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60
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER
- "
the soviet atomic energy program
limited distribution
Sub miffed ov Ml
DIRECTOR Or CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organization* participate* in the preparation of IhU attmatc: The Central Intelligence Agency and the tnletlletnee organization, of the Departments ol Stole. Ihe Army, ihene Air tore* The Joint Staff, ami
the Atonic Energy CoetfiUifon
Concurred in by the
INTFLL1GENCE ADVISORY COMMITTERuni WW. Concu'rlnff acre the Special AMitent.Department of Stale; thehief of Staff. Intelligence, Department of the Armv; the Director of Haial Inlelligencc; Ihe Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Int'lllgenee. The Joint Staff; and the Atomic
Energyto Iht IAC. Ut-
ant Dtreelor. Federal Bureau of Investigation, ebtlatned. the subject being eutHde of the jurisdiction of hit Agency. See appropriateovexr. for the duientlng Hem of the Director of Karat Intelligence and the Deputy Director
for Intelligence. The Joint Staff.
WiO
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE
cstimaw-ejas disseminated by Ihc Central Intelligence Agency. Thisfor the Information unVjw of the recipient indicated on the front cover and ofunder his JurisdlcUononsa need to know basis. Additional essentialmay be authorized by the fothwing officials within their respective departments:
a- Special Assistant to the Sccietary for Intelligence, for the Department of State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff. rntcUlgence^TarJhe Department of theirector of Naval Intelligence, for the Dejfcsi^ment of the Navy
of Intelligence, USAP, for the Departnteojiof the Air Force
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of Intelligence. AEC, for the Atomic Energy Corrrmjsslon
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Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Departsnent
Th&>apv may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance withsecurity relations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency bywith the OfficeReference, CIA.
When an estimate Is disscTrrmQtcd overseas, the overseas recipients may retain lteriod not In excess of oneJie end of this period, the estimate should either be destroyed, returned to the forwareHnj-agency. or permission should be re-requested of the forwarding agency to retain itwith2
DI5trib UTTON: White Bouse
National Security Council Department ofrne Department ol State OpcraUons Coordinating Board Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of investigation
rUTIOKAL IffTELLIcaCCE ESTIMATE
JOITTr .tTUQC EKE8CT TjrTETJ.TflgtCE CCrWTTTHZ
:B2 soviet anoxic crpgt ffocram
86
This estimate supersedes,ndo,
Thie estimate woo prepared and agreed upon by tlie Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Cooolttee, vith footnotes by Havy ond Joint Staffhlch le composed of representatives of the Depertcents of State, Aray, Havy, Air Force, the Atonic Energy Conaiesion, the Joint Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency. Hie FBI abstained, the subject being outaide of its Jurisdiction.
A group of expert consuL-ants working vith the Joint Atonic Energy Intelligence Conanittao have reviewed this estimate and generally coccur vith it. The estimate, vith footnotes, vbs approved by the Intelligence Advisory Core-it tee
PACE
tiffinof Soviet Alcaic Energy Activity Locations
TAP.LEI reduction of Fissionable
TABLEResearch And lower
TABLEUKiniun Ore
VABLEUranium Slug
TABLEWater Production
Eproduction To
TABLE VIIEstimated Cupulatire Soviet Production of
25
TABLE. Sorltt Nuclear Teste
TABLEEstimated Soviet Bloc Ore production In Metric
Tons ilecovorobls33
TABLESoviet Production ofar
All35
TALISPower
TABLSAtotric Pover Proerar39
TABLE. SStlMtefl Use Ofn The Soviet Pover
Rooctor*0
TABLS XIVEstimated riutonlua production From Power
Reactor Program*1
TABLSOf Total
TABLEotlnate Of Availability Of Fissionable Materials
For Weapon Uses^3
-ill-
86
1MB OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE SOVTLT ATOMICROGRAM
PACE
FIGUREor Atoclc Energy Activities
In tbe USSR
SUKKART 1
PARTtatus of tbfl Scviet Atoelc Energy Program As of tbe End5
Scope of
Material
Weapon
PARTrobable Soviet Capabilities5
I. Tbe Future Fissionable Material Production
II. Bon-Military Uses5
III. Nuclear Propulolon Program After
IV. Future Weapon Development and Test
V. Weapon Capabilities5
PARTrobable ProftTsai5
I. Probable Allocation to Ron-Weapon. I. Probable Soviet Acquirement For Nuelear. .
Weapons. .
ITT. Evidence of Soviet Efforts to Meet Their
Requirements For Nuclear Weapons 57
IV. Other Factors Bearing On Soviet Allocations
Of Nuclear
V. Arbitrary Examples of Soviet Stockpile
Allocations As. 59
VI. Arbitrary Exrunples of Soviet Nuclear Weapon
Allocations As of 62
VII. Arbitrary Examples of Stockpile Allocations
As of
AFP EOTuclear Weapon Stockpile 69
the sovrsr atomic ensngy program syro-AHY i
I. SIGNIFICANTT5
1. ighly significant development sinco the publication of,as the airburst on5hermonuclear weapon which yieldedegatons. It le highly probable that thi
marked the effective beginningoviet
,-wga-wn nuciear weapons capability. Proa the above acd other teats w* estimate that the USSR in developing andersatile group of nuclear weapons ranging free very low-yield
warheads toweapons.
addtticn,esult of new evidence, we haveprevious estimates of Soviet production ofactor of about four. 2/ This revision together with the
ovember test leads us to the estimate thatSR nowignificant mu Hi-megaton weapons capability and willajor capability in the near future. Our plutonium production estimates are about the same ae those in-
Soviets hav* displayed considerable progress inpower reactor development. We estimate they are capablethe ambitious goals of the Sixth Five-Year Plan forMW of installed nuclear electric power capacity by the endbut this achievement willery high prioritystate of their reactor technology elso indicates that thea capability for developing propulsion applications.
l/ irector of Naval Intelligence does not concur in the figures contained herein for the estimated productionnd for the estimated production of plutonluB These figures are Relieved to be too high in view of the following considerations: (Footnote if continued on next
27 see'arar,ro.phage
UV FRQPJgnon OFMERIAlfl
*. The first Soviet isotope separation plant employed the gr-ico'js diffusion process; was located at Verxhneivinsfc Id thend was put into partial operation beginning in Thie plant did not initially attain its designdue to corrosion problems, ln-leaxage of air, and rather poor barrlerj-
/The nature ox1 tale woraeluiTSndicaten understanding of gaseous diffusion processesophistication of engineering design. On this basis we. estimate that the Sovietsonsldorable increase lu tbe over-all efficiency of their gaseous diffusion However, our limited Knowledge of the rate at which May of the deeign improvements investigated were incorporated In the operating plant*egree of uncertainty la the estimates of plant operating efficiencies.
1/ (Footnoteontinued from Page 1)
assumption that all unaccounted-for electric powerthreesotope separation sitesutilized by the Soviets for productiondiffusion is not Justified by the evidence. plant efficiency In the estimate of Isotopebased on assumptions as to barrier availability andstripping of tailings, operatingdrive Improvement, and associatedassumptions cannot be supported by the Office of
expansion of plutonium production9 restsassumption of Soviet capability to place in effectplutonium-power reactor program ofand complexity. There is no evidence thatual-purpose reactor which willplutonium simultaneously. of Naval Intelligence believes that years ofand development will be necessary before thlobe achieved.
The Director of Naval Intelligence believes that for planningore practical magnitude of cumulative quantitiesould beange below that of theower limit of this estimate.
5. Cur estimates ofroduction have been obtainedestimated plant efficiency in terms of poverkilogram of product toerage electric power estimatedavailable for lrotope separation ln the areas of possiblediffusion cites. The uncertainties connected with bothfactors are sufficiently large thataximum thediffusion capacity could approach the feed materialsof the uranium ore supply which Is estimated tofor several years tbe feed requirements for bothplutonium On the other
production could have been much lower than that estimated, If less electric power were consumed or the plants did not operate at the efficiencies estimated. Thus the uncertainty In the estimate of cumulative Soviet productionp6 Is very large but probably does notf the estimated values. Our estimate ofroduction Is subject to many variables which are dependent primarily on Soviet plans and decisions and is therefore less reliable than the estimate of6 cumulative production. (See Table I)
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
believes that the new intelligence does not adequately support the estimateumulative production The estimate of efficiency of Soviet isotope separation operationsomposed of scant specific intelligence Information and uncertains to when certain Improvements were cade ln Soviet plants. Due to the many, varied and complex uncertaintiesore practical figure for planning purposes ofroduction5 would be one ir. theranee of uncertainty, approaching theicit.
The some reanonn,ack of intelligence on Soviet plana and progrnmn ln the atomic energy field, lead him to conclude that Vi- atttesAevailable bynd subsequenteflects projections and extrapolation" under very uncertain conditions, ratheralidor planning purports.
The abovere applicable tfiroughout. theof this estimate vheiwver estimatesr weapons fabricated from this metal are discussed.
Our estimates of
6. Production of Plutonium andoviet phi'-oniuit: production ,
lare euiipoTted by estimates compaited
uranluo petal and"heavy water production.
ftht amount of plutonium estimatedreality-
w totality of, tritiuo and any other isotopea aade in Soviet reactors and is hereafter referred to as plutonium equivalent. The uncertainty ln the cumulative plutonium equivalent production up6 Is reasonably. The uncertainty In the future cumulative production estimate Is subject to many variables vhich are dependent on Soviet plans and declsloca, and is therefore less predictable. (See Table I)
7- During the pastignificant amount of Information has been published on the noo-Dllltary aspects of the Soviet atoelc energy progra-i. This release began with the Moscow and Geneva Conferences and propagandised those phases of atomic research and development ln which the USSR seeks to rival the Western notions. It is encouraging the interchange of scientists and nuclearin the "peaceful uses of atomic energy".
6. The Soviet nuclear electric power program, which is of considerable magnitude, appears designed tolaim for world leadership, to produce fissionable materials, and to gain experience toward future economically cocpetltlve electric power. Ibe Soviet Union is engaged ln design and development ofozen types of reactors ranging in power fromlectrical megawatts for the production of electric power as part ofive-Tear Plan. Thia program, which callsotal capacityegawatts of electric power, is within Soviet capability but willigh priority effort for its One scail reactor began producing electric power free nuclear energy in Juneand has been given wide publicity by the USSR as the "first in the world". This reactor, while inefficient, is us-fil for experimental studies of power reactor operation. nnounced Soviet nuclear electric power program will require an Increasingly greater percentage of tbe totalvailable but will producey-product plutonium ornd tritium
Soviet program of atomic aid to the satellitelnroposes the construction cfand supporting facilities in East Germany,Hungary, Coomxlit China and possibly in Bulgaria Tbe amount of fissionable materials required forprogram wouldegligible drain on thefissionable material stockpile. The completion ofold program, which was probably undertaken primarily forvalue, will not give the eatcll!te3 the capabilityweapon? on their own.
the basis of known Soviet reactor experience wecoulduclear propulsion reactor suitable foror submarine application. W- have almost noon the Soviet aircraft nuclear propulsion reactor progrosi but
ortitat2 that it probably vill not progress beyond the research phase pricrjd. Assuring this propulsion progress, the amount ofbl- cntsrinl required to support the program will not subtract appreciobly fron the material estimated to be available for weapon production.
17. TJRS5S
li. esult of the airburstltitude) onbelieve that the Soviets are now beginning to stockpile tterWOTuelear weopons with yields ofTf
Slfl'l'f th* fabrication of megaton weapons probably did not comeace untilt is unlikely that the Soviets could bavre sorfew of these weapons by the beginning
12. ield of the5 type weapons could be increased to 'tboutT
By dovelcipnental advanced relatively minor in cordon son vim xnooe2est,i-
entImate
that proline* e- =uch warheads will be testednd vill beeem available Tor use shortly thereafter.
13. Scviot Interest in low-yield, small-dimension veaponsectablisRod by their military doctrine and by thepoae or device? detonated in the test5 It is estimated that the USSR nowon
implosion systoc of relatively low ellldiency. wiin yields in the rang? of less than one Xlloton to ten kllotons. Improved efficiencies, which will permit more widespread use for air defence, are expected
lft. The Soviets conducted their first underwater stoinlc test near Hovaya Zeolya onew phase in their continuing development of atomic weaponsariety of military uses. The underwater test opens new vistas into the development of atomic weaponsariety of naval uses, resultingignificant increase in the over-all Soviet atomic warfare capability. The significance of the test can be compared to the Totskoye explosion ofwhich was an airdroptockpile weapon as partactical military exercise.
l?. The estimate of fissionable material available can be convertedumber of estimates of weapon stockpiles, taking into account diversion of fissionable material for non-weapon purposes. The limited availability of fissionable material does not prevent the USSR fromignificant stockpile of high-yield weapons; however, the small amount of plutonium estimated to be presently available limits the Soviet's capability tosignificant quantities of low-yield weapons suitable for tactical and air defense use.
16. Available evidence indicates that the USSR is presently stockpiling and will continue toersatile family of nuclear weapons. We cannot determine with any degree of certainty the probable number of nuclear weapons allocated to each specific use since these will depend on strategic and other factors. However, In order to provide an appreciation of possible Soviet stockpile capabilities, methods of calculating Soviet stockpiles and several alternative Soviet stockpile examples ore given In Part IH and Appendix A. It is emphasized that these stockpiles are purely illustrative, as the Soviets can utilize their fissionable material for any number of combinations of weapons.
i
DISCUSSION PART ONE
STATUS OF THE SOVTEl .TOKIC ENERGY PROGRAM AS OF THE END
rrrecrx-cTioB
17- While the exact extent of Soviet capability in theremains uncertain, the general nature and some of thethe Soviet atomic energy program can be assessed vith Available evidence establishes tbe existence 1cof: igh priority, extensive atomic energydirected toward military application, wnleh isexpand; (b) an aaple uranium ore base on which to carryubstantial stockpile of fissionablea proven capability for the establishment ofstations;apability, so far believed to beutilizing nuclear power for propulsive purposes; (f) and aof producing explosions lo yield rangesewtoof employing both fission and fusion
principles.
Reliable evidence Indicatee that Soviet military planning includes the empLavment of nuclear weapons for offensive airin support of ground and naval operations, and pos-lbly air defense. At least twice3 there has been militaryin the Soviet nuclear weapons test program Indicative of both weapons effects tests end military maneuvers.
Our knowledge of the status of the Soviet atomic energy program as of the end5 is derivedonsiderable volume of evidence. Sufficient detail* are available toeasonable foundation for quantitative assessment. Information obtained by technical means on Soviet plutonium productionto bewithin the limits of Its probable error with information obtained through other sources. Information concerningroduction does not permit as reliable on estimate as In the caee of plutonium production, but important new information has been developed during the past year. Evidence received since our last estimate on the Soviet atomic energy program,rimarily concerns the mining of uranium ore. Its transformation Into
uranium metal, the production of plutonium, research on reactors and Isotope separation methods, tbe first Soviet gaseous diffusioneparation plant, electric pover available to gaseous diffusion plants, further testing of weapons, and military training and Indoctrination in atomic warfare. Information received and analysis mode since the publication ofequire aub-stantial upward revision of the estimate ofvailable over that given in5 estimate.
II. GENERAL SCOPE OF THE PROGRAM A. Hi story and Orga-il ration
Ibe Soviet atonic energy program started inith tbe formationcmnlsslon on tbe Uranium Problem attached to the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences, USSR. Members were representatives of various laboratories expected to be majoron the problem. In3 the Math Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (RKVD) was organised to sake preliminary studies in nuclear physics with special attention to atomic energy. t became responsible for uranium mining in the USSR, and, beginning lntwith moreerman and Austrian scientists to work In the0 atomic energy problems at several laboratories subsequently built for this purpose.
It.irst Chief Directorate attached to the Council of Ministers was createu and given responsibility for the Soviet atomic energy program. Aa the responsible nember of the Council of Ministers, L. P. Beriya exercised over-all direction of policy and drew into the program the best talent anu .leadership of the nation. These leaders, for tbe moat part, retained their old positions along with their new responsibilities. Ineto the program representatives of many diverse or goal rations such an the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of the Chemical Industry, and many others assured the high priority* necessary to implement the program. 0 the First Chief Directorate gradually took over the responsibilities
of tho Ninth Directorate of the BKVD until in0 the Hinth Directorate relinquished the last of Its functions, control of the Gorman scientists and wus dissolved.
tht steady growth of the Soviet atomica major reorganization took place early At this
tie* the Second Chief Dlroctorat* attachedhe Council cf Ministers was foroed and took over the raining, concentrationefining of uranium aohe development of new urariutn deposits. Its responsibilities originally extended to mining operations outside the USSR; however, satellite mines now appear to be subordinate to the Chief Directorate of Soviet Property Abroad, Ministry of Foreign Trade. The First Chief Directorate was thus free to concentrate exclusively on production ofmaterials and manufacture of weapons. SJpply, personnel, and other services common to both chief directorates were placedeparate body' serving both dir-ctorates; this body was possibly formedhird Ciief Directorate.
23. This orgarltatlccal otructvr* apparently ccctlnued unMl the arrest of Beriya in At that time the Ministry of Wsdlnm Machine Building was organized, and V. A. Malyshev woo designated as minister. 3ubseTJently he wtceputy Chairman of the Courcll of Ministers andly .succeeded Beriya as director of over-all policy for the program. In5 Colonel General A. P.rominent figure in the First Chief Directorateeading figure in the program since its beginning, was appointed Minister of Medium Machine Building and elevatedaputy Chairman of the Council of Ministorn, thereby replacing .Malyshev art over-all policy director of tin program.
2k. In6 TASS announced the formationaw atomic energy coordinating body, "Main Administration Forf Atomic Energy" attached to th* Council of Ministers oV. responsible for insuring the "large-scale UM of atceic energyoil branches of the nationalnd developing "eoopsratlcathe Soviet Union and other ecuatrics in the peaceful -ires of atomichus it appears that the Ministryua Wschine Building will retain most of IM former ftt>:tlons while the ccordlratlor. an.', supervislnr. of the oppllcatlcn of peaceful uwe- of ato-nlehroughout tho Soviet eeer.omyvntrol Of this new organisation.
B. gs-.ietpabllitlgrclear Ercrgy
25. The USSS has demonstrated considerable technical conpatonco in the Independent rencarch requiredomprohe-.sive nuclear energy program an evidenced by data obtained throughsntific detection system, the pap-t- presented st theand nor-wi international conferences on theuser of ato-nic crwrfy, InformationronsMswartd Soviet
scientific literature. The Soviet papers presented at international atonic energy and other scientific conferences provide valuable de-tails of some Soviet accotrpllshirents In the general areas of nuclear physics, metallurgy, research reactor design, reactor engineering, instrumentation, and biological and medical aspects of nuclear energy. These conferences also provided opportunities for personal contact between US and Soviet scientists which aided in theof Soviet professional competence. The USSR has excellent senior scientific leaders tad the Soviet educational system graduates competent younger scientists, substantial numbers of whom devote at least part of their time to research in the basic sciences.
High speed computers play an extremelyrole in many aspecta of an atomic energy programin the design of new weapons. The USSR now possesses afor computer research, and the Soviets haveexistenceumber of digital computers. One ofigh speed device comparable to some of tbecomputers In tbe US. This machine was Another is the URALonsiderablyslower machine. ery large machine, the STRELA, is known
to exist, bJt this has not yet been announced publicly. of both the URAL and the STRELA Is scheduled to be initiated shortly, and the USSR has agreed to supply a URAL type machine to India. In addition tomall digital computer was seenniversity in Leningrad.
Physics. The papers presented at the Geneva Conference by3 reflect creditable work In nuclear physics. Many of tho fundamental physical constants measured by Soviet scientists agree well with those reported by other countries. There le apparentlyittle lees emphasis on classical nuclear theory In the USES than in the United States, and Soviet papers on various aspects of theoretical physics demonstrated considerable competence in this field.
Soviet high-energy physics research is quite impressive andogical outgrowth of tbe long standing Soviet lnterect in cosmic ray physics. The USSR has an active group working In the field of high-energy physics and high-energy particle accelerator design. ev synchro-cyclotron of the Institute of Bjcleax problews of the Academy of Sciences Is
the largest caching of its type la the world. 0 Bev proton synchrotroc will also be the largest machine ofype In the world If It reaches design energy when fully operational. Design studies0 Bev strong-focussing synchrotron are now in progress.
29- Cher:stry. Papers presented at international conferences, open scientific literature and other collateral informationigh degree of technical competence. Research work dealing with isotope separation, tracer techniques and rare earth chemistry Is found in widely scattered papers under tbe guise of seeminglyscientific investigations. Reports on research and development have been notably omitted in certain fields of chemistry. Soviet security is probably responsible for the lack of Information directly connected with atomic energy chemical predefining and production.
30. Metallurgy. The Soviet Unionell-dev-lcped capability in the special metallurgy required tcery advanced atomic energy program. All of the metals necessary for use in tbe most up-to-date designs of US reactors areto be available in the USSR and to have received most careful attention by metallurgists known to be associated with tbe Soviet program, -be methods of manufacture, the purity of the metals Involved, the types of alloy syjtecs underend the published reports of effects of radiation on mechanical properties mggejt that the Soviet Dados ir wellin knowledge of the behavior of metallurgical materials, for construction of power reactors. The combination of fundamental scientific research on heat flow and high temperabore alloys of certain types appears to present some background for support of an aircraft nuclear power program.
3^' Reactors. So"lat papers, on nuclear reactors presented at International conferences indicate that their reactors are of creditable designs but have few original features. (See Table II) The First Graphite Reactor, described by V. S. Furscv at the Moscow confereece, ir very similar to the
32. The Heavy Vater Research Reactor has adesign suggestiveeactor used to study the properties of heavy water reactors. It was conceivedesigned8 and constructedt9-
T-0-
Tbe Laboratory or Measuring Instruments began designater-moderated water-cooled reactor This assign,to graphite moderation inecame the Reactor Physical Technical (RPT). The HPT vae used In2 for tests of the ri elements of the Atomic Power Station reactor and now isuel element design for the first large Soviet atomic power station reactor. The original light-water moderated and cooled reactor design was usedeactor built at Moscow University.
3b> The Fast Reactor and the Hydrogenous Critical Experiments were operated at very low power to provide data for reactor design. Experlmerts with these low-power reactors provide evidence of Soviet capability to construct the power reactors of similar design referred to In published statements oo tne Sixth Five-Year plan atomic power program.
35- The Atomic Power Station reactor, probably the first Soviet experimental power reactor, was probably designed0 and came into operation It is, according to the USSR,W of useful power. The Soviets Indicate that there has been little fuel element failure in over one year of operation but refused repeatedly to discuss fuel element construction during the Geneva Conference. It would appear that this reactor, while inefficient end certainly not elaborate, is useful for experimental studies of power reactor design.
TABLE XI
USSR RESEARCH AND POWER REACTORS
Arbitrary Name
Pover
Graphite
Reactor
thanW
Uranium Aboutons
of Measuring Instruments, Moscow
Reactor in
Europe"
Probably
critical
Water
cli-
KW
tons)
Labora-
Moscow
being
fornriched uranium
Physical
KW
Uranium
-Light
of Measuring
(KPT)
Moscow
use for power reactor fuel element studies
Water
W
Water
state University
studies
I
In Mid-loSC
En-
II
rani im
Reactor
low
Obnlnskoye (Abouti. SW Moscow)
operation before mld-
Critical Experiment
vatts
.0
or Plutonium
or
indl cater of reactor capabilities
Tover
W
satirized
(Aboutl.
*
Water
Moeeov)
Elect.;
Kg | Total
ixL
Controlled Thermonuclear Research. Soviet Interest in the application or controileil thermonuclear reactions for the production of power waa revealed at the Honcov Conference. on Soviet activity ln this field Indicates that the USSP has ths technological competence required to support an effective research program directed toward the achievement of controlled thermonuclear reactions. Tbe Soviets will probably not produce economic power free thermonuclear processes for many years.
37. Instrumentation. The USSR lc producing tlie Instrument* required touclear energy program, tht instruments used Kith Soviet reactors appear to be adequate erve their purposes veil. Tbe Soviet nuclear Instruments g rally lack versatility and appear to be designed for specific Jobs. On the other hand, the Soviet mass spectrometer,ppears to have good versatility and toodern, well-engineered instrument. Auxiliary Instruments shown at the Gen-va Conference exhibited considerable evidence of standardization by the Soviets. The USSRxhibit at Geneva also revealed considerable attention to biological and medical applications for use io therapy, diagnosis and health protection. Some component parts, such as photorrultlplier tubes, appear to havo serious weaknesses which may have impeded Soviet instrumentation progress. Soviet health physics 1astrumentation, on the otheris judged to be adequate.
36. Biology and Medicine. Considerable Soviet emphasis has been placed on mciiclne relating to the treatment of casualties which might be caused by nuclear explosions. The work is under the direction of the Medical Research Council, Chief Medical Directorate of the Armed Forces, Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Health. Preliminary preparations have been made for the treatment of mass casualties caused by nuclear explosions. Exporime rotation is in progress on tho use of novocain* blockso immobilize the patient to improve the chance for recovery from severe skin burna. arge number of protective drugs found beneficial against exposure to radiation in animal experiments by Western investigators have also been tested by tho Soviets, but only one, cyatineaclne, was found promising by the Sovietsrophylactic. Other techniques such as bloodinjection of bone marrow emulsion, csrotenold polyenes, and the use of antibiotics have been widely Investigated by Soviet medical authorities. Several original Soviet antibiotics have been broadly propagandized but remain untested ln the West.
39- Soviet health physics standards discussed at the Geneva Conference and stated in military doctrine are more restrictive than those of the Western vorld. The conservative health physics standards probably are not adhered to In the USSR and may linve been presented toropaganda advantage.
ho. Compared to US standards, Soviet radiobiologicalis less sophisticated but is directed along parallel lines. An exception Is the Soviet emphasis upon the neurc-physiological effects of radiation, particularly at low levels of exposure.
C. te rials ani Rcrpurees
*1. Ura-Tiun Tdnlng. liuch quantitative inforr-atlon is available on Soviet uranium prospecting, mining and orein East Germany, and sosevrat less on Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Punania. Mich less iti creation Is available on these activities within the USSR, 'ine estimated cumulative production up6 is more than sufficient to support the fissionable material production estimates. We estimateotal of approximately WOO metric tons of natural uranium (in terms of recoverable metal) was mined5 in the USSR and its satellites, including Sast Germany. This figure io subjectonsiderable uncertointy because we lock sufficient evidenco on internal Soviet efforts. etric tons of this total are estimated to have come from East Germany. This latter figure is considered to be subject to an uncertainty of not mere than plus or minuser cent. Estimated annual uraniumand cumulative uranium stockpiles are given in Table ITI. Areas of uranium mining In the Sino-Soviet Bloc are shown In Figure 1.
p. Other Rowlr.l'
There Is evidence of Soviet atomic energy interest in the exploitation of heavy sa.id deposits which ore known to contain thorium, zirconium, and other elements useful ir. atomic energy activities. Substantial quantities of the metals mentioned above are available, and lt Is believed that such quantities an arc required for atomic energy purposes would probably representmall percentage of the total Soviet capacity for producing theo.
TABLE III
ESTIMATES TJRA.Tf'S! ORE* (Metric Tone Recoverable Metal)
END
POLAND
19^
-
-
- Nominal
0
TOTAL
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
100
TOTAL ND5
Much quantitative Information is available on mining and ore enrichment in East Germany; somevbat less is known on Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Rumania; and much less on these activities in tbe USSR, Poland, China and Korea.
III. LSAH MATERIAL PPOHJCTTQ-l
I13. Uranium Metallurgy floats. Information obtained during che past year froa returned Gcroan scientists, used In conjunction vith dataalcium production and tisetables pertaining to Soviet uraniuB metal plantsairly reliable estimate of the amount of uranium metal ready for reactor uso manufactured each year up Analysis of this Information indicates that: (a) tho first metal suitable for reactor use vao node at Elektrostal in earlyb) this plantapacity ofetric tons of uranium octal slugs per month by0 and possiblyons per sooth by the middle of that year; aad (c) production lines ofons of slugs per month each vent into operation at GLazov, vest of the Urals, in September iO'O andnd at novoelbirsx, in central Siberia, innd
id*. Additional expansion could have occurred at any of these sites2 without ournce the evidence on vhlch to hose uranium metal productioneasentlally ceases by The estimate given below iseliable lower Halt
TABLE IV
METALLIC URAJTIUM SLUG PROPJCTIOHric Tons)
Dote
During
Year
.
Heavy Hatar (OqO). Early6 tha Soviets began the conversion and installation of equipment at the Chlrchik Nitrogen Combine In Control Asia to provide for the production of by-product heavy water for atomic energy purposes. Simultaneously, Germany wao
exploited for heavy water, research results, equipment, and research peroonnel. About mld-igliS construction of production facilities to use the electrolytic-catalytic exchange method was started at five other plants. Construction was also otartcdeventh plant at Alekoln which used the hydrogen sulfide-water exchange method. Limited production commenced at Chlrchlk7 and at Aleksin in Most of the other plants began producing9 0 wort was underwaylant at Norilsk in for north Siberia using the amoonio-water exchange system. It probably began producingay haveubstantial output by
*6. The following cinrilative estimate of heavy water produced in the ossa is considered to be reasonably accurate uput after that time the error ray be considerable.
TABLE V
nXAVYPOiXJCTICIJ (Metric Tons)
EjJD
D-,0
Cumulative
Graphite;. Tlie Geneva and Moscow Conferences on Atomic Energy and evidence from returned German scientists have established that at least four Soviet research reactors, including their first one, used graphiteoderating or reflecting material. Two returned German scientists aeocrt that the first production reactor also was graphite modorated. The details of tho manufacture and procurement of reactor graphite are otill obscure, but it was apparently available oc early The exact specifications of Soviet reactor graphite aro not known, but Soviet grade, available9 for morcury arc rectifiers in tonnageaximum ash contentalue well within the range used for reactors in tlie United States.
-so-
8T
48. Production Reactors. There lo evidence that construction on the flrat Soviet production reactor atarted earlyear Kyehtym ln the Urals and that It went Into operation abouteturned Cercan scleotists asserted that the first Kyshtyereactor was graphite moderated and may have been air cooled. The urgency in tbe Soviet program during this period is perhaps reflected in the fact that construction of this reactor was1 ore clx months before the USSR's first research reactor (also graphite moderated) went critical in the late summer
as also reportedecond production reactor at Kyshtya went into operation sometime toward the endt was heavy water moderated and construction must have begun at about tbe same time construction was initiated on the heavy water research reactor at the Thermo Technical Laboratory in Moscow, which became operational in
exact schedule and type of reactorsare not known. There nay have been insufficientto permit all subsequent reactors to be heavy waterthat the existence of other types of production reactors Evidence Iodicatec that0 construction otarted
lutonlun production site near Krasnoyarsk in mid-Siberia. The Novosibirsk uranium metal plant was probably built to provide materials to Krasnoyarsk and other* Siberian sites.
Initially the separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products was done by an oxidatlon-reductlon-co-preclpitation process which differed somewhat from that initially adopted by the US. It wns designed to recover uranium as well as plutonium, since the uranium metal plant at Glazov was designed to use depleted uranium as partial feed material. Soviet and German research on solvent extraction methods indicates that the Soviets may have lateretter process.
The Soviets have probably been operating enriched or spiked reactors In their production program for aoce tie* in order to supply the tritiumr stockpiling weapons of the higher yield types tested3 Thia could have Xon done elthor by modifying existing reactors or by constructing new reactors specifically designed for the task. Research on tho Mobcow Reactor Physical Technicalnd on the Soviet Atomic Power Station Reactorrovided experience and information eseentlal to the deaign of enriched production reactors.
53- TYltlur and The first known Soviet interest la trltluD was revealed by tbe publication inQco-prcheaelve revlev of the literature on tritium by K. B.taff member of the First Chief Directorate. Returned Germans report that2 tritium vaa available for research in their laboratories. This is consistent vith the probable use of tritium in the high yield tests3
5b. Active Soviet interest in thorium-bearing mineralsoutith the formationpecial directorate for their exploitation. Although part of this interest lay in the requirement for lanthanum chemicals for the Soviet plutonium separation chemical plant, German scientists at Elektrostal vere also required torocess for the production of pure thorium oxide. Subsequently, tho USSR acquired considerable thorium stocks. However, until the appearancen the high-yield test ofho only certain productionrom thorium was the research quantities mentioned at the Geneva and Moscow Conferences on Atomic Energy.
55- Plutonium. Estimates of Soviet plutonium production
(See Table vi) are/
tc
supported py estimates coatputec, oy comoininguranium metal production f
iusing reasonable assumptions as
reactor design, and asof rite construction and availability of moterlals.r"
TABLE vi
paTo:nuH production to
(Kilograms;
Curulatlve Production
0
reportedn reality "therttium, and any other isotopes made in Soviet reactors. Therefore production estimates are hereafter given in terns of plutonium equivalent.
57. During the last year, considerable infor-oatlon on trie" first Soviet isotope separation plant has been obtained from returning German scientists. This plant, which employed the gaseous diffusion process, was located at Verkhnoivlnok in the Urals and was put into partial operation about. The plant eroloyed flat plate barriers of high permeability and operated at low pressures. Although we believe this plant was designed for the productionrams per dayt UTtolucod initially considerably less than ?CO grams per dayS notorial. The failure of the plant to ochleve its design performance in ascrlbablc to corrosion problems, in-leokoge of olr, and rather poor barrier.
53. There is evidence that the Soviets put Into operation at Ycrkiuxlvlsskore efficient gaseous diffusion process. Tliis processreater number of stages and employed the tubular nic'/.el barrier developed by tho Germans. Also the operating pressure was appreciably increased. We estimate that this process was In operation In time to producesed in the Soviet test of
horo havo been substantial Increases in electric power capacity near VerWuwlvinsk and other Soviet atomic ennrcy eites. The fact that tho power capacity Increases cannot be acccv-ted for in terms of non-atonic uee, the magnitude of the increases, and other evidence lead to the conclusion that the Soviets expanded their isotope separation capacity at Verkhneivinsk and other locations. umber of methods for isotope separation were investigated in the Soviet Union concurrently with the development of the gaseous diffusion process, the available evidence Indicates that gaseous diffusion was the only process adopted for lorge-scolo production-
60. During Ibe1he Soviets werestudies on barrier research, turbulence promotion and The nature oi* this work and the results attainedunderstanding of gaseous diffusion processes and aengineering design. On this basis we eotirite that thea considerable increase in the over-all efficienciesgaseous diffusion operations To derivea variety of possible stage orrangetrenta andwere postulated, taking into account informationfirsthe rather limited infonmtion on subsequentand tho Soviet research and development studies From these were relectod the most likely plantvarious times. Althouch1 plant vas designedoncentration in the tallingr, evidence from theindicate that lt was operatedl at least untilIn view of tbe fact that there is an abjndor.ee ofavailable to the USSR, and that it is more economical fromof both quantity of outputilograms of productof electric power input to strip tohe latterbeen used inalculation. The consistency ofassumptions on plant design with the availableestablished ursing basic Rnreous diffusion th*ory. Thesenot only that Soviet plants are designed differentlyplants, but that the Sovietsdependently uehieved onstate of knowledge ingaseous diffunion. lleitod knowledge on theft* whichf the designinvestis^-ted byovietsted intoplontnc fl 1ir. theplant operating efficiencies.
he"estimeTB oror
p6 in very large but probably doss notf the estimated valuea. .
TABLE VII
Mid-
Power
In
of
for Caoeoue
Material
(MW)
Kilograms
Plant operating only last few conths of fiscal year.
62. Two Soviet nuclear tests have used Lithium as afuel. It is probable, from weapon design considerations, that this lithium was enriched in thesotope, although test debris bas not afforded positive evidence of enrichment, and no lithium Isotope separationeen Identified in the USSR. Soviet interest in mercurynd extensive Soviet literature in the field could indicate the employment of theoc cf lithium irctope reparation.
5/ The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff believes
that the new intelligence does not adequately support the estimateumulative production The estimate of efficiency of Soviet Isotope separation operations Is composed of scant specific Intelligence Information and uncertain assumptions aa to when certain improvemantn were made in Soviet plants. Due to the many, varied and complex uncertaintiesore practical figure for planning purposes of5 would be one in the lover range of uncertainty, approaching theower limit.
TV. NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS
The first Soviet nuclear test was conductednd vas followed hy test seriesf In theetected tests, plutonium, composite (plutonium) and thermonuclear weapon types have been exploded. (See Table VTII)
9 test apparently was conducted as soon as sufficient plutonium was available. It utilized an all-plutonlum core, yielded approximatelyilotons, andelatively low efficiency. The two test explosions1 demonstrated
a marked Increase in the efficiency of utilization of fissionable material. The fact that one of these testsomposite type core revealed that the USSR had been able to produce weapon graden kilogram quantities.
device detorstei onugust
four explosions of3 tost seriesthe USiiR was seeking to supplement the1 by the addition of both high-yield weaponssmall-diameter weapons.
estimated yield cf this device was reduced from0 KT previously reported infter re-eyaluatlon of tbe data with the aid of calibrations from more recent tests). The thermonucleard in this device was lithium deuteride
66. Seven exploolona occurred in* series. The first took place near Totakoy* and was an airdroptockpile weapon ao partilitary exercleo. Tha reoalning six tests occurred at the main Soviet proving grouM in the vicinity of Semlpalatinak. All-yielded leasilotons with apparently no thermonuclear reactions being Involved.|
lnaioatajtf development of mmall-slie" Implosion weapons.
67. 5 test series consisted of five nuclear detonations. One of these, onoo tho first Soviet nuclear explosion to occur underwater. ovember teat yieldedilotons and io considered to have been nn airdrop test of a
red version of the3 devloe.
A highly nl&niflcant developrent was tho alrburst
onoveiroeyhermonuclear weapon which yielded
cf-atons. It la highly probable that thie/"
tbe effective
beginningoviet multl-regatcr, nuclear weapon capability.
Thie weapon la capable of being scaled up toegatons without
significant design modifications.
60. The Soviets conducted,t leest three nuclear tests priorpril. All of these were of low yield,p
table viii (continued)
ho.
location yield buhst
(kt) height
xvi xvti
aug 5*
over
OO [
sept 55
zemlya
ct" xnc
5 !lor
b
xx
JOE
xx:
xx11
peb 50
,
mar 56
or surface
mar 50
than one fireball radius above the ground
FART TWO
PRQPABLE SOTTST CAPABILITIES5
I. E FUTURE FISSIoriABLS FATSRIAlPROGRAM
6o. Soviet capabilities to expand flnolonahle materialare believed to be primarily dependent upon tne over-all effort they are villing to devote to such expansion rather than on the availability of row materials euch as uranium ore. The estimote of future fissionable material production is based upon the assumption that the OND vill continue this pro cram at tbe present high priority; however the relative emphasis given to each flnclonable material is dependent upondecisions, plans and requirements. Therefore tbe estimate must be considered to have very vide margins cf possible error.
70. Uranium Ore Procurement. The US Geological Survey estimates that the .Soviet ECuS has several hundred thousand tons of uranium In medium grade cro deposits aid an ever, greater quantity ln low grade deposits. Even ifstimates were twice as high as actual Soviet ore reserves, the Soviet Bloc could double or triple its present ore production without recourse to less economical or- recovery processes tsan they are now using. If it la assumed that tbe present estimated rate of expansion of non-German ore production% per year, (see Table III) continueseasonable estimate of Soviet Eloc ore production would*abulated be lev,median figures ratherf possible value*. It in unlikely that the actual cumulative production vill be les* than three-quarters of the values shown :ta'I ore produetlon could ho eon-eidorably higher If soro uranium ore lr. needed. Thisof Soviet Bloc ore productionequuteiy nipport the intimated expenditure of natural unalua throjrh
TABLE TX
ESTIMATED FUTURE SOVIET BLOC OllE PRODUCTIOK IN MFTRIC TOWS RECOVERABLE URANIUM
Tear
loo
(Rounded)
(Rounded)
J.70
Uranium Isotope Serration. Future Soviet production ofas been based upon projected estimates of electric power available for uranium Isotope separation andrage operating efficiencies of the Soviet uranium Isotope separation plants.
a. During the period0he Soviets added an0 megawatts to their total electric power generating capacity. Frew this added capacity, an averageegawatts was probably used for uranium Isotope separation by the end of this period. Insufficient lnforeatloc is available on either the specific location of planned electric poweror of specific consumers of electric power as announced in the broad tone9 of the Sixth Five-year Plan to allow for the prediction of sites and capacities of specific Soviet gaseous diffusion plants. However, on the assumption that additional power usage by the uranium Isotope separation program will rise at roughly the earn* rate estimated for over-all Soviet electric power capacity, as implied by their kilowatt hour-seals0nC megawatts would be availableroduction by tho endnd on0 megawatte,otal0 megawatts, ey
b. It It not believed that the Sc/iets vtll continue to increase the effleltntry cf their gaoaout diffusion plants at the rate they are estimated to have achieve*05 period- The poor efficiencies of early plants leftroom for improvcsent during that pari DO* and the abundance of ore permit ted the core efficient, from thef Xg product per KW electric pcv.frBininslof natural uranium. If the estimate of Sovietranium ore production is essentially :errect, the Sr/lets may not ammt to -trip below
tail* eenrentr^tteaj onttl mom year*owever, in vlev of the Soviet practice cf maintaining large uranium ore stnoWilles it vac assumed that the tailc concentration decreasedIo Co Thus, although furthe- improvement- iy Soviet plant leclpt car. be erpsetad, the pover expended for theddlMt.Talf tziXt vill cour.teract the benefits. through The
estimate'] averageeratingutilised
prerented ln Table /. "
By this time the Soviets will have achlevel an "or.-etrenm" efficiency ofhus lesces resulting from plant non-operating time would be negligible. Thus the estimatedould bee*ber orthan given, if either the derived planti cr the electric power made available for isotope separation jwM befisy different from the estimativ. value:.
*
TABLE X
ETTE'ATZD SOVIET FHOJJCTIOT1 OPOR ALL PURPOSES
Average Electric Year Power Used Por
roduction
During Fiscal
Year In
Megawatts
On-Stream
Efficiency
During
Fiscal
Year
(*)
Average Plant Efficiency DuringYear in Kegavatta per Kilogramer day
(*)
Productionaterial or
(Kilograms)
50
Plant
only last few months of fiscal year.
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff believes that the new intelligence does not adequately support the estimateumulative production The estleate of efficiency of Soviet isotope separation operations le composed of scant specific intelligence information ond uncertain assumptions as to when cortsln improvements were made In Soviet plants. Due to the many, varied and complex uncertaintiesoro practical figure for planning purposes of5 would be one in the lower range of uncertainty, approaching theover limit. ontinued ot
72. Power Reactor Program. The very luroe electric cover reactor program onaouncci for th? Sixth Five-Year Planhe still greater exreneioa Indicated as plannedillajor Impact on future fissionable rateritl stockpiles bothonsumer ofndroducer of plutonium,nd tritium.
Sixth Fire-Tear Flanlectrical megavstts in operationnd further Information indicatesotalelectrical megawatts is being considered as the goalnext tventy-five years. Analyrln of Soviet publicthe Soviet Fouer ?enctor Froflriin provides the estimate ofnuclear electric power program giver, in Table XI. Itthat theSoviet program forelectrical megawatt! of nuclear pover0 isery high priority effort, but theprogram in Table XI retires the solution ofengineering problems.
Kurcfaatov outlined the Soviet planseven differentof experiMctal powerthe Puree of these reactor types are toin four, or possibly five, power nations. e fullscaie prototypes. Fcur small-scalereactors were else described. These would tend tothe Soviet reactor development, Sovietnuclear power program laaa ore, workingfuture when nuclear power vsula be econosicallyconvonttonol power costs in tho European 0 theproposes to put isto operation
7/ (Footnoteontinued fron Th*reasons,ock of Intelligence on Soviet plann and programs in the atomic energy field, lead him to conclude that the estimatevailable bynd sub?eeuent dates reflects projections and extrapolations under very uncertain conditions, ratheralid figure for planning purposes.
The abovere explicable throughout tbe re-moinder of this estimate whenever estimatesr weapons fabricated from this metal ore discussed.
five large pover stations oflectrical megnvatts each in order to accumulate experience ln: nuclear engineering, mass production of fuel elements, and fuel processing. These reactor types are outlined in Table XI.
c. Ibe USSR has indicated in acmetbe designs of tbe proposed graphite moderated, vater-cooled reactor type and the gas-cooled, heavy-vater moderated reactor type. The vater moderated and cooled reactor, vhlch could use either slightly enriched uranium or the US seed-core enrichment techniquerescurlzed system has many favorable features. However, there appear to be formidable technical difficulties in the construction of an appropriate pressure vesseleactor of this type, vhich may prevent the USSR from attaining the announced reactor pover level. The Sovietsot indicated how they propose to meet such problems.
il. omprehensive outline of the planned Soviet nu-lear electric pover program is not available. However, it is estimated that tl* general objectives of thisprogram are:
to be "first In the world" ln Installed nuclear electrical kilowatt capacity.
to produce fissionable materials.
tc gain experience directed toward future achievements of economically competitive electric power.
e. These objectives lead to thethat the large powerlectrical megawatts) will probably be desicned either for dual-purpose power (optimized for plutonium production) or for optimum power production. These large power reactora will be full-scale developmental prototypes for the' succeeding Five-Year Plans. The graphite-moderated, water-cooled reactor station and possibly the two water-moderated and cooled reactor stations, utilizing high cost fuel (enriched uranium) vill probably be optimized for pover production. The dual-purpose reactors would employ low coat fuels such as natural uranium,eed* core enrichment. It la probable that tbe Soviets would optimise the gas-cooled, heavy water-moderated reactor and the unspecified fifth station type reactor for plutonium production. Thiswould minimize the enriched uranium requirements and maximize
the plutonium production fron tho Soviet pover program. The coot of heavy vater'vould tend to keep the utilization of heavy-water type reactorsinimum. In addition, the Soviets may not, owing to technical difficulties, bo able to develop water moderated ond cooled reactors of the planned capacity. Therefore, itoroible that they may substitute for thin reactor type in order to meet their total announced power output, other types of reactors such as graphite-moderated, gos-eooied reactors, optimized for plutonium production, thereby further lnereaolw* estimated over-all plutonium rroduction. The possible range of Installed electrical capacity devoted to each major typo of recctor is given in Table XII.
TABLE XI
I*o. of Stations
ACTv?s
heactor Typo
Poel
Scul'j Stations
Water moderated
atsnm &toStation ofSciences, USSR)
betsroger.eour,
heavy
(Unspecified)
Pilot Plant Stations
Fast Plutonium
HomogeneousBreeder
Sodiun-cooled,
Boilinc
Uranium
TABLE XII
USSR ATOMIC POWER PROGRAM
tations
Electric Pover
(Electrlcul megawatts)
opae atKW (ZOO Ei' per reactor)
Dual Purpose Stations
Plutonium Production with some pover Lovuel (natural uraniumeed core)
tlKlxed Pover Stations
ooc-lfcoo
production with some plutoniui High cost fuel (Enriched uranium)
Pilot :'lant Stations
n tal
KW per reactor
EKW
egulrer-entc of Poverprogran. lacking precise information ve have estimated> (yOJt equivalent) sacrifice by assuming that approximately half of the reactors utilise enriched) with fuel requirements approximating those of the graphite moderated, pressurized light water cooled reactors similar to tbe best known current Soviet power reactor type. On this basis It has been calculated that thej equivalent) inventory, Including feed on hand and beingwould be roughlykilogramsegawatts of generating capacity. hermal efficiencyfc has been assumed on the basis of stated Soviet desire to Increase thehermal efficiency of the Obnlnskoye reactor. Iheurn-up has been calculated byurn-up factorilogramsquivalentlectrical megawatt years.
The use of these assumptions and calculations leads to the follo/lcg tablexpenditure. The cumulative estimatequivalent presented In Table XIII as expended or tied up lo the nuclear pover reactor program is subject to considerable variations, depending on Soviet juris for different reactor designs and variation In pipeline inventory requirements. If the Soviets install more than one-half of the announced electrical pover capacity in natural uranium reactors, then the quantityequired would be reduced. The pipeline inventory requirements utilized laestimate, although based in part on Soviet statements of fuel re-quireswncs, are tight. ere flexible or generous pipeline Inventory or difficulties being encountered in the separation process could almost double the total inventories outlined. Thus, the actual quantity tied up in the po--er reactor program cculd vary anywhere from about one-half to approximately tvlce the values presented.
TABLE XIII
ESTHETES USEOWER REA.-XR PH CORAM
EKW
Installed
EKW in
Enriched
Reactors
n Reactors fc Recycling Systems in Kilograco
um-upquivalent
CumulativeExpended or TieJ-up in Pea-tor Program (Kilograms)
8
hOO
000
19fO
19ft)
I963
I966
fO
0
T-O-
74. The quantity of plutonium which can be produced In the reactor program cannot be accurately calculated since little le known of the specific characteristics of the reactors to be built. Nor do we know the specific timetable under which the USSR will carry -ut its program. An estimate of plutonium to be produced has been made, assuming that about one-half of the Installed capacity will be in dual-purpose reactors and that one-half of the reactors will be optimized for power production. Table XIV gives the estimated total Installed electrical megawatts and power reactor plutonium production. Tbe plutonium production baa been estimated by asaigniag to these reactors characteristics and operating conditions consistent with what is known of Soviet reactor technology. The plutonium obtained from the reactors optimised for power production, which amounts to about one-third that provided in Table XIV, win be less suitable for some weapons applications. The values presented in Table XIV could varyonsiderable factor if tho Soviets fall to meet their announced goals, depart from Um assumed operating conditions, rr vary the ratio of dual purpose to optimised power reactor construction.
TABLE XXV
ESTIMATED PLLTOfOUM PRODUCTION PRCM POVER REACTOR PROGRAM
(Kilograms)
EMU Installed
Plutonium Production
Plutonium Production (Hounded)
idididididididid 66
0
00
0
7>. plutoniumsoviet plutonium
program is estimated to be capable of producingilograms of plutonium (or equivalent in tritium and/orer year. it is estimated that this program has been expanding for the past four years at an average rate ofilograms per year added production capability. it is ossumed that this expansion rote vill continue on the average throughhen it is estimated that significant plutonium production from the pover reactor program will first appear. it is further assumed thnt further expansion of plutoniumfacilities vill be limited to the production capability of the pover reactor program after on the baoie of these assumptions the following plutonium production may be predicted.
TABLE XV
estimateotal plutofftjh" (kilograms)
prcluction
135
02
a
6
00
0 Tkoo
0
76. Future Pisslon-Vble Material Production. The estimate of future Sovic avalliolUty ofterlals for weapon purposes lc tabulated below. Thestimated available for weapons Is the estimated total production ofinus tbe estimated use ofn the Soviet power reactor The "plutonium" estimate represents the estimated total of plutonium equivalent froai both production and power reactor programs. Cur estimates ofnd plutonium production ere subject to many variables which are dependent on Soviet plans and decisions and are therefore less reliable than the estimates of the cumulative production up
TABLE XVI
ESTIMATE OF AVAILABILITY OP FISSIONABLE KATE3IAIS FOR WEAPON USES
(Kilograms)
vailable Cumulative Plutonium Equiva-
Available For Weapons
05 56
n
91 62
a6
Power Program
Soviet nuclear electric pover program, which iomagnitude, appears designed tolaimleadership In this field. The Soviet Onion Is engagedand development ofoten types cf reactorspower fromKW for the production of electricport nflv--Tear Plan. This progrsm, whicha total capacityegawatts of electric power,
is within Soviet capability, but willigh priority effort for its achievement. One email reactor began producing electric power from nuclear energy In* and has been given wide publicity by theho "first in thehis reactor, while Inefficient, is useful for experimental studies of power reactor operation. The Soviet nuclear electric power program, assuring continuing expansion, will require an increasingly greater percentage of the totalvailable, but will producey-product plutonium ornd tritium.
Ir.teiTBtional Atomicctivities
inhe DM bosorein International atomic energy activities and has shownto use Its atomic energy resources for Within the Bloc the USSP has entered intosupply Cowwcist China and each of tlie EuropeanAlbania,esearchnd technical training. Iheforeacarch reactorhermothe Chinesehereo kilowatts reactors to theof the agreements are not known, but it is indicatedmaterials will be ocnt to the USSR In return. RadioIn5 that an atomic power station willin Chechoslovakia with Soviet help during the secondPlan Eftabli*hs*ntoint Ikiclearln Moscow waa announced on Allthe Sino-Soviet Bloc will porticlp-ite and it was announcedwould be open to ron-3Ioc nations.
79* Outoidc the satclliton, the USSR has agreed to provide assistance to Yugoslavia Inesearch reactor and in training Vugoolav technicians. United offers of training andassistance have been cade to India, Egypt, Indonesia and Iran. Slightly enriched uranium, in research reactor quantities vas offered to Norway in
oO. There has been increased Soviet participation Inmeetings during the past year. The USSR participated in the United nations Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at Geneva. In5 the Sovleto Invited scientists from the Free Worldonference in Moscow on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
81. In5 Premier Bulgonlo announced In Geneva that the USSR was prepared to contribute fissionable material to an aeceptabXe Inter witlonol Atomic Energy Agency when established. In6 the USSR agreed to the draft Statute of tbe proposed International Atomic Energy Agency along lines proposed by the US.
52. The announced Soviet program of atomic aid to the satellite nations, proposed inhould be largely fulfilledI. Construction of research reactors will probably be completed in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Communist China and possibly in Bulgaria and Rumania. It is estimated that the program may be expanded to include reactors capable of producing electric power on an industrial scale Further offers of old to nations outaide the bloc can also be expected In order to gain political advantage.
III. WC1EAR FnOTULSION PROGRAM5
83. Soviet research in application of nuclear reactors to electrical pover generation and in the production of fissionable material is applicable, at least in part,uclear propulsion program. 7erslors of the pressurlied-vater, tbe liquid-metal, the gas-cooled and the hccogeneoua-boillr- types of reactors could be adapted to some types of nuclear propulnlon.
6*. Iiqul'1i5;Coolcl Reactor Expcrlmentr. In2 the first loop foruel elemcntc of power reactors with water cooling under high pressure was completed with the test reactor
operating at full powsr0 KW. Later, tvo loops vers started to Investigate constructional elements of reactors with water cooling under high pressure and with liquid metal cooling- Two additional loops were then placed lo operation to test fuel elements of the nuclear power reactors with air and water cooling under working conditions. These loot two loops were probably started in3 or. For these reasons,taken as the date of completion of the feasibility study of this type reactor.
65- Hceogenerjs Boiling Type Reactor. Tbe paper the Soviets presented at Geneva on this type reactor appears toecently completed typical feasibility study for electric power. Research and developeent of this type applies equally well to reactors for nuclear propulsiec as veil as for breeding. In view cf thie fast, it ii reasonable tc suppose that theeasibility study was completedeactor used for electric power could very closely coincide with the corresponding completion datetudyeactor for nuclear propulsion.
86. Applications of Huclear Propulsion by the Soviet .Vayy. The USSR exhibited an interest in nuclear propulsion for 'nnvnl transports as early Publications56 have confirmed thie interest in nuel-ar powered transport ahlpa and also mentioned submarines and ice breakers. ive-Year Planork on the creation of atomic power Installations fcr transport purposes: To build an ice breaker with an atomic The ice breaker is stated to be of0 HP0 tons displacement class. The pressurlsed-water, liquid-metal, gas-cooled or homogerecus-bciltng type reactors could be adapted for use la naval propulsion units. The time necessary touclear propulsion unit for surface vessels is considered to be somewhat shorter than the time required to develop onearlne propulsion. It is not known if or when any of these types of reactors will become available for use in nuclear provision. It te estimateduclear propulsion program began about the tintR realize! that suitably reactor types were feasible. ho basis of this estimate .arid Intorprotine the research that In knew tan taking place in the USSR in the light of USand relates1 time scalos involved, lt is estimated that:
nuclear propulsion reactorurfacebe produce!
nuclear propulsion reactorubmarineproduced-
67. Application of liuclear propulsion by their force. There Is no evidence of Soviet Air force activities related to nuclear propulsion for aircraft other than the6 statement by E. P. Slavsky, Director of the Main Administration For the Use of Atonic Energy, that the Soviets "have every possibility of building, in the not too distant future, an aircraft with an atomicome of the research known to have been conducted by the USSR could apply appropriately to nuclear propulsion for aircraft. It is assumeduclear propulsion program for aircraft began when it was realized by the USSR that certain reactors could be utilized for this purpose. No information is availableoviet development of nuclear propulsion systems for long range ballistic missiles. It is estimated that:
aircraft nuclear reactor propulsion program,probably has not progressed far into theand probably win not progress beyond
reactor suitableubsonic nuclearfor aircraft applications will probablyavailable to the Soviets
88. Otherf >fucloar propulsion. There haveew pressoncerning the application of nuclearfor automobiles arid trains; evidence Indicates that these applications are not considered seriously by the USSR at this time.
IV, FUTURE WEAPON DEVELOPKBKT AW) TEST ACTIVITIES
69. Future Soviet weapons development and test activities must be estimated by extrapolating present Soviet capabilities, as revealed by the USSR's test program, usinguide current and projected US developments. The following estimate of Soviet weapons developmental capabilities therefore becomes progressively leas valid as it is projected in time.
We believe that the Soviets irill only stockpile significant numbers of weapons which ore similar but not necesoarlly Identical wit- tnose tested. Major improvementa in weapon design oryields will probably be tested before stockpiling.
Possibility of Hiltl-Megaton Experiments. With the detonation of JOihermonuclear ve-ipor.egatons, the Soviet nuclear weapons development program has reached the point where fabrication of multi-megaton weapons may be accomplished by the extension of techniques which led to the development of
this weapon. estulti-in-guton weapon may occur in any of the future Soviet test series for the purpose of optimizing weapon design and of diversifying weapon types. Sower, ualesf radical design changes are involved, the absence ofest will aot preclude the Soviet stockpiling of multl-regeVei weapon* on an emergency or provisional basis. In general, future Soviet nuclear wcapons tests will probably bo directed primarily toward theof rmaller-dlmensIon and higher-yield weapons to Increase the flexibility of weapons delivery systems.
Rcqulrercnts for Continued Testing Lb theclear Weapons Program. Ihc Scv.Let tent prograr his already provided sufficient data for the rapid and successful developmentariety of nuclear weapons types. U- believe that the majority of theoviet nuclear detonations detected by the OS have been primarily weapons development tests, although military Interest In weapons effects tests la evident In the Totskoye test4 and tlie underwater test near Hovaya tcmlya
Possible Effectest Moratorium on the Weapons Program, in our view, further development typeouia be considered desirable by Soviet scientists for the purpore of optimizing existing weapon designs and would be necessary to establish the feasibility of new principles of design. However,
we believe thatest nccatcriuo were imposed the Soviets could satisfy, with acceptable but not optimized nuclear asensbltes, their major military requirements for weapons, including warheads for all types of micsllcs,t!ior nuclear weapons tests.
V. APABILITIES5
For the50 Soviet weapons arc estimated to foil within six general categories. It should be noted that the various parnmeterri of nuclear weapons ore interdependent. Diameters
ana weights arc related to energy yieldsas ere quantities of fissionable material or type of weapon.
However, in order to permit rough llities and for ease ln presenta-
eotlmStes of their nuclearSoviet stockpile weapons types have been divided intoassemblies which resemble weapons tested and whichmajor Soviet military requirements.
Assembly A
b. Assembly B
c. Assembly C
d. Assembly D
e. Assembly E
f. Assembly F
FurtJierocrc, relatively stralGhtforward developments ccepored wita the accomplisnnents demonstrated in JOS XTX would permit improved thermonuclear weapons which coo have even higher yields or which can be incorporated into smaller warheads for use lnor delivery by fighters and light bombers.)
"The estimates of theigh-yield weapons nave been based ou these anticipated developments.
OS. Future Soviet capabilities ln the small weapons category
are derived primarily from the results of the4 test
series.
99. Estimates of weapons developments0 are Qecessarlly speculative, but It Is estimated that tbe USSR will be capable of producing nuclear weapons of whatever range of yields and characteristics are required for support of Soviet strategy. Over-all efficiency in 'the use of fissionable material in weapons of all sites will be improved./
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PART THREE
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estimate of tho probable actual direction ofnuclear program will depend net only upon theof Soviet technical and production capabilities,an assessment of probable Soviet military andbaaedroad range cf military, political,factors.
I. PROBABLE ALLOCATION TO IWB-WEAPOHS USYS
to Electric Po^ey rr-gram. There isthe USSrf in ur<WrtaK;rj< nr.irccram in theuses of nuclear energyincluding research and Tbe USSR has amplyontinued emphasiseconomic growth in which nuclear el*etrlc power will be In the llsht of these considerations, we estimateUSSR will allocate on increasing amcunt but still acfo is hi lniiumthat the USSR willerloua offcrt to achieveelectric power objectives ef tho Sixth rive-Tear Plan.
Ve have estimated that complete fulfillment of these objectives would require oOOO kllogrum?r stouter cent of estimated totalhrough mid-lyoO, but that some plutonium would be producedy-product.
oncle-iron. On the basis ofreactor experience ve estimate "tne* could produce areactor suitable for *urface -hip or We have little Information on the Sovietpropulsion reactor program but eitiiate that ltnot progress beyond the researchprior8 ood that
a reactor suitable for subsonic aircraftill probably not be available Asrutilngate ofhe amount of flosloiable cat-rial required fte, mipport the program will not subtract appreciably fr-XD the material estimated to be available for weapon production.
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II. rr.oiJJix sovietrr res .tjcleax weapons
Despite the likely allocation of an Increasing proportion ofo non-weapon uses, we believe that the proportion allotted to nuclear weapons stockpiles will not Tall. Not only do the announced plins and fissionable material estimates support thlc belief, but it is consistent with our estimates of Soviet motivations and strategic concerns in an age of growing nuclear capabilities. Tbe advent of nuclear weapons, and the growth of. nuclear strike capabilities basajor Impact on Soviet military planning for general war. This impact is apparent not only in various postwar Soviet military developments but from such evidence as we have of evolving Soviet military doctrine and tactics and from statements of the Soviet leaders themselves. In particular the threat posed. nuclearand, conversely, the offensive and defensive potential which possession of such capabilities offers to the Soviets rave led the Soviet planners to plan in terms of fighting, ifull scale uuclear war.
IOU. Soviet Military Objectives. It has been estimated that Soviet military objectives ln the event of war would be:
secure the Soviet Union against attack, bothmeasures and by offensiveany forces capable of significantlyits security.
reduce to the maximum extent practicalwar-making strengths of the
establish Soviet control over the Eurasianand to control or neutralize the Unitedthe Island chain of the Par East.
d. To disrupt Allied lines of communication throughout the world.
qulrgr-?nt for Providing Securityjcloarrime Soviet strategic objective Is the security of the Soviet homeland, which given current and potential Allied capabilities, means protection against nuclear attack. Although the Soviet planners
probably calculate that the most affective means of reducing Allied nuclear attack capabilities would be by pre-emptive action against these capabilities, they probably also recognize that this alone would be insufficient to completely destroy Allied nuclear strengths, andtrong defensive capability would also be required. uclear weapons standpoint, therefore, we estimate that the USSR has very high priority requirements for:
nuclear weapons, as these typeshighest probability of destroyingdelivery capabilities prior to their
and possibly medium-yield nuclear warheadsand air-to-air missiles for useaircraft. This requirement must be aone owing to the numbers andof the target systems which must
Pcqulremgnt for Attacking Allied War Potential. Another Strategic objective would be that o? decisively weakening Allied ability and will to carry on general war. In Soviet eyes this would almost certainly involve long-range nuclear attacks, primarily against the US and secondarily against the BT. Therefore, the Soviet planners wouldajor requirement for nuclear weapons and delivery systems for this purpose.
Requirement fcr Occupying Strategic Areas. The strength and disposition of the Soviet ground* and tactical air forces and their continued modernization Indicate that the Soviet planners are not relying solely on long-range nuclear warfare to determine the outcome of any general war. ajor Soviet objective would be to destroy the Allied forces and to occupy key e'reteglc areas, particularly in Western Europe. The Sc-iet planners almost certainlyeeulrr-jentuclear capability to attain these objectives.
IOS. Requirement for Interdicting Allied Sea Ccarrmjalcationn end Preventing Supply and Reinforcement ci Key Areas Overpcao. Corollary to the objective of seizing key area* around the Soviet periphery is the parallel objective of interdicting Allied support of these areas from overseas. The rapid increase In Soviet submarine andesser extent) cruiser strength indicates that the Soviets are
orce requirement of this nature. The Soviet planners almost certainlyequirement for some nuclear weapons to be employed ln naval roles.
requirement for Clandestine Use. Me have estimated.that the USSR might ciaauestln-ly employ nuclear weapons against key US and overseas Installations. Host clandestine weapons would be smaller than air-delivered weapons to facilitate handling andthe more precise placement possible would reduce the yield required. Ve estimate that, although clandestine attack with nuclear weapons might be made against specially selected targets,upplement to overt delivery by air, the use of lnree numbers of such weapons would probably be precluded by security considerations. Moreover, from the standpoint of allocation of nuclear material, clandestine use itself would noteparate requirement but would almply be one of the means of meeting various military requirements.
III. EVTJEHCE Of SOVIET EFFORTS TO MEET TfCEIR REQUTRjyEHTS FOR MUOLEAjI gggggs
There is considerable evidence from the Soviet test program nnd other intelligence that tbe USSR is attempting to meet most of the above requirements for nuclear weapons. This evidence bears mostly on what types of weapons the USSR is probably stockpiling and on what delivery systems lt contemplates. Thcro is no evidence of how many of each type are being stockpiled.
Ul. Evidence of Weapon Types Tested. Evidence from the Soviet ourlear test program Indicates toat several categories of weapons are being considered for stockpiling. The twenty-two Soviet nuclear testa fall into the following yield categories:
OF TESTS
of riarjcdlr. Support of Many of'the nineteen Soviet tests of low andwcapons,T,apability In low-yieldsrall-dimension weapons for pocsible use in support
of ground operations. In particular the Totsfcoye test was clearly designed tos type of use. Moreover, considerable evidence onoviet arry doctrine reveals the conterplated useumber of nuclear weapons In support of ground offensive operations. This doctrine also states that low-yield nuclear weapons would be delivered by aircraft of the Tactical Air Aruies. We estimate that other moans for the delivery of nuclear weapons In ouch situations could shortly be introduced into the Soviet Army.
of Planned Air Defense Errloyr^nt. f
nd JOE m, these may have been conducted at high altitude, and if confirmed this would Indicate on air defense interest.
lit. Evidence of Planned lone-Rorgc Ecpioyment. Extensive Soviet development und production ofiun and heavy bombers (BADGER, BEAR, BISo:') indicates great Soviet interest in strengthening their long-range offensive air capabilities. Tbe Soviets have also indicated extensive interest in developing long-range missiles. oot effective use of these delivery systems would be in conjunction with high-yield thermonuclear wcapons, certain types of which have already been tested.
Evidence of Planned Hovol Employment. Direct evidence of pooeibly Soviet planning for use of nuclenr weaponsaval role is indicated in the underwater test (JOE XVTIJ ofhich was conducted by the Soviet Navy.
Pattern of Soviet Military Establishment. Together with Its recent cirpnasis on air defense and cn bomber and iclsclle strategic deliverye USSR Is actively modernlilnc Its sizatle ground and tactical air forces, and io engaging in an extensive naval building program. All the Soviet services undoubtedly have expressed requirements for nuclear weapons to carry out their various missions, we see no evidence that the Soviet leaders would be likely to allocate all of the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile to any one of these services to the exclusion of the others. Therefore, ve estimate that, to the extent the USSRizable military establishment with extensive ground, naval and air components, available nuclear weapons will be distributed among the different major ccrponents, although in varying proportions.
IV. OTHER FACTORS BEAR ITC OPI SOVIET ALLOCATIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Necessity of Being Prepared to Meet Varying Situations. Aside from probable Soviet air defense, tactical and strategic re-qulrements and available weapons types, several other factors would Influence So/let doclsione on allocations of nuclear weapons. The USSR almost certainly has to plan not only for all-out nuclear conflict but also for various contingencies short of this.
United Availability of Fissionable Materials. The still limited amount ofrials available for weapons use
Is another factor which will affectcomposition of the Soviet weapons stockpile, although this factor is gradually diminishing in significance. At present, the Soviets almost certainly do not have enough weapon-grade material to meet all of their military requirements. This situation will gradually change as Sovietcontinues to accumulate. However, even byothat the USSR is unlikely to hove sufficient material to meet all priority requirements, particularlyarge requirement for nuclear warheads for air defense will still exist.
V. ARBITRARY EXAMPLES OP SOVIET STOCKPILE ALLOCATION AS6
The preceding analysis ha3 established that there are probably at least four major requirements for which the USSR would desire to stockpile nuclear weapons and that there Is considerable evidence as to the general sice, configuration, and yield of presently available stockplio types. However, it is more difficult to Judge what relative priority the USSR would give to the above requirements
and what cumberDe of weapon would be stockpiled. Such an assessment maul;- Ccjt better Information than we now possess, aa we;i% considerable "war-canine" of weapons versus specifictems. Moreover, the margin of error in any such estimates wc.ld increase greatly as they are projected forward ln time.
it is possible from availableour analysis o* current Soviet strategic requirecantspatterns to arrive at some general conclusions as toof the present Soviet stockpile. The Soviets have
*ted various types of small, medium, and large weapons, rangingTT and they have employed air, ground, andbursts. The present Soviet policies emphasise the maintenance of sizable ground and tactical air forces, as well as rapidly growing strategic air snd naval strengths and air defense systems. Wc have evidence that Soviet ground ond tactical nlr Torces ore being trained for employment of nuclear weapons. Finally, we can assume that the Soviet planners must estimate that, if war coreshe Allies will employ their nuclear weapons to the fullest advantage.
con reasonably infer that the USSR stockpile6ersatile stockpile of nuclear weaponson hich-yeild weapons, butonsiderable numberend medium-yield weapons. In summary!
USSR Is almost certainlyighstockpiling substantial numbers of medium and high-yieldbomber or missile attacks on Allied bomber bases, navalforces, industrial and population centers, andtareets.
USSH is probably giving priority to mediumweapons (bombs and possibly somewarheads) for use against NATO ond other key Alliedin the land battle and ln the battle for air superiority.
USSR Is probably stockpiling some nuclearother nuclear weapons for naval uses.
USSR is probablyigh priority toof snoll-dlamctor, small-yield, implosion typeuse ln air defense, but we do not believe they will navein quantity
Roughly ecual priority to high-yield weapons and to various types of medium and lov-yield weapons:
High-Yield
medlur-ylcld
iov-yield
VI. ARBITRARYr SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPON AUCCATIONS AS
Byontinued accumulation of fissionable materials, advances In Soviet weapons technology, and Improvement of delivery systems will have greatly increased Soviet nuclear capabilities. Ue have estimated tliat by this time the USSR will probablyarge force of heavy bombers, which will greatly increase tholr capability for surprise nuclear strikes against the US itself. The USSR Is also capable by then of having intermediate range ballistic slsslles. Finally, the USSR will probablyide variety of tactical
delivery systems, including various missile types and perhaps nuclear artillery. Eyhe Soviets could have an air defense cysten employing surface-to-air Blsslles and possibly air-to-air missiles, vith nuclear vox heads as veil, vhleh would probablyore effective air defense of their critical Industrial, population, and communication centers against attsck.
byhe USSR vill probably havenore advanced types of nuclear veopons to go withdelivery systems. They will almost certainly Increaseand reduce the size of weapons for long-range deliverycapabilitieswilluitable warhead Tor Ve furtherthey will have improved the design of their low-yield soall-
dlscoter implosion-typo weaponsore efficient warhead for air defense.
probable avrlLability byf advancedand delivery systems will give the Soviets forIn the distribution of their nuclear weaponsmake it even more difficult to estimate its likelysome generalizations cm still be made:
a. Sioce we presently estimate that the USSR will maintain substantial exound and tactical olr forces as well as Incrcane its stratecic olr and naval strength, it will almost certainly continue toaried stockpile of nuclear weapons for these forces, iiovever, these forces and the consequent emphasis oa particular weaponsht change slgiiflcantly by
b. Tpm USff? will probably givo high priority tosufficient hifh-yield nuclear weapons for attacks against key US strengths.
It Is not feasible to estimate with any degree ofthe probable composition of the future Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile. However, tin following arbitrary stockpile breakdowns serve to illustrate some of the alternative ways In which this stockpile might bo distributed ox ofomograph by which any desired stockpile may bo calculated la included as Appendix A.
EXAMPLE A
Clone to maximum emphasis oa high-yield, weapons; limited requirement for medium-yield; considerable requirement for lov-yield weapons primarily for air defense:
EXAMPLE B
Roughly equal priority to high-yield weapons, medium-yield and for low-yield weapons primarily for air defense:
By mld-lOol there vill have been further substantial accretions to the Soviet fissionable materials stockpile. ajor development in delivery systems will probably be in the missile field. In part1cmLor, ve have estimatedhat an ICBM could begin to be available by. Similarly, the major advances in nuclear weapons technology are likely to be in providing hirti-yield nuclear varheads for the several missiles types which will probably be available to carry them
In an era of rapid technological change it is Impossible to estimate with any precision what Soviet strategic concepts nnd force patterns will be some six years from now. Assuming no agreement on prohibition or restriction of nuclear weapons, tbe USSS will almost certainly continue to buildassive high-yield nuclear strike capability, including (if available) thether operational requirements will dictate the productionubstantial number of lower-yield nuclear weapons including warheads for defensive missiles.
Byhe number and types of nuclear weapons available to tha USSP are likely to be so great that considerations of competing priorities will be of considerable reduced significance. Accordingly, only two illustrative stockpiles aro given to Indicate the order of magnitude Involved. omograph by which any desired stockpile -ay be calculated is Included as Appendix A.
EXAMPLE A
Close to maximum emphasisigh-yield weapons; limitedfor medium-yield; considerable requirement for low-yield weapons primarily for air defense:
ATPETJIX A
jiUCLEAR WSAPOM STOCKPILt, DOHOCRAPHS For the
planning problem. Involving Soviet nuclearthe computation of weapon stockpiles which couldthe specific set of conditions peculiar to that problem.
Even minor modifications to the problem parameters requireof weoron quantities. To permit rapid calculationstockpileside range of assumptionsmateriuls allocation, the estimated cumulativestockpiles have been plotted ln norographic The nomographs were computed forprobable standard
of yield and deliverability are achieved hy modifications in respect to diameter and weight of the weapon configuration utilised with the standard assemblies.
for Using "cro^raphfl
Ihe following procedure is established to determine the number of weapons available in various assembly categories for problems wherein the set conditionsasis for allocation of basic fissionable material stockpiles. Where opeclflc quantities of each weapon type are stipulated by the problem parameters, the procedure may be reversed to determine whether the weapon quantities ore within the estimated Soviet production capability.
This procedure is best described through the solutionample problem:
The problem Is to determine the numbers of each standard weapon assembly which will be available to the USSR inndssuming the following arbitrary allocations of fissionable material:
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Original document.
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