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HISTORIC DECLARATION LASTNUCLEAR-FRES PENINSULA SUSTAINS RECENT MOMENTUM TOWARD IMPROVED NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS BUT DOES NOT ENSURE TERMINATION OF P' YONGYANG'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRCGSAM.
IN ACCEPTING THE DECLARATION. NORTH KOREA HAS AGREEDAN ON REPROCESSING. AND IT ALSO HAS PROCLAIMED READINESS TO SIGN THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS ACCORD AND TO ACCEPT INTERNATIONAL INSPECTIONS. P'YONGYANG KNOWS THAT LIVING UP TO THESE AGREEMENTS WOULD HELP END ITS DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION AND WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR BADLY NEEDED ECONOMIC AID FROM JAPAN AND INCREASED TRADB WITH SEOUL. THE END OF
SPECIAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS WITH ONETIME COMMUNIST ALL IBS AND A
SERIES OP BAD HARVESTS HAVE AGGRAVATED THE PROBLEMS IN NORTH KOREA' INHERENTLY INEFFICIENT COMMAND ECONOMY AND LEFT IT INCREASINGLY
VULNERABLE TO GROWING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE TO END ITS NUCLEAR
WEAPONS PROGRAM.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM CAN STILL
'YCNGYAnG
O KEEP ITS WEAPONS PROGRAM GOING 7JO WAS MAKING PLANS TO CONCEAL IT. THE NORTH MAY SEB DEVELOPMENTUCLEAR WEAPONETERRENT AGAINST ATTACK. GIVEN THAT SEOUL IS MODERNIZING ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES MUCH FASTER THAN P'YONGYANG. IN ADDITION, I? P'YONGYANG HAS BEGUN TO VIEW EXPORT OF NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT MATERIALS OR TECHNOLOGYOTENTIAL HARD CURRENCY EARNER. ITS ECONOMIC TROUBLES COULD KEEP IT FROM CURTAILING ITS NUCLEAR EFFORTS. THE NORTH KOREANS, MOREOVER, ARE SKILLFUL TACTICIANS, AND THEIR MOVE ON THK NUCLEAR ACCORD MAY BB DESIGNED TO REDUCE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE AND TO IMPROVE PROSPECTS POR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WITHOUT ACTUALLY DISMANTLING THE PROGRAM. SO FAR, P'YONGYANG HAS TAKEN NO STEPS BEYOND INITIALING THE NUCLEAR ACCORD AND THE NONAOGR ESS ION PACT.
LIKELY INSPECTION RESULTS
EVEN IP NORTH KOREA FOLLOWS THROUGH WITH IAEA SAFEGUARDS.
ST
HONS COULD HPTHAT MI EXTENT OT ITS HUCLEAR-
RELATED ACTIVITY WOULD BE KNOWN, PARTICULARLY IF THE WEAPONS UNDERGROUND. REGULAR PHYSICAL INSPECTION OP ALLWITH THE NORTH'S NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE COULD MONITORPLANT AND THE AVAILABILITY OP SPENT FUEL ATAT YONGBYON. THIS WOULD SIGNIFICANTLYABILITY TO PRODUCE FISSILE MATERIAL FOR WEAPONS FACILITIES, ALMOST CERTAINLY REDUCING THE NUMBER OFCOULD BE PRODUCED. MOREOVER, THE IAEA'S PLAN FOR PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR
VISITS TO UNDECLARED fACLLlTXKy. NEVERTHELESS, NEITHER INTRUSIVB INSPECTIONS AT YONGBYON NOR OTHER MONITORING IS LIKELY TO ASSURE THAT P'YONGYANG DOES NOT HAVE--OR COULD NOT OBTAIN--FISSILE MATERIAL PROM AN UNDETECTED SMALLER-SCALE REPROCESSING OR ENRICHMENT EFFORT.
ANOTHER VIEW INDICATBS THAT THB TOTALITY OKAND ACTIONS IN THB PAST PEW MONTHS SUGGESTS THAT, STALLING. THE NORTH HAS BEEN LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FORNCLUDING ACCEPTING IAEA SAFEGUARDS. I '" ON WHETHER THZ NORTH IS
'SELSrATIHS Tin? Hf-IEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. DISMANTLING IT. OR MOTHS AL LING IT FOR POSSIBLEIGHER TECHNOLOGICALOMETIME IN THE FUTURE. SAFEGUARDS, EFFECTIVELY APPLIED, SHOULD DETECT WHETHER THE NORTH ALREADY HAS DIVERTED ANY SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY OF PLUTONIUM PROM YONGBYONEAPONS PROGRAM AND SHOULD SEVERELY LIMIT THB POSSIBILITYUTURE DIVERSION.
BOX
PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS OF RBCBNT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REVIEW OF THE STATUS OF NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
- THB NUCLEAR RESEARCH FACILITY AT YONGBYON IS FOCUSING ITS EFFORTS ON PRODUCING PLUTONIUM AND REPROCESSING IT FOR USEUCLEAR DEVICE OR WEAPON.
- THE CURRENT RANGE OP VIBWS ABOUT WHEN PLUTONIUM FROM THE REPROCESSING PLANT AT YONG3YON COULD BE FABRICATEDEAPON IS FROM2 TO LATE
SECRET
--XT IS POSSIBLEMALLER PILOT-SCALE REPROCESSIKG FACILITY MAY BE OPERATING UNDETECTED AND KAY HAVE PRODUCED ENOUGH PLUTONIUM FOR THE NORTH KOREANS TO HAVE ALREADY FABRICATED AT LEAST OKB
MJCLEAS DEVICE.
MANY KEY ASPECTS OF NORTH
KOREA'S PRUGRAH. INCLUDING OVERALL PROGRAM GOALS AND ANYNUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN,
Original document.
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