CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research Staff on International Communlim
h CPSU CONGRESS IN RETROSPECT: ITS PRINCIPAL ISSUES AND POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM"
CIA/SRS-1
Thiepeculative study which has been discussed with US Government intelligence officers but has not been formally coordinated.
CONTENTS
Page
Pertinent Background
The Main Iseues of the
Internal
External
The Meaning of the Congress for International
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h CPSU CONGRESS IN RETROSPECT: ITS PRINCIPAL ISSUES AND POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
Pertinent Background Factors
CPSU is' the leading Communist Party in the world. leadership has been acknowledged even by theParty. Being in control of the Soviet state, itpolitical, military and economic power of the USSR, theof World Communism. Thus its pronouncements onand tactics are of decisive importance to Communist courses of action are determined primarily
in Moscow; the Chinese "People'sor all its potential strength, is still dependent upon Soviet guidance and assistance. The USSR remains the base of world Communism, and there is no indication that thisis about to change. If now, at the fountain of Communistew course is set which appears to deviate considerably from that of the Stalin era, repercussions are likely to occur which may be of great moment for both the Communist and the non-Communist world, if not immediately, at least in the foreseeable future.
reasons for the announced changes must be sought farthe Stalin regime. Long before his death, the men around Stalinrecognized that he paid only Up service to the doctrine ofWorld War n, when the USSR hadreat power, the rigidity
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Stalinist thought sad actiontalemate ir. Europe, fear of Soviet Interference in non-committed nations,idening gap between the Party and the Soviet people. It is probable that designs for altering the basis of the regime werend perhaps to some extentn ths dictator's entourage. When it became obvious that Stalin's days wsreid. immediate planseorganisation of government and Party were made, and these were put into action upon his death. Tbe successors to Stalin must have realized that the reorganisation and economic incentives. Initiated by Malenkov's "newould not, by themselves, crsata ths dssircd political climate at home and abroad. Even the liquidation of Berlya and the sharp limitation of police power were not sufficient to demonstrate that Soviet Communism had embarkedew, less violent, more gradualistic approach toward its objectives. Only an official break with the symbol of past policies, Stalin, could really impress the Soviet people and the world. The underlying purpose of the leadership was to promote political sscurlty and socio-economic incentives internally, to develop the concept ofcoexistence" externally, and to achieve global Communisthese objectives were defined during the three years following Stalin's death; they were confirmed and explained byh CPSU Congress and made explicit through the denigration of Stalin. It is against this background thath Congress must be understood.
The Main Issues of the Congress
3. The institution of Communist Party Congresses cannot be likened
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democratic conventions. Primarily, theae Congresses ara usedas sounding boards for the justification of past policies and the outlining of . ew ones. h Congress ssrved these traditional purposes, even though it differed from previous Congresses In both tone and substance. The results did not indicate that Communist fundamentals are to be On the contrary, the Congress emphasized that Communism is, and remains the wave of the future. But it did point out that the successes of International Communism have given the "Socialistore solid status in world politics and have thereby rendered Stalinist tactics obsolete. The revolution has not been called off, the Congress admitted; revolutionary techniques, however, are being changed. Revolution can become more gradual and respectable. In other words, the policies set forth byh Congress arc designed to make the anticipated eventual victory of Communism more easily acceptable and to eliminate at least the more dangerous tensions which have troubled the world throughout the cold war. To put this new approachirm ideological basis, some doctrinal "modifications" were announced, primarilyiew to rationalizing the type of successor regime, discarding some of the more obnoxious Stalinist principles, and advertising the so-called "return to Leninism".
4. hange from violence tond from tension to relaxation, no matter how well explained, cannot buteepimpact on the people inside ths Communist orbit and on the Communist parties outside. Even if such "msllowing" process is only superficial, it may set in motion forces extending far beyond the contemplation of the present
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leaders of tha CPSU. These leaders muit ba mindful that tho Bolshevik regimenique historic phenomenon. It has been able toitself in power for almost four decades after its original objective, the victory of the Bolshevik revolution, was achieved. It has achieved this extraordinary feat by what might be called "permanent revolution fromensions had to be kept high in order toeaceful post-revolutionary development. Totalitarian dictatorship had to be justified by alleging the necessity for an unending struggle against the "class enemy" within and "capitalist Imperialism" without, according to Lenin's concept of the "inevitable death struggle between the socialist and capitalist camps". Stalin merely extended and exacerbated this struggle, and, since the significance of nuclear weapons apparently escaped him, he continued it without letup after World War II. Since the new Soviet-Communist platform callseneralof tensions, the question naturally arises whether the leaders of tha CPSU and other parties can dispense with permanent tenaion without at the same time undermining their monolithic dictatorship. h Congress refrained from exhorting the people to continue the "relentless struggle against the classhe bugaboo of internal danger was, for the time being, played down. However, it maintained the theory of hostile camps, albeituch milder form. The Party has modified its strategy against the capitalist camp enough to tone down the "struggle against foreign enemies ofhereby weakening tho argument that socialist vigilance requires the continuation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It ls unlikely that the shrewd managers
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successors, generally speaking, have heavilyrather than force. There is apparently less of arbitraryslave labor camps are allegedly being dismantled. Labor lawsliberalized,ith fewconomic inducements,by Malenkov, have been continued by Khrushchev thoughemphasis. But while Malenkov, still very much under Stalin'son the support of the governmental bureaucracy against theinfluence had been waning, Party leader Khrushchevpredominance and turned dictatorial power back to it. At the samesought to improve relations between the Party and theIn the Stalin era had seriously deteriorated. This method is likelyParty dictatorshipime of diminishing tensions. Theare as unwilling now as they have evernd will beo democratize their system and to permit public discusof political problems. This was demonstrated by the lackh Congress, as well as by PRAVDA's recent warning notcriticism to include the Party and the system.
is clear, therefore, that the "return to Leninism" does notreturn to "Parly democracy". Nor is the substitution of Partyone-man rule necessarily an improvement from the viewpoint of US security.
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TIAL There ia no reason to assume that the modified "Neo"-Leninism, now eo heavily propagandized, ia more than formally different from the Soviet ayatem as we have known it. It may be recalled that the practice of "Partyr "democraticas severely limited by Lenin, who warned against "fractionalization" as earlyfter the Kronstadt revolt. Ath CPSU Congress in the same year, Lenin justified his position by referring to the danger of hostile class interests using the instrument of debate for their own counter-revolutionary purposes. Nevertheless, there still occurred occasional intra-Party discussions, cautiously airing opposing views. So strong was this habit that Stalin, having succeeded Lenin, could not completely eliminate its remnants8 when his position was firmly consolidated. During the remainder of Stalin's regime "party democracy" disappeared under the secret police terror. The collective leaders of the USSR now claim that they are re-Instating this principle. However, the mere fact that Khrushchev has called for more frequent plenary meetings of the Central Committee is no proof that genuine "democratic centralism" has been restored. He may permit perfunctory discussions so long as they do not show any deviationlat tendency. GeneraUy, however, such meetings probably can and will be usedeans of maintaining better control of this body and ofrt into rubberstamplng the edicts of the collective leaders without resort to the overt threat of police action. In truth, the heavily advertised "return to Leninism" consists primarilyhange In methods. The leaders of the CPSU have given up the Byzantine trimmings of the Stalin "cult of personality" without relinquishing any of their powers.
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The return to Leninism, we are told, means the return to "collective leadership". There were, indeed, traces of this principle under Lenin, which Stalin managed to eliminaterior to forced collectivization. Its highly vaunted renovation does not mean that power will now be distributed with checks and balances; it merelyifferent method of using power. At best, "collective leadership" might develop into an oligarchy with quasi-"democratic" trappings. It mightthe present despotismorm of "enlightenedollective leadership at presentuphemism for the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Within this Presidium, predominant power is exercised by the half-dozen active "oldf whom Khrushchev seems to be primus inter pares. In contrast to Stalin, Khrushchev and his colleagues appear to be willing to listen to arguments and consult with experts. They may be demanding and receiving more objective Intelligence reports. As theyore realistic attitude toward the facta of international life,
they may be able to look beyond the narrow confines of their ideology and
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formulate more realistic and subtle policies to achieve their goal peacefully. The result of this change can already be seen. The Soviet leaders have recognized both the destructive consequences of war and its futility in the nuclear age. They have therefore resorted to such peaceful methods as economic competition in lieu of military pressure. They are trying to stabilize their own economy by stimulating productivity; and they have introduced measures improving the lot of their own underdogs while at the same time whittling down the incomes of the nouveaux riches .
8. In order to carry out these policies, the break with Stalin had to be complete. The break itself wasurprise. Surprising, only, was the violence of Khrushchev's attack against Stalin in his "secret" speech ofebruary. This action may have been designed to perform psychological surgery onthe Party. But it was also conceivedarning to the Communists throughout the world that flexibility had been restored to Soviet policy, which could now employ tactics adequate to cope with the fact that the nature of revolution had changed. The reversal of more thanears of Stalinist indoctrination unquestionably will force many communists throughout the world to make difficult adjustments. But such adjustments have been made before and have not impaired the continuing vigor of the International Communist movement. The Soviet leaders must have known thath Congress woulderiod of confusion, particularly among the parties outside the orbit. But they probably calculated that eventually adjustments could and would be made. In any case, the interests of the USSR bothation and as the base of world Communism had to take precedence. We suggest that the Soviet leaders earnestly pondered these problems for many months and, having come to their conclusion, felt no hesitation to consummate the break with Stalin. If this assumption is correct, it would appear that they had not been forced to make the violent attack against Stalin onebruary because of internal or external pressures.
External Aspects
9. It was stated above that tbe CPSU leaders left the "class enemy"
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unmentioned. The same cannot be said of the "capitalistven though the noise of sabre rattling sounded rather muffled. The Soviet leaders have continued to emphasize the differences between the socialist and imperialist camps; by implication they have retained the thesis of basic irreconcilability. Nevertheless, they did transform their once rude and vitriolic aggressivenessoliter version of Communist verbiage, which was made more tolerable, if not actually conciliatory, by diplomatic flourishes and by some actual "concessions" such as the withdrawal from Austria. The development of nuclear weapons and jet propulsion, together with the growing belief, especially since the Summit Meeting, that the West does not now harbor aggressive designs, probably contributed decisively to Communist confidence in the future and led to the reinvigoration of what had long been known as "peaceful coexistence". Stalin had used this term in the Twenties but never gave it practical meaning. Malenkov reintroduced the concept, and Khrushchev, applying "creativeransformed it into "competitive coexistence" This new doctrine harmonizes admirably with the de-emphasis of armed power. At the same time the Soviet leaders may believe that it will stimulate the domestic Soviet economy while at the same time weakening the Western economic system. This, in turn, would stimulate the "contradictions among capitalist states fighting for world markets". Moreover, by inferring that the USSR is no longer isolated but has become the centerorld-wide system of socialist states, the Soviet and Communist leaders have admitted implicitly that at least some of the former "colonial and semi-colonial countries' have become politically independent. Their policy ofon-committed
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"peacef keeping it at least neutral, and perhaps winning it over to the socialist camp, may have led to revisions of their classic colonial doctrine.
break with Stalin signifies that the leaders of the CPSU willinsist that theyonopoly on the "correct" way toStalin's lifetime the only ex-post-fa-io blessingeviationSoviet doctrine was that which he had reluctantly given to Mao. to Belgrade would have been unthinkable. The Leninistvarious ways can lead toith the end of the road alwaysby Communistas not used by Stalin. Theof this formula byh Congress has probably quelled someon the part of the less sophisticated neutrals. It ls likely todemands from the satellites to follow their own path toMoscow denies them this right. It will have proved its insincerityworld and may lose, thereby, much of the good will it now possessesnon-committed countries. Nor will it, in the long run, be ablethe appearance of respectability, particularlyisFront partners. Much less will it be able to impresswith its claim that It will attempt to gain power legallymeans, and not by violent overthrow of governments.
should be restated here, and it cannot be emphasised toorecognition by the Soviet leaders of the significance of nuclear weapons
is the underlying cause forth sir policy shift. For the present, at least, atom and jet are the basic deterrents to general war, and probably also
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to local ware, Despite repeated pronouncementsuclear war would destroy only Capitalism, the Communists have no real ideological "guide to action" in this field; they surely mutt realize that the atom knows no ideological preferences. Stalin probably tried hard but in vain to come to grips with this problem since the day of Hiroshima. His successors appear to haveemporary solution by shifting from dangerous military pressures to less dangerous economic blandishments. Nevertheless, although their policies are designed to avoid war and to let capitalism diehere is no prohibition for Communists to divide the capitalist camp and render it harmless. Meanwhile, the "socialist" camp will continue to solicit allies among the imperialists, be they states, groups, or individuals. h century changes In capitalist economy are minimized or ridiculed. The Leninist view of the inevitable downfall of capitalism at Its highest stage, imperialism, has remained intact. Evolutionary tendencies, which goaded Lenin into writing vitriolic pamphlets, are still outlawed In spite of United Front overtures to socialist "opportunists".
The Meaning of the Congress for International Communism
12. The basic structure of Marxist-Leninist Communism has remained untouched. There is no Indication that the present Soviet leaders have renounced the goal of world domination. However, they no longer insist that this conqusst can and must come to pass under exclusive Soviet leader-ahip. Nor is there any hintommunist world would have to be dominated by the USSR. This means the acceptanceradualist approach
to Communist objectives which not only it considered feasible in view of the strength of the Sino-Soviet bloc and the growth of the uncommitted neutralist "peaceut also is made necessary by the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and by the great jeopardy to Communism's continued existence in the event of war. The post-Stalinist concept of Communist victory Is the achievement of "socialism" in individual countriesanner suited to national conditions, followed by the joining of such countriesoose community of "socialist" states. At first, these states would *etain their national identities but as time goes by they would gradually mergeorld-Communist community which would rule itself according tomotivated universal laws, having discarded national governments as
we know them today. Apparently the Soviet leaders anticipate the
of the first step, the end of capitalism in individual nations, by the end
the century. It Is conceivable that they think In termslassless
emerging only int century, inasmuch as the establishment of such
society is hardly possible so long as politically inimical camps continue
exist.
this view of the Soviet leaders estimate is correct, it would
follow that they can give considerably more leeway to the satellite parties.
the Soviet point of view, the military and economic Integration of
countries with the USSR is sufficiently strong toodicum of
Stalinists used to call "nationalist deviation". Communism in the Far
has to be adapted to conditions prevailing in that area, as was already
in the Soviet acceptance of Maoism. While there is, and
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will continue for lomi time to be, confusion among the Party rank and file, resulting from the break with the Stalin idol, this confusion Is unlikely to provoke many defections. Outside the USSR, it will be easier to achieve socialism by the "national" road than under the Soviet yoke. Soviet control and influence will be maintained, butubtler manner. Resistance against Communism will thus be overcomerocess of attrition rather than revolution.
confusion resulting from the break with Stalin will lastprobably have deeper consequences in the parties outside the Their doubts will be shared by leaders of international Front This period of efforts to adjust policies and methods to theapproach could be lengthened, and confusion could idenedpolitical warfare adequately exploits this uniquethe climate of political relaxation in non-Communistand the prospect of broader Interpretation of the Communistenable the leaders of these parties and fronts to maneuver overtly with
a minimum degree of obnoxiousness, while covertly strengthening their cadres for the tasks ahead.
is suggested that the long-range result ofh CPSUturn out to be beneficial from the Communist point ofrovided
the lack of tension does not soften the movement's hard core vanguard. The Soviet approach is realistic and ingenious. It takes into account military facts of life. It explores the increased stature of the Communist part of the world and the nationalistic sensitivities of the former "colonial
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andountries. It feels strong enough to engage tha USn economic popularity contest. It tries hard, and not altogetherto raise the level of Communistn the other hand. it. does not hesitate to stir up trovble in areas of political vacuum, such as the Middle East, if it can thereby advance its influence to hitherto closed parts of the world. Unless it is stopped, it will do the same in Latin America and Africa. Altogether. Moscow, under Stalin, has learned its lesson. It now uses psychology, taking initiatives designed to put the West on the defense. With this strategy, and appropriate tactics, it appears hopefulloodless victoryystem which, in the Communist belief, is doomed to collapse sooner orrobably sooner.
16, The question arises whether the new Soviet-Communist line will require more of an organization than is presently at its disposal. Not enough is known about the intricacies of Communist international communica-tions to come to definite conclusions. Overtly at least, the Soviet missions abroad avoid contact with national Party and Front leaders. Covertexist to provide personnel guidance, policy directives, and financial assistance. This machinery, however, is expensive, cumbersome, haphazard, and dangerous. Thus the problem may arise how to giveguidance to the apparatus in different countries whose political, social and economic developments vary. Better means of overallmay have to be developed. It is therefore possible that sometime in theew device may be put into operation which would take care of
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communicationore systematic way. This would probably not be an organisation as such. Rather, it might bs an international Partyossibly under an "innocent" cover, and conceivably with participation of non-Communist Marxists, set up to transmit policy directives and solve operational problems. conference" would be particularly necessary if the Communist leaders came to the conclusion that tbe relaxation of tensions hadlackening of Party disciplineeterioration of Communist resourcefulness. This possibility raises certain fundamental questions: Can Communism withstand the changes resulting fromh Party Congress without losing its revolutionary zeal? Is there inmellowing process" which in time will bringetamorphosis of Communism? Or, is the present lineigantic shift of tactics, imposed by the development of nuclear weapons and their jet-propelled delivery and made possible by both the greater strength of the Communist bloc and the emerging independence of former colonial nationsf
17. We cannot but assume that the Communist leaders wouldmellowing" process. They will try to do all in their power to prevent it from developing. Their only concept of Communist metamorphosis is linked to the shift from socialism to Communism, i, e, from theof the proletariatlassless society. They are likely toeriod of some years of relaxation during which they can extend their influence with the help of overt respectability while building up andtheir covert organisations and, what is more important, strengthen-
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tng the overall potential of the USSR. At the same time, they might also consider the usefulness of permitting thereater show of independence. As national states, remaining under veiled Soviet control, they would testify to Moscow's good faith. They might assist in the development of relations with Western Europe, possibly through their own liberated socialists who might be put in touch with Free World socialist parties. This would greatly advance the United Front tactic on anscale. But all these measures would be designed only to further basic Communist objectives. Since violence has characterized Communist actions in the past, subtler methods could be mistaken, even by Party members, as an Indication of "mellowing". Nothing would be farther from Soviet-Communist intentions.
18. There is, however, an outside chance that Khrushchev'sdeviating as it were from the irreconcilable, aggressiveLenln and Stalin, may carry the germs of revolutionaryitself. It Is conceivablesychological transformationthe Marxist doctrine of historical materialism. Once freedconfines of permanent tensions, mental attitudes may developbecome stronger than Communist faith and discipline. Such awould be slow, at first hardly noticeable, but it might workpersistently from the grass roots to the "leading circles". Itto estimate how longrocess would need tonor is it possibleoresee its ultimate outcome. Muc) upon the character of future Soviet .
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19. The premiseuccessful Communist holding operation is the continuation In power of the CPSU's Presidium as presently constituted. The shrewd "old Bolsheviks" will ruthlessly (and noiselessly) suppress any evidence of "mellowing". Nor can it be expected that the middle and higher ranks of functionaries and officers have any intention oftheir position by crowding the present leaders. It is futile to speculate on the character of the regime which will succeed today's collective leaders, but it is possible that the present constellation may0 years, provided "peaceful coexistence" continues. If antibiotics of transformation have penetrated the Communist body politic, their effect, if any, probably will not show during this period. If transformation is permitted to come to the surface later. It will do so very slowly, almost unnoticeably. It mayeneration or two before tangible changes become apparent. Moreover, any major disruptive event, such as Internal upheavals or local wars, would be likely to interrupt the healing process. Thus it cannot be expectedmellowing process" could become effective during the next decade. Nor Is It overly pessimistic to predictealthy transformation of Communismovement of constructive social endeavors cannot be expected in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile we shall be compelled to continue wardingiabolically clever opponent whose ingenuity and resourcefulness, unfortunately, is growing.
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Original document.
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