Created: 6/1/1958

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collection ol ailicics on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects o1 intelligence.

All statements of (act, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of

the authors They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency yr any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in ihehould be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations


There can be no quarrel with the charge in the foregoing article that Americans generally, and some intelligenceas well, tend to transport their homes abroad along with their baggage, consort with other Americans to the nearof foreigners, attend Hollywood films In Bond Bros, suits, etc. Nor can there be any doubt that the insularity of some intelligence officers creates grave disadvantages. Mr. TldwelTs proposals, however, carry within them problems quite as grave as those he seeks to solve.

First, it must be assumed that the writer is speaking of staff employees rather than contract personnel. The "outside man" under unofficial cover Is In many places abroad close to the local population. If the article's admonitions are intended for him, they will have for him none of the stimulusew idea-Personnel under official cover, on the other hand, cannotattern of conduct conspicuously different from that of their colleagues in the cover organization without attracting the attention not only of those colleagues but of local services as

The basic objection to admonishing all our people abroad, or as many as possible, to adopt any one line of conduct is that the admonition is Procrustean. Our intelligence officers are individuals. Our task is to see that each man knows his strengths and weaknesses and. both for the organization's sake and his own, exploits the former and guards against the latter. The question, "How should Intelligence officerss wrong per te. The right question Is, "How should thia officer act?"

The Richard Haliiourton type of Intelligence officer became obsolescent before Worldnd obsolete thereafter because this century has witnessed a. marked Increase in the sophistic*-tion and skill of counterintelligence In manyt is no longer possible, with the aid of Max Factor's makeup kitoiled burnoosc, to slip shadow-like among the Arabs and ferret out their plots. The cop wants to see tbe ID Card: and if It isn't backstoppedV-as ft won't be unless the purpose of the

New Anachronism

deception has been defeated at theour hero's troubles are even blacker. The only way In which we can learn about Arab plots today is to ask Arabs.

In some areas the appeal of Americans ts their Americanism. For years after theperhaps evenfor example, viewedarrow eye those Americans who spoke their tongue too glibly and followed their conventions tooThey suspected such Americans of being Jews who bad fled Germany in the thirties and returned to employpower for personal revenge and benefit Most people, even citizens of rather hostile governments, like and are willing to help the foreigner whose efforts to learn their language and history are as sincere as they are naive. But this pleasant atmosphere may vanish if the American is suspiciouslyHere too, the point is not that some foreigners will not be deeply impressedophisticated assimilation of their culture. The point isniform mode of conduct would be wrong In concept not only because intelligence officers are Individuals but also because potential agents are individuals.

The security risks intrinsic in Mr. Tidwell's recommended behavior-pattern are precisely those which are likeliest toinvisible to Ihe devil-may-care, bash-on-regardless hero most apt to act upon thetudy of the provocation techniques employed against us In Hungary and elsewhere makes it plain that the disadvantage of an English-Russian dictionary with curves is that she is very likely toussian-English dictionary as well. Of course it may be very useful for an Intelligence officer to establish mtirnacyoreign woman. But before he does so, he not only name-traces her but also submits his operational plan for approval.wide-spread bis contacts should be, they must remaindiscriminate. The officer who followed whole-heartedly the spirit of Mr. Tidwell's advice would probably find himself well addled. He would not only lose the cover over him; he'd also find nothing between him and the cold, cold ground but one thin native" .' '- ' .

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