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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER
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SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION1
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEWELEASEASSANITiZED
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Tlie title oi this estimate, when used separatelyie test, should 'jo clnipfne'1:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
rage
THE
Introduction: Soviet Developments In Perspective
I. INTERNAL POLITICAL
"Collective
Party
Relaxation ol Internal
The Anti-Stalin
1 11
33 13
14
:v
Lfl9
II. THE USSR'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER
Sino-Soviet Relations
Soviet-Satellite Relations
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIETPolicy
Post-Stalin Policies
The Sixth Five-Ycar Plan
Economic Growth
Distribution of GNP
Developments in Industry
Investment
Aobor
ProducflWfi/
20
2
24
Regional Distribution of 30
Developments in Agriculture
Developments In Consumption
Developments in Foreign Trade
IV. SOVIET SCIENCE AND TKCHNOIXX3Y
Scientific Resources and 34
2b
Scientific and Technical Developments of Economic and
Social Signiftcanc*
26
26
27
28
Biological
Scientific and Technical Developments of Miliiary
Significance
Nuclear Weapons
Guided Missiles
Chemical Warfare
29
Electronics
top SE-ert et"
TOP-'3 EC HIM-
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued
V. SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTHS
Trends In Soviet Military SO
Trends in Strength and Effectiveness of Soviet 31
Likelihood of Force 31
34
3
41
Effectiveness of Soviet 93
Soviet Ground Forces
Soviet Air Forces
Soviet Naval Forces
VI. SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES
3 44
Soviet Strategy for thc Initial Phaseeneral 41
Strategic Air Capabilities
Surf ace-tc-Sur face Guided Millie Capabilities .
Air Defense Capabilities
Offensive Capabilities in Western 45
Offensive Capabilities In the Far 45
778
991
Airborne 45
Naval Capabilities
VII. THE SOVIET ESTIMATE OF THE WORIXJ SITUATION .
Ideological Factors
Internal Factors
External Factors
Future Trends
VIII. PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION
Present Soviet Objectives
General Aspects of Soviet Policy
War and "Coexistence"
Diplomacy and Propaganda
Communist Parties in the Free World
Trade and Economic Aid 51
51
35 55
Courses of Action In Particular 53
Europe
Asia
Middle East
Africa
America
APPENDICES
of Military 55
Soviet Total Defense 75
TOP OKCR-BT
A. The changes in Soviet internal andpolicies over the last three years have resulted from the efTort of theto cope with problems ignored or aggravated by Stalin's arbitrary personal rule, and to develop tactics and methods which the Soviet leaders deem better suited to advancing Soviet Interestshanging world situation. It is not clear where this process of change willlead; the current Soviet leaders are probably capable of even morethan they have already But they have shown noto depart from the totalitarian character of the Soviet state or totheir aim of expanding thesphere of power and their ultimate objective ofommunist-dominated world. )
B. We believe that the principalof Soviet policy over the next several years are: (I) to increase the economic strength and military capabilities of the Sino-Sovieto weaken theof the non-Communist world, and
particularly to disruptoetraction of Western power and influence, and particularly to forceof US military power from its present deployment around the periphery of the Bloc;o expand Sovietthroughout the world byeconomic, and subversive means.)
Probable Courses of Action C. In pursuing these objectives, thcleaders probably intend to maintainonsiderable period the general posture of "peaceful coexistence" with the non-Communist world which they have been developing, especially since the spring They will continue the effort to identify Bloc policies with peace, anticolonialism, and social and economic progress, and to label the Western Powers, especially the US, as opponents of these causes. This effort is intended to end the isolation of the USSR and theparties which resulted frompostwar policy, to facilitatepolitical action in popular fronts with democratic groups, and thus to in-
-
Soviet Influence in theworld. )
D. Tlie policy of peaceful coexistencethe Soviet leaders' awareness of thc dangers of nuclear war inherentolicy of aggression as well as theirof the political opportunities opened up by their present policy in many areas. Accordingly, wo believe that tlie USSR will try to avoid courses of action which in its judgment would involve serious risk of general war. Nevertheless, insurrection or aggression by local Communist forces might occur if the Communists arc presented withwhich seem to them tominimal risk of large-scale conflict. Such aggression might even become probable if the Communists judge thecondition of the non-Communist world to be such that local aggression would promote confusions and divisions rather than stimulate renewed vigilance and determination)
K. The issues presented by the Chinese offshore islands and by Indochina appear at present to offer thc greatest possibilityommunist resort to armed action. On both issues the Communists might hope to Justify resort to military action on grounds that would be accepted by considerable elements of world public opinion, and moreover might expect that the US would be deterred from armed intervention by the opposition of its allies and by the fear of alienating somestates of Asia. For the present, however, the USSR apparently intends to curb tensions surrounding both issues, while encouraging by diplomacy andradual erosion of Western resolve to oppose Communist expansion in these areas. )
K. The underdeveloped countries have emerged in thc last year as particular targets of the new Soviet policy. Wethat the USSR wdl vigorouslyits recently expanded efforts towider economic as well as political relations with these countries Estimated Soviet industrial production wouldconsiderable increases in exports of capital equipment and military end items without appreciable adverse effect onBloc programs, and even with some economic advantage.)
Q. In particular, the USSR will almost certainly persistigorous effort to displace Western influence in the Middle Eastern and adjacent African states and to align them with the Bloc. Tlie USSR is using the Suez controversy and the Arab-Israeli conflict to enhance itsin the Arab world. We believe,that the Soviet leaders recognize that vital Western interests are soinvolved in the area that the USSR would be courting major political and possibly military risks if it supported the Arabs in violent courses of actioneither issue. )
II. In Europe, thc USSR will not relax its efforts to frustrate West Germanand to weaken NATO ties andefforts. On the central problem of Germany, wc believe that for at least the next several years the USSR willon maintaining the division of thc country. For some time to come the Soviet leaders will probably consider that even neutralization would not provide sufficient assuranceeunified Germany's tacit alliance with the West.)
RET
Political Developments
I. At least for the time being, thcofontinuing effective leadership in the Soviet state to replace Stalin's one-man rule has apparently been resolved. Despite the evidentof Khrushchev, there seems toollective participation in policyby at least the small group in the Communist Partyey feature of this "collective leadership" is thc apparent denial of control over the police power to any single leader. No firm estimate can be made as to whether the present apparent stability within the top leadership will continue indefinitely or whether one or another figure will eventually emerge in something like the absolute position held by Stalin. But eventruggle for power should occur, we believe that it would be resolvedopen violence and without basically weakening the regime's control. (Paras.
J. The recent repudiation of Stalinew phase In the regime's attempt to convince thc Soviet people, and world opinion as well, that it has departed from the evils of Stalin's rule. By providing greater security against police abuses, permitting broader contact with the non-Soviet world, and otherwise easingthe conditions of life in the USSR, the regime is attempting to cultivate more favorable attitudes towards itself and its goals. It is particularly interested in soliciting initiative on the part of the professional classes and party officials in order to advance its current efforts for greater economic efficiency andHowever, the attempt toew balance between coercion andhas not involved any weakening of
the means of control, including the police apparatus. We believe that the regime could return to Stalin's harsherthough at thc cost of somewhich would hamper it in the achievement of ils goals. )
Soviet Military Strength ond Capabilities
K. There will probablyecrease In the personnel strength of the USSR's active military establishment. Thereductions, which we believe would affect principally the ground forces, may reduce over-all active strength to about three million men. and possibly somewhat lower. However, the over-all effectiveness of Soviet forces for modern warfare will continue to increase,due to the improved weaponsavailable in quantity, to changes in organization, and to adaptation ofand tactics designed to fit Soviet forces for nuclear warfare.
L. Current and prospective militaryare likely to result in the following principal developments affecting Soviet military strength during the next five years:
he USSR's nuclear stockpile,from very low-yield weapons to high-yield thermonuclear weapons, willto grow rapidly. The upwardof our estimates of Sovietmaterials production and the Soviet testultimcgaton weapon lead us to conclude that the USSR nowignificant multimegaton capability and will soonajor one.)
'Pee the foolnot* by tbe Director of Nnvitlto
SEt'R
SECRET
estimate that the USSR now hasircraft in its Long-Range Air Force, includingISON jet heavy bombers,EAR tuibo-piop heavyADGER jetULL piston mediumBasedudgment as to what Soviet planners probably estunate their requirements to be, and on recentin the number of air regiments, we now estimate that the USSRorce ofodern bomber-type aircraft bye also believe that in Lhe light of probable Soviet optimum requirements, including those for attack on the continentalikely composition of this force would beet and turbo-prop heavy bomberset mediumany unknown factors, for example the degree of future Soviet success in the guided missile field, could lead to Soviet decisions which would alter both the size of this force and the balancetypes of aircraft. Long-Range Aviation will probably acquire improved base and staging facilities and ainflight refueling capability.ew medium bomber with "supersonic dash" capabilities may be )
At present, the USSR couldmall number of ballistic missiles with ranges up. These could carry small and medium-yield nuclearand in theould he fitted with high-yield, the USSR could alsomall number of intermediate-range ballisticnd
"The Assistant Chief ot Staff. Intellleenee.of Uie Army, believe* it unlikelyorce of thii magnitude and composition would be developed. See hla foolriot* to.
mall number ofballistic missiles.)
The USSR will considerablyils air defense capability, includingighLer force morelv'-'u withM'lirr types, im proved electronic equipment, andguided missiles and warheads.)
A substantial increase will probably take place in Soviet submarine strength, which Is now estimatedessels, about half of them being medium and long-range craft of postwar design.building rates will probablyto increase78 due in part to the impact of the nuclear-powered submarineand the probable adaptation of present submarines to missile weapons systems. If the8 rate were maintained through the rest of the period, this would resultorce ofubmarines of all types, includingong andboats of postwar design. However, we have no inlelligence toplanned future Soviet submarine strength. The Soviet Navy will probably also acquire surface vessels equipped to launch guided missiles.)
Soviet Army ground forces are being modernized to achieve improvedmobility, and combat effectiveness for both nuclear and non-nuclearThey are being suppliedide variety of new weapons andand will probably acquire guided missiles and tactical nuclear)
5
The size and composition ot the USSR's military establishment will be subject to further modification as the period advances and the Soviet leaders reappraise their military requirements and strategy in the light of theof the new weapons, the worldof military forces, and thepolitical situation. We believe, however, that the Soviet leaders willto maintain formidable military powerasis for their policy and to meet political and militaryThey will almost certainly not submit their military programs to the constraintsomprehensive system of international inspection and control. Soviel capabilities for nuclear or non-nuclear warfare of large or small scale, including direct attack on the US, will increase considerablyParas.)
Developments in the Soviet Economy
N. We now estimate that the present high rate of Soviet economic growth will decline only slightlyhen it will still exceed six percent per year.esult, Soviet gross national product (GNP)1 will be nearlyercent above5 level or aboutercent as large as the projected US GNP.5 it was aboutercent as large as
"Tht Assistant Chief of Staff,partment ol trie Army, does not concur in tbc coal study uponthisased 1I> docs not believe thatufficientavailable lo estimate the relativeburden on the Soviet economy. See his footnote lo Appendix B.
Sec also lhe footnote by the Director ol Nnval Intelligence, attached to Appendix n
the actual US GNP. Since Sovietexpenditures, despite the new weapons programs in prospect, willincrease less rapidly than GNP over this period, the relative military burden on the economy should decline
O. Present Soviet economic policy clearly envisages continued high priority for heavy industry, and we estimate that such production will increaser more during the next five years. The probable reduction in militarywill facilitate this growth byadditions to the labor force. Agricultural production will grow more slowly, probably increasing by about one quarter; such growth would provide the basisontinued improvement in material welfare.
P Soviet scientific and technicalcontinue to expand rapidly. Soviet industrial technology has demonstrated that it is able to adapt and introduce the most advanced methods of production, although the average level of Sovietstill lags considerably behind that of the West. Moreover, the USSR almost certainly has the scientific andcapability necessary to develop weapons and military equipment which are generally equal to those of any other nation, and in the technological race there arc times when in certain fields the USSR may well be ahead of the US and times when thc US will outstrip the USSR.
BORE
DISCUSSION
- SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS IN PERSPECTIVE
Thc three years since the death of Stalin have seen much change on the Soviet scene. Thc mm who succeeded him have adopted external policies which they deem to be better calculated to advance Soviet world interests, and internal policies which they consider more adroit for maintaining the Communist Party's control of tlie governmental machinery and of the population. This development hastheir awarenesshanging world situation which had outmoded some of the tactics and policies pursued in the postwar period. In part, also, change In the USSR has probablyonsequence of long-term trends related to rapid industrialization, thc spread of general education, and the creation of new social classes. Tlic present leaders have sought to release Soviet domestic and foreign policy from the more rigid mold in which Stalin had cast it. Their modifications in his system have caused the Soviet scene to lose some of the static character It hadunder the former dictator. It is not yet clear where this new Soviet flexibility will ultimately lead, but the fact of Its emergence has become evident. To assess the problems confronting US policy it has become asto focus on what is changing as on what is constant In the Soviet challenge.
Stalin's successors were confronted with the urgent problem of governingotaUtarian empire whose whole functioning was based upon thc absolute power of one man. In addition, they were confrontedumber of problems in both internal and foreign policy which Stalin had cither Ignored or aggravated. Though the resulting process
of review and adjustment is likely toan important stage in that process was reached at the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Communist Party Inhere the new leaders presented their policies and programs ln comprehensive fashion. They also demonstrated their intention to effect changes by their move to discredit many aspects of Stalin's regime and to reducehis historical stature As will befrom the different sections of this paper which follow, the effort to correct abuses and errors in Stalin's system has affected almost every aspect of Soviet Internal and external policy.
o date, however, the post-Stalin leaders have shown no inclination to depart from the totalitarian character of the Soviet state. Rather they are seeking to organize andthe power of the system more effectively and to adapt it to changing conditions. Nor has the present leadership departed from the Communist conviction that the strugglethe Communist and non-Communist worlds wiU continue. It adheres to thoCommunist objectives of destroying free states and expanding the Communist sphere of power. Although the Soviet leaders are now relying more upon political andaction than upon force or the explicit threat of force, Ihey are pursuing their goals with undiminished vigor and apparently wtth high confidence. Hone of the changes that have come about on the Soviet scene since Stalin's death, Important as these have been, suggest that the threat which Soviet and Communist power and purposes pose to the free world is likely to diminish during the petlod of this estimate.
-
I. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
LEADfRSHIP"
power had become so absoluteof party and state were subjectixTsonal control. Upon his death.were confronted with tbereconstituting thc supreme authority Instructure of power. Thcthe Communist Parly Centra!the repository of thell-man body continues to exercisepower, and despite the moreofan Centralother Party bodies, the Presidium isthe initiator of policy and thc final focus
The Soviet leaders describe thewhich obtain at the highest level of power In the Presidium as "collectiveWe have little specific information on the relationships among the highest Soviet leaden, but it is clear that these men arc not of equal stature and authority. Khrushchev's public prominence and his hold on thc key position of Party First Secretary, by means of which he has apparently been able tomany of his proteges to important party and state posts, suggest that he is thefigure. For the present, however,as the resultalance of forces among thc top leaders oroluntary agreement among them, there do appear to be limits to Khrushchev's power, and there Is apparently collective participation In policy formulation.
A key feature of the relationship among the top leaders ls the apparent subjection of the police power to collective control. Such an arrangement would be plausible, since it was Stalin's manipulation of the police power which enabled him to physically liquidate his opponents and brought about the excesses of the purge period. The present leaders, out of concern for thc continuity and stability of the Soviet atate itself, as well as for their indl-
'An organisational chart of the Soviet Parly and Government appears on the following; page.
vidual safety, would probably not wish to seeeriod return. The very gieat stress given at the Twentieth Congress lo theleadership" formula as thc original and correct party doctrine, which Stalin's "cull of personality" had allowed to fall into neglect, suggests that forces are at work to prevent the re-emergence of one-man rule.
e cannot estimate with firmness whether thc present apparent stability within thc top leadership will continue or whether one orfigure will emerge again In something like the absolute position held by Stalin. Even with collective control of the police power, there will almost certainly continue to be factional divisions. Intrigues for position and Influence, and disputes over policy.leadership" might break down over adivergence of view on some issue deemed crucial to the security or development of thc Soviet state, or as the result of an attempt by oneew members to acquire supreme power. Eventruggle forpower should occur, we believe that it would be resolved (as in the elimination of Deria and the demotion rtt Malenkov) without open violence Involving large-scale use of police or military organs, and withoutthe regime's control.
he members of the Presidium not only appear to be sharing the policy-making power, but apparently are trying to bring to bear on their problems greater realism and moreknowledge. They have apparentlythe circle of consultation, at leastthe technical and practical aspects of policy. We believe that Soviet foreignconomic planning, and military programs are now more strongly Influenced thanby the advice of specialists in these fields. This apparent freer participation and greater responsibility of professionals and experts haa been one of the strengths of the post-Stalin regime. This development has probablyimproved the morale of higher officials In the Party, government, and armed forces.
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tabilization of power attop level, one of the mostof the new leadership has beenfunction and vitality to theof thc Communist Party itself.leaders have apparently felt thatabsolutism was causing thc Parlyintoevival of Party activismto make theoreof policy Implementation andas well as to place themselvestouch with popular attitudes.thc Central Committee and ParLyare meeting at intervals prescribedstatutes. Local Party organizationsto meet regularly and to adoptleadership" practiced at theis renewed emphasis on practicalfrom below. The redefinition ofand tactics at the Twentiethin closer conformity withinternal and external, wasdesigned to contributeevivalspirit.
drive to revitalize the Party hasunder the sloganeturn tonorms of Partyhe myththc name of Lenin, to which the newhave particularly attachedin part to establish the legitimacysuccession and in part to justifybeing made in Stalin's system,to include the assertion that there"Party democracy" in Lenin'swas in fact freer discussion withinwhile Lenin lived andewBut even under Lenin "Parlymeant that debate and criticismwith strict discipline from thenew leadership, In dealing with theconcept of "Partyasthat it will not permit criticism todiscipline.
RELAXATION OF INTERNAL TENSIONS
claim of the leadership that itParty democracy reflects anof one of the serious problems fac-
ing the regime. The new leaders evldenlly believe that Stalin's policies of coercion and unpredictable terror, even against the Party Itself, had done much to paralyze activeand Initiative. This was true not only within the Party bul also within tlie government and economic admlntstiatlon and in the fields of art and science as well.was no longer believed to be the best way of achieving the regime's goals anddeath provided an opportunity to alter his methods of obtaining compliance. The size and complexity of the Soviet economy and the problems of increasing productivity and improving technology called for moreand initiative on the part ofbureaucrats, and Party officials, as well as more cooperative attitudes on the part of the general population.
Behind many of the regime's moves in the post-Stalin period lies an attempt loew balance between coercion and Initiative, between discipline and freedom, moreto the attainment of thc goals of the Soviet state. These moves have Included the amnesty of many persons sentenced to labor camps, an easing in some degree of the forced labor system, increased security of theagainst arbitrary arrest, broader cultural exchanges with thc West, and measurestoradual rise In standards of living. Industrial managers, scientists,and professional people of all kinds have been thc principal beneficiaries of these developments. But there are also signs that the Soviet peoplehole may bea more favorable altitude toward the regimeesult of slowly Improvingconditions and the increase in personal security. There isidely held opinion among the Soviet people that their lot is improving. This probablyonsiderable psychological gain for theas compared with Stalin's last years, and cases the task of the Soviet leaders ln solving their current internal problems.
On the other hand, the regime has not lost freedom of actionis the Soviet peopte. It haa control of the whole apparatus of police power, although this apparatus tuts been moved somewhat Into the background.
XTR-ET
CR BT
has not made any Irretrievable concessions and could impose on the Soviet people any course that It chose. But the mere (act that the new Soviet leaders have made gestures toward appeasing thc Soviet peopleource of possible future difficulty. While they would not need to anticipate anythingoss of control over the Soviet people if they returned to Stalin's harsher discipline, they could do so only at the costeasure of disillusionment and alienation which would hamper them in the achievement of their goals. The cost in these terms ofeversion would probably Increase the longer the present milder policy was continued.
THE ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN
The intention to reduce the Stalin myth In some degree was manifest throughout the three-year period following the dictator's death. It was evidenced by emphasis onin leadership, by efforts to rebuild Lenin as the greater figure, and by growing attacks on the "cult ofhis campaign led finally at the Twentieth Party Congress to attacks on Stalin himself, both Implicit and explicit Wc believe that this was the resulteliberate decision by the leadership.
There were probably several motivesthis decision. Thc Soviel leadersbelieved that the move would advance their current foreign policy in many respects. The attacks on Stalin were intended to blur the image of aggression and subversion which had become associated with Soviet policy, and to give the Soviet regime an appearance of respectability. The Soviet leaders probably estimated that the effects would be felt not only in neutralist countries but even in states belonging to the Western alliance.
owever, considerations relating todevelopments were almost certainly primary. The new leaders wished to repudiate Stalin's use of terror against the Soviet people "nd especially against lhe Party, to set up obstacleseturn to one-man rule, and to confirm the ascendancy of thc Party as anMoreover, they apparentlyesirable to eliminate tho absolute authority
attached to Stalin's past pronouncements In order to attain the desired flexibility in carry-lng out their new programs. The leadership probably hopes by these means to give tho regime continuity and stability, and to free It from thc hazardstruggle for power tootalitarian state is subject.
this, there were probablyrelated to the attempt to improvobetween the regime and theby relying less on coercion and morevoluntary response to attain theProbably the leaders felt that ademonstration such as the directStalin was necessary to win confidencegenuineness of their intention toeliminate the abuses of Stalin'sof terror, and Improve the material lotSoviet people.
are clearly some risks for theIn tho reduction of so authoritativeas that surrounding Stalin. Thesethe Implication that Communistincluding that embodied in thelacks the integrity andit has always claimed for itself. emphasis given to the Party asembodiment of authority and wisdomto counter this danger. TheStalin's errors is said to be that heabove the Party. Among thegenerally and especially amongrationalization has apparently failedcomplete conviction and there hasdisillusionment, though this isOn thc other hand, there arcof ordinary Soviet people who haveknowledge of the injustices practicedStalin era and who can be persuadedresponsibility even though manyabsolve the present leaders ofelite groups such as highereconomic managers, governmentand the professional military, theapparently won approval, partlyhave Intimate knowledge ofand partly because they welcomeof greater professionalenhanced security under the new
TOP
We believe that over the long run the regime will continue to be confronted with the problem of obtaining the benefitsreater measure of Individual Initiative and responsibility within the framework of asystem. It will probably not be willing to depart very far from the methods which
Stalin developed for the manipulation ofIn the Soviet state. Probably the attempt toew balance between discipline and Initiative will either fall short of winningresponse or It will evoke trends which the regime will regard as unacceptable and requiring new measures of coercion.
TOP aECRW
T
II. THE USSR'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST BLOC STATES
unique authority of Stalin as apersonality"actor in theof the Communist Blcc.probably required some redefinitionbetween the Bloc states on abasis, although this wastrue of the USSR's relations withChina than of its relations withEuropean regimes. We believesome friction and confusion,the European Satellites, the transitioncompleted without seriousthe period of this estimateBloc will probably maintainof interest and coordination
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
The concert of action between the USSR and Communist China has remained strong. Close coordination has been evidenced in the campaign for increasing friendship andrelations with non-Bloc nations. The intensity of Communist China's campaign to "liberate Taiwan" has been moderated,in accordance with Soviet tactics tointernationalhe Chinese Communists have frequently not followed the Soviet model on aspects of internal policy, but we believe that these divergences will notSino-Soviet relations. The Chinesecontinue to acknowledge frankly their dependence on Soviet aid and advice. The Soviet commitment to aid China's high priority program of industrialization wasextended well into China's Second Five-Yeart about the same an-nual level that has prevailed for the last five years.
We believe that the USSR and Communist China will continue to be closely linked not only by ideological bonds, but by common hostility to the US, by an interdependence involving Communist China's manpower and strategic location and the USSR's Industrial and technical capabilities, and by theof concerted diplomatic and economic activities. There probably are and will con-
tinue to be points of friction in thcbut not of such importance lo either party as to overbalance the joint interest in maintaining it. or to permit outside influence to affect it basically. Pciping's continuednn Moscowesources, and technical assistance willgive Moscow's views the greater weight On major questions of global policy. But Pciping's growing strength and prestige as an Asian power will probably give it increasing potential for influencing Moscow on Asian issues.
SOVIET-SATEUITE RELATIONS
he current Soviet leaders apparently believe that Stalin's policy of dictation from Moscow of virtually all aspects of Satellite affairs was not to the over-all advantage of the USSR. They apparently blame thc excessive rigidity of Moscow's control under Stalin for Yugoslavia's loss to thc Bloc, although they probably believe that no other Satellite would be able to follow Yugoslavia's course. Ihey apparently feelomewhat looser rein In internal matters which takes account of national differences and local problems will resultounder and more effective At the same time, such actions as the dissolution of the Cominform and theof Satellite leaders purged fordeviation, which have the effect ofthe Satellite regimes in an apparently more independent role, are useful steps In support of the USSR's current tactics ln foreign policy. The appearanceelaxation of SovietIn the Satellites not only suits the general "relaxation of tensions" theme, but it bears directly on the campaign to bring Yugoslavia back into the Bloc and on the effort to obtain contact andpopular front"with Socialist parties throughout the world.
he general direction In which theof the Soviet-Satellite relationship is moving now appears somewhat more clearly. There Is apparently touch greaterof inter-Satellite cooperation, although
ei(KT
arrangements will still be under Moscow's ultimate control. The Satellite regimes are being permitted to expandrelations with the West, thustheir own industrial and trading effec-tiveness. Concessions are also being made to Satellite national sentiment. They are no longer obliged to sacrifice their own prestige by applauding all things Soviet. Recent changes in Satellite- leadership, the new. though discreet, emphasis on the existence of "separate national roads tond thc withdrawal of the charges of deviation against Yugoslavia are further steps In this direction. The picture which emerges, iftrends continue throughout the period of the estimate, Is one in which tlie Satellite regimes willeal if limited autonomy in domestic affairs, and one in which their dependence on Moscow will be moremasked.
here are some risks for thc USSR in this post-Stalin course,heof exaggerated expectations in the Satellites. By permitting an atmosphere of expectant change to develop. Bloc leaders will probably stimulate new nationalist and reformist sentiment, even within the Satellite parties themselves, which could exceed thc level that they anticipated or could safely allow. In the course ot reversing Stalinist policies, particularly toward Yugoslavia, the USSR has weakened and In some casesthe position of competent andleaders. On the other hand, by seek-
ing to maintain in power many of the leaders who were Identified Willi Stalinist policies, thc USSR risks disillusioning those who believed In Ita promises of greaterand respect for national differences. Finally, the new policies willew element of complexity in Soviet-Satellitewith age-old controversies in Eastern Euiopc and differences In national tradition and temperament almost certainly Increasing in Importance.
evertheless, the basic Instruments of Soviet dominationa core of Communist careerists whose first loyalty Is lo Moscow, the functioning of Soviet advisers at key points in the Satellite armies and policethe substantial economic dependence of thc Satellites on thc USSR imposed by Soviet-directed economic plans, and the presence or proximity of Soviet armed forcewillDissatisfaction among thc Satellite populations will continue and, in the short run, may even increase and dramatize Itself in sporadic protest movements. Over the longer run. If the regimes find It possible to combine somewhat less stringent economic policies with effective discipline, anresigned and accommodating attitude may emerge among thc Satellite populations. However, if active opposition should Increase, we believe that the regimes would employ whatever measures were necessary tothemselves In power, even at the cost of abandoning their current effort to conciliate the populations under their control.
TOP
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY
POLICY
Soviet economic polky continues to be directed toward thc most rapid possible growth of the economy. The aim. slated atli Party Congress, of overtaking tlie US In production, underscores this policy and projects it well beyond the period of thbThe USSR conceives of thisprimarily in terms of heavy industrial output. Thus other sectors of the economy tend to be developed only to the extent that they support or at least do not hamper the growth of heavy Industry.
Post-Stalin Policies. While In tills most basic respect the present leaders have not altered Stalin's policy, they have apparently decided that several aspects of this policy were producing diminishing returns or evenself-defeating. First, agriculturalin the face of general population growth, and an even faster urban increase, focused attention upon the future adequacy of the food supply, upon thc wasteful use of human and other resources In agriculture, and upon the needetter diet. Secondly, the decline which the Soviet leaders probably anticipated in numbers of new industrial workers called for strenuous efforts to increase individual productivity If planned economic growth was to be achieved.3 have concentrated uponthese problems In order to Insure further advances in heavy Industry.
TTie Sixth Five-Year Plan. Sovietpolicy for most of the period of this estimate is outlined in thc Sixth Five-Year, which was announced in6 and approved byh Party Congicss in February. This plan, like Its predecessors, stresses industrial5 percent Increase in Industrialigh rate of investment Is to be maintained, still directed primarily Into heavy industry. This overriding claim upon Soviet resources, plus the requirements of the defense program, means that the growth in
consumption, although il will probably bewill continue to lag behind the growth in total output.
since future giowth alsoagricultural progress, thc manifoldon the agricultural problem willthe New Lands and cornfarming practices, higherimproved income Incentives forfarms and farmers, and strongercontrols. The increases in food andlikely to be achieved should assistby raising worker morale.in consumption on thc scalepromised will not occur until themuch more substantial increasesoutput than we now estimatelikely. Gains in industrialbe sought primarily throughand worker training, newof organization and management, andof the latest foreign andincluding some re-equipment.
policy of expanding trade wiihcountries, facilitated by offerson easy terms, wasnd the USSR clearly intends topolicy vigorously. The present leveloutput and that which wethe next five years will permitin the currently small Sovietcapital equipment to countries outsidewithout appreciably affectingThis factor, coupled withof obsolescent materiel as athe Soviet re-equipment program,substantial increases in Sovietmiliiary end-Items. By exportingand military end-items, the USSRfoodstuffs and raw materials inor costly to produce al home, andeconomic gains as well as
ECONOMIC GROWTH
he gross national product (GNP) of the USSR grew by an estimatedpercent during
TOP C R
five-year, an average annual increase ofe estimate that during tho six-yearoviet GNP will grow at nearly the same annua! rate and1 will beigher thanhis growth will come chieflyurther rise In the already high rate of capital investment, rapid gains in productivity, and substantial althoughdiminishing additions to the labor force. The rate of growth of Industrial production will slacken off somewhat, but agricultural output will probably grow about twice as fast as ineriod.
he growth rate estimated above Is higher ihan that projected inpublished. Whereas the previous estimate foresaw an increase of GNP ofercent0ith thc growth rate falling to slightly lessercent In the final year, it now appears that the GNP0 will be aboutercentnd that even1 the growth rate will still exceed 6This revision Is based upon theamount of new data which hasavailable in recent months and which has led us to revise upward our previous estimates of the growth of consumption and therefore of GNP for thc Fifth Five-Year Plan; upon the strong growth trends observednd, most importantly, upon an analysis of the Sixth Five-Year Plan which
'Theof estimating Soviet ONP Isnot only by incomplete data but byrhffleulUes aa well The presenthave benefitted rrotn the increaseddata made available In recent Sovietalthough Important gap*In th. military sector, aaor the conceptual problems,important relates to the compositionf'om the absence of
aerieulture. This haa been resolved byalue from analogoushe USSlnCe ,h"rocedure accounts ?nvif. Pe"?nt of ourestimate ol Um?ll0n' *
0 regard these eatt-mateseasonably correct sUUmcnt of the
econon^ ovkl
persuades us that mostof thc major industrial targets will be fulfilled. The plannedIn the armed forces, if largely carried out, will alleviate labor shortages, probably thc most serious hindrance to achievement of these goals.
erowth rate of Soviet GNP isthat experienced by the USthe past five years and anticipatedcoming period.esult, theof the Soviet economy increasedone third of the US economy inaboutercent5 and willaboutercentowever,gap between the two economiesto widen over this period.relationships obtain between theof the US and the NATOthe one hand and the Sino-Soviet Blocother. (Secased solelyprojection of present trends, thebetween the Soviet and US GNPsits widest point in the seconds and would then begin to narrow
Distribution of GNP
utilising its growing output, thecontinue to increase the shareinvestment We estimate thatwill rise from about5 to aboutercent) Because of the growth inthis period, Investment will be aboutlarger in the later year.will probably grow byart because of continuedits relative share of ONP willo aboutercent. (Forincreases In per capitan contrast, the US inaboutercent of its GNP toandercent lo investment.
US prices, Soviet investmentillion, or aboutercentinvestment, while consumption wasbillion, orercent of USabout one fifther capitadollar value of total defense expenditures
illion, or
percent of US defense expenditures.
RE"
ECRK
estimate of the ruble costs of past and projected military programs indicates that total defense expenditures will probably rise by aboutercent3Since GNP will probably grow at an even higher rate (about SOhe relative military burden on the economy shouldslightly over this period. The detailed study of defense expenditures Indicates that5 not only was thc dollar value of total Soviet defense expenditures approximately equal to US expenditures, but also that the dollar value of Soviet hard goods procurement was about equal to that of similar goodsby thc US.
That thc Soviet Union by expendingercent of lis ONP in rubles can obtain defense goods and services equal in dollar value to those of thc US. which is expending for the same activitiesercentNP two and one half limes as large, is explained by two important economic conditions. First, the average level of real pay and subsistence provided to Soviet servicemen, like the general standard of living, is very much lower than tn the US. Secondly, the Soviel armamentis one of the USSR's most efficientThe dollar and ruble comparisons above do not mean that the Soviet armament industry is more efficient than the USindustry. On the contrary, it is likely that productivity (production per man) in the
estimate Is based upon an Inter-agency stndv. details of which appear In Appendix D. As explainededuction ofillion men In the armed lorces would lower defense expenditures In 1M1 by some ii IS billion rubles: correjpor.iUr.fly. the Increase In5 and IM would fall loercent. On the otber hand, expenditures for the guided missile program have almostbeen understated in theTheremit of these two factors cannot bebut Itlear that they will offset each other lo some extent
Note: The Assistant Chief of SUM. InteUigence. Department ol Uie Army does not consider the cosj derived in the inter-agencyto be aappraisal of the over-all reals of theiliury erloit and does not concur In Uie ftnd-utn of iho study. (See footnote to Appendix
See also Uio footnote by the Director of Kavstf intelligence attached to Appendixaragraph 1.
Soviet armament industry Is lower thanin the corresponding US Industry. However, the Soviet armament industry Is very much more efficient than Sovietand the consumer goods industries. While productivity in Soviet armamentapproaches that of the US. Sovietin consumer goods Is much lower and agriculture Is only about one-seventh that in the US.uble will buy only about seven cents worth of goods andhen spent tor consumption goods and services but will purchase fromoents worth when spent for defenseThus, for example, if each countryorker from agriculture to defense Industry, the Soviet worker will produceas much armaments as the Americanbut the loss of his production inIs far less than the corresponding loss in the US and the sacrifice Involved Is less.
DEVEIOPMENTS IN INDUSTRY
espite the present size of Sovietoutput,oderate decline in its liigh growth rate Is estimated In lhe coming five years. The major factorsontinued high rate of growth, estimated at overercent per year during the period of this estimate, will be continuing heavy capital investment, increases In the number andof workers, and improvements In managerial and technical efficiency. We estimate that total industrial output willIncrease byercent or more in the Sixth Plan as compared withercent in tbe Fifth. Output1 will probably beercent or more above5 level. (Seeor the estimated output of selected industrial commodities.)
f particular interest is the trend in the output of heavy industry, which Is basic to future growth, military strength, andto export capital goods. In this sector, the increase during the Sixth Plan period will probably amount toercent or more as againstercent during thc Fifth. The rate of growth of heavy Industry nevertheless remains strikingly larger than that of the US and will provide the USSR0 with
ER
SECRET
TABLB 1
OUTPUT OF SELKCTKI) INDUSTRIAL I'RODUCTS
USSR
H
Power (billion kwh)
Petroleum (million tons) *
(million tons)
Steel (million tonal
Copper (thousand tons)
(thousand tons)
(million tons)
Tools (thousand units)
Carsxle equivalent units)
(thousand units)
Ammonia (thousand tons) *
Fabrics (million meters)
Machines (thousand units)
(thousand tons, slaughter wgt.)
stimates, except In the case of meat,ne-year projection from the0 targets, which we estimate will be substantially achieved. 'Figures In tons throughout the table are metric tons.
'US production of machine toots fluctuates considerably from year to year. Thc recent highnits2 and the peak outputnitsoreover, the proportion of heavy,and special purpose tools Is higher tn the US.
mostly for nitrogenous fertiliser.
3ECH8T
C-RET
output equivalent to aboutercent of US heavy industrial production.
We estimate that most announced Soviet targets for commodity output0 will bo fulfilled, particularly in producer goods, and that there willumber ofof production goals for major products. The most doubtful elements in heavy industry are thc target for installing new generating capacity, which will probably not be met, and the goals for production of non-ferrous metals, which will be fulfilled only with considerable difficulty. Fulfillment of the plan for large increases In the production of machinery and equipment may require more than thecapital expenditures planned for this industry. Failure to reach overambitlous agricultural goals will result In underfulflil-ments In light industry.
Investment. Of the total investment during the. two-thirds will be devoted to Industry, the same share which this sector received during the Fourth and Fifth Five-Year Plans. The division of this investment between heavy and light industry will continue1 ratio. Heavy capital requirements for increasing output of electric power, petroleum, chemicals, metals,non-ferrous, and construction materials, willeduction in the Investment priority previously accorded to the machine building and metal-working sector, wherein output outstripped alleriod. The proportion of total investment devoted to transportation will be approximately the same as under thc Fifth Five-Year Plan. Due to the emphasis on investment to provide more efficient Tunc-turning of all forms of transport, we believe that the transport requirements of the Soviet economy will be mot.
abor Force. Because the effect ofwartime birth rates will soon begin tofelt in fewer entrants to the labor force, the USSR can expect population growth lo piovide fewer new workers, perhaps three million less, during the Sixth Plan than dur-ng the Fifth. Armed forces reductions of ine size announced, however, would help to reduce this difference. The Increase in the
Industrial labor force, which grewuring the Flflh Plan, will fallercent In the Sixth.'
Despite probablethe labor force resulting from athe strength of the armed forces,per worker will have to rise faster Inplan than in the old if outputto be met and shorter workingAlthough the USSR recognizesincentives influence productivity,hopes are placed upon supplyingforcearger volume ofThis policy Is reflected inprogram, which calls forin expenditures for newthan in expenditures for theof new plants, though thc latterabsorb thc major share ofA considerable share of thiswill be used to replaceIn existing plantsuchrate lhan heretofore.
as Soviel priorities have producedstructure which appearscontrast with consumer orientedso they haveatternprogress which has beenin comparison to that ofMilitary production hasmost intensive development, anddefense-related Industries haveadvanced technological levels.making of ordinary steels, the bestare fully comparable to US plants,the industryhole is not. In
Sixth Plve-Year Plan provides for anof onlyercent In the Industrial labor force. Planned Increases In the Industrial labor force appear to be cuslomarUy kept low inof gain* In producUvlty to be made. Wben these gains do not materialize, laborare then relieved by abort-plan aJlocauom of labor. Thus though the Fifth Plan slto eaUed ror0 percent Increase In fact someillion above-plan workers werened to Industry during the course of the plan These were drawn largely from the collecUve farms. Agriculture's higher priority probably will not permit similar transfers daring the SUlh Plan, but armed force reducUona would serve as another Jtource of Industrial Ubor.
3EC-KBT--*
ntctalcutltng processes, ihe USSR isar with or noi far behind Uic US in machinery design and process mechanization, but it has only just begun the application ot automated control systems. Production processes are less advanced in metal form lug machinery, electric power generation, coal mining, and the chemicals industry; and they lag badly In the low-priority consumer industries. On an over-all basis, the USSR's smaller quantity of modern equipment and lower level ofare probably the majorabor productivity in heavy industry which is less than half that of the US.
his lag Isough measure of the USSR's potential for increasing Industrial productivity. Thc Sixth Five-Year Plan calls0 percent Increase In productivity. However the government has sinceeduction in working hours which wouldaercent increase In productivity per man-hour if this goal is to be reached. This we doubt can be achieved, but wethat productivity will increase during the Sixth Five-Year Plan more than theercent which we estimate was achievedthe Fifth. Productivity gains will result chiefly from modernization of plants and from Introduction of advanced domestic andtechnology. The intensive efforts toplanning, restore order lo the wage system, and raise efficiency through greater plant specialization and better interplantwhich have received little attention in the pastare intended toomprehensive reform of Soviet industry and to make an importantto productivity. Enlargement of the area of managerial initiative may also contribute to this result. On the otherore active party role in thc operation of Industry may limit thc importance of this factor.
In summary, we believe that the USSR will meet its0 targets for total Industrial output and for most important heavy industrial commodities. Sufficient above-plan workers will probably be available JJ compensate for any failures U> meetgoals, and the transitionhour work week could be slowed down if
necessary. Major shortfalls arc exivclcd only in some branches of light Industiy, where plan fulfillment will be prevented bysupplies of agricultural raw materials.
Regional Distribution of Industry. Soviet industry will probablyegional shift of considerable importance during the Sixth FIvc-Ycar Plan, although the bulk will still be located in European Russia and the Urals About half of the news scheduled to occur In the Urals and eastward, and1 this area Is to produce more iron and steel than did the entire USSR0 and more electric power and cement than did thc whole countrySec map on followingarge share of the new plants built in thc nexl five years arc to be located in this region, leaving Industry In European USSR to rely heavily on re-equipment of existing plants and otherin achieving planned increases In production. The construction of new rail lines will also be concentrated east of the Urals.
The development of this region Is based upon the harnessing of thc Siberian rivers with hydoelcctric stations at Irkutsk,ond Bratsk, the exploitation of large iron and coal reserves, and development of tlic large but mainly low-grade deposit* of non-ferrous metals in Kazakhstan. Movement to the Interior may be In part intended to reduce the strategic vulnerability of Soviet industry, but considerations of future economic growth are probably of greater importance, since the little-developed resources of this area offer greater long-run potential than furthero( the maturer regions of theUSSR.
DEVELOPMENT IN AGRICULTURE
agriculture5 showed theresponse to the multipleexpanding output which werethe preceding two years. Good yieldsin the Ukraine, and gainsa large expansion of acreage in thearea were only partially offsetThese circumstances. Inwllh the com program, raised grainproduction by aboutercent over
Potato output declined, however, and technical cropsixed pattern, sugar beets and flax expanding rapidly but cotton production (ailing Livestock numbersonly slowly and meat production grew scarcely at all, but improved (odder supplies contributed lo an increase of aboutercent in milk production.
Further growth In agricultural output will almost certainly result from the higheraccorded to agriculture3 and projected forward in thc Sixth FIve-Ycar Plan. State Investment In this sectors planned at twice the amount investednd will requireercent or total state investments as against only eight percenturther adjustments in prices paid to collective (arms and farmers appear lo be In prospect in the continuing effort to provide the incentives which previous policies had neglected. In contrast to the. when agriculture was called upon toontinual flow of workers to industry, agriculture will receive labor from the urban areas or al least hold its own. Most important of all, solution of agriculturalhas been defined as lhe major task o( the party membership.
Through local recruiting and transfers from urban areas, lhe parly has built up its rural strengthillion members7 to over three millionhishas grcally Increased theability lo execute Its programs and may permit greater flexibility in adapting these programs to localotably weak point In earlier agricultural campaigns. It has also made moreesumption of the drive against private (arming, evidenced in higher requirements for participation In communal laborecreeihat collectives "voluntarily" reduce the private plots and livestock holdings of their members. In contrast to Stalin's crude attacks, the present campaign isby higher incentives for communal work and ia based on thorough poliUcalIf it remains gradual, slateover agriculture will probably become more effective, but any sudden acceleration runs Uie danger of provoking peasant resist-
anceecline In output. Tlie keyin this program is whether the newmeasures will eucit sufficientamong the peasants to Induce them to regard the collective farm rather lhan iheir private holdings as the meansolerable and impioving standard ofurther pressure on the private sector is reflected in programs to increase state (ami output,of commodities competitive with those sold by Individual peasants in the free market.
Prediction Is particularly hazardous In Soviet agriculture, but an Increase of about one-fourth in the total value of farm output appears likely over thcbecause of an increase in qualitysuch as meat, milk, and fibers. This rate of growth is about double that achieved during the Fifth Five-Year Plan but farthe Sixth's official target ofercent. Our estimate allows some success to the New Lands and corn programs, despite climatic dangers and high coats. Although someacreage expansions can be expected, most of the gains In grain production will come from the improved yields which should resultreater than two-fold Increase in the combine park for small grains and. in the case of corn, from lhe use of hybrid seeds, further machinery supplies, and anof experience. We estimate that grain output1 will probably beIons against an5 harvestillion Urns and an0 targetillion.
Because current Soviet agricultural policy focuses upon higher outputs of livestocktwo-thirds of this Increase will be in fodder grains, in which unripened cornearly in climatically Inhospitable areas willajor role. This program has already produced good results in the higher milk yields of cows wintered on this feed. Increasesercent in meat and milk production over there expected to result primarily from higher productivity per animal rather than from larger herds, although swine numbers probably will grow significantly since they do not compete seriously with cattle for the
meadow and pasture areas. These increases, while far below Ihe0 targetsoubling of production, will nevertheless represent Important gains.
DEVEIOPMINTS IN CONSUMPTION
per capita consumption rose atrate of about Ave percent perthc Fifth Five-Year Plan and isto rise at about four percent perthe Sixth, raising the livingover one-quarter5 andis an appreciable improvement inwelfare, even though part of it isthan real, reflecting merely thewith urbanization, from theof goods made at home tothe market Allhough this livingstilt be low by Western criteria, Itnotause of seriousthe Soviet citizen will almostto experience steadymaterial welfare. Neither will Sovietappearark against thesystem in the eyes of most Asians.and Africans, accustomed toper capita levels of consumption.
estimated gains in agriculturalwill be the major factor in improvingstandard since agriculture providesfor about three-quarters of Soviet Per capita supplies of1 are expected to bendrespectively,5f durable consumer goodsexceed these rates. However,fall of! from the high rates ofoutput will be modest, and theseremain available only toHistorically, consumer goodshas suffered whenever Industry hasof resources, producer goods havingpriority. An importantoccur In urban housing, where theper capita space will rise by
'The rise In the value of per capita consumpUon of agricultural products will run ahead of theln total agitcultural output because of Increases In the value added by processing and packaging.
the distribution of personalhigher agricultural prices paid sincenarrowed somewhat thc gapand urban Incomes and willdo so during the coming five years,pension and wage rates are to behigher pension rates are to be cut.will tend to reduce somewhatclass differentiations whichand social policies had produced.
DEVEIOPMENTS IN FOREIGN IRADE
expansion of Soviet foreignhas been fairly rapid in recentoff5 atprimarily to the fact that tradeBloc partners, which accountsfour-fifths of the total, remainedunchanged. (See Tableewin trade within thc Bloc areresult from Communist China'sfor Soviet assistance ln itsprogram and the increasingthe Soviet and East European
TABLE II
njDBX_OF VOLUMEOFLSOVJBr FOI?) Bloc
6
'5
162
n its trade with thc Free Worldhe USSR substantially increased its exports as compared4 nnd reduced itsnotably of foodstuffs, thuseficitough balance of trade.Europe's share of Soviet trade with the Free World rose slightly to over four-fifths. The share of manufactured goods in Soviet exports continued to increase, and while the USSRarge net importer of capital
SBC-RE-T
f-
in its Free World trade, its own capital exports are rising. We estimate that .Soviet trade with non-Bloc countries will rise during the next Ave years, with developed countries continuing to account for the major share.
The most important development inforeign economic relations5 was the rapid acceleration of the USSR'sto establish the claim that it canajor source ol economic assistance tocountries, although the volume of trade with these countries docs not yet loom large in total Soviet trade. The most dramatic feature of this campaign, In which Communist China and the Europeanare also participating, ls Bloc offers of capita! equipment, military goods, and related technical services. These offers Includepayment at low interest rates,in local currencies or exportablewhich the underdeveloped countries find unsalable in other markets atprices. Bloc offers of medium and long-term credit now exceed one billion dollars, and credit agreements totaling more0 million have been reachedncludingndillion).
During the coming Ave years, Soviet trade with underdeveloped countries will probably exceed5 level of0 million by several times,ubstantial share financed by credit. Inhe USSR, seeking to industrialize rapidly, exchanged, its low-cost foodstuffs and raw materials forequipment from Western Europe and theuarter century of Industrial growth, agricultural neglect, and exploitation of the most high grade and accessible raw materials has so reduced the cost of manufactured goods relative to those of food and raw materials in the Soviet Union that it Is now economically profitable to export capital equipment infor the food and raw materials of other countries now seeking to industrialize. In Edition to economic considerations, this stage of development coincideseriod In Which the USSR can profit politically from such trade. The USSR's success In Industrial development as against its poorer agricultural
record and prospects provides furtherfor this kmd of trade policy.
Soviet economic capabilities are adequate toonsiderable expansion of Soviet trade and credit programs withcountries in the next several years.shipments of capital goods and arms to all countries have more than doubledredit extensions by the USSH to non-Blcc countries amount at present to lessO million, or about one-third of oneof Soviet GNP. Tlie USSR has afor expanding exports of capital goods which is large relative to thc probableof these countries, and the estimatedercent increase in production ofand equipment during the Sixth Five-Year Plan will further increase this capability. In addition, central planningtateof trade provide the USSR with anover capitalist countries in theof internal and external policies, giving it great freedom In directing its foreign trade for maximum political as well as economic advantage.
While past policy has severely limitedtrade, historic Soviel fears of losingindependence through reliance onsources appear to have been reduced by the strength ot the Soviet economy and by the creation of the Bloc market. The Sovietapparently realizearginal degree of reliance upon non-Bloc sources of supply, especially for products of advancedfor certain foods, and (or some rawIs preferableore rigid policy of autarky, since it offers the promise of more rapid rates of economic growth. In addition, they see opportunities in such trade programs for promoung neutralism in thecountries and encouraging politicalfavorable to the USSR and its economic achievements under Communism. Thesize of the trade and credit program with, underdeveloped countries is likely to depend as much on conditions in and the policies of these countries as on Soviet willingness and ability to expand these exchanges.*
a more detailed assessment, seeSlno-Sovlet Policy and Its Probable Effects
tMAprtI
SEC it
TOP-S
IV. SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY"
RESOURCES AND POIICY
Soviet scientific and technical capabilities continue to expand rapidly. Although total Soviet scientific resources remain smaller than those of the US, and assets of the Sino-Soviet Bloc far smaller than those of thc West, the USSR has been able to achieve near parity with the US in areas of critical military and Industrial significance. By Increasing the emphasis on science and technology and by controlling thc allocation of scientificand facilities, the Soviet regime bas developedmall original baseby past exploitation of Western science enough competence to provide expert scientific support for priority military and economic programs.
Trained Manpower. We estimate that the USSR as ofasraduates of scientific and technical curricula given at the university level;f these are post-World War II graduates. The number of these graduates actually cm-ployed in scientific and technical fields in theompares closely with that in the US. However, the USSR Is nowsubstantially more trained scientists and engineers annually than the US. Iftrends continue, byhe USSR will have more graduates employed inand technical fields than the US and aboutercent more In physical sciences and engineering."
n the postwar period thc quality ofscientific training has been generally good and has approached and In some cases surpassed US levels. However, the number engaged in research and teaching In the
Capabilities and Trends In Soviet Science and Technology" la scheduled for early publication.
* Numerical ceUmates of Soviet scientificarc believed lo be correct within plus or minusercent. For detailed comparison of ussn and UB scientific personnel, see graphics on Iho following page.
physical sciences and engineering Issmaller In the USSR than In theoreover, the practical and experimental aspects ot engineering training have been traditionally weak, although efforts are being made to overcome this. Weaknesses Intraining will not, however, affect Soviet ability to achieve technological objectives to which priority Is attached.
Scientific Facilities. Financial support, organizational direction, and the quality of laboratories arc generally adequate for the effective utilization of scientific talent.complex research instruments are probably In shorter supply than in the US or UK. we believe that present Soviet research and development programs of majorare hampered only slightly by shortages or nonavailability of scientific instruments and equipment. On the other hand,of lower priority are probably hamperedreater extent. We believe that1 the USSR will have made further substantial progress In research and development Inwhich is basic to instrumentation, and will have achieved near equality with the US in research instruments.
Basic Research. The quality of Soviet basic research in mathematics, and in niany fields of physics and chemistry is believed about equal to that of the US. New evidence indicates striking progress over the past few years in such Important fields as nuclear physics, geophysics, high-speed digitalhigh-temperature alloys, and theof automation.
Ideological obstacles to scientific research and developmentnever of importance! in the major Industrial or war-supporting fieldswill probably diminish in consequence of the repudiation of both past doctrinal rigidity and an outwardly contemptuous attitudeWestern technology. Recognition of
"See the category -Scientificn Uie graphics on the following page.
RKT-
retarding effects In certain phases of biological and agricultural sciences wasin the recent demotion of Lysenko and In Soviet purchases of US hybrid corn.In these fields (and in agricultural ma-ctiinery) were probably caused, however, more by official emphasis on other areas of research and development than by ideologicaland will probably be partly remediedgricultural research ls now more Intelligently directed than In the past toward solving the essential problems of increasing per acre crop yields and livestock production. There Ls an evident intention to profit from USuch fields of current Soviet emphasis as mineral fertilizers, chemicals to control crop and livestock pests, and crop breeding.
The Satellite scientific contribution to Soviet technological development ls largely in optics, electronics, communication equipment, synthetic fibers, and pharmaceuticals. Its relative importance will probably diminish during the next five years because ofSoviel capabilities in these fields.
Nonprofessional technicians. The USSR Is not as well supplied with technicians,and maintenance men as arc the Western Industrial countries, where broader sections of the population have acquiredskillsonger period.of maintenance are also generally lower than in these countries.oviethave partly compensated for these deficiencies by building machines andwhich are simple in design and easy to maintain and repair. Considerable progress has been made during the last decade inthe supply of nonprofessionalpersonnel, and the present emphasis on specialized training after lower school should significantly increase the number availableyear lower school program of the USSR, which is gradually replacing the former seven-year curriculum, alsoigh proportion of scientific and technicalof use In training nonprofessional
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICALOF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE
Soviet technology In heavy Industry hasamiliarity with the mostskillsapability for adapting and introducing modern techniques, whether self-developed or borrowed, into their rapidly expanding industrial base. However, Soviet practices were initially backward, and theof new techniques has often been slowed by reluctance to replace obsolete but still workable equipment. Thus, while the best Soviet practices ln many industries can be generally considered equivalent to those of the West, the average level of Soviet practices still lags considerably behind that of the West.
Thc USSR plans to increase greatly the emphasis on automation In Industrialduring the current Five-Year Planprogress in this sphere will probably be less than in simple mechanization and re-equipment. In the technology of chemical production the USSR generally lags wellUS practice, but the USSR is nowajor efiort to develop new techniques in petrochemistry. In the metals industry,in rolling and finishing technology have lagged badly behind advances In most other divisions, although further progress is likely during the period of this estimate.ability to design metal-cutting machinery is believed to be comparable to that of the US, and with respect to ceramic tools forcutting the USSR is superior to the US.
Soviet medical science is generallybut behind that of the major Western countries in some areas of basicresearch. Clinical research and practices are nearly comparable to Western standards, and Soviet work In biochemistry, hematology, and physiology has been outstanding.in the latter field coniinue to be applied to mental and physicaland there hasartialof the science of psychology from the rigid doctrinal bonds of the Stalin era.
SCIENTIFIC ANO TECHNICALOF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE
USSR almost certainly has tlieand technological capability necessaryweapons and militaryarc generally equal to those of olherand in the technological race therewhen in certain fields the USSRbe ahead of the US. and times whenwill outstrip the USSR. Thoughprobably cannot carry outsimultaneously In all fields,resources are adequate loprogramsariety of
Nuclear Weapons"
esult of new evidence wc haveupwardactor of about four our prcvlous estimates of past and future Soviet production. The element ofin our current estimate of pastIs very large, but the error probably does not exceed plus or minusercent."Our estimate ofroducllon is subject to further variables, such production being dependent primarily on Soviet plans and decisions and is therefore less reliable than the estimate6 cumulative
A highly significant development during the past year was the airburst on
3 This test, together with thc above revision in our fissionable materials
"Sec, "Tho Soviet Atomic EnergyS IRESTRICTKO DATA) for fuller details and dissent*.
"The IM ice tor of Naval Intelligence believes these estimatesroducUon ba be too high. He believes that for planningoramagnitude would beange below that of the minus SO percent lower limit of this
"The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that the new intelligence does not adequately support Uie estimateJ1 cumu-IsUreore practical figure for planning would be one In the lower range of uncertainty approaching the minusercent lower limit given for IBM.
estimate, leads us to estimate thatignificant mulllmegatonand willajor capabilitynear future. The USSR could havedeveloping an emergency capabilityand havethe5 typeulyit did noi encounter fabricationthis lime, it could be in full-scaleso Ihat it could have convertedportion oftockpile
he USSR is now capable ofyield of the5 typefurther developmental
advances. Future developments willlead to increasing the nuclear efficiency, yields, and delivcrability of high-yieldWc estimate that prototypes of high-yield missile warheads (though with yields
will be
tested.
oviet interest In low-yield, smallweapons is well established by Sovietdoctrine and by the targe proportion of low-yield weapons or devices detonated In lhe test series6 [_
"} Improved
efficiencies, which will permit "moreuse for air defense, are expected by
The USSR conducted its firstatomic test near Novaya Zcmlya onhich opens new vistas Into the development of atomic weaponsariety of naval uses, resultingignificant increase in the over-all Soviet nuclearcapability.
Available evidence indicates that the USSR is presently stockpiling and willtoersatile family of nuclear weapons, ranging from very low-yieldto high-yield thermonuclear weapons. We cannot determine with any degree of ceilainty the probable number of nuclear weapons of each type since this will depend
27
strategic and other factors. However, In order to provide an appreciation of Soviet stockpileew arbitrarystockpiles under varying strategicare given below. It Ls emphasised that these arc purely illustrative, as the USSR can utilize its fissionable material Ln any number of weapons combinations.1*
Arbitrary Examples of Soviet Stockpileas OfAssuming overriding priority toweapons for attack on alliedand relatively less emphasis ontypes of medium and low-yieldYield L
Medium
Low Yield
ssuming roughly equal priorityyield and to various types oflow-yield
High Yield
Medium
Low
Arbitrary Examples of Soviet Stockpileas of
close to maximumhigh-yield weapons; limitedmedium-yield; considerablelow-yield weapons, primarily for air
High Ylcldt*
Medium
Low Yield
roughly equal prioritymedium, and low-yield weapons,primarily for air defense:
High
Medium
Low Yield
uclear Power. The Soviets haveconsiderable progress in nuclear clec-
]
nalysis of these various alternatives end tht reasoning behind them, as well as forof calculating other alternative stockpiles, see. It should be noted that the dluents of tbe Director of Naval Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Intelligence. The Joint Staff, also apply to these stockpile
I
trie power reactor development. We estimate that It Is capable of meeting the ambitious
goals of the Sixth Five-Year PlanW of Installed capacity by thc endut this achievement willery
high priority effort.
uclear Propulsion. The slate of Soviet reactor technology also indicates that the USSR is capable of developing propulsionWe estimate it couldeactor suitable for submarine or surface ship application. The Soviet akretaft propulsion program probably will not progress beyond the research phase prior
Guided Missiles"
e believe thai the strategic requirements of the USSR haveajor effort in the field of guided missiles. Fromarge number of personalities and activities associated with missile development, recent statements of Soviet leaders, observed air defense sites around Moscow, and other material, we have concluded that the USSR Is engaged In an extensive guidedigh priority. The USSR has an adequate economic baseizableprogram; and we are convincedfrom our knowledge of Soviet exploitation ofmissile experience and evidence of Soviet capabilities in related fieldsthat the USSR has thc basic scientific and technicaltoomprehensive research and development program. We believe that the USSR now has surface-to-air guided missiles in at least limited operational states, and could have guided missiles in limitedstatus in the other three categories (air-to-snrfacc, alr-lo-air, andoviet missile capabilities will continue to grow during the period of this estimatewe have little firm Information on the specific characteristics of the missile models
"Toe fuller discussion of Soviet guidedeeding estimates of thc dates when various types of missiles might appear In operational use. seeZ-SS. "Soviet Guided Missileand Probableublishedhis will be superseded bySoviet Oulded MUstle Capabilities and Probableo be published in October
-6ECRET-
USSR is presently develop big, ov may now have in operational use.'*
Electronics
he magnitude, diversity, and pasto( the Soviet research and development program in electronics Indicate the probable development of new and improved electronicduring the period of this estimate. Soviet air defense capabilities will probably be enhanced by continuing Improvements in detection, warning, interception, and data-handling equipment Air offensiveare likely to be Improved by an increase in accuracy of Soviet navigational equipment and bombing radars, which will probably be comparable in performance to WesternSoviel research on communication theory will probably result in improvements In communication techniques, radar,automatic guidance devices, and telemetering, and could lead over the next five years to developmentommunication network exceedingly difficult to intercept or lam.
a. Early Warning Radarhe USSRarge variety of EW radars in use. Including World War II sets, native sets based on Western designs, and sols of purely native design. Most of the older sets will probably be replaced by the endoviet radar coverage Is estimated to be fairly reliable against jet medium bombers at maximum rangesiles (up0 feet altitude)iles (up0 feet.8 the USSR will probably have developed one or more EW radars capable of detecting Jet medium bombers0 feet upistance ofiles, or under certain circumstances to as much. The problem of low altitude coverage will still exist, but probably will be greatly lessened by the use of moving target indicators and gap-flHer radars.
b. Ground-Confrof Intercept Radare estimate that8 the USSR will have GCI radars of new types aa well as thetypes now in use:cam sets
"For estimates of tnecapabWUes of Soviet forces to employ guided mlaalles. seeX
which are probably capable or coverage on Jet medium bombers at maximum reliable ranges ofautical miles,he paired combinations of long-range aiimuth indicating sets (GAGE) and height Indicating sets (PATTYhich collectively can provide GCI data We believe that1 GCI coverage will be increased lo thc olderiles and perhaps beyond. Ranges of this sort would require the use of transponder beacons not now known to be installed in interceptor aircraft.eliablecoverage will be achieved up to0 feet, though at less thanranges.
Intercept Radar (AI).intercept radar is now in extensivebest equipment expected to bethe nexl five years may haveranges againsi mediumautical miles for searchiih range accuracy ofards and angular accuracy ofminus one degree The best of thccurrently available mayperformance.
Bombing and NavigationalUSSR has operationalandset. which will probably beBy the end7 we estimatebest Soviet blind bombing andradar will be capable of operating atup0 feet, and will haveautical miles forand navigation accuracies willequivalent lo those of WesternThe use of frequencies higheris unlikely for tlie present, butachieved by
Control Radar. The WHIFFSoviet version of theillto be used In quantity,ewCAN. Ls coming into quanUtysets with even greater accuracies,and reduced vulnerability tomight appear at any time. Thcprobably be used for newly developedradars.
I. Electromagnetic Warfare. The USSR presently has the capability of seriouslyWestern long-range radio commurd-
QT T-
nnd electronic navigational Systems. Capabilities in related electronic fieldstbat the USSR is probably capable of clectionlc lamming at frequencies0 megacycles, and possibly considerably higher0 lhe USSR may haveequipment ln operational use Inranges0 megacycles. Evidence indicates that the USSR Is now training In the use of "chart."
g. Microwave Communications. Microwave communication equipment Ls in wide use in East Germany, and we believe lhat existing fixed networks in the Soviet Union and some other Bloc areas areecent marked decrease in Soviet orders forrelay sets from the Satellites probably indicates that Soviet expansion of microwave communications will be accomplished largely with Soviet equipment.heminimum channel capacity for long distance civil circuits willnd thewill be suitable forignal many times without serious degradation.research in semiconductors Indicates that0 transistors will be used extensively in communication equipment, which will thus bo much lighter and less power-consuming than present-day counterparts.
Biological Warfare
he USSR has the technical knowledge, trained personnel, and facilities necessary for conducting an extensive program in BWand development AccumulatedIndicates lhat the USSR is almostengaged inrogram, probably Including antipersonnel, antllivestock, and possibly anticrop agents. The scope and magnitude of the program cannot be Judged from the Information available, but the organisms of at least four human diseases
(anthrax, tularemia, plague, and brucellosis) and two animal diseases (foot-mouth and rinderpest) are bcheved to haveW ngents.
USSR IsM has thc facilities,and materials needed for theof BW agents, although weevidence of such production atbelieve that iturrent capabilityBW operations againstlivestock, and certain crops, and acapability generallythat of Western countries. Sovietfor clandestine and possibly forof BW agents will probablyto be expanded, and defensiveImproved.
Chemical Warfare
World War II, the USSRof the standard chemical agentsequipment for chemicalUSSR is believed lo have maintainedits wartime toxic munitions stockpilessome peacetime production ofagents. While present productionnot known, the USSR has theskills available to produceons of toxic agents per year. would consist primarily ofand such nerve gases as OA (Tabun)small quantity, GB (Sarin). Sovietreserves are believed sufficientlarge-scale operations for Soviet defensive capabilitiescomparable to those of During the period of thisUSSR will probably conduct researchtypes of toxic agents. Including theand possibly certain
TOP-S
V. SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTHS
IN SOVIET MILITARY THINKING
n the last lew years Soviet strategic eon-cepts and the Soviet military establishment have btenrocess of evolution, dictalud both by the advent of nuclearand advanced delivery systems and by the fact that the USSR'* chief potential enemy, the US. lay beyond the reach of traditional Soviet military power. Whereas formerlyforces were designed almost exclusively lor massive land battles on the Eurasianthey now include substantial long-range air and submarine forces designedfor the contingencyonflict with tbe US which would not be limited to Eurasia.
Soviet military thinking through the end of World War II emphasised traditionalviet territorial objectives, Stalinist concepts of "permanently operating factors" determining the outcomear. and battle-tested methods of employing the variousof military power. In the immediate postwar period, the Soviet continental base position and the strengths and weaknesses of existing Soviet military, political,and economic asset* dictated an"Eurasian" strategic concept. Inthe world balance of military forces Soviet planners apparently recognized that their only significant military advantage lay in the preponderant Soviet capability for landon the Eurasian continent. Sovietplanning probably reflected the belief that in thc event of war It would be necessary to overrun rapidly as much of the Eurasian land mass as possible, particularly thc strong economic and military base in Western Europe.
The USSR has probably continued to recognize in its military thinking the great importance of the Eurasian area for Soviet strategic interests and has thereforeto maintain and modernize large ground and tactical air forces. At the same time, the USSR evidently came to appreciate that the Drimary military threat which it faced was
from growing US nuclear striking power. Consequently, emphasis was fhst given to the strengthening of Soviet air defenses,the early production ol Jot interceptors and the creation of an early warning screen extending to the borders of the newly acquired Satellites. The USSR also undertook afor strengthening and increasing the range of the Soviet submarine fleet In order to Interdict overseas reinforcement ofareas In event of war. Concurrently, the USSR embarked on an Intensive research and development program for the production of new weapons systems In order to overtake and surpass Western technologicaland toapability for direct atiack on thc US. High priority was given to developing nuclear weapons, improvedequipment, long-range bombers, and various types of guided missiles.
There is additional evidence of change La Soviet military thinking. It was only after World War II that the USSR began seriously totrategic air capability.the formulation of new concepts was probably given freer rein by thc emergence after Stalin's death3 of an atmosphere moro conducive to an objectiveof strategic questions, and there has been considerable discussion of the significance of strategic surprise on the outcome ofactor which Stalin's pronouncements tended to play down. The nature of operations in the Initial stagear, including surprise nuclear attacks, has been closely examined.
The concentrated effort given to theof nuclear capabilities demonstrates that the Soviet leaders have for some lime been aware of the significance of the new weapons. They have probably recognized that the US nuclear capability remains superior to that of the USSR, despite strenuous efforts made to build up thc latter. This assessment, together with the great relative geographic advantage derived by the US from Itsof nuclear forces around the periphery of the Bloc, as well as on the more remote
BORBT-
In the continental US. hu probably led thc Soviet leaders to conclude that at piesont thc USSR, even if Iturprisewould receive unacceptable damageuclear exchange with the US. Therefore, the Soviet leaders have almost certainlythat their principal efforts must be directed toward countering Westernnuclear capabilities. Aside frompolitical means to this end (such asto disrupt the alliances whichbases for deployment of US strategic air power) the Soviet leaders are attempting to counterbalance and surpass Western nuclear strength by developing as rapidly as possible their own strategic nuclear capability and their air defense. Nevertheless, they probably believe that, at least during the period while the manned bomber remains the primaryvehicle and while the US network of oversea? bases is maintained, they will have to contendeographic disadvantage In the application of strategic air power.
espite the formidable military strengths developed by the USSR, the Soviet leaders probably do not regard the deliberateof general warresently admissible course of action. Moreover, they probably cannot now foresee whether militaryover the next five years, Including planned advances In their own offensive and defensive capabilities, will so affect thebalance of miliiary power as lo alter their view in this respect. They almost certainly expect that the continued existence ofWestern nuclear striking forces, and the likelihood that thc West would use these forces in thc event of general war. will makeSoviet initiation of generalction involving unacceptable risks." At
-The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence,of the Army, believes that, possibly by8 orhe Soviet leaders may come to believe that their own nuclearhave reached the point where the us would be inhibited from launching nuclear attacks, even In response to deliberate Soviet InlUatlcn ofnon-nuclear war. Accordingly, he believes that the USSR might thentrategy of undertakingar, and that the likelihood of this contingency ls considerably greater than Indicated In the text Of (
the same time, the Soviet leaders almostbelieve that the development of their own nuclear capabilities hastage at which the West Is also deterred frominitiation of general war. In our view, therefore, the USSR ls maintaining, strengthening, and further developing its armed forces primarily for three purposes: (a) to deter the US from Initiating war against the Bloc; (b) to support Soviet diplomacy and other forms of political warfare against the West: and (c) toapability fora general war successfully if it occurs, and also for engaging in, or supporting,or localized wars.
TRENDS IN STRENGTH AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SOVIET FORCES
n the course of the Soviet leaders'of their miliiary situation, the roles of the various types of Soviet military forces, as well as the optimum balance among these forces, have clearly been under review. While the concept of maintaining balanced forces of all types has been evident in recent Soviet doctrine and In pronouncements by Soviet military leaders, their statements and Soviet weapons programs have shown that long-range air and naval striking power Is now given much more weight in this balance than il was at the end of World War II. At the same time, published Soviet materials on strategy and tactical doctrine, as well as the announced Soviet intention to reduce the size of the military establishment, point toof smaller, more mobile, better-equipped fielde-evaluation of force requirements in the light of the present world balance of power may have contributedoviet decision to adjust the size of its active military forcesower level than that maintained heretofore.
Likelihood of Force Reductions
ur last estimate in this scries, dated, as well as earlier ones, gave the personnel strength of Soviet miliiary forces, excluding security forces, as about four million men. There arehowever, that our estimates of Soviet military personnel strength havo not reflected
changes in Soviet force levels." We now believe tt probable that these levels were substantially higher during the Korean War than we estimated,radual reduction in force levels beganut that these levels as of5 were probably somewhat higher than we then estimated.*1 Moreover, we have added to our currentenincluding air defense control and warning. AAA. and surface-to-air missile personnel, as well asserving or training to serve surface-to-surface udssiles. Therefore, Sovietpersonnel strength foraatncludingillion army ground force personnel,ir forces personnel,aval personnel, and upersonnel whose subordination by service is notestablished.**
llhe USSR announced that by the end of that year it would reduce its armed forcesen. Inhe USSH announced that by7 it would carryurther reduction ofillion men. The nature of our information on Soviet military personnel strengths is such that we can expect no firm, quantitative confirmation of these announced reductions. There has been evidence of selective weeding out In the Soviet forces during thc past three
reasons for this are given In Uie Mole on Methodology accompanying Tableppendixliat tbe actual personnel strength of the Soviet armed foices Increased by an Indeterminate amount |ust prior lo and during tha Korean War Is Indicated by: evidence that beginning Inumber of Soviet cadre divisions In Eastand the USSR were Increased to normal peaceUme strength;omparable Increase occurred in total Soviet military personnel strength In Oertnany; that1 two conscript classes were called upumber of Soviel reserve officers were recalled to acUve duty; and that Sonet overt military expenditures increased sharply during the Korean War. "For detailed personnel strength estimates of Soviet and other Bloc military forces inee Appendix A, Table 1.
"Theie is some reason to believe that the total number of personnel In tht last category may be as lowor an explanaUoo of thissee Appendix A, Tableootnote 4.
years, apparently as partn effort to economize and to improve personnel Fragmentary reports suggested the skeletonising of some Soviet ground force units priorore recently, thc USSR has announced reductions in the terms of service for air, naval, and coast defenseThese actions may have been related to tlie Soviet announcement ofut we cannot confirmen have actually been released, and there is as yet no evidence that first-line combat units of any aim of service have been reduced In strength.n spite of the lack of evidence on actual reductions, we believe there are factors which make force reductions logical from thc Soviet point of view. We estimate, therefore,ersonnel reduction on the orderen from the uncertain Korean War peak has probably been carried out. that thc Soviet forces will probably be further reducedand that the additional cut might be on the orderen In accordance with the recent Soviet announcement Areduction of the magnitude announced would ease the present manpower shortage caused by Soviet efforts to expand industry and agriculture simultaneouslyime when the lower birth rate of the war years is beginning to reduce the annual increment to the labor force. In addlllon, the USSR almost certainly saw various political advantages Inove, as supporting its new policy line and demonstrating Soviel interest inwithout the USSR's becoming uivolvcdisarmament agreement or being required to disclose its force levels. The increasing cost of new weapons, which. If Soviet forces were maintained at present strength andlevels, would involve an Increasingburden, has probably argued forlhe sizeilitary force which together with other Bloc forces already enjoyed marked superiority In manpower over potential enemy forces. Finally, based on probable current Soviet strategic concepts, the effectiveness of new Soviet weapons systems, and the apparent Soviet belief that the likeUhood of general war has diminished, it Is reasonable to suppose that the Soviet leaders concluded that their
very large active forces exceeded their
rder of magnitude ofarmedssuming fullof the recentlyillion men. would bethree million. As Indicated Inwc are not able to determine thetiming of the reductionst may be, therefore, thatmillion total should be reduced bya portion of the announced
have no direct evidence as toUSSR would apportion personnelamong the variouschowever, lhat the Soviet leadersthe bulk of thc cuts to thcand thc remainder between theaire estimate that duringof this estimate, Sovietair defense forces, and modernforces will suffer no personnelThese elements, together withguided missiles, will probablyan Increasingly large proportionatetotal Soviet military personnel.lhe Soviet leaders will probablyaim for balanced miliiary forces capablenuclear orarge or small scale.
"Sec tlie Hole on Methodology accompanyingA. Table 1.
"The Soviet announcement throws little light on this question, stating that It was Intended "to demobiliseivisions and separate brigades, of wlilch three air divisions and other military units, numbering more0 men. areon the territory of the German Democratic Republic; toumber of military schools of the Soviet Army; and to put Intoarships of tlie Sorlet Navy."
"The Director of Inielligence. USAP, believes that thc trend In thc Soviet Air Force Is toward an Increase in military personnel requirements, as exemplified by rapid modernization ot the force and by the recent significant Increase In the number of Long-Range air regiments. In thc absence of evidence of decreases In other air elements, he considers it highly unlikely that the Soviet Air Force will undergo personnelduring the period of this estimate.
Effectiveness of Soviet Forces
During the period of this estimate, the effectiveness of Soviet forces for modernwill almost certainly continue to Increase, primarily due to the improved weaponsavailable In quantity, to changes In organization, and to adaptation ot doctrine and tactics to fit Soviet forces for nuclear warfare. There will be Increases in numbers and types of nuclear weapons, aircraftbombers and all-weatherong-range submarines, and guided missiles. There will also be progressive modernization ofweapons and equipment, particularly those Incorporating electronic guidance and control.
Limitations on thc effectiveness of the Soviet armed forces during the period of this estimate will derive from deficiencies in the air defense system, together with lack offor long-range amphibious andrface naval operations. logistical problems will continue loonsiderable limitation upon lhe Soviet capability to wage intensive warfare over an extended period. These problems are due to the vast size of the USSR, the great distances from Interior sources of supply to scvoral main operational areas, the relatively inadequate road and rail network, and the acute shortage of Bloc-registeredn order to offset these disadvantages the USSR has maintained large forces and militaiy stockpiles In forward areas. Stockpiles of ammunition and of other types of supplies that are consumedelatively constant rate are probably sufficient toorceine divisionswith air and naval forces in Europe and Asia for an extendedp to six months depending upon the scale of; POL stocks are probably sufficientomewhat shorter period. During the period of thb estimate the Soviet logistical situation will probably improveesult of continued stockpiling and the developmentore flexible and versatile transport system.even in the absence of nuclear attack on the USSR, logistical problems will continue
reakdown of the Slno-Sovlet Dicefleet, see Appendix A,
- -TO I1
onsiderable limitation upon(or extended offensive operations,In the Far East.
SOVIET GROUND FORCES"
Soviet Army ground forces haveand modernized since theWorld War II, and for the past threeunit organization has beenchanges to meet the requircmenlswarfare, nuclear orthe most significant recent changesline divisions are: Increases inof organic tanks, assault guns,artillery, wheeled vehicles, andof improved models of suchof equipment as medium andantiaircraft and field artillery,and small arms; aIn the caliber of artillery of allIntroduction into units of certainof equipment such as armoredpersonnel and cargo carriers,tanks and recoilless weapons;in the authorized divisionalstrength. These changes are intendedmobility and fire power, and toa capability for Soviet line divisionsand concentrate rapidly withoutcommand control.
thc past three years theground forces have expanded theirdoctrine and training to Includethe tactical employment of, andnuclear weapons. Small-unithas emphasized defense againstThere Is also evidence thatand defensive tactics envisageof tactical nuclear weapons In supportground forces. Revised Sovietemphasizes mobility andgreater Initiative, dispersion,reconnaissance, and individualmeasures. Soviet offensiveallocationubstantialof nuclear weapons for use againstpositions, air facilities, reserves, nu-
Appendix A,or detailedof the strength and composition of Soviet and other Bloc ground forces.
clear capabilities, and encircled enemy units. The assaultuclear attack would employ tanks and armored Infantry In order toaximum speed of exploitation Doctrine for the defense emphasizes deep revetted trenches and other protectivedispersion In width and depth, and larger and more mobile reserves. However the Soviet Army appears to regard nuclear weapons and tactics as supplemental to, and not replacements for, standard ground force weapons and tactics,
present unit strength of Sovietforces is estimatedineplusupporting artilleryAAA divisions, andndependentOur information on theequipment of Soviet units in certainand peripheral areas is adequate, butinformation is availableunits in the interior of the USSRIn Eastern Europe have forbeen maintainedeacetimeof aboutercent ofstrength, butigh degreereadiness. The strength andof line divisions in the sovietare probably lower than those ofin Eastern Europe and SovietAny reduced strength Soviet linehowever, probably have fullavailable and could beery short period of time.
believe the manpower strength ofArmy ground forces has probablywithin the past several yearsprobably be cut further within theThe effect of reductions to date onlevels has probably been mainlyand supporting elements;reductions would probably result inor skeletonizing ofin the Interior of the USSR. Wereground forces reduced by as muchmillion men, and the present ratioand supporting units maintained,permit the retention ofano percent of authorized strength.
-See Note on Methodology accompanying Table
TOPe-RVErT-*
on previous Soviet practice, wcore likelyarger number of units /ould be maintained, with some of them keletonized at full officer and equipment trengths and aboutercent of over-all omplement. On thisossible force tructure wouldine divisions, half at '0 percent strength and half skeletonized.
he gross mobilization potential of the Soviet Army ground forces will probably be uTected relatively littleeduction in itrcngth-ln-being. We estimate that there ire at present sufficient trained reserves and ;tockpiled equipment to expand the Soviet Vrmy ground forcesotal strengthillion men, includingine divisions it the new tables of organization,0 lays, although there would probablyon-dderable variation in combat readiness andischarges into the reserves iccompanying personnel cuts would corre-ipondingly increase the trained manpowerbut the time required for achieving com-jat readiness of the total reserve forceengthened.
uring the period of this estimate, the ire power, mobility, and combat-effectivenessoviet Army field forces will continue to ncrcase as their reorganization and re-equip-ncnt progresses. Wc estimate that major {round force equipment is being producedercent of the capacity of those facilities presently engaged wholly or partly in thc prc-iuction of ground force equipment, and that production will continue at about this rate."believe thc Soviet program to develop jround force equipment will continue to re-lect the demands of tactical operations undernuclear and non-nuclear warfare con-litlons.1 the Soviet Army groundwUl probably have available new self-propelled artilleryariety of full--raeked carriers and amphibians. Improved nedium and heavy tanks, additional models
"For detailed estimates ef Soviet and other Bloc trained reserves and ground mobilizationsee Appendix A. Table 3.
"For detailed estimates of current and futureproduction of ma]or ground forcesee Appendix A,
of rocket-launchers and reeoiUess weapons, and improved fire control andequipment. It Is also probable that during the period guided missiles will be added to the equipment of Soviet line units, and that some types of tactical nuclearwill become part of the Soviet ground force arsenal.
Airbornehe USSR has sizable airborne forces In being, estimatedivisionsotal strength ofen. Soviet airborneare being increased throughin equipment and techniques, as well as by intensive small unit training.personnel and cargo parachutes have been developed.he USSR has displayed two new assault-type helicopters, oneormal payload estimateden with combatnd the otherormal payload estimateden withhe USSR could develop helicopters with payloads up to0 pounds.AB and COACH twin-engine piston transports are currently included in the Aviation of Airborneew medium jet transport, the CAMEL,ew twin-engine turbo-prop combat cargo aircraft which may be an assault transport have appeared. The USSR could convert BULL bombers retired from long-rangeto troop and cargo carriers, and within the period will probably have substantialof transport aircraft with improved range and capacity,
Security Forces. Soviet Internal security forces. controUed by tho Ministry of Internal Affairs, number. These troopselect group, well trained and equipped, andignificant increment to Soviet military strength-in-bcing. However, their primary responsibility for maintainingcontrol would probably prevent their becoming available for combat operationsthe USSR.re border troops, disposed along all accessible land and sea frontiers. Thenclude troops responsible for suppressing anyin the country, for guarding labor camps
Gfl-B
.shipments of prisoners and strategic cargoes, and for maintaining the security of high-level government and military
SOVIET AIR rORCES "
Ul. Although In World Warhe USSR cm-ployed its air forces primarily in the ground support role, increasing emphasis has since been given to the development of theand long-range bombing arms. In addition, statements by Soviet military leaders over the past several years have reflected their growing appreciation of air power. Wethc overall actual aircraft strength of Soviet military air units inthis is probably aboutercent of authorized strength. Continued replacement of piston medium bombers by jet medium and jet and turbo-prop heavy bomber types and an Increase In numbers of jet all-weather fighters will probably constitute the most significant improvements in Soviet Air Force strength during thc period of this estimate. We estimate that over-all actual aircraft strength In Soviet operational units willabout the same during the period, reaching0 aircraft by
Tlie Soviet aircraft Industry hasfor aboutercent of total Bloc aircraft production of fighter and bombere estimate thatircraft were produced by thc USSRf wliichere bombers and fighters. We estimate that45 theaircraft Industry was operating at aboutercent of capacity. Production1 Is not expected to vary substantially fromate, althoughare expected as new models are
Soviet Fighter Aviation of Air Defense will be strengthened considerably during the
" For detailed estimate* of the aircraft strength ot Soviet and other Dloc air forces during the period of this estimate, see Appendix A, Tables. S. and 7.
For comparisons of Soviet Bloc- HATO and USSR-US aircraftSS, see Appendix A, Tables
period of this estimate by the introduction of new fighters with Improved performance,In numbers of fighters equipped with airborne Intercept radar, and the probable addition of alr-to-alr guided missiles to the armament of some fighters. Although the FRESCO day fighter is now thc principal equipment of Soviet Fighter Aviation of Air Defense, the transonic FARMER day fighter and the FLASHLIGHT all-weather fighter are rapidly being phased into operational units. We estimate that an improved supersonic day fighter based on the FARMER will be inuse7 andupersonic day and all-weather fighter will be Introducedll-weather fighters willcomprise more thanercent of the total Soviet fighter force; we estimate that at present this force numberset fighters, includingll-weather fighters, and that inotal Soviet fighter strength will be about the same, but willll-weathere estimate that the Soviet leaden. In order toreater capability forair operations, haveurther build-up andof Soviet LongRangc Aviation over the next few years. The BUM* piston medium bomber, which is now obsolescent, is beingby the BADGER jet medium bomber and the HISON Jet and BEAR turbo-prop heavy bombers. The assignment of BADGER aircraft to operational units, which beganas proceeded more rapidly thanestimated, and will probably bring BADGER units to their full complement by The assignment of BISON and BEAR aircraft to operational units is believed to have begun5 but has apparently proceeded more slowly than previously
asedudgment as to what Soviet planners probably estimate their requirements to be, and on recent increases In the number of air regiments, we now estimate that the USSR is buildingorce of about
"For estimated Soviet and Blocee Appendix A,
- For esUma.led performance characteristics offighters see Appendix A, Table *
-TO P"
modern bomber-type aircraftng-Rangc Avi.iticn bye also believe that, in the light of probable Soviet optimum requirements, including those for attack on the continentalikely composition of this force by type would beeavy0 BISONEAR) and about BADGER medium Soviet aircraft production facilities are more than adequate lo meet thisalthough the proportion of aircraftfacilities assigned to heavy bomber production would have to be increased. Many unknown factors. Including the degree of future Soviet success ln the guided missile field, could lead to Soviet decisions which would alter both the size of this force and the balance between types of aircraft.the introduction of aircraft designed
The Assistant Chief of Staff.parlmcnt of the Army, docs not concur In the estimate of heavy bomber strength contained herein, except In the case of those listed for
force tolalomber aircraft,distribution of these figures betweentypes Involved. Is based almosiwhat us planners consider to be arequirement for an attack onStates. There la no evidence thathaveequirementoal. Neither Is there evlder.eeSoviet leaders liavc establisheds
bo achwS Wh"h soa" 10
estimate that Soviet leaders willachieve such an optimum capability byIs not supported by the conclusion that
Soviet policy will emphasize political ar.dpenetration, as expressed in Paragraphs
Bf the conclusions of this estimate, and
"J' 'nd ,flX ofdiscussion. Neither Is the development ororce in consonance wllh the conclusions expressed In Paragraph fl* that the USSR will regard the risks Involved in thc deliberate Initiation of general war as unacceptable.
nless thc USSR Intends toeneral nuclear war In thcppears unlikely that the resources required to developwould be committed. The
It would face early obsolescence with the advent
In the interim period would be highlyto Improved US air defenses. It, therefore, seems more likely. In the absenceecision
primarilyanker role or the presence in operational units Of some bombers in al-ternativc lanker-bombcr roles could affect thcnd composition of Soviet fong-RarRe Aviation. Thus, the following table ofnumbers of bombers in operational units of Long-Range Aviation through the period is the best that can be made ate, but the factors of uncertainty aregreater during the later years-
bull
BADGKR
BISON
BEAR
756
HIS
35
.
Thisonsiderable downwardfrom our previous estimates of thc nuni-^ber of heavy bombers in operational units
cral war. that the USSlTSW establlsh something less than an optimum force
w or deterrence, and
would not produce the numbers of heavycited herein.
ther factors militating against theof the csuiaafcs of bomber strengthherein, are:
a There Is no evidence that facilitiesroducing BISONS are Increasing prcduc-lon, or that the additional facilities required
onverted to
BISON production.
ULnrm evldcnce lhat both BISON and BRAR production over the past year has fallen !ar short of that estimated Justear ago hc BISON forecast for
Sai^ff *'Uded hCrCJO 'epreSenlareasc ofercent over the end strength
estimated Innd the BEARfornd thereafter Is unchanged
f.feqfat1bas not been givento produceransports to meet probable requirements.
CI"etSlafT-e.of the Army, therefore, concludes:
I0bibl* wltWn *he capability of
herein If Soviet leaders have already decided to do-so and have initiated steps, not now evident, to expand production.
It Is unlikely that the forcewill be developed.
there Is Insufficient evidence toa conclusion as to the future strengthLong-Range 1
P-8ECRET-
TOP 3
the period lohis results from new evidence which indicates that, probably at Jets' in part because of productionRSSON and HEAR production during lhe past year lias beenonsiderably lower rale lhan previously estimated,olal o( onlyircraft of each
Long-Range Aviation willwiih its present aircraft types,the BULL, throughout the period."models of both the UADGER andwill probably have appeared The USSR is capable of pro*
y a in.'WVr wit!.
"supersonic dash" capabilities, and such an aircraft may appear in units at about that lime. We have no intelligence onuclear-powered bomber; we believe that such an aircraft will not be in operational units during the period of this estimate.
now have evidence lhal the USSHan inflight refueling system,believe that during the next fewubstantial uiflightWe have no evidence nfoviet aircraft type designedfor tanker use. Thci:it ire!role. Both BISON and BEARhave been constructed toailer of hours fromanker role, and vice versa.knewn Soviet aircraft, only tankerthe BISON or the BEAR would bewith the BISON bomber. Onhand, the USSR may elect lonew aircraft primarily for the tankerany case, we estimate that in order toa heavy bomber striking force ofestimated foreriod.
. 'Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Actionn.. andSoviet Gioaa Capabilities for Attack on the US and Keynstallations and Forces Through0 March
-Por estimated performance characteristics ot Soviet bombers, see Appendix A, Table 9.
the USSR would probably require on the orderOQ aircraft employed in the tanker role.
Aiifield construction In the USSR and the Satellites during the postwar period has kept pace with demands created by theof High performance nircraft.irfields are In use in thc Soviet Bloc, of which5 in the USSRn the Satellites) have hard surfaced runwayseet or longer. Many of the military airfields now being built have runways ateet long, and someeet or more. Many airfields in lhc Satellites arc being equipped with night lighting, radio navigation aids, radar,POL facilities, and improvedWe believe that similare being made on airfields in the USSR, and Ihat the growing network of-modern, well-equipped air facilities will keep pace withBloc air capabilities during this period. Weelieve that airfield construction will continue lo be pressed In the Far East and in Soviet Arctic areas.
Combat effectiveness of Soviet military aviation is, on the whole, below that of the US. The chief limiting factors have been lower average crew proficiency, lowerof maintenanceraining, and lack o! certain aircraft types. During this period thc increasing numbers of new or improved fighter and bomber types, together withappropriate to these types, will leadignificant Increase In combat effectiveness. With cumulative improvements in theof career personnel, over-all combat proficiency will almost certainlyigh level during the period of this estimate.In long-range, night and all-weather operations will continue to be reduced.
SOVIET NAVAL FORCES "
recent years the Soviet Navygreatly strengthened by an intensebuilding program, concentrated on light
"For detailed estimates of the strength, eoinposl-sltlon. nnd dispositions of the Soviet and other Bloc naval forces Innd mld-IOSl. see Appendix A,
C'-R
39
destroyers, and submarines. The Soviet submarine fleet is now the largest in the world and Is still growing; over half its strength consists of long-range craft ofignificant and increasing proportion arc modern types We estimate the main strength of the Soviet Navy Intestroyer types,ubmarines. These totals include vessels of postwar design numberingight cruisers,estroyerong-range, andedium-range submarines. During the past year, net destroyer strength hasby approximatelynd netstrength by
At the present time, tlie Soviet Navy is also estimated to includeinor war vesselsumber of "overage" major war vessels. Fourteen major surface vessels, including battleships, light cruisers, andare more thanears old.ubmarinesears old. We believe the Soviet Navy's share of the announced force reductions would be taken largely from among these "overage" vesselx. and from minor craft However, we estimate that anyunits thc USSR chose to keep instatus could again be ready for service.
Soviel naval construction Is currently estimated attandardtons, which represents slightly more than one-third of Lhe capacity of Sovietand one-fifth of total Bloche USSR will probably continue to place primary emphasis on thc construction of long-range submarines, although the construction of conventional cruisers and destroyers may also continue through the earlier years of thc period. Battleships and carriers could be wilt in all fleet areas except the Far East, mt there is no evidenceovietonstruct these types. It ls probable that oward the end of thc peiiod. guided missilesrockets will be adapted for naval use asand surface-to-air weapons,
"For detailed estimates ot current and future Soviet naval vessel construe Hon, nee Appendix A. Table IS.
and unconventional vessel designs may appear as these weapons become available.
Soviel Navy Is now concentrating on
thc construction of two long-range submarine types, developed since World War II and equipped with snorkel. The "W" class has an operating radius under combat conditions of" classm. BynW" andZ" class submarines had joined lhe fleets, as well asostwar-designed, medium-range "Q" class boats. Thc building rate6 Is estimated atndQ" class boats.
In view of the rate at which Sovietconstruction facilities have beenin recentubstantial Increase in thc current submarine order of battle will probably take place over thc next several years. Since estimated annual Sovietbuilding capacity tsong and medium-range boats, the USSR could buildver thc next five years.wc estimate that actual production will beubmarinesnd that it will be reduced tooatsue to the impact of the estimated nuclear-powered submarine program. If production continued at the8 rate for the remainder of the period, cumulativeloaken in conjunction with such factors as the phasing out of older types and the probable adaptation of presentlo newer weapons systems,orce ofoats of all types, includingong and medium-range boats of postwar design.we have no inlelllgence to indicate that the USSR will in tact produce this number of submarines or lo Indicate the planned future strength of the Soviet submarine force.
The operating efficiency of the Soviet Navy, while still below that of thc US Navy In some fields, is quite high and will continue to improve during this period. Little Is known of the operating efficiency of the submarine force, although in recent years training has been Intensified, particularly in long-range operations.
C R
Impoitant developments In the Soviet Navy are likely (luring tlic period of this estimate. One Is the probableof some iiuelenrpowerrd itubfnAilrMS, The USSR atso has the technlcnl capability to construct or modify long-range submarines for launching guided missiles, and mayhave done so We expect that anwakeless torpedo with acoustic homing device andexploder will probably be available around the middle of the period; wc expect the appearance of an offensive sea mine employing acoustic, magnetic, andfiring mechanisms Inand wc believe the USSR Is at present capable of adapting nuclear warheads lo mines and torpedoes. We estimate that early in Die period Soviet antisubmarine forcesve improved sonar detection gear In association with attack computers for use with depth-chnige throwers.
The principal weakness of the Soviel Navy derives from thc wide separation of the sea frontiers of the USSR, and from itsto control thc tea routes between these areas. The USSR ls thus deprived of the strategic mobility traditionally enjoyed by naval powers, and is compelled to maintain four separate fleets together with theirfacilities The Inland waterwayconnecting the White and Baltic Seas now permits the interchange of vessels up to the size of small destroyers and Including all current submarine types. During this period, possiblymprovements in Inland waterway systems will extend this Interchange capability to rench the Black Sea. However, parts of these waterway systems are open
only on an average of fiveear be-CftOM of weather conditions. Increased use of the KortheTn Sea Route, which Is openix to eight-week period in lhe summer, may also Improve the situation. The Uok ofsupply lines to the Northern and Far Eastern mens is an additional handicap. Limitations on sustained offensive operations derive from the land locked poslllnn of the fleets In thc Baltic and Black Seasroughlyercent of Soviet navalhc exits from which are controlled by the NATO Powers, and from the lack of advanced bases. Other current limitations are thc lack of auxiliary vessels suitable for underway logistic support, thc paucity ofin long-range operations, and the apparent lack of long-range reconnaissance
aircraft
aval Aviation. Soviet nav.nl nvlaliun, composing nearlyercent of total Soviet air strength, has increased in stature within the military establishment, and Is now the second largest naval air force in the world. Itelatively high priority in thc allocation of new aircraft, equipment, and weapons. Soviet naval aviation is engagedoncentrated training program which stresses oflcnslvc operations against enemy naval forces and the air defense of naval bases and forces. During the period of thisSoviet naval aviation Is expected toat approximately constant numerical strength, while continuing its modernization program. Improved jet light bombers and all-weather fighters will probably beand possibly long-range bombers for attack and reconnaissance.
3 SC
"TO V 0
VI. SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES
military strength of the Sovietfar superior to that of all other statesnear the Eurasian continent. Thesebe defeated, separately or Inunless US armed forces joined inHowever, thc Soviet leadersbe sure that the US would not jointhe defense of these states or that It would
confine its military interventiontrictly 'localized area. Indeed, they probablythat, at least in certain areas, the US would not so confine its military action.they must take Into account the possibility that any localized or limited war would develop Into general war.
would be impossible, within thethis paper, to analyze the capabilitiesUSSR and of thc Bloc generally toror localized war in various areas andvarious degrees of US militaryIn this section, therefore, weonly Soviet military capabilities forwar and wc consider them In theour estimate of probable Sovietthe Initial phase ofar."
SOVIET STRATEGY FOR THE INITIAL PHASEENERAL WAR
In view of the transition which is taking place In the Soviet military establishment, it is probable that thc Soviet strategic concepts which would govern how the USSR wouldeneral war are also in flux. However, the USSR must appreciate that US nuclear capabilities would be the principal element in the Western military threat to Sovietin thc event of general war.Soviet military strategy almost certainly places first emphasis on forestalling or at least neutralizing any US nuclear attack.
In planning for the contingency ofwar, thc Soviet leaders might hope that through their political action prior to the
It should be emphasized that wchat the Soviet leaders probably do not icgard the deliberate Initiation of general warresently admissible course of action.
tune war broke out, the USSR would have imposed such inhibitions on the US as to prevent the latter from Initiating the use of nuclear weapons.evelopment would be greatly to the Soviet advantage, especially while the USubstantial nuclear superiority,avorable geographical deployment of Its nuclear strengthis the USSR. More likely, however, the Soviet leaders would believe that the prospects for excluding US use of nuclear weapons would be too slight to risk the possibility that the US would deliver the first nuclear blow. Therefore, we believe Soviet war plans would provide that,ecision to launchwar, it would be initiated by strategic nuclear attacks."
-he Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence.of the Army, does not concur In the estimate that,ecision lo launch general war. It would be initiated by strategic nuclear attacks.
ince, as haa been estimated In
Soviet Waders probably do not now regard the deliberate initiation of general warres-enUy admissible coarse of action,ar occurring during the period would probably re-suit from thc enlargementimited orwar. Tho enlargement would at aome pointale of war between the US and the USSR which would then be called general war In this chain of events general war Is not aof decision, but one of definition.
The decUloa aa to the Initiation of strategic nuclear attacks,ne which must be made during the progress of enlargement. We believe that. In view of the mutual destrucUon Inherent In such attacks, the USSR would avoid Initiation of them by every means possible and seek instead lo achieve Its objectives throughwarfare.
The Assistant Chief ol Staff. Intelligence.of the Army, believes that Sovietconcepts emphasize maximum ReUbibty, and that war plans have probably beentoumber ofon-nuclear war through variousof nmllaUon cm nuclear weapons to the extreme of an all-out nnclcar exchange. That the latter la not lhe primary elemcnl of their strategy Is Indicated by thc following facts:
(Footnote continued on page iii
necessity of forestallingS attack would also make surprise In the Initial nuclearital Ingredient of Soviet strategy. In the Soviet view,would be essential In order to reduce as much as possible the nuclear retaliation which could be launched against thc USSR by Western forces deployed around thc Soviet periphery and In the continental US.we believe that preparations and redeployment of forces which could giveof the decision to proceed to general war would be heldinimum in order to avoid compromising the Initial air strikes. Inareas, missiles launched from submarines could be an important supplement to nuclear attacks by aircraft, but limitations on target coverage and the risk of premature disclosure of intent would probably inhibit their Urge-scale use in an initial surprise attack.
The Soviet leaders would probably regard an attack by ground and tactical air forces against NATO forces in Western Europe at an early stage as essential to prevent NATO deployment and mobilization, and to disrupt action by NATO's tactical air forces. Atthc USSR has large ground and tactical air forces deployed in Germany which would not require reinforcement by additional units
(Footnote continued trom page Ali
(round lotces have beenand re-equtpped so as tocapability for mobile land warfare
Soviet naval program, with lisonas been aimedatapability toreinforcement ot Eurasia.
e. There bas been Utile or no evidence of extensive Soviet effort to develop Uie carrier task forces, or long-iange amphibious forces essentialtratify envisaging direct attack on Lhe Uniled States.
development of Ions-rangehas apparenUy been accorded low
apparently low priority accordedof an Inflight refueling capability.
nuclear weapons and devicespredominant in iho Soviet nuclear
ls substantial evidence of aeffort In the Aeld of short andsurface-to-surface missiles.
In advance of offensive action. We believe that the USSR would plan to commit Ihcse forces to an offensive against NATOin West Germany as soon as possible, consistent with maintaining surprise for the initial air assault against the US and its overseas bases. Under the most favorable circumstances from the Soviel point of view, advances by these forces could be undertaken as soon as the West had obtained warning of the Soviet strategic air attack. However, dur-Ing some phases of the annual trainingeriod of several days might be required to deploy these forces forrgcof Soviet submarines would probably move to Interdict US reinforcement offorces and in particular to Isolate the European theater.
We believe that, in its planning for the initial phaseeneral war, the USSR would not assign the same priority to campaigns in thc Middle and Far East. Appropriate targets in these areas would, of course, be embraced in tbc Soviet plan of Initial air attack, but campaigns by Soviet ground,or surface naval forces wouldbe delayed. The USSR might regard an atiack to seize the Turkish Straits as of early high priority, but we believe that other major campaigns would be held up until thc USSR could assess the results of the Initial nuclear exchange.
In summary, wc believe lhal Soviet plans for the Initial phase of general war would be directed toward the following military
destroy or neutralize Westernwherever deployed, byattacks.
bring thc USSR out of thein the better relativeaximum air defense effortnuclear air attacks.
c To deilroy as much as possible of the ready NATO forces deployed In Westernand to prevent mobilization ofull potential.
d To interdict US reinforcement offorces and in particular to Isolate the European theater.
V-P
STRATEGIC AIR CAPABILITIES"
USSR is now capable ofair attacks with nucleartargets in thc US. the UK.North Africa, the Middle East.and the Asiatic Island chain.will improve during the periodestimate, as tho Soviet nuclearand the number of highlong-range bombers continue toSoviet capabilities for attack onUS are restricted by the relativelyof operaUonal BISON andthc limited availability ofweapons, the limited capacity ofand the probable lack of ainflight refueling capability.however, that Soviet capabilitiesattack on continental US willas Uie period advances-period of this estimate, the capacityforward staging nrcas and thecomplex could be increasedpermit thc simultaneous launching oflong-range bomber force fromMoreover, we believe that thenow acquiring an Inflight refuelingadequate to permit the launching ofnumber of Jet heavy bombersbases on two-way missionsUS. Toward the end of the period,nuclear weapons could be availableof the Soviet long-range bombers.
are unable to estimate whatof thc available force of Sovietmight be launched against thewhat proportion against overseasSoviet planners would attempt tothese initial attacks in such ato Insure the optimum combinationand surprise against all areasand UK retaliatory capability wasNearly all of the heavy bomberalmost certainly be used againstUS In an attempt to destroyof US war-making potential as possible
consistent with the assignment of first priority to US retaliatory capabilities. The scale o: attack with bomber aircraft would also de pond upon the availability and efTcctlvenesi of other forms of delivery which could appeal as the period progresses.
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE GUIDED MISSILE CAPABILITIES "
e estimate that in view of the extensive Soviet guided missile program and the stage of development estimated to have been reached, Soviet missile capabilities will grow rapidly during thc period. If the USSR in fact develops the surface-to-surface guided missiles which wc have estimated to be within Its capabilities, the following possibilities for attack would exist during the period, and missiles might replace or supplement bomber aircraft for attack against some areas:
a. Short and Medium-Range MissUes (up tohe USSR couldmall number of ballistic missiles able to reach, from launching sites within lhe USSR, all of Western Europe (except the Iberianhe UK. and the Middle Eastthe southern part of thc ArabianIn the Far East, these weapons could reach targets In Japan and Alaska. If thc USSR elected to employ launching sites on lhe periphery of Uie Bloc, these ranges could be extended to cover Ireland, much of Spain, the Tunisian, Libyan, and Egyptian coasts, much of the Southeast Asian peninsula,Taiwan, and the Ryukyua. Thesecould carry small and medium-yield nuclear warheads, and in theould be fitted with high-yield nuclear warheads. At present, it would also befeasible for Uie USSR to attack targets within the US with missiles launched from submarines, and the USSR could have for thisubsonic guided missileuclear warheadangeauUcal miles.
a fuller discussion of this subject, see, "Soviet Gross CapabiliUes for Attack on thc US and Key Overseas Installations and Forces Througharch lvW.
"Material In this section ls based onnd NDJs! publishedew estimate on Soviet guided missile developments.. will appear In
t
-TOP-3OR KT-
Range* the USSR could have aol ballistic missiles, able tolaunching sites within the USSR,in Greenland, Iceland, Europe,thc Middle East, most of India,the Ryukyus, Japan, Alaska,of Canada. The use of launchingthe periphery of the Bloc wouldranges to include all of continentalthe Philippines. These missilesbe equipped with large-yield
he USSR could have aof ballistic missiles equippednuclear warheads able tolaunching sites within the USSR,target areas of the western worldall of thc US.
AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
he Soviet leaders probably believe that the defense of thc USSR against nuclearwould depend In large measure upon the success of an Initial Soviet assault on Western retaliatory capabilities But the USSR has large air defense forces whose task would be to reduce the effectiveness of counterattack by Western forces which escapedin the initial Soviet attacks. The air defense system of the USSR provides for the employment ofircraft in the Soviet Avialion of Air Defense and for theemployment of theoviet and Satellite fighters. In addition, theCommunists and North Koreans haveighters which could make some contribution to thc defense of the Soviet Far East We believe that the air defense role
"These dates are estimated to be the earliest probable dates by which the several missile types could have been, operationally tested and be ready lot series production. By these dates, small quanllUe* of m'.uiVi could have beenand placed In the hands of trainedof one operaUonal unit, thusl ted capability for operaUonal employment. However, an addlUonal period, which would vary according to missile lype. would be requiredmissiles could be produced In quanUty and additional units trained and deployed.
ol the fighters of Tactical and Naval Aviation would be given priority In the early stageseneral war. We estimate that Soviet PVO and field forces nowotal of0 antiaircraft artillery pieces, and that significant developments In both high and low altitude weapons have been made over the last several years. The USSR still relies heavily upon radar-directed antiaircraftbut guided missiles arc now being added to the air defenses of Moscow andto olher areas of key strategicin the USSR. By thc end of the period, we estimate that surface-to-air missiles will have largely replaced heavy antiaircraftin the static defense of the morestrategic targets. Even earlier, the air-to-air missile will probably have enhanced the capabilities ot fighter defense forces.
e estimate that Soviet air defenseIn areas of dense air defense(European USSR, Eastern Europe, and thc Marilimc-South Manchuria area of the Far East) are as indicated below.in other areas are probably considerably less.
a Against bombers0 feet in daylight and clear weather, we believe the air defense system Is capable of inflicting severe losses on high-speed jet bombers. At higher altitudes this capability would begin to diminish, and0 feet would fall off markedly. Againstpenetrating peripheral areas at high speed and minimal altitude the effectiveness of the defenses would be very low.
multiple-prongedaltitude stacking, diversionaryand electronic countermeasures, wethe air defense system is subject toand saturation, which wouldreduce its effectiveness.
air attacks conducted underconditions, we believe the airIs at present capable of offeringresistance, owing to the inadequacyand training for all-weatherTlie rapid Introduction ofInto operaUonal units and thesurface-to-air missiles are, however, giving
ECRE
USSR an increasing capability in this field.
the period oi this estimate.defense capabilities will almostsubstantially increased, due toexperience and thethe defensive forces of additionaland all-weather fighters, newimproved early warning and GCIelectronic countermeasurcs.missiles, and improved missilethese improvements, however, wethat Soviet air defenses will stUl beto exploitation by penetration forces.
OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE
We have estimated above that, should thc USSR seek tourprise nuclear attack against Western retaliatorythe USSR would plan to deferor redeployment of major forces for other campaigns until after the initialOnce the initial nuclear attacks were launched, the highest priority would probably be givenround, air, and naval offensive against Western Europe in order to destroy the bases and forces concentrated there, toATO build-up, and to isolate the area. The forces in East Germany andareas would under present conditions probably be regarded by lhe Sovietas adequate to initiate such an offensive. These forces are capable of rapid movement and the tactical employment of nuclear weapons.
Air support of Bloc offensive operations in Western Europe could come fromircraft presently stationed In East Germany and the Satellites, withavailable from theircraft stationed in the Western USSR.arge proportion of these aircraft arc fighter interceptor types in units which currently have an air defense responsibility as wellactical support role. Thiswould probably to some degree limit the availability of fighter aircraft for tactical support in the Initial phase of the land campaign. The estimated increase in
Satellite air defense capabilities during this period will probably reduce this limitation. Even at present, however, the USSR and the Satellites haveet light bombers available in East Europe and Western USSR for use against targets In Europe.
OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES IN THE FAR EAST
capabilities forwar in the Far East areliniltcd by the capacity of thcrailway, the only route byIn large amounts could beother parts of the USSR. Theaboutivisions in the Far East,withircraft andnaval force, and with stockpilessufficientonsiderablecombat. These Soviet forces could,in conjunction with Chineserenew hostilities in Korea. Theylaunch an invasion of Japaninitial airborne assault of one divisioninitial amphibious assault of upollow-up waterbornefive or six divisions. The samecould be employed in other areas ofEast within range of land-basedand amphibious attacks on acould also be launched against Alaska.
AIRBORNE CAPABILITIES
only those transportsto the Aviation of Airborne Troops,could liftirborneone dropay. orrops,adius. Inoperationroops could be lifted. This liftcould be increased byircraft made available fromtransports of Soviet Civil Aviationcomponents of military aviation,be further augmented by the use oflarge helicopters of the Aviation oftroops. Wc estimate that Sovietcapabilities will probably increasebut at least during the early partperiod most airborne troops wouldbe carried by the low-performance CAB
K
(wiih. and this would place aon the effectiveness of airborneThe allocation to airborne use of BULL aircraft converted for transport purposes could increase the Soviet capability lotroops by air by anroopsircraft converted.
NAVAL CAPABILITIES
t the present time, the principalcapabilities of the Soviet Navy are in submarine warfare, operations of cruiser-destroyer task forces, air operations utilizing shore-based naval aircraft, and mine warfare. These capabilities will continue to improve throughout the period due to the building program, technological development, andtraining. The Soviet Navy willcapable of mounting short-haullifts of considerable strength, but will have little or no significant long-haul amphibious capability during the period of this estimate.
a. The Soviet submarine force will greatly Increase its capability to undertake offensive patrols and mining operations along most of the world's strategically situated sea lanes.
and possibly to launch guided missile attacks against land targets.
Soviet surface units andshore-based naval aircraft willto Increase their capability tooffensive operations In Blocespecially In the Baltic and Blacklo protect thc seaward flank ofThe advent ofmissiles, as well asmissiles, would further enhance
existing airfields. Bloc Jetcould range over the entireand the English Channel; seaportFrance, the UK. and Scandinavia; allwestern end of the Mediterranean;Pacific Ocean area embracing Japan,and central Luzon.
USSR has an extensive capabilitymine warfare, possibly Includingmines, to interfere seriously withcommunications. In thc Europeaneffort could Include all the ports andof the UK and Western Europe.Far East, most of the vital alliedand sea lanes around the perimeterBloc could similarly be attacked.
CRET
T-
VII. THE SOVIET ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION
FACTORS
he Soviel leaders' view of the worldis strongly Influenced by Communist Ideological conceptions and these remain basically intact. This predisposes them to view Western actions and developments in terms of an Ureconcllable struggle between the Communist and non-Communist worlds While this conception in part determineslong-term objectives, it docs not Impose rigidity in choice of tactical objectives and methods. Stalin's successors havean ability to respond realistically to the actual play of political forces in the world. They have maderincipal point ofof Stalin's leadership that he was too narrow and Inflexible in hisore practical appraisal of tbe world situation seems to characterise the present Soviet leadership, even though the world is stUl viewed in terms of thc historical forecasts contained in ofllcial Communist ideology.
INTERNAL FACTORS
n the preceding sections of this estimate we have considered political, economic, and military factors in the Soviet situation which will affect the USSR's position and capabilitiesis the non-Communist world over the next several years. The Soviet leaders' own weighing of these factors appears to convince them of the general strength of their position. They apparently believe that they are able to cope effectively with the Internal political problems Stalin left them, that they canweaknesses which might slow the growth of the Soviet economy, and that the USSR's Industrial strength is now such as to permitreer hand In domestic and foreign policy. They probably also believe that the Soviet military establishment is adequate, now that the USSR hasuclear capability, at least to deter resort to major military action by the Western Powers.the Soviet leaders are likely to approach foreign policy decisions during the
course ol this estimateense ofin the strength and potentialities of the Soviet system.
EXTERN At FACTORS
aramount in Soviet calculationsthe non-Communist world is almostthe enormous physical strength and potential of the US as the principal restraint upon Soviet freedom of action In thesphere. References to the US in the speeches of the Soviet leaders ath Party Congressontinuingof the great gap which still separatesindustrial capacity from that of the US. In thc military sphere, the Soviet leaders, despiie the gains they have made in advanced weapons, almost certainly believe that atthc USSR should not deliberately incur the hazards of general war with the US. Moreover, they probably consider that thus far the ability of the Western alliance loa common purpose toward lhe USSR in the face of distractions and Soviet divisive maneuvers, though weakened, has not been fundamentally shaken.
onsequently, taking presently existing power (actors alone into consideration, thc Soviet leaders must see formidable obstacles to their ambitions and certain potentialin the international situation. While they probably believe that the current leaders of the US realize the dangers of nuclear war, and would exercise caution to avoidar, they recognize Ihat the US remainscommitted to resist tho expansion ofpower Moreover, their stated fear of the influence of "aggressive-minded" leaders in the US may be in some degree real. They probably feel therefore that there is aof latent danger against which they must calculate, in each instance, therisks attending the policy decisions they make. In particular, they will Iry to weigh the gains which they hope to achieve against the dangers of setting Inourse of events which could lead to general war.
R
TRENDS
hile factors of physical power almost certainlyentral position in their estimate of the world situation, the Soviet leaders are also sensitive to other factors which weigh In the balance of forces between the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the West They are peculiarly disposed by tlielr Marxist training to view Uic world as In an historicallyprocess of change. Consequently, they are likely to give particular weight to what they believe to be the emergent forces which are transforming tho present situation. In this perspective of change, the prospectsappear more favorable to them than the power situation. In Its present aspect, would alone lead them to conclude.
oviet expectations for change appear to be fixed particularly upon the quickeningtownrd nationalism in the countries of Africa and Asia. Thc Soviet leaders appear to believe that domination of this area would, over the longer term. Up the balance of world power in their favor. Over the shorter term, they almost certainly believe that nativeand antlcolonial movements can be manipulated to damage Western interests, some of which are of critical economic and strategic Importance, and to encourage differ-ences among the Western states themselves.
he Soviet leaders appear to believe also that there arc forces at work within thealliance system Itself which, it assisted by their own actions, could leadecline in Its vigor and unity. They have probablythat aggressive actions by the Sino-Soviet Bloc tended lo increase the willingness of non-Communist nations to follow US leadership. They probably now believe that the more amicable posture displayed by the USSR over the last year, Including apparent willingness to negotiate some Issues, offers of mutually advantageous trade, and greatly broadened cultural exchanges, have gone far toward dispelling thc Image of Sovietintentions which has been the principal motivation for the Western alliance. They may calculate that the steps which they have recently taken to repudiate Stalin will further diminish anU-Communlst feelings in the non-
Communist world and complicate the efforts of the Western powers toommon front against Soviet policies. They probably regard France as particularly vulnerable,that the absence of an evident Soviet military threat, combined with the revival of German power and the continuing diversion of French resources to colonial problems, will make it increasingly difficult toarliamentary combination slronglyto NATO.
The Soviet leaders have recentlyore realistic appraisal both of thc ability of capitalist countries lo achieve furthergrowth and of the Soviet need to learn from thc West. Nevertheless, they still maintain that long-term trends point to eventual economic crisis In capitalistlhc view that state Intervention in economic activity could avert capitalistwas again repudiated ath Party Congress. Instead it was affirmed that only such artificial stimulants as rearmament and the temporary absence of Germany and Japan from world markets had sustained capitalist economic activity over the last several years, and that with these stimulants becoming exhausted, capitalism's general de-gene ratory trend would continue.
In sum. the Soviet leader* probablythat they areeriod in their relationship with thc non-Communist world in which the tide of events Is running in their favor. They probably believe that Western power and unity arc becoming increasingly vulnerable lo Soviet political action, and that many Asian and African governments and peoples will become more and more susceptible to tho political and economic allurements which the Bloc can provide. While the Soviet leaders may not expect major defections from the non-Communist world during the course of this estimate, they probably believe that more and more states will move toward some closer degree of cooperation with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. In short, the Soviet leadersbelieveore fluid situation isin the political alignments of the world, and that additional opportunities for the expansion of Soviet Influence will appear.
VIII. PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION
SOVIET OBJECTIVES
believe that the developmentsUSSR and the Soviet estimate ol thewhich have been discussed insections have led the Sovietassess their over-all situation somewhatThe balance of military power inincluding the possession of largecapabilities by both sides, is rapidlysuch that neither side coulda general war without graveneither side is capable ofpressure to thc other side toto make vital concessions. Onesult of the more amicableby the USSR over the last year,dividing the Communist andworlds have tended to blur, manystates are entering into closerwith the Bloc, and there areof division within the WesternItself. Finally, the Soviet economyits rapid growth, and givesof sustaining thc expanding range ofthe regime has undertaken.
believe thnt Soviet policy duringof this estimate will bo conditionedconsiderations. At the same time,that the Soviet leaders remainto the view that the struggleCommunist and non-Communist,irreconcilable and that the relationshipthe two can never remainalance
.which Is stable and mutually advantageous.
'Consequently, we believe that the Sovietwill push forward during the course of this estimate to achieve thc following general
increase the economic strengthcapabilities of the Sino-Sovlct Bloc;
weaken the cohesion of theworld, and particularly to
etraction of Westerninfluence, and particularly to force with-
drawal of US military power from Its present deployment around the periphery of the Bloc;
d. To expand Soviet influence throughout the world by political, economic, andmeans.
GENERAL ASPECTS OF SOVIET POLICY War and "Coexistence"
we have indicated above, wethe USSR, largely because of theof nuclear destruction, will attemptduring the period of thisof action which in its judgmentserious risk of general war. Theleaders would almost certainlyattacks across recognised stateSoviel. Communist Chinese, orforces as Involving such risk.for the next few years, thc politicalCommunists hope to make bythemselves from aggression andseem to argue against actionscompromise their general posture.
ossibility that, as Sovietcapabilities more nearly approachthe US. the Soviet leaders might comethat lhe US would no longer beto accept the risk of employingagainst the USSR exceptoviet nuclear attack. Underthe USSR might be willing,the end oferiod,from nuclear attack on the US,major attacks withand weapons to overrun key areasEurasian continent. However, wepossibilityemote one."
c believe It much more likely that the Soviet leaders intend to maintain for aperiod the general posture ofcoexistence with the non-Communist world
Liit Chief of Staff, Intelligence.of the Army, considers this possibility to bt considerably more likely than Is Indicated In tbe test. See his footnote to Paragraph lit.
which tney have been developing for some years but with particular efiort since the springrincipal object ofh Party Congress was apparently to validate and affirm this policy, lo bolster it with theoretical Justifications, and to clear away remaining obstacles to its further development. Tlie modifications of tactical doctrine made at thc Congressfavoring cooperation withand other "progressive" forces,the inevitability of war, andthe possibility of revolution by peaceful and parliamentary meanssuggest that the Soviet leaders think of their present policy as designedairly long period. They have Internal problems which could be casederiod of relaxed international tension. Moreover, both the deterrentsolicy of aggression arising from the threat of nuclear war as well as the political opportunities open In many areascoexistence" policy would seem to argue for continuance of the present policy for at least some years.
n the other hand, thc Soviet leadersto believe that the element of threat should not be eliminated from Iheir policy. They evidently consider lhat fear as well as persuasion can advance their objectives In some areas. Moreover, the Soviet leaders probably believesoft" line contains some dangers to the Communist movement itself. Their warnings against ideologicalindicate that they realize that the discipline and spirit of Communist parties may suffer in an atmosphere of reduced tensions. Restiveness in the Sovietor in the Satellites could develop as aof the anti-Stalin campaign and might lead the Soviet leaders again to emphasize an alleged external threatontrol device. In sum. while we believe that it is the present intention of the Soviet leaders to maintain an atmosphere of detenteonsiderablecontingencies could arise internally orwhich would lead them to revertolicy involving gtcater tensions and risks.
t is possible that, at any time during the period of this estimate, armed outbreaks under Communist sponsorship or aggression by local Communist armed forces could occur, espe-
cially if the Communists are presented with opportunities which seem lo them to Involve minimal risk of large-scale conflict Local aggression might even become probable If the Communists judge the political condition of the non-Communist world lo be such that local aggression would promote confusion and divisions rather than stimulate renewed vigil-ance and determination.
Diplomacy and Propaganda
Ihe USSR's current policies caU for heavy reliance upon more conventionalof diplomacy. Attempts to Influenceby establishing an Identity ofbetween them and the USSR Is theof the present policy. Thus "bourgeois" governments in former colonial areas which were once described as "lackeys ofnow qualify as "progressive" if theyWestern defense support or follow aforeign policy. The Bloc's tiade and credit program provides Inducements for them to do so. even though resulting economic gains may in some cases strengthenwith anti-Communist domestic policies. Similarly, thc government of West Germany, once characterized ass nowrespectability and recognition. Theso tactical shifts indicate that the USSR, in the pursuit of its foreign policy objectives, is now relying upon its ability to influencedirectly, largely through bilateralapproaches, rather than uponactions against those governments At the same time Soviet propaganda Is sup-porting these diplomatic tactics by attempting to raise popular pressures for cooperation with the USSR
umber of themes have emerged inpropaganda, diplomacy, and politicalwhich are likely to coniinue to receive principal emphasis. They are intended to end thc political Isolation of the Communists which resulted from the USSR's postwarand to lay the groundwork for an increase of Communist political influence In thc non-Communist world.
a. Peace. Recognizing that the desire to avoid nuclear war constitutes an increasingly
It
ltil political motivation throughout the world, the USSR will continue the ePTort to represent itself as the foremost protagonist of peace and to associate the US with warAt thc same time, it will emphasize its desire for good relations with Ihe US. It will thus seek to eive the impression that US-Sovlct relations are becoming less tense and lo reduce the sense of urgency throughout the world for defensive arrangements directed against the Bloc.
The USSR willIts effort to ride the wave ofand colonial revolt In Asia, theand Africa, and to identify thc USThe imrnediate aim is tocritical areas to Western influenceand In some cases to sap themilitary strength of certain
ond Economic Progress. Thearepecial effort,in underdeveloped countries, toand other political elementsIn social change and economicthat Communist methods insurerapid economic growth and theto realization of social justice.
Popular Front. Thcalso trying to convince various nongroups that Joint action withon democratic principles isImmediate aim is to narrow the basesupportumber of keypro-Western foreign policies.hope to acquire control of suchby infiltration.
Communist Parties in lhe Free World
he Communist parties in the free world are adapting their tactics to current changes in Soviet foreign policy. The present Soviet leaders are permitting greater flexibility of political maneuverarger degree ofautonomy than did Stalin; the Soviet leaders evidently believe that In this newthe Communist parties willore useful adjunct to Soviet politicalagainst the free world. These tactical shifts and in particular the denigration of
Stalin have evidently caused some confusion in lhc Communist parties. Wc believe, how-ever, that for some time to come they will continue to accept Moscow's leadership and to adapt themselves lo lhe main lines of Soviet foreign policy, with only minor variations. We believe that the present Stalinistof Communist Party leaders would be likely to do this on purely ideological grounds, even should Moscow conclude that lt no longer needed direct control and could rely merely on the influence it exercises as the fountain-head of Communist doctrine. It Is possible that ultimately, though we think not in any short period, new leadership In these parties might conclude that their aspirations to power In their respective countries would be better served if theyenuinelynational character.
Trade and Economic Aid Policies
USSR will almost certainlyemphasize trade and economicas means to further Itsgoals. During the last year, thegreatly increased efforts to developties with underdeveloped countriesAfrica, and Latin America, and hasfor an expansion of trade wtthEurope. It aims to displace WesternIn underdeveloped countries Inbring them into closer relationshipUSSR and where possible Intoupon it More generally,wishes to portray itself as abusiness-like member of thetep toward breaking downother barriers between thenon-Communist worlds. Thefor broader economicthe non-Communist world, theof the Soviet leaders, andand amounts of credit which havebeen offered all indicate that thcundertaken an important shift inpolicy which is intended toa number of years at least.
Disarmament
believe that the USSR considersIssue to be one of the most lm-1
poitanl areas of propaganda and diplomatic maneuver in support of its current policy- It gives the USSR opportunities to document Its efforts for "peace" and to probe potential divisions within the free world.wc believe that the USSR wilt continue the effort begun5 to give the appearanceonstructive and flexible attitude on this issue.
Nevertheless, the USSR will almostcontinue to reject Western proposalsomprehensive disarmament schemeeffective Inspection and control. The Soviet leaders are not likely to repose the confidence In Western intentions which would be necessary for them to agree to set upystem. In any case, they would not wish to deny themselves the option of resort toaction or to abandon thc clement of threat which is always present In their policy, even in Its current phase. Moreover, theleaders almost certainly regard the kind and scale of inspection procedures required by the Western Powers not only as dangerous to their security, but as conflicting with their desire toontrolled society.
What Soviet policy has aimed atoosely-drawn pledge of mutual disarmament without significant inspection features. The Soviet leaders have probably had twomotives. First, they hoped that the effect of such an agreement would be to encourage an atmosphere of relaxation ln the West which would tend to undermineapid degeneration of Western military effort, andlimate inhibiting the possible use of nuclear weapons by thc West. Secondly, they wished to obtainImportant economic advantages for theeduction in the size of the Soviet military establishment would assist them to absorb the high cost of current programs for the introduction ot new weapons and would make available an important increment of manpower to case their current laborA further relaxation of tensions would also enable them more easily to carry costly new weapons programs.
The Soviel leaders have evidently now concludedisarmament agreement
with the Western Powers cannot be obtained because of two Western conditions the USSR could not accept. These were the insistence on comprehensive inspection and control and the idea that,ertain minimumof forces, political settlements,in Germany, must be Included. The Soviet leaders have therefore decided to take unilateral measures of reduction which they probably believe will place thc Westernunder pressure from their public opinion and parliaments to follow the Soviet example. We believe that the USSR, for the economic and political reasons mentioned in the preceding paragraph, In fact wishes to reduce the pace of armaments competition, but without necessarily impeding its ownof advanced weapons, andolitical atmosphere conducive toesult. The Soviet leaders may also hope that. In the longer run, the reduction of armament effort would be carried further in Western countries than in the USSR, and would gradually leadosition of Soviet military superiorily.
COURSES OF ACTION IN, PARTICULAR AREAS
Europe
The USSR's recently increased activity in the underdeveloped areas of Asia and the Middle East does not mean that it intends lo neglect Europerincipal area of Soviet political ambitions and diplomatic activity. Tlie failure of the USSR to prevent theof the Paris Agreements in the spring5 broughteorientation of Soviet policy in Europe. Recognizing that Westrearmament could no longer be delayed by threats or the pretense or Sovietto negotiate German reunification with the Western Powers, the USSR sought to-shelve Four Power negotiations on the German question, and to rely instead upon the effect of ils shiftenerally conciliatory posture to obtainelay In German rearmamenteakening of NATO ties and effort.
The diplomatic and propagandaagainst NATO under the slogan of "peaceful coexistence" employs several-gam-.
03
A European securily pact to supersede both NATO and the Warsaw Pact is one which the USSR is likely to continue toThe Soviet leaders will picbably prefer for thc present to work lluough bilateralrather than by further great powerTlie weaker or more remotely placed members of NATOas Iceland, Greece, or Turkeywhich may have regional or local Interests difficult to reconcile within NATO, are likely to be special targets of Sovietand diplomatic activity. Thc USSR probably believes that the withdrawal of its cooperation evenmall state would have effects on NATO morale and unity farthe loss of strength involved. Finally, the Soviet leaders hope that the popular front alignments promoted by Communist parties or the USSR's own cultivation of Socialist parties can bring about changes In theof key NATO states. France isrincipal target in this connection.
ermany. We believe that no departure from the policy on Germany to which the USSR adhered in5 Geneva meetings, and which amounted lo an insistence upon maintaining the present division of theis likely during the next several years. The Soviet leaders almost certainly believe lhat the alignmenteunited Germany with the West would seriously impair the USSR's military position In Europe, diminish its ability lo influence European developments In the future, and complicate theof Soviet authority in the EasternSatellites. For some time to come they are unlikely to consider that any formula for neutralization would provide assuranceeunified Germany's tacit alliance with the West Consequently, the Soviet leaders probably believe lhat they have at present no alternative to the policy they have been following in Germany, which is tothe Communist regime ln Eastwhile Insisting that reunification isroblem for the two German regimesIn view of the complexities of the German problem, they probably have not clearly formulated the course which they will follow beyond the next year or two. They probably believe that eventually the West Ger-
mans can be induced to make Independent approaches to Moscow which would greatly complk-ate the relations of the West German government with its NATO partners.
Tlie restoration of goodwtth Yugoslavia has been nof the USSR's post-SfaJIn policyWhile the Soviet leadersa renewed alignment of thewith the Blocaximumprobably also considered that alesser puiposes justified the sharp andrespects awkward turn in policy. Atthey aimed to arrest theof Yugoslav ties with the Westernand lo disrupt Yugoslavia's pactand Turkey, at least insofar as itan adjunct to NATO. Thoyhope that Tito's willingness towith the USSR will encourageIn uncornmitted states of lheEast and South Asia, and will caseto useful contacts with SoclalUtWestern Europe. The Soviet leaderscontinue their efforts toavorable trade and creditpossible sacrifice of other anti-Titolstin the Satellites, and byYugoslavia's independence andthey would almost certainlygranting of an equal measure oflo the Satellites as too high apay for Yugoslavia's completethe Bloc.
Asia
Northeast Asia the principalSoviet policy remains to detach Japansphere of US influence, although asJapan docs not become an ImportantIn Asia, the USSR is unlikely toconcessions to achieve thisIn concert with Communist China,will almost certainly continue"normalize relations" with Japan as abroader official and unofficialUSSR will probably not greatlylimited concessions it has alreadyJapan In current negotiations, sinceleaden ire unlikely toeryof the present or prospective strength
5-1
Japan's bargaining position. Theybelieve that there ls potential political Instability in Japan on which both Soviet foreign policy and the Japanese Communist Party, especially through ils Influence In other political organizations, can work gradually but effectively. Most Importantly, in theview, Japan's critical need for markets and for raw materials will in the long run make Communist trade solicitationsmore attractive, and create frictionsJapan and the West. Probably the Soviet leaders expect thateriod of several years forces in Japanore independent and nationalist course in foreign policy and trade will become Increasinglyand that the effect will be,inimum, lo move Japan away from close tics with the US.
n South and Southeast Asia thc USSR will continue the intensified effort launched with thc Khrushchev-Bulganin trip to India, Burma, and Afghanistan lo extend Sovieton thc government-to-government level, and to build up popular support for pro-Soviet policies. In these states the USSRumber of assets which it will try to build upon to encourage increasingly anti-Western policies,loser economic orientation toward the Bloc. In many of these states there exist real or imagined grievances against the Western Powers and distrust of theirkey and influential figures who have been impressed by Communist achievements indevelopment, territorial claims which could be supported by the USSR to win favor among popular and official elements, student groups under Communist Influence, andpressures which the USSR Is In ato alleviate. Tlie propaganda image the USSR will seek to convey will be thattable government in possession of irresistibly growing power, abjuring violence andto the broadening of the "zone of peace" In the interest of human welfare. It ts In this area that the USSR will give particular scope to "competitive coexistence" with the West, on the level of trade and economic aid and of political ideas as well. The Soviet leaders apparently regard Indiaey target in the area.
we believe that It Is theof the USSR to avoidfree world with an armed challenge,critical Issues such as theIslands and Indochinaay as to bring aboul such aOn both Issues the Communiststo justify resort to military actionthat would be accepted byelements of world public opinion,might expect that thc US wouldfrom armed intervention by theof its allies and by the fear ofsome important states of Asia. Forhowever, tho USSR apparentlyto curb tensions surrounding bothwhile encouraging by diplomacya gradual erosion ofto oppose Communist expansionareas. Wc believe thatnow shares this view. But thereno assurance that Peiping wouldSoviet guidance concerning whatIts vital interests in Taiwan andislands, should the USSROn balance, however, weChina would not undertakerisks without Soviet assent andsupport.
Middle East
concurrence ol developments overyearthe conclusion of therising tensions over the Arab-Israeliand the growing ambitions of NasserEgyptian hegemony over thecombined lo provide tho USSRto Inject Its influencethc Middle East by offering arms toArab states. Tho USSR's immediatewas to prevent an extension andof the Weslern militarymakes disruption of the Baghdadprimary target, and to this end thc USSRthe nationalist ImpulsesWest already present. Moreover, itto improve relations with keyof the Baghdad Pact, such as Turkeyby removing long-standing sources of
55
The USSR is using the At:nd the Suez rrtnOiwiu'eu i
> aiK so n
raeli con-hancc Ha km, how* nizpnvolved
In the area that the USSR would be courting major political and possibly military risks if It supported the Arabs in violent courses of fiction affecting cither Issue. Soviet policy piobably alms, therefore, at achievingfor the USSRajor Interested power participating equally wllh the three Weston Powers in regulating the affairs of tlte area. Although thc USSR will not want to Jeopardize Its posture as an advocate of peace it will try to appearupporter of Aiab nationalism both within and outside the UN.
USSR's ultimate aim is toinfluence in the area, and tostates of the economichave enjoyed through exclusiveaffecting thc exploitation andof oil. The Soviet leaders may notthe adherence of Middle Easternthe Communist sphere in the nextbut they probably belicvo thatcan be persuaded to alignwith the USSR onMoreover, they probably believesympathy which the USSR Isa result of Its current policies willinfluence of domestic Communistsome Arab states.
[Africa
USSR's increased activity inEast has been accompanied by apolicy in those areas of AfricaSoviet Influence by diplomacy orIn North Africa, thc USSR hasfrom open support of Arabrevolt in order not to compromise its effort
to Influence development! in France to the detriment of NATO. However, the USSR's presently enhanced Influence ln Cairolong the headquarters of emigre nationalist groups from Tunisia, Algeria, and Moroccomay permit It to exploit unrest In French North Africa more effectively by encouraging and supporting the propaganda and subversive activities of these groups. Al the nunc time, thc USSR will probably continue lo employ direct approaches to native governments, such as Libya and the Sudan, to establish anda diplomatic and economic foothold In tiie area. There are Indications Lhat thc Soviet leaders Intend to devote increasingto all of Africa as an area for Soviet penetration and subversion In the future.
Latin America
he USSR will almost certainly attempt through broadened economic, diplomatic, and cultural exchanges with Latin Americanto extend its influence into the Western hemisphere and to encourage frictions among the American stales. Toward this end the USSR will attempt to exploit existingin Latin America against US import barriers and US competition in worldand will present Itselfradingwilling and able to accept Latin American raw material exports and to actource of supply for capital equipment Bloc trade Willi iJttin America remains at tow levels, but it has increasedubstantial percentage in the last year or two, largely due to an expansion of Satellite trading contacts. In addition to the economic and diplomaticthc USSR will almost certaintyits efforts through local Communist parties and front groups, appealinglo labor, students, and Intellectuals, to promote anti-US sentiment, to embarrass US business Interests, to obstruct economic and military cooperation of Latin Americanwith thc US, and to encourage lhe formation of governments amenable toinfluence.
TABLE l
ESTIMATED ACTUAL STRKNOTH OP" BLOC ACTIVB MILITARY PERSONNEL,
OKOUI.T) FORCES
UNKNOWN
NAVAL FORCES
AIR
FORCES
SECURITY
TOTALS (Not Including
USSR (toUl)
Satellites (total)
o va Ua
Oermnny
Asia (total)
Korea
Mlnh
1.
Totals
IO
Figures bmcd primarily on order-ol-battle, and do not take inlo account announced Soviet andreductions For methodology, see accompanying note For estimate ofoviet armed forces pcr.-iimie] strength, iv.iimlng full Implcm*-elation of announced reductions, see
' Foe purposes of this table, anaval aviation personnel are Included In the total of Soviet air forces personnel
not Include MVD naval forces, which for purposes of this table are carried In Soviet Security Forces total.
'Air defense control and warning personnel and personnel serving or training to servo surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles. The Director of Intelligence. USA*', believes this toul0 air defense coutrol and warning0 jurface-to-alr missile personnel,0 surface-to-surface missile personnel, allot whom are air forte* personnel. Tlie Assistant Chief of start.Department Of the Army,e total should be only about0 air defense control and warninglulle personnel,mall number Of surface-to-surface missile personnel, all of whom are ground forces personnel
" Including naval aviation personnel.
* Including naval aviation personnel.
troops, organlwd Inegional battalions.
Jp-
P-
1 (continued) Note on Methodology
I. Figures on over-nil military personnel strengths arc based essentially on unit order of battle. To this base, estimative factors are applied for average personnel strength per unit and average number of administrative and supporting personnel per unit or area. Soviet ground units are estimated at aboutercenttrength; most Soviet air and naval units are estimated attrength. The resulting over-all personnel strength estimates arc subject to amargin of error. In addition, personnel strength estimates based on order of battle can lag considerably behind actual changes In strength, since the basic unit Identifications are accumulated over relatively long periods. Ofoviet line divisions identified since postwar demobilization Inave been rcidentlfiedyestablishing the existence of division headquarters or one or more subordinateelements, or by observation of thepresence of ground elements at the locations of previously Identified units. The total Identified In any one year is muchhowever, and there can be no certaintyiven division or other unit3 is still operational
ecause of these limitations, we consider that our over-all personnel strength figures
represent ordcr-of-magnltude rather thanmeasures of actual strength at given dates. Thus, while there Ja evidence tothat Increases In the personnel strength of the Soviet armed forces occurred. and that reductions occurredn the absence of quantitative confirmation our strength estimates have not reflected these fluctuations. For this reason, our estimates of Soviet armed forces personnel strength, prior lo the reductions are more likely to have' erred on the low side than on the high side.
he principal usefulness of this method of analysis.Is toasis for judging the approximate present strength of Soviet forces. Except foroint ofand being suggestive of Sovietlt does notirm basis for future estimates of over-all strength. Othersuch as probable future requirements or changes tr. Soviet policy based on political and economic factors, must be taken Into account in making estimates for the future. At present, wc believe it probable that future reductions In over-all Soviel militarystrength will occur and that the cut might be on thc orderen. Inwith announced Soviet Intentions. Since we are unable at this time to mako moreentative estimate of the size andof Soviet forces following such adetailed future personnel strengthhave been omitted from Table 1.
ECRET-
Bfl
one-?-
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED BLOC TRAINED RESERVES.8 AND MUM98I. AND GROUND MOBILIZATION CAPACITY,
MOBILIZATION
Days Personnel Dlv.
Days Personnel Dlv.
Days Personnel Dlv.
'
0
China
Korea
Minh
Is estimatedivisions win be utilized to provide replacement units or Individuallor combat losses.
'Units in excess ol this number could be provided but would lack equipment unless provided by the USSR.
g-t;
TABLE i
ESTIMATED ACTUAL AIRCRAFT STRENGTH OF BLOC AtB WITS
GAT
NKAF
AT
NKAF
AT
NKAF
UT Ell
790
645
53
(Day! Jet) Piston
0
100
Jet' Plslon
523
190
116
265
495
40
BOMBER Jet Piston
60
260
BOMBER'
Jet
Piston
769
380
190
30
BOMBER' Jet
Turbo-piop
130
250
300
300
300
Medium Light
185
Large
Jet Fighters et Lightiston
10
60
0
140
56
to
a Uon
Jet iston
115
115
115
115
115
TOTAL
,o not take Into account the posslDle eUect on the air forces of the announced Soviet force reductions.
1 At present this force consists of fighters only. We estimateet attack type will be introduced.
iscussion of the factors which may affect the present medium and heavy bomber estimates, especially In lhe later years, seo paragraph lis.
are not shown In specific numbers since Ihey have not been Identified In operationala discussion of Soviet Inflight refueling capabilities and probable tanker requirements, see
82
TABLE 5
ESTIMATED OEOORAPHJC DISTRIBUTION OP SOVIET ACTUAL AIRCRAFT STRENGTH BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT EASTERN TYPE
USSH'
USSR *
SSR
USSR'
CENTRAL USSR*
EAST'
Jet (Day) Jet)
75
369
204
131
37
Jet Piston
184
113
523
BOMBER
Jet
BOMBER
Jet
Piston
_ ti
328
83
230
769
BOMBER Jet
Turbo-prop
30
Medium Light
Large
Jcl Fighter Jet Light Bomber Piston
51
26
77
t88_
Jet Light
Bomber Piston IMIsc) 14
8
29
58
109
Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Rumania.
Leningrad, and White Sea Military Districts.
Bclorusslan, Carpathian, Kler, Odessa, and Tauric Military Dlslricls.
South Ural, Volga, Voronezh, and Ural Military Districts.
'North Caucasus and Transcaucasus Military Districts.
Siberian, Turtestan. and west Siberian Military Districts.
' Far East and Transbalkal Military Districts.
-ODCKBT1
TABLE 6
ESTIMATED SOVIET ACTUAL AIRCRAFT STREN0TH BY ROLE WITHIN MAJOR 0OMPOHEK1B
TYPE AIRCRAFT
FIGHTEROTAL
ATTACK Jet
TOTAL
t FRONTAL) AVIATION
FTR. AVIATION OF
AIR DRFKN&K
LONG-RANGE AVIATION
NAVAL AVIATION
232
L7Q6
AVIATION OF ABN. TROOPS
BOMBER
MEDIUM BOMBER
Piston
HEAVY BOMBER Jet
Turbo-prop TOTAL
TRANSPORT
HELICOPTERS
RECONNAISSANCE
Jet
Jet Lieht
UTII.ITY/Ln
475
J5A
0^
214
-U4
k *1
1 V
162
162
BS
63
OC
4
>5
!3S
77
162
745
64
TABLE 7
ESTIMATED SOVIET ACTUAL AIRCRAFT STRENGTHS BY ROLE WITHIN MAJOR COMPONENTS
TYPE AIRCRAFT
(FRONTAL) AVIATION
AVIATION OP
AIR DEFENSE
AVIATION
AVIATION
OP
ABN. TROOPS
J!
A/W
76
ATTACK Jet Piston
TOTAL
669
_
BOMBER Jet
BOMBER Jet Piston
-
BOMBER Jet
Turbo-prop
300
.
r
Medium Jet
.
ias
Piston Light Piston
605
-
230
Jetight Bomber Puton TOTAL
UTZUTY/Ln Ml Piston TOTAL
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCET FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
Into Operational Use
Celling
Combat Radius
t
FRESCO
FARMER
Seaft.
a
0
naut. miles
010
1
WF-59
Current9
CIS
ALL-WEATHER
0
Internal fuel only.
SECRET-
TABLE 9
ESTIMATED SOVIET LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE UNDER OPTIMUM MISSION PROFILE
(Calculated In accoidar.ce with USA Spec except that luel reserves are reduced toaximum ofinutes loiter at sea level, and aircraft operate at altitudes permitting maximum radius/range)
CONDITIONS
BULL
BADGER
BISON
BISON
30MEEK
Radius/Range (nri'. miles*
b. bomb load
refuel'
b. bomb load
refuel
b. bomb load
refuel
(kn./ft.)
Max. speed/
alt.
Target speed/
celllne. (ft.)
Target Altitude (ft.)r
b. bomb load
omb load
b. bomb load
.KG
(See footnotes on preceding page.)
It Is estimated that1 the USSR willew medium bomber with supersonic dash capabilities
* Service celling at maximum power wiih one hour fuel reserves plus bomb load aboard. No range figure ls associated with this altitude.
Pill
STIMATED BLOC NAVAL FORCES. MID-lWfl,
OVERAGE VESSELS'
FLEET
SEA
TOTAL
China
St
China Communist
MAJOR sniFACl VESSELS
Cruisers
(OVERAOE MAJOR VESSELS)
1
SUBMARINES
Range
Range
Range
1OVERAOE SUBMARINES)
Does not Uke Into account the possible effect on the naval forces of trie announced Soviet force reductions. See.
* Modern veascU Include surface shipsears of ige and less (from date ofnd submarine*ears of age and Lett.vessels include surface ships more thanears of age. andears cf age But marie ea are eluded entirely from thr iillmiUd future order Of battle atears. Surface vessels are not excluded because of age Theae are Included usUl It becomes apparent tnat tney are co longer fulfllUng type asaitr.mer.ts, at which time they are assigned to the Miscellaneous Auxiliary (AO) eaU-
Construction rates of minor combatant vessels are uncertain and probably wiU be limited lo only sUebtly more vessels than will befulfill replacement needs.
o reliable information upon which to estimate fuiure augmentation to the Chinese Communist Kavy. The Chinese CoramunUU doignificant srilptui.aUig capacity and tnls factor should be considered when analytlngiscussion of the factors which may affect future Soviet submarine strength, see. "Includes ID unasslgnednaaslgned
tH-i
TABLE 11
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF MAJOR GROUND FORCE WEAPONS
Tantcs
Heavy Tanks
Assault Guns2
Amphibious Tanks
Light Tanks
mmm AA
mm AA
m Sell-propelled5
m Self-propelled5
m Howitzer'
m5
m Gun-howitzer'
mier
m5
unm
800
800
800
800
300
CO
300
300
production will be In-
{
71
TABLE 12
A IRC It AFT PRODUCTION IN SOVIET BLOC AND NATO
1 5 TOTAL
VICT
Fighters
Bombers
All Others
Total Alrcralt(million pounds)
Fighters (Unlla) 8
Bombers (Units)
All Others (Units)
Total Alrcralt Production (million pounds)
TABLE 13
AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION IN USSR ANO US
?
Weight1
Postwar Total Dnils
Bombers AU Others
0
5
3
5
0
Bombers All Others
4
weight Is In thousands of pounds.
72
TAHLE 14
ESTIMA7
ED SOVIET BLOC ATRCRAFT51
Bombers
Heavy
Mcdlum
Ll/Attack
FjBhters_ AU Others
. USSR
I>5
.
180
_
All Others
Bombers
Heavy
Medium
Lt/Atlack
Fighters All Others
402
fin
SOVIET BLOC
172
g
532
C?7_
TABLE 15
ESTIMATED TOTAL USSR NAVAL VESSEL
Surface Vessels
Cruisers Destroys
Escort Destroyers
"lis
2
/| r*
ys he
M
i" u t- r-
II . in aj o <o a,
cgS? Be
MAA
li-Ii-M
S
S33 52
r-
33 -3
i i "? "T T
1
ontinued BLACK SEA FLEET
No. GRT
NO. GST
NO GRT
No. GRT
Xo GRT
No. GRT
NO. GRT
No. ORT
No GRT
28BJ23
Ml
Hungary. Rumania
EAST FLEET
COMMUNIST CHINA
No. GRT
No. GRT
No
out
No. ORT
No. GRT
No. GRT
No. ORT
No. GRT
No. GRT
5
9
67Q
4
5
9
4
1
mVUt
75
APPENDIX 8
ESTIMATED SOVIET TOTAL DEFENSE
The estimates of Soviet total defensecontained in Paragraphre basedtudy conducted by the 1AC Ad Hoc Military Cost Study Committee.'1 This study has been undertaken for three major purposes. The first is to measure over time the economic burden placed on the USSR by its defense establishment through calculationuble total which can be compared with gross national product. The second Is to examine these expenditures in detail in order to permit closer analysis of the composition and trends within this total. The third ls to measure the dollar value of Soviet defense
' The Assistant Chief otntelligence.of the Army, does not consider the costs derived In the Interagency study toalid appraisal of the over-all costs of the Soviet military effort and does not concur in theof the study. He believes that Its basic weaknessack of sufficient Information, pointing out that few current prices arefor Items procured by the Soviet armed forces and arguing that tha derivation of prices by tho Indirect mothods employed Is tooHe further believes that the evidence as to whether tha armed forces do or do not pay
Ul* turn-over Lax is not conclusive. Lastly, be regards the Infoimatlon available on costs of
such Important programs as guided missiles.
atomic energy, and research and development as
almost nlL
"The Director of Naval intelligence believes that although the text(a) the results of this analysis are tentative and subject lo error, ib) Important gap* remain In statistical dataparticularly In the military sector, and (c) the comparison o( the value of defensein the USSR and the US mayrude one. the discussionhose gives an Impression of reliability whichorethan the methods and Information used can Justify.f the tenuous nature of much of the evidence used and other ImportantIn Intelligence, he believes thatdrawn from this study may not be valid, and that comparisons between USSR aad USexpenditures should be used with caution.
expenditures In order to obtainrude one. of the value of defense expenditures in the USSR and the US.he estimates presented here include all known Soviet defense expenditures,of whether these expenditures are made from thc announced mililnry budget or from other sources. For purposes of this study, total expenditures hare been categorized as follows:
programs, consisting ofweapons, ammunition,refitting of naval vessels, mines,military aircraft, aerial bombs,guided missiles, atomic energy,and development,and equipment, and associatedoperating spare parts;
consistingariety ofoperating and trainingas for POL, purchasedfor the maintenance andof facilities (including barracks),of heterogeneous equipment,medical supplies, printing andretirement pay, personnel costs forKOB personnel, and thc support(paramilitarynd
personnel, consisting of theallowances, food, clothing andpersonnel supplies for the activepersonnel of the Ministry ofmilitarized components of the MVD,reserve program.
ecause the analysis was conducted in far greater detail than previous work In this field and took into account many factors notexamined, we believe that the results are considerably better grounded than our earlier estimates. Nevertheless, they remain tentative and subject to error.re-
"frOT OP OR
margin of error cannot bo determined, it is unlikely that It exceedsercent In either direction for total expenditures or the major subtotals. Furthermore, severaltendencies serve to reduce the margin of error associated with total expenditures,to as low as plus or minusercent
he ruble totals are the sums of individual estimates of the value of asist of defense goods and services as possible. These Individual estimates are ln turn, with some exceptions, the result of applying ruble prices obtained directly or derived In aof ways to physical estimates of goods and services devoted to defense purposes. Theof the results is therefore affected by the reliability both of the estimates of the physical quantities and the prices applied to them. On the first count, there Is someto suggest that physical estimates of end-item procurement have tended to be high but that military manpower may have been understated In recent years (see Paragraphfn the second count, the four basic valuation procedures employed, listed in descending order of reliability, nro as follows:
of ruble prices obtainedfrom Soviet sources. The majorln this fashion are personnel pay,and clothing: automotivetractors; petroleum products;construction; some miscellaneousand services; civilian wages;MVD-KGB personnel costs;research and development.
mall sample of ruble pricesruble/dollar ratios which werelo convert dollar prices of otherInto rubles. For example, ifUnksubles0 dollars in the US,uble/dollar ratio was appliedUS heavy lank priceollarsh valueubles for theSoviet heavy tank. Thisused in the valuation of aircraft,and armored vehicles.
third procedure is actually aof the second but Is distinguished
here because the smaller price samplesprobably result in lower reliability. Items in this category are communicationsand installations, ammunition,and certain weapons (principally towed artillery, small arms, and mortars).
d. In those cases In which physicalwere not available or for which prices could not be obtained, values were estimated by thc use of partial Soviet data and modified US values or factors, which were converted to rubles by estimated ruble/dollar ratios. This procedure was used to value atomic energy, guided missiles, some research andsome equipment spares, and otheritems.
hows the share of estimated total defense expenditures accounted for by each of these four types of valuation procedurest will be evident that, apart from the effect of possible errors in physical estimates, which become more likely for future years, the reliability of the final result also declines over the period because Items which must be valued by less reliable procedures acquire Increasing importance in total expenditures.
TABLE X
Share of Estimated Total Defease Expenditures Obtained by Various Valuation Procedures
'"L
l
2
J
4
In order to permit comparison with gross national product, total defense expenditures originally calculated1 rubles (see Table II) have to be expressed in terms3 rubles jtt factor cost* and adjusted slightly
valuation basis for the original derivation or the various series1 market prices These series were then converted3 ractor costs by two adjustments. The first of these lo3 market prices, was accomplished by applying the followingoor (ai For military pay. MVD-KOB pay.pensions(Footnote eonUnued on
over time to account (or the changes inprices wliich are considered in theol GNP growth. Thc results of this compulationillion rublesillionillionndicating that defense expenditures absorbedercent of GNP0 and the same share5 and will take aboutercent
7 In Table II, tolal defense expenditures Inubles are broken down Into categories which' show tlie cost of various types of mill-taiy activities and variations In the relative Importance of these activities over time.
The series reflects an over-all51harply rising trend for the5hen the total cost1 rubles. Beginning8 the seriesrelatively constant atillion rubles for two yearshen another sharp rise begins, reachingillion rubles
Over the period, procurement (including spare parts) for major programs increases more rapidly than the total.5 this category accounts forillion rubles, orercent of the total.1 this sameIncreasesillion rubles,f total defense expenditure. Among the major programs, ground equipmentdisplay relative constancy through the. reflecting the continuing modernization of forces which have already
(Footnote continued from
(bl For foodretail food price Indexc> For clothinga retail price Indexd> For reserve paya money wage Index.
(el For all other categories (Includinghard goods)Investment cost Indexhe second3 market prices3 factor coals, was made by reducing thecategoriesfood, clothing, and POLby IB percent The values of these categories are first red weed byercent to remove the turnover tax. The rturort la then Increased by two-thirds to account for Imputed factorSince wholesale prices were used for these goods In this study, the appropriateIs slightly larger.
attained considerable size. The fairly level trend for the naval program Is due primarily to growing expenditures on submarinesby declining expenditures onvessels. During the same period thc air equipment and the "other" category (which includes guided missiles, atomic energy, And research and development) show significantercent andercentSuppori expendituresuring the period, fromillion rubles5 toillion rublesnd nc-countelatively constant share ofercent of total defense expenditures.expenditures showodest eight percent Increase and therefore declinehare of total expenditures fromercent in
ercent
s was mentioned inbove, thc strength estimates which were used ns the basis for personnel costs In Table II for theere probably too low.at least some portion of theSoviet personnel cuten probably took placet alsothat military end-Item procurement may have been overestimated for
n addition, the calculations in Table II are Incomplete In two other respects, the efiecls of the reduction In military manpower discussed in0 and thecosts of the guided missile program. At minimum, the announced reductionillion men, if carried out. would leadeduction in direct personnel costs (pay, food, clothing,epending on whether the cut were madelice or largelyadre basis, thc result would be an ultimateIn annual expenditures of51 rubles. To this shouldbeeduction In operating costs and probably some decrease In procurement. However. In thc absence of Informationthe details of thc reduction, these amounts cannot be estimated with anyAgain depending on variousas to how the cut would be made, the reduction in annual expenditures for other than for personnel might range
TABLE II
COMPOSITION OF ESTIMATED TOTAL DEFENSE EXPrMDrTUHES'
1
1 Rubles)
PROORAMS
1
2
3
PERSONNEL
8
Seeor definitions of categories.
'The calculations made In lhe basic study and presented In thb table were obtained In terms1 prices. Since comparison with gross national product required conversion3 factor costs, the total In this table differs from the total expenditures Given in connection with GNP lnbove.
1 rublesotal range of fromo1
Recent unofficial Soviet statements have5 percent cut in budgetedexpenditures with the recentof manpower reductions. This36 rubles, falls roughly ln the center of thc range given above, which is fromoillion rubles when converted16 rubles.
We believe that something like1 rublesetter estimate of theannual savings from theanpower cutillion than the smaller amount based on personnel costs alone. If, then, these reductions are carried out on schedule, the projection in Table II should be lowered by thisnd by smaller amounts6
On the other hand, an Increase in the estimated costs of the guided missiles program is likely in the near future. The presentarc taken from5ndnd run1 rubles4illionoillionillionew estimates, however, ire currently being developed fornd preliminary results suggest thatupward revisions may occur.
The combined result of these two factors cannot be predicted, but it is clear that they will offset each other to some extent For this reason, we do not feel that the error tn ;stinialed total expenditures which results from the omission of these two factors vitiates the usefulness of the result Introduction of ihese factors into Table II would, of course. Ignificanlly alter thc pattern of costsere, particularly as between major programs ind military personnel.
or purposes of comparison with the US. stlmated Soviet defense expenditures have >ccn converted to dollars and presented In
'The range in the footnote totUlon rubles, expresses these same amounts3 factor costs In order to achievewith the ONP caleulaUoru.
Table III ln order to Indicate thc costs which the US would Incur in reproducing the Soviet defense effort. The results show that the dollar value of total Soviet expenditures wasercent above US defense expenditureshat US rearmament closed this gap and put US expendituresercent above theestimatehat the continued growth of Soviet expendituresecline In US expenditures produced virtual equalitynd that the dollar value of estimated Soviet expenditures will riseillion
TABLE III
Dollar Value of US and Estimated USSR Defense
5 Dollars
US
31
n Table IV. Soviet and US5 for major programs,and military personnel are compared In dollar terms. Expenditures for majorconsisting mainly of hard goodsare virtually equal,onsiderably differentcomposition ln the two countries. The lower Soviet value for support reflectsthe lower civilian wage bill resulting from estimates of less extensive maintenance and operating practices in thc USSR as well as the extra costs Incurred by the US by virtue ofverseas bases. Since Soviet military manpower exceeded US manpowerpplication of US costs per man In bothresultsigher dollar value for Soviet military personnel costs.
T
Original document.
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