NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

Created: 1/6/1992

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

national intelligence daily

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Analysis NORTH KOREA: Implications of Nuclear Accord

The historic declaration last meek on esiablhhing asustains recent momentum toward imprortdbut dors not emurc termination of Pyongyang'!program.

Can Still Son!.*

In accepting the decUraiion, North Korea bis agreed to areproceu.ng. and it alto has proclaimed readiness to signsafeguards accord andccept intercanonal inspectknows thai living up to thesewould helpdiplomatic isolation and would pave the way for badlyaid from Japan and increased trade with Seoul The endtrading arrangements with onetime Communist allies andof bad harvest! have aggravated the problems in Northinefficient command economy and left ilto growing International pressure lo end Its

Nuclear W

. im going and was making plans to conceal it. The North may see developmentuclear weaponcurrcnl against attack, given that Seoul is modernizing us conventional forcei much Taster than P'yongyang. In addition, if Pyongyang has begun to viewof nuclear materials or technologyotential hard currency earner, its economic troubles could keep it from curtailing lis nuclear development ellbrti The Nonh Kprcans.killful tacticians, and the nuclear accord may be designed to reduce international pressure andmprove piospecli for economic assistance wiihout actually diimanihng the program So far. P'yongyang has taken no stepi bejend taiiialirg. ihc nuclear accord and the non aggression pact.

Likely Inspection Result*

Even ir North Korea follows through wiih IAEAnspeclions could noi guarantee that the extent of its nuclear-related activity would be known, particularly if the weapons program goes underground. Regular physical impcclion of all facilities associated

Cunlinurd

wiih lhe North'i nuclear furl cycle could morn tor ihe rcpracniinc plant and (he availability of spcM fuel ai lhe reactors al Yongbyon Thii would significantly constrain Pyongyang's ability io produce fissile material for wcapom al these facilities, almost certainly reducing the number of weapon* that could be produced Moreover, the IAEA's plan for special inspections |

would provide an opportunity forTlOcR'llTTa utilities Nevertheless, neither intrusive Inspections ai yongbyon nor olher tvi i'i noting is likely io assure that P'yongyang does notcould ikmmaterial from an undetected smaller-scale rrproeessiTtg or enrichment eflort.^ DIA'

Original document.

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