NOTES ON "CAPABILITIES" IN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Created: 12/1/1956

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title: notes on "capabilities" in national intelligence

author: abbot e. smith

volume:

STUDIES IN

INTELLIGENCE

A collection ol articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects ol

All statements offset, opinion or analysis expressed tn Studies in Intelligence are those of

the authors They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present Nothing in the contents should be construed is asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations

ATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

by Abbot E. Smith

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HEN CIA was established with the mission ol producing "national" intelligence It perforce drew heavily for doctrine upon the military intelligence agencies. Over the years, the intelligence organizations of the armed forces hadell-tested routine Formulas were available to meet various requirements. Agreement had gradually been reached on what needed to be known about the enemy, what data were necessary for the estimate, why they were necessary, and how they could most usefully be presented. CIA had no counterpart to this doctrine. It therefore frequently borrowed from the military, and in no Instance was this borrowing more conspicuous than In the matter of

"capablHttea.wanes of acUon of which tbe enemy Is pbjslcallt capable and which If adopted will affect theof our mission. The term "capabiliUes" Includes not only ihe general courses ot action open to the enemy such as attack, defense, or withdrawal but also all the particular course* of action possible under each general course of action. "Knemy capabilities" aro considered tn the light of all known factors affecting mlUtary operations including Ume. space, weather, terrain, and Ihe strength and disposition or enemy" Dictionary of United States Military Termi for Joint Usage. Issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The doctrine of enemy capabilities is one of the mostand useful that military Intelligence has toapabilityourse of actionaculty for development which lies within the capacity of the person or thing concerned. More particularly, in military Intelligence, enemy capabilities are courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable and which would. If adopted and carried through, affect our own commander'snist of enemy

tics Is alist of the things that the enemy can do. here1-* ore apt to be the most significant partilitary Intelligence officer's "Estimate of the Enemy Situation."

It Is true, of course,ilitary Intelligence officerand transmits to hisreat deal of other Information. He reports on the weather, terrain, andin the tone of operations. He may set forth the politics and economics of the area. He collects and evaluates data on the enemy's order of battle, logistical apparatus,weapons, morale, training and the like. All this is made known to the commander, but it Is stilltatement of enemy capabilities. Only when the Intelligence officer hasall this Information, and constructively brooded over it, can he set about describing the courses of action open to the enemy. It is this ust of capabilities that tells the commander what, under the conditions existing In the area, the enemy can do with his troops, his weapons, and his equipment to affect the commander's own mission. The enumeration and description of enemy capabilities Is the ultimate, or at least thegoal of military Intelligence. It is one of themodes to which the great mass of Intelligence Information available is bent, In order to give tbe commander the knowledge of the enemy he needs to plan his own operations.

Adaptation of this doctrine to the requirements of national Intelligence presents at first no real difficulty Courses ofmay be attributed to persons, organizations, parties,or groups of nations as well as to military units, and to friendly or neutral, as well as to enemy, powers. They may be political, economic, psychological, diplomatic, and so on, as well as military. It Is trueational Intelligence estimate* Is not madeilitary commanderlearly denned

Throughout this paper the term "naUonal Intelligence estimate" Is used generally to mean not Just the solemnly coordinated "Na- Uonal Intelligence Estimates" approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee, but any estimate, great or small, made by any office or person producing national Intelligence.

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mission, to which enemy capabilities may be referred toif toey do in fact "affect" the carrying-out of that mission. An equivalent for the commanders mission is not far to seek, however, since national intelligence is obviously concerned only with foreign courses of action which may affect the policies or Interestsabove all the security intereststhe United States. It is by no means as easy to be clear about all theand interests of toe United States, and to perceive what might affect them, as it is to understand the mission of acommander, which Is supposed to be unequivocally statedirective from higher authority. But this is one of the reasonsational intelligence estimate is apt to be more difficult to prepareilitary estimate of an enemy

In national intelligence, then, capabilities may be denned as courses of action within the poweroreign nation orwhich would, if carried out, affect the security interests of the United States.

It is probably unnecessary to argue toat statements ofare usefuleans of organizing and presentingIntelligence. The parallel with military intelligenceseems perfectly sound High policy-makers doubtless want to be supplied with authoritative descriptions andof the politics, economics, and military establishments of various foreign nations, together with explanations of thepolicies, and habitual modes of action of these nations. They need to have the best possible statistics, diagrams,and data In general. But when all the labor andhas been finished, toe results collated and criticised, and the conclusions written down, it will still be worthwhile to go ontatement of what each foreign nation orcan do to affect the interests of the United States. This Is the statement of capabilities.

In recognizing, formulating, testing, and presenting foreign capabilities. Intelligence doctrine comes into its own. Apart from toe special function of intelligence operations In collecting

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data, most of the preliminary spade-work for IntelligenceIs the province of other disciplines than that specifically of intelligence. This spade-work of course takes nine-tenths of the time, trouble, and space devoted to any estimate. Political scientists analyze the structure of government and politicsoreign state; economists lay bare its economic situation; order-of-battle men reveal the condition of the militarysociologists, historians, philosophers, natural scientists, and all manner of experts make their contribution. When all this has been done it Is the peculiar function of Intelligence itself to see that the learning and wisdom of experts is directed towards determining what the foreign nation can do to affect US interests. Thereby the major disciplines of social and natural science are turned to the special requirements of intelligence estimates.

Let us be careful not to confuse this with the function of prophecy. To predictoreign nation unll do is aand useful pursuit, albeit dangerous; It rests on knowledge, Judgment, experience, divination, and luck. To set forthation can doifferent matter. One stilldgmcnt, experience and luck as well as knowledge, but soothsaying is reducedinimum There is an element of the scientific. The Job can be taught, and Its techniques refined. It can be reduced to doctrine.

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Generally speaking, in military usage an enemy capability Is stated without reference to the possible counteractions which one's own commander may devise to offset or prevent such action. The Navy's handbook entitled Sound HQttary Decision puts it this way (italicsndicate actions which the force concerned, unless forestalled orfrom taking such actions, has the capacity to carry out."

Here are three' examples:

Bloc has the capability to launch large-scale,amphibious operations in the Baltic and Black Seas.

USSR has the capability to launch general war.

Chinese Communists have the capability toto supportroops in Indochina.

These statements give no estimate of what the effects or results of any of these courses of action might be There is no indication for example that the United States or some other power might be able to make it difficult or impossible for the Chinese Communists toroops in Indochina, or that the West might possess such strengthoviet decision to launch general war would be tantamount to suicide. The statements simply lay down what the nations concerned could do. without regard to any possible opposition orSuch unopposed capabilities are frequently referred to as "gross" or "raw" capabilities. They arc the kJnd of enemy capabilities which are reportedilitary commander by, In the "Estimate of the Enemy Situation."

The high policy-makers for whom national intelligence is designed, however, are not In the comparatively simple position of military commanders facing an enemy. They have broader fields to cover, and more numerous problems to face. They need toicture of the security situation in the worldhole and In various areas of the world. This picture ought to show not only the multifarious forces which exist, but also the probsble resultants of these forces as they act upon each other, or as they might act upon each other if they were set in motion. The policy-makers need, in short, to know about net capabilities, not merely about gross or raw capabilities.

This Is well understood and accepted as long as the courses of action of foreign nations alone are concerned. Nobody would think of enumerating the capabilities o( France, for example, without giving due consideration to the frequently opposing capabilities of Germany, and to the tangential capa-

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bllltlea ol Great Britain and otherven In the purely military sphere, statements of net capabilities occur In national estimates. For example:

Israel, an armys capable of defeatingIts Immediate neighbors,

Chinese Communists have the capability lorBurma.

believe that the Chinese Communists are capablethe island of Quemoy if opposed by Chineseforces only.

It is an Intricate and difficult operation even to attempt to work out the probable resultants of the enormous forcesor potentially at work in the worldpolitical, economic, military, and the like. Without such an operation, howeversometimes called "wu-gaming" when limited strictly to the military spherenational intelligence estimates of capabilities would lose much of their usefulness for the particular purpose they are designed to serve.

Obviously no estimate of the security situation anywhere In the world will be worth much unless the capabilities of the United States are taken Into account and their effect weighed At this point, however, grave practical difficulties arise. We of the intelligence community are solemnly warned that we must2 our ownilitary authorities are shocked at the suggestion that we should indulge Ine are told that it Is the function of the commander, not of the Intelligence officer, to decide what counteraction to adopt against enemy capabilities, and to judge what the success of such counteraction may be. It Is pointed out that noestimate of net military capabilities can be madeull knowledge of US war plans,ong and highlyexercise in war-gaming by large numbers of qualified experts. Since intelligence agencies as such quite properly have no knowledge of US war plans, and possess no elaborate machinery for war-gaming, they are estopped from making

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an estimate ofcapabilities where lis forces are significantly Involved.esult there is, for instance, no statement in any national intelligence estimate of how the military security situation on the continent of Europe reallyf the probable net capabilities of Soviet forces against the opposition they would be likely to meet if they attempted an Invasion of the continent

This state of affairs Is unfortunate, and the value of national intelligence estimates Is thereby reduced below what It ought to be. The difficulty Is really not one of Intelligence doctrine, however. Practically nobody doubts that high policy-makers ought to be supplied with estimates of net capabilities even In situations where the US Is actively engaged. It is agreed that they ought to have the best possible opinion on the security situation on the continent of Europe, and that they must be Informed not merely of the gross capabilities of the USSR to launch air and other attacks on the US (the subject of an annual National Intelligence Estimate) but of what the USSR could probably accomplish by such an attack against the defenses that the US and its allies would put up. In one way or another policy-makers get such estimates of net capabilities, even if they have sometimes to make them themselves, off the cuff.

The question is, then, not whether estimates of netare legitimate requirements, but simply who shall make them. This problem is outside the scopeaper ondoctrine. It may be suggested, however, that thehas probably been somewhat exaggerated. The jealous prohibition ofn grounds that to conduct Itnowledge of US war plans and an enormouswith numerous personnel, Is overdone. In four out of five situations where an estimate of net military capabilities Is needed the judgment of wise and experienced military men, based oneneral knowledge of US war plans. Is likely to be about as useful as the most elaborate and protracted piece of war-gaming. Such exercises have too often given the

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wrong answerthey ore really no more dependable as guides bo the outcome of future wars than research in economics is dependable as an indicator of the future behavior of the stock market. This does not mean, of course, that economics and wargaming are useless pursuits

Gradually, indeed, the difficulties respecting estimates of net capabilities are disappearing. In the most critical situationsair attack on the United States, for example, and perhaps the security situation in Europeit may be necessary to establish special machinery for the most careful playing-out of the problems and ascertainment of net capabilities. In less critical situations the trouble is solving Itself. Military men area little less shy of making an educated guess as to net capabilities, even when US forces are involved, and theis not as distressed as It used to be at the accusation ofng USoctrine is gradually being evolved by trial and error, which is as it should be Some day it may be desirable to commit the evolved doctrine to writing, but the time has not yet arrived.

Ill

Of course any foreign nation of consequence Is physically capableast number of courses of action which would affect the security interests of the United States. One task of Intelligence (after the spade-work is complete) is tothese capabilities; another is to test them against known facts to make certain that they are real and nothird is to test them one against another to see how many could be carried out simultaneously, and how many may be mutuallyourth is to work out In reasonable detail the implications, for the nation concerned and for thetates, of the actual implementation of each ImportantI propose to pass over all these tasks without further discussion, and to concentrate on the problem of selecting from

among the capabultles those which are to be Included in the formal estimate. For even after all the testing is finished there will still remain far too many capabilities to put into any document of reasonable size Considerations of space, time, and tbe patience of readers make It imperative that some principles of exclusion be adopted, so that the Ust ofpresented will be useful rather than merely exhaustive.

Capabilities are excluded from national estimates for one of two reasons: either because they are Judged unlikely to be actually adopted and carried through, or because they areto be so insignificant that they could be Implemented without more than minor effect on the security Interests of the United States. For short we may say that they are excluded on grounds either of improbability or of unimportance

The second of these criteria docs not require muchClearly It wouldaste of time and paper toational estimate with lists of courses of action which, even If carried out, would affect the security interests of the United States only to an insignificant degree. One applies common sense in this matter, and forthwithreat number of capabilities from further consideration. Along with common sense, however, there ought always to be plenty of specialized knowledge available. Everyone knows that an expert can sometimes point out major significance In things which are to the uninformed view negligible, and conversely that experts will sometimes Inflate the Importance of things which common sense and general knowledge can see in Juster proportion. Out of discussion and argument on these matters comes the best verdict as to the Importance or unimportanceiven foreign capability, and the best guidance as to whether It should be put Into the formal estimate.

To reject any foreign capability because we Judge It unlikely to be implementedore serious and difficult matter. Here indeed we part company with military doctrine, which frowns upon the exclusion from an estimate of any enemy capabilities whatever, and especially condemns any exclusion on grounds

cf Improbability. There has been much"debate;*trnong the military, on whether an Intelligence officer should presume to put into his formal estimate an opinion as to which of the enemy capabilities listed is most likely to be implemented. It has been said thatudgment is for the commander alone to make, and some have even held that the commander himself roust not make it, but must treat all enemy capabilities as If they were sure to be carried through, and must prepare to deal with them all. This latter doctrine is somewhatIt is doubtful that any intelligence officer, or any commander worth his salt, has ever acted strictly In accordance with it Yet It remains that according to the more rigorous teachings of military intelligence no enemy capability of any consequence may be omitted from the list presented to the commander. The disasters which can result from even aconsidered exclusion have been frequently pointed out.

Nevertheless,ational intelligence estimate we must for the reasons already stated exclude many foreign capabilities because we judge them unlikely to be carried out TheIs In turn generally established on one or more of three grounds, namely, that Implementation of the capability (a) would be unrelated to, or incompatible with, nationalof the country under consideration; <b) would run counter to the political, moral, or psychological compulsions under which the nation, or its rulers, operate; or (c) would entail consequences so adverse as to be unprofitable.

Tha most obvious capabilities to exclude are those which, if implemented, would serve no objective of the nation under consideration, or would clearly run counter to some of that nation's objectives. Thus we do not bother about thethat the British might conquer Iceland, although they certainly could do so and if they did US security interests would be affected. The conquest of Iceland, however, would serve no British objective that we know of. at least In time of peace. Again, it is clearly within the power of the USSR to give up its Satellites, renounce its connections with Commu-

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rust China, and retire modestly into isolation. Or the British might, in order to improve their economic condition, abandon all armaments and cease toorld power. We do not give such capabilities serious consideration, however, because we believe them manifestly contrary to the fundamental aims of the Soviets and British respectively. By applying this sort of standard we can Immediatelyreat number of courses of action which lie within the power of the nation concerned and which would affect US security interests.

One must be careful in using this test, however, for national objectives change, sometimes with changes in government, sometimes without. It is, for example. Impossible to be sure about the objectives which will determine West German policy in years to come. Even the Soviets do not always appear to the Western view to act inashion as to serve what we estimate to be their real alms. Moreover, all nations have various objectives, many of which are to some degreewith each other. Sometimes one is governing,another. Nations can even pursue simultaneously several conflicting objectives, to the confusion of their own citizenry as well as of foreign intelligence officers. We must be very certain, beforeoreign capability as incompatibleational objective, that the objective Is genuine, deeply-felt, and virtually certain to govern the nation's courses of action.

The political, moral, or psychological compulsions which operateation, or on its rulers, make the Implementation of some of that nation's physical capabilities unlikely or even impossible. Thus, for example, it would probably be judged that the US is unlikely totrictly "preventive" war against the USSR because such an action, under any foreseeable US government, would be politically and morally unthinkable. It may similarly be true that the Soviet rulers are psychologically unable toenuine state of peaceful coexistence with capitalist states even though they may proclaim their desire to do so and may judge such a

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course of action conducive lo the ultimate alms of ConurmhlsnV

fact that they are physically capable of doing them andtheir national objectives

calvs"oraUy.lvenofthat

1apability at all, and we need not

1rettv satisfactorily sychological

S'tlB;on judgment and1 Is

upon demonstrable certainty for an estimate in the matte?

W0Uldthe fact, that

capable of turning against Stalin

Bit aI* capable ofStates would be poUtlcally capable

tiWllsm- Experience warns us againstconfidence in our estimates of national character, andSid" tt caPabUit^ all courses oa nation Is physically able to carry throughas Improbable but none as g

se capabilities which would, If implemented, lead to such adverse consequences as to be unprofitable. There are, curiously enough very few

Il^yand then have to be excluded on this ground. This is because most courses of action having indubitably dire consequences

or to the political, moral, or psychological compulsions of the naUon. Those few which are left arc generally military in nature and are apt to be so important that we include them hi the estimate anyway. Thus it Is clear that general war with the us would be hazardous and perhaps disastrous for the USSR, it therefore seems highly improbable that the Soviets will deliberately run grave risks of involving themselves inar, yet no national estimate on the USSR would

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omit mention of the eapabmUesnf that nation

war with the US. The same holds true for the capabilities of

Ihe Nationalist Chinese to invade the mainland, or of the

South Koreans to attack North Korea. We may Judge such

capabilities Improbable of Implementation, but we do not

exclude them from our estimate,

By applying the tests of importance and of probability, as described above, the vast number of capabilities of any foreign nation will speedily be reduced to manageable proportions. The process of exclusion will at first be almost unconsciousmost capabilities will be rejected forthwith, without doubt or debate When this stage has been accomplished, however, there will stillormidably long list which wfll require more serious consideration. Exclusion becomes more difficult, and begins to require longer discussion and maturer Judgment The same criteria of choice continue valid, but are applied with more deliberation. This is the point at which preparation of the estimate gets interesting, for the choice of capabilities to Include or exclude may prove to be the most crucial decision made during the estimating process.

Though we have departed from the military doctrine inejection of capabilities judged unlikely ofwe may still return to it for an important lesson-Like the military commander, the high policy-maker Is entitled to something more than Intelligence's opinion of what foreign nations will probably do. He is entitled to be Informed of various reasonable alternative possibilities, and to be given some discussion of these alternativesof their apparentand disadvantages, and of the reasons whydeems them respectively to be less or more likely of implementation. National estimates sometimes discuss only the particular foreign capabilities which the intelligencein Its wisdom believes will actually be carried through. This la going too far in exclusion. Intelligence must winnow the mass of capabilities down to two or three orozen

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in each situation examined, but it Is the responsibility ofnot of intelligence agencies, to decide which among these few last alternatives shall in fact constitute thebasis for US policy.

IV

Looking back over old national estimates one is apt to feci that the borrowing of military terminology wasttle over-enthusiastic. The wordor example offers an almost irresistible temptation to aU of us who compose' governmental gobbledegook. itong, abstract noun, of Latin derivation, and itleasing air of technicality and precision. It will appear to lend portentousness to ansimple statement. Perhaps this is why the word appears in estimates so frequently, unnecessarily, and sometimes even incorrectly.

One trouble is that the worderfectly good,meaning,uality, capacity, or faculty capable of development It is commoner in the plural, when it usually denoteseneral way the potentialities of the possessor, as when we sayan "has goodhis usage is frequent In estimates:

air defense capabilities of the Bloc

Communist and North Korean capabilitiesKorea have increased substantially.

e. The capabilities of the new fighter aircraft are superior to those of the old.

No valid objection can be taken to these examples. Indeed, the usage is virtually the same as that of the technical term! for the statements are about the things that the possessors of the capabilities can do.

rSiaWct**

One can find,ood many examples of slipshod usage:

capabilities lor attack on Greece andon Turkey are too limited for conquest of

Tudeh Party's capabilities for gaining control ofdefault are almost certain to Increase If the oilnot settled.

There Is no good reason for using the word "capabilities" In either of these statements; in the first the word shouldben the second, "chances" orf one really insists on talking about capabilities then the statements ought to be rephrased: "The Satellites are not capable of conquering Greece ornd "If the oilis not settled, conditions in Iran will be such that the Tudeh Party may acquire the capability to gain control of the country."

It will be perceived that the immediately foregoing examples are statements of net capabilities, and it is in connection with auch statements that imprecise drafting most frequently occurs. It must be remembered thatelationshiptwo nations (or other organizations) the grossof one side can be increased or decreased only by an Increase or decrease in the strength, resources, skills,f that side; what happens on the other side is irrelevant The net capabilities of one side, however, may be altered eitherhange hi its own strengths and resources orhange In those of the other side For example, suppose that the strengths and resources of the United States and the USSR both increase in the same proportion. Then the grossof each side will have Increased, but the net capabilities will have remained unchanged. But, if the USSR should grow weaker, while the United States made no change in its strength, then the net capabilities of the United States would havealthough its gross capabilities remained unchanged.

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This la simple enough, but tt*fceeds to be* drafting is to be accurate and clear. Consider the following example:

In South Korea and Taiwan where US commitmentsboth physical security and political support of the established regimes, present Communist capabilities for political warfare are extremely small. If the US commit-ment and physical protection were withdrawn for any reason, substantial and early Communist political warfare successes almost certainly would occur.

The first of the two sentences in this quotation can only be understoodtatement concerning gross capabilities,to be sure the word is used In its non-technical sense But the second sentence reveals that Communist grossfar from beingre In fact very considerable. The two sentences togethertatement of netbut the drafting is poor.ule to govern this problem may be formulated In this way: when the wordor "capabilities" is used inon-technical sense, signifyingeneral way the qualities, faculties, or potential of the possessor, it must be used only to refer to gross, and never to net capabilities. If there Is any question, doubt or difficulty, the word ought to be avoidedynonym chosen

Finally, even when using the word In Its technical meaningpecific course of action, the drafter ought always to make clear whether he is referring to gToss or net capability. For example:

a We estimate that the armed forces of the USSR have the capability of overrunning continental Europeelatively short period.

b. The Party almost certainly lacks the capability for seizing control of the Japanese government during the period of this estimate.

The first of these statements la unclear because the word 'overrunning" does not Indicate beyond doubt (as "conquer"

or "defeat" do In some examples previously quoted) whether the statement Is or Is not one ol net capability. Does the sentence mean that the armies of the USSR can overrun Europe against all the opposition that the West may put up? Or does it mean only that the USSR has enough men and logistical apparatus to spread into all of continental Europeelatively short period if unopposed? The second example is clearer, but still It does not indicate beyond doubt whether the Party Is unable to seize power because the JapaneseIs strong enough to prevent It, or whether the Party simply lacks the men and talent to take over the job ofJapan even if no one opposed its doing so.

Apart from such suggestions for clarity in drafting as those given above, it would be premature to lay down rules for the statement of capabilitiesational intelligence estimate. Sometimes it may be desirable to list them seriatim, as the military generally do in their estimates of the enemy situation. This mightholesome exercise while drafting an estimate even if It were not retained in the final version, for it would tend to promote precision, to reveal inter-relatlonshlps and produce groupings of related capabilities, and thus to prevent the Indiscriminate scattering through an estimate ofof capabilities in bits and pieces. On the other hand, the number and complexity of courses of action which have to be presented may often be so great that extensive listing would be tedious, and attempts at groupingonnected essay (in which, incidentally, the word capability or capabilities need never appear) may convey the material far more adequately. .

These matters will be improved by experimentation, and by the talent of those who draft estimates. Improvement Is worth trying for, in this as In other aspects of estimating capabilities. Itreat and responsible task to survey the whole political, economic, and military strengthsation, to ascertain its objectives and the moral and political compulsions that govern its conduct, to weigh all these matters in the light of that

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nation's relation to other nations, to perceive what that nation could do to affect the security interests of the United States, and to select from among these manifold courses of action those sufficiently important and feasible to be includedational estimate. The techniques of this task are stillormative stage. They wul develop through experience, through trial and error, through discussion and argument, and perhaps, from time to time, through purely theoretical and doctrinal investigation.

Original document.

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