Created: 12/1/1956

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible



A collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects oi intelligence.

All siaicmcnis of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of

the authors They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Govemmeni entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Govcmmcnt endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.



N September, the Office of Training issued the mtroducloxy number of Sfudiw in Intelligence. Our purpose, we said was to stimulate thinking and writing about thaof intelligence work, and to sponsor the beginningsrofessional intelligence literature. We especiallytwo requirements basic to the production of such afirst, all that we publish will be entirely unofficial and will represent only the opinions of the Individual author-second, the success of the project will depend on participation ny the whole intelligence community. Successive Studies that Is to say, will appear only as worthwhile manuscripts reach our desk; and we will be able to judge the Impact of what weonly as we receive reader comments.

In presenting tbis issue on "capabilities" we calloncept whose applications extend to nearlyof Intelligence wort Just about everyone, at oneanother. Is in the capabilities business, from the casecurrent and reports on the "capabilities" of aCommunist Party to the Board of National Estimatesout exhaustive studies on the "capabilities" of theOne of the classic definitions of intelligence is,analysis of the capabilities and vulnerabilities ofrelevant to US securityoththe subject at Its most basic: what do we mean byand, if our meaning Is not always clear and>Lr0Uid We mean? Wn*tdo we draw oncapabilities" and how, In specific cases, doesproceed? . .

/ Both Abbot E. Smith and Harold D. Kehm Bring "tobear'on -the subject an abundance of experience in Intelligencein capabilities analysis) and related fields. Mrhodes Scholaristinguished historian, has taught at

Bard College and Columbia University. During World War n, and immediately after, be served in the US Navyf roles: as Acting Chief, Naval Division, Allied Commandustria; as Chief of the Historical Section, US Naval Forces in Europe; andember of the Historical Section, Joint Chiefs of Staff.r. Smith has been with CIA. Col. Rerun has been an Instructor in Economics andat West Point and Chief of Instructor Training at the Command and General Stafff the Ninth Army during World War U, Army Attache In Dublin, and Assistant Commandanthief of the School) at the StrategicSchool. Col. Kehm joined this Agency

The two articles that follow by no means exhaust thehandIt is much too broad and involves too manyfor that At least two directly relatedtudy in itself, have occurred to us as we haveMr. Smith's and CoL Kehm's contributions. One isof the special characteristics of national, asdepartmental, Intelligence To put It in the form ofto what extent is the experience andilitary intelligence directly applicable to theof national Intelligence? The terminology hasto be sure; but in Mr. Smith's and CoL Kehm'sare differences in usage of the capabilities conceptresult In part from basic differences In the problemsand the military intelligence officer are asked totoo, there is the problem, raised In both articles,ationalmay, again, complicateof applying the systematic and time-testedthe military intelligence officer to national mtelUgence. And*

surely there are many other rnrjbleroi of "carsablMies" that ould usefully be addreiwd hi subsequent issues of this wries; these are but two of the more" * ^ '

We invite suggestions and prospectuses, therefore, for some f these unwritten Studies and comments on the present one-comments which we would like also to publish in subsequent



Issues. To repeat something we thinkot ofng: If Indeed these Studies in Intelligence are to help In the airing of intelligence principles and methods. In theof experience, and eventually In the building ofdoctrine, then we are going to need the advice and tbe participation of every member of the intelligence profession to do the Job well.

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic: