THE LIKEIHOOD OF A BRITISH-FRENCH RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION AGAINST EGYPT IN TH

Created: 9/19/1956

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

NST) ' NUMBER'

rHE^IKELIHOpDRITISH-FRENCH 3ESORT TO MILITARY ACTION AGAINST

i^EGYPT. IN THE SUEZ'^

rCtXTRAL TNTEUIGENtt' "

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THE LIKELIHOODRITISH-FRENCH RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION AGAINST EGYPT IN THE SUEZ CRISIS i

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the likelihood and probable circumstancesritish-French resort to military action against Egypt during the next few weeks.

CONCLUSIONS'

least for the immediate future,and France will almost certainlykeep the way open for the use oftemptation for the British and

French governments to resort to military

action against Egyptbably be great over the next few weeks, despite substantial opposition in the UKlsewhere) to the use of force.

balance, at this stage of thebelieve that UK-French resort toaction is likely only in the eventnew and violent provocationmajor violence to British andand property In Egyptunite British public opinionacllon In such ar. event, theFrance would probably useEgypt even without USbelieve that Nasser reaUeswill make every effort to prevent

Mt<iLon Ku In lh* pett two iner.lhi undtiContchancel,btth* to So to

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toat %Wchbeat UiUtlmt.

such violent provocation from occurring, though it is always possible that he may not be able to do so.

We do not believe that the nonviolent incidents which are likely toof shipping In the canal,to admit ships with users' pilots, differences over tollswill cause the UK and France to take military action against Egypt so long as the US continues to oppose the use of force. Should the situation develop so as to cause tbe US to sanction th* use of force, there is at least an even chance that Prime Minister Eden would move despite the continued existence of public opposition toourse.

Finally, it is possible, but we believe unlikely during the period of thisthat other situations of friction In theArab-Isiaell conflict, or Iraqi-Syrian relations for examplemight develop Inay as tolsh an occasion for UK-French mililaiy Intervention against Nasser.

Ly.1

Ihe majority of the British cabinet,Prime Minister Eden, and Tirlually all the members of the French cabinet, arethat the elimination of Nasser Isto the preservation ol vital WesternIn the Middle East and North Africa Theyave ly concerned with the dangers or appeasement and probably believe that forceful action against Nasser offers the only real hope of arresting the decline of Iheirhey have taken pains tothat they remain prepared lo us;f necessary. They are continuing theirbuildup in the Mediterranean. They are nowigh slate of nilitary readiness and can initiate military action at any time

C. Nevertheless, ever the course of the Sues crisis, the British andesser extent the French governments have come increasingly to rcrognire disadvantages to the use of force. Atthough they continue to believe that there vould be no serious Soviet military reaction and appear to discount the likelihood ofrepercussions In the Arab stales, they hare been forced to recognlreesort to military sclion would entsll serious adverse reactions Uvaughoul the non-CommunKt world. In response to the pressure cfsnd world opinion, they hsve feltlo indicate Ihal they would use fcrce onlyast resort, and the British govern-mtnt has reluctantly undertaken to take Its grievances to the UN Security Council (except in raseerttney) before making any mill-Isry move against Egypt.

he temptation to resort to militaryagainst Egypt wil! be great over the next few weeks,iew of theAnglo-French military buildup and thestand ot Nasser. As long as the USSR continues lo support Egypt, It is highly unllMly that any diplomatic and economic pressures that can be brought lo tear againstkin cflet any early prospect thatetters! horn his refusal toegree of International supervision or control of the canal which the UK and Fisnce wouldas eflectlve. Having firmly rejected the plan to hsve ships transit the canal under "users* association" auspices, he will almost certainly deny passage to those ships which refuse to accept Egypt lansupplied pilots and may also bar those which refuse to pay tolls directlygypt in convertible tunds There are various technical means by ahleh Nasser couldthe passage of ships falling lo meet Eg> pt's conditions, even without remit lo mill--lery force.

Furthermore, to the extent that Western shipping continues to use the canal on Egypt's terms, it may encounter, al least in the early stages, accidents, delays, and obstructions arising from Egyptian failures of operation. The UK and France would view such iuctdents si further JuStincaUon for forceful action against Newer. -

While these factors sre thus likely lo roaln-tsln Ihe temptation to use forceigh

level, the inhibitions fo the use of fores wUl probably also continue to be strong. Egypt and its Soviet and neutralist friends will prob-ably continue to press Nasser's proposalsew conference on the Sues situation, thus generating further worldalde pressure against the use of force. If theefers the ease to the UN (for example, on the grounds of denial of passage of Westernhis would provide further demonstrationIiih French eeslre to exhaust all peaceful means of achieving Iheir objectives. While the UK tnd France mlf,ht then regardto beetter position toesort lo force, the apfesl to Ihe UN would almost certainly generate new demands for conciliation. It wight evrn result In adifficult for the Western powers to opposespecifically enjoining the parlies to refrain from use of force.robablyroalng tendency on the part of many who had originally supporteduse of force to feel that Uie opportune moment for such action had passed.

ht attitude of lit* US will continue lovery greet importance. The UK andrecogniseetort to militaryNUMf without at least implicitwould Involve risk* which theyto fcr-iuine alone. On the otherare limits to the U8ltuallon should developBritish opinionsaccept tht use of force, the Britishwould probably resort to forceUS

ll. It remains possiblt, though ve believe unlikely Ourlmj Ihe peilod of this estimate, that If the UK and France are inhibited from using fwce over, the Suei Issue per it, they might eventually lake military aclion against Nasser In conrecUoa with other possible crises In the area. It Is possible IhsV other situations ot frictionthe Arab-Israeli conflict or Iraqi-Syrian relations, for examplemight develop Inay as to furnish an occasion for UK-FTtnch military Intervention against Nasser.

Original document.

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