Study: To Improve ClA/CS Manpower Potential Thereby Increasing Operational Capability
view of your interest in the critique on the "Unconventional War"
in Korea and the deficiencies of the Agency during that conflict and my remarks to you about the stale of our readiness to cope with such problems;m not too presumptious, perhaps you would be interested in noting the attached study on this subject.
study was prepared al the request of then order tofrom my experiences, both in Korea and PBSUCCESS, what might beimprove the Agency's operational capabilities. taffed the paperGenerallDMIN concurred inconcepts recommended. P dissented on the grounds thatemergency we could always depend on the Armed Forces for personnel.
I do not concur in the latter view and consider it very unrealisticailure on the part of the Agency to provide advance preparations to meet its ownrequirements. In any event, this study never got off the ground.
wish to reiterate howppreciated your kind words atdecoration ceremony and my pleasure in having my wife and sonon that occasion.
of Report and Btaff Study
you vory much for sending theseae. reatly enjoyed reading tbe report ooWar innd found it moatin spite of the fact that tho pseudonymsand neoessary repetition made ratherope that in sanitised forn, clearedand cryptonyms, thia valuable report lo
made available to various Individuals and agencies Interested in training for such operations.
I alao enjoyed very much your Btaff fltxaly on hov to improve CXA/CS manpower potential. lour idea lo certainly on original onean well understand the hesitation at adopting tbe reserve concept.
Thanks again for asking these paper available to oe.
T.B.y3 Cy #2
6 Cyndv/ attachments
This study establishes CIA's dependence on the Bilitary serrices for
nanpower end recoscerds solutions to ttila problem.
Attached to the study are drafts, transmittals and anweww**
historical staff source
In support of ny cement re "ad hoc'ing" of special situations, in view of historical proof of theirin the past and promise of repetition in theould appreciate lt If you could take tine to read Annex "A" and Annex "B" of the attachedossible systemtic approach to special problemsontinuing basia*
I believe Korea should havepecial task force during the war as much aa PBSUCCKiS waa and Indonesia, Syria and others present or to cam':. Hy proposal does not Impinge upon tbe Area Divisions but instead provides them the support and outside experience which should be appreciated. Host of nil it providestaff component to serve DDP/CCP,nd in turn the DCI, in monitoring and doing tbe many chores involved in order to better enable higher authority to guide and decide as required.
repared this study at Frank Wiener's request inmuch of it remains to be Implemented. Dick Blasellopy et the time of its
Attachment: Staff Study
(TO improve CIA/CS manpower potential thereby increasing operational capability)
ammuim rtai tep/cops
Study re Inprovenient of CIA/C? ilanpower Potential Thereby Increasing Operational Capability
Pursuant to your oral directive
staff study on tho above subject, attached herewith is his working paper, which has boon informally coordinated with the interested staff elements.
In general, the study has been found acceptable in principle andeasonably found Initial approachomparatively broad subject. Toe activation of the essential provisions of this study vould logically involve practical alterations in dotal 1. However,s believed tc Contain sufficient guidance to constitute the basis for 1li.pl cnentation.
It willV-t) that tiie pace and scope of ttfa reserve program, although astSblinsaM) by Ma* and interpreted byallsradual recruitment of personnel on an as needed basis. Fxpanslon lo tbe ultimate majcinun would logically wait until circumstances warranted such effort. Theprccludod provision for ailitarj and contrart staff agentoil ths tasls (hat the essential prohlsa was related primarily to Carter Staff Personnel. Thus, the estimate for maximum manpowerfor planning purposes concerns primarily Career Staff Personneleserves lo augment tliis cadre. litary and contractentwere to ho included in nrricr to visualize Um over-all reouire-
raent for t'. c. personnel, it is estimatedhould bc added.
rand total0 for the full strenct:: he Clandestine
It. The proposed establishmentombined Operation Staff has boon fully endorsed for future operationsighly specialized nature as it provides for the integration of tho three basic functions essential
its location could be in any of CIA's buildings,ogical solution on the basis of tbe highly sensitive nature of its activities and the need for status in order to fulfill its responsibilities lnto the Senior Staffs ant! Area Divisions. The operational nature cf this Staff places it outside tne characternc is therefore not re com nen dec"unction of PPC co the premise that to be mostplans and policy programing should remain apart from actual It is, however, strongly reconunended that trie Combined Operations ^taff be constitilted as proposed in tne Study and be assigned to no one
Senior Staff element in order to ensure its effectiveness inlose integration of allunctionservices which would be vital tc its contribution to the Clandestine Services. Considerable thought liar been given to the wartime needentral, combined operations staff and the establishment ofmall staff as envisioned above wouldefinite stride in the direction of acquiring experience and guidance for such an eventuality.
5. Upon coordination of the Study with DOP/admln end the "eputy Chief, Plans and Analysis, Office of Personnel, it became apparent that
CIA would ultimatelyeserve personnel section withinc service the entire Agencyentral point of administrative Therefore, in the interim, CCP/Admin has suggested that the functions of the Reserve Section, as defined in the Study, become the temporary responsibility of tne Administrative Officer assigned tc the Combined Operaticns ptaff until such time as they may be transferred to the appropriate section established by AlVP.
6. In consideration of the foregoing comments, it is mythat the general concepts tint', basic principles involved in thisapproved for activation witn full recognition that proceduralbe resolved as the probata unfolds. Aside from the possibilitysupport for existing special operations, the imple-
mentation of this program should bo contemplated as preparation for future situations.
In conversations with the DDCI during the PBSUCCESSeoall his statements to ths effect that CIA ought to be betterto nest such situations in the future and by ail means CIA ahould profit by this valuable experience gained in PBSUCCESS. In discussing ths pilot situation vith regard to the require rent suddenly developed ln PBSUCCESS for sterile fighter and cargo pilots other than JBDETLECT pilots, the DDCI expressed ths opinion that CIA should be prepared for such situations by having persons of this categorytring under some cover arrangement.
h. SA/PPC/DCI, Mr. Richard BISSELLt
Upon tho conclusion of PBSUCCESS Inh, in Mr.ffice with Mr. Barnes and other PBSUCCESS personnel present, Mr. 3issell stated that CIA hadreat deal fron PBSUCCESS and that there would be many cases in the future which would require similar semi-covert aggressive actionpecial task force nature. Tha discussion which followed had to do with tbe possibilities and feasibility ofermanent watch cocsnittee or staffto study and plsn for such special operations. Ko firm views were expounded although there appearedeeting of minds on tho subject of profiting from PBSXCESS byystem and procedures for future operations of this nature. Mr. Bissell expressed the thought that perhaps these special operations should be separated from tho regular or normal CS operations to avoid contamination of the latter and provide for tho "one shot" nature of tho special operations. My next opportunity to review the subjeot with Mr. Bissell, took placePC briefing on the approach to the problen through the manpower cspabillty study. At this time his conmants wore more along the lines of the "fourth force" concept in which he stated
considerable reliance would have to be placed on the Armed Forces for psrsonnel although he recognized that there was merit intoIA civilian reserve component* Upon completion of theopy was forwarded to Mr. Bissell for review and comment. As of this writing no response has been received except from his
provide general procedures for the "fourth force" organization.
Operations Staff, although he was not certain that the best place for this stsff would be under DDP/COPS snd had no alternative suggestion to offer at the moment.
5. DDP/COPS, Mr. Richard HELMS:
Onb,eported in to Mr. HeIns for assignment of duties, he requestedtilize the experience gained in PBSUCCESS and Korea to study the organization of the CS in order to determine the feasibility oftandby cadre or reserve pool of specially selected peraonnel who would be in readiness at all tiass to support existing operations or to meet crash situations as in PBSUCCESS. as authorized to take whatovor time required to thoroughly study the problem and cone uptudy that had been carefully staffed out in all particulars. For thisas to be attached to PPC although oontinued on the, oint Task Force type organisation was discussed inwith the above specific subject and Helms sgreed that it should be considered and left tho matter to bo resolved during the course of preparing the study. Onctoberafter havingonth to research and re-orientation on the DDP conplex andtho main subject with interested staffeported back to Helms that as an isolated subjeotonsidered my original
too confining and requested redefinition of tha directive, directive/ The answers to the special cadre or reserve manpower pool
was thought by ma to be contained within the larger problem of CS
operationaland manpowor capabilities or otherwise stated
as "manpower operational capabilities". dded that the oadra or
pool to be effective should be included either In the existing system
of the CS or partubsystem within the overall CS system, Mr.
Kelns concurred in this approach and so authorized the redefinition
of the verbal directive as par tha aforementioned. Ko further discussion
was hold with Mr. Helms prior to the submission of the Staff Study on
6. PC, Oeneral 3ALMSR:
Upon assignment to PPC and reporting to General 3alr-er, the latter authorised my full uso of his staff and reference material inthe Staff Study. During the course of staffing out andresearch on this Study, General Balmer was frequently consulted and briefed on the development of same. The personal views of General
f< Balroer are expressed in his covering rwmorandum on the Study to the
?, P, Mr. C. Tracy BASNESi
During the many hours of close association with Mr. 3arnes on the PBSUCCESS Project and afterwards, just prior to his departure for Oermany, we discussed the future of such special operations and the ways and means whereby the Agency might bo better prepared in the future to cope with them. elt wearmony of views in respect to the need for devising specific procedures andoint Task Force concept, out of the way of regular operations, which would be in readiness before serious situations wero allowed to becomerash, assignments. Mr. Barnes was particularly interested In the possibilities ofoint Operations Staff and considered the
experience in PBSU8CSSSignificant demonstration of how elosojy integrated Fl and PP should be and Important it ls to conduct both functionsombined manner. He expressed interest in the civilian reserve proposal and thought that PBSUCCESS would never have beentrain on tha Agency if it had ample qualifiad reservea to draw upon. He visualised reserves of pilots, crevchlefs. mechanics, paratroopers, sabotage Instructors, small boat operators, radio programmers, creative writers, artists, and etc, more than enough in reserves would ensure the chances of having tho few available when needed. Kr. Barnae' ideas and thoughts on thia entire subject were very helpful in providing guidance in tha preparation of the Study. It is regretted that he departed before it was completed aa his review of the Study might have been helpful to the DDP.
SA/DDP/PP, Mr. Hermit ROOSEVXLTi After having read tha Staff Study, Kr. Roosevelt discussed itswith eoongthy period. resume the DDP will receive his views personally and direct,atter ofslt Mr. Rooseveltomplete grasp of tbe subject and nany pertinent thoughts on the various aspects of the Study. Hethe need for being more alert to serious situations which sightpecial task force if thoy fcecamo critical and thought this was basically the Job of tha Area Divisions. Ko agreed that ininstances it might be advisabls to assign acme competent officer for this specific task to an Area Division to study and plan for any contingency that night arise although he doubted the value ofspecial staff or committee, sitting full time in thi3 rolo. As to doctrine and future operations, Kr. Roosevelt felt that there having been only two such special operations thus far and thoy were at complete varianco
with each./that it was doubtful any pattern could be established or any doctrine developed at thia time to guide future situations. He
aoknowledgod^owever, that history was replete with many Instances cf revolts, coup d'etats and other efforts made to overthrow governments or seats of governmental authority and that the British systemfor special operations of this nature. Hy impression was that Mr. Roosevelt felt that tho merits of tha Staff Study could only be determined by higher authority and then on the basis of policy; policy determination as to how much CIA should or plans to do in the Cold War snd thereby determining how much attention or effort should be devoted to preparations along this way of thinking. fourth force" concepteparate CIA force prevails then ha thought the proposals in the Staff Study night prove helpful but if the present course was to be continued without change then there would be little justificationpecial operations system apart from existing procedures.
The views and reservations of on this Study are contained
eparate memorandum attached to the Study. nly had one interview of about thirty minutes on thiselt that he was very much in favoringle,perations staff, but did not look upon special operations as being particularly "special" enough to be worthy ofnail, conbined staffermanent basis. He appeared in favorolid reserve backing up the CS but did not think wellivilian reserve as proposed in tba Study. Although lt was clearly expressed in the Study andmemorandum that the civilian reserve would not in any way remove or preclude the military from providing reserves as needed, f* referred placing reliance on the latter completely toivilian reserve effort of selected persons by CIA. The reasons for and tha advantages contained In thB proposed "Special Casual Unit" appeared completely unnecessary as in his opinion both Career Staff
and outsiders brought in on contract oould be assigned under existing procedures. Tho only objective cementan make is that it is in PP where the greatest deficiencies exist today for specialand preparationsot War and that the Study proposing roans of correcting these weaknesses has fallen so far short ofP's concurrence.
During the course of staffing out theumber ofwithm various aspects of tho subject. I
ascertained that be felt very strongly that CZA should have fim relations with tha Arned Forcas and that they should be the reserve strength for CIA in any special operations requiring personnelthe capabilities of the Agency. Ho did not think it advisable totanding group or reserve pool of PM on band tt all tires. His answer or thought on this subject was that Cli should be able to call on the Marines or the Special Forces of tho Army if and when suoh personnel wsrs needed. C JJjlso thought that CIA could augment its capabilities by psriodically training certain personnel in tbo othor components of CIA outside of DDP. although he recognised that this "robbing Peter to pay Paul" procedure would handicap the other oorrponents but considered thisatter of establishing priorities of Interest. On the subjectoint or combinedstaff.C ^thought that PP was presently able to handle many of tho special operational requirenents and that FX would support thomervicing role. In any event ho did not foresee the need forpecial staffermanent basis. ocognlsed the similarity oft iews with C ontinued the Study along tho lines indicated because of what appeared to no to be the weight of logic on tho side of tho civilian reserve in addition to the military or apart fron and the serlts of the special operations
system over the heretofore and current improvisation ofrash basis.
Onoccasion of my initial interview witrwith
present, the main principals of the Study were reviewed
at length.stated he had longoint or single
operations ataff consisting of PI and PP and' felt very firmmanpower shortage of PP In terms of special operationsot War. Although he felt that reliance could bethe military for certain types of personnel in an emergencythat many of PP's specially qualified personnel wouldoomo from civilian life. The civilian reserve proposalto bin at thia time and he expressed no firm viewsthe Combined Operations Staff, reserving them until he hadStudy. eft this intervieweeling of generalviews. earned that the next day had been devotedover the Study withother PP Officers. That
as informed bythat although PP had no serious
objections to the reserve concept they did dissent on the needspeoial operations system and particularly the Combinedas being outside PP. He also stated that PP did not concur %the assumption in the paper that the present allocation ofwasnferring PP believed theirbe larger at this time. Tha followingreparedcovering memorandum forPcto send with theCOPS inndicatedad construed to be PP'sas described by C above. howed this memorandum*ho stated it appeared very strong in writing but was
essentially correct. hen suggested that he pass tho Study"ith the above draft indicatingould appreciate
his restating PP's position in any manner he so desired. Aboutlaterthe Studyeparate memorandum
setting forth his reservations as indicated above.
Prior to ny interview with C equestedto
review ths Study and provide his personal comments. After having read thsiscussed lt with hln ln detail. He qualifisd his ability to make coment on the basis that he waa unaware of the policy or intentions of higher authorities to conduct special operations and was relatively unacquainted with PBSUCCESS. It was his impression that the Study would probably receive quicker reading and action if it were reduced in size by breaking into several maineserve progran. Combined Operations Staff and the Special Casual Unit. He concurred, however, in the discussion on the weakness of CIA's dependence or. the nilitary, as he seriously doubted whether CIA would ever reach the point of being able to depend upon drawing the types of qualifisd personnel required for CIA's highly specialized operations. He wss particularly doubtful of what kind of response CIA would receive from the nilitary ln the event of an emergency or Hot War. Although he recognized some help would be forthcoming from the nilitary in emergencies whether for Cold or Hot War, he did not think it prudent for CIA to depend entirely on these resources and therefore thought thateserve program as proposed in the Study should be instituted by the CS. Although there was probably merit in his comments regarding the size of theid set not break it down on the basis that each of the main parts were inter-related and parts of,losely integratedmatter.
PP Staff, C
The firstnterviewed in initiating my staffing of thowasrequestedto provide =ebriefing on the PM side of ths subject. C mall committee composed of himself,
onsiderable tine was devoted to analyzingin terms of PM's situation. The deficiencies in theof the CS were carefully noted and discussed lr.of these deficiencies appear in the Study after havingout with others. This committee aided me materiallythe questions, the answers to which would provide theto the problem. The blueprint for action was established andtha suggestions were later incorporated In the Study. Withroceeded to develop tho problem and returned with thatheaa in contact with
a copy of the Study and briefly indicated interest In it,id not ask him for specific comments after I' learned the initial position ofP as above.
Althoughhad teen among those present at the above committee
id not confer with him again until the Study wasasked hin to review it and give me the benefit of his candidbUged byhorough review of tha Study. He had
a great deal to aay on many aspects of the Study but in general appeared tobs in agreement on the principles involved. Ho thought the Study did not reflect strongly enough tho Inadequate preparation personnel-wise of PM during tbe Cold War period. As for the Combined Operations Staff, he thoughtmall staff for thia purpose waa not enough that tho entire operations of both Fl and PPshould bo contained and special operations wouldnail part thereof.
He thought well of the civilian reserve proposal tut againegular formal roserve program was needed, tiedwith the Armed Forces and the latter should te moreln terms of how much help and what kind would thsy be to provide. He took exception to the statement thatCIA personnel served nore devotedly in Seres than thewho were ordered there. tood on the statement ascomparison snd an prepared to defendconsents
were piercing and thoughtful and in the main were either over procedural details or over the matter of understatement.
Both of the above officers wore helpful in planning the reserveand providing other suggestions. Tha hypothetical case of AMD being authorised to develop an sir reserve potential was discussed at length. They agreed that it would be completely feasible to develop contract reserves among ccenerslai pilots, crew chiefs, meohonlcs, Jumpraasters, cargo handlers, dispatchers, meteriologists as well as balloon handlers and snatch pick-up specialists. in terms of the maximum along the lines of the "Plyinghey thought CIA could developighting potential among civilian, Air Force trained reserves. as also believedoranercial resorve cargo flight could be easily developed in an unwitting manner to fill the needs now being serviced by JBDEFLSCT. They were highly doubtful that the Air Force would be able or willing to provide CIA the several hundred pilots that might be neededot War and, therefore, thought CIA should plan in the Cold War for its ownthus havingotential in being for such situations as PBSUCCESS.
Tha problems confronting the Maritime Section in both Cold and Hotthoroughly reviewed withMaritime operations
appeared to be the nost difficult of all to maintain in aof readiness. The assets that are required forot War are not Justified otherwiseurrentthe importance of maritime operations is notnor la it realized how much of the earth's surfaceand how many countries lend themselves to this type ofadvances in high speed, small boats and midget submersiblasunexplolted by CIA to date. It was believed that many ofproblems and potential advantages could be realized inreserve maritime capability both as to personnel and Unquestionably considerable advantage would be gainedpresent static situation ifmall, balanced reserveconsisting ofj small boat operators, navigators,operators and ship repair or maintenance personnel. Inavailability of this type of personnel,no
doubt in being able to find and reoruit whatever number is decided upon. He pointed out the decline In the Merchant Marine ir. recant years and the related effeat on maritime personnel as being available for reserves end part time or temporary duty.
1?. pp Staff,
Throughout tbe preparation of thewho had served on
PBSXCESS, was very helpful In providing suggestions and guidance as well as sditing the Study. His position In PBSDCCESS required hia, among othor duties, to go out and recruit pilots and air mechanicsover arrangement. This actual experience under pressure was very valuable as it clearly indicated what could ba done if thewere for reserves and not under pressure. C Jsharod the views
of regarding what could be done in developing
sir reserve potential if the will and energy were devoted to the task. The many problems related to this endeavor were discussed and one by one either eliminated by adjustment or considered as drawbacks which did not seriously impair the overall value of an air reserve, fj was in the planning ccssslttee which established the MaterielBoard. He felt that there wouldumber of special techniques developed by this Board which would require teans of specially trained personnel to handle then. Many of these techniques would only have occasional value ln current operations,therefore, would not warrant the full time eaployaent of staff personnel. However, if the reserve program were adopted thla would enable the Board to solect and train reserves for these techniques and provide the means of conducting experimental operations without drawing on regular staff personnel. This suggestion was incorporated in the Study as lt also provided for the specialists in reserves requested specifically byT.
One of the earliest oontaota and interviews made on behalf ofwas with Ke devoted over an hour to the general
discussion of OTR's problems, pointing out many deficiencies in the present system and possible remedies for them. The ideatand-
J ing reserve pool storiginally proposed, did not rest
Baird'a approval and ho outlined the obvious weaknesses involved; aorale could not bo maintained, wouldool of cast-offs, could not bo expected to hove proper types for all occasions and wouldepetition of past bad experience- along this line. had cany good suggestions to make in how to go about the research on the subject and what wore the main problems. Heointed out the importance of looking at the picture from the broad point of view before getting into details. He thought CUi/CS should
constantly be awaxo of possible Hot War requirements and relate then aa ouch ao possible to the Cold War plans and operations. He did not think well of the scheme to train CIA peraonnel of otherin CS techniques because it would soonatterobbing Peter to pay Paul" and seriously dislocate the ether functions of the Agenoy, presuming they are also important* The prospects ofilac reserve and providing two week training periodsearly basia wae discussed briefly. greed that lt could be done and would want to have it planned out in order to schedule such training carefully. This training could be handled for both witting andreserves. Regarding the lack of adequately trained senior staff personnel to supervise combined missions or serveot War situation, iC Jjtated training waa not the problem but having tbe right personnel made available was the bind. Ths proposaligh level, sort of command and goneral ataff type, two weak course for senior peraonnel, appeared entirely feasible Jujho added that he thought there waseed for the training of senior personnel in combined operations and relations with the military and state,toth Cold and Hot War situations. If requested to do so and assured tha right kind of personnel could ba made available the establishment of the course would present no unsuraountableave been unable to date toopy of the final Study to OTR but shall do so st the first opportunity asomments would behe DDP.
During ths staffing of thenterviewed
regarding the training of senior staff officers in ccmand andoperations. ound thatC 3has long advocated that this be done and has presented recommendations to this effect. His views were mostly pertaining to the selection and preparation of senior
CIA personnel for possible future assignments with thadeplored the present situation statingot War vouldunprepared to properly staff its critical top assignmentsresult that they would havo to be filled by non-CIAofficers or untrained CIA personnel.shared C J
views above and vent further by adding that all senior personnel qualified for military assignments should also complete ths reserve "Command and Oeneral Staff course now offered at Ft. Myer.
One of the firstnterviewed after receiving themake this study wasreviewed the problem with
him and he appeared completely informed on the background ofattempts through committees to resolve this particularproblem was related to the stresses snd strains developed in Project and C- rged that they be kept in rindto the ultimate proposals on this problem as hethat proper systomatio preparation and advance planningcrash situations and afford the opportunity forcare and nore effective results administrative-wise. Heconcur in the existing proposal to simplyoolpersonneltandby basis ln event of possible need. Hethat there wero ways that these needs could bo met anda flexible aye-em which would tie then into specific need"the right types were available at tho right tlae.
discussed the reserve problem and felt that CIA has long needed sane prdgram of its own without placing full roliance on the military for every situation which arose and without draining the othor elements of CIA of their personnel. Ho authorised my calling on
- IS -
hia staff for any as3latanceight require and added* he would be available personallyeeded any specific administrative guidance. With thia complete offer ofhen worked with several of his officers mentioned below. Upon the completion of the Study,
reviewed it carefully In ny presence. Whereas, he concurred in principle on the overall aspects of the Study and assured me of hia support once it came before COPS, be suggested that the functions of the
, DDP/ADMTN/CRS (roservo section) be handled temporarily by theof the Combined Operations Staff until such time as thea central reserve section for all of CIA as that wouldlogical place for this function or unit. He concurred In tbeof maximum manpower requirement for planning purposesthe CS Career Staff Peraonnel, but suggested that the total ofcitizens, including contract agents and militaryC,argin for the other types nottbe Study. He considered tbe reserve progran, the CombinedStaff and the Special Casual Unit aa sound proposalswith the above salification. Be was particularlyths Combined Operatlone Staff and rsoognized that in effect itthe establishment of the PBSXCESS Headquarters, supportby Hr. Eaterline)ermanent basis.remarked
that he would want toood Administrative Officer on this staff to represent DDP/Admln in all support matters related to reserves or
- special operations.
devoted several hours at different tines during tho course
of the study to assist mo on administrative matters and providedsuggestions. His views on the final Study, whloh hesimilar tothat there would be
certain,special operations which could be forecasted sufficiently in
advance to parait thoir inclusion in tho Support Planning Cycle,aiding materially in the proper advance preparation for the various support requirements involved. He considered tho reserve program as fundamentally sound and as necessary for tho propor functioning of the CS in tbe Cold War and as vitalot War situation. He deplored the tendency by certain officers in DDP of thinking ln terns of raiding tho other olenenta of CIA whenever additional or special individuals were required, and sdded thateneral practice it would soon seriously disrupt tho smooth functioning of the Agoncyhole.
In order to analyze tho present composition and administrativetheas referredbriefed
me on the current situation and roviewed tho problem as related to personnel sdmiriistrstion. Heunbor of helpful ooraents and sssignsd o assist ne intatistical analysis of tho DCP complex and working out administrative procedures for the Study. C, umber of hours to the.ad requestedor statisticsreat deal of his effort ls reflected in tho final Study.
During the course of theeviewed the DKLEKA problsmfornerly Chief of Mission,in Korea.
We discussed tho needsIA civilian reservetandingsupport special field operations.how CIA
attempted to handle tho Korean Mission as though it were one of many normal operations. The Area Division was not properly staffed nor was the DDP cceplox prepared to cope with tho police action that grow into he fourth largest war. He agroed that tho Korean situation was unique and should not have been handledoutine operation in the Division.
Inombined Operations Staff in connection withwas readily apparent that it would haveupportnot only for the Mission but for theDivision. eserve program had been in effect lt isthat the extreme shortages In personnel would haveproblem at that time was not necessarily the lack ofthe unwillingness of staff peraonnel to accept Korea as an There waa considerable talk during and after Korea bysenior officers that CIA should profit fron itsbe better prepared for the next Korea. ersonal corsoentquotinjI aerioualy doubt If CIA has profited at all
from Korea or that the experiences there have even been catalogued let alone studied for lessons for the future. It now remains to bs seen whether PBSUCCESS will be allowed to fade into the background in the sane manner. Perhaps it was coincidencead been selected
to conduct PBSDCCESS, at anyan certainly state withor
neither/the officerselected from the Korean Mission could have or would have undertaken PBSUCCESS were it not for the confidence and experience gained in Korea,
Coincidentemorandum prepared by the DDPthea standby PM pool for emergency support of existing oralsoemorandum indicating Pi's
need for certain types of specialists or special duty peraonnelthe periodic but not permanent requirements of the field. on this subject of Fl needs as related to the
subject of the Study. After reviewing the subject, it becameFl'a problem was not soatter of reserves pecial reserve or ready potential to meet thespecific requirements,
3 of Fl Planning Staff to assist me in obtaining Fl'a views and
coordination. After completing tho Study and reviewing it with Jjthe latter took tbe Studyand reviewed it with
hin. C Jreported back to ne ad no major reservations and thought that it night provide forrequirements ae originally
stated. C con_fimed my query whether this constituted informal
concurrence In principle. ave since learned through Mr. that In discussing the Study Jthet he said he had concurred informally in principle but that he intended to non-concur on the Combined Operations Staff ones it is submitted to him for formal con-currance. ave not discussed this with C- as surprised to learn of his intentions ^agreed that Fl ahouldoequal role or atoint role with PP on special operations as certain of these operations wouldajor Fl role.
25. Fl Staff,
After my initial interview withC- sorked entirelyelationship to the problem. Jvta very helpful andumber of suggestions which were later incorporated In ths Study. We discussed FI's rols in Special Operationsointed out that Flajor contribution to PBSUCCESS through the defection progran which was completely aside fron tbe supporting, but sasentlal role of intelligence. C- Jolted several examples known to himwhere special operations would have to depend on Fl assetsajor degree. He cited his experience In tho days before the Red putsch in Chechoslovakia wherein his Intelligence assets could have saved the country If there had been the will to do and organizational procedures such as exist In CIA today. It became evident in discussions JJohat ths premiseombined Operations Staff for special operations was valid and that such operations would be prejudiced if considered solely as PP type operations. The other features of the Study, the reaerves and FI's relatively minor Hot War requirement
and tha Special Casual Unit appeared to pass his scrutiny and in he expressed the thought that tl would be able to profit by this procedure* Pi's interest In ths reserves would be to recruit and develop the types of specialists snd other personnel that they would needemporary basis and ths Speoial Casual Unit would provide Tor their core and administration while "on duty" status with ths Agency.
26. AD/P, Plans and Analysis Branch,
Early in the preparation of thoalled onwho
was st that time in charge of planning for CIA's personnelmatters. pent several hours withC -Previewing primarily the natter of reserves. Be pointed out the long standing need for CIA to develop its own reserve strength and the fallacy of placing full reliance on the Armed Forces. By this be scant CIA had to depend on the Armed Forces for special commitments beyond its capacity tobut that those situations would be most extraordinary- as nowand that CIA should not oontinue to depend on tho military for its normal expansion and retraction of operations. He shared the doubts that CIA could place full reliance on the militaryot War and keep its present obarter or be expected to effectively fulfill its mission. He considered the idea of the CS depending upon the other elements of CIA to meet its emergency personnel requirements asunsound and would soon break down tho offlcienoy of the Agencyhole. It was his firm view thst CIA should start now to develop its own civilian reserve to meet all foreseeable requirements up to andot War. orollary problem was msntionod as one that ho was currently working on pertaining to the oorpletlon ofwith tho Department of Defense for the assignment of all CIA military reserve personnel to CIA mobilization assignments. He said that if they were able to conclude this agreement it would also provide for CIA contraot reserve personnel who alao havs nilitary reserve status.
A second corollary problen pertaining to CIA reserves who would be subjeot to military conscription or draft, involved making arrangements with tho Selective Service Board for thoir exemption providing thoy are accepted by CIA at the time for active duty assignments. This latter arrangement appeared quite feasible, whereas, he thought the best they could do for military reservists would be to earmark themoint review by CIA and the military service involved to determine greatest need and the preferences of tho individual. C ^thought it was vary fine that DDP was makingtudy of marl mum requirements sndeserve program as ho was presentlytudy to support ths IssuanceIA regulation establishing the responsibility on each component element of CIA to do Just what DDP was doing in this instance. This regulation is now ready for the Directors approval. ater reviewed tho final study and consented that it provided tho general principles and requirements and that be concurred with it onbasis although ho took exceptionetails andwhich be agreed eould only be worked out ia final form after the principles had been accepted.
Without reviewing the individual comments of all the PPChave been consulted on this problea and who have road thoI might add that tho following were particularly helpfulideas, suggestions and criticisms! C Jon guidance,- C policy jon tho Cold War Planning* and, C _7
and C Jot War Planning.
Having been entirely in the field since my employment in the Agency, the first step toward asking this Study was to acquire an lntiaate knowledge of the Agency and particularly the Clandestine Services.
I attended orientation and re-orientation courses and studied all the
basic manuals, policy books and tbe organizational structure of the
CS. eviewed the Planning Cycle System and read available Cold and
Hot War Plans and related plans and studies. Through the assistance of
I accumulated all the available past reports, studies and
oommittse notes pertaining to this general subject natter and studied
each one carefully. Aside from this research and consulting the
staffrew upon my own exporlenoes of six years en the
War Department, Military Intelligence Division, General Staff, and
seven years with this Agency in tbe field, C
n Korea during the war and as the responsible operations officer for PBSUCCESS.
X'MORANDUM FQRi DSP/COP?
Study re Improvement of CIA/CS Manpower Potential Thereby Increasing Cporatlonal Capability
Oob, you assigned
purposes oftudy pertaining to the feasibility cfa roady manpower pool of specialists to aupport special and/or current opuratlono cn an as needed basis. Afterhorough study on this subject, lt was reported to you onb, tnat tne proposal was impractical as an isolated subject and' thst the solution wss believed to be within tho franowork of the broad subject of manpower operational capability. Accordingly, you rode fined the original directive to en con pahe broader subject ofanpower situation in terns of developing means ofoperational capability. It was understood that thin broader approach would result inorkable solution to th* originsi problem and would bo completed In general form on or sboutb.
2. The above study was undertaken ss objectively as possible and consisted Initially of reviewing all available records and reports on ihe subject andith all cenlorTR,ndC/DCI. Tho PPC ^taff wae consulted frequently and concurred in position assumed In tne study, Upon completion of tho study's "working paper" it was again reviewed with tho saoe staff elements cn Un basis of determining Infernal reactions to the provisions adopted in this paper. It was acknowledged tnat tlio bruadth and scope of too subject matter would require considerably study by all concerned before formal concurrence or coordination would be consummated. However, in an effort to provide DSP/COPS with toe benefit of tne views of those concernod after having reviewed the study, it was coordinated simply on the basis of whether the staff elementsln agreement with tho general principles set forth-therein. Accordlnrly, the following views were obtained: a. Ii Concurred In principle and considered tne proposals as
l feasible noans of providing PI with spocialirtauservo basis
as requlrod snd originally proposed.
b* DEP/Adoln.i Concurred In principle and considered tho proposed Combined Operations staffractical solutionong-range approach to special operations froa an administrative point of view. CEP/Admin, suggested thateserve Section, advanced by the study, be con-
sldered the intarin responsibility of the Administrative Officer aasigned to the Combined Cperaticns Staff until such time asrovided such aorvlce through eetabllshment of an Agency wide reserve section. Theof the Combined Operations Staff within the Office of CDP (CC?P) was considered particularly desirable in vieweculiar and hlgnly specialised nature of Its duties.
(Deputy, Plans and Anslysls Branch)) Consideredplan as practical for tne Clandestine Services ands proposed ragulstion to establish naodnun roqulreswnts andby sll component elements of tne Agency. nlyon details rathar than content or substsnce.
Although the reserve progran was considereddoslrable, PP did not concur on tha concepteparateStaff for special operations. Toe assumption thatof peraonnel is eatlsfactory was not concurred in byheld toe contrary view. It was held that PP, as presentlycapable of fulfilling all functions assigned to the Coebinod e present personnel allocation ofor PP useto meet ita current Cold War requirements.
3. It will be noted that the only exception to the Integrated proposals contained in this study was advanced by PP. The non-ccncurrer.eeP on the principle of the integral position of tho Combined Operations ^taff was taken with full cognisance of the reasons advanced in the study forsuch an elenent, namely i The highly sensitive nuture of its duties[ toe laportanco of special operations as dletlngulshed from general operational the need for the closest possible impartial integration of functions and services and the fact that PP would not predominate in all casts)needlar staff element to study and monitor reaorve requirements throughout the Clandestine "ervicee for tho DE?he need for an Intar-lntra functional
and aervico staff eletssnt to administer toe Special Casual thlt insteadingle senior staff element administering for all three.
il. The Study haa endeavored to weigh the ovor-all situation confronting ClA/CS In terms of naapowor requirements for both current Cold 'Ort War situations, from such deliberations it was possible to determinecoursus for peraonnel action. The Study adopted as an assumption tnat the present allocation of personnel waa satisfactory cn the basis that the original directive which established the study Intended to derive means of increasing ths Clandestine "ervices capabllltios within existing manpower coilingn. Under this assumption lt was possiblo to proceed to new areas of consideration such as the Special Casual Uniteserve program. To have done otherwise would have constituted an undue interpretation of tits Lntent within the original directive and exceeded the competency of the officer assigned to conduct the study. Kovurtheless, byis assumptionasis for projecting maximum requirements, it is bellevud to naveseful purpose if it nas resulted in the illuminationisproportionate distribution of present pursonnol as indicated by PP above.
S>. Owing to the magnitudeis 'Huoy ami thfc impracticability of resolving all procedural details without first obtaining TTP'a concurrenceSi ipneral principles proposed therein, it Is believed that the ^tudy snould be examined initially on thle basis orropooud course of octioilto tho genoral subject. It will be noted tnat tne "tudy Logically proceeits from the general to the specific and reaults in two maincssrve programpecial operationsich are thun Integrated In acomplementary manner toinal picture of now to increasor-onpewer operational capabilities. The followlnR PPC comraonts may be of interest with respect to the three elenonts proposed in tola Study:
a* eserve Program While it is bolleved important to recognise the woeknoss cf dependence upon tne military services for reserveand the needlA/C^ civilian rooorvo proKratu, it is also important to realise that the establishmentIA program asby this Study in no way precludes or elininato9 the potential reserva available at all times In the military services. On tho contrary, lt is believed that the creation of civilian reserves selected and screened by CIA would lessen dependence on the militaryventually would reserve
tne nilitary for em-rgency or extraordinary situation? beyond the capa-bilitlee of CIA's maximum effort to provide Its own requirements. o pace and scope of the proposed Clk/C- reserve program would be set by PEP, tills permittingradual buildup baseded: ateor. If trie situation warranted the effort required, tne reserves could bo steadily increased to maximum proportions in an estimated period of eighteen Tenths. Tne tine required to build up tne reserves of course becomes commensurate vi tn the offort devotede tasK. Tneaximum manpower requironmnt for planningstablished within PPC and contained In tills ^tudy, pertains solely to Career "taff Parendot encompass all American citizens wno might ba required In other categories sucn as military and contract staff agent porsonnc-l. ISP/Admin, estlsatedould be reasonable for these personnel, union would place tbo msxlmun for American citizens at
b. ooblaed Operations "toff: The proposal formall element within too fits'chelon, without independent status or identity, to fulfill the duties of staffingctal operations, administering too special Casual Unit and monitoring tie reserve program from the point off special reqnlrer.ier.ts, 'iaendorsed in principle by PPC and ill cenior "taffaJ'i'. roripiuerotle fionght and past study have been given to the practicality and desirability of combining PI and PP operations into one joint operations staff. Both FX and PP concurred ln principle, and PPC indicated tub practicality of the step ae aascntlal In eventdt Th* subject was reviewed and considered premature action on tne caslrc merger tlteo in progress -nould be purnitted to develop further before attemptingadical ccnflolidstion of operations. Tnus tu* principle of Joint or combined operations hart boon established as duslrable but not practical at the moment. The proposed establishmentmall, highly specialised combined operations oleawnt without separate staff or scholon status except that willed wo'Jld be derived from being In tic Office ofr, appears to bo practicalis time an it wouldontributory factorpeelal field of operatlcna not presently delegated to any one senior staff element but -nconpasslng all three. Therefore it is
would provide useful experience in the event it ls later decided to combine all operations of Tl and PP.
c. pecial Casual Unit: The proposed ostablis^nt of tnis unit, utilizing the present, for purposes cfdministrative means of assembling and .'loldi.iij spociaL psrr'jnnel for specific or contingency rfiqulroioenls isractical solution to tite original need for such mechanism. Tiie lunnericii it Ls designed to providelots for the Combined Operations ptaff and tne latter foraing the headquartors element of tho Ur.lt, is evidence of tha integral nature of the proposed epecial operations rvstuw. Tnu existence of the Combined Operations Staff would provide tho close personal direction of all individuals assigned to the unit in order properly to guide their training and preparation for later operational deployo.-ant. 6. In consideration of the foregoing comments and thiew, In part, aa expressed byP, it is my recommendation that tiie general concepts and basic principles involved in tols "tudy be reviewedecision by DDP, Aside from tiie possibility of providing manpower support procedures for existing special commitments, it Is believed tiiat the implementation of the special operations system proposed therein suoulc! be contemplated asfor future situations requiring such action.
ubject Staff rtudy.Original document.