BPPPDVID FOR RElEflSt2
eptemberFOR: Acting Director of Central Decisions on AQUA TONE
pot e; Thia memorandum is the result of extensivereflection upon the future of Project AQUA TONE. Itsis to urge with all thean command that at thewith higher authority you attempt to obtain full andon all of the alternatives open to us ao that we will be in achart our course of actioneasonable degree of certainty forof months at least. The secondary purpose of this memorandumpresent my recommendations as to the position you should urge uponauthorities with respect to the various possible courses of action.
of Continued Uncertainty: m sure youwith many of the circumstancea that render continuedI shall venture to refer to them again. They seem to mea powerful argument against any further postponement of decisions.
a. It is not necessary to elaborate on the fact that inaction compounded by uncertainty is beginning toerious effect on the morale of many personnel assigned to AQUATONE.
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b. If operations are to be carried on in the Far East,decision must be made as to the base from which they willlreadylate to prepare any base other
support an AQUATONE detachment by mid-November, when Detachmentbe ready for deployment. Yet, if an AQUATONE detachment is toa SAC unit recently deployed there will be displaced.
The training of SAC personnel fornit is nit will have nowhere else to go under present plans
5 until March or April. If ourannot be deployed out of
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on time or if another one has to be brought back to be based there for the winter, the SAC program will be delayed and immediate steps must be taken to find another base for the SAC unit. We are being pressed hardirm decision on the availability of apace at
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no operations are to be permitted in the near future,it ia desired to maintain the AQUA TONE capability intact, decisionsurgently needed as to where the three detachments will bethe winter. The location ahould probably be in the ZI but nobe loat in obtaining andite if this ia to be our decision.
supplier.i, aware that no operations are incompletely without guidance as to the future, arc already beginningtheir development and production efforts on our behalf. Als scheduledctober at which it ls moat important to give
aome firm guidance. It ia In the National intereat to take the prc*eur<
off our remaining development work if there ia no immediate prospectoperational use ofamera,
On the otherperations are to resume at
any predictable date, it may be very important to ready these systems for
uae.
f. We are tyingizeable body of peraonnel, many of them with extremely ecarce skills badly needed eleewhere. Theae individuate should not be kept idle for much longer unlesa thereood proepect of using them for the purpoee for which they were originally assembled. Groupa eapecially worthy of mentioning aa falling within this category are Agency commo personnel (whoae scarcity ia well known toero-medical and aupply peraonnel from the Air Force (who have been extremely hard for ua to secure even with our priority because of theirighly ekilled maintenance peraonnel and their technical supervisors from our supplier*.
3. Deciaiona Required: It would aeem that the following three seta of deciaiona must be made (either by higher authority or within tbe Agency) before it would be poaaible for us toefinite couree of action. My recommendations with respect to these iaauet and the manner of their preaentation are set forth in succeeding paragraphs.
a. The major decision that haa to be made ia whether AQUATONE operations are to be permitted in the reaaonably near future against any denied areas and if ao against which areas. It ia useful to diatinguiah four target areas:
Western Russia Including Turkiatan and Western Siberia.
Eastern Russia from Lake Baikal.
The European Satellites.
China.
operations are to be permitted, the secondtheir timing aad the deaired pattern of operations. Shouldcampaign bo mounted or is it desirable to accept thediplomatic protests in order to be less "provocative"lower paceonger time ?
the decision ie that no operations or only verywill be permitted, say before next spring,ecisionas to whether the AQUATONE capability, both weaponsorganization, is to be kept in being in substantially its presentadministrative framework, or alternatively whether thebe turned over to the Air Force and the preaent project liquidated.
Should the Major Isenee Be Presented?! It goesthat the USSR west of Lake Baikal is by very large marginpriority target area. If given complete freedom of action,preaumably uee the AQUATONE capability ae we had plannedtarget area until our reeourcee were aufflcient to permit us towith two units in the West and one in the Far East. question, however, is not what we would like to do but howshould be presented to higher authority. During the past twohas generally been our feeling that even to diecuae the possibilitylimited to the Satellite! or of redeployment to the Far East,
or of postponing all operations until next eeason, wouldecision in favor of one of these undesired conreee of action. Accordingly, both in diecuseing future plans and in determining the deployment of ourwe have concentrated upon preparation for the major task of extensive reconnaiesance over the western USSR. ecision on this course of action should be the first one requested.eel strongly, however, that if it is negative, the time has now come to discuss the less eatialying alternative courses of action and to seek authoritative guidance concerning them. Whatever our reluctance to operate over the Satellites and the Far East, the Air Force is prepared to do so. And it makes no sense toesser capability whilereater capability Idle. Noreneible decision be made about the preservation of our capability in standby status except on the basic of guidance as to the probability of active operations next spring, Theae considerations argne strongly againet the attempt to exclude certain courses of action from consideration by silence.
We Favor Intensive Rather Than Attenuated to thie point it hasnanimous view that if operations arethe Western USSR, we should plan for an extremely short periodoperations conducted with aaapability as can be
emptoyed within the limits set by weather patterns. eading ofIntelligence Estimate on probable enemy reactions tothat this view should at least be reconsidered if only to be The Estimate concludes that the intensity of anyis one of the variables mat will affect the violence of the enemy
reaction. Perhaps we should plan on quite infrequent operations (say three missions per month) continuedong period. Or perhaps we should propose intensive operations for an extremely short time (say three or fourctivity then to be suspended and repeatedonth or six weeks. m inclined still to believeingle major operation to continue until the anticipated protest arrives is probably the most sensible course of action but urge that alternative patterns at least be mentioned.
b. Should We Favor Ope ratigainst Lower Priorityf the decision is made that operations against the major target area cannot be permitted for aometronglyequest for permiaaion to operate against the Far Eastern USSR, the European Satellites, and China, in that order. My reasons are as follows:
intelligence to be obtained in thia manner hasvaluable to the Air Force, this Agency, and our Allies aohave conducted overflights against these targets in the past andmajor capabilitiesy the Airy the Agency) to do so in the future. AQUA TONE is abeing superior to any others presently available and thia capabilitylimited life which has been running out since it was fully exposed tolast June. Certainly, there can be no justification foroperationsesser capability while holding oura in idleness. to me the only position thia Agency can take is that thesego forward using the beat capability available to our Government.
couree of action would involve negligible addeddisclosure of our capability to the enemy, since he already can formaccurate estimate of speed, range, and ceiling. Theia not sufficiently advanced toajor technical asset.
cannot be denied that such operations might elicitprotests which in turn could worsen the chances ofthe main target at some later time. If, however, the decisionto the Western USSR is negative now it will probably continue tountil there is aome major change in the domestic orm convinced that, in the event ofhange ofreview of the basic decision, any intervening embarrassments in the
form of diplomatic note* from Satellite Governments or from the Chinese would not prove decisive. In anyee no reason for attaching great weight to this argument against Satellite and Far Eastern operations unless thereubstantial likelihood that access will be permitted to the main target area next year.
d. It is not neceseary to dwell upon the other powerful but practical considerations which support thia view. It will be far easier to keep the human and organisational capability together if it ia being utilised. Under the spur of actual operation! our remaining development will go forward faeter and our equipmentake down more effectively.
7. Should the AQUATONE Capability Be Kept in Being ?: If no operations are to be undertaken for the next fewelieve the choice between the maintenance of the exit Hog capability, at leaettandby baeis, and ite liquidation accompanied by transfer of its equipment to the Air Force ehoold be determined largely by the outlook for operations next spring. Unless theretrong probability that overflights will then beould recommend prompt liquidation (subject to onenoted below). Aboverge that inatead of relying upon our guesa ae to how our own political authorities may feel in six months time, we aecore definitive guidance from them by aeking bluntly whether or not the proepecta are eufficiently favorable ao that they wieh thia capability kept in being and in our hands. The main conelderationa that bear on thia conclusion are the following:
baeic coneideratloa ie that, in the judgment ofcompetent pereone, the riek of enemy interception mayto becomeime before the end Bytherefore, the Project will be liquidated in any event. Unleeea reasonable likelihood of using the capability duringhere le no reason for maintaining it In being through tha
secondary coneideration ie that to maintaintandby basis will requireajor effort, since it waa built
up in an atmoephere of urgency and designedingle period of active operatione. Attitudes of personnel aa wellariety of administrative and other arrangements would have to be modified. This can probably be dene successfully but it will ba almost iraposeible in the abaence of thathat we will be allowed to do the job next year.
c. The otherill mention ia thet to maintain thia type of capability permanently in being ia aeaumed to be contrary to Agency policy, which atill further complicates the taak of maintaining morale and efficiency for an indefinite period of inactivity. Quite apart from AQUAaae could be made for reveraing thia Agency policy and for conaolidating all of our air operationeermanent organisation con-aiderably more self-contained than that repraaented by our Air Section, overaeaa and the Air Maritime Oiviaion at Headquartera. It might well be eaaier toapability ia being, much of the timeend by baaia but prepared for recurrent eituations in which it could be used, withonsolidated organisation which was deaigned to be permanent than with tbe present type of highly temporary arrangement. Were we to move down this road, the caae for maintaining the AQUA TONE capability throughout the useful life of the equipment would be much stronger than mated above.
8. Summary: Reflecting the varioua recommendationa made above, the following iaould urge aa the dealrable procedure when guidance ia sought from the political authorities:
permission should be sought to rtiume operationsprimary target area. Thia would be the appropriate time toNIS aad, in the light of ita conclusions, to discuaa the relativelong, drawn out, as againat intenaive. operatione and the poeeibilityagainat the major target area, but with certain allegedlyexcluded.
permiesion to operate againat the primary target areathe several alternative courses of action should be outlinedsought to operate against the secondary target areas, withpriority on the eastern USSR, second on the Satellites, andChina.
such permieaion ia alao denied, the dealrability ofAQUA TONE capability until next aeaaon ahould bo explored. ahould be aought on the proapecta for next apriag with theauch guidance ia essentialensible decision on thia point.
EllfHIIAcMIVR
tUl,HAKO M. IH^ihLL, JR.
Project Director
Original document.
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