A collection oi articles onhistorical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspecis ot intelligence.
All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of
the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.
O THE EDITORS Dear Sirs:
I should like to comment critically on Lewis R. Long's article, "Conceptshilosophy of Airhat appeared in Studies in Intelligence, vol.o..ubject withan claim some fanullarity. In World Warerved as Chief of the Target Intelligence Divisionombat Air Force headquarters, as commanding officer of an OSS-type organization that provided intelligence to air units for close support or ground forces, and as Chief of the Intelligence Division ofection.
Colonel Longreatly expanded mission for air intelligence, one that far exceeds the requirements of the air commander because It Includes areas where the air commander has no assigned decision-making or operational competence. The article builds up Its case from the propositionhat "air Intelligence must encompass all aspects of power In foreignyhe author means that the Air Force command must, in effect, have its own estimates of "all aspects of power to foreign nations (political, economic and psychological as well asrepared by Its own experts on the basis of information collected through its own(including covertnd that the Air Force should act oflensively through political, economic andwarfare, both In cold and hot war situations,deriving Its inspiration for these activities from its own estimates. Be also postulatesroper function of air intelligencenforming the American publiclanned basis" about Soviet. ?
No one can argue that the air commander should beabout "aspects of power In foreignnd all will agree that he must know everything possible abcort that part of the total^enemy situation "directly, concerned with bisigned operational mission. However, the assigned mission does not impinge directly on all aspects of the enemy situation, but onlyiscrete sector thereof. That his own people do not overtly and covertly collect and process Intelligence on the aspects lying outside his assigned operational responsibilities
does not mean that the commander has to remain ignorant of the larger picture- He can draw on the intelligencewhere he Is represented, for this Information, and he need not duplicate existing facilities.
Colonel Long's contention that the air arm should engage In political, economic end psychological warfare In hot and cold war situations is hard to take seriously. One could equally well argue that Treasury and Commerce, having operational responsibilities relating to the economies of Communistshould have their own air photo recon organization for Communist country overnights to get the Information onestablishments that they need to meet theirFor the air arm to engage in these three activities would mean duplicating facilities already in existence and in use. and It would mean going far beyond the assigned Air Force mission, assuming roles already allocated and assigned to other agencies of the government.
Colonel Long supports his claim for greatly expandedfor air intelligence by an appeal to Clausewitx* statement that war Is an extension of policy by other means, and by the argument that tbe Marxists have shown bow "the line of demarcation between politics and military action is extremelye says that the Air Force "will have to carry the brunt of any initial contacts with thend "seek out and destroy ail aspect* of warmaking potential and will toven were these truisms. It would not logically follow that air intelligence should be what he would have It Indeed the only logical Justification for his position would have to comeemonstration that the Air Force is theelement In the executive branch of the Government, with ail other elements, including tbe office of the Chiefsubordinate to it. In this situation the air command would Deed an Intelligence service such as that described
In conclusion, air Intelligenceery difficult business to douspect that Colonel Long htm"e'f knows that there -has always been more to It than tbe concentration onstrengths and weaknesses of foreign air forces" which heas the alternative to hi* expanded role. Even at It* highest stage of development In WWfor example, the incredibly bad In'enigence preparation for the XXth Bomber Command strikes on Yawata andwas
always room lor greatubmit that airhas enough to do to support the air commander In his assigned responsibilities without seeking to encompass theof other organisations.
R. A. Random