will continue to be. "Liberation" of the Yangtze Valley willyield to the Communists the huge col-lectlon-and-salc apparatus of the Central Trust and other National Governmentthus reenforcing and firmly establishing the Communist state trading base.

Further, CCP acquisition of the Yangtzewill be an Important factor in curing the present paralysis of Internal commerce by restoring the normal Integration of the Central and North China economies.

xternal Problems.

(a) Requirements in Foreign Trade.cotton, and the railroad, factory, and power equipment needed for reconstruction are the principal imports that thewill require during the next year.amounts of any of these items will seriously hamper economic recovery. Fuel-oil requirements can be met in part by the substitution of coal, which should beIn quantity to the Communists. But kerosene, gasoline, lubricants and otherproducts which have no substitutes must be imported. Current Chineseincluding aviation gasoline, isillion barrels annuallyillion barrels would probablyinimumannual requirement, with fullof coal and with no Increase in the level of economic activity.

Reconstruction requirements for China areinimum reconstructioncalling for rebuilding China's prewar Industry and railroads and perhaps one-half of Manchuria's peak industrial capacity, would require imports ofillion in Chinaimilar amount in Manchuria. The bulk of the expense would be for railroad equipment; the remainder would largely be textile, mining, and power machinery and equipment Reconstruction offers specialto the Communists since substantial credits or investments from the USSR areand there are severe political obstacles in the way of Western Investments. In the next few years, the Chinese Communists will be confronted with the problem of paying for


Intelligence organization of theof State dissents from the subject report on the grounds that it does not give adequate treatment to the implications of thedesireommunist China forrecognition. The treatmentaccorded this highly complex and technical subject makes for an cnrer-simpliflcatlon which Is considered unsatisfactory In view of thepolicy decisions Inevitably involved in the present Chinese situation.




SUBJECT] Tho USSR and thn Korean lnraalcn

Tha Invasion of the ilepublic ci Koroa by tbe Worth Soman Anay was en-doubtadly undertaken at Soviet, direction andfct.erial support Is unqueaUcsiebly being provldadB Tbe Soviet objective uas ths elimination o/ the liuit remainingwrxiunist bridgehead oa the Bainlsnd of northern Aaia3 thadaraiolnj tbe position of the US and the Soatern Ponerei throughout the Far Bant, hcoaing Korea an tho area of attack, the UdSR vaa to ^huiloDse ths OS specifically and teat tha firjBSiaa of M'isto'.-iniio toansiona

Berth Korea banthe capabilltiea for attacking Sooth bm far eood taee, and thoaj probably boon caking alcnn for sucha;':ince the withdrawal ofcrcsa fa-oat Bona In Tbis nlthirawi and aussecfVQt OS policy probably led tbe Krsolin to tailors that, ths IS bandotiad any totsniion of giving effecMve ailltary support to) Soiitn Korea and that Birth Kcroan aj^casslon could bo oodnrtokeo wltallflht, riak of OS iatervaa-Moo- ThsxofcatOy further eatlcoriad that, even in Hm event* JntarTOntina, it could readily disclaim or otherwise lovullM the conflisfco

x'ia tlaics of tho latraaloa oas probably detnrainsd prisnrily by hcMi Mint indications of ttvcroaaei US interaat. la tho Parja 'he dcTeiop-csnt,cticy for occioole and ntUlary aid for SoutheasrP- Asia,

Tao pfosj:', OS rccciloa in cede ring air andf Sort Evo. hoa probably ezreedod Sovlat, axpoctat-ioaa, and tho lbs* is now facedtrong possibility of global varupporte the Hero Korean bmudcti eufficiantiy to ovarctzM corbined US and South Korean rosiofcanea* t-ili oatiaabed thai, tbe BBSS Is notpreparod to riak full-scale aa? watIi tht-Basteffa Ponarf. and it Isherefore, that tha UsaS nill mvk tq lc-Mliaa the Korean cooflaot* The USSfl can achiara this result,b.Uclj' diMlaijsjjjg any reaponaltJlity for tbe invasion audi (I) nc-rot-lyorta Korean withdrawal ta tho 3flth Parndamtttin^ the Hnrta Korean fores* to be drir-on baak tch PataUcl tut, probably continuing rufficieat aid to caintoln that poaUifrijvidiago fiorxh Korea short of open participatiec by Soviet fortesnhe civil war and dints In korth Sana posj'.ksa rfouth ofh Par.UUt, Ivcauso of tho odvaatasea cf ccotlfluinc *irlX

ot boonationa of tho Oapartoonfcs ofrmy, Maty^ and ?Ls Air

ippimim ieliasl


and eilitary disorder In Korea, tha USSii will probably adopt ths thirdmat ivo. In tha probable ovont that this attempt proves lcpoasible. Km situation night cell develop into indecisive and intermittent hoatllitiei stabilised at approxlEat-Dlyh Parallelg aeanahile, the BSSE vriU continue to provide substantial material aid to tha Horth Koreans,irregulars recruited frca Chinoso Ccmmuniots end Soviet foreea0

Although tha USSR haasons time been considering tho advisability of aggressive moves in other areas of the norld, there is no conclusive evidence to indicate tho cvsnct nature or timing of tha xovoo being ccntes-plated* Southeast Asia (particularlyran, Jugoslavia, Greece, and Sarlin offer the USSR the araateat opportunities fcx aggressive aovos or increased pressure* Forthoro is continuing airidence ofreparations in the Ealkans aimed at oithar Jugoslavia or Grcacc and several roporta hare indicated tha Korean Invasion waa ck)Eignadfl in part3iversionary action to cover an attack on Fcmacsa,,

la vien of tho vigorouseaction to the Korean oituatlcn,t la not likely that tho USSRinstigate surprise oovss in anyoee areas tmUl tha Srealin ins had an opportunity to studylicatlcna of thia reaction. parUflularly as to its effects on the possibility of global warfare in the avsnt of Soviet "inspired outbreaks alsaoherso Boverthcl-iap. Comuniat activity in the Par Saat and elaechare 'sill continue end oil!e intensified, bat greater care sill be taken to caaiiitain tho fiction that it le "icdiseccua,"

I$3anBhiler ths DSSS has raaetad to tho strong IS resolutlona on tie Worth Korean icvaaion by Winding all action taken thus far by the Sacuri^-Counnll as illegal and haoeo not binding,. The attack itsartf indicated continued Soviet, indifference to ending tea boycott of tho (S3 and tha $sm-psr of non-Soviet soakers of the CH will in turn cake It far mora difficult for ths USSR to return,,

ui^irf^iKrtrs Keaasaawr bo. sea

Ccusecusieca of the Koiao) Incldrnx

Apcrt fron immediate strcV-gie ravsrrccfrco, the basic cbJcoMTOo in lacicoiBj the Hortbmi Koreoa attach piwbatty ware tos (l) test tho strength of US corsaltMrita inraliclt in the policy of eectalit-cent of Ceramist CTrxmcicajjoin oolitlcal sdioulSMeg fin thension of Comi-rfca In both AaU ard Europe by nr.dsrninSns the cenfidenco of win Ootutuilut states in ths vales ofppei-fc,

S" lM MMiina oT tha reaction to tiearaocprobcaly that: (l) UH actios would be slcv andwald not Intervene with its cmoctfc. vetldcollapse pronptly, presenting; tho 'dll "litl!ltwsld thoraforo ho ctsrelotely localisedjbfl fi^inp?ertrsyed nr.South Korean essresaica and tha BerthasAsiatic Katlcoelisi; Uestvii cclor.:Ullm.

21, nlqacfltaACT.trte Ebrc-in inciaan-l.

ftore are at preacct fan?alternative oournescacicc oesr. CO -ihe UTSR, ro noi; smfcuaUy cctelucive cenrsoo cf retiCK. tiit lo estimated thflfc tho BSSBy lSktHj try toha fighting ia ZorecCaltsmirtive belov) Ccr inses at thcr w voelos cr rathe, ifppear ftoorshlc to Soviet leai'-ers, shift to tho corececr.te cf erenitas tdsSlscbelcvi).. Thers oKisdnsd ocaj ia ores? of prcbaMivcy, t in ordWoasin'i viaZc e* elohclfncrovsinEa? effcrfc or the part of tie IC53J

ttfco IES3 scs- icciiiao the Screen'c'- o forces to driyo tho Kortfcbsci rca cwiijglrciisre. tia CESR would rcsaiin uncocroittrf in ^orer. md uculd dsvslep tho prropdcnnd*f TJS nsTrcseion cud icperislintie intorfaresco is do&esfciof ca Asiatic nationa

Kotet endciE hoc no^ ^on ccordijiatcd vith thartjaainatlcno ofn;-ta',cnt3 of State, Arte-,Air ^orco..


C tfaWw!


itvc-AVius tlioand cie

olitical SjifXatiioo wcvJLd ho ficcafcirilollv

SovlcJand inflame* vculd fca damaged, tec fcisro

* S8

as ailitoxy amraSSf1=2 T^i PS

l^ttU^ rror Ifestan

3-. iije vculd "to tamest

vere prolongan


Iu Thaould obtain eftMrr.oo.-vrary. QeMnfeteaWgains inluanceoafflH oftho"campaiirn" and portraying CIS as Imperialistic iTaotcm grosser la Asia, imlcoa aucceaafully countaixc by r. OB "Truth" cacpai<jr_,

thH ** uld

limit US capabilities to support aiKtilar ccotaitawnta elssrchare. otarn European allies of the US would feelocod for scae tine (even if tho ISartial aobili^aaticn for

ho USSR probably trill adopt this altornativo course of action at least for tho snort run, ainca there rrouldoviet disadvantages or risks and tha Soviet gains wold ba appreciable,

ppear especially attractive tobecause at any tino, if conditions appearedthe USSR could sh>.ft ta than whiche

Alternative C. Tho USSR, nolle atiaaptlne to prolong tho figfatliu in *crea as in, nay also atteunt to diaperso and ^rhrxc

overstrainUitary fcrccs-ln-readings byaries of inc^donta sinUar to ilia Korean affair* Sithoufcd cpanly Involving Soviet forces, such Inoidcnta coeld be craoted In FopnWi Indochina, Bunea, Irsa. Xi-aoslAvia, and Greece* Tho offoat? ofwaoxe cc-jld be aKravatad by rinsircd prooarrs on, coaaibly,

- 'SHuldcniparatlvalyaalva courao

for tha UsbH to talra. Ita adoption eould indicato oiUin-now to run

an apprecoablo riah oflobaJ conflictof the

^ alternate atbut it ia not likoly to turn to it until thniyimplications of tiia IW ccmaltoent in1

Savins aseloyat! lie axaad ftrcaa i* cup-crtin Korea, tne IS will havo to honor aiuilary* moat e" the advantage of tha policy of ^porting thet*entfl

The IS docs not ruvo tha ^iliUryo arena othar than Korearc)icreaLe in


.'i* Ii^ep invulroont ef botdTOM in toaBeat uovld loon .Teatait, Sarope 'Jvoq noruou3iy"

5.'. At aaaj point totter Koraan-style incidents (requiring tbe coanitiaent of US forwa to stabilise the situation) crc-jw-xhlr nculJ lores the US to adept one oi thaterns.tlTO:

(a) roriso tho policy of general contalnrsnt by Uniting SiSSHiISS lann-"S jjreB6ion only at thOM selected points Bhere existing US military strength would permit;

(t) begin partial oiXitir/ ^nd industrial mallUatloc in an attempt s> enable theo cca&et mj fttrKurGi'os^xca rnvmiera In ths uorld' or

(cj hefiin total onorahle tM IS t* threatent any bovaat cr Sc'viat.^osoi-uitiicfiaioat tha iSi&l

5- R probablyd-;yt oxtyKiiUva jcouscrSoviet loaders do act eitioflteglobalnvolved to be

aubotantlalo preparedar if it dc^iou.1,

7- If Soviet dcvelcptSTit c* rfcis altemaMwr Fc-tiac

iuacaencvai CS xobUiaation ,itbio bias Uiat the

UhSR prob-bly would in that event continue United agp^-niom- fjeccroiTlcrt

by tip cuoto*trypi-opaganda, discounting actual US initiation"

a general war and perhaps oatlauting that tha political and aconcej"

nfiiscradit the US and its The USSR, however,

(a> desist frcn further nggrascicn or tha Korean tyra.lobal war -nd taking xobilisaiion aa an indication of graator risk than Soviet loaders had anticipated in choosing this couraa of action; o;

US-initiated global aar. attemptoiss the

initiative by tewtt-toly attach Us


ffl^^fi" Dl MXtrtervoaaiaa la .tw. cither as tha pralude-ol an inevitable global war or en Joetification fcr Mganoing

1* irJji6 in the Eenooot ludtastM ttat thattld delica-atcly decide tc aaploy SoTiotin dln-atrcclpltatlnG global :tar, jliiwly if, rj owprobcble, Soviet; Isadora- beSlaro that:

thoro era continuingtc arcsni Soviet influence Ly the ccuperatively cheapsafe rr.-r, ofCc^ajnist revolutionary activity (includingsub-wrslon, guerrilla warfare, and orsdcia-sd mUitwry action by loceJ OCOBuniat troopc- -aa in Korea), which acn ha mcT.jrted by Soviet diploBcey and the care thraat of Soviet military stzwntfda^ readiness;

there lo aubctentlal risk Involved forR In tha

8-loIjoI war that alecet certainly suvJA en?na fron direct ail] fury potion byet forces,,

C5SRappear tolittle reasonlrtic

'xca short of global *r,ee ng tho courses of action described Inndabove.

USSR lo unlikely to choose the alternative ofClobal thisin view of: (a) the Bsoaralths IB and its allies In total power-potential; and (b) tho f'ictpresont Soviet atraoic capability i= inoufficinnt to nontmUuretaliatory Capabilities and to offset iftoof tho US and its alilea by Interfering with teeindustrial

III. Sffocta of aof US -forces to Bold South SCorea.,

Ao The taaediato conser.uencasailure to holdamaging blew to USith loss in political inQcenc-greater than tha losa that would have boon Incurrsd If the OS led not undertaken to support Its moral coitniltocnt in South Korea,,

8, The US wouldconfrontedcisc-lug tho lees of UStw tc raajAin as nuch prestige as possible by ccwitfcing subatarrtial US nrilltary roaourceaifficult and costly invasion of an area which is not of primary strategic iarportance to the overall US

capabilities would be discredited at hem and abroad,

?ld Probably

adopt alternativeaa described above (Section IT). It might be tempted, hovrovor, to postpone further aggressive action elsovmsra until

in Sf

ent net be brought within

Its sphere of Influonce through Intimidation aloro,

WPFOVlDFQBBlllASl ceil am;in


review of the world situation






copy of this publication Is (or the Information and use of theon the front cover and of tadivlduals under the jurisdiction of thewho require the information for the performance of their official duties.elsewhere in the department to other offices which require thefor the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:

a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, for the Department of State

irector of Intelligence, OS, USA, for the Department of the Army

Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy

of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force

of Security and Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy

eputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff

g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other Department or Agency

copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordancesecurity regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agencywith the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.

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The unprovoked attack on the Republic of Korea by the armed forces of the Soviet-controlled North Korean governmentew phase in the power conflict between the USSR and the non-Soviet world. For the first time since the end of World War II, the USSR deliberately attempted to expand the Soviet-Communist area of control throughon-Soviet state by themilitary forcesuppet state. Apart from the Immediate strategic advantages of Communist control of all Korea, the primary aim or the USSR in instigating the attack probably was to discredit the US policy ofcontainment of Soviet-Communism.

US intervention, endorsed by nearly all of the non-Soviet members of the UN (Includingine beyond which Soviet-sponsored aggression could not goailure to draw this line would have seriously discredited the whole US policy of containment, gravely handicapping US efforts to maintain alliances and buildInfluence with the Western European powers and with other nations closely aligned with the US. The Korean Incidenthole, particularly the virtual collapse of resistance by the Republic of Korea and the Interposition of US forces in the path of the attack, raises several problems of the gravest importance to US security. Outstanding among them is the possibility that reverses in the fighting inmay quickly counter the favorable Initial psychological effects of Intervention and bringrop In the morale of the Western world.

turn events take in Korea,has the capability oferiesroughly comparable to theeach one threatening either tothe US policy of containingexpansion or to disperse andmilitary forces In readiness.

Soviet leaders might estimate that the USSR was warranted in running tho risk of global war inherent in the repetition of the Korean pattern elsewhere, reasoning either: (a) that the US would abandon or drastically reduce lis commitments, particularly In Asia, before it would challenge the USSR directly; or (b) that the outbreak of global war in which the US took primary responsibility for enlarging the area of conflict would leave the non-Soviet world critically divided and weak. The Far East (Taiwan, Indochina. Burma) and the Balkans are the border areas where signs of Impending military action are mounting.

the early reaction of Westernwas to give enthusiastic approval tointervention In Korea, the Westernnations are unlikely to take resoluteaction to meet the challengein the "limited war" phase ofconflict unless US military power can

be mobilized and deployed In strength that Is plainly sufficient to constitute at least adeterrent to further Soviet or Soviet-sponsored military aggression.

Note: This review has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of theof State, Army. Navy, and Ihe Air Force. The lnformaUon contained herein Is as ofuly IBM.



Limited Wo. In Korea.

The unprovoked attack on the Republic of Korea by the armed lorces of theNorth Koreanew phase In tbe power conflict between the USSR and the non^Sovlet world- For the first time since the end of World War II, the USSR deliberately attempted to expand the Soviet-Communist area of control throughon-Soviet state by themilitary forcesuppet state.the USSR may claim that the conflict In Koreaivil war, It cannot disguise either the fact that North Koreaoviet puppet or the fact that the attack was launchedtate whose sovereignty had been recognized by the UN.

In Eastern Europe the postwar techniques of Communist expansion have not gone beyond propaganda, sabotage, subversion.coups, and guerrilla warfareby Soviet diplomacy and the threat of Soviet military force. Even in Greece, Iran, China, and Indochina,activities have remained within the limits of Insurrectionary fighting in asituationingle state.

a. The Attack.

The North Korean venture. Involving anstep toward open Soviet aggression, amountsaboratory test of the advantages the USSR might gain byar ofobjectives and limited liabilities through the medium of puppet troops. Sovietwere limited In the sense that the North Korean forces proposed merely to bring about the "unification" of Korea within itsnational boundaries rather than toa global war involving the US. Soviet liabilities were limited because the USSR avoided becoming openly and unequivocally associated with the attack desplto the fact that the North Korean forces wereSoviet-equipped, Soviet-trained, and Soviet-supplied.

In planning the Korean Invasion the USSR probably did not expect the US to Intervene with Its own military forces. In the absence of US intervention, Soviet leaders coulda quick Communist victory that would present the US and the UN with anfact, undermine the confidence of non-Communist states in the practical value of US moral commitments, and give political and military momentum to the further expansion of Soviet-Communist Influence in the Fax East. Apart from the Immediate strategicof Communist control of all Korea, the primary aim of the USSR In instigating the attack probably was to discredit the US policy of general containment of

o. US-UN Reaction.

Whatever the original Intent of the move in Korea, the prompt US commitment of Its own military forcespolice action" on behalf of the UN automatically converted the Korean incidentritical Issue. The USendorsed by nearly all of the non-Soviet members of tho UN (includingine beyond which Soviet-sponsored aggression could not go without beingA failure to draw this line would have seriously discredited the whole US policy of containment, gravely handicapping US efforts to maintain alliances and build politicalwith the Western European powers and with other nations closely aligned with the US.

The Immediate psychological reaction of the Western world to US-UN Intervention In Korea was almost uniformly favorable, and theof nations committed to the containment of Soviet-Communist expansionubstantial lift. Nevertheless, thehole, particularly the virtual col-

lapse of resistance by the Republic of Korea and the interposition of US forces in the path of the attach raises several problems of the gravest importance to US security.among them is the possibility that USIn the fighting In Korea may quickly counter the Initial psychological effects ofand bringrop in the morale of the Western world.

c. Effectsrolonged Battle in South Korea.

The efficient military performance of theforces In the first three weeks of battle Indicates that there la little probability that the North Koreans can be quickly driven back toh parallel. The USSR can supply material aid In sufficient quantities tothe fighting and deeply Involve the US In Korean military operations. Chinesetroops can be brought into action covertly and. If necessary, openly. The USSR might consider that the risk oflobal war was not substantial so long as no Soviet forces were openly committed.

A prolonged battle In South Korea, which now seems probable, would seriously damage US prestige. The Western European allies and other nations aligned with the US would steadily lose confidence In the military value of US commitments to assist them against armed aggression and would be increasinglyto take energetic measures in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization {NATO) and the Mutual Defense Assistance Programhile some credit might redound to the US for Initially honoring its commitments, more anxiety will arise about US ability to counter threats of Sovietthan about US Intentions to doajor commitment of US forces andin Korea would seriously Limit USfor taking military action elsewhere, and Western European nations In particular would feel dangerously exposed- While the US would encounter all of these disadvantagesocal but prolonged war in Korea and the USSR would reap cerrespondlngthe USSR could also registergains in non-Soviet countries where "peace" propagandatrong appeal by emphasizing Soviet non-interference (In the technical legal sense) and portraying the US action as an Imperialistic Western aggression against an Asiatic people.

d. Effectsilitary Reverse for USouth Korea.

The Immediate consequenceailure of US forces to hold Southossibility that cannot bo ruled out, wouldumagtig blow to US prestige The US would thenbe forced to try to regain as much of its lost military reputation as possible bysubstantial US military resourcesifficult and costly Invasion of an area that Is not in itself of primary strategic importance to the US. Whatever the US did to redeem Its military reverse, US foreign policy andUS military capabilities would bediscredited.

A voluntary withdrawal of US forces to avoid the military risk of being driven off the Korean peninsula would not reduce andwould Increase the damage to USinterests all over the world. Voluntary withdrawal not only would show US moral commitments to be unreliable when putevere test, but in addition would leave grounds for considerable doubt as to theof the US to back up any of itswith adequate military force. Deakke shaking the confidence of the Westernallies and other nations on whose strength and cooperation the policy ofdepends, withdrawal from Korea would damage US standing In UN affairs and would undermine the effectiveness of the UNevice for mobilizing Western resistance to Soviet-Communist aggression. Pro-US governments, particularly In areas where theUSSR could initiate limited militarywithout openly using Soviet forces, would suffer serious losses of prestige. In some cases (for example, Indochina or Iran) these government* might lose control of the country altogether or feel compelled to seek an accommodation with the USSR. The total effect of voluntary withdrawal on world-wide US security Interests wouldeversemore calamitous than the effectS failure to hold Korea.

2, Soviet Pressure on Other Border Areas.

Whatever turn events take in Korea, the USSR has the capability oferies of incidents roughly comparable to the Korean episode, each one threatening either tothe US policy of containingexpansion or to disperse and overstrain US military forces in readiness. Withoutand openly Involving Soviet military forces, the USSR could engineer the outbreak or (where guerrilla fighting Is already going on) the rapid Intensification of local wars In Taiwan, Indochina, Burma, and the Balkans. The effects of Incidents In these areas could be aggravated by renewed pressure in other places bordering the Soviet sphere. In Iran in particular the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party and other subversive elements either within the country or in adjacent Soviet territory areof creating disorders which the USSR might useretext for invoking1 Irano-Soviet Treatyran with Soviet troops.

The use of puppet forces (or Soviet forces In the special circumstances In Iran) would involve some risk of global war. The USSR probably will not deliberately Initiate global war at this time in view of: (a) the general superiority of the US in total economic and military power potential; and (b) doubts about whether the newly developed Sovietfor atomic attack is as yet capable of neutralizing US atomic retaliation andthe US from mobilizing Its economic and military power.

Nevertheless, Soviet leaders might estimate that the USSR was warranted in running the risk of global war inherent In the repetition of the Korean pattern elsewhere, reasoning either: (a) that the US would abandon or drastically reduce Its commitments,In Asia, before It would challenge the USSR directly; or (b) that the outbreak or global war in which the U8 took primaryfor enlarging the area of conflict would leave the non-Soviet world criticallyand weak.

Whatever Soviet Intentions may be. signs of impending military or quasi-military actionarge scale are mounting In nearly all the border areas. These signs may be part of the war of nervesoncerted deception plan designed to prevent US concentration of effort on the Korean operation. Some of them may be feints to draw attention away from newust one of the trouble spots. It Is conceivable, however, that the USSR plans aggressive action of some kind at all these points within the next year or two. In any case the pressure continues to be heavy, and possibility of early Initiation of newIncidents by non-Soviet Communist troops cannot be excluded.

Far East.

It Is not yet clear whether the USSR will force the Chinese Communists to give open military support to the Korean operations or toew operation elsewhere In the area. The Pelping regime la unlikely to commit mill-tary forcea to operations outside China on its own Initiative, but almost certainly would complyoviet request for militaryChinese Communist troop strength and dispositions would permit intervention in Korea and military actionumber of other places as well with little or no warning. Forces in considerable numbers apparently are being staged on the mainland opposite Taiwan, and possibly opposite Hong Kong. Although no significant changes haveIn the strength of troops stationed along the Southeast Asian frontiers, these forces are capable of crossing Into Indochina if necessary to strengthen Ho Chi Minn'sforcea or into Burma, where the presenceew fugitive Chinese Nationalist troop units wouldhow of legality to aIncursion.


There haveumber of indications of an acceleration of Soviet and Satellite troop movements in the Balkan area. Sovietequipment and supplies have been flow-bag Into the Balkans for several months in quantities that appear to be In excess of the needs of Soviet forces available there. The number of Soviet troops in the Balkans has not changed significantly in the past six months, but the efficiency of Balkan puppet forces has probably been Increasingesultightening of Soviet control and theof Soviet materiel.

While it Is still probable that Soviet-Satellite troops in the Balkans arc inadequate touccessful armed oflensive againstit would be possible (or puppet troops with covert Soviet support at least toocal waronsiderable scale by moving across the borders of Yugoslavia, Greece, or Turkey. Soviet propaganda is emphasising the imminence of hostilities in this area (through Greek and Yugoslav "aggression" ofhe Initiation of any kind of armed aggression in this area by Soviet puppet troops would present the basic Issues of the Korean incident all over again, forcing the US either to abandon some of Its commitments or toIts military strength.

3. Western Europe.

While the early reaction of Western Europe was to give enthusiastic approval to the CSIn Korea, as tune goes on soberthoughts are bound to occur to the NATO nations. If the fighting hi Korea is prolonged, as seems probable, or spreads to other border areas, Western Europeans are sure to fear that the US programs of military and financialwill be limited to present levels If not reduced because of the strains this peripheral fighting would put on US resources. On the other hand, fear of global war will beas will fear that the time may be short to prepare for defense against Soviet aggression In Europe. The Korean situation will bring sharply home to Western Europe the fact of its delenselessncss against direct militaryand may provide the US wtth anto press for an Increased defensive effort and more effective mutual aid andof forces. Beaolute and coordinated action along these lines will be required if the Western European nations are to meet the critical issues that will confront them so long aa Soviet-sponsored aggressions continue.

The prospects of such action arehe light of the halting progress made to date in unifying Western European military and economic efforts.the strong resolutions adopted at the London conferences of May, the projected strengthening of NATO has hardly begun. The Schuman plan for Integrating thecoal and steel industries, one of the most promising economic integration schemes, Is moving slowly. The French have proceeded vigorously to the heart of the economicproblem by proposing to establish supra-national organizations and clearlysupra-national authority. Thia radical departure from traditional political patterns alarmed the Benelux countries and caused them to retire for governmental consultations. Only the Germans, who have no sovereignty to lose at this point, and the Italians, whose industrial stake is comparatively alight, aro Inclined to accept the Schuman plan more or less as presented. The British, who are not negotiating but are being kept Informed,to make it plain that the UK would not participate In the plan the French haveThe influence of Franceeader in Western Europe, which otherwise would growesult of the development of the Schuman plan, has remained uncertainof the protracted difficulties ofew French cabinet.

The Western European nations may avoid giving way to apathy or despair andmeet the challenge implicit in thowar" phase ot world power-conflictby the Korean incident. They are unlikely to do so, however, unless USower can be mobilized and deployed In strength that Is plainly sufficient toatubstantial deterrent to further Soviet or Soviet-sponsored military aggression.


j'nctors Affecting the Desirability' MJ..itary Conquest af all of

^te were unable toopy of this rjeraorendun. igest nade In1 by the Office of fiationai

| Although an inToslon of Korth Korea by lit: forces could, if successful, brine several Important advantages to the US, it appears at present that crave risks would be involved inourse of action. It Is doubtful that OS allies and other ron-6ovietreticns In the would supportourse of action. Asian nations, particularly India, would reecl unfavorably, and nany Asians Right be convinced that the US is, after all, an aggressive nationolicy of self-interest in Asia. The invading forces might becone involved in hostilities with the Chinese Con-DunlDi3. As it became apparent that the Worth Koreans were being defeated in Scuth Korea, tbe Chinese eight veil take up defensive positions north of the 3Bth rarallel. The USSR might use Chinese Corrnunist troops at any stage in tbe fighting, but their participation would be especially useful ath Far ail el where UH iieaoers could legally discontinue their support of the LiS policy. Inasmuch asP. would regard theof North Koreatrategic throat to tho security of the Soviet Far -iaet, the invading forces eight become involved, either directly or Indirectly, In hostilities with Soviet forces, under conditions which would alienate most of Asia from the OS-Oil cause in Korea.

The conquest cf tforth Korea would not provide assurance of peace throughout the country or of true unification. Continued threats of


degression frora Manchuria or the USSR would produce instability, requiring the continued presence of large numbers of US or Uli forces. Synpnari 3hee and his regiao are unpopular auong nanyifaicrityof non-Comnjunist Koreans. stablish his government throughout all Korea would be difficult, if not Impossible} even if this could be dona, the rogine would be so unstable aa to require contlnuirg US or UK Military and economic support. K trusteeship wore established, it would be unstable. Korea once no re would become the cat's-paw of international politics, and lta ultimate 3tatua would be dependent upon the comparative strength and anbitions of tbe countries whose representatives supervised tho trust adminletration.


OHBU iirExuaass una

'js-xxuusxi: so. yih


Probability of Direct Chinese Ccmrau-Ust Intervention in Korea

To assess tho probability of an open Ccwait-ierrt ef Chineco Cosounistorces in Korea.

caxaitueit of botli recular and local Chirsso Ceo-

ramlnt ground forces, and the use of the Clunese Cco-raunist Air Force in support of tho IJorth Korean invaders are conaiderod.

ASSUTJrTIOtEi nited oorert Chinese Consninist asaiatance to the ltartli Korean invaders, includinj; the provision of individual soldiers, is ansu.nod to be in probTes8 at present.

ho provision of evert asaiatance by the Chinese Cocoanists would require approval by tho UCSt and ouch approval would indicate that the ITCSl is prepared to accept an incroased rial: of precipitatinu coner'ai hoatillties.

1. Co.nclufd.on3.

Although there is no direct evidence to indicate whether or not the Chinese Ceramists will intervene in Berth -orea, it is evident that the Chinese Coraunists or the USSR cast supply trained and equipped combat replacements if the IJorth Koroan invasion is to achieve aamplete control over South Korea before the end of the year.

Reports of an increasing Chinese Coeainist build-up of edlitary otrength in L'anchuria, coupled with the known potential in that nraa, make it clear that intervention in Ksrea is well within icnadiate Ctiineae Corsnunist capabilities. loreovar, recent Chinese Cctxiunist accusations regarding US 'armrossiorr* and 3violation of the limchuriaii border" nay be stace-QotUng for an laainont overt novo.

Hotei This neiaorandura has not been coordinated with the intelligence orzanizatLone of tho Dopartaonto of State,vy, and the Air Torcc

The maDOTandum was proparod in accord with tho roquost of tho mraefcor of Intelliconce, Headquarters, United States Air ?orce.


iiftrthe incaentoue ropsrcuofllons from such an overt action, hoawer, it appears mere probable that the Chinese Coraamist partlclpetaoa in Ihe Eorsen conflict vill be coro indirect,though significant, and will bo United to intecrctLes into the Jfcrth I'eroan forces "Uoncliurian vdunters-o/ perhaps inelnditic air units as well as (ground taoopc*

2. Present Status cf :Vrth Korean ?crccc.

Tho decision whether or not to comrit Cliicese CoMcwnast forceo vdll depend in pert on the aval lability of Korean manpower, both in ranchuria and that part of Korea, new in Corxatnist hands- Current ostimtes by the Ilepartuorrt of the /ti*ny stateo traijied Korean veterans nho had served with the Chinese Communists in the "anclnuiaa caopalgrxst6 toremain in Lanclroria and theretrategic Iforth Korean reserve. It is notemrthy, however,cgost ltarth iCa"?ans here been using caabat replacements -sith as little aa too week's training;rth Koreans would logically havo oomraitted all available arganibed Korean units soon after UK forceo had beer, comsdited because at that tine the lrapict of liO,CCO trained troops probably would have been decisive.

The foregoing considerations Indicate either th*vt any Korean reserve in &mchuria vcaispersed that It did not cocatitute an effective racervo or that this reserve never in factreover, the possibility that Scroan rsserves in Manchuria novo now boon celleotod and raorgardacd and that some ero now onroutc to tho combat area tends to be discounted by the fact that the tiae elapsed sinceune should have penrttted the crrganiactionWfttaQBt of tha tajcrity of this reserve shier, noold have been far (inparifir is cjuality to these virtually ortraired Kccth Korean traop3 that have actually boar, utilised in thon balance, therefore. It ippears highly probabla that,victory in Korea is to be achieved jy tlia end of the year the IJorth lemon forces nust nccr rely on either Soviet cr Chitcsa Ccwmirdst resources for decisive ongmmrtailon.

3* Chinese'-iilitieu l'cr Iq^jycntion.

Tbe Chinese Ceraiuniots havo approxi:nat3ly four lolllicn sen under arras, includingtary District troops, and provincial forces. ng the fall of Uenchurie. there were eppr orcinaUitan- District troops in [hnnmr.-le.rfettoneliefcO, andCCf tints* hq troops have now been integrated into tho regular array and organisec! ae corubat forcw. These units, an well as the remaining IS troopCj. probably aro Soviet-ecuippsd.. In addition, rsporto during tha poet threeaonsiderable increase ir. ra^iLir troopchurl2. It is aatlcBtod that tho aajer


o, lAnnccbatneat in "cncJiuria and are prchabiv located along or adjacent to tho Koroan border, in position fop'raoid cciasiteient in Korea.

osniamist regularsh Junc-chen's command are presently deployed in thena araa. Sere of these troops have been reported enroutechuria.

The Chinese Cowisurdats are believed to possess an air force totalling 2coperational combat aircraft, scene units of which are reportedly deployedscchuria.

u Indications of Chinese Communist Intention to Intervene a

ttuaerous Chinese Conaurast propos^xfa attacks on the US during recent weeks, charging the US with "iiitenrention" and "aggression" in 1'airan, have been cliaased by too navr protests to tne UK claiming US air attacks in violation of tlio I'anchuria-Korea border. It is possible that theso charges, besides serving apropaganda function, may be adcted at prtrading an excuse for Chinese Corcaiaist intervention in Korea.


Since tlio fall of ISelnan ineliable reports have indicated that elements of Idn Mao's lith iHeid Amy traro beto-noved nortterard frcra tho Canton araa.1 Ilstfor elements of the hzh ield Army areelieve* to be either in cr enroute to ifimchnrla. Other reports indicate; that military construction is in progress near Antung and along tha Talu ?lver% GtrerigUic-ning of liuichm-iau border defenses -Tight eitherogical, securityt .in view of the Korean conflictreludo to tha offensive anplovrent of forces in the area.

Reports of iceressad activity at Antung on the Ilanchuria-Sorea border include thG ropes-ted arrival of Chineae Ccmnarlst aircraft.* Antung lias also been reported as the aiair. 'ease cf tho

Reports of preparation for this movereceived aa earlyell in advance of the assault cn Hainan by LIII's forces.. Altiiough these preparations nay liavc boen sort of announced CCF plans for dcaobilication, it appears acre likely that these alaiascts trare Korean troops of Iinrse- being released to the North Korean Array.

2- The thro* airfields in the Antongotalircraft.


Lfcrth Korean Air Force, vaiere that deplotod rorco ecu seek refuge frcnair attacks. rts of recent JJovth Korean activity, Including revetment construction at airfields south ofh Parallel have been rocoivod. These construction reports could indicate tho loninent forward movement of air reinforcecents for the "orth Koreans. Although 3one of this anticipated air sup-pert eight be provided by tha as yet untested Chinese Cooaunlst Air Force, Micro is no .firs evidence to supportontention.

^- "actors 'iilltnting Against Intervention

Tne coesdtaiant of Chinese Ceramist anaed forceo in Korea would clearly transform the Korean conflict from an ostensiblyispute to an international struggle, Tlio decision to ccenndt Chinese wist troops to the Korean conflict would significantly affoct the Soviet position in China as well as innd Soviet influence over both Peiping ard Pyongyang debt be jeopardised. Other factors "which night tend to da tor Chineso Cosc*ini3tin the Korean war, but which would be of minor conscqiienoo in soecision, crei hinese national and oilitory pride night cause friction if Chlneeo troops tiotu placed under Soviet or Screen coasard;hineso Cocoinlst interventionprobably olledncte all prospects for China's ocaission to the United Ibtioos.

i -


review of the world situation




copy of this publication is for the Information and use of theon the front cover and of individuals under the Jurisdiction of thewho require the Information for the performance of their official duties.elsewhere In the department to other offices which require thefor the performance of official duties may be authorised by the following:

Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence,Department of State

of Intelligence. GS, USA. for the Department of the Army

Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy

of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force

of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission.

a Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Stall

g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other Department or Agency

copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning In accordancesecurity regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agencywith the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.

DISTRIBUTION; Ofllco of tbe President National Security Council National Security Resources Board Department of State

ol Secretary of Defense of trie Army of tbe Navy ol the Air fort* Joint Chiefs of Staff Atomic Energy CommlW.on Research and Development Board




early three months after beginning Its venture Into wax-by-prcccy, the USSR retains the strategic initiative to some extent locally In Korea anduch greater extent

The USSR Is probably not yet prepared for International military operations designed to defeat the TJS and Its allies. Nevertheless, the USSR has been vigorously preparing Its armed forces. Its economy, and Its political-control system for the eventualityajor war. In view of the traditionalof the USSR with its defensivethese preparations de not necessarily in-dicatc that the USSR Intends deliberatelylobal war. Nevertheless, the time-phasing of some parts of this war-readiness program suggests that the USSR made an urgent effort to be ready in case large-scale expenditures of military materiel should be necessary In the fall0 or the spring

Whereas the US and Its allies have been able to contain Soviet efforts at expansion in Europe and the Middle East during the past two years, the USSR has steadily gained ground in Asia. In large measure it hasIn identifying Communism with local nationalist ambitions, anti-Westernand economic

esult of Communist seizure of control In China, the USSR has In the Pciplngisciplined lieutenant in theCommunist program of eliminating Western Influence and establishing indigenous Communist governments throughout the Far East.

It Is doubtful that eitherChinese Communist forces will besouth of the SSth parallel, bothand Peiplng have the capability oforganized military units to reinforceKoreans at any critical Juncture.much more likely, however, to aidcause in Korea by releasingof trainednits, perhapssmall air units, for incorporationNorth Korean forces.

is still no conclusivepolitical warfare over Taiwan willor perhaps accompanied by aassault on the Island.

the present tunc opportunities forof Communist influence inappear to be more promising thanbelligerent ventures (such asIntervention inoscowprobably will prefer to maintainthat Communist aggression isrevolution or civil war (as theyKorea) and to rely on the efforts of"liberation" movements ratheropen employment of organized forcestheir own territory. Thus thewould continue to limit theirHo Chi Minh to indirect or covertmilitary assistance.

The spread of Communist influence in southeast Asia probably will continue, at least in the short-term future, acquiring newwith every local triumph, in defaultevelopment of an Indigenous Asian regional association capable of resisting the expansion of Soviet influence in the Fax East;

This review has not been coordinated with the intelligence organisations of theor State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force. The contained herein is as ot


Western success in convincing the local populations that "colonialism"hreat and that Soviet controlirect threat to nationalffective US aid.

hile bringing heavy pressure to bear on many non-Soviet countries,eak In the Korean attack, the USSR has recently beenoft policy toward suchas Iran, Afghanistan, and India, which the Kremlin evidently wishes to neutralize for the time being. In Iran in particular, this soft treatmentore difficult problem for the Iranian Government thanarsher attitude and may yield considerable advantages to the USSR without furtherto pressure tactics,

oncurrently with Its Integratedof aggression, pressure, and political enticement around the borders of the Soviet sphere, the USSR is vigorously prosecuting Its propaganda warfare In the UN. During the coming parliamentary maneuvering In the SC the US may be able to counter Soviet propaganda moves and to prepare the ground for what will probably develop Into the most solid anti-Soviet front yet displayed In the UN General Assembly.




Current Soviet Policy Patterns.

Nearly three months after beginning Its venture Into war-by-proxy, the USSR retains tbe strategic initiative to some extent locally in Korea anduch greater extentChances that the North Korean forces alone might drive UN troops out of Korea have been materially reduced in the past month, and it Is doubtful whether the North Koreans can still draw upon enough reserve military resources to permit them at once to maintain pressure on the major UN-heldaround Pusan and simultaneouslyother UN forces. The concentration of Chinese Communist troops near the Korean border in Manchuria, however,owerful secondary reserve which, if Moscow and Pclping should agree on It despite therisks, could enter the battle andchange Its course at any time. The Chinese Communist armies are also capable of attacking Taiwan and Indochina without seriously weakening their positionKorea. Meanwhile, the USSR andChina areajor UN propaganda offensive emphasizing theirtoand castigating so-called US "aggression" in Asia.

2. Soviet Readiness for War.

These particular manifestations of anSoviet foreign policy appear against the background of rapid advancementeneral war-readiness program In the USSR. The USSR is probably not yet prepared for international military operations designed to defeat tho US and Its allies, mainly because of its limited stockpile of atomic bombs, its relatively weak strategic air arm, and itsweak surface navy. The USSR has, however, been vigorously preparing its armed forces, its economy, and its political-control system for the eventualityajor war. In view of the traditional preoccupation of the USSR with its defensive capabilities, these preparations do not necessarily indicate that the USSR intends deliberately tolobal war. Nevertheless, the time-phasing of some parts of this war-readiness programthat the USSR made an urgent effort to be ready in case large-scale expenditures of military materiel should be necessary in the fall0 or the springhis time-phasing may wellolicy designed to protect the USSR from the risk of global war which Is implicit in tbe instigation of local operations by non-Soviet forces on theof the area of Soviet influence.

There is still no conclusive evidence as to whether the USSR will resort to furthermilitary aggression through the medium of non-Soviet forces or, what may be more likely, will adhere to Its standard policy of extending Soviet influence by propaganda, subversion, Internal coups, and guerrillaby Soviet diplomacy and the threat of Soviet military strength. TheSoviet war-readiness program could, however, be an indication of Sovietto meet the eventuality of general war if it actually should come01esult of US reaction to further Soviet oraggression. In the event of war In this period the USSR could use its enormous ground army and tactical air force to occupy most of the Eurasian continent The USSR then could: (a)trategic air bombardment campaign against the UK;

deny US access, at least partially, tobase areas from which US strategic air attacks could most effectively be mounted;

employ against the continental US the supply of atomic bombs available, thusthe US capability to retaliate; (d) add the resources of Western Europe to the Soviet war potential, permitting the USSR in time to absorb heavy damage from US strategic air


attacks without destroying Soviet capabilities for continuing hostilities; and (e) set the stageolitico-military offensive designed to bring the remaining non-Soviet countries Into an accommodation with the USSR.

3. Offensive in Asia.

Increased Soviet war-readiness greatly strengthens the position of the USSR mIts current campaign to expand Soviet influence and extend the area of actualcontrol in Asia. Whereas the US and its allies have been able to contain Sovietat expansion in Europe and the Middle East during the past two years, the USSR has steadily gained ground in Asia. In large measure It has succeeded in Identifyingwith local nationalist ambitions, anti-Western sentiment, and economic discontent.esult of the "revolutionary situations" created by the breakup of the colonialsystem, the USSR has had angradually to extend Its bold over large areas In Asia and at the same time to weaken the Western Powers indirectly by diverting their critically needed military resources to the Far East Thes anticipated, hasear of crises in Asia, and theworld has been suffering serious lossesesult of Communist accretions of power In the Far East.

(Current Soviet concentration on Asia does not, of course, alter the fact that theof political, economic, and military strength In Europe continues to be of primary importance to the security of the US. The USSR can be expected to return to thein Europe whenever vulnerabilities there warrantact which makes theand procedures only now being worked out by the NATO powers the most criticalof the next year or two so far as US security is concerned. The direction and import of theso decisions and procedures will have to be studied In the context ofto put them Into effect rapidly andduring the next few months.)

4. Communist Capabilities In the For East.

esult of Communist seizure of control in China, the USSR has available in the Pel-pingisciplined lieutenant capable of

furthering the international Communistof eliminating Western influence and establishing Indigenous Communistthroughout the Far East. a. Korean Venture.

While there Is no clear evidence that either Chinese Communist or Soviet armed forces win be used in Korea, the USSR and Its Asian lieutenant will probably try to prevent the loss of the political and military advantages already won by the North Koreans. While it is doubtful that either Soviet or Chineseforces will be committed south ofh parallel, both Moscow and Peiplng have the capability of sending organized military units to reinforce the North Koreans at any critical juncture. They are much more likely, however, to aid the Communist cause in Korea by releasing large numbers of trained Chinese Communist (Manchuriannits, perhaps Including small air units, forIn the North Korean forces. Inthe Chinese Communists may try toor at least Interfereajor UN counterattack in Korea by mounting aneither against Taiwan or In Indochina. If the USSR and Communist China should adopt either of these courses of action, Itwould either bring local militaryin Korea by diverting US forces or, In default of effective US Intervention, would promote general Soviet strategic objectives by extending Communist influence elsewhere In Asia.


Formal lodgment of charges against US "aggression" In Taiwan (as well as on the Korean-Manchurlun frontier) has marked this themeey element in Soviet and Chinese Communist propaganda. There is still no conclusive evidence whether political warfare over Taiwan will be followed oraccompaniedilitary assault on the Island. The remaining time for weather most favorable to an amphibious attack isew weeks, but the Chineseare capable ofowerfulforceatter of days. In any case the Taiwan issue will be pursuedIn the UN. The USSR will attempt In thbt way to spilt the solidarity of tho nations


UK, and France In particular) that supported US policy on intervention In Korea but are reluctant to become associated with the Chinese Nationalist regime or toirtually endless war withChina The USSR and Communist China, In addition, may hope to secureof Taiwan as part ol an eventualof the Korean situation

c. Indochina.

At the present time, opportunities forof Communist influence in Southeast Asia appear to be more promising than more openly belligerent ventures (such as formal Chinese Intervention inhere have been many indications that Ho Chi Minn's forces are preparing for an early majoroffensive. The Chinese Communists are already assisting the Indochlnese rebels by giving them materiel, technical assistance, and training. They are capable of Invading Indochina and occupying ail of VietnamCochin Chinaewand Pelplng probably would prefer,to maintain the fiction that Communist aggression in Indochina is merely localor civil war (as they claimed In Korea) and to rely on the efforts of Indigenousmovements rather than on openof organized forces outside their own territory. Thus, the Chinesewould continue to limit their aid to Ho Chi Mlnh to Indirect or covert thoughmilitary assistance. In this case, China would be doing for Indochinalike what the USSR has done for Korea. Inase the USSR would not only be waging war-by-proxy (as inut would be waging war-by-proxy-by-proxy.

The Ho Chi Mlnh forces probably will in the near future launch an offensive designed to seize or destroy key French border posts,French strength by attrition, andthe wayecisivef they had substantialof artillery pieces and armored vehicles, the Communist-led rebels wouldood chance of driving the French out ofwithin the next year or two.of whether Ho Chi Mlnh receives aid In the form of open military action by Chinese

Communist troop units, Indochina Is likely to pass Into the Soviet sphere unless the French in the meantime receive considerably more foreign assistance than is presentlyand (by greater political concessions In the direction of nationalin over the support of the Vietnamese people. The slow pace of measures to set up effective defenses against Communist control inis especially grave because the advent to effective powerommunist regime probably would induce the other independent stales of Southeast Asia to assume aCommunist colorationenerally pro-Soviet alignment in foreign affairs.

In the short-term future, at least, the spread of Communist influence in Southeast Asia probably will continue, acquiring newwith every local triumph. In default of:

development of an indigenous Asianassociation capable of resisting theof Soviet Influence In the Far East;

Western success in convincing the local populations that "colonialism" ishreat and that Soviet controlirect threat to naLlonalffective US aid. Even if India and the lesser states of South and Southeast Asia began toeffectively with one another and if they could be persuaded that the Western Powers had completely renounced the old Far Eastern colonialrm military (and political) front against Soviet and Chinese Communist influence could be maintained only on the basisomprehensive economicprogram designed to givetake in their nationalThere Is very little time to organise such an effort to save Southeast Asia and the difficulties In the way appear almost insuper-

'able. The other alternatives, however, are cither to write off Southeast Asia at once In order to concentrate on areas of more vital strategic value to the US or to accept the probability that It will be losteriod In which it drains off French, British, and US resources badly needed elsewhere.

5. Middle Eoit.

The flexibility of Soviet tactics Is revealed In the current turn of Soviet behavior in the

Middle East, particularly toward Iran. While bringing heavy pressure to bear on most non-Soviet countries,eak in the Korean attack, the USSR has recently beenoft policy toward such countries as Iran, Afghanistan, and India, which the Kremlin evidently wishes merely tofor the time being. In Iran,atter of fact, this soft treatmentore difficult problem for the Iranian Government thanarsher attitude and may yieldadvantages to the USSR without further resort to pressure tactics. The USSR has returned Iranian soldiers previously held prisoner, entered Into negotiationsrade agreement and the return of Impounded Iranian gold, and proposed to set up afor frontier rectification.

These appeasement moves, though they have not been accompanied by any slackening of Soviet-Inspired separatist agitation in Azerbaijan and among the Kurds, willthe traditional Iranian desire for apolicy dedicated to neutrality. The new Soviet approach Is well-timed, since the firmly pro-Western Razmara Government Isgrave difficulties in its chosen policy of rehabilitating the Iranian economy with US help. While Premier Razmara is not likely to relax his vigilance toward ultimate Soviet designs on Iran, these Soviet gestures of friendship will encourage criticism along the line that Iran has become too closelywith the US and too dependent on US aid that was not forthcoming. Should the combination of Soviet maneuvering and the anticipated economic hardships of the winter months cause Razmara's downfall, the present cabinet might well be replacedovernment much less firm in Its opposition to the extension of Soviet influence in Iran and even,ime,overnment openly to favor of appeasement of the USSR-

6, Propaganda War.

Concurrently with Its tntegrated campaign of aggression, pressure, and politicalaround the borders of the Soviet sphere, the USSR la vigorously prosecuting Itswarfare In the UN. Soviet obstructive tactics in the UN Security Council haveIn no spectacular victories, since there was no way to Invalidate the June Security Council resolutions that formed the basis of UN intervention to Korea. Nevertheless, the USSR succeeded In broadening the Security Council agenda to Include Communist charges of US aggression, thus obscuring somewhat the issue of North Korean aggression anda bargaining point of possible useuture settlement of the Korean war.

Chinese Communist charges of USboth on Taiwan and along the Karean-Manchurian frontier, and charges of French and British border "violations" as well, could of course be used as "justification" for Chinese Communist Intervention to Korea orAt present, however, the USSR isthe threat of Chinese CommunistIn an attempt to Intimidate the US and its UN allies and divide them from one another.

Soviet tactics to UN meetings duringwill probably continue to the pattern evident since tho return of Soviet delegate Malikugust. However. US willingness to have charges of "US aggression" placed on the SC agenda and to have UN commissions make on-the-spot Investigations hasdeflated these potentially dangerous Soviet propaganda efforts. The impact of these charges will be further reduced if the USN solution lor the eventualof Taiwan and follows up its present meticulously correct attitude on the charges of violations of Chinese territory by USA continuation of such parliamentary successes to the SC would enable the US to counter Soviet propaganda moves and tothe ground for what will probablyInto the most solid ant!-Soviet front yet displayed to the UN General Assembly.




critical situations in the far east





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a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, for the Department of State

o Director of Intelligence, GS, USA, for the Department of the Army

a. Chief, Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy

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irector of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission

eputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff

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set of estimates regarding criticalin the Far East waa prepared In responseequest from the President. The intelligence organizations of theof State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated In the preparation of these estimates and concur in them.

The estimates follow In this order:

of Full Chinese Communist

Intervention In Korea

of Soviet Intervention In Korea

of Chinese Communist Inva-

sion of Formosa

of Chinese Communist Inva-

sion of Indochina

Capabilities and Threat

In the Philippines

Soviet and Chinese Commu-

nist Intentions and Capabilities in the Far East

Inasmuch as the conclusions reached with respect to these particular situations in the Far East depend In part on the possibilityoviet decision to resort to global war, the latest agreed estimate concerning thatis included as Section O.

A. Threat of Full Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea

Statement of the Problem.

estimate the threat of full-scaleCommunist Intervention In Korea.

fl. Capabilities.

Chinese Communist groundlacking requisite air and navalare capable of intervening effectively,necessarily decisively, in the

III. Factors Bearing on Intent,

Indications of Intentions. Despiteby Chou En-Iai, troop movements to Manchuria, and propaganda charges ofand border violations, there are noIndications of an actual ChineseIntention to resort to full-scaleIn Korea,

Factors Favoring Chinese Communist

a Intervention, If resulting in defeat of UN forces,ajor gain in prestige for Communist China, confirming it as the premier Asiaticajor gain for World Communism withincrease in Communist China'sin the Slno-Sovletesult in the elimination of the possibilityommon frontierestern-type democracy;ermit the retention of sources of Man-churlan electric power along the Yalu River.

ntervention, even If not resultingecisive defeat of UN forces,the Chinese Communists to utilisewar aa an explanation for failure to carry out previously announced economice consistent with and furnish strongto anti-Western trends in Asia;laim for maximum Soviet military and/or economic aid to China.

c. Intervention, with or without assurance of final victory, might serve the cause of World Communism, particularly the cause of theUnion, In that It would Involve the West-era blocostly and possibly inconclusive war in the Far East.

d. The Communist cause generally and the Slno-Sovlet bloc particularly faceajor setback in the struggle with the non-Communist world If UN forces are permitted to achieve complete victory In Korea.

actors Opposing Chinese Communist Intervention.

a. The Chinese Communists undoubtedly fear the consequences of war with the US. Their domestic problems are of suchthat the regime's entire domesticand economy would be Jeopardized by the strains and the material damage which would be sustained in war with the US. Antl-Communlst forces would be encouraged and the regime's very existence would be

b Intervention would minimize theof Chinese membership in the UN andeat on the Security Council.

intervention would beunless protected by powerful Sovietand naval support. Such Sovietnot be forthcoming because itSoviet Intervention.

of major Soviet aidPeiplng more dependent on Sovietincrease Soviet control In Manchuria to a

.point probably unwelcome to the Chinese Communists.

unsuccessful, Chineselay Peiplng open to Chinesethe grounds that China would be actingSoviet catspaw.

ilitary standpoint the mosttime for intervention In Korea has

g. Continued covert aid would offer most of the advantages of overt intervention, while


B. Threat of Soviet Intervention in Korea

of the Problem.

estimate the threat of directIntervention in Korea

armed forces now In the Farcapable of intervening overwhelminglyvirtually without warning.

Bearing on Intent.

Indications of Intentions. The Soviet Union to date has given no Indication that It Intends to Intervene directly In Korea. Since the beginning of hostilities the Soviet Union has sought In Its official statements and In its propaganda to give the Impression that It Is not Involved In the KoreanMoreover, the USSR has taken noor military actions that constitute direct armed intervention in Korea.the Soviet Government for some months has been Increasingly Improving Its military capabilities In the Far Rut as well as In other strategic areas.

Factors Favoring Soviet Intervention. The defeat of North Korea wouldajor setback for the USSR. It would involve:

a. The lossatellite, andestem-orlented state on theof Communist China and the USSR.

iving the Westernotential strategic bridgehead which the Kremlin would always regardhreat to the industrial, communication, and military centers ofand the Soviet Far East

the Soviet military andpositionis Japan.

loss to Soviet political prestige Inwould demonstrate that the Kremlin lato support Its followers effectivelySoviet-Instigated action.

loss to Soviet military prestige Inwould leadendency, whether or not

Justified, to re-evaluate the effectiveness of Soviet military equipment and tactics.

eduction In the prospects of the Soviet Union for expanding its politicalby means short of war In that It would demonstrate the determination and capability of the non-Soviet world to resist effectively Soviet-Inspired aggression.

Opposing SovietIn weighing potential gains and risks of

Intervention, the Soviet leaders mustas an overwhelming consideration, that their open intervention would lead to direct hostilities with US and other UN forces over an Issue on which the Western world hasew degree of unity. Soviet leaders would have no assurance that combat between Soviet and US forces would beby the US to Korea or to the Far Eastern theater.ecision toopenly In Korea, In the ultimate analysis,ecision to risk immediate and probably global war with the US.

Soviet leaders may estimatewill be possible, without assuming thisrisk, to salvage some of the lossesfrom the Korean situation. USactivities could be obstructed byguerrilla action, which might involvein an extended and costly occupationcould contribute to Soviet effortsInacial enmity towardand the Western Powers.

IV. Probabilities of Soviet Action.

t Is believed that the Soviet leaders will not consider that their prospective losses In Korea warrant direct military Interventiononsequent grave risk of war. They will Intervene in the Korean hostilities only If they have decided, not on the basis of the Korean situation alone, but an the basis of over-all considerations, that It is to theirtolobal war at this time.

C. Threat of Chinese Communist Invasion of Formosa

of the Problem.

L To estimate the threat of ChineseInvasion of Formosa

Despite certain definite Chinesedeficiencies in naval and air forces and probably in amphibious training andthe Communists are now capable of launching an Invasion against Formosa withroops and moderate air cover. The USSR couldinimum furnishadvice and technical and logistic support.

Although Chinese Nationalist forces are sufficient In number and materiel to defend Formosa, lack of staving power, poorstructure, lack of inter-servicequestionable morale and shortages of some types of ammunition make their defense capabilities questionable.

Without direct Soviet participation and given strong naval and air assistance by the US armed forcea, the Chinese Nationalist defense forces are capable of holding Formosaetermined Chinese Communist Invasion.

HI. Foctors Bearing on Intent.

of Intentions. Frequentstatements of the Chineseclearly Indicated their Intention toof Formosa. However, availabledoes not Indicate theirdo so In the Immediate future. Anfactor bearing upon the intentis the degree of control the USSRof exercising over the Chineseand the Soviet Intent withFormosa.

Favoring Invasion of Formosa.

a. The occupation of Formosa wouldthe symbol of Nationalist resistance;otential source of coordinated opposition to the Chinese Communist regime;

and would seriously diminish continued antl-Communlst resistance In China andSoutheast Asia.

or continuedof an attack on Formosa would resultloss of "face" to the Chinese Communists.

c. Formosa would provide themall but significant source of foreign exchange,otential source of rice, thereby contributing somewhat to Chinese Communist capabilities for economic reconstruction.

Opposing an Invasion of Formosa.

would bo Improbable.

attack involves the risk of warUS as long as US forces areFormosa and the mainland.Communist leadership would beto Jeopardize its popularachievements, and internalan attack on Formosa that could leadair attacks on Chinese cities, toblockade of the Chinese coast, tosanctions, and to protractedcould sap Chinese economic strength.

Chinese Communists faceproblems, Including banditry,unrest, guerrilla opposition,agrarian maladjustments, andinvolved in consolidating theParty's political control. Forthe danger exists that, iffall or prove unduly costly, thesolidarity of the Communistbe subjectedevere strain.

'n view of current UN interest inthe Chinese Communists have someto hopeavorable political solution.

IV, Probability of Chinese Communist Invasion.

S. It Is believed that,ovietto precipitate global war, an invasion of Formosa by the Chinese Communists will not bo attempted during the remainder


D. Threathinese Communist Invasion of Indochina

of the Problem.

estimate the threathineseInvasion of Indochina

From forces presently deployed near the mdochina border, the Chinese Communists couldroops for an invasion of Indochina withoutdditionalCommunist troops could arrive at the border In support of an Invasion within ten days. Reinforcements and supplies might be moved by sea to rebel-held sections of the Indochina coast. It la also within Chinese Communist capabilities to furnish air support for an Invasion.

These capabilities could be exercised without Jeopardy to other possible Chinese Communist military operations In the Far East, except to the already Inadequate air supportimultaneous North Korean or Formosan intervention.

If the Chinese Communists shouldIndochina. It la almost certain that the defending forces under the French would seen lose all of Vietnam, except Cochin China.

Bearing on Intent.

of Intentions.

a. The construction and Improvement of roads, railroads, and air facilities; theof technical and training assistance and advisory personnel; present logistic support from the border provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsl, and Yunnanall these might be construed as positive Indicators of aninvasion. These activities, however, might also be Indicators of an Increase in the flow of Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh Communists, rather than of Chinese Invasion.

o. Although Chinese Communists have given propaganda support to the Viet Mlnh, there has been no public Chinese Communist statement which could reasonablyommitment to Invade or asfor invasion.

Favoring Intervention.

Chinese Communist invasion ofwould be the most rapid means ofa Communist Indochina.

fall of Vietnam to thefacilitate establishment ofover Burma and Thailand.

early Communist victory Inwould In part offset the loss ofCommunist prestige occasionedreverses in Korea,

Chinese Communists, operatingof International Communism,Indochina with the hope that, evenintervention should deprive them ofvictory, Western bloc forces wouldIn Inconclusive warfare In the

Opposing Intervention.

Chinese Communist invasion ofwould greatly Increase the risk ofCommunist Involvement in warWestern Powers or the UN, aa well asof global war.

Viet Minh military successesthe probability thatof Indochina can be ultimatelyresort to Chinese Communistproviding there Is no major Increaseplanned external assistance toand their supporters.

Minh capabilities can beIncreased without resort to open

of Indochina by Chinesemunist troops would arouse local anti-Chinese

sentiment and coulderious source of command conflict between Pelping and Viet Mlnh leadership.

Chinese Communist Invasionto antagonize the presently neutralAsia, particularly India.

ommunist China's prospects forin the UN and UN-sponsoredwould be Jeopardized and thefor the establishment of diplomatic rela-



E. Communist Capabilities and Threat in the Philippines

of the Problem.

estimate the Communistthreat in the Philippines.

Hufa. The Huks (RukbongNg Bayan) are today the armyCommunism, led by avowedwho follow the policies and seekthe objectives of Worldarmed strength Is estimated athe Huks areguerrilla organization, utilizing "hittactics; making maximum use of theof surprise, choice of terrain, andand avoiding frontal engagementforces. The Huks. who arealmost exclusively to Infantrythe capability of mounting0 men)attacks simultaneously againsttargets.. theytheir areas of operationand to other Islands of therecent months they have carried outand more widespreadHuks have terrorized localInterfered with travel. They canIntensify their operations, particularlydefended provincial areas, andstage another series of coordinatedbefore the end


a. Support of the Huk movement, apart from that derived from unorganized lawless elements. Is found among large numbers of peasants, who willingly or by force andcontribute to the Huk movement.source of support Is found in thelabor movement, where low real wages and poor conditions of work permitof the union movements by Communist organizers.

the Communists haveIn China, It is believed that athe approximatelyillionhave already aligned themselvesPeiplng regime. Such Chinese arefacilitating Communistfinancial support, andaid to the Huks.

intelligence does notthe Huks have received, or are likelysufficient assistance fromsources to alter their militarysignificantly

Countermeasures.efforts to deal with the Hukbeen Ineffective thus far.have been and are able tointernal security but are unablelocal areas where dissident groupsRecently reorganized armedbe able to deal more effectively withbut little Improvementisillusionment withIneffectiveness has causedwho are not active Huk supportersIndifferent and uncooperativeefforts to stamp out theThe government, moreover, hasdisposition to adopt and implementand social reforms which mightconsiderably the number of peasantsthe Huks.eductionmeasurably Huk capabilities and theof their operations, but would notthe hard core of the Hukwould continue to pose aproblem.

IV. Conclusions.

the Huks are capable ofwidespread, coordinated raidscentral Luzon, and creating someIn the Manila area, It is estimatedcannot overthrow the

F. General Soviet and Chinese Communist Intentions and Capabilities in the Far East

of the Problem.

estimate general Soviet andIntentions and capabilities InEast

jet live*.

Soviet Union and Communistthe common objective ofcontrol throughout the Farboth would prefer to secure thiswithout resort to general war.Union Includes In Itsommuntzed Asia.While the Chinese Communistsobject to such Kremlin control, theyno overt Indication that they do notthe primacy of Moscow in

Short of Direct Employment of Armed Forces. The Soviet Union and Communist China have the capacity, through aof measures short of war. further tothe strength of Communism In all areas In the Far East except those occupied by US or UN forces. It is estimated, however, that in no area of the Far East, except Tibet and possibly Indochina unless presently planned external assistance Is Increased, do they have the capability of establishing completecontrol0 through such measures.

With fuU-Scale Employment of Armed Forces. In the event of war beginning

Soviet Union acting alone has theof rapidly occupying Korea.Okinawa; ofubstantialInvasion of Honshu; andharassing attacks on theKyushu, Formosa, the Philippines,Islands in the adjacent waters, andcommunication.

China acting alonecapability to overrun Tibet andof the mainland of Southeasttotrong attack on Korea.

combination, the Soviet UnionChina have the capability ofpractically all the Asiaticpossibly of occupying all Japan

IV. Intentions.

Both the Soviet Union and Communist China have clearly Indicated that they intend to pursue without pause their goal ofCommunist control over every vulnerable area In the Far East by every means open to them short of direct use of their armed forces. Neither has given concrete Indication of anto employ0 its own armed forces outside its own boundaries.

It Is estimated in particular that,oviet decision tolobal war. the Soviet Union will notirectly with Its armed forces inhostilities, and the Chinese Communists probably will not0 attempt to invade Korea. Formosa, or Indochina.

With respectossible Sovietto precipitate global war, the latest agreed conclusions are set forth In Enclosure G.


G. Conclusionsossible Soviet Decision To Precipitate Global War

Soviet rulers are simultaneouslyby Marxist-Lenlnlst^Stalinistby considerations affecting thethe Soviet Unionorld power.made clear that their long-termto establish World Communism underof the Kremlin. Theirhowever, are:

maintain the control of thethe peoples of tho Soviet Union.

strengthen the economic andand defend the territory of theUnion,

consolidate control over theAsian Satellites (Including

make secure the strategicthe Soviet Union, and to prevent theIn Europe and Asia, of forcesof threatening the Soviet position.

eliminate Anglo-AmericanEurope and Asia.

o establish Soviet domination overand Asia.

p. To weaken and disintegrate the non-Soviet world generally.

The Soviet Union will try to pursue these objectives simultaneously. In case of conflict between one and another of these objectives, however, it may be expected that the Soviet rulers will attach greater Importance to the first four listed, and In that order.

On the basis that the long-term object of the Soviet rulers Is immutable and dynamic, and that the Western Powers are notto succumb to Soviet dominationa fight, there Is, and will continue to be, grave danger of war between the Soviet Union and Its satellites on the one hand, and the Western Powers and their allies on the other.

The Soviet Union will continueits aggressive pressures on the power position of the Western nations.


The Soviet rulers could achieve, and areair way toward achieving, the first three parts of their object (see a,bove) without risk of Involvement In direct armed conflict with the Western Powers.

Parts d, e, f,f their object are improbable of achievement without theof armed force, though there are still factors in the existing situation which might well lead Soviet rulers to consider that, In certain circumstances, and In the absence of effective armed opposition by the Western Powers, they might ultimately attain these parts of their object without the overtof Soviet armed forces.

In pressing to achieve parts d, e, t,f their object, the Soviet rulers will, atstages. Inevitably Impinge upon the vital interests of the Western Powers and so incur the risk of Involvementeneral warthrough the necessary reactions of the Western Powers.

In the belief that their object cannot be fully attained without involvement in awar against the Western Powers, the Soviet rulers may decide deliberatelyaroment when, in their opinion, the strength of the Soviet Unionls the Western Powers Is ot ItsIt Is estimated thateriod exists now and will extend from the present through IBM (Noteith Its peak at about halfway,2

From the point of view of military forces and economic potential, the Soviet Union isosition toeneral war ofduration now If Soviet rulers thought it desirable or expedient.

While intelligence is lacking toalid prediction as to whether or when the Soviet Union may actually exercise Itsand capability toeneral war, in view of the foregoing it must be recognized that the riskeneral war exists now and


/ 25


review of the world situation




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Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence,Department of State

of Intelligence, OS, USA, for the Department of the Army

Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy

of Intelligence, USAF. for the Department of the Air Force

of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission

eputy Director for Intelligence. Joint Staff, for tha Joint Staff

g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other Department or Agency

copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning In accordancesecurity regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agencywith the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.


Offlco of tha President National Security Couocll National Security Rmouicm Board Department of State OOce of Secretary of Defense Department of the Army Department of tho Navy Department of Uiii Air Force Joint Chiefs of SUIT Atomic Energy Commission Research and Development Board




Soviet Korean venture, aIn the use of non-Sovietocal war of limited objectives,hi failure. While the tacticalhas not necessarily been discredited,Kremlin should employ It In theUSSR will have to reckon with theof UN powers to Intervenethe meantime, the commitment ofsea, and air units and theof South Korea have marked awhich Soviet-sponsoredgo without being forcefully challenged.

a Soviet decision towar, the USSR Is unlikely toown military forces to rescue theInstead, the Kremlin probablythe North Korean Communists to holddefensive positions aa long asthen to harass UN forces bytime-honored tactics of guerrillaand propaganda

the USSR Is ready towar, or unless for some reasonleaders do not think that warUS would result from openKorea, the odds are that Communistthe USSR, will not openly interveneKorea.

Is too early to determine whateffects of the Korean defeaton the USSR, but It ia quite possiblesacrificeatellite willointwithin the Communistsome time to come and may aggravateof Soviet predominance in themovement.

rapid pace of recent events inEast has not, as the USSR maydiverted US attention from the fact that Western Europe is the area of the world most vital to US security. The emphasis In the Atlantic community of nations Is shifting .away from economic recovery, designedto meet the Internal Communistand shifting toward the task of building up defensive capabilities that can deteraggression or sustain the Initial shock of an attack if it should come In the long run, the most important effect of the Sovietin Korea may be that it has given new vigor to the effort to revive Western Europeower-complex and thereby redress the world balance of power.

by events in Korea, the NATIs passing from the stage of initialand organization to active executionThe crucial problem ahead isnot the European allies of the US canmorale and exert efforts sufficientadequate defensivethe threat of military aggression.

reluctance of the Europeanto divert substantial resourcesrecovery to defense is largely aof doubts as to whether European Intensive rearmament effortdestroying the essential economicof Western European defense.

appearsore unified effortfield of activity Is necessary If thecommunity is to meet the threatthe USSR in the shortest time and atpossible cost.

the Western European countries,France and Germany, haveultimate need for West Germanmilitary contributions to the common de-

Thb review has not been coordinated with the intelligence organisations ot theof State. Army, Navy, and Uie Air Force. The review contains informationto CIA as otctober.

fense of Western Europe. The Germans are increasinglyosition toigh political price for the services they can render to Western Europe and the US. Nevertheless, while seeking in every way to get an equal role in the Western community, the Adenauer government Is firmly committed to theEuropean camp.

e. At best. Western Europe will require three or four years totate of comparative preparedness sufficient to deter or meet the danger of military attack. Meanwhile, Soviet war-rcadlncss and Satellite capabilitiesincrease. It Is entirely possiblereater and longer sustained effort than the program now being blocked out will beof the U3 and its European allies.

n extensive drought In Yugoslavia, which has materially reduced agricultural production, haserious threat to the Internal stability of the Tito government.




Strategic Aftermath of the Korean Venture.

The Soviet Koreanaboratory test in the use ot non-Soviet Communist forces toocal war of limited objectives, has ended in failure. The margin by which the North Korean forces failed to overrun and occupy all South Korea was narrow, and the test would haveonspicuous success but for the Intervention of ON forces. The tactical device itself, therefore, has notbeen discredited, but if the Kremlin should employ it In the future the USSR will have to reckon with the capabilities of UN powers to Intervene effectively. Nevertheless, the prompt commitment of UN ground, sea, and air units in support of South Korea hasine beyond which Soviet-sponsored aggression cannot, in the meantime, gobeing forcefully challenged. USIn drawing this line, combined with UN action against the North Korean forces, has redounded to the credit of the UN and into the credit of the US policy ofcontainment of Soviet expansion.

Since the USSR has scrupulouslythe thin fiction of having nofor the actions of Soviet-trained, Soviet-equipped, Soviet-supplied Communist armies In Korea, the Kremlin can afford to write off the Korean venture and try to minimize the tactical defeat it has suffered. There Ishowever, to be any basic change in the normally aggressive character of Sovietand Soviet foreign policy.

a. Soviet Reaction.

In attempting to minimize or offset theeffects of the military defeat suffered by the Communist forces In Korea, the USSR probably will rely on the North Koreansto oppose UN occupation of North Korea.oviet decision to precipitate global war, the USSR is unlikely to commit its own military forces to rescue the North Koreans. Instead, the Kremlin probably will aid the

North Korean Communists to hold organized defensive positions as long as possible and then to harass UN forces by employing the time-honored tactics of guerrilla warfare,and propaganda. There has been no evidence of any breakdown In the Internalof the North Korean Communists. Their leaders have been through many years of adversity In China and Japanese-occupied Korea, and they probably will continuein one way or another for the Communist cause regardless of local defeats In Korea. The USSR probably can depend on these men to continue organized military operations in defense of North Korea as long as possible and then to try to obstruct UN occupation and pacification of the area indefinitely.resistance by military units andoperations, probably supported from Manchuria, might force advancing UNvirtually to lay waste to the country, thereby confronting any UN-sponsored regime with enormous economic reconstruction

b. Possibility of Chinese Communist

There haveumber of reports that the Chinese would openly Intervene after UN troops (as distinguished from Republic of Korea troops) crossedh Parallel. There are certainly enough Chinese Communist forces readily available in Manchuria tomilitary Interventioncale sufficient .to alter the course of events in Korea.ense, of course, the Chinese Communistshaveince forty to sixty thousand Chinese-trained troops of Korean origin have been fighting in the North Korean army and since Manchuriaajor supply source for North Korea. Further covertand supply of the North Korean army almost certainly will continue.

It Is becoming less and less likely, however, that Chinese Communist troop units will openly enter the battle under the flag of the

regime. The time has passed when Chinese Intervention would have turned the military tideomplete Communist victory to Korea. While willing to participatear-of-nerves maneuver that probably was designed to dissuade UK troops fromNorth Korea, or at least to delay UN troops long enough for the North Koreans to regroup forces andefensivethe Chinese Communists are unlikely to be willing to come to the assistance of the North Koreans at the risk of becomingin open hostilities with the US and its UN allies. The Chinese Communists cannot fail to be unaware that war with the US, at least In the absenceeneral East-West war, would be disastrous not only to China's Interests in general but also to the domestic program and stability of the Peiplng regime. Therefore they are likely to try to avoid open participation In military operations outside China's traditional boundaries. Thus, unless the USSR Is ready to precipitate global war, or unless for some reason the Peiplng leaders do not think that war with the US wouldfrom open intervention In Korea, the odds are that Communist China, like the USSR, will not openly Intervene against the UN troops In North Korea.

c. Consequences of Soviet Failure.

Whatever the course of organized fighting and guerrilla resistance in North Korea, the USSR will make strenuous efforts to recoup the prestige lostesult of the defeat of North Korean forces. The defeat mustatter of serious concern to the Kremlin, in viewhe united reaction of the non-Communist world to Communist aggression In Korea and the rapid strides towardundertaken by the US and Itshe possibility of eventual repercussions within the Satellites and the Internationalmovement resulting from aof the Kremlin's fallibility as well as of the unwillingness of the USSR to rescue one of Itsetback to thepropaganda claim of the early success of colonial liberation movements under the leadership of the Communistof tho fact that the advance of Soviet power and Influence In Asia can be challenged and repelled. It la too early to determine what the long-range effects of the Korean defeat will have on the USSR, but it is quite possible that the sacrificeatellite willoint of contention within themovement for seme time to come and may aggravate resentment of SovietIn the Communist movement

ew Phase in the Revival of the European Power-Compltx.

The rapid pace of recent events In the Far East has not, as the USSR may have hoped, diverted US attention from the fact that West-cm Europe Is the area of the world most vital to US security. The problem oftable European power-complex hasew phase, ushered in by the sense of urgency engendered by Soviet-sponsored aggression in Korea. The emphasis in the Atlanticof nations Is shifting away fromrecovery, designed primarily to meet the Internal Communist menace, and shifting toward the task of building up defensivethat can deter military aggression or sustain the Initial shock of an attack If It should come. This shift to emphasis ondesigned to protect the fruits of past economic accomplishments against the danger of foreign conquest,ost of difficult problems. Their solution is essential to US security Interests, and In the long run the most important effect of the SovietIn Korea may be that It hasew vigor to the effort to revive Western Europeower-complex and thereby redress the world balance of power.

a. NATO Rearmament. Given the basic decision of the NATthat rapid improvement inapabilities Is essential, the present problem is no longer whether or when to rearm but whether they can rearm fully and quickly enough. Impelled by events in Korea, the NAT system Is passing from the stage of Initial planning and organization to active execution of plans. The Europeans in general reacted favorably to the US (and UK) announcement of the early commitment of additional forces to Europe and to the strong US initiative shown at the recent NAT Deputies meetings

and the Foreign Ministers sessions in New York. At these sessions the NAT powers have made the far-reaching decision that, on the strictly military side at least, the defense of Western Europe is to beully uniflprf basis. The NAT countries have also agreed, at least in principle,igh PriorityProgram designed to provide anstart toward filling the most critical deficiencies in military equipment.

Under the Impact of the quick US reaction and subsequent UN successes in Korea, there hasarked improvement in Western European morale. The crucial problem ahead is whether or not the European allies of the US can sustain morale and exert effortsto establish adequate defensiveagainst the threat of militaryThere still remains among bothand peoples considerable lack ofin the ability of Western Europe to rearm adequately and simultaneously to solve the economic problems that are pressing. The European NAT members, Including the UK, are acutely conscious of how precarious is their economic stability and how large Is the need for continuing emphasis on recovery. Consequently, they do not feelosition to divert the same relative resources topurposes as the US. Despite the fact that some US estimates have indicated that the NAT countries could undertake2 billion in rearmament over the coming three-year period without any markedof living standards, the Western European nations are reluctant to undertake the drastic revision of present economic objectivesto achieve this level of defense effort. They point out that internal stability Is still asefense against Communism as adequate military defenses, and they are unwilling to assign overriding priority to the latter. The British In particular display this attitude and areajor USof financial assistance as essential to large-scale rearmament on their part.

he Economic Problem.

The reluctance of the European NATto divert substantial resources fromrecovery to defense Is largely aof doubts as to whether Europe canan intensive rearmament effort without destroying the essential economicof Western European defense.Europe's remarkable postwar economic recovery and the attainment of reasonable financial stability, it is already evident that, in the aftermath of Korea, Europe will again be plagued by Inflation and shortages ofmaterials. Moreover, the first phase of European recovery has Involved forced-draft capital investment,ostponement of appreciable increases In consumption andstandards. Now, Just when European peoples are about to reap some of the economic advantages of this program, they are faced with continued belt-tightening or perhapse-imposition of stringent economic controls. The unpleasant necessity ofrestriction of consumption levels, new tax Increases, and the postponement ofinvestment programs may require more determination and effort in the direction of containing inflationary pressures,investment programs, and in generalthe economic repercussions ofthan the Europeans are able to sustain.

c. The Needore Unified European Effort.

It appears, moreover,ore unified effort in every field ot activity is necessary if the Atlantic community is to meet the threat posed by the USSR in the shortest time and at the lowest possible cost. The search for ways to merge separate national interests in the pursuitommon objective has been an outstanding feature of the postwarscene. It has developed pragmatically In different forms and at different levels, but in general there hasradual evolutiononcept of strictly Europeanwith the US supporting but notto the ideaooser but broaderCommunity, with full US participation. Recently, as rearmament has begun to take the center of the stage, economic and political as well as military matters have been tending to merge under the umbrella of the NorthTreaty. The probable economic impact of rearmament on the national economies makes it more imperative than ever that the shock be shared and minimized. In addition.

the whole experiment of European unification lunges upon finding an effective means of utilizing German resources while preventing another upsurge of German aggression. It remains questionable whether the movementnified Western European-US effort can become sufficiently operative In time to achieve the objectives that are essential to US security.

d. German Rearmament.

The increase in the tempo of Westernpreparations for defense has made more urgent some decision on the question ofrearmament. Recreation of annational armyull-scaleindustry in West Germany has been clearly rejected by all the North Atlantic Pact (NATO) nations and the majority of thethemselves. Nevertheless, all theEuropean countries, Including France and Germany, have recognized the ultimate need for West Qcrman industrial and militaryto the common defense of Western Europe. Present French opposition relates to the timing rather than the principle ofrearmament, although the FrenchIs holdingrm decision. The French maintain that West Germanmay result In reduced cooperation on the part of the German Federal Government, revived military spirit among the German people, and Increased Soviet suspicions of the military designs of the Western allies.not "Irrevocably opposed" to German remilitarizationater date, the French advocate prior developmenttrong NATOarge NATO stockpile of munitions,irmly Integrated command structure prior to the organization and training of any German units. French opposition probably will weakenesult of pressure by the other NATO countries, particularly if the US were to guarantee both rapid delivery of arms and equipment for the expanded NATO forces now envisioned, and the creation of positive safeguards against eventual Germanof an Integrated Western force. The other NATO nations generally considerremilitarization essential to Europeanand would probably consent to any formula acceptable to France. If GermanIs eventually permitted, itwill be restricted to military units ofsize permanently assigned to the West-em defense force under NATO command, and German units would be keptixed ratio to the forces of the other participating nations. In any case, West Germany probably will be called on to furnish steel, raw materials, and finished goods not exclusivelyilitarypermitting tho other Western nations toarger proportion of their Industrial output to munitions.

Meanwhile, the Germans are increasinglyosition toigh political price for the services that they can render to Western Europe and the US. The initiative for making or breaking the progress ofEurope toward an effective defense against the USSR is passing into Perm an hands as time goes on. Increasing NAT emphasis on the necessity of securing the cooperation of German manpower and military materiel toossible Soviet advance has enabled the Ocrmans, who are determined to make the most of the opportunity, to recover anmeasure of control over their external and internal affairs. The Adenaueralready has shown indications of its use of the leverage given It by the US position and the need for German steel, to influence the course of such efforts toward European Integration as the Schuman Plan. Thus, with the prospect of Increased coal and steelas well as the removal of restrictions to meet the needs of the Western rearmament effort, the Germans no longer see the same advantages in merging their Industry with the less efficient French, Belgian, and Italian ones under the Schuman Plan.

Nevertheless, German sentiment tends to favor participationestern defense force. West Germany desires remilitarization not only for reasons of security but also for the Increased prestige and bargaining power it would gain by sharing In the common defense effort. Thus, while seeking in every way to get an equal role in the Western community, the Adenauer government Is firmly committed to the Western European camp. Iftension continues to be high, itwill Impel the Atlantic community to find


resolution of differences on the detailed character and timing of German rearmament.

e. Long-Range Prospects.

At best, Western Europe will require three or four years totate of comparative preparedness sufficient to deter or meet the danger of military attack. Meanwhile, Soviet war-readiness and Satellite capabilitiesincrease.4 tho USSR may not only have achieved more effective defenses against strategic air offensives but markedly increased strategic naval, air, and atomic capabilities of its own. It Ls difficult to foresee to whatsuch Soviet achievements may neutralize the effect of presently projected NAT defense plans, but it Ls entirely possiblereater and longer sustained effort than the program now being blocked out will be required of the US and its European allies.

3. Yugoslav Crisis.

An extensive drought in Yugoslavia, which has materially reduced agriculturalhaserious threat to thestability of the Tito government.privation and some outright starvation are inevitable before spring unless substantial amounts of grain and other foods areSince the deficit Yugoslav economy is incapable of financing required emergencythe economic crisis can be relievedonly by substantial Western aid. The already widespread hostility of theto the Tito regime is likely to increase as greater pressures are exerted by the localto meet regional food quotas. The morale of.the labor force, already low, willfurther dropsesultharp decline of living standards, which are still belowlevels. The situationhole will tend to undermine the ability and willingness of the Yugoslav people to resist hostile Soviet pressures, and the USSR will probably increase its already extensive efforts to overthrow Tito's heretical anti-Soviet Communist regime.






SUBJECT: Chinese Cortainist Intervention in Korea.

Fresh,quipped North Koroen troops have appeared in the Korean fighting, and it has been clearly established that Chinese Coraninist troops are also opposing UII forces. Fresent field estimates are that00 Chinese Communist troops organized in task force units are operating in liorth Korea while the parent units remain ir. ilanchuria. Current reports of Soviet-type jet aircraft in the Ac tang-Sinai, ju area indicate that the USS3 nay be providing at least logistic air defense forn churl nr. border. Inadio broadcast ofctober fron the emergency North Korean capital of Sinulju announcedVoluntoor Corps for the Protection of thedroelectric Zone" has been formed to protect that area from the advancing DN forces. The broadcast errphasized the importance of the Suiho hydroelectric system to the industries of Manchuria asd pointed out that Chinese People's liberation Foreo3 are concentrated along the

;;ar.ehurian side of the Suiho zone.

This pattern of events and reports indicates that Carnunist China has decided, regardless of the increased risk of generaltoincreased support and assistance to North Korean forces. Although the pcaaiciiity can not be excluded that the Chinese Co-munists, under Soviet direction, are comitting themselves to full-scale intervention


in Korea, their main motivation at present appears to be tonited "cordon ssnitalre" south cf tho Yalu Hivor. frirary objectives of the Chinese Ccczounlsts in attainting to establisho-nan's land would probably bei (a) to guarantee security of tha >ianchurian -orderKdch the Chinese have labelled as invaders;b) to insure continued flow of electric power fron the vital Suihosystem to the industries of Hanchuria. The preceding considerations, which are of direct concern to Coir-tatnist China, would also be in line with the general desire to further international Co muni sn by helping the North *oreana prolong their resistance.

The Chincso CoamnJats probably genuinely fear an invasion of flanchuria despite the clear-cat definition of UK objectives. Thoevacuation of industrial nachinery and civilian personnel fron liukden could be the consequence ofearhe possibility exists that this evacuation has been undertaken in nr. effort to anticipate possible retaliatory action by UH forcos following Chinese Cccrsinist Intervention in Korea. 'Ihe Suiho hydroelectric system, with generators located on the Korean side of the Yalu River,arge part of South llanchuria's electricity and scat of the power for the Fort Arthur naval base area. To date, the UK has made no statement regarding the distribution of Suiho power after UN forces take poaoos3ion, and Chinese Cosx-unist apprehension nay have been increased by the recent statonentouth Korean general that all power to Manchuria would be cut off.

(signed) Walter ft. Smithisp. via Spec MsgrALTER E. SMITH Director

cc: Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Chairaan, SSRB

Disraiamcfi i c to addr vias viacc: VD viaSRB viact0pntraler.


chinese communist intervention in korea



unmoral utiusi



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his copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning In accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency bywith the Office of Collection and Dissemination. CIA.


Office of the President

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Offlee of Secretary of Defense

Department of tbe Army

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Department of the Air force Atomic Energy Commission Joint Chiefs of Staff rederal Bureau of InveaUgatlDn Research and Development Board Munitions Board





The Intelligence organizations ot the Departments ot State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forcehe preparation of this estimate and concur In It This paper Is based on information available

ipprottd fob RE1EASI

mi iui;iii



L To estimate the scale and purpose of Korea and Chinese Communist capabilities Chinese Communist intervention In North and intentions.


Present Chinese Communist troop strength in North Korea is estimated0hinese Communist ground units are engaging UN forces at various points ranging fromUes south of the Korean-Manchurian border. Recent action has been marked also by the appearance of Soviet-type jet fighters in combat with US aircraft over Korea.

S. Present Chinese Communist troop strength in Manchuria is estimated. Of this number, there are ategular field forces. These troop strengths, added to the forces already In Korea, areto make the Chinese Communistsof: (a) halting further UN advance northward, through piecemeal commitment of troops; or (b) forcing UN withdrawal to defensive positions farther south by aassault.

he objective of the Chinese Communist Intervention appears to be to halt theof UN forces in Korea and toommunist regime in being on Korean soli. In accomplishing this purpose, the Chinese Communists would: (a) avert theand political consequencesisastrous outcome of the Korean venture; (b) keep UN forces away from the actual frontiers of China and the USSR; (c) retain an area in Koreaase of Communist military and guerrilla operations; (d) prolong Indefinitely the containment of UN, especially US. forces In Korea; (e) control the distribution of hydroelectric power generated in North Korea and retain other economic benefits; and (f> create the possibilityavorable political solution in Korea, despite thedefeat of the North Koreans.

The Chinese Communists thus far retain full freedom of action with respect to Korea. They are free to adjust their action Inwith the development of the situation. If the Chinese Communists were to succeed In destroying the effective strength of UN forces in northern Korea, they would pursue their advantage as far as possible. If the military situation Is stabilized, they may well consider that, with advantageous terrain and the onset of winter, their forces now In Korea are sufficient to accomplish their Immediate purposes.

A likely and logical development of the present situation is that the opposing sides will build up their combat power InIncrements to checkmate the other until forces of major magnitude are Involved. At any point in this development, the danger is present that the situation may get out of control and leadeneral war.

The Chinese Communists, In Intervening in Korea, haverave risk ofand general war. They would probably Ignore an ultimatum requiring theirIf Chinese territory were to bethey would probably enter Korea In full force.

Tbe fact that both the Chineseand the USSR have accepted anriskeneral war Indicates either that the Kremlin Is ready to face awith the West at an early date or that circumstances have forced them to accept that risk.



Actual Devolopmonl ol Intervention to Dote.

Prior to mid-October. Chinese Communist support ot the North Koreans consisted solely of logistical aid and moral support Since that time, however, the Chinese Communists have been committing troops In Increasing number so that at present UN forces are being engaged by Chinese Communist ground units In varying penetrations, ranging fromiles south of the Manchurian-Korean border.

To date, elements taken from the Chineseh,d armies of the Fourth Field Army have been identified In the combat zone of Korea. Units ofbattalion size from each division of three or more of the Chinese Communist armies along the Korean border in Manchuria have been combined to form units ofdivision size. One regular Chinese Communist division has been tentativelyPresent Chinese Communist troop strength in North Korea Is estimated0his number,with an0 North Korean troops, constitutes an over-all enemy strength0f this total,re in contact with UN forces.

The arrival of Chinese Communist ground units In the Korean fighting hasarked stiffening of North Korean resistance. The previously confused andNorth Korean units now appear to be in process of recommitment as reorganized and re-equipped combat units. There arethat Chinese Communist forces In Korea are being reinforced.

Although the nationality of the hostileInvolved In recent incidents over the Kc-rean-Manchurian border has not beenestablished, the fact that Soviet-type Jet aircraft were Involved Indicates that the North Koreans are receiving air assistance from Manchuria in addition to direct ground force support from tho Chinese Communists.

hinese Communis! Capabilities for Armed Intervention.

The over-all strength of the Chineseground forces ls estimatedf thisre well-trained and well-equipped regular field forces, and the remainder are fairly well-trained and well-equipped military district troops. Inthere areoorly-trained and poorly-equipped provincial troops.

Sincehere haseneral build-up of Chinese Communist tactical troop strength In Manchuriaoint whichnormal security needs. The movement of numerous major units from south andChina ls estimated to have broughtChinese Communist strength Into. Of this number, there are ategular field forces, comprising possibly eight to ten armies, plus elements of at least four other armies.

The Chinese Communist Air Force, not tested In combat to date, is believedombat aircraft In tactical units. Of,reight bombers,reround attack,re LA-9It is possible that the CCAFoviet-type swept-wing Jetformerly stationed in the vicinity of Shanghai, some of which are believed to have been the jet aircraft which have appeared In recent operations In Northith these ground forces and this air strength, the Chinese Communists couldmake available as manyroops withinoays for sustained groundin Korea and could provide limited air support and some armor. This could be done without jeopardizing their Internal control In Manchuria or Chlnu proper. The Chinese Communist Forces are therefore believedeither of: (a) halting further UNnorthward by matching any foreseeable


UN build-up with piecemeal commitment of forces presently along the Yalu River: or (b) forcing UN withdrawal to defensive positions further southowerful assault

hinese Communiit Motives for

The Chinese Communist decision totroops in North Korea, entailing as It does the serious risk of widening the Koreanwould not have been taken byChina without Soviet sanction or possibly direction. It must therefore be assumed that both parties consider the anticipated benefits to Justify the acceptance of the calculated risk ofeneral war in China which could eventually involve the Soviet Union, This calculated risk includes tbe possibilityeaction on the part of the US directly to meet the broader issue with the USSR rather than to allow itself to become involved in an expensive and indecisive war with Communist China.

The lmmedate occasion for Conimunist Chinese armed assistance appears to have been the crossing ofh Parallel by US forces and the consequent swift collapse of North Korean resistance. Unless the Chinese had intervened. UN forces would soon have reached and secured the Yalu River line. The Korean People's Republic would have ceased to exist exceptovernment-ln-cxlle anduerrilla movement. Confronted with this possibility, the Chinese Communists have apparently determined to prevent an early UN military victory In Korea and to keep aregime in being on Korean soli.

It Is significant that the Chineserefrained from committing troops at two earlier critical phases of the Korean war, namely when the UN held no morerecarious toehold In the Pusan perimeter and later when the UN landings were made at Inchon. The failure to act on thoseappears to Indicate that Peiplng was unwilling toerious risk of war, prior to the US crossing ofh Parallel. Since the crossing of the Parallel. Chinese Communist propaganda has Increasingly identified the Peiplng cause with the cause of the North Koreans.

The immediate objective of the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea appears to have been to halt the advance of UN forces. Chinese Communist military operations to date, Including the nature of the forcessuggest an Interim military operation with limited objectives. This view Is strengthened by consideration of theimposed on military operations byweather In this mountainous area.

In assisting the North Koreans, the Chinese Communists can derive several advantages for themselves, the Soviet Union, and world They are:

avert the psychologicalisastrous outcome ofDenture.

The prestige of the world Communistand, more particularly, the domestic and International political position of the Chinese Communist regime, are linked with the fate of the North Koreanomplete UN victory In Korea would adversely affect the power of International Communism to attract and hold adherents. For the Chinese regime Itself, the total eliminationatellite state in Korea woulderious loss of political face In China and in the world at large, most notably In the Asiatic areas that havebeen selected by the Chineseas their primary sphere of Influence.

keep UN forces away from theof China and the USSR.

The establishmentestern-oriented and US-supported regime on the south bank of the Yalu River is probably viewedhreat to the security of theregime in China. The USSR would likewise be sensitive to the advance of UN forces to the northeastern tip of Korea. The Chinese Communists apparently regard the USostile power, determined to bring about their eventual overthrow.

retain an area in Koreaasemilitary and guerrilla

The terrain of North Korea adjacent to the Manchurlan border is especially suitable forase.


prolong indefinitely theUN, especially US, forces in Korea.

Prolonged Involvement of UN and US forcea In Korea la favorable for Communist global strategy. The containment of these forces in Korea prevents their redeployment toor to other areas where they might be required to oppose Communist aggression.

control the distribution ofpower generated in North Korea andother economic benefits.

Peiplng has an immediate economic stake in the preservationriendly state south of the Talu. The hydroelectric Installations in North Korea, particularly the Suiho plant, are important sources of power for SouthThe port of Antung in Manchuria is part of an economic entity that embraces the Korean city of Stnuiju across the river; trade In the area would be hampered severely If no arrangements existed for the operation of the Antung-Sinulju portingle unit. River traffic on the Yalu and the Tumen rivers isupon workable agreements between political authorities in Manchuria and Korea.

o create the possibilityavorable political solution in Korea, despite thedefeat of the North Koreans.

It is possible that the Chinese Communists and the USSR hope toilitarythat will make the UN willing toa settlement of the Korean conflict In preferenceong drawn-out and expensive campaign.

13. Possible Developments.

The Chinese Communists thus far retain full freedom of action with respect to Korea. They are free to adjust their actions mwith the development of the situation. Their current violentaa it has on (a) the "will of the Chinese(rather than the government) to supply "people's volunteers" to aid the North Koreans and "defendnd (b) America's "use of Japanese" and "aping of Japan" In tta "aggression againstexcellently adapted for preserving maneuverability, it could mean equally: whipping up of public opinion that seems chilly toward any Koreanarteneral war ofeal Intention to organize an antl-UN military campaignpeople's volunteer" basis;sychological preparation of the Chinese people for hostilities with the US, Iforld war.

If the Chinese Communists were to succeed in destroying the effective strength of UN forces in northern Korea, the Chinesewould probably pursue thatas far as possible, bringing Infrom Manchuria to exploit the

If the military situation Is stabilized, the Chinese Communists might well consider that, with advantageous terrain and the onset of winter, their forces now in Korea are adequate toilitary decision favorable to the UN, at least until spring.ilitary deadlock would contain UN forces In Korea and expose them to attrition. It would also permit the reconstltutlon of North Korean forces and facilitate the development ofoperations behind the UN lines. In these circumstances, the possibilityolitical solution as the most convenient means of bringing the situation in Korea to awould be Increased.

A likely and logical development of the present situation Is that tho opposing sides will build up their combat power In successive Increments to checkmate the other until forces of major magnitude are Involved. At any point in this development the danger Is present that the situation may get out of control and leadeneral war.

The Chinese Communists appreciate that in Intervening in Korea they havo Incurred grave risks of retaliation and general war, but have accepted the risk. They would probablya UN ultimatum requiring theirIf Chinese territory were to bethey could and probably would enter Korea In full force, with the purpose ofUN forces altogether.

The fact that both the Chinese Communists and the USSR have accepted an Increased riskeneral war Indicates either that the Kremlin Is ready tohowdown with the West at an early date or that circumstances have forced them to accept that risk.


soviet capabilities and intentions

ublkhtd IS0





The present estimate Is an editorial adaptation of'ith certain modification* and additions to bring It up to date. The Intelligence organizations of theof State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated In the preparation of this estimate and concur In It This paper Is based on information available on




To estimate Soviet capabilities andwith particular reference to the date at which the USSR might be prepared to engageeneral war.

Soviet rulers are simultaneouslyby Marxlst-Lenmlst-Stallnlatby considerations related to thethe Soviet Unionorld power.objective is to establish aworld controlled by themselves orHowever, their Immediateall consistent with that objective, are:

a. To maintain the control of the Kremlin over the peoples of the Soviet Union.

o strengthen the economic andposition and defend the territory of the Soviet Union.

consolidate control over theand Asian satellites (IncludingChina).

make secure the strategicthe Soviet Union, and to prevent theIn Europe and Asia, of forcesof threatening the Soviet position.

eliminate US Influence InAsia.

o establish Soviet domination over Europe and Asia.

g. To weaken and disintegrate the non-Soviet world generally, especially tothe power and influence of the US.

The Soviet Union will try to pursue these Immediate objectives simultaneously. In case of conflict between one and another of these objectives, however, It may be expected that the Soviet rulers will attach greaterto the first four listed, and in that order.

as the Soviet ultimateimmutable and dynamic, the Sovietcontinue relentlessly its aggressiveon the non-Soviet world, particularlypower position of the Western nations. Consequently there Is, and will continue to be, grave danger of war between the USSR and Its satellites, on the one hand, and the US and Its allies on the other.

The Soviet rulers could achieve and are achieving the first three of their, b, and c) without risk ofIn armed conflict with the United States.

Their remaining Immediate objectives, end g) are improbable of achievement without resort to armed force, although there are still factors in thewhich might well lead the Soviet rulers to suppose that, In favorable circumstances, they might eventually achieve thesewithout the use of Soviet forces.

In pressing to achieve these latterthe Soviet rulers will inevitably Impinge upon vital Interests of the Western Powers and thus Incur the risk of Involvementeneral war through Western reaction.

In the belief that their object cannot be fully attainedeneral war with the Western Powers, the Soviet rulers mayprovokear at the time when, in their opinion, the relative strength of the USSR Is at Its maximum. It Isthateriod will exist from nowith the peak of Soviet

' ISMssumed to be the dale by which North AUanUc Treaty farces In Europe will have been built op to socb strength that they could withstand the initial ahock of Soviet attack and by which the cap between the military strength ot the Western Powers and that ofR will have begun to



The Soviet rulers ore simultaneouslyby Marxist-Lenta 1st-Stalinist doctrine and by considerations related to the position of the Soviet Unionorld power. Their ultimate objective Is to establish aworld controlled by themselves or their successors. However, their Immediateall consistent with that objective, are:

maintain the control of thethe peoples ot the Soviet Union.

strengthen the economic andposition and defend the territory ofUnion.

c To consolidate control over theand Asian satellites (includingChina).

d. To make secure the strategic approaches to the Soviet Union, and to prevent theIn Europe and Asia, of forceaof threatening the Soviet position.

t. To eliminate US influence In Europe and Asia.

establish Soviet dominationand Asia.

weaken and disintegrate theworld generally, especially tothe power and Influence of the US.

The Soviet Union will try to pursue these immediate objectives simultaneously. In case of conflict between one and another of these objectives, however, it may be expected that the Soviet rulers will attach greaterto the first four listed, and In that order.



'See alsolscuulon of political allgnrnenU and morale facton In tbe event of war.iscussion of Soviet oojecUves and proopecta tn particular coon trie*.

There ls nothing in Soviet Ideology, or in the Internal situation of the Soviet Union, which requires or precludes either deliberate resort to war or the achievement of any particular objective by any given date.

The Soviet rulers appear to believe that, provided the security of the Soviet Union can be assured, time will be on their side in the achievement of their long-term objective of world ccmmunlzation under Kremlin

The Soviet rulers have shown, however, that they are more immediately concerned with the power position of the Soviet Union than with their long-term objective. Inthey have made it clear that they will not rely solely on the operation of historical processes, but will actively and aggressively press for the realization of their aims, using


armed force. If necessary, even though serious risks may be Involved.

Soviet decision to risk general waruse of armed force In any particularand, eveneliberate resortwar, would depend on:

a. Tbe Soviet rulers' estimate of theof the particular situation Into their over-all security.

he prospects of accomplishing tbeinvolved by other means.

c. Their estimate of their chances oftheir over-all power positioneneral war.


Soviet Union has already largelyits industry for war. It nowmanufacturing and stockpilingmateriel andreatof military stocks, which enablesonly to maintain superior military

'Excludes eonBderaUon of Soviet eapabUlUes In nuclear enemy production capacities,


maintains this numerical superiority. When the Soviet rulers believe that they haveufficient quantity of atomic bombs to be seriously crippling or decisive against the Western Powers, the danger ofattack will be greatly increased. When the Soviets have attained this atomicthe US superiority In total numbers of atomic bombs will no longereterrent to the Soviet decision for war, in the samedegree as before. The extent of Soviet vulnerabilityetaliatory US attack will, however, affect Soviet calculation.

It Is impossible to state when the Soviets may estimate they have reached thisThis may occur at any time and themay become critical at any time within the next two years.

As regards other Items of scientificit Is considered that the Soviet rulers would probably be willing to assume the riskajor war at any time after the end c!.

Ground Forcei.

The military effectiveness of the Soviet Union Is being steadily increased. At present the Soviet Army comprisesineand could rapidly mobilizeore, and subsequently increase this number If required. By4 Indicatedtraining, and equipment programs will have been completed. By that date the Soviet rulers should be able to place reliance on the satellites to the extent that anproportion can be expected to fight well against hereditary enemies. The Soviet Union possesses the advantageoncentration of force on Interior lines and potentially ofthe Initiative.

The state of readiness In the NorthTreaty Organization countries is far below that of the Soviet Union. Reaction to the Korean conflict caused many of these nations to plan increases In national armed forces. Evenowever. North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries cannot achieve parity with the Soviet Union In numbers of menarms or In quantities of certain items of equipment.


Under the impetus of expected Increased aid from the United States, coupled with an increase In appropriations at home, the forces which should be available to North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries for14 are estimated tondivisions respectively.

At present the Soviet Union possesses the capability ot Initiating hostilities In Western Europe without any additional warning and invading Western Europe with an Initial force of aboutivisions at present located In East Germany and Poland, and of rapidly building this force to aboutoivlstona. In such event the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries are not at present capable ofthe overrunning of Western Europe,the United Kingdom

It Is accepted that it will be foundprogressively to build up the NorthTreaty Organization forces In Europe so that,hey will be capable ofthe Initial shock ofurprise attack.

In the Near and Middle East area, the planned Improvements In the armies ofGreece and Iran areatter of modernization rather than expansion. There Is, therefore, little military advantage from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union In opening hostilities In this area in any particular year between now

From purely an army viewpoint, if therulers are willing to Initiate, to provoke, or to accept the riskeneral war, it would be In their best Interests to do so at some time between nowith the optimum date probably being about the middle of the period.

Air Forces.

authorized military aircraftoperational units of the Soviet Airestimated to0 aircraft at thetime. While definite information isIt Is believed that the actualof the operational units may befifteen percent below theIn addition to the aircraft inunite it Is estimated thatombat aircraft In storedthe stored reserve, the combat units


The Soviet Merchant Fleet is capable of providing the lift for short range amphibious operations, and of sustaining the wartime economy of the Soviet Union, except, possibly, In the Far East.

Civil Defense.

he knowledge available indicates that neither the Soviet nor NATO blocs have yet taken effective measures of civil defensecale sufficient to cope with atomic attack.



The basic problem here considered is to estimate the courses of action that may be followed by the Soviet rulers in pursuit of their objectives as stated in paragraph 1.

It must be recognizedeneral war might occuresult of some Soviet action undertaken without deliberate intention toeneral war and even before the Soviet rulers considered themselves fully ready for it.

The Soviet rulers, while so far eschewing the direct use of their own military forces, have shown themselves willing to employ every available means short of this. Furtherin the face of Westernwill carry with it an Increasing danger of general war. Short of abandonment by the West of Its policy of resisting Communist aggression, the only circumstance that could remove that danger would be theby the Soviet Union of its policy of

On the basis of Soviet conduct andof policyhere is nothat the Soviet rulers will modify their policy of aggression. In fact, during the last year their actions have shown an apparently increasing disregard of possible WesternIn particular, the North Koreanack appears toignificant stepin the Kremlin's strategy, since, even though the Soviet rulers may have originally discounted the risk of US reaction to the North Korean move, they have persisted In their course despite actual US reactions.

The Soviet rulers can be expected totheir aggressive pressures on the power position of the Western countries. In their cholce of time, place, and method they will continue toolicy of expediency. They can be expected to continue to attempt to exploit every apparent soft spot, employing such weapons and tactics as seem best adapted to particular situations.

The Soviet rulers have shown that, while applying the rule of expediency In choosing among the possible courses of action, they will not necessarily reject such courses as carry the risk of armed conflict. Logically, they would prefer not to take action of this nature so long as they believed that they were attaining their immediate objectives without it. If, however, they came to the conclusion that they were failing to obtain these objectives by other means they would be willing to assume the risk of involving their own forces, dependent on their estimate of their chances of success both in attaining their Immediate objectives and In coping with any resultant reaction by the Western Powers. Generally, the more closely they considered their objectives related to the security of the Soviet Union the more readily would they risk involving their own military forces.

In view of the above, an estimate of the danger and imminence of war can be based onlyeview of the critical situationsand impending, together with aof Soviet alms and prospects In each case, the relative strength and state of over-allof the powers Involved, and the impact of likely Western counter-moves on Soviet planning.

In dealing with various critical situations existing and pending, Soviet rulers mayto achieve their objectives by either:

Courseshort of deliberateto general war, or,

Courseresort to general war.

T Or-fif CRET

forces In tne case of Korea. Similar employment of non-Soviet forces could beIn the following areas, although the Kremlin would have to recognize thataggression in any of them (except Tibet) would in varying degree carry risk of general war:

In Europe: Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Western Germany, and Berlin.

In Asia: Tibet, Formosa, Hong Kong, Macao, Indochina, and Burma.

Europe. Military success would bein the cases of Turkey and Greece, and questionable In the case of Yugoslavia. In Western Germany It would also be unlikely in the present state of development of the Potted Bereitschaften. The Incorporation of Berlin Is an essential step towards the Soviet aim tonified Germany subservient to the Kremlin. An attack by the Potizeiat Soviet instigation upon theoccupying forces in Berlin might wellto Soviet rulers to have prospects of local success, although the Soviet rulers would have difficulty in disavowing responsibility for such an attack unless Soviet occupation troops had been previously withdrawn from the Berlin area.

Asia. Tibet can be occupied at any time without any risk of extension of hostilities. Military success in Formosa is problematical but success could be assured against Burma, Indochina and Hong Kong, and Macao.of Burma and Indochina wouldSiam and control the major sources of rice to Asiatic countries at present outside the Soviet orbit. Slam could not then avoidunder Communist domination, andwould thus be directly threatened. Hong Kong wouldesser strategic prizehe difficulty of localizing the war would be greater than in the case of Burma and

CourseLocal aggression by Soviet armed forces).

he Soviet rulers may well consider that only against Finland and Yugoslavia could Soviet forces be used directly without grave danger of Immediately precipitating general war, and would recognize that even In those cases their use would bring general warnearer.

On Balance.

The Soviet rulers may have reason tothat they can achieve some of theirparticularly in South and Southeast Asia, through measures short ofrontier. However, the existing situation, apart from the possible effects of long-term considerations, gives them littleto hope for achievement, through these means alone, of their major objectives,those related to the rearmament of the West Including utilization of West German and Japanese military can be assumed that they will continue to exploit every opportunity for theof such means in order to retard Western defensive preparations and to weaken and divide the non-Soviet world.

A decision to employ Indirect or directaggressionocal scale will probably depend on developing circumstances,on the progress of Western defensive measures. The Soviet rulers might accept serious risk of general war in order to prevent the actual development of hostile military power on the strategic approaches to the Soviet Union. They would be particularly concerned at the recreation of West German or Japanese military power. It must bethat Soviet rulers may well regard the progressive development of the situation In Korea In the same light and may take local action accordingly.

Course Two (Deliberate Resort to General War).

Soviet rulers might, underconsider that it was todeliberately to engage in warWestern Powers. However, it isthey would be unlikely to take thisunless they were convincedmost important objectives wereIn addition, they would haveconfident, either:

of speedy neutralization of USpower; or,

of their ability toegree of control over the Eurasian land mass,the neutralization of the United King-



following countries are likely toin alignment with the Soviet Union:

Europe: Poland, EasternHungary, Rumania,probably Albania. (There Is aAlbania may cease toovietthe course of the nest few years,remains outside the Soviet bloc.)

Asia: Communist China and

In the eventajor war In Europe the European satellites may be expected to be belligerents.

In the eventar between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers, Communist China is not likely to deny to the Soviet Union any faculties or resources, and Is likely toan opportunist policy of expansion. The Slno-Soviet Treaty0 requires each party to render assistance to the other In the event of attack by Japan "or any other state which should unite with Japan directly or Indirectly in acts ofommunist China Is unlikely to forfeit the advantages of thisin present circumstances.

The political alignment of Korea willon the outcome of the present United Nations action there.

Anti-Soviet Bloc.

the event of any war between theon the one hand and the Unitedand the United States on the other, Itthat the following countrieswith their overseas possessions) willalignment against the Soviet Unionoutbreak of the war:

United States, United Kingdom,Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Ceylon.

following countries (with theirpossessions) would probably also be


aligned against the Soviet Union, but notunless the provisions of the NorthTreaty were Involved:

Prance, the Benelux countries, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Portugal.

Those countries not participating aswould be at least benevolently neutral.

India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan may well decide to maintain non-belligerent status unless directly attacked, though their attitude would be sympathetic to the Western Powers.

Treaty commitments (all subject to the provisions of the United Nations Charter) also exist between the United Kingdom and Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq.

Under the Treaty9 (which expires Inthe United Kingdom and Franceto go to the assistance of Turkey,is attacked, but Turkey Is notassist her alliesar against theThough the Turks are likely tothan submit to any major Sovietthey would not otherwisethe Western Powers In war.

The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty(which expiresermits theKingdom to station limited land andin the Suez Canal Zone. Onthe Egyptian Government,ar with the Soviet Union,favoring the Allied cause, wouldto the use of Egyptian armedpossibly in defense of EgyptianThis would not, however, affectuse of bases In Egypt.

and Jordan. Under thetreaties with Jordan and Iraq,agree to offer one anotherIn the case of Iraq, assistanceUnited Kingdom ls limited to thefacilities in Iraq territory.


the Soviet rulers have toa degree of disloyalty (which mightin war) among the mtnrtrttw inStates, the Ukraine, the Caucasus,Asia, rebellion on the part ofgroups could not be expectedpolice control had collapsed orand protection were at hand.

The European Satellites.

majority of the populations incountries are Intenselylarge proportions resent thethe Kremlin and the presentwith which they arethis attitudeource ofto the Soviet bloc, there is noto Indicate that it would givefurther successful nationalist deviationslines, nor would it produceto the Soviet war effort unlesswore going badly lor the Soviet Uniondisaffected elements were givensupport from the West.


the event of major hostilities thePeoples' Government could maintaincontrol over the general populationIn North, Central, and EastIn most of the large cities, throughpolitical and police apparatus.and Southwest China, where theapparatus la not yet fullywhereuerrillas stillactive opposition, the effective authorityChinese Peoples' Government wouldbe limited to the principal cities andcommunications and to the frontiersand Burma, leaving millionsbeyond Its control. Thiswould not endanger the regimean organized, politically coherentmovement, with outside support, werewithin tho country. There isIndication ofevelopment.

The Weitern World.

chief elements of weakness Inmoraleeneral feeling ofto resist armed attack by the(combined with an unwillingness toinvolved In another war) and the lack of unity of purpose on the part of the Western Allies. These weaknesses are enhanced by the Intellectual and emotional appeals ofCommunism; the social andunrest which Communism exploits; andeneral failure on the part of the rank and die of the Western Nations to appreciate the real conditions of lifeommunist dictatorship.

n Western Europe, the internalthreat la not serious except In France and Italy where the Communist parties have abold on the labor organizations, and. In Italy, also among the poorer peasants. The position of other Western European countries will be materially affected by that of France. In France, although the majority ofare anti-Communist, there ia afeeling of defeatism. There is, under presentonsiderableto resist If war breaks out, or to risk being compromised In the eyes ofoviet occupation which isaccepted as inevitable. Ifhowever, can be given real confidence in their ability, with the support of their allies, tooviet Invasion, this defeatism is likely to be dispelled. Defeatism has not gone so far as to affect the attitude of the French Government toward her allies. The Soviet Union Is awareeneral situation and appears In Its propaganda to the West to devote more attention to exploiting the desire for peace and attracting those elements of the population most susceptible to peace appeals than directly to expanding the Communist parties in these countries.

In Western Germany there Is generalto Communism and the Communist Party is unlikely toeriousthreat. Nevertheless. German morale Is at present low and will deteriorate stillunless Western Germans can be given confidence that either they themselves, or the Western Powers, will be enabled to defend Western Germany from attack.

In the Middle East, although Communism Is generally feared and disliked, the social structure is such that there is fertile ground


the following discussion, possibleunder Course One (Means ShortResort to General War)

Northern Europe (Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark).

The immediate Soviet aim in Northern Europe is to prevent the occupation and use of that areaase of operations against the Soviet Union. If the Soviet rulers considerederious threat were developing they wouldisk of global war if necessary to preventevelopment. Thedesideratum would be control of the entire area, thus acquiring not only itsand resources, but also complete control of the Baltic and free access to the North Atlantic

With the exception of Finland, Sovietcapabilities in Northern Europe are extremely limited. Even in Finland theappears capable of keeping Internal pressure under control. The only effective means available for accomplishing either of the alms indicated above is the overwhelming local preponderance of Soviet military power.

The coercive threat Inherent in theof overwhelming Soviet power appears sufficient. In large part, to accomplish the Immediate Soviet aim. It imposes cmecessity to cooperate with the Soviet Union (so long as Soviet demands do not require national suicide) andain consideration causing Sweden to adhereixed policy of neutrality. Although Norway andhave adhered to the North Atlantic Treaty, they would be disinclined to permit developments In their territories which the Soviet Union could regard as an offensive threat.

Conversely, the local employment of Soviet armed force for the subjugation of Northern

Europe Is Inhibited by regard for the broader consequences. Outright Soviet invasion of Finland would be resisted by the Finns to the best of their ability. Tbis action, also, might well frustrate the immediate Soviet purpose in Northern Europe by drivinginto adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty and by stimulating offensive-defensive preparations in Norway, Denmark, andAn attack on Sweden would be resisted and would also stimulate the preparations in Norway and Denmark and would involve riskeneral war, An attack on Norway or Denmark would directly Involve war with all the North Atlantic Treaty States.

Soviet rulers will continue tothe subversion of Finland bysupported by theof the Soviet Union, but are unlikelyto local military action Inunless convinced that such actionto prevent the occupation andof the areaase for operationsSoviet Union or that global war is

Western Europe (France, Benelux, Italy, Portu-aol).

Soviet alma In Western

prevent the countries offrom becoming organized Into aof presenting effective militaryto the Soviet Union, either as aor threat.

destroy or Impair WesternIn, and association with theand United Kingdom.

foster conditions favorable toof communist strength.

of deliberate resort to generalonly means at the disposal of thefor the pursuit of Its alms In Western

use of East German military forces tocontrol over Western Germany. While the Polizei Bereitshajten Is at presentinadequate toonquestthere is evidence that It Is being steadily strengthened. In the near future the Kremlin may consider thia forcestrong to be used to attack thezones, and the possibility of such ancannot therefore be excluded. Therulers would have to recognize, however, that this would Involve great risk of general war.


Apart from the aim of securing control of all Germany, an immediate Soviet objective is to secure the withdrawal of Western forces from Berlin. The Importance of this to the Kremlin lies not only In the Impetus that full possession of Berlin would be expected to give to efforts of the East German government to extend its rule over all Germany, but also In the exaggerated sensitiveness of the Soviet rulers to the presence of hostile forces in the heartoviet province.

Without the use of forceful measures, however, there appears Utile possibility that the Western position In Berlin can be made untenable. Restitutionull-scalewould under present circumstances be very embarrassing to Western authorities, but it appears doubtfulecond blockade would be risked unless tho Kremlin wereto maintain It by force If necessary. The use of East German forces for thisor for direct attack on the Westernof Berlinistinct possibility. The same great risk of general war would be involved hero as in the case of West Germany.

For both Berlin and Western Germany, the Soviet rulers must realize that theof their own forces in any sort of attack on the Western Forces of Occupation would not be possible withouteneral conflict.


Kremlin's policy with respectappears to be to continue theuntil such time as the Germansettled. It now appears highlythe Kremlin will agreeeace treatyithdrawal of occupying forces. On the other hand, there are no Indications that Increased efforts are to be made to extend Soviet control over the whole of Austriaor independently of GermanIf the Oerman situation should develop favorably for the Soviet rulers,external and Internal pressures an Austria could be expected.


The defection of Yugoslavia from the Cominform, besides isolating Albania,the Soviet Union of an Importantposition In Southeast Europe, giving direct access to the Mediterranean, and of an Important base for exerting pressure on Italy, Greece, Trieste and Western Austria. Moreover, the Soviet rulers must realize that the continued existence of the Tito heresy makes it easier for dissident elements In the communist parties of other countries tothe Kremlin's leadership.

The Soviet aim must therefore be to bring about as soon as possible the fall of Tito. The Cominform will continue to try to promote economic collapse and toowerful pio-Cominform communistwithin the country.

Soviet policy in Yugoslavia might meet with greater success if tho economicdeteriorated far enough to lead todiscontent, but at present there la no sign that any alternative communistcan be built up In sufficient strength to evict Tito andro-Cominform government The only means open to the Kremlin under present circumstances Is the use of external force. If the Kremlinthat satellite forces, with such Sovietassistance as might be required, could overrun Yugoslavia, this possibility must be reckoned with, particularly as such an attack would not necessarilyirect clash with the Western Powers. However, therulers are unlikely to consider that theforces are powerful enough at present to overrun Yugoslavia without direct SovietConsideration of the military factors shows that the military strength of


parties;ommunist sabotageparticularly in oil field and pipeline areas; instill fear of Soviet armed strength; exploit anti-Israel feeling; extend theof the Soviet Union through the Orthodox Church; and exploit dissident minorities such as Armenians and Kurds.

Soviet policy toward Israel has appeared to be more directed toward embarrassing the United States and the United Kingdom in the Middle East and promoting political chaos than toward any Immediate aggressiveIn Israel proper. The Soviet rulerswill attempt to orient Israel away from the Western Powers, in particular the United States. However, for the present they will limit their efforts to propaganda and the strengthening of Communist influence in Israel.

In neither Israel nor the Arab States can the Soviet rulers expect the above tactics to establish Communist control, although they may succeed in influencing political attitudes. At present they probably do not consider the time is yet propitious to bring to bear any other type of pressures.


SO. The primary concern of the Soviet Union with respect to Iran is to prevent thein that countryotential base of operations against the Soviet Union, withreference to the vulnerability of the vital Baku oil region. The Soviet Union'son that point Is reflected in Itsemphasis on the Soviet-Iranian Treatyhich contemplates the entry of Soviet forces In Iran If necessary tohreat to Soviet securityhird power from Iranian territory. An additional interest would be the advantage to be derived from Soviet control of Iranian oil resources with particular reference to their denial to Western use. The bulk of this oil would not beavailable for use within the Sovietunless Its transportation by sea wereSoviet domination of Iran would also permit direct access to the Indian Ocean and the Arab States,onsequent increase In the ability of the Soviet Union to undermine Western Interests in those areas.

Iran's proximity to the Soviet Union, its remoteness from potential support, and the political and economic conditions prevailing within the country all facilitate Sovietand subversion. The principal factor is the Immediate presence of overwhelming Soviet military power. Subversiveexist, locally. In Azerbaijan and Kurdish disaffection, and, nationally. In the Soviet-dominated Tudeh Party. Soviet employment of these means has met with successive checks: Soviet withdrawal from northern Iran under United Nations pressure, with theof United Nations support against any future Soviet Incursion; the Azerbaijan debacle; the outlawing of the Tudeh Party; and the emergence of the strong Razmarawhich If given prompt economic and military aid, may succeed In stabilizing the Internal situation. Nevertheless, dangerous subversive potentialities will remain,If there shouldurther deterioration of the economic situation.

A Soviet decision to solve tha problem by direct military Intervention ls not prevented by any local power of resistance;lausible political Justification for directIn Iran could probably bewithout much difficulty but the Soviets would have to reckon with longstanding UK and recently expressed US Interest In Iran, the previous UN action, and the KoreanIt could be conceivedocalonly on the calculation that It could be accomplished before any reaction could occur and that the United States, the Unitedand the United Nations would shrink from any dangerous counteraction after the fait accompli

The threat of Soviet Intervention under1 Treaty Is probably sufficient toIranian content to the development of any real threat to Soviet security In Iran;It might Induce Iranian oppositionefensive build-up of Western forces in Iran. That being the case, the Soviet Union, for the time being, will probably subject the Iranian Government to alternate intimidation and blandishment, while simultaneouslyevery subversive opportunity with the


Indian Government has' reacted strongly to Communist violence, but is disposed to tcelrate nonviolent agitation and propaganda. Itsto control Communist activity have met with some success In Industrial centers, but less In rural areas. Parts of Hyderabad, for example, are to all practical purposes under exclusive Communist control. In general, however, the previous Communist program has fallen short of expectations and the Party has been weakened by arrests, purges, anddissension. The Party is nowa new policy modeled on that of theCommunist Party.

Soviet Union will presumablyto exploit Indian susceptibilities asmay In the International field, whileto guide and promote CommunistIndiaong-term project.


Is the announced Intention of theCommunist regime to "liberate"military operations to this end areunder way. The issue may,be decided by direct negotiations,token use of military force. Anythat might be undertaken wouldlocalized.


In Burma the general Soviet object la the spread of Internal violence lo preventiableiew eventually to securing Communist domination of the country.

The principal instruments of Communism are the threat of direct or indirect Chinese Communist Intervention In support of the present activities of the Burma Communist Party.

In general, while Burma is one or theisturbed of the Southeast Asian countries, it is not soield for Communistas some of Its neighbors. There la no nationalist problem; nor Isargeminority. On the other hand, thereertain amount of agrarian discontent, and this will leave the situation precarious unless the Government's plans for agrarian reform are successful.

Recently, the Burma Communist Partyevere military and political set-


back, andesult, It is unlikely thatsubstantial aid from China, It couldthe stability of the legitimateeven though the latter is faced with many other resistance groups throughout the country.

Chinese Communist assistanceform of materiel and leadership (athe strength of theParty would be greatlyagainst this must be placed the innatebetween Chinese andantagonism might result In the lossCommunists of left-wing Socialistincluding the support of the tradewhich has been cooperatingWorld Federation of Trade Unions.In Burma are probably notto Justify direct Chinesebalance, the prospects of Communistin Burma probably seem sufficientlylead the Kremlin and Chinesenot to go beyond theirthere. Communist prospects Inbe materially improved by theof Communist control over all of


slam there Is no agrarianlittle popular sympathy foroverseas Chinese community Is theelement subject toThe situation In Slam,be decisively influenced byIndochina and Burma, If either ofwere brought under CommunistSiam would probably seek toitself to the new situation.


the Chinese People'sthe Kremlin will wish to see theUK Influence and the substitution ofParty control In Malaya. TheCommunist Partymallwhich nevertheless enjoysfrom the local Chinese to prolongoperations. Although the SovietsCommunists will aim atpopular support. It is difficulthow this policy can succeed In view of the



canisturbed Internal situation in the Philippines, but are not capable of seizing control of that country In presentChinese Communist or Soviet armed intervention on their behalf will not be feasible, short of conditions of global warfare. Formosa

Chinese Communists for theirwish to recover Formosa and theof the Islandestern base mustSoviet aim. Although the Chinesehave sufficient shipping to liftthe Invasion is bound to beto US air and sea patrols, and, atwithout Soviet naval and airoperation would be unlikely tothe Intention to takecannot be considered to have


The Soviet aim Is to dominate Korea. The Soviet rulers probably consider control of the peninsula necessary to safeguard their Pacific provinces and their Interests inAt the same time they probablythat it Is necessary if they are to succeed in their plan to neutralize and ultimately to gain control of Japan.

To date there ls Insufficient evidence to indicate that the USSR intends to commitforces overtly in Korea. However, the commitment of Chinese Communist forces, with Soviet material aid. Indicates that the USSR considers the Korean situation ofimportance to warrant the risk ofwar. The probability Is that the Soviet Union considers that the US will noteneral war over Chinese CommunistIn North Korea and the reaction thereto. The principal risk of general war Is through the exercise of Soviet initiative which the Kremlin continues to hold. TheIs that the Soviet leaders have not yetecision directly toeneral war over the Korean-Chinese situation. There

N"^sa**goorl chance that they will not In the tor-mediate future takeecision. At what point they milecision to launch awar Is not now determinable by


The Immediate objective of the SovietIn Japan will be to weaken the position of the US authorities thereiew toits usease or as an area for the development of an effective Indigenousforce.onger view, and morethe Soviet rulers must see that thewould, under Soviet control, contribute materially to strategic, economic and political domination of the Far East.

The instruments at present available to the Soviet rulers are the Japanese Communist Party, elements of the Japanese Trade Unions, the peace campaign, and subversive tactics (including the possible formation of ainhere appears no possibility that the Kremlin can hope to achieve Its aims even by any combination of these factors. Without taking into account occupation forces, the Japanese Government, which is staunchly anti-Cornmunlst, Is sufficiently strong to cope with any Internal disorders that the Communists appear capable of mounting. Moreover, the Japaneseis generally both antl-Communlst andand subversive movements wouldlittle popular support.

There are accordingly no other methods open to the Soviet rulers save Invasion of Japan.

It at any time the Soviet rulers decided that It was necessary to go beyond theirtactics, It ls unlikely that they could do

' much In the way ofoothold Insave by direct attack by their own forces (with or without Chinese CommunistThey would presumably recognize that this would entail inevitable consequenceeneral conflict.










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a result of tha intervention ofCommunist troops in Korea, the UN tactical position there has deteriorated sharply, and the USSR has regained thein its continuing world-wide power-contest with the US and its allies. Thedemonstrates that the USSR is willing to pursue the experiment In war-by-proxyonsiderable risk of vastly enlarging the area of armed conflict, Neither the beginning of the accelerated NorthTreaty rearmament program nor the new vigor shown by the UN has caused the USSR to change either its strategic objectives or Its aggressive tactics. Soviet policy continues to aim at the development and exploitation of local weaknesses on the periphery of the non-Communist world.

Despite the grave risk that Intervention in Korea would lead to retaliation andglobal war, both China and the USSR stood to gain certain Immediate advantages from It: averting the Immediate psychological and political consequences of the North Korean defeat; keeping UN forces away from the actual frontiers of China and the USSR; prolonging the commitment of UN forces in Korea; and keeping open the possibilityolitical settlement. By not formallythe objectives of their intervention, the Chinese Communists have retained full freedom of action, and, depending upon US and UN reaction, can tailor the precise nature and extent of their intervention to

The Introduction of Chinese Communist forces into Korea has confronted the UNore serious challenge than that presented by the Initial Invasion of South Korea. Nevertheless, there are definite signs that the international organization hasore effective device for curbing aggression than at any time In Its history. Although theCommunists may limit their intervention to still-to-be-defined local objectives, the grave probability existstrong UN military reaction against Chinese territory wouldthe Chinese Communists toarge-scale offensive designed to secure Korea.

The situation In Indochina remains one which the Communists can exploit without serious fear of early and effective UNBoth the military and politicalhave deterioratedritical state, but so long as the present political context of the war In Indochina continues, it Isdoubtful that the UN could agreeasis for Initiating effective military action against Ho Chi Mlnh. Containment of He's forces presently depends almost exclusively on US aid, and even with such help (short of direct ground, air, and naval support) the French probably cannot hold northernfor more than six months, nor all of Indochina for more than eighteen months.

The Chinese Communist Invasion of Tibet has aroused considerable anger andwithin the Indianasic change in India'soutlook Is not yet apparent,pressure Is undoubtedly being placed on Nehru to have him abandon his moralof Communist China. As the threat of Chinese-dominated Communism In Southeast

Note: This review has not been coordinated with the Intelligence organizations of theof State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force. The review contains Information available to CIA as of

Asia increases, prospects for suchwill improve, together with thepossibilities of Indian cooperation in curbing Communist expansion.

rench intransigence is not only prevent-ing positive international action in Indochina, but is delaying the developing defensefor Western Europe, where thelessgraver than those in Indochina.French opposition to Germanappears to be weakening, the factthat unless the NATO countries arrive at an adequate solution of the defenseWestern European skepticism as to the efficacy of the West win be so intensified as to render the entireubious

he recent Soviet overtures towardunification were designed, In part at least, to deter the West Germans fromGerman remilitarization. Although it Is conceivable that the USSR may be willing to forego the advantages of its control over East Germany In order to try to neutralize Germany through unification. It Is more likely that these Soviet overtures are merely awhich the USSR might develop seriously only If the Western rearmament program shows signs of real Implementation.



Current Patterns of Soviet Strategy.

esult ot the Intervention ot Chinese Communist troops In Korea, the UN tactical position there has deteriorated sharply, and the USSR has regained the initiative In Its continuing world-wide power-con test with the US and Its allies. Tbe Interventionthat the USSR is willing to pursue the experiment In war-by-proxy despite arisk of vastly enlarging the area of armed conflict. Chinese-Soviet propaganda and the course of action undertaken by the two powers suggest that Communist leaders believe the Western Powers are unprepared either politically or militarily to initiateagainst the USSR, and that they will avoid war with China so long as neither the USSR nor Communist China ls technically and officially in the Korean war.orm ofhowever, the USSR hasdeveloped its "peace offensive" In the UN and In other diplomatic contexts, thereby laying the foundation forimited politicalif and whenove should prove expedient. In the meantime. Soviet policy continues to aim at the exploitation of local weaknesses on the periphery of theworld without the direct use of Soviet military power.

In addition to halting the advance of UN forces In Korea, the Chinese Communists have moved to take over Tibet and are bothand supplying the Communist-ledwho are gravely threatening French control of northern Indochina. The USSR is engaged In long-range penetration programs In many areas, particularly Germany.Greece. Iran, Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines, where local military action can be precipitated when conditions permit. Neither the beginning of the accelerated North Atlantic Treaty rearmament program nor the new vigor and determination shown by the UN in recent months has caused the USSR to change either Its strategic objectives or Its aggressive tactics. Prolongation of theIn Koreaesult of ChineseInterventionrucial step in securing the Immediate Soviet aims of:ontrol over the Satellites, Including Communist China; <b) securing the strategic approaches to the USSR; and (c) preventing the establishment on the Soviet periphery of forces capable of threatening the Sovietposition.

2. Chinese Communkt Intervention In Korea.

In addition to considerations of general strategy, the USSR and Its Chinese allies were faced during the past month with the need to take Immediate action to offset or minimize the effects of the defeat of the North Korean forces and of the rapid UN advance toward the Manchurlan and Siberian borders. Inupon intervention of Chineseforces to restore the military situation and to avert the political and strategicof the threatened disaster, both the USSR and Chinareater risk of direct war with the US than was implicit in any earlier adventures. Because the USSR is in an advanced state of war-readiness, it must be assumed that the Kremlin leaders, aware of the danger of direct UN or USagainst China or the USSR, were prepared to accept any challenge given.

Both the USSR and China stood to gain certain immediate advantages fromwhich would serve to: (a) avert the Immediate psychological and politicalfor the world Communist movement of the military defeat of the North Korean forces; (b) keep UN forces away from tbefrontiers of China and the USSR; (c) provide an area In Korea from which military and guerrilla operations could be mounted;


prolong the commitment of UN forces In Korea, thus sapping both Western strength and morale and discouraging theof UN forces to Indochina, Germany, or elsewhere; and (e) keep open the possibilityolitical settlement In Korea. Thethemselves, having assumed greater risks than did the USSR, probably hoped for some compensating advantages such as greater prestige in both the Communist and non-Communist worlds, protection to the Suiho electric power Installations, and the strategic advantage of eliminating any threat of US-Chinese Nationalist military action against China from Korean bases.

By not formally announcing the objectives of their Intervention, the Chinese Communists have retained full freedom of action withto Korea, and, depending upon UN and US reaction, can tailor the precise nature and extent of their Intervention to developments.

3. ew Challengetronger UN.

By Introducing Chinese Communist forces Into Korea, the USSR and its allies havethe UNore serious challenge than that presented by the initial Invasion of South Korea. That challenge, if accepted, will expose the Western Powers In theas well as thea grave threat of global war. Some members of the UN will be much less Inclined totrong position against China than they were on the more limited and much better denned Issue ofaggression against South Korea. India, for example, advised strongly against the UN movement north ofh Parallel even before the Chinese Communists had Intervened.

Although the problem of Chinesehasew strain an the UN, there are certain very definite signs thai the international organization hasore effective device for curbing aggression than at any time rn Its history. The Generalhas taken forthright action regarding Korea and has even taken steps to prevent paralysis of UN machinery In the eventorean-type venture elsewhere. The UN,impatient with Soviethas reached the point where emphasis has shifted from seeking to win theof the USSR to determination to actdespite Soviet obstructionism This new UN determination wfll undoubtedly cause the USSR, In preparing new aggressive moves, to give more careful consideration to theof UN intervention.

Nevertheless, the Korean interventionmost serious problem for the UN. Theof the Chinese Communists and thoof their military capabilitiesa strong military reaction by the UN,air bombardment of Chineseprobablyarge-scale offensiveto drive the UN forces off theNevertheless, the UN maymeans short of military actionpersuade the Chinese Communistsfrom such an offensive and limitto local ob-


It is doubtfulN condemnation of Chinese action would either drive the USSR out of the UN or divert the Chinese Peoples Republic from Its ambition to Join the UN. On the contrary, the USSR shows everyof remaining and of doing all In Its power to prevent further strengthening of the UN and further consolidation among the non-Stalin 1st nations.

Although the growing unity within the UN may induce the USSR in the future to be more astute in applying the technique of localthe local situations In Indochina and In other vulnerable areas contain elements which the USSR can probably exploit while still avoiding effective UN counteraction.

4. Criili In Indochina.

In northern Indochina the forces of Ho Chi Minh haveimited offensive In the Chinese border regions with tho apparent objective of opening supply lines to China. Improvement ot transport facilities on the Chinese side of the border foreshadows an early Improvement In He's logistical positionubsequent offensive (probably within six months) against the French forces now


deployed In the papulous Red River Delta area around the northern capital of Hanoi

The deteriorating French military position has aggravated the political crisis InThe Vietnamese Premier, whohas acquiesced to French policy, has apparently expressed the views of even the moderate Vietnamese In publicly denouncing the French position In currentpolitical negotiations.

If the Indochina problem were to be taken to the UN In the present political context,and helpful action by the UN would be extremely difficult. So long as the Chinese Communists have not given convincingof overt intervention, so long as the external appearance Ls one of Europeanpower fighting revolutionary nativeand so long as the anti-Communist native government Is at odds with the French, it Is extremely doubtful that the UN could agreeasis for Initiating effectiveaction against Ho Chi Minh. Until the civil as well as the military problem ofls submitted to the UN, and Indochina becomes, like Korea,rustIt Is Improbable that the UN can take effective action.

Although some Frenchmen now favor throwing the entire Indochlnese problem Into the UN, It Is unlikely that. In the absence of Intense pressure from other Western Powers and further deterioration of the Frenchthe French Assembly would acceptolution. The containment of the Ho Chi Minh forces at this Juncture depends,almost exclusively on unilateralontinuation of the present political situation In Indochina, even with US aid (short of direct ground, air. and navalt is doubtful that tbe French can hold northern Indochina for more than six months, nor all of Indochina for more than eighteen months. The mounting threat of deeper US Involvement In Korea, however, may well force both the French and the UN to seek an early political solution. One recent development which may contribute toward the solution of the Indochina problem Is thein India with the aims andof China.

eterioration of Indian-Chinese Communist Relations.

Concurrent with their operations in North Korea, Chinese Communist forces InChina have apparentlyestward movement toward the Tibetan capital. This well-advertised advance makes It clear that the Peiplng government Is determined toIts control over the province, with oregotiated settlement. Inthat objective, the Chinese Communists have not been, nor will be, deterred by Indian entreaties to refrainilitary

China's conduct regarding Tibet has aroused considerable anger and resentment within the Indian Government. Recentreferences to the Indian borderof Nepal and Slkklm, China'samong the tribes of northern Burma, and increasing Chinese support for the Ho Chi Minh cause in Indochinaurther potential challenge to Indian securityand should produce further misgivings about the wisdom of retaining friendshipPeiplng as one of the central features of Indian foreign policy. Nevertheless, Nehru himself Is still the prime mover In external affairs, and the underlying considerationsIn his China policy (the need to get along with India's most powerful neighbor, the belief In the Peiplng regimeegitimate expression of Asiatic nationalism, and tbe fear of global war) continue toowerful Influence on Indian thinking.It ls not yet clear that any basic change in India's International outlook will take place In the Immediate future,pressure la undoubtedly being placed on Nehru to abandon his moral support ofChina. As the threat of Communist expansion into Southeast Asia with Chinese support and instigation Is intensified, the pressure for abandonment of China willIt is already apparent that someleaders are worried about Indochina and Burma, and positive assistance from India in curbing Chinese-dominated Communistinto those two countries must be recognizedefinite possibility.

6. Western Europeon Defense Problems.

Mot only has France's unwillingness to give up its prerogatives thus far prevented positive international action in Indochina, but French intransigence is delaying the developingprogram for Western Europe, where thelesspotentially graver than those in Indochina. In an attempt to preserve Its life, the present French Government has attached conditions to German remilitarization which are largely unacceptable to the other NATO countries. However, French opposition appears to be weakening, and, If the NATO countriesto their position. It Is almost certain that NATO can develop some satisfactoryformula which, In the face ofthe French would be obliged to accept. Indeed, unless the NATO countries arrive at an adequate solution of the defense problem, Western European skepticism as to the efficacy of the West would be so Intensified as tothe whole defenseubious enterprise.

Present French Intransigence over German rearmament also has adversely affected the ability of the Adenauer Government to secure parliamentary support for providing West German unitsuropean defense force. Already obliged to defend Itself againstand Protestant attack, the Adenauer Government not only would find It politically Impossible to accept the present Frenchbut Its ability to contribute forces to any European Army Is being sapped by the continuing debate and uncertainty regarding the method. Nevertheless, given an earlysolution permitting German entry on an equitable basts, the West Oermans can be expected to contributeuropean force.

Underlying all the discussion of thedefense problem Is the fundamentalwhich has existed since the program was conceived: will the continental NATObe willing and able to bring aboutInternal unity and to make sufficient economic sacrifices to contribute to thedefense forces the necessary enthusiasm, equipment, and manpower to make that force an effective deterrent to CommunistComplicating the entire program, at least on the continent, Is the vicious circle which has been set up: the rearmament and defense program cannot be carried outunless the Individual West European believes In It and supports It, yet the West European will not extend his full supportIt Is demonstrated to him that thewill be effective.

7. oviet Counter-Thrust at Germany.

Tho dilemma of the West European citizen was posed directly by the USSR to thewhen the Foreign Blinlsters of thecountries under the guidanceeclaration in Prague calling for German unityeace treaty. Thein effect told the Germans that by supporting Western rearmament they might Involve themselvesar, but by staying out of the Western camp they would achieve the unification of Germany.

Whether the declaration and theformal Soviet demarche callingFM meeting on Germany will succeed inGerman differences and thus deter the Adenauer Government cannot yet benor can it be stated definitely that this Soviet proposal was not intendederious overture to the West. It Isthat the USSR is genuinely frightened at the prospect of Western rearmament and at the new firmness of the non-StallnlstIn dealing with Soviet expansion. The USSR may, therefore, be willing to forego the advantages of Its control over East Germany (for example, unhampered furtherof the uranium deposits) and agree to German unification If such la the Soviet Intent, It Is so only because the USSR hopes to neutralise Germany by adding EastCommunist and Protestant strength to the already substantial antl-remilltarlzation sentiment In West Germany.

Tho probability Is, however, that the Prague declarationambit which can be further developed If the Western program shows signs of real Implementation. Since the Soviets are well aware of the hazards which the West-em program must surmount before anfighting force can be created, it Is doubtful that the USSR at this stage hasGerman unification with anyseriousness.





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o re-estimate the scale and purpose of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea.


Chinese Communists will

a. Maintain Chinese-North Korean holding operations In North Korea.

aintain or Increase their military strength In Manchuria.

c. Seek to obtain ON withdrawal fromby Intimidation and diplomatic means.

case of failure to obtain UNthese means, there will be IncreasingIntervention In Korea. At aChinese will conduct, on anunacknowledged operations designedUN forces In Korea, to subjectprolonged attrition, and toorth Korean state Inevidence Is not conclusive asor not the Chinese Communistsyet committedull-scale offensiveEventually they may undertakedesigned to bring about the withdrawal of UN forces from Korea. It Is estimated that they do not have the military capability of driving the UN forces from the peninsula, but that they do have the capability of forcing them to withdraw to defensive positions for prolonged and inconclusive operations, which, the Communists might calculate, would lead to eventual UN withdrawal from Korea.

So long as Chinese intervention continues, the USSR will continue and possibly Increase Its support to the Chinese by furnishingplanes, technical advisers, and"volunteers" as necessary to man the more intricate equipment.

The riskeneral war will develop already exists. The Soviet rulers maythis possibility but they appear to have allowed for It and to feel prepared to cope with It.


The immediate situation with regard to Chinese intervention In Korea is as follows:

military activity of ChineseKorea so far is not In itself sufficientthe existencelan foroperations.

preparations being carriedManchuria and elsewhere in China arescale sufficient to support majorprolonged duration, either offensivelyor defensively in Manchuria.

opinion In China,in circles close to Party leadership,to reflect expectations of hostilities,expectations of extensive airChinese, particularly Manchurlan cities.

the Chinese Governmentpropaganda has thus farChinese Governmentpecific lineIn Korea. Discussion ofsupport of Korea has been only In"volunteer" action.

propagandists for the pasthave been carrying on ancentering on the charge thataction in Korea is an attack aimedand have called for all-out sacrificesand defeat this threat throughthe Koreanub-theme ofhas been American Impotence Inwith China.

has been no suggestion inor official statements thatsupport of North Korea has asuch as protecting poweruffer zone on the border,the UN forces back tohIn fact, none of these objectives hasby the Chinese. All Chinesehave been in terms of thebringingithdrawal of foreign forces from Korea.

p. The Chinese decision to send ato the UN has been announced Inanner as to give no conclusive Indication of Chinese intentions with regard to Korea. The delegation has been reported to be willing toiplomatic settlement on Korea so long as It is arranged outside the SecurityNo terms have been suggested, and there are as yet no Indications that the Chinese would accept less than the withdrawal oftroops from Korea.

h The Soviet press has reported withChinese support of North Korea.official statements and Soviet propaganda have Identified the struggle of the Northwith the Communist cause generally. However, neither source indicated that the USSR Is In any way committed to any specific line of action beyond mora) support of North Korea and of China.

hile there Is no reliable Intelligencethe rolo that the Soviet Union has played in decisions reached by Chinese leaders in regard to Korea, Chinese intervention in Korea furthers Soviet objectives. Although the USSR has made no open commitment to support the Chinese, planes drawn from the Soviet air force have been observed innumbers In Manchuria and over Korea. Soviet propaganda has recently calledto Soviet obligations under the Sitreaty to support China In case ofby Japan or by any power directly orassociated with Japan. Sovietand propaganda have recently stressed alleged US use of Japanese troops in Korea and US preparations to use Japanase for aggression.


Indications of Chinese Caamunlst Intervention0

(As reported and evaluated In CIA DailySn-lai's threat to Chicoaato intervene with troops In Korea, "if" UK-US forces crossparallel, but not to intervene "if" only South Koreans crossso Chou En-lai reportedly told Indian Ambassador InCIA connectedCT0BZ3,

Dally Suwaary) that while Chicom has "long" had the ndlitary capabilities, they will "not" intervene "if, as now seems likely, they anticipate that war with the UN nations would result." CIA, furthermore, questioned reliability and accuracy of Indian report,plant" to influence US-UK policy. CTOBSa, no credence was attached to Indian report by US aabaasy Moscownstead. Kirk "speculated"

* Copies of this publication are available in OGB Top Secret Control.



that Chou Sn-lai statement "mayast-ainute attempt" to provoke fear In India (not explained). CTOBSi, State Departaent Washington "felt" that Chicoe statements (like Cfcou cn-lai's) "can only be designed tc dissuade US members from supporting firm UN action." Thus (Stateanchuria is already an "important" training and logistical base fororean troops who have already been trainod there by the Chine3ej and "the only question" is "the extent" of Chinese intervention in Korea. IA (in rteeJcly Summary) commented more strongly (than in telly Summaryow saying that Chou Sn-lai's statement wasbluff".

Chou En-lai's statement was sisQlarly cisccunted by

(CIA DallyCTOBER) that "Chinese were evidently prepared to make equivocal statements to pleas* thend that Eicon's present "obligations" (notand its "supply and econeerlc situation" was too "difficult" for them to go through with intervention. CIA again commentedCTOBER) that Chicoa'a threats to intervene ara "probably designed" to deter UN-US forces from goingh parallel.

Yalu River (Suiho) hydroelectric plants areotential source of conflict between Korea, Chicon, and Soviet interests, so US aabaaay MoscowIA fail? Suraaary). No content by CIA, which presumably thereby accepted this as evidenceivisive trend in Soviet-Sino relations that would be of future advantage to the West.

has sent six divisions into (torth Korea, so it was clat-ned by official Nationalist report fron Taiwan. Mentioned in passing (in CIA Dally 3ur=aary,n connection with astatement by Mao Tse-inng which nationalists were challenging, no CIA comment on Chicoa troop movements. These Ifaticnalist reports were not mentioned at all in the CIA Weekly Suaroary that was issued the aame day.

Similarly, ondivisions" of "unidentified troops, presuswd to be Chineseave bean reported to have crossed the Kanchurlan border into Korea, I

CIACTOBeK, Dailyithout


citing nature of sources, that thera have been "numerous7 during recent weeks" of four Chicora units (variously called "araies" andctually in Korea, but discounted this latest report because it "nay" berepetition" of earlier reports. In any case "CIA continues to believe" that Chicom, "while continuing to assist the North Koreans," willot intervene openly." CTOBEa, Daily Summary).

Similarly onCTOBER CIA Dally Summary mentions report that Chicoa has "decided" to intervene;0 Chicom troops are reported to have moved to Korean border, alerted to crossctober or two daysnd that Chicom-ccntrolled Central Air Transport Corporation has recently bad an "urgent and unexpected air operations conference" in Peiplng. These reports carae originally to US Military Liaison Officer in Hongkong,eport attributed by hin to an official of that Chicom corporation. CIA's comment,ctober, was that while Chicom hasto intervene, "the optimum time for such action hasnotnd that Chicom and USSR areilling to assume the increased riskhird World War which would result fron direct Chinese Communist intervention in Korea." On the same dey Korean situation was omitted entirely from the CIA Weekly Surgery (see

No further items on Korean situation in CIA Daily Summery7or any mention in next Weekly Summary

Onhe CIA Dally Snnrcary resumed reporting on Chicom

* If there were earlier "numerous reports'1 with any credibility at all, they had not been cited up to this tiae.



plana in Korea, this tiae (for the first time) quoting reports front*decision against intervention was

made (so the reportsin earlyonference in Peiping attended by Chicoo, USSR, and North Korean leaders, calling for thewithdrawal" of North Korean "main" forces to Manchuria, "if" they cannot resist UN crossingh parallel;uerrilla operations in Korea by the "balance" of the forces. One of the two CIA sources did say, however, that Chicom units had already been in North Korea for sow tine, but that "tho bulk" of these units had already beeneaving only skeleton forces in order to create an impression" of strength, in order to. intelligence. dA, commenting cn thesectober) "concurred" with these indications of alleged Soviet and Chicoa non-interventionnd acknowledged that the report of "skeleton" Chicom forces is "consistent withfield reports thus far received on Chinese Coanunistin the Korean fighting," This conment ofctober and the alleged non-intervention conference decision, were not repeated in ths next CIA Weekly Summary,

As ofhree Chicom divisions "are now inccording. 8th Artsy interrogations of ten Chicom PCW'e. CIA's conraent (in Daily Sumaary,ctober) is similar to those in preceding days and weeks: "CIA continues to believe that direct Chinese Coamunist intervention in Korea is unlikely at this time." Commenting skeptically on POM reports, CIA asserts that "the presence" of Chicom units in Korea "has not been confirmed" (but seeIA questioned theof reports of FOW "privates" as not being in position to know; and

CIA questioned, further, whether these Chicomere not sent to Worth Korea to "plant" misleading reports in the "hope of slowing the ITfl advance." (The rdlitary indications based on these FCW reports were not

OnCTOBER, consenting further (DallyIA acknowledged

that there were Chicom units "along the Manehurian-Korean border" which "may" (that is, presumably in the future) be moved across the border tocordon sanitaire" around the Suiho hydroelectric plants and other nearby installations that were, in CIA Judgment, "essential to the Kanchurian economy." (This "defensive" economic motive for limitedas against any larger "offensive" political motive of USSR and Chacon for intervening, is again expressed by CIA in the Weekly Summary)

Onhicom troops again were reported to be in North Korea, this time in an "estimate" made. 6th Armynd the troops are said to have entered Korea "on or aboutctober." (CIA Daily Summary,. Although the infer3*tion is "sketchy" (the 6th Armywo Chicom regiments "may be engaged" (at that very moment) in the 8th Army's combat sector; and whether they areChicom units or integrated with North Korean units is not known (so the 8th Army reports). CIA acknowledged that "there probably are small numbers" of Chicom troops in Korea, but CIA adheres to its prior position, that "CIA does not believe" that their appearance "indicates that the Chinese Communists intend to intervene directly or openly in the Korean war." (No mention of this further Bth Army estimate is included in the next CIA weekly)

As0 (CIA tellyt is reported that Chlcoa

allegedly had made its "decision" to "participate" in the Korean war as long ago asonference of "top Sino-Soviethat the "formal" decision to intervene was madectober,eeting presided over by Mao Tse-tung; and thathicon "armies" ara "now"ovember) in Manchuria. So it was reported /not by Chinese Nationalists, 1

cismeports. Ihue, CIA acknowledged that there were "considerable troop movements (on the basis of reports received by CIA from "US"

/unexplained/ representatives in London and Rangoon, and from "CIA"

sources innd said that these troop movements have been occurring "for several months". CIA interpreted the Sino-Soviet conference decision of August as beingl>quiteecisiono increase Chicom logistical support to North Korea,o plan large-scale "defensive" preparations by Chicom "in anticipation of possible UNfor this increased military /that is, logistical7ut

the thirdo enter the Korean war with "open large-scales "notIA concluded. (CIA Daily Summary,

2) Similarly, the next day, on'3 NOVEMBER, in the Weekly

Summary, the probability of Chicom intervention continued to be discounted.

No comment (or reports) at all on the Korean situation in the Daily Summary. Similarly, nothing was Motioned in the Daily Summary

IA summarized the positive military indications

of actual Chicora intervention as follows (presneted now without ClA comment, presumably because CIA had accepted reports both as reliable evidence and as valid indications): 0 Chicon troops are now "engaging" US forces in northwest 3ector of Koraa, and Chicon force of "about divisional strength" are in northeast sector (reports from US Embassyotal ofChicom troops are engaged (frora military "field ak aircraft wereovomher, "which could only have come frora Manchurian fields" (from "USeports"). (CIA Daily)

JVSHBEa, CIA Daily Summary included no further reports on actual intervention (presumably because by then intervention was an accomplished fact?). As to motives for Chicom intervention, CIA quoted (without comment) Yugoslav UN representative (Eebler) as being "convinced" that Chieoms "fear" that Yalu hydroeleatrio works arehat UN forcesgenuine threat" to Manchuria;at UN and US should give "assurances" on these points in order "to reduce Chinese CommunistCIA Daily) This point of view in favor ofdefensive" motives appears again, apparently with CIAbut without specific reference to Yugoslav reports,eneral commsnt in the next CIA Weekly Summary,

CIA laily Sumaary). Skepticism is expressed, by US Embassy Seoul (repeated without consent byhat recent Chicom moves into Korea are really "intervention". hieom's "failure" to follow up earlier nilitary successes "mayodification in any plsns they night have had for all-cuthicom participation to date "cannot be regarded either as direct, open intervention

orontinuous effort." In the same vein, CIA quotes various military indications approvingly: decrease" in Chicom's "vehicle" traffic on the nightovember; and "no solid contact" so far by 8th Army with Chicom forces. (See also CIA Weekly Sumaary for sameovember^ in which CIA concludes that Chicom's participation in Korea ia ofimited extent.")

Nothing included on Korean situation (in CIA Daily Summary)eport on Australia's apprehensions. Its Prime Minister is said to have urged "military caution" in dealing with what he calls Hanchurian "bordernd he suggests "temporarily" ignoring these Chicompending clarification of Chinese Comrxinist objectives, which may or may not be limited in scope."

Ill andothing on Chicom intentions in Korea included in CIA Daily Summaries.

n CIA Daily Summary, with respect to Chicon motives: Chicoa havinj intervened in Korea at this "late" date "may"SSR desire "to salvage something inatherhicom "intention to plunge Chinalobal war with" it was concluded by US Shbassy Moscow. Although Soviet propaganda treatment of intervention "may reflect an ominous SovietS Bhbasey Moseow concedes, the evidence is not sufficient that Chicom is "inviting war with the US and thaince the Soviet press emphasizes that Chicom intervention is "limited" to Chinese Communistnd since no Soviet "volunteers" have so far been mentioned in the Soviet press. No comment on this State Department report by CIA, presumably because it is not inconsistenturrent CIA and IAC-coordinated estimates.

0 (in CIA Daily Summary),

Chicompeaceful settlement of the Koreano it was reported

At the same time,

Chicom military moves arelexible nature, designed for probing and for limited purposesnd the "Kremlin" willllow present activities to developeneral war." (Ibid.) Neither of these reports was commented on by CIA, in the above Dally Summary; but in the Weekly of the sameIA has concluded that Chicom did not seen "ready" to "withdraw" from Korea, and that their military tactics were "defensive."

IB0 (CIA Dally Summary). British have justcompromise" proposal to US, callingdemilitarized zone" in North Korea, to be controlledN body, "with Chinese Communist This wouldhe British argue, Chicom "anxieties concerning UN aggressive Intentanchuria." The British doubt, furthermore, whether MacArthur has "sufficient forces" to drive to North Korea and maintain his position there "without striking at Manchurian air targets."

0 (CIA Daily Summary). Chicom intentions areby CIAj while intervention so far has beenimitedIA sayo, Chicom'a military and psychological preparations for "full-scale war continue" within China; and Chicom's "present" military objective (oro "contain" (that is defensively) UN forces in Korea "through theo keep Chicomositionflexible for either withdrawal or full-scale commitment at a


On samen CIA Daily Summary, regarding thequestion as to hoy "genuine" Chicoa's "fears" aren rtanchuria,abaasy Moscow warns that "to thehicoa officials "may be convinced that the US will not invadend that if such assurances byare made, 3iicom "may be encouraged in their aggressive actions."

Nothing on Chicom Intervention in North Korea included in the Sally ^im.'iiorynd 2li November when full-scale intervention was imminent or actually occurring. In the Weekly Summary forovember, however, Chicom's "ultimate" objectives are estimated by ClA aswhile its immediate military objectives are regardedoidint" operation to "defend" northwest hydroelectric area and northeast Manchurian bordare.

nd nothing on Korea Included in CIA Dally Summary.

0 (CIA Dally Sumnary): Chicom'a military operations in Korea are now labelled asn the paragraph heading. US Embassy Seoul, quoting "local military circles"allsurrent attacks "of such power and intensity as toeneral offensive rathereries of counterattacks aa first (rfhether CIA ormbassy Seoul had been "presuming" the latter conclusion is not clear In the text.) f thenemy troops now "in the line" are Chinese troops, the 8th Army said.


Mo mention of Korea included in CIA Daily Summary.

(CIA Daily Summary) Ps to the original timingof Chicom intervention, the US representative tc the UHjust "passed on" to the British and French (to their delegates in

thehat is apparently the considered conclusion of US intelligence (frcm an unidentified post-facto estimate, not previously cited in CIA Weekly or Daily Summaries up to this date)the conclusion that "the Chinese Cotnmunist offensive had been prepared and was actually in motion when the UN offensive ^at Inchon inasnd (Crosshe British and French "were visibly impressed".

Chicom leaders had made their intervention decisionccordingress dispatch by an unidentified Bombay journalist, reportedly suppressed by Indian Governnent and byritish news agency." Chicom plans had includedillion of Chicom's "finest troops" he said; Chicom was "fully prepared to face anyand they had received USSR assurances of assistance if they suffered "reverses or defeat." Earlier, in "October" (according to the sane Indianhicom and USSR hadsecret agreement" calling (among other things) for eventual Chicca intervention in Korea.

Ho comment by CIA. (CIA Daily Sumaary.)


(CIA Daily Summary). Chou En-lai is said to have

that Chicoa "has made Itself ready"rd World War, which he says is "inevitable" aa long as "neither UN nor Chicoin forces are willing to leave China."

0 (CIA Daily Summary). Chi com'a forces "intend to occupy all Korea unleas prevented by force," the US Embassy Taipei was

(net by Chinats,


"fully expected the US" tc bonb targets in Kanchuria andthe Chinese intervention in Korea could no longer befear of bombardment was "the important reason" why Chicomlong as possible,"Ho comment

by CIA.

imyaa ni muase



cnt of Chinese in CIA 'ai "Weekly0 (prepared by Historical Staff,

10 (p. U)

USSR and CHICOM accusations against US "nay actually be" propaganda build-uo for CHICOM military aggression in Korea. (This estimate was

reversedee items below.)

80 (p. 7)

CIA admits that there are "numerous reports" of "readily available" former Korean veteransn Manchuria, but "discounts" reports because those troops have not, in fact, thus far appeared in "combat areas:" "if"rained reserve had existed onune, they would have been committed by CHICOM long before now, when the use of "inexperienced" troop reinforcements by North Korea has been so common.

North Korea's replacements are estimated to be available in the following order of probability: on-veteran Koreans in Manchuria and Communistuntrained Chinese Communist or Soviet manpowerlowest priority) "Chinese Communist or Soviet militaryif" intervention ia decided. Elsewhere, CIA predicts that "another large scale forth Korean effort will probably develop In the nearut CHXCOK forces are not specifically mentioned in this context.

0 (p. 1)

CIA doubts that CHICOM intervention would occur. While UN amphibious landing in Korea has "focussed attention"ossible commitment of

CHICOM forces, the "continued Soviet reluctance to expand the Koreanas well as various political disadvantages, appear to precludeevelopment." Elsewheren the sane4 notes "numerous reports" of CKICOH "troop movements inut regards intervention as "unlikely:" "cogent political and military considerations make it unlikely that Chinese Communist forces will be directly and openly committed in Korea." USSR strategy, according to CIA, is to avoid "general war" and to rely on "indigenous 'liberation' forces assisted, but not to the point of overt intarvsntion, by neighboring Communist regimes," ChTCOH intervention is unlikely for further reason that intervention would "strain rather than solidify the Chinese-Sovietecause (CIA says) the Chinese would place demands on USSR for military aid in addition to material aid. Furthermore, CHTCOK would fearntervention" because that step would "invite retaliation against China by UNeanwhile, USS^ and CHICOM will use threat of "direct Intervention"ropaganda weapon (only) "to exploit Western fears of thisIA concludes,


After UN landing at Inchon, CHTCOK and/or USSR intervention in Korea remainIA says "disadvantages" to USSR outweigh advantages of CHICOM and/or Soviet intervention; USSR is likely to "write off" Korean venture, and continue its present "hands-off policy, rather thano employ Soviet or CHICOM troopsoiplomatic settlement. Intervention "would force the USSR to disavow its previous stand regarding the Koreanndven further

weaken the current Soviet peace offensive" An "even moreeason for non-intervention is that intervention would "substantiallythe risk of global war"nd it would Invite UN air attacks on "Chinese and Manchuriae supply routes, and possibly industrial installations." USSR will "probably" avoid risk of damage to "this segment of the Communist Far EasternIA says, "unless It intended tc initiate general war in the immediate future." CIA's estimate ends with the assumption (apparently fully accepted, p.f the imminent "collapse" of the North Korean effort, and it goes on to discuss the resulting "reconstruction problems" that will face "the victorious Republic."


CIA's summaries on the Korean situationre limited to the military situation: the "lessening" of North Korean resistance; the withdrawal north ofh parallel; and the expectation of North Korea's "final" defensive effort, for which its troops are now beingto the north. CIA by now no longer makBs any mention at all of the possibility of CHICOM intervention, except to note (in.hat "the world still waitedor some firm indication of the 3teps the USSR would take to keep control of North Korea."


CIA re^arda CHICOM or USSR intervention as even "less" likely than before, as indioated by "continued failure of the USSR to react violently" to the "UN endorsement of the Western position on Korea" (p. 1, ElsewhereIA assumes the "defeat" of the North Korean

ConBranist regime and theof that area to Soviet control; end predicts that1 probably be reluctant to attempt another Korean-type venture in the near future." CIA concludes that the possibility of Soviet or CHICOM Interventionto diminish" (p.nd again onnd thatas temporarily, at least, written off Korea."

Chouhreats to intervene (declered to Indian Ambassador at Peiplng) areast-ditch attempt to intimidate theis recent remarks hinting at intervention "are in fact estimated toless drastic actions"hich would take the form (CIA says) of being "probably" limited to "support of North Korean guerrillas and sanctuary for North Korean leaders" His implied threat tois "probably" an attempt to "bluff" the UN into not crossingh parallel, "ratherorewarning of ChineseCIA concluded


North Korea will "continue" to resist "as long asin splta of" recent OH ultimatum, and they can depend on "material" aid (that is, supplies, bases, sanctuary, and guerrilla support) fromnd CHICOM, CIA concludes; but "direct Chinese or Soviet ^military/ intervention" is "unlikely" (p.hlghllghta"). This conclusion was qualified elsewhere, however mm Korean units "nay still be transferred" from Chinese armies to North Korea; and CHICOM "may" sendew Chinese troops" across the Talu Siver to protect its bridges and the hydroelectric plant at Suiho. In any case. North Korna's "entire" force "lacks the strength and experience" to continue "prolonged" organised resistance,



Korean situation omitted entirely, both from "highlights" (o,nd from the detailed area ccramentsxcept that Korea's "reconstruction problems" (following expected South Korean victory) are mentioned by CIA as being discussed in the UN


Again, the Korean situation is emitted entirely from both the(p.nd the "Far Eastern" sectionxcept that (incidentally, underndia is said to be "angered" at its "embarrassment" that CHICOM has "failed" to fulfill "lt3 avowed intention" to "resist" UN-US crossing ofh parallel. Meanwhile, CHICOM's announcement "hinting" at intervention (not now in Korea, which is not mentioned at all, but ins "discounted" by CIA.


North Korean resistance i3 now "suddenlyhus posing "gravest threat" to US security, CIA concludes; but probability of CHICOM intervention is again discounted Thus, while "the possibility cannot be excluded" that CHICOMS are "gradually committing themselves to full-scaleIA regards that their "main objectives" are touffer area or "cordon sanitaire" sooth of Talu, in order to guarantee Kanchurian border, and to protect the Suiho hydroelectric system. Civil-defense indications in Mukdenvacuation of industrial machinery, civilian evacuation, and air-raid precautions) all "indicate" that CHICOM expects UN "retaliatory action" for CHICCM's "activities" in Korea


After "new turn inith CHICOM troops now "committed" to North Korea, CIA reports that Korean fighting istemporary lull"nd CIA. concludes that CHICOM participation is ofimitedp.gain on This situation "may" indicate, CIA estimates, that CHICOM "merely"o halt UN militarytoommunist regime on Koreano "hope to achieve some kind of political solution." (pp. CHIC CM operations are "apparently restricted" todefensive line along the Manchurian border" CIA warns, however (p.hat CHICOM "retains full freedom ofnd that "with forces available inHTCOMS are "capable of committing more troops in an attempt toN victory in northern Korea." "At any point in thisIA warns, the "danger ia present that the situation may set out of control and leadenoral war" CIA predicts {p.hat "every effort will be made" by UN powers to localize CHICOM operationsuch ae "assurances" (a) that the UN has "no intention" of crossing the Manchurian border, and (b) that CHICOM interests in tha Salu hydroelectric plants will be "protected"


CHICOM military and political moves give "little indication" that ClilCOM is "ready" to "withdraw" from Korea orpolitical solution" Horth Korean military tactics appear to be "defensive"nd their military pressures have "definitely slackened." Yet CIA reports the "possible" presence of two additional Chinese armies in the northeast sector Other indications that CHICOM is "not" planning

an "earlyrom Korea are reported by CIA: air-raidin Mukden area; propaganda blasts against UN; and "expanding" CHICOM intervention in Korea (not explained). ChTCOH still retains "full freedorj ofIA concludes, to take following alternatives: (l) to prolong the present militaryo increase its military effort to drive UN backh parallel, or "possibly" out of Korea entirely;even" to "withdraw" from Korea or to reduce scale of its interventionminimum"


Evidence is "stillIA concludes, as to CHICOM's "ultimate objectives" in its military intervention in Korea since early November, except that it is "fairly clear" that CHICOM "will, for the present, maintain holding operations in North Korea," while seeking UN withdrawal from Korea by "intimidation and diplomatic means" (p.gain on If latter objectivethere may be increasing, butChinese intervention In Korea." CHICOM "will continue" to direct main military effort to "holding" northwest front (hydroelectric area) and northeast triangle (to Kanenurian-Sovietut "except theHICOM troops are "thinlyith "only limited" ability to launch counter-attacks.


Tr-:atngnt of Chinese Communist Intervention Issue inlly Korean0 (prepared by Historical Staff,

The Daily Korean Summary (see Appendix B) was intended lo be, as the President hadesume* of the military situation on any given day. It was not in any sense intended to be an estimate. It did what other CIA publications normally did not do, in reporting on the positions and activities of American forces. It was based primarily on US military reports, particularly the daily teletype conference between Washington and Tokyo which its editors attended.

The Suiwary also carried brief sections on political, psychological, and "otherowever, and reflected interpretations placed on intelligence by command headquarters. If not its own interpretations.

Ita first reference to possible Chinese intervention isuly, when there is mention of the presence, in Korth Korea, of Korean combat veterans who had served with Chinese Communist forces in Korea, and the presence of USSR "advisers." Onuly the possibility of Korean-Nanchurian "veterans of the CCF" is mentioned; andhe bodySSa officer was round in the wrec kageowned North Korean plane (the prase report indicating this was stated asby CIA).

There is no mention at all, however, during theuly toctober, of any of the indications of CKICCH intentions whichwere being reported in CIa's regular weekly and daily world-wide summaries.

On lhIA quoted (without comment, suggesting that CIA did


not discount theeportetherlands diplomat in Peiping to the effect that fourpresumed to beave crossed from Manchuria to North Korea. In this issue, CIA calls this report "another" report (that is,econd) on CHICOM intervention, but no reference to any earlier report, in preceding issues of the Korean Summary, has been found.

Onhree Chinese POvJ's are reported as captured by ROK forces, and CIA (for the first tine in the Korean Daily Summary) published its conclusions, as follows: "An unknown number of Chinese soldiers were probably incorporated recently Into North Korean units to assist in the defense of Kanchurian border areas. There has been no indication of open intervention on the part of Chinese Communist forces."

On ythe capture of ten POtf's from three CHICOH divisions is mentioned by CIA, but the US 8th Army's conclusion (which was meanwhile published on the same day, in CIA's regular Dailyhat three CHICOM divisions were in North Korea, was not Included In the Korean Summary. On the contrary, CIA added (and presumablyorroent. from General MacArthur's higher headquarters, that "The Far Sast Command does not believe any of theseth,th Divisions/ are in North Korea."

OnIA mentions (withoutn its beginningsection, that "additional Chinese Communist troops have been captured." Later in the same Summary, CIA quotes theorps as having "confirmed the identification" and "tentatively accepted the organisation" ofth Regiment ofth Division of the CHICOM Army, "which is said by Chinese POW's to have crossed into -'forth Korea at Chian on or aboutctober." This report carries no comment by CIA

(in the Daily Koreanut in the CIA Daily Summary for the saneIA comments that "CIA does not believe" that theof Chinese troops indicates that CHICOM "intends to intervene directly or openly in the Korean war."

Ho further military indications of CHICOM intervention are reportedov.n the Daily Korean Summary.

S 8th Army has "re-interrogated" certain captured Chinese POV'a and has now concluded that the two units previously regarded as being only of "regimental" strength are actually of "divisionalo comment added by CIA, nor is there any comment from the Far East Command either accepting this revised estimate or revising its ownIssuedhat it did not "believe" that Chinese units were in North Korea,

o further military or other indications of CHICOMare mentioned.

IA quotes (without comment) anresumably by OS 8th Army, that three CHICOM divisions are now engaging the "immediate" front of the Sth Army, that is, the northwest sector, (in CIA's regular Daily Summary for the same day, this estimate is attributed not to 8th Army but to US Embassy Seoul.) The Daily Korean Summary for this dateoes not, however, mention the northeast sector, where (according to the regular Daily Sumnary, same day) still another CHIC OK division was located.

o further military or other indications of CHICOM

intervention appear, excepteport of "enemy jetbserved patrolling the Manchurian side of the border."

On fln attack on the "first span"alt: River bridge by UN carrier-based planes is reported. Additional hits are reportedov.

Ondditional Chinese POW's have been interrogated by US 8th Army, one of them indicating for the "first time" the "presence of an entire Chinese Communist army in North Korea," (No comment by CIA, nor is the report itself repeated in the CIA Daily Summary for that and subsequent days.)

Ho reports on CHICOK operations onov.

On lliFar East Command now believes" that CHICOM troop strength in Korearesumably reversing its estimate of two weekshich had denied that "any" CHICOM divisions were in North Korea.

Onn the "highlights" section, CIA states that "Evidence continues to indicate an enemy withdrawal in the northwest sector." See also CIA 'Jeekly Summary forn which CIA apparently expects "withdrawal" by CHICOM, but concludes that CHICOM does not yet seem "ready" to do so.

Onhe views of "UN Command Headquarters" (General KacArthur's immediate headquarters) are quoted as "summarizing the pattern of enemy withdrawals during the last ten days." That headquarters has concluded


that "although such withdrawals have in the past preceded enemy offensive action, the current withdrawals couldigh-level decision toefense line based on selected strong points in the generally favorable defensive terrain of northern Korea."

No mention of CHICOM forcea or operations In Korea, in the Pally Korean Surgnaryndov.

OnIA quotes (without comment) "ON Command Keadquartora in Tokyo" as having hadiscussion of Chinese Communistuggesting that General HacArthur's headquarters is now less sure that CFICOK forces will actuallyut believes that "in any event" CHICOM Intends tohe Yalu reservoir and power-installation area. In that estimate, UN Command Headauarters "points out that /its7 present indicationsossible Chinese Communist withdrawal to thelver are counterbalanced by the increased tempo of Peiping's psychological warfare, which is stressing the themes of continued intervention and China's inability to permit the occupationeighboring country by 'American imperialists.'"

Onov. there is no mention of CHICOM forces, operations, or intentions.

Onhh Armies are in North Korea, according to additional FOV sources. One reporthinese offlcor)otal of "six CCf Corps (Armies) in Korea." US Embassy Seoul regards enemy attackgeneralrepeated the next day in CIA's regular Daily Smaeary,ov.).


OnKICCM units are now reoortedformidable threat" toorps.

HICOM forces in the northeast sector are "now estimated as nine divisions" (estimate presumably made on the ground by UN forces in Korea, not by CIA).

Onec, US 8th Army has had "no positive contact" with CHICOM forces "Tor several days."

Onresident Rhea of SOX wants DM General Assembly to act to "permit MacArthur to continue the fight inccording to US Enbassy Seoul. Hhee "hold stubbornly to theays US Embassy, "that MacArthur's first commmioue" (the date of which is not sivtn in thisstating that the ChLnese Communist invasion is inew war calling for new decisions in the world's chancelleries,ublic statement that he was without authority to continue the fight against ths Chinese Communists." Shee "furtherays US Embassy Seoul, that "the lack of such authority accounts for the 9th Army's retreat and that MacArthur must receive such authority from the UM if ha is to centime the fight in Korea." Mo concent added by CIA, nor does any comment appear in regular CIA Daily Summary for those days.

Tho present survey of they farefin Nummary is limited to the period ending



Cunmary of CIA-CoUocted Information, July-KovemborrhTnaT's llrte-tlois in Korea

(prepared by Hiatorical Staff,

The aummary below is based not on the CIA reports themselves, but on several tabulations (SECRET, totalling aboutagea) prepared for the Director's use, iny CIA/CO and CIA/OSC, which were the two offices that had direct res; onsibility for collecting and disseminating information from CIA-controlled sources. While those tabulations extended beyond0 (to, and hence go beyond the period of the present study, they do nevertheless cover comprehensively an accounting of CIA's own intelligence-information reporting during the critical periodhen Communist China was planning and launching its military intervention in Korea.

. During tha periodIA's reports bearing on the Chinase-interver.ticn issue totalledeports collected and disseminated. Of then, four were renderedC during that period; fourteen by CO/PDIDjy CC/FDD;y CSC. All of these reports were disseminated according to noma! procedures. It can be assumed, conversely, that none of these reports was withheld fron the responsible agencies involved! neitner from CIA's estimating organization (ORE,EJ; nor from the State and Defense Department intelligence agencies, which (with CIA/CHE and ClA/CKE) werer preparing and coordinating estimates in Washington; nor fromacArthur'ain Tokyo. It appears, furthermore, that many if not all of these


reports were also referred to again later, if not specifically at least as background information, in the course ofegular Daily and Weekly Summaries, thich were published and disseminated (to the same agencies) during the period

CO/C's four reportsarning from an American businessman (indirectly from the Portuguese Primenhat the USSR would intervene in Korea if the North Koreans "net reverses." CHICCK troop movements from south to north China,ereindirectly from several sources, including Chinese Nationalist sourcesranslator in one of the ChTCCJJ ministries. In addition to these four reports, several other reports of CHI COM troop strength, as of "October" andere obtained by OC/C, but not published until nether the latter additional indications had actually been collected before the critical days0 ia not indicated.)

CC/FBID's reporting on broadcasts of USSR and Far East origin, during the periodncluded, of course, full reporting of Communist propaganda attacks on US "aggression" and onilitaryin Korea. FBTD published the following, among other items in lb studies: Chou En-lai's threat, early October, not to "supinely. aggression" in Korea; ano-l'increase in Chinese CocKunist propaganda,ctoberovember, to convince the Chinese that theyblood debt" to Korea; and ioscow's broadcast, aboutovember, defending Chinese "participation" in Korea. operations in Korea were "really directed at China."

CC/TEO's twenty reports, published during the period Tifj 'Innaalniwere based principally on newspapers published in the Far East,publications appearing in Hongkong, Shanghai, Tokyo, Bangkok, and Hanoi andew instances) Communist-ccr. trolled newspapers in Hankow and Kukden. Anong the indications reported by FDD wore the following: troop ro vera en ts from south to northulyuly,uly,uly6 July,uly,ujaist,ugust, andugust other war preparations inuly and othereportCWuly) that theK Division then at Seoul was "composed mostly ofroop movements by USSR at Port Arthur andresence of CHICCK troops actually Inossibility of CHIDOi intervention in Taiwan or Indochina, with Korea netSSR-CHICd! policy conference inhe dates above are the dates when the newspaper or other publicationrigiraliy published, but all the items Here disseminated by CC well within the critical period (Host of CC/FDD's translations and summaries were not disseminated until three or four weeks after the original publicationlven newspaper. Whether this delay was at that time the normal delay in collecting and transmitting the publications to Vashington, and how lengthy CIA's processing period amounted to, have not been analyzed in the present study. In any case, the references above were each disseminated and published by CC well within the critical period,)

eports were immediately disseminated directly to the Far Fast Command and processed as soon as possibleew days later)

through Washington XAC channels. Included^Smong CSO's intelligence report wereeports disseminated during the critical period July. According to OSC's summary ina considerable number cf reports derived from Chineseracethe movement of Chinese Ccnnunist military forces northward into ianchuria and toward the Korean border, indicating units, equipment, aid other order of battle details." Also included in CSO's listing of reports are seven "indications based on Chinese Coircoinist commercial activities In Hongkong, October andnd thirteen indications of CHICGi orand policy statements relating to war preparations,


The following excerpts from publicublished1urnish content on CIA's part in anticipating *inese Communist intervention In the Korean War.

The classification "Confidential" applios to this exhibithole, not to Individual press references cited.

These excerpts have been selected and quoted from, the comprehensive press-clipping file entitled "CIA in thessembled andin two forma by the CIA Library i he main acrapbooic for therranged chronologically;upplementaryof unbound clippings, organizec by subject, including three envelopes in particulari "Truman Firesillatucoetter Co-wetsnd n the DiamisaalacArthur." In addition, further recollections by General Mac Arthur were published laten U, in hismemoirs,, edited by mnerai rfillcu^fcy and Jchn Chamberlain;n the memoirs entitled^ndezvous Withditedneral Courtney

Appimim iiuAst



President Truman, at his regular press conferencelj was asked to cosatent on General HacArthur's testimony, earlier that day with respect to pre-intervention intelligence coverage on Communist China. (The President's remarks as publiahed were paraphrased, rather than quoted verbatim, in accordance with traditional rfhite House press practice. The fullest suswary found la in the Washington) Ccaaaenting on SacArthur's charge that CIA told Kaetrthur that the Chinese "would not intervene in Korta," the President said that "if" CIA had madeeport, "it had not come to him" (that is, to the President). When pressed farther, however, by anothor reporter, who asked the President whether CIA had not actually reported to the unite House "in advanca of the ffovembarntervention," the President qualified his first categorical reply and "said he didn'the would have to look it up." He said further that "the CIA sent reports to him every day. He added that he read then every day, too, but couldn't recall exact dates. He said the question of what the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff expected before th* Chinese did intervene would be brought out by the Senate committee."

At the same preas conference, President Truman said thatrtnur did "not* have the benefit of "CIA reports at the time of the Redt was "because he (MacArthur) did not let the agency (CIA) operate in hia command until recently" and that that administrative situation improved "only after itamith, flew to Tokyo laat


January to confer with ItacArthur." (The next day, at the Senate hearing, MacArthur labelled Truman's charges of non-cooperation as "allor MacArthur's further testimony on this point, see elsewhere in this study.)

In another report of this press conference (few York, President Truman said (paraphrased) that General rtecArthur "certainly had convincedt their Wake Island conference inthat the Chinese Reds would not enter the Korean conflict."


ress interview, Admiral Killenkcetter commented on General MacArthur'a chargeew days earlier) that intelligence agencies in Washington failed to tell him of the movement of the Chinese 3rd and hth armies from China to Manchuria. Hillenkoetter said that "he did not recall any word of Chinese troop movements to Manchuria up to the time he left the CIA" Such information, if it had been available to CIA, "would" have been sent by CIA not to MacArthur directly but to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "under normal procedure."

As to MacArthur'a non-cooperation with CIA, charged by President Truman, Hillenkoetter recalled that "CIA had cordial and effective relations with KacArthur's Par East Command up to the time he left" CIA.

Hillenkoetter also consented generally on his understanding of CIA's responsibilities for estimating, apparently in the same interview. He said that "CIA could not be called on to report more than the location and estimate of the capabilities of any Chinese troops innderscoring his belief, Hillenkoetter added (quoted directly): "To predict the intentions of the enemy, real or potential, you wouldrystal ball,"

All except the latter direct quotations are quoted from various paraphrases of Hillenkoetter's preas interview, published at the time (for example) in the Huntingtonulsaribune,nd Fresnoee,

MacArthur's Estiaete of About0

t the Wake Island conference. General MacArthur's own estimate of Chinese Communist intentions in Korea was requested by President Truman. erbatim transcript of MacArthur's estimate isin Frazier Hunt'.'a The Dntold Story of Couglas. It took the form of reiaarks in reply to President Truman's question, "What are tha chances of Chinese or SovietacArthur's reply was as follows:

"Very little. Had they interfered in the first or second month it would have been decisive. We are no longer fearful of their intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand. The Chineseen in Manchuria. Of these probably not morere distributed along theiver. 00 can be gotten across the Jialu niver. They have no air force. Now that we have bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter.

"With the Sussians itittle different. They have an air force in Siberiaairly good one, with excellent pilots equipped with some jets59 planes. They canlanes in the air withore from the 5th and 7th Soviet fleets. They are probably no match for our Mr Force, The Russians have no ground troops available for North Korea. They would have difficulty putting troops into the field. It would take six weeks toivision across, and six weeks brings the winter. The only other combination would be Jiussian air support of Chinese ground troops.

"Russian air is deployedemicircle through Mukden and Harbin,

but the coordination between the finssian air and the Chinese ground would be so flimsyelieve Russian air would bomb the Chinese as often as they would bomb us. Ground supportery difficult thing to do. Our Marines do it perfectly. They have been trained for it. Our own air and ground forces (coordination) are not (as good) as the Marines, but they are effective. Between untrained air and ground forces an air umbrella is impossibleot of joint training. elieve it just wouldn't work with Chinese Communist ground and Russian air. We are the best."*

The text of MacArthur's estimate does not appeer, however, in his own authorized memoirs, publishedU by tfllloughby and Chamberlain, nor in those edited by Whitney

At the Senate hearingverbatim transcript in New York, Oeneral MacArthur was asked by Senator Russell,id your intelligence have any previous knowledgerossing the boundaries in any considerable force, prior to the attack and our reversals in North Korea, last Do camber?"

MacArthur replied as follows: "We had knowledge that tha Chinese COTrainists had collected large forces along the Yalu River. My own reconnaissance, you understand, was limited entirely to Korea; but tbe general information which was available, from China and other places, indicated large accumulations of troops. The Redt thatwere putting out, almost daily, statements that they were not intervening, that* volunteers only."

th* aiddle oft on, "our Secretary of State announced that he thought there was little chance, and no logic, in Chinese intervention. vembor cur CentralAgency her* had aaid that they felt there was little chance of any major Intervention on the part of the ChineseIbid)

MacArthur continued: "Now, we ourselves on the front realized that the North Korean forces were being stiffened, and our intelligence, made just beforelker launched his attacks, indicated they thought from0 men might be down there." (Ibid) ether that figure included both Chinese and Korean troops, cr only -hlnese troops, was not indicated by MacArthur.)

MacArthur, generalising about the nature of intelligence, went on


to say; "How you must understand that the intelligenceation ia going to launch war is not an intelligence that is availableommander limitedmall area of combat. That intelligence should have been given tobid. (Whether MacArthur was actually receiving CIA's estimates and CIA's Weekly and Daily Sunwaries during this period0 is not indicated in the hearing.)

Commenting further on intelligence sources available to him, MacArthur suggested that the British had better intelligence from the Defenseand that ClA and other Washington agencies were withholdingfrom him that they had obtained or could obtain from outside his own Far Bast theater of operations. Thus, be went on: "The agencies that the controlling powers had,which received reports from all over the world, from all ths nationa of the world, which hadBritish Secret Service had every secret service of any of the allies at his disposal, which were not ata much wideruch broader basis upon which to make those concepts." (Ibid.)

Whether MacArthur depended on intelligence at all is not clear. Thus Senator ^ussell asked MacArthur whether he deployed hi3 troops on the intelligence "assumption" that there would be "no interventiononsiderable number ofnd MacArthur replied emphaticallyis troop dispositions were based instead, he said, "upon the basis of the enemy that existed, and the ordersad to defeat them. That enemy was the North Korean group, and our forces had practicallythem. We would have completely destroyed them, if the Chinese had not intervened. We werey the two conditions: the size of thead; and the mission that was giveno clear out all

Worth Korea, to unify it, and to liberaliseatter of fact, the disposition of those troops, in my opinion, could not have been improved upon,nown the Chinese wors going to attack. The difficulty that arose was not the disposition of the troops, hut the overwhelming number of the enemy forces, and the extraordinary limitations that were placed upon me in the use of my Air. een permitted to use my Air, when those Chinese forces came inaven't the faintest doubt we would have thrown them

Senator Russell asked again,nderstand you correctly. General, when youad you known the Red Chinese were coming in in great force, that you would have had exactly the same disposition of troops that you did have?" MacArthur replied,on't seeould have done anything else. Senator. You understand, italculated risk from the day we entered in Korea onhe calculated risk was whether China or the Soviet would intervene. In the face of that risk,ad nothing to do with, youas ordered with thesead to clear Horthow when the doubt arose as to whether the enemy was concentrating great forces there, we had three alternatives; one was to ascertain the truth of the strength of what we had; the other waa to elt where we were. Tbe third was to goow what we actually did was to move forward to ascertain the strength of the enemy'shat we did was really ain force. It was the only way wa had to find out what the enemy bad and what his intentions were."

MacArthur then repeated, again, thatad known the Chinese

troops weraouldn't have done any differently. ad started

theis exactlyid, just as soon as we ascertained the

truth and the plana were all made."

iJith reference to the problem of contemporary records vs. later historical recollections of HacArthur's a'ake Island conference with President Truman onacArthur was reminded, at the Senate hearing inhat General Bradley had sent him copies of the minutes. MacArthur acknowledged receiving those minutes on aboutut, he said,id not read theerely put it in theave nohether It wasy that tine Senator, that incident was about as dead as the dodo bird." But, MacArthuroment later,ave no doubt in general they are an accurate report of what took place."

With reference to MacArthur's intelligence estimate made to President Truman int the Wake Island conference, in which MacArthur doubted the probability of Chicom intervention, MacArthur was quotedew days before he appeared at the Senate hearings) as recalling that no one in the. Government had the "slightest idea" that Communist China would intervene in Korea. In an authorized -statement for him,ssued in Mew York City by his "military secretary" (General Whitney), MacArthur goes on to say that "At the time cf the Wake Island conference, as farnow, no one had the slightest idea thatecision of intervention wculd be made by Red China. As farnow, neither the State Department nor higher intelligence agencies of the Government had the slightest evidence to warn ofecision. Certainly, no such warnings were given to MacArthur. To the contrary, all appeared to disccunt the possibility of such intervention at thatlaborating orally on MacArthur's prepared statement to the press, Whitney said that, so far as the Chinese intervention issue was concerned, President Truman "produced nothing from his better sources of information

beyond what tne Amy bad." (New York Tinas,)

On the other hand, HacArtbur's other chief assistant, General Willoughby was quoted as follows,ress interviewaw weeks after Generalappearance before the Senate committee. In that interview, Willoughby denied that Chicom intervention in ^orea badmonumental surprise' to MacArthur's headquarters. "That ia not thehinese troops were known to be along tho Yaluheir build-up inside Korea was known, but not in detail." What his headquarters did not know, Willoughby added, was "whether or not the Chinese meantinto the wararge scale." The "bnly way" to -jet that kind of intelligence, tfllloughby asserted, wasreconnaissance intaxe prisoners, capture maps anc" orders, and "slice into the threatening Chinese mass and break it up." (AP dispatch, quoted in the Centralis,)

Kac Arthur recalled (i.t the Senate hearhat in0 he expected to gather more intelligence on Chinese intentions by what hereconnaissance in force". "The reconnaissance would have developed the strength of the eneny. If it was not sufficient to resist us, it would have been an all-out assault (by US-UN forces) and,xplained in my communique, it would have undoubtedly destroyed the last remnants of the North Korean forces. econnaissance inlineeconnaissance in force and an assault attackather nebulous one and depends upon circumstances. What starts outeconnaissance in 'crce might well resultull-scale assault so far as your forces ere concerned." ew York)

Regarding President Truman's statementay) that MacArthur had


not cooperated with CIA In the Far East,uestion raised by Senator Knowland, MacArthur saidAy; ibid.): "That statement is all tovr/rot. Every possible assistance has been given by se to the Central Intelligence Agency. The onlynsisted upon was that the Central Intelligence Agency, when they cane into the theater, would not act surreptltiouoly so thoy would coordinate with my own intelligence, ave given then every possible assistance."

Replyinguestion by Senator Flanders, for General MacArthur's general estimate of Soviet intentions, MacArthur said: "Hy belief ia that th* basic plan of the Soviets are pitchedwchbreader basis than an Incident which might occur in Korea or even in Asia Itself. aidelieve the Soviet has two fundamental basic choices, either she is going to attack or she is not going toattactc;o not believe that what happens in Korea will tend to shape the world-wide global policies that they may enter upon." (Ibid.) Giving his estimate ofelations, MacArthur said (in replyuestion of SenatorIthar* is an interlocking of interest between the Communist China and the Kremlin. The degree of control and influence that th* Kremlin -viy have in China ls quite problematical." (Ibid.)

On MacArthur'a alleged non-coop*ratlon with CIA in the 7ar East, Senator Mors* asked himhether the two agents, mentioned by President Truman, were barred from "your intelligence files" and were ordered not to have access to the Korean battlefield, some time before iJeneral Smith's trip to Tokyo in MacArthur replied, "pure bunkum,M. Y.) The "only" problem of having additionaltesldes theater intelligence, MacArthur said, is "that there should b* proper coordination between his cwn intelligencend the ;iA.


The CIA out in my command has worked in complete unity and with my Chief of Intelligence, General (Ibid.) Replyingurther question by Senator Morse, riacArthur asserted that tbe purpose of General Smith's trip to TokyoD "was to perfect and expand tho CIA; it-was not to iron out any friction, it was not because of any difficulties. It was largely due to expanding and increasing the effort that was being made to gather Presses further by Horse, whether there was anybetween CIA and Willoughby, MacArthur aaid, "Nothing that would not be normal and minor, nothing that ever reached me." Pressed further again, by Morse, whether CIA was "denied access" to "whatever intelligence your intelligence system couldacArthur replied: "That would be ridiculous." (Ibid.)

With respect to indications and estimates of Sino-Soviet intentions in Korea0 andArthur expressed his opinion andaa followseplyurther question by Senator

don't believe that the Soviet has sufficiently associated itself with the war in Korea to believe that the defeat of Red China to theof her being forced to evacuate Korea would necessarily produce great prejudice to the Soviet cause in other parts of the world. It has been quite apparent to me. Senator, that the linking of tbe Soviet to this Korean war has paled out as the events have progressed.

this was first started, there wasn't any special thoughts'd China intervening. The entire thought of the world, and anxiety of the world, was that the Soviet might intervene, but as time has progressed, the conjunction of the Soviet to this campaign has receded rather than increased.

arrimoraiiiiEASEin mi

"At that time we were all lookingig Russian mission there. We were looking for various Soviet indications of engaging in the combat.

"On the contrary, the Soviet, even when we accidentally bombed one of her fields and admitted it and apologized and disciplined the officers Involved and offered the Soviet compensation, they didn't even take the trouble as farnow to collect any compensation. They dropped the issue.

"We havs gone close to their border there without, as faran ascertain, or my intelligence, the slightest increase of their troops on the sector between North Korea and Siberia. ave seen no indication of the Soviets' desire to identify themselves increasingly with this Korean caapalgn. They have at Lake Success and the chancellories of the world. They have been the spokesmen, but out on the battlefront it has been quite the contrary."


- la -

.^collections by MacArthurh

u Ceeeral Willoughby and John Chamberlain, undoubtedlyOencrAl HacArthur's opinions, published the authorized edition of MacArthur's Memoirs, With reference to Chinese intervention, they concluded) that whatipped the scales in Red China's future decisions" (that is, its intentions with respect to intervention in Korea) was "the amazing order from Washington, issued to the Seventh Fleet ino 'neutralize'his order, they say, "released two great Red Chinesebat is, to Manchuria. Sometime afterilloughby asserts, these armies "were reported to be moving north toward Manchuria." This "concept of sanctuaryillcushby concludes, "undoubtedly tipped the scales in Red China's future decisions." (Ho documentation is offered by him, however, either from sny contemporaryor any post-intervention intelligence analysis which led to thia conclusion.)

OnMacArthur's intelligenceiscellany of highly suggestive anrf completely ominous reports from Chinese Nationalisto Willoughby recalledh Among the indications of Chicom intervention quoted by him (apparently verbatim) ware tho following! high level meeting" in ?eking; the appointmenthicom commander for North Koreaj and various ^hicom troop movements.

Ataterhat ia, sometime afterugust (but tho exact date is not indicated by the editors', MacArthur himself is quoted as saylnv that it is "now plainly evident" that Chinese intervention "was rsspcnsive to basic decisions reached oven before the North Korean attack


last June.* It is "perfectly clear now" that, regardless of. crossing beyond the 3Bth parallel, "the Chinese forces would have been utilised to rectify the situation resulting from tha Jfarth KoreanacArthur it quoted a3 saying that it would be "naive indeed" to "believe" that such an imaginary line ash parallelnfluenced th* Chines* in the slightest degree." (Willouahby does not identify thisin the context in which it was originally produced, and the significant word "now" is not dated. Whether this considered conclusion by MacArthur was expressed by him before orth* actual intervention, or before, during, or after the heat of public controversy, end whether this was aexpressed privately or utteredof these questions are answered by Willcughby.)

Regarding MacArthur's Wake Island conference with President Truman onertain otherwise identified "staff notes" of thatare quoted verbatim by "llloughby, as follows: "The item of Chinese intervention was brought almost casually. Truman and his advisers had known from intelligence reports for some timeuild-up of Chinese forces in Manchuriaait accp-ull. On. H. Q. reportedled Divisions along the *alu, while an over-all total ofivisions was carried ino determine ifd hordes Here on the move or not, by day or night, was made impossible by Truman's own auicldal orders that kept our planes twenty miles south of the river border. It was the general consensus of allthat Had Chins had no intention of intervening. This viewpoint had previously been advanced by the Central Intelligence Agency and Secretary of stateeneral ;iacArthur's views were asked as to the chance ofhina's intervention. He replied that tha answer could only be 'speculative'; that neither the Stat* Department through its diplomatic listening posts abroad, nor the


the Central Intelligence Agancy toield commander must look for guidance asoreign nation's intention to move from peace to war, reported any evidence of intent by the Peiplng government to intervene with major forces; that his own local Intelligence (which he regarded as unsurpassed anywhere) reported heavy concentrations near the Yalu border in Manchuria whose movements were indeterminate; that his own military estimate was that with our largely unopposed air forces, with their atomic potential capable of destroying at will bases of attack and lines of supply north as well as south of the Yalu, no Chinese military commander would have dared hazard tho commitment of large forces upon the Korean peninsula. Tha risk of their utter destruction through lack of supply would be too great."


Another "staff coBtoentary* by MacArthur'g headquarters (not dated)


is quoted: "How little did MacArthur realize that by one process or another it would be conveyed to the Red Chinese that even though they entered the fray in large forces, it would be under the sanctuary of being immune from any destructive action by our military forces within tboir ownhat the Redommander apparently )najecision would bewhile General MacArthur did not, represents one of the blackest pages ever recorded."

Meanwhile, between early June and latailloughby saysher* were "continuing evidences" of Chicom troop movements. "As early as Juneeport Indicated that North Korea "received rein-forcerents frcm th* Chinese Communist Forces through Manchuria." "This was the firstontinuous succession of reports and commenta on the Chineseilloughby says. There follow ) quotations of various indications of Chicom capabilities and intentions,une to


aken from the Tokyo "Dally Intelligence Summaries." On lU October, is added this considered estimate by MacArthur's headquarters: "Re the fine line of demarcation between enemy 'intentions' and enemyecent declarations by Chinese Communist leaders, threatening to. if the Americans were to crossh parallel, are orobably in the category of diplomatic blackmail. The decision is beyond the purview of combat intelligence: itecision for war on the highesty tha Kremlin and

Willoughby goes on to say,hat "Military-politioal research dealing with the intentionsoreign nation normally was handled by the State Department or ths Central Intelligence Agency."

He theneport which he callsurious example ofWashington reporting on this elusive topicj it was obviously 'planted'." This report, Villoughby says, was mailed to Tokyo on Novembernd "took moreeek to reachut it is not otherwise identified by Willoughby, (whether itlassified officialewspaper report,ersonal letter is not indicated.) The report, he says, "conceded" that evidence of intervention of "serious proportions" was present tut "concluded" that "there was no evidence available that the Chinese were committed to an all-out military action." The unidentified report, as Willoughby quotes it, is aa follows

"Many people in Washington including several European Diplomats know of an overall intelligence report on Korea prepared by the CentralAgency. This reportery grim, foreboding view of the numbers and intention of the Communist Chinese in Korea. Completed ont was available to MacArthur's staff before the offensive was launched,"

Recollections by MacArthur?

General Courtney Whitney's forthcoming book, "MacArthur's Rendezvous witherialized in Life Magazine in August andeals in passing with the Chinese intervention Intelligence issue. The prefatory note to the Life articles states that theet forth by Ooneral "Aiitney are presented aa the authoritative answers of General MacArthur." The excerpts below are fron Chapter IV, "The War MacArthur Waa Hot Allowed to Win":

"But the best example of how the Administration used the Wake Island conference against MacArthur ia shown by the President's charge that the general had given him "assurance" that the Chinese Communists would not enter the Korean war.

"Here is what both Truman and MacArthur said on the subject!

"Truman asked, 'What are the chances for Chinese or Soviet interference?

"MacArthur replied that his answer would be purely speculative but that his guess would be "very little." MacArthur proceeded from the premise, which the others present knew, that there was no evidence from Peking that Red Chines* intervention was under serious consideration. Ho intimation ofossibility had been cocanunlcated to him by Washington. And field intelligence, badly handicapped by the orders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to restrict air reconnaissance to 'forth Korea, could furnish no reliable clue.

"But what is suet important about the entire discussion Is anof the rdlitary assumptions upon which MacArthur waa naturally basing his qualified guess. It seemed to him at the time, as indeed it still does today, that if anttacked our forces, we would immediately This would appear to be so obvious an axiom that it did not even


need to be stated. If the Chinese intervened, we could use our undisputed air and naval superiority at the very cutset to establish an effective blockade of the Chinese coast and launch destructive blows against -'fed China's Manchurian bases of supply.

were not pretending that the units of our Navy and Air Force were blockading and bombing the North Korean enemy only in Scuth Korea. We had responded to the North Korean attack by carrying the war to the enemy in "orth Korea. MacArthur naturally assumed that In the case of China we would do the same.

never occurred to MacArthur toesident Truman and his advisers on whether or not they intended to takeourse. It wculd have been like asking if we intended to fight tha enemys or with bows and arrows.

"Why this cbvious point eluded the President and his military advisers MacArthur will never know. But it could not have eluded tha Chineseof thatis sure. It follows, then, that there can be only one circumstance under which the Chinese old finally decide to enter the Korean wan someone must have told then what no one told MacArthur. Someone must have told them that even if the Red Chinese swarted across the Yalu into berth Korea in overwhelming hordes, even if they. soldiers by the thousands on tho battlefield and in the prisoner of war camps,. Government would meekly decline to retaliate and the Soda' staging and supply area in Manchuria wouldanctuary.

"Despite false charges to the contrary, MacArthur did not predictthat the Chinese would not enter the Korean war. And it is of interest to note that so convir.cec were the President's advisers that there

approved EOtREiEASi


would be no intervention that General Bradley asked MacArthur whan he thought ho couldivision for Europe, MacArthur estimated that the North Korean enemy night well be defeated in time for the Eight Army to leave Korea by Christmas. And the plans for the political unity of Korea and its postwar government and rehabilitation were discussedatter for the immediate future.

"After MacArthur and the President had net and started to converse, the general was sure that the conference wouldonstructive one. MacArthur liked Mr. Truman from the start and was delighted with his ensuing personality. It waa only later, when Mr. Truman cad* his amazing charge that MacArthur had misinformed him on the possibility of Red Chinesethat MacArthur understood what the Vain Island meeting actually waa: ly political ambush.'*

The US 3th Army's "first" combat intelligence on Chinese Communist troops in Korea came after the action on the night of0. "Then came the dread news: prisonersndicated for the first time that an estimated minimum of three divisions of Red Chinese had Joined the battle."


Socretary of state Acheson'3 Recollections inogether withns fronG

At the Senate committee hearingacrotary Acheson replied at length to questions by Senator Saltonstall on what Saltonstall called "the leek of accurate intelligence" regarding CHCCJi intervention in Korea (Verbatim transcript of hearing in New York TOSS, Ii) Some of these replies were from memory, while others were apparently quoted either from original documents available tc the State Departaent0 or from historical studies made for his use in the Senate hearings The verbatim transcript1 ie as follows:

"The general state of information viiich came tocheson recalled,an describe this waythat in the period frccah of June tof September, the general intelligence estimates which wore put together, regarded intervention as improbable, barring Scviet decision to precipitate global war.

"That waa the cdelusion which was drawn fron all the bits of information that come in.

"Fromd toh, it seemed that the same result was probably true.

ave to caution about all of these things, that one should not supposeen youonclusion of that sort, that thai turns into fact.

"This is one's best guess, as to someone's intentions.


"You also have information as to tho capability of tho other people, and tha capability of intervention always existed and you hare toecision as to whether yen think it is possible or probable; and the general view was that it was improbable and everyone continued to express the idea that you couldn't dismiss the possibility.

"At the end of September, there ware reports which were sent out through the Government of India, that statements had been mad* to their representatives by Chinese officials that if we crossed th* Thirty-eighth Parallel they would intervene.

"Those were important matters to be considered, and thoy were considered; and on the 3rd of October, for instance, the Chinese Conunist forei(ji minister informed the Indian Ambassador, at Pelping, that if we creased tbe Thirty-eighth Parallel, Chinasend troop3 to tho Korean frontier torth Korea.

"Thatryptic statement made by bin. aid that tills action would not be taken if onlyrean troops crossed the parallel.

"Thatatter which had tc be giver, very considorabl* alter tlur, and inf; mat ion to that effect was sent to General .

hshis statement was made, the United Katio*.is waa preparing to vote on its resolution, finally adopted by the General Aa-aambly cn October 7. It was acted cn by Committee Cne, on Oct. h, so that you also have to keep in mind that perhaps this statement was put out to hova some effect cn the vote.

"It went on in October. Cthor officials of other nations reported similar statements coming cut of Feiping, by Chinese officials.

his was pat out on the radio from Peiplngtatement of their intentions.



"The general view still remained, onhat while itossibility, and you have to keep it in mind, they did not think itrobability.

"At the tine of the Wake Island meeting, there was consideration of this, and it was considered unlikely.

"Onh of October, the State Department came to thethat it was unlikely but said they could not be dismissed, these threats could not be dismissed as mere bluff.

h of ^ctober, the first Chinese prisoner was captured,hat you began to know, at that point, that something was happening.

"On November u, the Commander in Chief, Far fast, in anappreciation, stated that while Chinese Communist interventionistinct possibility, sufficient evidence was not at hand to warrant immediate acceptance.

"On Novembereneral MacArthur,pecial report to the Unitedeported. forces were 'in hostile contact with Chinese Communist military units', so the thing begins to be more and mere known.

Novemberupplementing his report. General MacArthur, in his communication of November 6th, reported the destruction of the tferth Korean armies, but. forces were now facedewresh army, 'backed upossibility of lar-enemy reserves and adequate

was on the 6th of November.

"On the 7th of November, the Commander in Chief, Far cast, in

an intelligence appreciation stated that if immediate enemy build-up might

continued, that that prevent any further advance and mijht even force


mil iii lm

a retrograde movement.

"On tovomber the fith, the general view here in Washington stated the Communist objective 'was to halt the advance of. forcea in Korea and toommunist regime in bainj on Korean soil.'

"Fromnward, the United Nations Security Council members took immediate cognizance of that interventionilitary and political fact of grave Importance and talked aboutreat deal.

"On fevember 2u, we concluded here In Washington that the Chinese objective was to obtain United Nations withdrawal by intimidation and diplomatic means, but in case of failure of these means there would he increasing intervention, and it was said that there was not available evidence sufficientonclusion as to whether tho Chinese Communists were ce-*aittedull scale offensive effort.

"On November 2li, General MacArthur's special communique to the

U.S. said:

'The. pincer moved according to schedule today. The Air Forces, in full strength, completely interdicted tho rear areas and en air reconnaissance behind the enemy line, and along the entire length of the Yalu river border, showed little sign of hostile military activity. The left wing of the envelopment advanced against stubborn and failing resistance. The right wing, gallantly supported by neval air and surface action, continued to exploit itsposition.

'Our losses were extraordinarily light. The logisticis fully ^ared to sustain offensive operations. The justice cf our


course and promise of early completion of our mission is reflected in the morale of troops and ccsnanders alike.'

"Cneneral liacArthur's special com-nnlque to tho United flaticns said:

'Snecry reactions developed in the course of our assaultof the past four days discloseajor segment of the Chinese continental armed forces in amy, corps and divisional orgai is atior. of an aggregate strength ofen is now arrayed against the United Nationa forces in North.

'Consequently, we face an entirely new war.'

"Thatevelopment of the intelligence. There is one part of ithink ought to be pointed out.

"You have two problems here, in the Intelligence field. One was to try and work out anapprociation of the Intention, whether the Chinese intended to come in, and would cone into North Korea.

"The other one was to get information from th* theatre as to what they could do, if they carte in, and in what numbers, ard bow serious that would be.

"The estimates of intention turned out to be wrong, although froa October onward, there was increasing evidence that they could

AlTCtlS'imLAs of Nov. 2h, tha determination here was that the Chinese would probably not come in; is that correct?

CHE3CKHo, Cn Hov.h* view here waa that the Chinese objective was to obtain I'.'i. withdrawal by intimidatior. and diplomatic .icans, but in case of failure of these means there would be increasing intervention. Available evidence was not coasldered conclusive as to

whether themirdsts were committedull-scale offensive




"They were in there, all right, but whether they were ccoaittedull-acale offensive effort was not known.

"The ether thing that in Intelligence was important waswould happen, what were the possibilities, if ths Chinese cane in; and the report of the Hake Island meeting, and General MacArthur's estimates follow:

'Had they interfered in the firat or second months'his is the Korean operation'it would have been decisive. Ve are no longer fearful of their intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand. The ChineaeCO men in Lanchuria. Of these probably not morere distributed along tha Yalu River. 00 could be gotten across the Yalu River. Thoy have no air force, liow that ue have baaoa for cur .dr Force in Korea, If the Chinese tried to got down to Jyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter.'

That turned out to bc an error that they could onlyuCOO across the river, and if they tried to get down to the south, thoroe great daughter. They did and ir. considerably larger numbers.

SENATOR SAITCIISTAILThey really fooled us whan it cones right dowi to it, didn't they?


SENATOR SALTCfvSTALLI have no further questions."



ecu iiunci


.ntalliger.ce estimating on Chinese intervention in Korea0 was discussed by various Defense Department officials int Joint hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Ceonitteea. The excerpts below are from the verbatim transcript published in the tew Jbrx Times, unless otherwise Indicated.

General Marshall, who had replaced Louis Johnson as Secretary of Defense inaa the first of them toofter listening to all of General MacArthur's testimony, and new all of the preceding testimony of General Marshal, Senator Saltonstall concludedhat "it appears to me that the difference between tha Administration'snd General MacArthur's opinion really boils downlash of opinion as to tha Soviet's intentions, and the Soviet's capabilities for waging war in the Far last. Do you agree that that la the basis of the difference lnbetween you?MARSHALL:

That is the principal basis of the difference ofto what is the proper course to follow. SENATOR SALIC NSTAIL:

And that comes down touestion of trying to interpret tho Soviet's intentions, and trying to determine from our knowledge, through oar Intelligence, of his capabilities in the Far rest for waging war, an aggressive war, rather than purely defensive, and as to his intentions of putting those capabilities to work; la that not about it?



Including his relations with the Chinese Communist regime, which is an important factory but you mention the dominant factors."

Replyingurther question by Senator Saltonstall, Secretary Marshall repented (what he apparently had aeaerted the day before) that: CIA's reports and evaluations were regularly disseminated by tha Defense Department to UN Command Headquarters in Tokyo,0 as well as currently.

After commenting at length fenn the dangers tc effective intelligence wont by publicity (of the kind that was being aired inarshall recalled the intelligence available in "In November, so far asybur information was concernedas aware of, thereuild-up in the number of planes that the Chinese Communists were reported to have In Manchuria; but later on in January and and particularly March, there were indicationsery decided build-up, which added to the threatery effective retaliation, but that was not the casearge way,eall the information, in November."


In still another part of tho, Secretary Karshall denied that he withheld any CIA reports fron MacArthur on Communlat Chinese intervention. He said: ave checked very carefully to see that all theora the CIA went to his headquarters,resure, of course, he either saw it specifically, or it was briefed for hisBaltimore Son,)

General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified at the Senate committee bearings from aboutay to (Only the trenscripta foray were available at the time of this study.)

Bradley was ouestioned by Senator Smith about XacArthur's "terrible blunder on his part that he didn't know" that Communist China would intervane, and was asked: was "MacArthur's Intelligence Staff" to blame, or was it CIA, or "where was it"? Bradley repliedi"ihe intelligence on which he had to base his decision had to be primarily field intelligence,

"How, there were evidences from captured prisoners of from late October that Chinese had core in to some extent into the operation.

"Then, on Nov. o. General MacArthor sentessage that the Chinese were pouring across the bridges across the Talu, and they were coming across in great numbers. That was on about tfov. 6.

"How, what happened betweennd the time that he waa hit by the Chinese attack of about Nov.rtwenty-sixth, Iis hard for us here to know,ot of that intelligence should have come from his own field command.

"That concentration on ths right flank of the Eighth Army should have been picked up by air reconnaissance and ground reconnalaanca; in other words, by patrol and aviation put in there.

"How much of that he had. Senator Smith, we don't know here, because


we don't get all the field gets in the field end acta on. But certainly there was enough coming in to indicate that thereonsiderable Chinese build-up somewhere in North Korea.

Q."Was KacArthur prevented from sending recrnnalsserce planes across the border in Manchuria to see whether there wero accumulations there of troooa?

A."We knew all the time that there were concentrations in Ituestion of how -any of them had moved over into Korea, and that,ay, could have been obtained or should have been obtained by air reconnaissance and ground reconnaissance.

"Now, you must realise, of course, also, that that country in there is very heavily wooded by evergreens, and it is rather difficult to pick up troops and,ay, it is very hard to sit here in Washington and say be should havo known or just what he did know. That is up to the field commander,ertainly would net blame him orMr/one else for the fact that he may have had certain information and may have evaluated it wrong."

want on to say that General Collins, Army Chief of Staff, would testify further on the intelligence issue, "because he ia tho executive agent (of the JCS) who passes or. to General KacArthur's headquarters all the intelliRence information,.and he will tell you exactly what heU.T. Times.) omplete Us ting was apparently not, however, published, in the subsequent hoarings.)

General Collins testified onut the full transcript of his testimony was not available at the time of the present study, alter Trohan of the pro-KacArthur Chicago, said that Senator Ccnnally questioned Collins whether CIA or MacArthur's headquarters had


"primary responsibility* for "the military intelligence that wculd haw shown the Chinese Reds intended to enter the war last fall," frohan added, without coroent: asserted the primary responsibility was MacArthur's." Later in the hearing, which (like the entire hearing) dealt largelyariety of non-lntelllger.ce Issues, Senator KcMahon again pressed Collins on the intelligence situation in the fall Collins' reply, as TTohac reported it, was as follows t "Collins said that virtually all tho intelligence the Pentagon had came from the far eastern command. Heessage from8 days before the Chinese Communists attacks in Korea,'in which MacArthur said men and material in large force were pouring over the Yalu river bridges from Manchuria."

General Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of. Air Force1 (as

, and,ormer Director cf Centraluestioned by the Senate committee on The partial transcript of hie remarke. Times,oes not, however, contain any recollections by him on the particular issue of intelligence estimating of Communist China's intentions In Korea


editorial AHP political COffiPiT.1

on imteLLic-sscs estimating on chiccw isr&av^mijN

In1 the Intelligence Digest editorialized that "Chineseereatter for local intelligence." The "failure correctly to appreciate the Korean situation was in Quarters far higher than MacArthur's local military intelligence. Hend it was there that the fundamental mistakes were made that led to local tactical disaster. hrough reorganization of the CIA isnd much closer collaboration with the intelligence services of other

Onl. News and World Report said that General Smith is now "taking hold". Intelligence in Korea. onclusion washe magazine alleges, "that appraisals of the military situation in tho past had been tailored soacArthur would got what ho would like to hear rather than what the facts really indicated,"

Onanuary, Drew Pearson alleged (in the Washington Post) that "poor intelligence" on the throat of Chinese intervention was one of seven rtajor "errors" in the Korean war to date. He alleged that "MacArthur repeatedly and categorically cabled Washington that the Chinese wore bluffing and would not enter the war." These estimates by KacArthur were "contrary" to CIA reports, "oontrary" to statements of Defense and State Cepartment officials, and "contrary" to the warnings of the British and French.

Onpril, the London Times reported hawing heard that CIAarning aome days before" the Chinese Cownunist offensive was launched, "which was seen and rejected by Tokyo" headquartere. the


Defense Department In Washington, said the Times, was "less" confident (than the command headquarters in Tokyo) that Comnunist China would not intervene.

On 2li April, David Lawrence, in tha Mewsrald-Tribune, defendod MacArthur's bed guess (at tbe Wake Island conference with President Truman inhat CHICOM would not intervene, with this assertion: "Actually, General KacArthur bed no other information except that furnished tin by the Central Intelligence Agency of our government, which presunably has informants around the world, and that which came from the Department of State."

Onpril, Walter Wine-hell (in the Washington Post) quoted warnings of CHICOM intervention that he said he had published in his column "two months before" the Chinese Invasion, or "one month before" the Wake Island conference. Apparently he referred to one or rore colums of about (These have not teen checked for purposes of tl'.is study.)

On 2b, April, Meal Stanford, in the Christian Science to niter, said that "the record will show, there is reason to believe, that much of Washington's failure tohinese Communist attack in Korea stemmed from the reports it was getting from General MacArthur'sbelittlingevelopment."

Mark Watson of the Baltimore Sun, and an urinamed editorial writer in the Washington Evening Star, were each quoted (inD as having publicly warned, inf the pending intervention byChina. These newspapermen were quoted by Richard Wilson in Looks follows. Watson was said to have published sometime before the military attack6an elaborate


UIL III till

warninghinese build-up in Manchuria, clearly indicating an offensive operationarge scale.11 Similarly, the Washington Evening Starat about that time that Communist China "would soon launch an offensive0 troops." (The two original articles referred to have not been seen in this study.)

On Iii Hay, Tris Coffin (in the New Republic) reported on what was said toconfidential briefing for the Senate Armed Services Committee"t which General Gruentber, then one of the Pentagon's "tops said to have "piecedragic lack of alertness by the KacArthur command." At that briefing it was supposedly revealed that "therehinese Communist troops on the Korean border." Coffin editorialized that "the General's failure properly to evaluate Chinese intervention at this time was the major blunder of the war."



h June

30th June

3rd July btt July 7th July

20th July

25thh July Uth August 6th August

Worth Korean Armed Forceo crossedh Parallel and attacked the Republic of Korea.

Security Council of the United Nations, through President Truman, called upon all members of the united Nations to render aid to the Republic of Korea,

North Korean Armed Forces captured Seoul. First American troops landed in Korea.

Inchon captured by the enemy.

Suvon captured by tbe enemy.

Oeneral Douglas MacArthur appointed Supreme Conmander of all 'Jnited Nations Forces in Korea.

Taejon captured by the enemy and Major-Oenaral Dean taken prisoner.

The port of Pus an threatened by the enemy.

Start of the United Wat Ions stand in the Pusan perimeter.

Enemy bridgehead established across Kaktong River near Pusan.

Ynemy threat developed against Taejon, the location. Eighth US Army.

h British Infantry Brigade landed in Pusan frca Hong Kong.

of an all-out attack by the enemy to break into the Pusan bridgehead.


Nations Forces landed at Inchon,

Eighth US Army started an offensive to break out from the Pusan bridgehead.

US Marine Division recaptured Kimpo airfield near Seoul.



19th September Start of the collapse of enemy resistance around the Pas an bridgehead.

25th September Enemy In full retreat northwards fromh September S Marine Division recaptured Seoul.

let October Enemy in fall retreat acrossh Parallel.

7th October General Assembly of the United Nations authorised the United Nations Forces to pursue the enemy into North Korea.

10th October Wonaan captured by troopsOK Corps.

19th October Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, captured by the United Nations Forces.

20th October Troops oforps atarted landing at Won3an.

1st Noveafcer Forward elements of the United Nations Forcea reached positions along the Yalu River.

2nd November First identifications obtained of Chinese Communist Forces in Korea.

26th November Chinese Communist Forces launched their first offensive

against the United Nations troops, forcing them toithdrawal.

27th November Starteep penetration of the United Nations line in the area of Tokchon, which threatened the right flank of the Eighth US Army.

Uth December Pyongyang recaptured by the Communists. United Nations Forces in full retreat.

Uth December Retreat oforps to the Hungnam bridgehead completed.

15th December United Nations Forces endeavoured toefensive line in the area ofh Parallel.

23rd December Evacuation oforps from Hungnam completed.

27th December General Matthew B. Ridgeway assumed command of the Eighth US Army, in succession to General Walker, killedoad acd dent.


29th December Large concentrations of enemy troops reported in front the United Nations positions alongh Parallel,


Thomas, Major R. C.



"CHE" Series

Estimates with the short title "ORE" were published by CIA up to0 when the short title was changed to "CIA/RE" and then to "NIE". AH itens in the "CRE" series were "coordinated" with the IAC. (Classification according to circumstances.)

HIS Series

This short title was adopted after the establishmentIS. All estimates in this series were approved by the National Estimates 3oard and examined in council by the IAC. (Classification according to

2efore the establishmentS this short title stood for "Special Evaluations" Which were publisbed without coordination under conditions of urgency by CIA separately rather than as part of the Daily or Weekly Suraaarles. After the establishmentE the title stood for "Special Estimates" Nhich were coordinated. (Classification according to

U. eries

Items called "Intelligence Memoranda" vere published before the establishment2 for numerous purposes. They were sometimes fully coordinated, sometimes partially coordinated, and sometimes not coordinated. In any case, they were 3ont as aemoranda from theo theho

took full responsibility' for their further distribution. Bio so cited here were uncoordinated but were probably disseminated to the more important part of the distribution, list for national intelligence. (GLesslfication according to circumstances.)

5' "Review of the world Situation"

Short title, "CIA." Was somewhere between current (publishedeach month and up to date as of publication) and estimative intelligence (always contained beat current estimates arrived at by CIA on important developments). Was designed for and circulated primarily to the KSC. (Secret)

These sometimes had short titles such as "DM" (Director's memoranda) or "SS" (prepared by Special Staff) but were in general cctamnications from the Assistant Director, Reports and Estimates to the DCI for the DCI's information. (Classification according to circumstances.)

Daily Summary

A highly selective digest of all dispatches and reports receivediven day, intended primarily for Eresident Truman who had originally requested this service ir. Februaryand continued to desire it.n, in response to demands from recipients, the Daily had also contained "CCA Corauents" to interpret informaticn being reported. Hence, it constituted moreun ring intelligence estimate than had been origirally intended. All members of the ESC plus the principal officers in the State Department and Pentagon received it. (Top Secret)



Weekly Summary

Began four months after the Daily and sent to same distribution list. Waseview of tho week's events as rofiocted in the Daily. Although it was originally intended to be no more than this, as tine went on, it also tended toward interpretations and estimates. (Top Secretsometimes Secret)

(IKT3: The Daily and Weekly Sun-ariss wereingle editor; the Review of tho VJorld Situation was producedifforant editorial staff, loth were dependent on tho research organization of ORE for expert contributions.)

Daily Korean Surcary

Sronarlzed the military situationesident Truman who had requested the service imiaediately after operationa began in Korea. Apart from the President's insistence, would not have been produced by CIA because it consisted almost entirely of military reporting. (Secret)




Principal Jro-Invaalon Estimates on Korea The Situation in Korea (S)


u6 ORS-Uli-u83i9

of Soviet Objectives in Korea (S)Current Situation in8


Prospects for Survival of the Republic of KoreaCapabilities in Southt9

Consequences of US Troop Withdrawal from Korea in9 (S)

Current Caoabilitiea of the Sbrthern Korean Regime (S)

Estimates Relevant to the Korean Situation,ther than those cited in the "Discussion".

Soviet Capabilities with respect to Japan in the

Light of the OS Commitment in0

of Chinese C< in the Korean tfar (S)

innljt 7articipatlon


The evidence suggests that this was never written although it is listed among'3,in an inventory madeS in Ancouncerent waa made on or about Julyhat it would be written. Its "Scope" waa outlined aa: "Assuming that Chinese Communist forces will participate in the Korean War, this paper will estiTnate the possible extent of such participation (in terms of ?Iorth Korean re-quirenents forhe character of such participation, the possibility of direct hostile contact with US forces, and the implications in terms of Soviet intentions under varying conditions of Soviet willingness to initiate open hostilities with the US." Indications are that proposedecame merged withbelow.)

Soviet Use of Japanese Prisoners of

War (S)


2/2 Soviet Participation in the Air Defense of Manchuria (TS)

Intentions in th* Current Situation (TS)

0 December0


ofProbable Levelooments


Communist and Chinese Nationalist In-

tentions and Capabilities with respect0

Prospects for the Defease of Indochina against a

Chinese Cojaainlst 0

(Supplement) Prospects for Chinese Communist Action

in Indochina0

Consecuences to the OS of Communist Domination of

Mainland Southeast0


Original document.

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