.APPROVED FOR RELEASE CATS:7
76
Agreed Policy Gove ruing Pre* Europe Committee Operation*
UkU sUteneat supercedes all previously issuedof general policy concerning Tree Europe Ccmaltta* operations.
Aaa^tloaoi
In planning sxploita-.ian of opportunitiss which have emergedesult of Communist polioy shifts, tho following Is assumed:
denigration of Stalin haa created serious difficultiesrelation* vith tbe Satellites; it haa raised basic question*the infallibility of Soviet leadorahlp among important element*partis* In the satellite nations: it has aroused tolatent aspirations for relaxation of oppression, restorationIndependence, and tbe establishment of governmentsresponsible to popular vill.
polioy will continue toino of limitedof coercive techniques of control in thahileto maintain effective domination of these countries. may extend even to tbe satellite nations being permittedcertain Independent lias* of national action on looues iiblchestimated by th* Kremlin aa dangerous to real Soviet control*.
polioy will continue to permit growing contactsatellite* and tbe Free World, In effect partially lifting tbobut not to th* extent that the Kremlin considers anyof it* power ia threatened.
. D; hough the Kremlinssumed to intend retaining real control over theecent more flexible policie. have set in motion oertain aoolal and political trends toward Independence pereonBl
representative gcrvernment* which may prove irro versof forcible repress ion. Satellite leadership, especiallyandhaa been Abakan. Manybeen down-graded. The positions of others are imperiled. tlwMlm.
SvntLfr?dsvwOopment in directions favorable. long-term interests.
e. Yugoslavia will insist upon remaining an independent Soviet Orion for the pursuit of specific political and ideological objectives. In its strategic or long-term alma it will be the partner of the Soviet Onion. It* tactical practices in central and eastern fciropc will vary from country to country,to some extent by the degree of geographic proximity, in the capt ire nations nearest Yugoslavia it* tactical alas will appear to be
*!to tho point where "liberal!-
aation iven country exoeedo that in Yugoslavia itself.
FSC effort* are currently directed primarily towardessor extent toward Albania, Estonia, Latviaareas where exiles from the abovs countries are assisted
in working toward agreed-upon objectives.
1JDpresently developing "countryhich will defiie its policy and cperaticoal objective* in each country and in tho Free World generally.
H Discussion:
Under Stalin, Soviet policies ln the satellite nations vore based cn total Soviet domination achieved through coercive police-state measures, .liter the death of Stalin thererief periodc* referred to aa the "newuring vhich the people in tho satellite nations vere given some temporary relief, at least In the economic field. However, It vas not untilhof the CPSU that policies wore set in motion vhich have much greaterfor the way of life ln tha satellite nations. At tbe Congress the leaders of the Precsidium (Politburo) at least in word, gave their approval to differing roads to Socialism, to the establishment of popular fronts, and even to parliamentary forms of government. The Belgrade declaration ofulganln and Tito vas blessed by the Congress, ond national communism thereby appeared to become an alternative to which the satellite nations wight aspire. Moot important of all vas the denigration of Stalin with all of its far-reachint; iirqjllcatSons, especially in its inpact on the satellites.
esult of the foregoing developments, unrest In varying degrees has begun to appear in the satellite nations. As far as the majority of the people are concerned, however, there has not been any significant Improvement of their lot or change of their basically antl-cccraunist, anti-regima attitude. of the forms and priority for the development of heavy industries are still the stated basic policies of their governments (it should be pointed out however that tho regimes appear to have been frightened into promises of transfer of investment free heavy industry to light Industry and agriculture as tho result of Internal economic pressures in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It is also pointed out that kulaks and other private farm owners ore currently being referred to vith greater tolerance, especially in Poland and Hungary). There has been some surface reliefesult of diminishing interference by the police, some Improvements in working conditions, less propaganda, end more opportunity for real amusement in the various cultural outlets such as radio, books, films, newspapers, etc.
Tlte Important change has been within the communist parties. ubstantial number of communists have been deeply affected by the denigration of Stalin and the recognition that much of what he stood for vas wrong. tChe denigration of Stalin also provides satellite ccnmunlsts vith the recognition that Moscow leadership is not infallible and, ln fact, con be very harmful. Many ccmnunists, particularly the youth, have become disillusioned. There is evidenceignificant struggle In the satellites between tlioee communista whose major loyalty is to Moscov and who therefore don't want lihetullsa-cion to go too fastt out of control, and those corouniots who are primarily loyal, to their own national Interests and who therofo.ru vent the "thaw" to proceedore rapid pace.
The developing ferment within the communist parties has bean prxticularly noticeable eaaong the youth and intellectuals. It has manifested Itself in many ways, including outright attacks on the Soviet Union. The thaw has gone furthest and the agitation has become most apparent In Poland, vhich has always resisted Soviet domination more than the other satellites. East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary alsorowing degree of unrest. Therehange in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania, hut there have not been splits of such apparent depth within the pertlo3 in these countries. Stalinist controls at this inritlng appear to remain most firm ln East Germany. Although Rakosi has been removed from bis position ln Hungary, be appears to have been succeeded by another Stalinist.
atpact mm made with Tito
at Belgrade In That pacteclaration to tha effect
2fto erect it. ova political
end social inatitutiona, speoifioslly to follow ita im road to "social ism." Aa
LT^IliT'^Party and regirl
autonomy, alone the line* of "liberalisation" presold
5from Titl^utllso
^arl?^to fall. s'hsv* dls!
not'Id the hlgbeet poet by leedere ^
la .till in flux.
a true sati-Stalinlst oppceltion come to power. But we bare seen for tbe
f clueterTof concertederies of "professional elites" .peaking out and taking
apeak within the framework of State-created oreenlaa^^but it is certain that many are at heart antl-ccemuUst and it
c^fiSrTL^ ot only to the broad popular
oppoeltlon to force further concessions aad reform, upon their governors.
oU*rchBn**tbe fact tbat the Iron Curtain hasofficial contact between the eateUlte govero-
iafsr^flT UorliOTerM*nt"-ns in all fields irilud-
lag scientists,porta teams, cultural groups,asfrom the Free World are being ehown againlne
. _ refcurnea ior tne nrst time
w^bl^hifL^S lZ*Private satellite opeen countries, arse selection
rL^tSn^ I" again on tbe sbelvw ofsesiv.ie! ticipatlng in severe! trade fairs induring the past year, aven some of
the physical manifestations of the Iron curtain have been removed slcnHbV
t neen
removed, though the barriers may nmrely have been moved farther back into Hungary, or may beifferent end less conspicuous nature.
e much more negative lapaet on the feataan exilee than tbey will on the people behind the
xilee have kept weUabreot oHhe^iaw
ndoned long ago their earlier hopes of Uberation by war. The^eopportunity for positive sction
depends upon contact with tbe enemy, there is now
aatelllte.. This opportunity In the
because of the many indications that events in the satellites are -oving more repidly than the leadersr were fully prepared to copT
III. Objectives t
A. Strategic
1. To. political warfare iney as to induceto favor the adoption of tho following
freedom from Soviet control over internal affairs.
rflw^LsSre being madeXlh. exchange
rosmas' returned for tbe firstthe Iron Curtain im
trm 8ovletla external affairs to tha practica-
ble extent that It can be brought about by nautralixstlon on the Austrian orFinnlah model, with the concomitant withdrawal of the captive nations from the Warsaw Pact and from CBft which today bold tboae^itlons aili-tarily and economically in tbe Soviet Orbit.
Freedom to negotiate the formation of non^nUltmxy regional its or federations and eventually, either directly or through reasoned units, to negotiate entry Into sll-Buropean non-military crge-nlsations or Into on all-European federation or confederation.
t*to fuU prc^and* adyantaga of the Belgrade Prlnelpls which recites tbat questions of internal organisation or differences in socialre solely the concern of the individual countries" and to refrain
- -V5
wh,rh3- model shall not bsodal with
which the captive peoplsa can rest content for themselves, by refrainIn*
ortsntsmot therewith; ond.turtber,
todeallnthsassmwaywlththsldssof "national communlesT in order that
8houLlollnd peoples snd elites to th. harsh realitloa contained In tha noun.
*t. To aatlafy the yearning of every captive people, snd psrtloulsrlT of
and cjillj; IViy*itsujcurttnsmsst by carrying on an appropriate program ofcontacts with those peoples.
5. To conduct our politicalay as tothe ssUbUshment of democratic Institutions in th7captlve^ationsof essential liberties for the individual andthem the
overnment allowing for non-consualat psrtles, free .lection, by secret ballot, free parliamentary debate, and effeo-ttvs local bodiee and Institutions, snd In independent Judiciary.
.quality of opportunity by elimination of classremoval of handicaps due to "clss.eligion, andon social snd political affairs.
of Intellectual inquiry snd expression.
thought, expression, assembly, worship, press snd ths other cosmonenuemocratic bill of rights.
th.opulstlon to base its existence upon the three pillsrs of peasant life: property, tbe family, religion
, rue dssocrstlc trade unions organised snd sdadnlstersd in ths Interest of ths worker snd not of ths state-capitalist employer.
M rHVdtmterprlss for those who seek to he self-employed, including th.he sbopkmep.r, snd th. practitioner oflhe libsrsl professions.
h. Freedom of Internal movement snd coanunlcations.
SUHkl
1. Freedom ot ecmajunl cation vith tbe mm iworld. B- Tactical
encourage liberalisation of Inetitutloni aad dscentrslizstlon
of authority and deoialon-msking power to the pointeturn to Stalinistwill be politically impracticable for reglne or party leaders.
To continue cross-reporting of the progress of anti-Stalinism and demands for liberalisation in the several captive nations.
To continue, specifically, morel support for individual peasant proprietorship, free trade unionism, sslf-employment, private professional practice, snd other democratic demands being currently mads by economic and intellectual groups in the captive nations.
k. To encourage autonomy of local political councils and to gJlde tbam by describing local government ln the United States snd other rres nations.
To report all Jugoslav manifestations which contribute to thsof Stalinists ln power and to the withdrawal of 8tallnlat leaderseans towards further attenuation of communism In order that dsmocratlcmay eventually become fully operative.
Bearing in mind the importance lent by the Praeoldlum of the CPSU to Its campaign for transition to "socialism" in the free world by non-violent means; and
Remembering the role voluntarily assumed by Tito as principal agent of ths new Soviet-Iugcslav partnership ln ths luring of social democratsa cosmnniist-pooiallat alliance against the capitalist democracies and
Considering that the tasks of construction and reconstruction la tbe captive countries present problems of such magnitude as to make wwin-mnnt Ia* dors hip and direction Inevitable---
take all possible measures to make ths captive peopVsths facts about tbe new capitalism (in American and elsewhere)the extent to which the fruits of enterprise areowners, moagement, workers, government and ths ccosusKr,ways In which its concern for the welfare of the community
show clearlyev non-doctrinaire concept ofguiding the social dsmocratic parties of the free world, pr>xapted
by emphasis on the welfare snd dignity of the worker instead od* emnbesls on out-dated dogmas, both In the Scandinavian countries and eliewbure In Europe.
o. To display tbat there bos been an interpeaotrationpltaUst and socialist ideas, and that both the new capitalism snd the newseek to safeguard tbe liberties while promoting the welfniv of the Individual ln ths free cooraunlty.
7- To discredit membership ln OKA by showing that it mesas:
ft. Radical IsmossibUliWof:ational economic path because it stakes the nations! economy, in its structure snd goals, Ita
mm-
'TWt'jnitlee and -rewards fw the ttsUfaenml end ttw aaUoc, tusecn-'ient io Sovlot,deology, piano and yjitoitlons1,
b- Continueda/sent of an ctceeslve part ot uknn-
power .ind resources for military end a, thus prvssinche atandini of living.
of the nntionn; idonpover uvl reaoui-ces inof Sovietampaignoncede competlon"by vhich tho captive peoples are deprived ofoi their own iixlustr5.aliaaW.on and are forueft to naU abroadlose in order to further Soviet ITuflsU'i aoHtr.eoj. ptvposes
artificial barrier to the traditional ardrelations of the captiwr people! with th* frss not lor aand the other ccnttno-nts, and to direct unrertrletadessential supplies available in the free Wd
barrier to wsribership of the captive peoples in tlv-econcaiie orgwSC, *FU,^CAfi,r'*ith those -vrgaci atloos fron whichurope ;profited ao -jremtly ia its peraicteot efforts tonrJwii.
6- To discreditio the Heron* fact by iuowinguh-aorvience of theimed foraen to tho Oenoral Staff at Pos<.cv is:
totionsl nen'-ieent because th-do not wiah ta aca'eoa Sovlot Russia but only tn defend
degrading coloni-il status equivrlent to thatvti-lof India (forore released by tbe British Co--ormeat.
ever-present throat of belatf drsva into local orby Soviet Russia and in tho sole inlerest of Soviet Russia.
material bin den pressing upon the iXYtipmal atardcr.1vJiich could, be greatly lightened by Independence from :iabecavoe lt Is self-evident tbat no Western power t! reatmoof the captive notions.
promote the idee, of future IntecroUenurooeeaeoononic eofaauoltyeaceful ob,<ecttva vfcioh would lead toand
use available radio facilities and purveyors of tic pi-intoc- word ail-borne leaflata sua* nailing aro.Jucts) an ehanwU for con'aict
by ths captive peoples vith ve3tcm culture, hnlanna and the arts: aad,o meanc through vblch to satisfy too huager to learn about free Ustltutionr. constantly reportod frem the captive nations.
U. Io enlist Important opinionovernmental ond private) in tho free world in support of the above strategic and tactical objestiver. These should include politicaleaders of trade unions, iitei-naMcoolreligious, furni, civic, youth, vosan's groups; eceaiuuicrttions
madia; journalists tad Operational Tasks t
, .il B^Uo Free Suropo, the Free Europe Frees and the Free Europe Exile Halations Division) should continue to ixrtfnaify ite activities vith reepeet to all listed objective*.
3. More epeelfloaUjr, the Free Europe Comnittee should:
a- Continue ratio broadens to to the Satellites as long as essential liberties and democratic inetltutdnos (set forth in HI Objecti-ee, above) are denied its peoplse hy the Soviet Obion end itslaes.
b. Continue to drop leaflets by balloon until free sad uaeniwad entry of printed eat bar is assured.
o. Continue nailing projects to specially selected groups of recuse end rsxty functionaries, rashers of professional, issnsgerial and intelloetual bodies, sad others among vhoa the nev elitet of th* nationalare to be found.
d. Continue It* distribution of the Khrunbohev "eecret spiecn" ln the engimge* of the captiveoth in those eountrlee aid in exilencluding* sad irtTlsnmnt*.
Continue and increase activities utilising responsible exile orgnnisaUon*Individuals vho can contribute to the objectives of this plea. It should vork toward broadening the base of exile undsrvtending !bd.rrpcefllblllty lnflexible attitudes toward ts oupor-tuoitle* proaonted by the preaeat political relasation in the satellites end encoursgo exile initiative la seising these opportunities.
*' Ccartlaue its operations to cxnarber the eocBualsto
penetrate, manipulate, fragment, end subvert tbe various test Enropeen emigrations, aad be sensitive to nev opportunltle* to do so.
te use outstanding exiles to seise opportunitiescommunist satellite cffiolala on such Ibsuss as the dagroecontrol end tbe remaining mro^oo tat Ions of Stalinism in It should *eek these opportunitieo wbarover neutralistbe effected. It. ahould create cppoitunitieo for such debet ssparticular evert* auoh a* tho Poxnsn riots occur.
outstanding end appropriately selected exilethe underdeveloped areas of the world, iTludto* Latin America ,the nature of Soviet cxOoninlinm and to give eyewitnessthe techniques which the Soviets uso to take over control of Siirilarily, such exile* ahould attend internationalparticlpete Jn lnternstlanal organlrations. should writepubllcationo sod otherwise ettempt to Influence importanttoward the above objectives.
CotAlaus its preparation of bsadoooks on the countries of its iatereet for distribution to African groups and tourists prepering to visit the captive nations sad for eventual translation Into anjroprinto languages and use by others after farther exploration of this tatter
B. gggyj| Operations
Alttewfh many of th* following nay be carried out sore appropriately by ca-ganltatlcma other than ths Free Europe Censdttee, they are listed as ctivitiesi
1- Select sad place reliable sad Informed individuals on major tours tolng sponsored from the Vest to ths Seat by the communists. (Tor oxsmnls, there will be six tours to Poland this summer snd fall for Amerloaan of Polish extraction.) Such Individuals could bs used for briefing other masters of ths
lanted la the tours snd counter their SSHSS1among more naive assssrs. They could ask antei laaslini options at press ccnfsrenoas In Poland, must important of all, thay could bs usadfbr factual rsports, particularly In their native language press whan they rstura to the Vest. These operations should also bs conducted from the many countries which are now stopping up Bast-Vest contacts.
aade to Influence high level satellite
*ueb opgmtlQMbe carried out only la collaboration with Stil,Pt* *bendlplosatlc etenaoln caaBOt baorsasBDla, vhsa Polish Premier Cyrankiewio* visits franco this fall, one srtgnt arrange to have scars of his former Socialist colleagues contact hla.
arefully selected Individuals should, vith the approval of theof Stata^aataUlah social and otter informal contact within the Free
k. CoMideration should be given to Inspiring snd subsidising travel totlCa' fOT eetlves
_ suteldlslng tha development of greater
^SS^^ei^^books, aswspansrs,cdlcSTln tte
both In Western Europe and satellite oat Ions,1 ^OjjjForongress of vril*rs oouU* have considerable political potential.
7. laflaamce snouU bs sstabllated la various International cs variations
snoh sa tte aVxawasle Orasrtsalon for Europe in Geneva.
. fflolals, an effort should 00
to assist tte expansion of xugoslav influonce ia tte satellites so Las. aa ,
v a nmron so lamal f'l a
closer MmSmm aateUito. and rugoalavsoviet control of the satellitss. On tte otter hand, efforts shouldmc-ag TuepalaT government officials to sharpen their appreciation ofr^tSP 5! Socialist, frie^ io tte
ift* "ted to aeouasifSTuspalavla to demonstmto mors
_^trfrrrt1
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: