NORTH KOREA'S ENGAGEMENT: PERSPECTIVES, OUTLOOK, AND IMPLICATION

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A/ortfi Korea's Engagement:

Perspectives, Outlook, and Implications

Conference Report

This conference was sponsored by Ihe Nadonal Inielligence Council and the Kederal Research Division of the Library of Congress. Additional copies of ibis conference summary can be obtained from ihe office of ihe National Intelligence Officer for East Asia!

The view* expressed In ihis report are those of individuals and do not represent official US intetligtnct or policy positions. The NIC routinely sponsors such unclassified conferences with outside experts to gain knowledge and insight to sharpen the tevtl of debate on critical issues.

North Korea'sOutlook, and Implications

Introduction

The National Intelligence Council (NIC)onference on1 in cooperation with the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress on "North Korea'sOutlook, andhe conference featured discussion of seven commissioned papers that are published io this report. Sixty government andspecialists participated in the conference. Followingriefof the views of the specialists.

Engagement: Causes, Status, Outlook

The specialists agreed that North Korea is pursuing greater contact with South Korea, the United States, and other concerned powers stemming from its dire economic need and the importance of international support for the survival of the regime. Kimas so farontrolledand not embarked on fundamental systemic change. He hashts power following the death of his father, Kim II Sung, and is clearly responsible for the changes in policy and greater opening seen thus far. International support, especially material assistance from South Korea and other donors, hasey incentive in North Korea's pursuit of engagement

The results have included extensive North Korean contacts with South Korea, the United States and other concerned powers; large-scale donations of food, fertilizer, fuel and other assistance; raiL road, and tourism projects spanning the DMZ; and current and prospective agreements regulating North Korea's missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. North Korea has become increasingly dependent on foreign support, and the overall danger of war on the peninsula has declined. Specialists caution, however, that many uncertainties remain, especially regarding North Korea's Intentions and tbe military standoff on the peninsula that continues without significant change.

Most specialists foresee incremental progress in North Korea's engagement over the next two years, subject to possible fits and starts because of adverse developments in North Korea or among the concerned powers. Progress will remain contingentange of variables, and could be halted or reversed under some circumstances. Kim Chong-il hasey role in

North Korea's diplomatic opening but does not appear tomaster plan" for engagement. He is likely to continue to exploit the oppottuniues presented by South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's sunshine policy and other international openings. Because the South Korean leader's policy is critically important to the current phase of engagement, the end of his term in two years makes longer term projection* difficult, according to the

Many at the conference thought that the engagement process was likely to slow this year because of strong controversy in South Korea over the costs and limited benefits so far of the sunshine policyime of uncertainty in the South Korean economy. Some noteisit by Kimo Seoul later this year could spur the process ahead again. Some speculate that North Korean elites remain divided over the pace and course ofand are waryS policy review could lead to lower priority for engagement with the Noith Korean regime. The central role of the military in North Korean decision making couldrag on forward movement, though some experts judge that military opposition was offset by the Korean People's Army leadership's receipt of financial and other benefits related to the engagement process.

The experts were pessimistic thai the North Korean regime over the longer term (five toears) would be able to carry out needed economic changes while sustaining tight political control, as have the Communist regimes in China and Vietnam. North Korea's pervasive economic weaknesses and hidebound political and economic elite are among major unpediinents to effective longer term change.

The specialists judge that US policy hasey role in North Korea's recent engagement, second only to South Korea's sunshine policy. USfor engagement, which several participants note began as early as the Reagan Administration, provides important political backing for Kim Dse-jung in the face of his many domestic critics. Il also allows Japanese leaders to provide aid and pursue negotiations with P'yongyang. despite broad skepticism among Japanese elites as well as public opinion.

Issues tn Dispute

The specialists differ strongly over how engagement has affected North Korea's intentions. Some argue that North Korean leaders are determined lo make substantial changes in order to survive and developewenvironment defined by P'yongyang's increased dependence onassistance and support. The regime hasurning point

requiring more economic reforms and nascent moves to ease militaryIn contrast, others argue that growing aid dependency andcontacts have not changed North Korea's long-term strategy to dominate tbe peninsula by military means. North Korean changes thus far are the minimum needed to take advantage of the recent and unexpected material benefits provided by South Korea, the United States, and other powers; the changes could be easily reversed under different circumstances. Those who hold this point of view believe that greater reciprocity must be an aspect of engagement with North Korea. Tbey especially believe in the need to seek concrete concessions, especially regarding the conventional balance of forces on the peninsula, which keeps in step with additionaland concessions for P'yongyang.

Implications

The spccialisis assess lhat North Koreaa engagement will have theimplications for other countries:

China is well positioned to gain from continued gradual North Korean engagement Incremental progress supports Beijing's interests in stability on the peninsula, avoids costly Chinese efforts to shore up the failing North Korean regime, and allows China to pursue ever closer relations with the more powerful and influential South Korean Government. Prevailing trends and easing tensions on the peninsula appear to add to Chinese arguments against US regional and national missile defense (NMD) programs and undercut the rationale for much of the US military deployments inAsia

Japan is poorly positioned to benefit from some recent trends in North Korean engagement, though it does benefit from the reduced risk of war on the peninsula. Gradual progress in Pyongyang's relations with South Korea, the United States, and others has reinforced North Korea's deeply rooted antipathy to Japan. Tokyo fears being called upon repeatedly tofinancially and politically US and South Korean arrangements with North Korea that do little to meet Japan's concerns. Thus, Japan believes that US efforts to curb North Korea's long-range missile development do not address Japan's concern with the immediate threat posed by North Korea's deployed medium range ballistic missiles. Japan also worries about tbe long-term implicationseunified Korea that is anti-Japan.

South Korea will face deepening debate and political controversy if Kim Dae Jung's sunshine policy continues to elicit only limited gestures and assurances from North Korea. The demand for greater reciprocity is likely

to increase as opponents jockey for advantage while President Kim's power wanes as he approaches (he end of hu term.

The conferees generally believe thai the Vniled States probably will sec iu influence reduced somewhat as Northstill focused on the USmilitary security, cccnomic assistance, androader range of inicmaiional players. The ability of the United Suites to control the pace of the engagement process probably will decline as South Korea, China, and others improve their relations with Pyongyang.

The specialists assess that North Korea's engagement increasinglythe US security paradigm of the pastears that has viewed North Koreaajor enemy and military threat. It complicates the existing rationale for the US military presence in Northeast Asia and challenges US values and norms as US policy provide* aid and pursues negotiationsegime thai affronts many US-backed norms.

Because of Ihe multifaceted and complicated array of US policy issues related to engagement with North Korea, several specialisisenior US policy coordinator for North Korea; others opposetep as unneeded in the current context.

Contents

Agenda

Deja Vu Al) Over Again: Lessons From US-DPRK Engagement

B. Relss

New US Administration and North Koreaime for Review

Adjustment

Plunk

Korea's Historic Shift: From Self-Reliance to Engagement

Obtrdorjtr

Korea's Engagement: Implications for South Korea

Oh

Ultimate Oxymoron: Japan's Engagenxot Wiih North Koiea

D. Cha

hanging North Korea: Issues. Uncertainties, and Implications?

IX Pollack

Wiih North Korea: Implications for tbe Uniied States

McDevia

nk Page or Missing from Archival Copy

Conference Agenda

Welcome and Ground Robert L. Worden, Chief, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress Huhs

Robert G. Suiter, National Intelligeoce Officer for East Asia. National Intelligence Council

One

Panel Two

Panel Three

Panel Four

on North Korea's Engagement

Mitchell Rexss, William and Mary School ofDeja vu All Over Again: Some Lessons from US-DPRK Engagement

Daryl Plunk, HeritageNew US Administration and North Koreaime for Review and Adjustment

Donald Oberdorfer, Johns Hopkins University. Nitze School of Advanced InternationalKorea's Historic Shift: From Self-Reliancc to Engagement

Perspectives on North Korea's Enaagement (continued)

Nicholas Eberstadt, American Enterprise

Implications for South Korea, Japan, and China

Kongdan Oh, Institute for DefenseKorea's Engagement: Implications for South Korea

Victor Cha, GeorgetownUltimate Oxymoron: Japan's Engagement with North Korea

Jonathan Pollack, Navalhanging North Korea: Issues, Uncertainties, and Implications

Implications for the United States: General Discussion

Michael McDevitt, Center for Navalwith North Korea: Implications for the United States

Conference Coordinator: Andrea Savada Library of Congress

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Avoiding Deja Vu All Over Again: Lessons Prom US-DPRK Engagement

B. Rclss

Dean of Iniernaiional Affairs; Director of ihe Wendy and Emery Reves Center for Imernational Studies College of William and Mary

little-noticed anniversary took place earlier this year. Nine years ago, inS Under Secretary of State for Politics Arnold Kanter met in New York with Kim Young Sun, the Korean Workers' Party Secretary for International Affairs, in what was the first-ever senior-level meeting between the United States and the DPRK. Kanter laid out the sevenNorth Korea needed to meet if it wanted to normalize diplomatic relations with the United States, including resolving the question of the North's separation of plutonium for use in nuclearimlhat tbe DPRK wouldafeguards agreement with the IAEA in the next few days and would alsoilateral inspection regime in accordance with its1 Denuclearization Declaration with the ROK.

years later, diplomatic relations are still not normalized between the two countries and important elements of the North's nuclear weaponsremain unresolved. Relations during the intervening period have oscillated from the high drama of the4 nuclear crisis to the smiling diplomacy of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's visit to P'yongyang inn between, we have witnessed mutual recriminations, allegations of bad faith, belligerence, aggression, inattention, and even some cooperation and agreement.

One theme running through this entire period has beenof each other's decision-making procedures, intentions, motives andeven policy objectives.

How could it be otherwise? The DPRK, the "Hermitas long been the most isolated country in the world. What tittle interaction Pyongyang had with the international community decreased further with tbe end of (he Cold War. Its superpower patron and largest supplier ofequipment, the Soviet Union, disappeared. The North's other strategic partner, China, advanced its own interests by engagingrosperous trade with the ROK and allowing the simultaneous admission of both Koreas into

1 Thcoibetpreccociiiocinding all balllwic missilelacing itsand biological wen poos programs under internationalegularizing lhe return of US MlAi from lhe Koreaneclaring (hat it would not engage in or tup-portuWumtial progress" in North-South talks,mproving human rights conditions, eg. allowing the meeting of divided families. See Mitchell B. Reiss, Bridled Ambition; Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washing-ion. DC: Woodrow Wilson Center.

ihe United Nations. The DPRK's fraternal allies in Eastern Europe were all toppled by internal revolutions.

Perhaps fearful of ejections. P'yongyang kept iu official*hort leash: those who were allowed out of the country were not allowed out very often. At the DPRK's Mission to the UN in New York Gty. North Koreanhave been confined to radius ofiles from midtownThey do not have regular contact with US officials or other knowledgeable Americans and haveudimentary understanding of how the American political system works. They have been abysmal atrelations on the few occasions they have attempted to shape US domestic and international opinion

For the United States, the Korean peninsula has always been relatively neglected when compared to the much larger and mote powerful Japan and China, which have received far greater time, attention and resources. With the Asian economic meltdown inndonesia further disjiiaccd North Korea on the US diplomatic agenda. Contributing to this imtitutional reluctance was the fact thai North Koreaiplomatic black hole. Few US officials were fluent in Korean, fewer still had ever met with North Koreans, nndprivileged" few had ever visited the North.

The severe famine in North Korea in trdd-decadc also contributed to this institutional neglect- It seemed the game was not worth the candle at Washington came to believe the North was in imminent danger of collapse. Because the DPRK enjoyed no domestic constituency in the United States and because of Congressional hostility (especially among Republicanto the4 Agreed Framework nuclear deal, many Clinton Administration officials abjured responsibility for this issue, believing it toolitical "loser" and "careerenior officials ignored or delegated the matter to more junior officials, which often amounted to the same thing. For long periods of time, it appeared as if no one at tlie State Department was in charge of this issue. Under these multiple disincentives, initial enthusiasm for American engagement gradually surrendered to complacency.

Unsurprisingly, the resulting record of US-DPRK interaction has been mixed. Towards the goalore stable and secure Korean peninsula, some important progress hu been achieved. Work at the nuclear facilities covered by the Agreed Framework has ceased; this freeze is beingby international inspections. These facilities could haveuclear arsenaluclear weapons by now. In addition, the North has agreedoratorium on ballistic missile lews.

But serious qucstioru remain over the scope of P'yongyang's nuclearits ongoing chemical and biological weapons programs, its readiness to eliminate its ballistic missiles and its interest in reducing its forward-based military posture along the DMZ. Is North Korea really stringing the United States along, willing to agree to meetings in return for food aid butto relinquish its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) Drograrns? Does it calculate that diplomatic "fatigue" will eventually allow it to avoid fully cooperating with the IAEA to reveal the complete history of ita nuclearWill it balk at confidence-building measures that ask it to withdraw its conventional force deployments along the DMZ? Will it refuse to make any fundamental changes in the nature of its regime, allowing only aof foreign investment so it can maintain itself in power?

In sum, what are the North's intentions? The answer to this question is unknown (perhaps even by many in Northhe new Bushwill need to probe the North Korean regime aggressively to learn this answer.

Thissurjaequent policy decisions by Americanbe influenced by many factors, including the lessons learned and policies adopted by the DPRK. Consequently, it will be useful not only lo review the last nine years of engagement between the United States and North Korea and examine what lessons might be extracted. It will also be helpful toas to what lessons North Korea may have learned during this period as welL'

Strategic Lessons for the United States Be Humble

Afterecade of interaction, the United States still doesn'tNorth Korea very well. The country continues to be "the longestintelligence failure in USn the words of the former American Ambassador to South Korea, Donald P. Gregg. How are decisions made in the North? Who's up and who's down? Who makes the decisions? We simply do not have very good knowledge.

A short list of serious misestimates by US Government officials and outside experts would include the prediction that the "Dearim Chocg-iL would be unable to consolidate his power and rule the country after his

* There are some obvious shortcomingsriting about lesaoniby ihe United Sutra and the DPRK. Foremost it tnsr neither party Is monolithic;ikely UiMeertaJD officials, bureaus, and ministries have learned lessons that are not understood or evenio some of theiri is perhaps more accurate, then.tale lhal this paper present! lessons lhal thcmld have beea learned by all the major actors in both the United Slates awl DPRK.

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father's death inn the contrary, the past few years have not only demonstrated his tight hold on power, but also bis ability to maintain control and prevent social unrestisastrous famine andeconomic conditions. Another example came inhen the US Intdligence Community was strategically blindsided when P'yongyangore advanced ballistic missile years ahead of itsinally, many observers both in and out of the US Government predicted that ihc North would collapse inecause of food shortages and economic decline.*

The lesson should be clear: humility should be our guide. We need towe still do not understand the DPRK very well. In this environment, the risk for senior policy-maker* is lhat anyone can assert he or she is an expert- Therefore the assumptions behind the policy proposals need to be stated explicitly and analyzed with care.

Let'seal

A second lessor, learned over the past nine years is that it is possible to do business with North Korea, even on very sensitive issues. In'yongyang agreed to freeze its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and allow them to be inspected around-the-clock by the IAEA. Inhe North agreed to suspend iu ballistic missile tests; this pledge was later upgradedallistic missile moratorium and placed in writing. And the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (Klil)O) projectan ongoing example of the North's willingness to enterariety ofdirect North-South transportation links, onan moependent communications network in the North, on sweeping privileges and immunities for KEDO employees (especially, ROKworking at the nuclear site, and on sending DPRK technicians to South Korea for reactor training. These agreements, and others, prove thatcan bring tangible benefits.

Bul It Won't Be Easy

If it has been possible to reach agreement with the Northloser examination of the negotiating histories shows that reaching agreement

' Tbe US Intelligence Community had "undereatunUed the capabilities of the Taepoy failiag to aauctpacc (be umhirdNational Intelligence CohACil. "For agn Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to tbe (Jailed States".ee also, Executive Summary of the Rcr^ of theio Assess the Ballistic Missile "Ureal to the United States (the Rumsfeld Commissionury ls>rmiWrowAcnise^WbascAeso^ BMThreaLbim

See, for cumpfc. Nicholas Ebenud^ Koreajv. and "Hasten:ac Koreanoreign Affo'i.,otable eaeeptkm to the bocki that puipx! io Tinow" Nurth Korea it Helen Louise Hunter, Kim It-tmg'i North Korra (Wetiport Ct-. HunterIA analyst whose work focused on DPRK society.

hu rarefy been easy. Tbe North Koreans are skilled and experienced negofJaiors. and consequently like to keep all their options open for asossible.

In addition, the DPRK has been much mere comfortable than the United States in conducting negotiations in an atmcephere of high tension or even confrontation. At times, Pyongyang haa even tried to generate bargaining leverage for itself by aruncially ratcheting up tensions. Examples arc its3 aririouncement that it wcu^

and its unnwdtored unloading of reactor fuel inInnegotiation* at KEDO during the Supply Agreement negotiations. North Korea repeatedly threatened to walk out. terminate the Agreed Framework and restart their nuclear program if KEDO did not relent or capitulate on anhis type of behavior should be expected.5

The United States has done best in these negotiations when it hu followed fourirst, Washington needs toery clear idea of its objectives and priorities. In the past this was easier said than done, given the broad spectrum of views by key participanis in the Clinton Administration. US policy objectives were also influenced by South Korea and Japan, whose interests and prjorioes in dealing with North Korea were often sirnilar to, but not identical with, those of the United States

Second, Washington hu done best in these talks when it hu insisted on strict reciprocity. Indeed, the Agreed Framework is structured so that each party must reciprocateangible manner before tbe other will respond. The United States has largely followed this "tit for-tat" approach in itsrnissile talks with the North,elaxation of unctions in returnuspension ofEDO hu also adopted this approach in itswilh the DPRK.

Third, when dealing with the DPRK, patience is notirtue, itactical and strategic advantage. North Koreans are culturally verymore so than most Americans. Ambassador Stephen W. Bo* worth expressed it succincdy: "Never be more eager than the North toeal.'"

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Fourth, aod related to this point. Is that the United States should not be afraid to walk away from the table if the North's position is unreasonable. The occupational hazard for every negotiator is what might be tanned the "Bridge on the River Kwai" rjoenenrefloo. Jusi as the British colonel, played by Alec Guineas, fired on British commandoes to stop them fromthe bridge, Washington must neve* lose sight of its larger objectives in its haste to curry favor or reach agreement.

And Will the North Keep lis Side of the Bargain?

As difficult as it is to reach agreement with P'yongyang, an agreement once reached usually sticks. Under the Agreed Framework nuclear free re and with KEDO, North Korea has demonstrated that it can keep iu side of the bargain.

There are two important caveats here. First, thr North will keep it* tide ofoint. For P'yongyang. do contract is immutable. North Korea has atterrtpted. sometimes jucassfully.evisit and renegotiate commitments previously made. This has been observed in at least two sets of circumstances. If it believes the other party Is not living up to iu side of the bargain, it will backtrack on some of iu commitments. Andommitment has becomeor eoonomicallythe North often has engaged In highly literal interpretations of the text to weaken or erode completely its responsibilities. There is not much to be gained from arguing in response about the "spirit" of an accord. Thisarticular hazard for American negotiators trained in the Western legal system,1

The second point is obvious, but worth noting nonetheless. All agreements with North Korea need to be verified continuously, rigorously and com pre-beraiveiy to ensure strict compliance.

US Leadership Is Essential

As the moat powerful country In the region and globally, the Untied States has an indispensable role to play on the Korean peninsula Bui American leadership will be neither cheap nor easy. It will lake additional financial resources, which in the past Congress has been reluctant to make available. For example. Congress has been unwilling to fully fund KEDO* heavy fuel oil shipments to the DPRK, which are expected to double this yenr to

' Thisot new.ean ago. Rudyard Kipling captured (hit ulea ki"At the end of the lightombstone white- with the name of Ihe laicihe ipnauh drear 'A Pool lata here who tried to hoaue theAecordaag to one knwIedgtwbM Korean expert, the North Korean* are moreperu.ni ta tmmmumaa

be asade coadHKrial to sotiest-ani rt< To iifjcstrobfeea mun beor a* one addraaedctaiionahLp i*Ncsocenty Pteiblema (hould Se portrayed aa annovng obaiaclei do what Is most important: personal" Linton, op.

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0 million. Needless to say. it demeans the United States and ditninishes its influence throughout Asia if Washington is unwilling to adequately fund the terms of an important US initiative. (At the same lime, the United State* can also better leverage its European. Persian Gulf and Asian partners to win tbeir financial support for the KEDO rfroject)

Diplomatically. Washington's leadership in engaging North Korea can also provide helpful politicalor Seoul snd Tokyo to do likewise.the US lead, rather than being seen to act independently, can be helpful in dampening criticism from domestic political opponents in South Korea andesser extent in Japan who oppose engagement with the North.'

Bot Who's Id Charge?

The past few years have shown that North Korea is too important to US national security Interests lo be ignored. P'yongyangumber of challenges for American poi icy makers, ranging from nuclear issues,missiles. North-South interaction, conventional forces, humanitarian relief and economic sanctions. One of the main challenges for anyis to bridge the gap between the arms control/nonproliferation experts and the regional/area specialists in the Administration. Both the defense issues and the politics must be "right."

These issues require consistent attentionery senior level, preferablyingle person with broad responsibilities. Implementing thebuilding support svilhin the Administration, winning Congressionaland coordinating with keyall be indispensable to engaging with tho North. Mid-level officials, no matter how talented, cannotperform these tasks.

Indeed, it wu only after former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry became North Korea Policy Coordinator in8 that the Clinton Administration wu able to overcome what one critic termed its policy of "strategic incoherence" towards the North andlear way

The period leading up to Perry's apeenntment proves that if the Fxecutive branch docs not aggressively take the leadoreign policy issue.may move to fill tbe policy vacuum. During the put few yean.hasariety of legislation, some of which has placed additional constraints on the President's ability to carry out policy towards theuch of this wu due to Congressional distrust of the Clinton Administration's steAwudidup of US foreign policy generally and towards

s an intriguing if unanswerable otiestton as to whether US kodorship also makes it easier for North Korea to engage the South.

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the DPRK in particular. Bul Congress has nowtakeholder in US policy lowards North Korea and will likely waich closely the Bushactions towards tbe North.

Dynamic Environment, Rapidly Changing

Within the last twelve months, much has changed on the Korean peninsula. The0 summit between Kim Dae-jung and the "Dearim Chong-il. was remarkable political theane. Following this historic event, the two sides have signed an agreementeoul-to-Shinuiji rail link. Pyongyang has attended ASEAN Regional Forum for the first tine, joint de-mining activities continue along the DMZ, North and South Korean defense ministers met on Cheju Island and there hasialing down of the propaganda aimed at the South. (One South Korean wit has claimed that Korea has gone from being die "Land of Morning Calm" to the "Land of Morning Surprises.")

It is unclear whether these positive developments will continue, bat past practice suggests that the situation will continue to evolve In unpredictable, al times even dangerous, directions. It is useful to recall thatew short years ago. the South Korean Navyorth Korean petrol boat on the wrong side of the Northern Limit Line. P'yongyangallistic missile over Japan, North Korean commandoes tried to infiltrate the South by submarine, end the North routinely spewed forthrhetoric condemning the South Korean leadership and theof the Seoul regime.

At times, the United States has not been able to keep pace with these rapid developments, learning of meetings between the two Koreas or policy changes only after-the-fact Washington has at times reacted lo events rather than shaped them to US ends. This lesson supports the arguments expressed above for greater commitment to intelligence gathering, greater attention by senior policy-rnakers. and greater assertion of American leadership.

Th* United Stales Can Go It Alone (But It Is Better If II Does Not Have To)

Although the United States must always be willing and able to actto defend its interests, it can significantly reinforce its position and advance its policies in Ncctheast Asia rf it works closely with important allies, such as Japan and the ROK.

" Curiouily in its dealings with Cap-tol Hill, the Clinton Administration never tried lo frame the Nonh Korean usue as one of national security and defense. It therefore left itself open to criticism from Republican members lhat il was proppingailing North Korean regime by providing heavy fuel oil and luuninitarian aasiitance.

As an American official once said about NATO. "The trouble with alliances are theith any multilateral enterprise, members' interests overlap but are not necessarily identical; they often diverge in important ways, whether due to shaky parliamentary coalitions, domestic public opinion, financial constraints, or bilateral pressures. The same reality applies to Ncctrasast Asia While Seoul and Tokyo snare many of Washington'sin dealing with North Korea, their pnoriues aad tactics at times may differ widely.

Although some policy differences can never be completed dimiruued. the last few years have demonstrated that often they can be overcome,or mini mi red in pursuitarger common goal. One institutional example is KUDO, where nationals from all three couniries (and theUnion) work closely together to implementR projectoreover. Seoul and Tokyo will bear almost all of the estimatedillion flnancial burdenrice-tag sure to rise as the project encounters furtherndeed, construction of the LWR plants would bewithout these contributions since Congress passed legislation9 prohibiting any US funds from being used by KEDO to underwrite the costs of LWR construction.

Another example is the highly useful and long overdue Trilateral Oversight and Coordination GroupS-ROK-OOJ mechanismin the Perryere the United States has worked closely with its allies toommon approach to North Korea. Sincehas proven skillful in the past at exploiting differences among the three countries, this intensive consultation is crucial. An option for the Bush Adrrirnstrafaor. is to coaUnue the TCOG, but with an upgrade in status to symbolize the importance Washington anaches to this issue and to ensure that sernor-level officials are both rnformed and involved

Finally, there is additional "value added" of Washington going forward in concert with its allies. Should the United Suites need to reverse course, enhance its deterrence posture or adopt punitive measures against North Korea, it willuch easier time winning support from Seoul and Tokyo if all three parties have previously worked closely together in their policy approach to P'yongyang.

" Perry presented his major findings of his "Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea" in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs onhis can also be found in David Albright and Kevin O'Neill, eds, SoMng ihe North Korean Nuclear Puzzle (Washington. DC:,.

he Perry Report also used ibis reasoning in explaining its "two-path strategy" toward the North. Ibid

Whai "Rogue" Regime?

The Uniied States no longer refers to the DPRKrogue" regime or any other of the pejorative labels that passed tor policy wisdomumber of years. Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig have whiten that attempts to dismiss North Koreaogue regime offer little insight into North Korean objectives and motivations, and offer little guidance to US policy-makers seeking to bring North Korea into trie international communiiy asn other words, if Washington truly believed that the North Koreans were rogues, with its imputation of irrationality, then allprescriptions would lead to an analytical dead end. How can you dealrazy state?"

For this same reason, calling Northogue regimeumber of domestic problems, not least tbe difficulty of explaining to Congress and the American public why Washington was meeting and negotiating with P'yongyang. Avoiding this linguistic shorthand allows the United States greater flexibility to engage diplomatically with ihe North. No doubt this was one reason why Secretary of Slate Albright did an about-face on this issue inhen she expunged the term from the diplomaticin favor of "states ofortie early signs indicate that the Bush Administration will steer clear of ihis trap and deal with the Northragmatic basis.1*

Strategic Lessons for North Korea

There arc obvious limits as to how well we can understand North Korean behavior. But some thought must be paid to what tbe North may have learned from the part years of engagement with the United States. Asreviews the past decade, the lessons itihe po'icyitbe influenced by North Korea's anticipated future behavior. This behavior will have been shaped by the lessons P'yongyang has learned from recent experience with the United Slates. In other words, there will be what political scientists and economists call "slra-

See Oh and Haasig. North Komih* Loohmgaaniagtee.

" The ben treatment ol UMs subject is Robert S. Urwak. ftogae Siair, and US Ibnlpt fbl-uy: Cimiainmem Ajltr ihr Cold Hfar (Washington, DC woodrow Wilson Center Preas,

ee Steven Million.rogue'rogue' il'stale of concern1Vnithbigian Am.. Sec aho the transcript ft the of Stale Dailynenng.Richard Bencher, which can be found at0rM6/rxWi9dbJttiril

* At the Munich conference in early February. Secretary of Defense Donald RuoufcU pointedly (lid riot refer to "rogue- states in explaining the Ainencan rationale for national missile orfeose. Sec Alexander Nlcoll, "Defense debate stresses ihe need for more WW fuutm-tal

tegichere decisions arc affected by ihc dynamicbetween two actors who find themselvest is therefore useful to speculate, (torn an American perspective, what lessons the North Koreans may have learned from the past nine years of engagement with the United States.

Tbe United States Is Afraid of the North's Strength The United States respects the North's military power. Whether it is Pyongyang's nascent nuclear weapons program, ambitious ballistic missile program, or million-man military, the North's potential to destabilizeAsia (and other regions through ballistic missile exports) attractsattention. Whenever the North has engaged in highly provocative behavior, the United States bas responded by immediately re-engagingand seeking to address some of Pyongyang's concerns.examples are die North's3 threat to withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty, the unmonitored unloading of spent fuel in4 and the8allistic missile test. Within weeks of each event, Washington found itself back at the negotiating table with P'yongyang, thereby acceding to one of the North's main objectives. And of course, the preponderance of North Korean corrventional force along the DMZ, including artillery that can reach Seoul, actsonstant threat to the South and US forces stationed there.

For this reason, it is entirely possible the DPRK might apply this lesson to the new Bush Administration, testing them if the North believes ii is being ignored. Accordingecent article by Robertot beif P'yongyang tries to provoke athreatening tofrom the Agreedan effort to test the new Administration and put it on the

The United States Is Afraid of the North's Weakness

As worried as the United States is about the North's strength, it is alsoabout itso-called 'hard landing" by North Korea would result in enormous human suffering and physical hardship in the North and risk destabilizing the Korean Peninsula and perhaps beyond.

To avoid this possibility, the United States has taken the lead in propping up the North Korean regime in an attempt to stave off collapse. This assistance has taken the form of food and other hurnanitarian aid. North Korea is now the largest reeipieni of US aid in Asia,0 million9 alone, and totaling0 million since thehat this assistance has routinely continued despite periodic North Korean belligerence,and lack of cooperation hasowerful signal to P'yongyang,obert A. Manning. "Will Korea be Busb's first policya Angeles

namely, thai the United Stales will feed theof theIt adopts. For North Korea, it would appear, there has beenhingree lunch.

The United States Is ao IhareJiable Partner

For P'yongyang, the United Slates may appear lo be an unreliable partner, often promising more than it can deliver. The LWR project, whichenterpiece of the Agreed Framework negotiated by the United States,arget datet now appears the project is at least five years behind schedule. Further delays may be expected. It is likely KEDO wfll claim that these delays will escalate costs, which will contribute to further delays.

Washington has proven unreliable with respect lo another clement of the Agreed Frart>ework uspledge toetric tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) annually to the DPRK until the first LWR isFor the past three years, this commitment has not been met; the North has bad to wait additional months to receive ia quota of oil Trus problem mayrisis this year, as skyrocketing oil prices will double KBDO's cost in delivering HFO.

If Washington cannot be trusted to keep its wordatter of suchimportance, why should P'yongyang trust il on other mailers?

The Normal Rules Dent Apply to North Korea

Whether because of it* .strength or its weakness. North Korea has nol had lo honor the same diplomatic and economic rules as other countries. The United States (and the ROK) have been willing to "eiKourage" North Korea to attend meetings, such as the four-party talks, to consent ta inspections at Kumchang-ri. and to allow family reunions by offering certainOften these inducements (or what used to be calledave taken the form of food aid or financial assistance. This US policy of "food for meetings'* started6 and lasted through the end of the Clintonoerm from contemporary psychology, the United States has "enabled" North Korea by indulging its bad habits.

This also contradicted longstanding US policy of not using humanitarian assistanceever to try to compel political change. The Dintonapproach here attempted lo do two things simultaneously and ended up doing neither very well. First, il wanted to deflect charges offrom its domestic critics who viewed food assistance as providing comfort to the enemy (especially given doubts about how the foodoug H. PaaJ.oreangenda lor the New USUl TTar Korean Peninsula tmentury: Prospects for Stability and Cooperation. Joint IIS-Korea Academic Stwhei...

" See Marcus Notarsd. Avoiding ihe Apocalypse: The Future of iheoreas (Washing-Ion. DC: Institute for laiernatkMsal..

monitored andecond, it wanted to promote diplomaticwith the North. It came up short in both instances. Getting the North to the negotiating table was not sufficient to satisfy the Clintoncritics, especially in Congress. And "bribing" the North to attend meetings whn food aid sent the wrong signal to P'yongyang. Once the North merely showed up, aid would flow and its primary policy objective was achieved.

This preferential treatment carried over to the economic realm. Foreign investors (admittedly, mostly South Korean) have acquiesced in highly dubious financial transactions with the North despite die extremely hostile investment environment characterized by the absence of the rule of law,property rights, or any dispute resolution mechanisms. These ventures, often assisted by under-the-table payoffs to North Korean officials, promise little if any return on mvestrocnt.

Moreover, it is not even clear that these investments have achieved this politicalas the promotion of North-Southcould somehow justify the expense. To take one example. North Korea is not only reported to receive anillion per year from itsproject with Hyundai, but it still manages to keep its own peoplefrom ideological contamination by strictly hrruting access to the South Korean tourists.

Big Brother Is Watching

It is clear that the United States has invested tremendous resources to uncover North Korea's military capabiuties, especially with respect to WMD, and that these resources are quite sophisticated. This becameduringuclear crisis, when the United States shared high-resolution satellite pictures with the IAEA: these pictures showed twospent fuel sites at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. In addition. IAEA inspectors trained by the United States were later able to uncover evidence of "irregularities" in the DPRK's initial declaration to the IAEA conceraing the amount of plutonium it had separated.

But the lesson here is more complicated because of the Kumchang-riIn this case, the United States falsely claimed that the DPRK was building an underground nuclear site thought to houseeprocessing facility or nuclear reactor. In fact, US officials who visited the sib: found no such facility.

So what is the real lesson? Perhaps that the United States used Kumchang-riretext for other purposes? Or that US capabilities are not as good as previously thought? That the North should continue to conceal and deceive the outside world on nuclear issuesay to get Washington's attention and food assistance? And to the extent P'yongyang understands US dctec-

tion capabilities, will this lead the North to adopt more sophisticatedand concealment efforts?

Tbe United states Will Support (be Sunshine Policy The prornocjon of North-South dialogue has longtaple of US policy towards die DPRK: this principle was enshrined in the4 Agreed Framework and was regularly repeated by US officials in iheir meetings with the North through the rest of the decade. The culmination of this approach was realized by the0 summit between the two Kims.

Reviewing Washington's long-time emphasis on North-Southesson the North has learned is that it will be difficult for the Bushto reverselthough early irritations suggest that the Bush Administration will continue to support inter-Korean dialogue, it is possible that P'yongyang may still try to leverage its relations with Seoul to compel Washington to re-engage with the North on its timetable, not the Bush Administration's.

Concluslon

During the past decade, both countries have climbed some wayairly steep learning curve.

North Korea and the United Stales will need to draw upon this experience if they wish to move forward together inore stable Koreanduring the next few years.

For the United States, however, dealing with the DPRK likely to get more, not less, difficult in the next few years. The North's recent diplontaucwhat their press has termed "magicay constrainfuture flexibility in ways that are difficult to predict, As other countries improve relations with the North, thereisk that prcicrving good ties with P'yongyang will be seen as an end in itself, oretter means to an end than issuing threats orobust deterrence through military exercises. There isrowing sense In Asia that the best way to work with North Korea now that the hermit kingdom lias left its isolation isroadly engage P'yongyang through coaxing and "incentives" rather than through oven displays of deterrence. These countries, including US allies, may criticiie. frustrate or oppose American actions they view as provocative to tbe North. Washington willacklash if it is being perceived as adopting unreasonably harsh measures against P'yongyang.

" fVsoftil corveratiaas wiih DPRKebruary ?CO!

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In fact, Washingion has faced this problem before. Inson the Korean peruhsula increased, the US Commander in South Korea requested that US/UN forces be reinforced with Patriot missiles. In the face of strong criticism from Seoul. Washington backed down. Only in March,ound of North-South talks ended badly, were the missiles shipped to South Korea. Aod duringeriod, the United States consistently faced resistance at the UN Security Council when it tried to adopt sanctions against North Korea for violating its IAEA and NPT obi iga-tjons.

With Pyongyang's expanded contacts and warming relations, this problem will increase. For example. North Korea's new friends may now even more harshly criticize any hardening of the US position over negotiating the end of lhe North's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Attempts by the United States to seek sanctions in the United Nations or reinforcetroops on the peninsula would likely be met with strong criticism from US adversaries and allies alike. Washington will feel growing pressure to be more flexible, more generous, and more forthcoming. North Korea may thus be encouraged to raise its asking price, harden Its stance, and be mote patient in dealing with the United States than beforeelcomender these circumstances, Washington may lose control over the pace and perhaps even the agenda of its negotiations.

In short, the risk isubtle shift in the balance of power at thetable may take place. And no one is more adept than the North Koreans at engineering crises and exptoiting differences between the United States and its allies to gain concessions from Washington and others. American efforts to resolve the North's WMD programs, missile threats, and theforce threat will take longer, cost more, andreater test of allianceUS diplomaticbefore. In the past, the North Koreans haveeak hand well. Now they will have the chance touch stronger hand.

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The New US Administration and North Koreaime for Review and Adjustment

Daryl M.

Senior Fellow

Themost Americans are anxious to see the new Bush Adnuiustration

forward movement on such domestic issues as tax reform and edu-

cation, significant foreign policies already confront the United States. One area that requires early attention is the US-Republic of Korea alliance. In recent months, new developments in relations between democratic South Korea and Communist North Korea require that Washington review itstoward the North and, where necessary, make appropriate adjustments.

Hopeful but Slow Progress

Theyear old standoff between North and South Korea funda-mentally was affected by last June's leaders* summit in the North's capital, P'yongyang. The talks between South Korea's President Kim Dae-jung and North Korean leader Kimere the first such meetings between the two bitter enemies since Korea was dividedefore departing P'yongyang, President Kim Dae-jungormal agreement with the de facto leader and Defense Commission Chairman of the North thatconcrete avenues toward reconciliation and eventual reunification of the Koreas.

The significance of the summit and the pact cannot be overestimated. Never before have political talks between the North and South reached such high levels. South Korean President Kim deserves praise for his relentless pursuit of the summit after years of diplomatic stalemate. The next major step in the budding peace process will be the reciprocal visit to Seoul by the North Korean leader.ate for that visit has not been set, there aresigns that it may take place around April.

US-South Korean Coordination Is Essential

Washington should applaud President Kim's success at negotiating the pact as well as establishing Seoul's leadership role in theole that the Clinton Administration had downplayed in the past To sustain thethat President Kim's visit to P'yongyang has sparked, the United States now shouldareful strategy that keeps Seoul out in front andto offer any US benefits to the Northtrict, reciprocal basis. This principle of reciprocity was rarely enforced during the Clinton

tion and now deserves close scrutiny by President Bush as he and his senior advisors review America's North Korea policy.

The0 Joint Declaration

The four-point pact signed by Kim Dae-jung and Kim Chong-il in P'yongyang on Junes brief and concise, yet broad in its implications:

Firs', the two leaders declared that on the matter of national reunification, Koreans should play the leading role. This is significant since the Clinton Administration in recent years assumed the lead role. In doing this, itthe North-South dialogue and thus stymied any meaningful progress toward tension reduction on the Peninsula.

Second, the two Korean leaders pledged to negotiateloose form ofn Presidente-jung's mind, this would involve astage during which the two governments would cooperate closely on economic, social and political matters. Defense and foreign policy issues would remain the sovereign domain of the respective governments.radual period of reconciliation under the confederation arrangement, the two sides eventually would negotiate formal procedures for reunification of the nation.

Third, the two leaders pledged to move swiftly to address the plight of moreillion relatives separated since the national division of Korea. They agreed toarge separated-family member exchange for National Liberation Day onugust.

Fourth, the leaders pledged to greatly expand their countries' economic lies, and even cited several specific infrastructure projects on which the two sides could cooperate.

Tensions Remain High

Despite Seoul's successful efforts to resume North-South dialogueearly decade-long hiatus, little meaningful progress has beenery limited and highly regimented exchange of several hundred separated relatives occurred, and the two sides are wrangling over the next exchange. Critics of President Kim's sunshine policy toward P'yongyang worry that Kim Chong-il simply is allowing for perfunctory North-South interaction in return for stepped up food and financial assistance from Seoul. The Kum-gang-san tourism business, funded mainly by the Hyundai Group, is painted by President Kim's opponents as an operation that, by some accounts, has generated as muchillion in monthly profits for the North. While the South Korean leader deserves credit for achieving the historic summit, Seoul should lake careroper degree of North Korean reciprocity also

is secured. Above all, the North must be pressed to begin reduction of its conventional military threat.

In Senate testimonyIA Director George Tenet said that the North continues tomilitary first policy" at the expense of other national objectives.esult, "the North Korean military appears for now to have halted its near-decade-long slide in militarye concluded that Washington "has not yetignificant diminution of the threat from the North to American and South Korean interests,"

Tbe US-Korea security alliance re mams domi rated by the serious military threat posed by Communist North Korea, and the Korean perunsule remains the only spot in tbe world where tens of thousands of American lives are at risk. Despite its tattered economy, the North's regime maintains one of the world's largest standing armies and has used its nuclear weapons and long-range noissile development programs to extort support from the US and the international community. The North's forward deployed forces require the continued presence0 US troops in South Koreaost ofillion US taxpayer dollars per year.

North Korea Policy: Past Lessons

The Bush Administration wisely announced early on that America'stoward tbe North would be reviewed and. where necessary, changes would be made. In this regard, an analysis of President Clinton's policies and their resultsseful exercise. How were the past policies conceived, and what did they achieve? For one thing. North Korea became one of America's largest recipients of foreign assistance.roundillion dollars has been spent by Washington on the North in the form of humanitarian food assistance, payments to the North for the return of US Korean War-era MIA remains and energy assistance required tinder4 tJS-Ncrth Korea nuclear deal.

Early in his first term. President Clinton grappled with the North's renegade nuclear weapons program. After many months of tedious negotiations with the North, the first-ever US-North Korea political agreement was signed inhe so-called Agreed Framework offered benefits to the North inchiding improved trade and political tie* withillion per year fuel oil supply and construction of two nuclear reactorsat aboutillion. Togetheronsortium ofozen nations, the United Stales is raising funds to support this process, alrhoogh Seoul has pledged to pick up most of the tab. In return, the North agreed to "freeze" its current nuclear program, preventing it from processing any more weapons-grade plutonium titan it already has.

The Clinton Administration proclaimed that the nuclear threat had been checked. There were serious holes In this assertion, however. Washington backed down on its earlier demand lhal the Northull accounting of its enriched Plutonium stockpile Inspection of its storage sites, which the North is obliged to allow under other international treaty obligations, has been delayed for years to come.esult, tbe North may have alieady secretly assembled nuclear bombs. Even senior Clinton Administrationmade this public admission. This makes the North's missileadvances all the more threatening.

As part of the deal, the North promised to resume substantive dialogue with the South in pursuit of tension reduction. It refused to do this for nearly six years, yet the Clinton Administration downplayed this direct violation of the Framework.

The North continued iu ballistic missile development program and exported its missile technology to nations hostile to the US. Pyongyang'sonven-tionnl military threat remains and, considering its missile advances, has become more dangerous. It is receiving assistance from the US and its allies in returno-called nuclear "fre*7c" that has left all of the North's nuclear weapons development capabilities inands.fundamental US national security consideration> on the peninsula.North Korea policies largely have failed.

Why So Far Off Course?

Clinton Administration officials often answered Agreed Framework critics with the accusation that the policy's opponents never proposed any viable alternatives. That simply is not true. The Heritage Foundation, amongwasariety of policy options when the nuclear crisis heated uphe recommendations in this paper's conclusionare in line with the ones Heritage espoused during that timeframe. The fact is that the Geneva deal was poorly negotiated and poorly designed.

The North's threat and bribery tactics have repeatedly paid off forActually, the most significant "freeze" in play today relates to three key issues. Unlike the much touted yet illusionary nuclear freeze, these other frozen aspects run decidedly counter to the interests of the US, South Korea and its allies. They are:

olitical and military tensions oo the peninsula remain frozen alhigh levels. Indeed, given the profound ripple effects throughout the region of the North's missile program, tensions are increasing and drawing other nations into the fray. The Agreed Framework has

cally and disturbingly created more instability and frictions ihan il has solved.

The US was frozenargely fruitless bilateral political dialogue with P'yongyang. Trappededious and inconclusive series of talks with Ihe North, the US became the focus of most of the North's attention and energy. Losl in the shuffle was anythinglear, forward-looking, co in pre hec plan for achieving lasting peace in Korea.

irect result of point two. South Korea was frozen out of the point position it once held with respect to peace negotiations with the North. For decades, the US required that the North deal directly with Seoul since, in tbe end, only the two Koreas can ink the formal agreements lhat will be necessary to get tbe reconciliation process going. The US position once was that Washington could not solve the stalemate on its own. That US position was overturned by the4 deal. Until last June, the North had refused to hold even one formal government-tr>government dialogue session with the South. The June summit had more to do with Seoul's dogged pursuit of the breakthrough and the North's frustration with the Agreed Framework than with the US-North Korea deal itself.

Why did our Geneva negotiators not anticipate these problems? How could they not have suspected that the first political agreement betweenand P'yongyang would turn the North away from, not toward,dialogue with the South? Did they truly believe that the North was sincere in pledging lo give up its nuclear weapons program in return for two power plants?

Misguided Expectations on Both Sides

Some critics of current US policy believe the answers lie in two relatedFirst, perhapsush to contain the crisis and loathe to stand firm in the face of the North's defiant violation of its NPT obligations, the North's demand for the light water reactor construction project (LWR) was accepted despite the wholly impractical nature of scheme. Very serious questions about the viability of tbe construction project have emerged that seem not to have been anticipated by the Clinton Administration. One fact is that the North does not have the capacity to distribute the energy that would beby the reactors. There are other technical and legal matters that have emerged which cast long shadows of doubt upon the very concept ofLWRs in the North.

Given this, one can reasonably suspect tbat President Clinton's negotiators had oilier considerations in mind.ongressional election looming, they appeared to have beenush toeal before

The Framework alone would not bring peacehe peninsula, bul II would buy time. Il appears, however, that the Clinton Administration may not have assessed lhat the structure of the deal could in fact worsen tensions. Another factor may have been those officials in the Clinton Administration who believedrth Korea was well on the way lo its collapse. Buying lime would pacify and distract Pyongyang for some months or severaluntil the govemment there slippedoma andsofthe work on the LWRs would not be in vain then as ihey would be inherited and made viable by prosperous South Korea.

The other side of the coin was the North's expectations and intentions.Administration officials did not realize how divergent the North'sof the deal were from those of the US.ew weeks after the Geneva deal was signed, senior North Korean officials met with Heritage Foundation representatives. What the North Koreans said was striking and disturbing. For one thing, the LWRs were not lhe focal point of IheirIn fact, they seemed to place little importance upon the conslruciion project and its purported future benefits. Instead, tbey were elated over the broader implications they saw in the deal. Three points dominated their analysts:

As the first formal agreement with the US, lhe Framework was an unprecedented poiilical feather in the North's hat It would afford P'yongyang greatly enhanced stature and legitimacy in the iniernaiional community and undercut Seoul's image since the deal broke the Smith's rnooopoly on ties with Washington.

The North Korean officials were adamant in their prediction that these political realignments would open the way lor the North and tho US loilateral peace treaty. That, in turn, would pave the way for the withdrawal of US forces stationed in South Korea.

With the lifting of America's trade embargo, the North would bewith US aid and lucrative business transactions, thus saving its decaying economy.

It is important to point out that, in defending these predictions, the North Korean officials pointed lo ihe side letter that Presideni Clinton sent to "Supreme Leader Kim Chong-il" on the day (he Geneva pact was inked. In it. President Clinton pledged that the US taxpayer would pay themultibillion-Jollar price tag in the event (hot the South. Japan and other allies failed to do so. To P'yongyang. it was proof that it hod finally succeeded in its strategy of isolating Seoul by aligning itself closer toThe Clinton letter should go down in history as one of America's most careless and disingenuous diplomatic ploys.

Assuming lhal the North did indeed wildly misjudge and overestimate ihe benefits lhat would flow from the Geneva accord, one can understand its subsequent defiant attitude. P'yongyang believed the agreement wouldand protect the North Korean regime and its economy at the expense of the South, and that it could simultaneously try to squeeze all it could out of the US, its allies and the mtranational community. In ihe end, Geneva was not about peace. Ii was about survival.

he Banning of the End of the Framework?

8ivotal month for North Korea policy, particularly from the US perspective. That month. The New York Times first reported on the "suspect site" at Kumchang-ri. Then, in late August, North Korea shocked the world by successfullyong-range missile. That missile was fired over Japanese territory, sending an unmistakable military warning io Japan and its closest military ally, the US. Within the spaceew weeks, US attitudes toward North Korea were shaken to their core. First, there was dramatic new evidence that the North not onlyissile threat to the South and Japan but also to US territory. Second, the Kumchang-ri incident, coming four years after tbe North bad pledged to keep its nuclear programolidified tbe opinion of many that P'yongyang never had any such intention.

South Koreans have lived under the threat of North Korean attack for decades. The missiles, whileatter for concern, are just more arrows in Ihe North's quiver in the minds of many South Koreans. However, from the US peispective, the missile program aims to extend the North Korean military threat right to America's shores. First, of course, is the specter of the North possessing missiles tipped with nuclear or chemical weapons capable of reaching western areas of the US. Next, the missiles have setegional chain reaction throughout Northeast Asia. This in turn is an added threat to American security interests. Japan was so rattled that its officials reportedly even considered the "preemptive strike" option. Washington has responded byissile defense initiative similar to the one that President Reagan was unable to realize even during the cold war. This, together with broadening discussions of theater missile defense programs for allies including Korea, Japan and Taiwan, has become aof contention bciwccn Washington and Beijing.

So, the North has ceased to beeninsular threal. It is dismaying that some South Korean analyses blame the current debate over changes in US policies toward the North on "hard-line Republicans" orBut, this isebate over whether to be "hard" or "soft" on P'yongyang. Rather, itebate over whether Clinton policies have

compounded US challenges instead of solving them. Itebate over how to formulate more effective policies.

How the Framework Has Failed

It should be recalled that Section III of the Agreed Framework stipulated. "The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration onnd the DPRK will engage in Vorth-Soulh dialogue, as thia Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.'*

The Clinion Adrninistration's attempts to coax P'yongyang to thetable with tbe South were, in the end. ineffective. The North, miredtaggering economic crisis, repeatedly has demanded commitment* offood aid from the United States and South Korearecondition to negotiations. Seoul. Washington and the international community laveeocrmoos amounts of humanitarian assistance. Still, the P'yongyang regime consistently refused to engage Seoul in political dialogue (until President Kim's Junethe promise it made in writing in Geneva

The US-North Korean Agreed Framework of4 was hailed by the Clinton Administration as an historic opcKWtunjty to end the state of wnr that had lingered on the peninsula since3 Korean War cease-fire. Instead, military tensions on the peninsula remain high, no progress has been made in easing the North's conventional threal, the North's economy isree fall and many of its citizens are starving. Also, under thethe North was allowed to keep its nuclear card for years to come. It technically is obliged to allow for full nuclear transparency just beforeof the two reactors, which, al this point, will not happen for many years.

Also, In order for the Clinton Administration to coax concessions from theattern of payments and concessions emerged.9 Kuin-chang-ri is an embarrassing example of this. Early that year, the US announced thai an underground site had been identified in North Korea that was suspected of being used for nuclear weapons development purposes. When the site became public knowledge, andolitical bone ofwith respect to the purported nuclear freeze, ihe US demanded inspections. The North offered to allow inspections0 million. In the end. P'yongyang got most of what it demanded, and the US got much less. The food assistance that Washington announced just weeks before theUS-DPRK Joint Press Statement" was valued in0 million range. Secretary of State Albright proclaimed lhat the North had

agreed to "multiple site visits" by US officials to Kumchang-ri. Actually, what the US received was an "invitniion" by the North toingle inspection inny reasonable person would question this failure to secure immediate inspections. The inspection turned up nothing, and observers wondered whether il has been sanitized or simply had been used by the North as an extoruxm tool. Consider the9 commentary published in the South Korean daily newspaper. Ckoongang Ilbo:

"In effect. North Koreaave for gifts equivalenthird of its annualhe US came away with nothing, not even face [ernphasishe US backed away big rime, too, from its ori ginal refusal to pay any compensation to the North. The US-North Korea agreement, to be sore, contains no mention ofbut nobody is fooled by that The agreement is aexchange of assistance for visits. Meanwhile, of course. North Korea has carted away any evidence at Kumchang-ri and US *visits' ere imlikely to turn up anything."

The Northrowing missile arsenal that is acquiring intercontinental capabihties.it is becoming one of the world's most prolific salesmen of missile technology to rogue nations. Il Is not widely known that, in recent years, the Clinton Administration discovered not one but two sales of North Korean missile technology.'yongyang sold Scud mobile missile launchers lo Iran. 'Ihe next year, the Clinton administration,ow-key, official notice, published in an obscure government document, admitted that the North had been caught yet again selling missileIn both cases, Washington was forced under existing US law to impose additional (though meaningless) trade sanctions upon North Korea. Inof these cases did the administration take the initiative of speakingabout the North Korean saleseither the US press nor the Congress came to know the full story of these incidents. Theartem of downplaying or ignoring serious hostile actions taken by Pyongyang, actions that one could conclude violated the spirit if Dot tbe letter of the Agreed iTamewcck

America's economic political and security stakes in Northeast Asia are very high. Should the North attempt to make good on its infamous threat to turn the Southsea ofhe entire region would beIn this context, the Agreed Framework process has not eased Korean tensions.

Clinton policies have done little more than paper over the threat and entice P'yongyang to engage in talks with the United States by offeringulti-billion dollar energy infrastructure construction along with pledges ofUS aid and political ties. Now. the United States and other nations are

responding io llie North's economic crisis wiih food aid. For the first time, ihe North openly admits to its economic woes and is publicly appealing for international support. Pyongyang continues its strategy of extractingfrom the United States and its allies. But, thisutile game. The North's needs are much greater than Washington and the internationalarc willing to provide. Massive aidation (hatlear and present military threat is hardly an acceptable option. As the Northits slide toward economic collapse, it can expect only limited aid under the current circunuttances. The mullibillion-dollar bonanza it has beennuclearnisierialize for years.

Tbe Geneva Deal's Bask Flaws

The General Accounting Officeesearch arm of the US Congress, has published several reports highlighting the Framework's multiple flaws. It has found that (he Agreed Framework is "not legallyither under US Or internal!una; law. The QAO determined the document wasormal treaty of any sort butnonbirxlmg politicalocument does not require prior US congressional approval. It is reasonable to assume that this was precisely tbe aim of the ClintonStill, the Congress has been compelled to appropriate many millions of dollars to fund the Clinton deal. So. the Congress has been somethingostage in this process. The GAO concluded that the Agreed Framework "can have the effect of pressuring the Congress to appropriate raooeys to implement an agreement with which it had littlene could conclude that "no involvement" would haveore accurateof lhe congressional role. Also, the report pointed out (hat the Congress must eventually approve transfer of any significant nuclear technology to (he North, despite the fact that it was not consulted

The GAO study round that the North eventually would have to purchase expensive nuclear liability insurance to protect KEDO participants,Americans. Also, the North's existing power grid or infrastructure is not nearly capable of distributing the power that will be generated by the new reactors. Tbe GAO quotes State Department sources as saying that this grid will cost0igure (hat isery conservative estimate. The US and its allies understandably say they will not pay for this enormous project. Given its economic crisis, il is certain lhat the North will not soon beosition lo pay this price. The GAO stales that "North Korea could exert pressure on others to pay for the gnd."

The most recent GAO report on these issues was released inmong other things, it stressed that the Interrational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) "identified several problems affecting its ability towhether North Korea is complying fullyspects of the

M

nuclearne specific problem is that the North "bas not allowed the IAEA to implement required safeguards measures on the hquid nuclear waste tanks" at tbe Yongbyon facility. Furthermore, "the Agreedallows North Korea to continue operating certain nuclear facilities not covered by thehe report found. The GAO report notes6 State Department cable expressed "deep concern about whether North Korea will fulfill critical components of tbe Agreed

During talks wiih the North3S policy makers spokepackage deal" under which P'yongyang would reap substantial rewards for giving up its nuclear ambitions andasting peace on theAt that time. The Heritage Foundation, among others, supported this approach and called for an attractive trade and aid package from the United States, South Korea, Japan and other concerned parties in return for Pyongyang's cooperation. Instead, the Clinton Administrationower plantcheme What ihe North desperately needs now is financial assistance and economic reform, not ihe prospect of enhanced electric power capabilitiesears from now. What the US urgently needs now is an unambiguous end to the North's nuclear threat and rapid tension reduction in Korea.

Current North Korea policy should be changed to address these critical needs. While this will require careful diplomacy, there axe no legal barriers to such action. After all, the GAO report to Congress found that the Agreed Framework is not legally binding or enforceable under either US orlaw. The study quotes State Department officials as admitting that the deal was structured in this manner since "the United States wanted theto respond to North Korea's policies andow is the time to respond.

Sunshine Policy to the Rescue?

Within days of assuming office. President Kim Dae-jung sounded some hopeful notes wilh respect to North Korea policy. Particularly noteworthy was his contention that the South should resume its front-and-centerin dealing with ihe North. Seoul's primacy is essential to success, but Washington largely bartered its point position away in tbe Geneva deal.

Over the course of his first year in office. President Kim fleshed out what he calls his sunshine policy. It hasatter of domestic Koreancontroversy since some accuse President Kim of not requiring enough "Tinkage" in return for South Korean assistance. Still, his policies embrace

the fundamental principles necessary for turning our concerted efforts away from the current, feckless track and moving them in directions that can eventually produce positive results.

President Kim speaks of an appropriate measure ofoncept thai would link North Korean good behavior to incentives that would be offered by Seoul and its allies. In this, there could be the makingsom-prehensive "carrot and slick" package deal that the Clinton administration chose to abandonhis is the sort of approach Seoul should follow, taking care that the principle of reciprocity is enforced against the North. It is important for Seoul to resume the point position in dealing with North Korea. Real progress toward tension reduction must be achieved primarily by the Koreans, with the US, Japan, China and other concerned nations playing important but supporting roles.

Conclusion

The Cold War may have ended, and North Korea may no longer have China and the Soviet Union standing by ready to support its military aggression toward the South. But, even as its economy crumbles, the North continues toaily threal to the security of South Korea, as well as to llieof the United States and the Souths other allies.

The time has pessed for simply offering reasonable incentives toto produce reasonable behaviors. The North must now show substantive efforts and make rapid progress toward achieving peace and stability on the Peninsula. President Kim's North-South summit initiative gives rise lohope that this process has begun and that the two Korea's areractical, step-by-step journey toward peace andWashington should step back, support the South in its efforts, snd ensure ihai future aid is tied to real reciprocity on Ihe part of the North.

MV

Nortli Korea's Historic Shift: From Self-Rel iance to Engageraent

DonNorth-South summit meeting of0 has brought dramatic

Johnsto the Korean peninsula In political terms, it is the greatest change

since the Korean Warentury ago. The resulting engagement, if sus-School of Advanced tamed, has the capability of theundatnexfaJJy new era in International Studies Korea and Northeast Asia.

How did this surprising engagement come about? What are its essential characteristics? Where is it leading? What are the prospects of success?

This paperodest effort to explore some of those questions, even (hough much essential informalion about (he origins and inner workings of the tranaforrrurtion remainsave always been fascinated with historical turning prints: my first book.as about the turning point of the Vietnam War; my second book. The Turn: Fnvn the Cold Warewescribed the negotiations which ended the global struggle between the United Slates and (he Sovietind the current shift on the Korean peninsula no less fascinating or less historic, even though the final result is still beyond our grasp. Whatever the developrnenu to cane, whether they bring tbe renewal of Km. Chotig-irs regime or itsm convinced that the future of the Korean peninsula will befrom the past. Thus, the developments that came to fruition in the0 will be long remembered.

As la clear from the paragrapho not believe the Norm-Southmeeting in P'yongyang in June or the events thai foUowed were mere symbolism without substance, as some in Washington and elsewhere have contended. Compared with the past, Ihe events since Ihe June summit have been nothing short of startling. They are already bringing important changes lo the relationship between the two regimes that share the Korean peninsula, and they are likely to bring notable changes to (he rrdationship between (he two Koreas and United Statesost of ether nations.

Since the June summit. North and South Korea have held four rounds of formal ministerial talks on the difrerences between them and agreed to four Nonh-South pacts to encourage trade andefense ministers of North and South have held one round of talks to discuss securityand lower-level rnflirary working groups from the (wo opposing armies have held five meetings. Two sets of emotional meetings toamilies on each side have been held,hird is scheduled for luie

ood summary of North-South IntcrocrJoni line* the June summit, seeinyln. "Noilh-Souih Koreanhrrmolory of the *New' Dialogue"Research Service,

February. The athletes of North and South Korea marched togetheringle flag in one of the most memorable moments of0 Sydney Olympics, in sharp contrast to their bitter disputes over8 Seoul Olympics. The two sides have agreed on plana to repair and reconnect the severed North-South railroad that ran through the peninsula until thewis divided more thanentury ago. and toighwaythe tracks to facilitate commerce and other exchanges. Rail reconstruction and mine clearing has begun, to make possible the new links through the heavily fortified DMZ.evelopment that started earlier. South Korean and foreign tourists have continued to visit North Korea's Diamond Mountain by tbe thousands. North Korea and South Korea's Hyundai Corpceabon have continued discussions on the establishment of an export processing zone atistorically important city in theof the militarily sensitive area just north of the DMZ. Many of these items represent interactions which are incomplete and in some cases have run Into problems. But every one of them is unprecedented inyear struggle between the rival regimes that inhabit the Korean peninsula.

In the international area, the North Korean dogma of jucfte has given way to an almost dizzying drive for engagement. Kim Chong-il sent Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rote, widely regarded as tbe second most powerful figure in the regime, to sec President Clinton in Washington, carrying unexpectedly sweeping proposals to virtually eliminate North Korea's long-range missile programs. Secretary of State Maddeine Albrighteam of high US officials flew to P'yongyang to negotiate further about the missiles, Ixn were unable forge agreementeal before the Clinton admirnstration left office. North Korea resumed ncernalization talks with Japan in0iatus of eight years. In July P'yongyang joined its first regional security organization, the Asian Regional Forum sponsored by Southeast Asianonth later it renewed its application for membership in its first international financial organization, the Asian Developmetii Bank. Meanwhile. Kim Chong-il held summit meetings with the leaders of China and Russia. In September his government sent letters to the European Union and every European country proposing the opening of relation*orth Korea has established diplomatic relations wiih Italy, Australia, the Philippines. Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada and Spain and has moved toward full relations with several others. Nearly all of these developments are also unprecedented.

In Pursuitummit

In examining the motive forces behind these changes, the central focus most be on North Korea. Although Kim Dae-jung's sunshine policyey factor in the developments, it brought few results during its first two years because Kim Chong-il was not ready fully to engage.24 South Korean presidents from Park Chung Hee through Kim Young Sam had tried at one time or another to establish serious relationships wilh Kim

Il-sung, tbcir counterpart in the north, and all except Park ardently sought summit meetings, but with only minimal success. Kim Dac-jimg was more determined and more consistent than his predecessors and deserves much credit, but even his extensive efforts came to littleecision was made lo P'yongyang to respond in kind.

For roost of the half century since the creation of the regime. North Korea's role on the world scene was that of menace to the peace. Its attack acrossh parallel that started the Korean War, its massive and forward-deployed post-war military force, its practice of terrorism and its bristling vocabulary of threats madeariah state to be dealt with disapprovingly and as liule as possible by most of the nations of the world. Beginning with the death of Kim Il-sung and the evidence of its poverty and deprivation in tbe, North Korea was seen lesshreat and more as anbasket case and the object of humanitarian assistance. Beginning with the0 summit meeting. North Korea and its leader began to be accepted for the first time in termsormal state. What had been shrouded in mystery began to be explored; what had been cause for either anxiety or pity began to be engaged diplomatically and examined at high levels by many of the world's democratic governments.

In exploring Kun Chong-il's turn toward engagement, it is necessary first to understand that it did not come out of the blue. His father, Kim Il-sung, the founder of the state, sought on several occasions to engage South Korea for his own purposes and on bis own terms. These efforts go all the way backhen he invited the nationalist leader Kim Koo to meetings in P'yongyang, although under conditions which were intended to establishung's surjeriority.hile exploring tbe initiative of Park Chung Hee that led to the first North-South joint declaration, Kim ll-sung endorsed meetings and frequent contacts betweenhe authorities,"parties and social organizations" and even the "rulers" of the two Koreas as part of efforts to eliminate misuno^rstandings and achievebe Great Leader, as he was known in North Korea, and undertook secret talks, including discussion of summits, with South Korean presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo Moreover,e agreed toull-scale summit meeting in tbe North with Kim Young Sam and was actively preparing for it on the very day he died.13

Whensked Kim Yongenior aide to both North Korean leaders, whether Kim Il-sung had engaged in internal discussions before offering4 summit, he responded that this was unnecessary becauseorth-South stimmitlong establishedut

" Kim II Sung Wfarfa.oreign Languages Publishing.

For details, ace Don Oberdorfer. Ths Twoontemporary History,asic.

thai ihe South had alwaysay lo thwart it in the past.sked Hwang Jang Yop. who hadenior aide loung4 but who defected to the Southhy the Great Leader had agreed io4 summit meeting. He responded that there were three reasons: to avoid warangerous situation; to obtain South Korean money to overcome the North's economic crisis; and to build up ihe pro-North Korean factions which still existed in the South.

In the imrnediaie aftermath of Kim It-sung's death, hrs son and hair appeared ready to move ahead to an early summit.eeting inwith his father's funeral, Kim Chong-il told Parklose aide to the cult leader the Reverend Moon Sun Myung, lhat he wished to hold sum-mil talks with Seoul, which Park described as sure lo take place inailer ofhis, however, was before President Kim Young Sam, lhe South's incumbent leader, refused to express condolences at Kim It -sung's death and placed his military on full alert instead Kim Young Sam's actions and his belief that the collapse of the DPRK was near deeply offended the authoriiiea ihe North, who had little to do with him for the rest of his time as presideni.

The coming to power of Kim Dae-jung as South Korea's presidenirucial factor in bringing about the North-South summit. Not only did it eliminate the impediment of Kim Young Sam. but moreit brought to the leadership inerson ready to deal. To myin talks with himirst met him inKim has consistently advocated peaceful coexistence and the easing of North-Soulh tensions throughout his entiree was red-baited for these positionsuccession of South Korean politicians and presidents, but be never gave them up. In his inaugural address one declared the essence of his engagement, or Sunshine, policy: *Tim. we will never tolerate armed provocation of any kind. Second, we do not have any intention to harm or absorb North Korea. Third, we will actively pushand cooperation between the South and North beginning with those areas which can be the most easily agreedhese were remartable sutementHouth Korean president. In Ihe months thai followed Kim initialed gestures and declaraoons to follow through and prove bis sincerity.

North Korea responded warily at first, harshly criticizing Kim and hisalthough in notably leas vitriolic words than had been used regarding his predecessor. Despite lhe frustrating absence of positive responses. Kim persisted in his policies and insisted that eventually they would succeed. This unwavering persistenceey element in his success.

imxza mranitSeoul.orea Heraid. I*at iarfcacuaioct on his earlyee "Rial Taa-caaing's Pastcjcable from American Enibaay Seoul io Secretary ot Siaac.0 Cooftdenual.a possession of the author.

irst saw Kim as presideni inonth after hishe told mc, "We're now waiting for the North Koreanhink there is discussion arnong the North Korean leadership about how to change their policy toward Southaw him nextear later inhere was growing criticism in Seoul of the sunshinebecause of the absenceisible response. Nonetheless, Kim stood firm, saying, "We have had some positivefour party talks, talks on the underground [suspect) racuity, missile talks, general officers* talks, Kim Chong-il's meeting with [Hyundai founder] Chung Ju-yungesult of the separation of politics from economics,0 South Korean tourists visiting theonsider those things to be indirect responses to my policy.'* He added,on't bunk the engagement policy is perfect or is certain to bringit is the best wc cany the time of our third meeting during bis presidency inim was beginning to receive secret runts of more direct North Korean responses, but he did nol lip his hand. Asked about Ihe lacklear-cut response to his overtures, Kim told me, "We told North Korea when they respond to our efforts for peace, we will respond" He expressed the belief that ihe activities of former Secretary of Defense William Perry and the growing solidarity of the United States, South Korea, and Japan wouldositive influence on North Korea.

The Decisions8

In retrospect, according to senior figures involved in North Korea policy in both Seoul and Washington, August and8 appears to have been the period when new decisions began lo emerge in P'yongyang that led erventually to serious engagement. Paradoxically, the developments of those crucial weeks seemed at lhe time to be pointing toward intensified conflict with the United States, Japan, and other nations.

In North Korea military and political leaders were summoned tofor two related events:h anniversary of the founding uf thePeople's Republic of Korea, and the first meeting sinceung's death of the Supreme People's Assembly, in theory the highestauthority in the country. The SPA meeting amended the constitution, introducing elementshinese-style socialist market economy, bringing younger, more pragmatic bureaucrats to positions of power to replacerjgrjreheads, and centralizing governmental authorityabinetlo operate under the direct control of Kim Chong-il. Four years alter his father's death, Kim Chong-il was officially designated the nation's leader as chairman of the National Defenseosition which was declared to be "the highest post of theim Chong-il's choosing to ruleilitary post and the increasing prominence of military leaders in thethe fast-rising Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok. who was given the honor of nominating Kim Chong-il to an assemblyto many observers that North Korea was rapidly oecoming an even more rnihtarized regime

Since his father's death and especiallyim had beenreat deal of time establishing and improving close relations with the North Korean military. He was preparing to be designated general secretary of Ihe ruling Workers'ong awaited event that look place in October thatisitor to P'yongyang7 noticed some of the extraordinary ways in which he was garnering rruihary support. Large numbers of officers had been promoted. General officers, of whom there were now many, were being driven around the capital by uniformed drivers in new Mercedes and BMW limousines. Despite the famine in thepecial floor of the Koryo Hotel, the capital's best, had been set aside for tbe lavish wining and dining of senior military officers. Outside ihe capital, Russia-style dachas orresidences were springing up for the use of military leaders. As It turned out, Kim Chong-il's new post as chairman of the National Defenserth the veteran lo Mvong Rot. former chief of the Air Force, at his side, cemented his grip on power, including power over iheand set the stage for greater diplomatic flexibility.

The domestic nuuteuverings over ihe new constitution and new posts for Kim Chong-il and younger technocrats were overshadowed for the rest of the worldpectacular event with international repercussions. which apparently was intended to celebrate Kims ascendancy': the launching onugusthree-stage rocket known asestng area on the country's East Coast. Participants in theh anniversaryflashed cards in unison thatocket rising in the air, aprobably created and rehearsed weeks, if not months, in advance The announced purpose of the rocket was toatellite in spacethe revolutionary hymns, "the song of General Kim Il-sung and the song of General Kim Chong-il" as it flew in orbit around the earth. USsaid, however, lhat the satellite failed and fell into the ocean.

Notwithstanding the satellite's failure, ihe rocketolid fuel third statereater range then had been expected, giving it enhanced potential toormidable military missileeadly payload. Thetest was front-page news, far overshadowing the domesticchanges that were hard to assess. In the most dramatic physical threat to Japan since World War II, Ihe rocket flew over the Japanese islands, alarming the Japanese people and also causing great concern in Washington, where it added punch and power to the drive toational missile defense. An American official who was in close touch with P'yongyang at the time believes the North Koreans did not anticipate ihe powerful political impact of the launch.

North Korea had nolotential ballistic missilend thatodong rocket of much snorter range. P'yongyangest of its longer-range projectile in6 but postponed it after US representations. Inorth Korea publicly offered to

negotiate with the United States an end to missile sales and perhaps to deployments, but Washington did not respond. Preparationsest were resumed in8 while military and political leaders were being summoned for the meeting of the Supreme People's Assembly.

The Taepodong test, whichotal surprise to allew experts in tbe outside world, resurrected the perception of North Koreailitary threat after years of being seen primarily as an area of humanitarian disaster. The tests came only six weeksponsored commission to assess the ballistic missile threat to the United States, headed by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, reported that the threat was greater and more imminent than the executive branch had acknowledged. The North Korean launch seemed tailor-made to prove the point The launch also came just weeks after the public revelation that US intelligenceNorth Korea of preparing to cheat on4 nuclear-weapons accord byiant hole in the ground tolandestine nuclear facility.

All this greatly strengthened the hand of conservatives in Congress, who had never liked4 Agreed Framework nuclear deal, which created the first non-hostile US relationship with tbe DPRK and accorded legitimacy to the North Korean regime. The possibility that North Korea was preparing to cheat on its nuclear obligations while testing threatening missiles was of grave concern even to those who had been backers of the Agreedinside and outside the Clinton administration. To save the nuclear accord and the tenuous US-North Korean relationship from being scuuled by Congress, President Clinton named former Secretary of Defense William Perry as North Korea policy coordinator toull-scale study andabout what to do regarding North Korea. Although no one guessed it at the time of their inception. Perry's activities would become an important element in North Korea's turn toward engagement

The Aid-Based Regime

Nearly everyone who has examined Kim Chong-il's turn towardhas identified economic riecessity as the principal motive force. Kim Dae-jung, for example,inner meeting of Korean experts in New Yorkhat "North Korea's desperate situation, [its| economic travail,'* was the most important reason behind Kim Chong-U's agreement to the June summit The North Korean leader realized, according to Kim Dae-jung, that without improved relations with South Korea, "others won't help" the North in its economic quest This was especially true of the United States, Kim told the dinner meeting. North Korea wished to sideline South Korea while responding to the United States, he said But "the United States clearly rejectede said.

Because aumoritative data is missing, there is much dispute about thestate of North Korea's economic output It is almost universally agreed

by outside observers, however, thai (he economy had beenharppath beginning with the collapse or* the Soviet Union1 and especially since the death of Kim Il-sunghere istrong consensus that the economy began to "stabilize"89ery low level, which was close lo an economic collapse. The South Korean centra] bank, the Bank of Korea, went so far as toercent gain for North Korean national Incomeut this figure is widelyWhether North Korea's economy stabilized, hit bottom, or actually turned around near ihe end of the decade, it seems likely thai the relative improvement enabled Kim Chong-il to experience enoughreather to experiment with externa! economic supportore fundamental nature than mere humanitarian food aid for subsistence purposes It is also possible that he realized that humanitarian aid IO starving people was not likely to continue forever. DorK* countries and aid groups, weary from yeanostly man-made famine in which as manyillion or more people may have died, were beginning to be afflicted with fatigue.

Starting with the reports of extreme famine in outlying areas in the, the international community began supplying humanitarianprincipally food and medicine, into North Korea. The aid throughgovernment grants, Ihe UN's World Food Program, private aid agencies, and the heavy fuel oil provided by the United States through the KoreanEnergy Development Organization (KHDO) under4 nuclear accord produces0 million annually, according io Marcus Noland, the most careful independent record keeper of such data. This aid has come fromifferent countries, with the United States, South Korea, China, Japan, and the European Union being largest contributors. In addition. North Korean income from missile sales and illicit activities such as counterfeiting and the drug trade adds up to nearly as much. Noland hashese sums are roughly equal to the aggregate value of all of North Korea's recorded exports of slightly less thanillion per year.

Aside from China, which wuhes to keep North Korea afloat for security and ideological reasons, the moat likely source of immediate economicis South Korea, many of whose citizens originated in the North and whose businessmen speak ihe same language. North Korea's largest and most important individual benefactor these days is South Korea's Hyundai group, tbe country's largest industrial combination,year-old founder. Chung Ju Yung, was born in North Korea and has always wished io aid the people he left behind. Inamonlh after becoming head of Ihe government, Kim Chong-il played host to the visiting industrialist in

* See Marcus Noland, "Between Collapse anileiMerpreuiion of ihe North Koreannstitute foror ao anecdotal account usingjOTmalislir iretholi tit Ninth KmiiuI iMfnvettierit, see Doug. Korea Back From Theothuigion5arcusorth Korea's Cstemal Economicntthuic for International Ecooorrucs (HE web1

P'yongyang, They agreedeal under which Hyundai would pay Northillion per month to bring tourists from South Korea and,from other countries to the famed Diamond mountains just north of the DMZ. The enormous potential of this connection in Korean terms is suggested by the fact that the Hyundai group's combined sales7than five times the national output of North Korea. Hyundai's payments0 million in the hist six months ofMountain tourism mightodest sum in international financial terms, but it was close to the total sales of North Korea's largestyundai claimed when tbe deal was struck that it would be self-supporting, but it has turned out toig money loser. The company, now in growing economic trouble, has asked North Korea, so farto permit it to slash its payments in half. The deal remainsin Seoul, especially since Hyundai has been making its payments in cashorth Korean bank account in Macao, which reportedly benefits Kim Chong-il and his luling elite but not the North Korean people.

Although Hyundai's dealings with North ostensibly are the workings ofbusiness, in fact the Kim Dae-jung government hasritically important role.9 Chung Ju-yung was the first important South Korean industrialist to visit the North, but the disapproval of the Kim Young Sara government prevented turn from returning to negotiate possible deals. Kim Dae-jung, on the other hand, encouraged Hyundai's activities with the North under his policy of separating politics from business, The Diamond Mountain tourism deal was widely hailed as the first fruit of Kim Dae-jung's sunshine policy. There have been widespread suspicions thai Kim's government has acted to protect the ailing conglomerate from its creditors in order to further the North-Southenior aide to Kim described Hyundai's dealings with the North as an important part of aprocess, especially In8 andhat the Diamond Mountain payments continued even during periods of increased tension between the two governments was an important lesson foraccording to the aide. "They began to truste said.

Looking at these developments, Marcus Noland recently described the DPRK as "an increasingly aid-dependentisit to Seoul in1 observed much the same phenomenon and reported in The Washington Post that North Korea's increasing dependence on outsiderepresentsea change in the country's relations with the outsidethat, in the long run, is likely toreater effect on thisdivided peninsula than the current controversylandesti ne nuclear facility or concern about its surprisingly sophisticatedn my view the significance of this change is very great in

" Noumd, as eked above

* Don Obenlorfer.ation With an Iron Fist and an Outstretched.

political as well as economic terms, internally as well as externally. Although the DPRK maintains the slogan of "militaryhe recentof Kim Chong-il and governmental officialshange inFrom the time of his father's death4he great rnajority of announced activities by Kim Chong-il were with military units or on nulrtary occasions, lhat began to changeven though be had become chairman of the Military Commission. In the firstonthse was officially reported to have made at leastn-the-spottours in the economic sector compared toilitary inspection visits. He had made more thanililary visits the yearimultarxously, both Kim and his government began spending much more time with people from rhe outside world. Kim was reported to have engaged inith foreignersany more than in the pest. Accordingouth Korean intelligence report, lesser ranking DPRK officialsverseas visitsompared8 and"

Although P'yongyang stillose of superiority in dealings with outsiders and often acts in recalcitrant ways that frustrate its benefactors, it has so far been careful to yield on (he issue at handreaking point is reached. For example,outh Korean tourist was briefly held on charges of trying toorth Korean soldier to defect, the Kim Chong-il regime stepped in quickly to put (he matter right. The most notable exception lo this pattern has been relations with Japan, which is the likely source of billions of dollars in aid because it generously supplied aid to South Korea when (hose two couniries normalized their relationseal with Japan, while logical and beneficial to P'yongyang, remains to be made, possibly because of Kim Il-sung's famous history as leader of an anti-Japanese guerilla group and because of the deep-seated cultural and historical antipathy between all Koreans and the Japanese who occupied their country in the first half ofh century.

Kim's openingshe outside world in the June summit and thereafter have madeore acceptable aid recipient.onvincing case could be made thai the blame for bis actions lay elsewhere, returning to anposture of threat would be hazardous for Kim It would probablyevere cutback or even an end to moat of the humanitarian aid, except for aid from the reliableoubt that Kim wishes to place his future entirely in (he hands of his massive Chinese neighbor.

Following the arrival of (he first tourist shipiamond Mouniain in8 and (he beginning (hen of (he monthly cash payments. North Korea began to make overture* toward governmental relations with

* For data on Kim's activities, Kwak Scung-'i.ove "TowardtMgV Poini. December..

u Noiiyuki Suzlki. "North Korea under Kimaper presented at the Conference oa North Korea Policy after the Ferry.

the South. Inhe Notth publicly prcposed high-level North-South political talks, and privately sent messages through privateasking for economic assistance- The following month P'yongyang agreed to permit US access to the disputed underground site at Kumchang-ni in return for humanitarian food assistance. In missile talks P'yongyang negotiators expressed willingness to suspend its missile exports in return for compensation and finallyroposed figure, SI billion annually for three years. The United States declined, but the talks continued.

Toward Breakthroughs Wtih Seoul andariety of signals from P'yongyang in the early months9 suggested that Kim Chong-il was preparing to move ahead toward ties with South Korea and possibly with the United States- The atmosphere darkened notably in June, however,ine-day standoff between North and South Korean naval vessels in the Yellow Sea resulted in tbe sinkingorth Korean torpedo boat and the death of aboutorth Korea seamen, but no serious injury to ROK sailors or equipment. Shortly after the naval dash. North-South diplomatic talks in Beijing, which had been expected lo result in major progress, broke up because of bitter charges and countercharges about the incident.

At the time, the South Korean and international press was full ofabout whether hard-liners in P'yongyang had mitigated the conflict toorning North-South rapprocneinent, or whether Kim Chong-il himself was to blame. Moreear after the clash, senior US and South Korean officials said they knew at the time that the confrontation wasThe actual causeoubling in the annual quota demanded from North Korean fishermen for crabs which inhabit the waters of theSea, including those on the southern side of the Northern Limitautical dividing line which North Korea has never fullyl wasn't planned by eitherS official in retrospect, "but once you got into it, itest ofad it not been for the naval clash, the dramatic North-South developments0 might well have taken placeccordingenior ROK official. If so. this would have given Kimngagement policies more time to work, and might have allowed timeweeping US-DPRK missile deal before President Clinton left office.

Tlir American track of Kim Chong-il's engagement with the outside world began to take shape with naming of William Perry in8 to be policy coordinator for Northeasure of near desperation in order lo save the policy from fatal blows aondtusiered by an angry Congress. The former Defense Secretary initially thought the job wouldew months at most; in fact, it engaged him intensively forear. Perry, who had presided at the Pentagon when the United States and North Korea came close to war in Juneonsulted extensively both inside and outside the government and especially with the allies in Seoul and Tokyo. In May

e flow to P'yongyang to present the North Korean government with his views and obtain its ideas, presenting himself as speaking not only for the United States but South Korea and Japan as welL

A crucial element of Perry's findings was that the United States mint "deal with the North Korean government as it is, not as we might wish it ton clearer terms than ever slated before atigh level. Perry accepted North Koreaeality and indicated lhat the United States, like the South Korea of Kim Dae-jung, would not seek to undermine it- This was of central importanceim Chong-il. In P'yongyang, Perry outlined two different roads thai potentially lay ahead for the foreign relations of the North Korean regime.'1 One road involved "complete and verifiable assurances that the DPRK does notuclear weapons program" as well as "the complete and verifiable cessation of testing, production and deployment" of long-range missiles and complete cessation of long-range missile capons. If this path were lo be chosen, be said, "the United States and its allies would,tep-by-step und reciprocal fashion, move to reduce pressures on the DPRK it perceives aspecifically, he said, the Uniied Slates would normalise relations with the DPRK, and take olher positive steps. He said South Korea and Japan had indicated they would do likewise

Tbe other path, if North Korea should reject these proposals, he mentioned only briefly. In this case, "the United Slates and its allies would have to take other steps to ensure their security and contain theerry ssud. He did not spell out what he meant, but it was not lost on his audience that heormer US defense secretary.

The North Korean officials took the Perry report seriously but did not respond imnwdialoly. Coming out of P'yongyangS Air Force plane, the members of Perry's team debated what they had heard Some otficials felt that North Korean officials had merely stuck to their rhetoric and were not likely to respond positively. Another group, including most of those with extensive previous experience with North Korea, were encouraged that the proposals had not been rejected and saw signs they might be accepted in the end. The latter group was right.eijing meeting in June, one month after ihe Perry visit to P'yongyang, American officials received clearthat North Korea was interested. Three months after thai, inNorth Korean negotiator Ambassador Kim Gye Owan officially told US Ambassador Charles Kartmaneeting in Berlin lhat North Korea would agreeoratorium on long-range missile flight tests in return for lifting of substantial US economic sanctions. The deal was done, and on Saf^canbtilinton announced the lifting of most sanctions against North

a "Review of Uniied States Polxy Toward Norm Korea: Findings sad Recommeniattons,-Unclassined upon by Dr. William J. Perry, US North Korea policy coordinator,9 (from State Department Web she).

SO

Korean products. Perry and his aidesigh of relief, believing that North Korea had accepted the fuse path and was now headed toward arelationship.

At the next US-North Korean diplomatic meeting, in Berlin in rrud-Novernber. North Korea proposed and United States accepted the idea ofigh-level emissary from P'yongyang to Washington to codify the missileand take the next steps toward mutual engagement The Americansending the emissary as quickly as possible, so lhat the issue would not become involvedolitical debate in the US presidential election year. The North Korean negotiators seemed sympathetic to that plea, as ihey were inmeetings in January andut as the months rolled on. each lime the North Korean diplomats were unable toale.

Why P'yongyang stalled on naming its "high-level emissary" in9 and0 remains somethingystery. Perhaps it was because Clinton, after announcing the lifting of sanctions inid not actually do so until after the North-South summit inerhaps it was because, as North Korean diplomats said, P'yongyang did not wish to send an emissary who would arrive in Washington while bis country was still officiallyerrorist nation. Perhaps it was because in the meantime Kim Chong-il for reasons of his own had decided to move first with South Korea. Or perhaps it was, as some US officials have guessed, because of internal joclceying in P'yongyang between Deputy ForeignKang Sok Ju and the Foreign Ministry, in charge of negotiations with the United States, on the one hand, and Workers Party Secretary Kim Yong Sun and his Asia-Pacific Peace Committee, which is in charge of dealing with the South, on the other. By0 it seemed clear to P'yongyang that quick money was nol likely to come via Washington, and thebegan to sense that North Korea had turned its attention to relations with the South.

Closing the Summit Deal Just beforeorth Koreaignal of sorts by participating in North-South basketball matches in Seoul, the first such sports exchanges in eight years. Particularly significant was the attendance of Song Ho Oyong, the senior deputy io Party Secretary Kim Yong Sunell connected veterannowledgeable South Korean official denied that Song met any government officials while in Seoul, but suspicious US experts expressed doubt Song had come south only loasketball game, even though Kim Chong-il is reputed toasketball fan.

The first clear-cut evidence that something was changing in P'yongyang camehen Kim Chong-il traveled to the Chinese embassyive-hour dinner with the departing Chinese ambassador. The remote North Korean leader rarely received ambassadors under anyfor him to visit an embassy was astonishing in North Korean terms.

In retrospect, it appears that Kim used the occasion to prepare the way for the secret crip he made to see Chinese leaders inay, on the eve of the North-South summit

In Seoul, Kim Dae-jung was heartenedariety of signals from P'yongyang suggesting it was time for gcwemmcnt-to-govr^nment talks about economic cooperation and peacefulecision was secretly made in Seoul to tryummit meeting with Kim Chong-il on grounds that negotiationsictatorial government can only succeed if they start at tbe top. After learning that the North Korean leader wasto find out what he might obtain fromummit meeting, Kim Dae-jung putist of incentives that he announcedarchBerlin declaration'1reviously scheduled visit to the GermanThe initiative was so hastily prepared that American officials were not informed until hours before the announcement, even though US-North Korean diplomatic meetings were taking place simultaneously in New York. ROK Foreign Ministry officials responded to US dissatisfaction by saying the declaration was still being formulated even as Kim Dae-jung was en route to Berlin.

Although private sector economic cooperation was underway due to hisof separating politics from economics, Kim Dac-jung declared in Berlin, "the time is ripe for government-to-govemment cooperation" on much larger projects of the "socialncluding expansion ofharbors, railroads, and electrical and communications facilities. Moreover, he said the solution to the North's chronic food shortages would not be yearly food aid from outside but "comprehensive reforms in the delivery of quality fertilizers, agricultural equipment, irrigation systems, and other elementstructurale pledged that the ROK"is ready to respond positively" to DPRK requests. To make sure that North Korea paid attention, Kim reiterated the Berlin offers in secret talks in Singapore between aides of the two governments andessageto officials in P'yongyangisiting American academic.

North Korea's response was quick. Even before he returned home,to an ROK diplomat, Kim learned that the DPRK wished to explore his offers. On IS March, Kim assigned Culture-Tourism Minister Park Jte-won. one of his closest aides, to meet secredy with North Koreans in pursuitummit meeting. Park was chosen rather than the Unification Minister or others who would be expected to work on such matters because they would be more closely watched by the press and the bureaucracy. Two days later. Park met secretly in Shanghai with Song Ho-gyong, the veteran diplomat and senior aide to Kim Yong Sun who had come south in December. After several further contacts. Park and Song reached full agreementpril in Beijing on the summit meeting to be held in mid-June in P'yongyang between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Chong-il. The news was announcedpril, just three days before nationwide parliamentary elections in the

Souih. leading Ihc opposition Grand National Party to condemn it aspoliticking to grab votes."

This is not the place to recount the fascinating interplay atune summit meeting in P'yongyang. One point, however, should be borne in mind: die North Korean leader, who had been depicted as an enigmatic and eccentric playboy shrouded in mystery, with his finger irresponsibly on the military trigger, emerged in the light of dayensible and even appealing ruling figure. After considerable mteraction withenior South Korean official described Kim astrong dictator" but also as "open-minded andoodecisive when he ispolite to older men around him" and with an unexpected sense of humor. An American official who accompanied Secretary of State Albright later in the year described Kim in remarkably similar terms asell-informed and extremelyractical, thoughtful, listened verywith] asense ofot theot of people por-irayed himoth tbe Korean and American official were impressed that Kim Chong-il took notes himself in important meetings.

Although the North-South summit meeting wasestival for the two Koreas, US interests were not ignored Kim Dae-jungritten document about the missile issues to Kim Chong-il, and told him that the missile negotiations with the United States must be broughtmooth and satisfactory conclusion. Otherwise, he said, you cannot expect (he North-South accords to go ahead. The South Korean president also spoke to his counterpart about nuclear issues, saying thai (he Agreed Framework must be strictly adhered to.

In perhaps the most mteresting exchange, according to Kim Dae-jung, the North Korean leader said be agreed it was desirable that US troops stay on the Korean peninsula for stability and peace against big powers even after an accord between the two Koreas. This statement was startling to many people when it was revealed by Kim Dae-jung in interviewsish-ington Post and The New York Times in September. However, North Korean officials had been saying in private talks5 that American forces might remain indefinitely under "new peace arrangements" involving both the North and South, in order to bring confidence and stability to lhe Koreant the same time, though, the official position of the DPRK in the Four Party Talks has consistently been that the departure of American troops must be on the agenda for peace talks.

" For tbe quotes from the American official, Doug Struck and Steven Mufson,Korea's Kim Sheds Image of 'Madman'" Wtuhtngtonhe first known statements slong these lines were reported by Sciig Ham son after his meetings with Kane So* hi and DPRK General Ri Chan Be* ineearticle.oft Landing inoreign Policy,

Uniil (he June summit. US diplomats often passed along messages from Seoul to the North Koreans in their regular diplomatic meetings.urn-about in June. Kim Dae-jung passed along messages from Washington to his North Korean counterpart Seoul was unhappy with Americans taking the lead in talks with North Korea; despite their rhetorical fealty to direct negotiations between the two Koreas, Americans were edgy about being left out of their dialogue.

Ri entry of ihe Untied Stales. It did not take long after the June summit and the flurry of immediate North-South meetings that followed for the United Stales lo be back in the game. On the first day of the next round of US-North Korean diplomatic talks, in New York oneptember. North Korean ambassador Kim Oyc Owan announced that P'yongyang was ready Iu send Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, the number two person in tho ruling National Defense Commission, to Washington as the long awaited "high levelThe Americans were surprised and pleased. They had not expectedigh-ranking visitor, nor one who was so well situated to discuss tlie security issues that arc the United Stales' most important concerns.

Was the resolve by Kim Chong-il to engage South Korea and Unitedingle decision or two separate decisions? Thisascinating question whose answer mighl suggest the degree of the cornpreheruave planning or of impromptu maneuver on the part of tbe North Korean leader. As early asune, Kim Chong-il told the visiting Korean-American co-respondent Julie Moon that he would send to Washington as hisigherfigure than was under discussion in westernorth Korean diplomats made similar comments to Americans on several occasions last summer. Neither Kim Chong-il nor the diplomats mentioned the name of Vice Marshal Jo. but it is fair speculation that this is who the top leader, al any rate, had in mind in June. It so. he clearlyingle decision to engage comprehensively.

When Vice Marshal Jo arrived inctober, he brought two more surprises: first, ihai North Korea was prepared to negoiiate an end lo development, production, and sales of long range ballistic missiles, and was even willing to discuss deployments and other issues of concern to the United States; and second, that his principal objective was toisit to P'yongyang by no less than the President of the United States. Although be wore civilian clothes during most of his visit, Jo donned his marshal's uniform with row after row of service and battle ribbons for his call onClinton al the White House. Jo bandedetter from Kim Chong-il. and expressed the belief that all difficulties between the two nations could be worked outeeting between the two lop leaders. The high-ranking visitor appeared to be disappointed when the Americans insisted that Clinton could not travel to North Korea without cxtens vc

" Julie Moon dispatch from US- Alien News Service datetined Woman, couneiy tf Julie Moon.

preparations, sad suggested lhat Secretary of Stale Albright should go to P'yongyang first to work oat the details. Jo and Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju, who accompanied him to Wastaigton, were pleased, however, with the US-DPPK joint cornniuruoue which cleciared that "the two sides stated thatneirher govrrnment would have hostile intent toward the other andthe conunitinent of bothlo make every effort in the future toew relationship free from pasthe declared absence of hostility and enmity is of crucial importance in the North Korean scheme of things, just as the declarations that they were no longer enemies were of crucial importance in ending the Cold War between United States and the Soviet Union.

Albright's two-day visit toctober made substantial progress in the discussions about limiting or eliminating missiles, but they fail to solve all the issues at hand. Lower-level negotiators were unable to close the gap in subsequent meetings in Kuala Lumpur. It was finally decided over New Year's weekend that not enough time remainedeal with sufficient importance to be struck torip by Clinton before he left officeanuary.

With Ncrrh-South discussions and movement continuing. Europeanwith P'yongyang developing rapidly, and North Korean nornuUiutlon talks with Japanlow-moving track, the US-DPRK negotiations on missiles and full normalization are currently in limbo, awaiting decisions by the Bush administration. After the rapid changes that took place in Korea in theew situation has dawned.

Summary and Outlook

Who and what are responsible for the great change an the Korean peninsula?

Kim Dae-jung and his policies in South Korea were key factors in enticing North Korea to engagerand scale. In the United States. William Perryractical mute for North Korea to follow, opening the way to cooperation with the leading nation of the post-Cold War internationalJapan, China and other nations also played useful roles.

It is undeniable, though, thai the crucial decisions were made in the North and were made by Kimt is my belief that his decisions flowed from tendencies and objectives that have long existed, but that only now have coincided with cin^rratanccs thateasonably good chance for fulfillment. In otherelieve that what has developed in North Koreaose or aberration but is the consequence of possibilities with roots in the past

The historical record suggests that despite the ages-long tear by Koreans of being overwhelmed by its stronger neighbors and despite the sometimes belligerent talk of self reliance, the regime of tbe Kim Il-sung and Kim

SS

Chong-il was well aware since iu inception of the necessity to court the big powers that could strongly influence its future. Thus Kirn II-sung wasseeking to maneuver between the two great powers of communism, the Soviet Union ard China, while seeking in tix>desi fashion, at least sioonnection with Uniied States. VVhco the Soviet Unionand China emphasized markets over Marxism, thereafterformal and increasingly close relations with South Korea,ung placed growing emphasisotential US connection, even whilenuclear and missile programs to deter his enemies and protect North Korea in caselash. The weapons programs had the added advantage of seizing the attention oflhc United States. In the month before he died inim also decided toummit meeting with South Korea, which clearly would have had an impact on the AmericanIn fact it was an American, former Presideni Jimmy Carter, who obtained lhe news of his Kim's willingness loorth-Soulh sammit and brought it to Seoul.

After inheriting the regime from his father, Kim Chong-il initial iy was unable to move on the North-South front because of an antipathy lo (he South Korean President, Kim Young Sam, and due lo the unproven state of his authority and the dire slate of his sinking economy. He hadeal with lhe Americans on the nuclear program in4 Agreed Framework, but it had brought him neither the legiumacy nor the economic gains he had soughi and perhaps expecied. After cementing his authority and wiuiessing atodest upturn in his economy, Kim appears lo have decided in lhe second half8 toew rxuh wiih the mere-willing South Koreans aod with the Americans. The events90 flowed from that exploration

For Kim Chong-il, the most important immedialc objective appears lo have been economic assistance bringing the stabilization and permanent improvement of North Korea's economy, leading to the survival of his regime. In the final years of the twentieth century, the right circumstances seemed to comeassurance of his position as nationalodest improvement in the sinking economy, and receptivrin Seoul and Washington. Since early last year, al least, he has been trying to make lhe best of these opportunities.

It is well to remember lhat twice before North Korea has taken major steps toward engagement with the non-Communist world, only to rum back when conditions darkened.he opening to Park Chung Hee's South Korea was followed by new contacts abroad and the extensive acquisition cfmachinery and equipmenl intended to bring North Korean industryew era.3 Middle Easi war and oil embargo, which were notunbalanced the iniernaiional economy and made it difficult for North

So

Korea io pay for the industrial machinery it had imported. Instead of paying or agreeing to participate in an inusnaiional committee to oversee its debts. North Korea defaulted and refused to speak to its creditors, placing itselfthe pale of tbe inrtjnauonal ccoriornic life for decades to come

econd occasion, as the Soviet Union was coUapsingim II-Sung followed the advice of Chinese leaders inapprochement with the South and the Unitedide-ranging basic agreement with Seoul was signed at the end of that year, and Kim Yong Sun went totorocess of recooeiuatioo earlyhe favorablewere short lived. North Korea's refusal to submit to inspections of its nuclear program, to which it had previously agreed, led to escalating conflict with lite United Slates and almost brought the two couniries lo war

What is the likelihood that the policies of South Korea, the United States and other key actors will remain favorable to Kim Chong-il's engagement policies? This is an imponderable beyond the scope of this paper. If the weather outside remains suitable, what are the chances that Korea willpursue Ihe current opening despite any difficulties that may arise, and in so doing, successfully secure the existence of lhe regime into the foreseeable future? Any answer to tics must be highly soecjlative,ould rate the chances as less. The experiences of the former Communist states in the post-Cold War era suggest it is exceedinglyalthough not impossible, to make the changeentrally directed economy to some formarket economy,uided marketlhat con thrive in the contemporary world. China has done il. although daunting problems remain, but other states have done less well. No doubt Kim Chong-il'i recent trip to Shanghai was an object lesson for him in what can be done with strong leadership, the right policies and favorableIl is equally difficult, if not even more difficult,onverttable political system resting on the foundation of the consent of Ihe governed. Historically, North Korea is an extremely negative example in both the economic and political realms.

Having saidust add that Kim Chong-il has turned out toeader very different from previous depictions and thai he has done much more, more quickly and more srnoothty, to create favorable new conditions than anyone bad expected. This time last year, no one dreamed of thethat have taken place in recent months on the bitterly dividedand which, in my view,urning pointuture still unknown.rote in the last lines of my book. The Two Koreas, "Hold on to your hats. Koreaand of surprises."

North Korea's Engagement: Implications for South Korea

Oh

Institute for Defense Analyses

Standards

How engaging is North Korea? The answer depends on how engagement is defined. Much of tbe excitement generated by North Korea's recentefforts should be attributed not to what tbe Kim Chong-il regime is doing now but to what it has failed to do in the pastodern-daykingdom the changes are almost startling.ormal stale, they hardly deserve notice-Engagement can be defined in at least three ways: by process or events, by goals or intentions, and by consequences.orking definition,can be understoodrocess of non-punitive interaction designed to elicit cooperation. 'Ihis definition includes reference to both process and goals. Defining engagenbent in terms of process or events is relatively easy to do, but not especially useful in terms of predicting future policy, since process can serve any number of purposes besides the desire forThe Joint Declaration signed at the conclusion of0 inter-Korean summit may be intended by the two Koreas in very different ways, and if this is the case, it is likely to prove aseans towardas21 agreements. Engagement events can take many forms: economic, political, nuhfary, or social; bilateral or multilateral; gov-emmenial or nongovernmental.

Defining engagement accordingountry's intentions is more satisfying, since intentions explain present events and predict future ones. Butare often difficult to determine, especially on the pert of secretive actors such as the North Koreaningle engagement event can realize multiple intentions: the desire to communicate, to provide aid, to teach by example, or to undermine through increasing dependency. Students of North Korea are understandably reluctant to attribute North Korea's engagement intentions to peaceful purposes, given its history of using engagementover for aggression and united front tactics. But history should not blind us to changes. The tendency to attribute ulterior motives to North Korean initiatives may be an example of the "hostile attribution bias" as described some years ago by Ole Holsti. who cited the example of John Foster Dulles' refusal to attribute Soviet actions, do matter how peaceful, to anything other than an underlying aggressive intent

Defining engagement by consequences, regardless of the magnitude of events or seriousness of intentions that lead up to them,ragmatic approach that is most closely related to the concept of "implications of

andshake or conversation between leaders may yield far greater consequencesormal treaty. Orake another example, the act of opening to the outside world, which North Korea intendseans of inducing foreign direct investment and aid. may subsequently trigger events that fully engage the country in the international community. The tricky thing about defining engagement by consequences is thatare often substantially shaped by other countries' responses to engagement initiatives. How South Korea responds to North Korean engagement overtures will ultimately determine the consequences of those overtures, regardless of North Korea's original intentions.

Nonh Korea's diplomacy has become more active in the dosing years ofh century. The question that presents itself to foreign governments and potential investors is whether this flurry of North Korean activityecision to join the international community (on the community's own terms) or whether it is an effort to replace lost support from fellowregimes with new support for the dictatorial political methods and autarkic economic policies of the Kim Chong-il regime.

This discussion of the background and implications uf North Korea's engagement of South Korea beginsrief overview of recent instances of engagement, which form the necessary basis for drawing implications. The discussion then turns lo South Korea's responses to this engagement, which will materially influence Ihe course of engagement, and finallyimplications of engagement according to two scenarios; first, lhat North Korea's engaging behavior is an indication of its willingness to reform its political and economic system; or alternatively, that engagement is intended to fortify ihe Kim regime and lis "socialism in our own style."

Instances of Engii cement Pre-Summlt Events

The inter-Korean summit meetingatershed in South-North relations. But historic as il was. ii was certainly not the first time (hat North Korea had agreed to high-level meetings with the governing authorities of the South. The two Koreasong history of contactackground of hostility and violent acts. Notable examples ofand business engagementeries of Red Cross meetings culminating inorth-South Joint Communique, eight high-level meetings leading lo the adoption of ihe North-South Basic Agreement onyundai Chairman Chong Chu-yong's visit to North Korea io inspect the Mt. Kumgang area for developrnent innd (he Kim Young Sam-Kim II Sung summit talks scheduled foruly

co

ul cancelled after the death ofunguly. It should be asked how these contacts, which failed to bear fruit, differ from today's engagement proceedings. Did theyoundation for the present engagement, despite an interval of hostility in which the North Koreans twice (in4 andhreatened to turn South Korea and Seoulsea ofr is the present engagement built onnewer foundation of circumstances in and around the Korean peninsula?

Tbe election of President Kim Dae Jung did not seem lo melt the ice in P'yongyang. At tbe center of Kirn's engagement strategy were the three sunshine policy principles: 'not to tolerate armed provocation by Northnot toakeover or absorption of Northnd "to broaden reconciliation andorth Korean criticism continued until just before the summit talks were announced. Thus for the first two years of Kim's tenure most North-South contact wason-government nature, primarily through business contacts. Most notably,ears after his first visit, Hyundai's Cheng Chu-yong finally succeeded inontract to open Mount Ktimgang to tourists, with the first tour arriving in

In9 North Koreameeting of the government, political parties and organizations of the DPRK" at which .Secretary Kim Yong Sun offered to holdide-range dialogue between the north and the south, including the talks betweenhe catch was lhat the South Korean government first had to meet North Korea's long-standing demands to end cooperation with outsiders against tbe DPRKnd securitywith the Unitedbolish the National Security law, andpro-North Korean organizations full freedom of activity.

im Dae Jung, speaking at the Free University of Berlin, made three promises to the North Koreans: to "guarantee their nationalto assist in their ecooornic recoverynd to "actively support them in the internationaln return, Kim asked that North Korea guarantee to "abandon any armed provocation against the South once and foro "comply with its previous promises not to develop nuclearnd to "give np ambitions to develop long-rangehe day before tbe speech. South Korea hadorresponding four-point proposal dubbed the "Berlin Declaration" to the North Koreans at Panmunjom. In addition to offering to aid the North's economic recovery and asking for the realization of peaceful coexistence, the Declarationto resolve the issue of separated families and hold talks between South and North Korean authorities.

On IS March Radio P'yongyang rejected the Berlin Declaration us offering nothing new. reiterating that North Korea was prepared to engage in talks as soon as the South complied with precondition* announced in thehe next day tbe North's Committee for theReunification of tbe Fatherland (CPRF)roadside against Sooth's National Intelligence Service (NIS) citing the same preconditions, and adding that the North would never have any dealings with the NIS.

But in the background tbe Kim Chong-il regime was approaching the South. As is now known, in responseorth Korean proposal ofarch. President Kim sent his Culture and Tourism Minister Park he-won ontrips to China for four rounds of talks onndarch, another round of talks in Beijing onarch,hird set of talks in Beijingpril, which produced the summit agreement that was announced onpril, three days before the South Korean election for the National Assembly. An answer to the question of why the Kim Chong-il regime reversed iu petition on government-level talks al this time would go tar ia explaining North Korean motivations for engagemcnL

The summit, at the last minute delayed one day at North Koreas request (citing "problems of technicalersonal uiumph for both Kims, but particularly for the reclusive Kim Chong-il. who surprised and charmed his Sooth Korean guests (and apparently his own people) from the moment he appeared at the airport to greet President Kim and his(including President Kim's right-hand man. Yim Tong-woo, head of thehe full extent of the topics and informal agreements discussed was net disclosed. On his return. President Kim declared. 'There are [a) number u( good things that were understood, but it is not [the) proper time yet to reveal them."

The South-North Joint Declaration issued at the conclusion of the talks on IS June is taken by both Koreas as the new cornerstone for engagement. Like the previous agreements, the Joint Declaration opensall for the two Koreas to "independently" achievehrase interpreted by the North Koreans2 as calling for the end of the ROK-US security alliance. According to the Declaration, the two leaders find aelement" in their governments' respective models of reunification (the South's confederation of two politically independent states and the North's federal government overseeing national defense and foreignledge to "promptly resolve humanitarian issues" including visits of separated families and the return of imconverted North Korean prisoners held in the South; will promote "balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation andnd will pursue further government-level exchanges to implement the Declaration,romise by Kim Chong-il it* visit Seoul "at on appropriate time."

ents

Having secured whai theyeneficial agreement in terms of promised economic cooperationid) and independent reunification, the North Koreans have persistently called for the two sides to implement the Declaration "to thehe summit meeting and Joint Declarationlurry of gowrrirneai-leve] engagements, as summarized in the table

The implementation of posl-surnmit engagement is guided by agreements reached in the Ministerial Talks lead by South Korean Unification Minister Park Jae-kyu and North Koreas Senior Cabinet Councilor Jon Kura-jin. These talks prepare the way for discussion of more specific matters handled by the Red Cross talks, the military talks, and the economic talks.

The highest profile contacts are the Red Cross talks to arrange family reunions. At the first round of talks the two sides agreed to bold the first family reunions in August, and South Korea agreedepatriateprisooen (ie,he talks were reportedly stormy at times At tbe second round of talks an agreement was reached to hold second and third rounds of family reunions, to begin exchanging names of Koreans to confirm family survival and addresses, and to exchange letterseparated personsrial basis. The talks were criticized by the South Korean press for failing to address the issues of the return of hundreds of South Korean prisoners held in the North and the establishment of afamily reunion meeting place. The third round of Red Cross talks, postponed from0 to the end ofgreed to another family reunion, the exchange of letters and "one oreparated family members, to expand the size of the family search and letter exchange programs in the fixture, and to continue tothe establishmentarmly reunion center. The talks were repeatedly difficult and not only did the two sides fail to scklress the issue of the return of South Korean prisoners, but the North demanded that remainingprisoners held in the South be returned. By the end of the third round of talks North Korea's dialogue strategy was becoming clear delay and Until social reunification projects as much as possible

The August family reunion arranged by the first Red Cross lalks moved the entire South (andorean people with its heart-rending meetings of long-lost family inembers and relatives. Held in Seoul ond P'yongyang, it cost the South Korean government andillion. For the lucky participants, ihe reunion experience was mixed. According to one poll,ercent were happy with the meeting.ercent were more concerned about their northern relatives than before, andercent did not expect to have another chance of meeting them. The second reunions in latedid not command as much public attention as the first. Politicalmade by North Korean family members annoyed their South Korean kin and the South Korean press.

Korean Engagement,1

0 March

Declarauon

March

Korea proposes firsteries of meetings, China

South Korea announces potentialons of fertilizer aid

Summit meeting anno-jneed ,

May

une

Koreaons of fertilizer aid

Summit Meeting. Joint Declaration. P'yongyangay)

une

Korea1 ions of fertilizer aidTalk* Mi Ktimpanp

Julyugust

Ministerial Talks, Seoul

South Korean media heads visit Pyongyang

August

ugusteptember

offices re-opened, Parununjom

First Rurtify Reunions, Seouloagyang

Hyundai and North Korea ai-.ree to launch Kaesong industrial park

Second Ministerial Talks, P'yongyang

Return of unconverted prisoners to North Korea

Septembereptemberctober

Yong Sun visits Seoul and Ctieju

South Korea begins preparations for rail connections

Second Red Cross Talks. Mt. Kumgung _ _

First Defense Ministers meeting. Cheju

First working-level economic meeting. Seoul

Third Ministerialbeju

South Koreaons of food aid

October

South Korean civic and religious leadersnniversary of WPK

November

worklni' level economicongyang (postponed fromuober)

ecember

Family Reunions, Seoul and P'yongyang (postponedovember)

December

Ministerial Talks, P'yongyang (postponed fromovember)

December

Irvter-Korean Economic Coopcranonengyang

anuary

Koreaons of food aid

January

Red Cross Talks, Mt. Kumgang (postponed fromecember)

January

Korea provides Irmwmation on whereaboutsamily members

February

cooperation subcommittee meeting, Pyongyang

February

family reunions (postponedjcernber)

March

excbanites (postponed from November)

but Unrealized Contacts

(Mid-Sepiemcer?) Exchange of tour groups. Ml Packtu and Mt. Halla [Mid-November?) Second Defense Ministers Meeting

Fcbruarv)

Inter-Korean Economic Cocjperauon meeting

Talks between tbe North and South Korean military organizations were also high on the agenda of security-conscious South Koreans. The two defense ministers, meeting on Cfaeju islandeptember, issued ain which the two sides agreed to ease military tension in unspecified ways and permit entry into the DMZ for the purpose of reconnecting rail aod road links. By early1 five working-level military talks had been convened to discuss the issue of handling security in the DMZ during the reconnection of road and rail lines, with only vague reference to other tension reduction measures.

The first meeting of the Inter-Korean Committee to Promote Economic Cooperation wasecember in P'yongyang, preceded by working-level contacts. The two sides discussed power industry cooperationroviding electricity to Northonnection of the Kyongui rail line, Inrjin River flood control programs, the creation of an industrial park in Kaesong, and the actoption of trade and investment agreements. The North's chairman announced that, "Now that our sideweepingover issues like the formation of survey teams, we expect that there will be concessions from the South at the time of the second meeting to be held in Seoul."

in addition to these on-goingumber of one-time engagements occurrednugust, the beads of most of South Korea'smedia organizations visited P'yongyang anduncheonwith Kimeptember visit to Seoul and Cheju island by Secretary Kim Yong Sun was seenreparatory stepim Chong-il visit to South Korea. Secretary Kim was accompanied by the North's General Pak Jae-gyong, who presented three tons of North Korean mushrooms (valuedift from Kim Chong-il to designated South Korean recipients, as crigiiially offered at tbe summit talks. Thethen hastily returned to North Korea without meeting any South Korea military officials, thereby puzzling and disapDCdnting his hosts.

ast start, inter-Korean contacts began to slow in the last monthseetings and family reunions were postponed. Kim Chong-il's trip to Seoul remained unscheduled, making President Kim's trip look moreributary visit than an engagement visit. The North Koreans put offover settingermanent meeting place for family reunions, and said they would have to delay efforts to locate family members becausehortage of computers. The theory that North Korea had decided to switch its attention to relations with the US highlights the importance of theengagement context in explaining inter-Korean engagement.

South Korea's Role in Inter-Korean Engagement

South Korean Proposals and North Korean Rejections How much is Norm Korea initiating engagement for its own purposes and how much of its engagementesponse to South Korean overtures? North Korea showed little interest in irnplemenung the engagementof21 inter-Korean agreements. Wiih North Korea's economic and political fortunes declining even furtherim Chong-il initially rejected Kim Dae Jung's engagement proposals aa well. Bul lhe North Korean press has repeatedly called for the implementation of the Joinl Declaration, and to date both sides have met lhe minimumfor upholding the agreement. In tact, many of the voices counseling caution in implementing ihe agreement are from conservative security-minded and economy-minded South Koreans, who are concerned that the reconneclion of road and rail links will make the South more vulnerable to an invasion from the North, and that economic aid and invesiment will strengthen the Kim Chong-il regime and its mililary while draining (he bal-lered South Korean economy.

South Korean Aid

The path for North Korean engagement was smoothed if not paved by South Korean aid. South Korean government aid to North Korea5 (the high cost attributed to the use of domestic3 millionillionillionillionillion0 (plus0illion of food aidi "loan"illion from0 aidons of fertilizer announced on Mayonth before the summit meeting:ons of fertilizer announced onay before the firsmeeting.ons of0 Ions through the WFPreated as an unsecured loan) agreed to during the second working-level economic meeting in late September and announcedctober.0 South Korean aid surpassed in value aid from the test of the world. In1 the South pledged0 tons of grain to North Korea

Inter-Korean Trade and Investment

ost inter-Korean engagement wasusiness nature.9 inter-Korean trade (through third couniries)illion.he Southeries of "Laws on South North Economicrompting the cautious inauguration of chaebol investments in processing oo-<ommission IPOC) trade; trade jumped1 million13 millionhe NcsTh Korea nuclear controversythe business atmosphere until the controversy was resolved by the4 Agreed Framework,4 the South Korean

government lifted iu bin oo direct business contacts with North Korea.5 trade7 million but then leveled off for the next several years, constrained by the lack of improvement in North-South relations under the Kim Young Sam government.

Kim Dae Jungs proposal to separate politics and trade enabled South Korean companies to do business in North Korea without waiting for the government-level contact that North Korea continued to avoid.for the sunshine policy, the financial exists that struck South Korea7 restrained companies from entering new business ventures. Inter-Korean trade8 was down1 million;9 it bounced backup3 million.

These trade figures cover difterert kinds erf economic transactions, only some of which are strictly business. To take an example,0 inter-Korean trade5 million, but this figure includes economic aid from the South, trade involving the KEDO project, and Hyundai payments for permission to conduct its money-losing Mount Kumgang tours.these substantial sums, the estimated inter-Korean trade0 is8 million.

The lack of growth inrean commerce reflects business uncertainty about the health of the South Korean economy and the fact that without govemmenl-leveJ connections and guarantees, business transactions between the two Koreas entails unbearable risk. The North Koreans are known for their short-term business practices, taking as much as they can with tittle regard for establishing good will. They have been told that this is how business is done in tbe dog-eat-dog world of capitalism. Estimating the mood of South Korean busuies. interest in North Korea is cornpiicated by trie tact rhat tbe Kim Dse Jung government, in its desire to bolster its engagement policy,ositive spin oo inter-Korean business prospects. On the eve of ihe summit meeting announcernent. President Kim (with the foreknowledge of the meeting) predicted "an hnmense North Koreanboom, which would dwarf the business boom the country enjoyed with the Middle East countries, and small-to-medium-sized businesses will be granted opportunities to Invest in North Korea on an tsnimaginable scale."

Hyundai, the leading investor in North Korea, is motivated primarily by the patriotic sentiments of iu founder. From8 to the endyundai's Mount Kumgang tourist business had attractedisitors. Unfortunately. Hyundai's upfront costs and fixed payment rateonth to North rtorea have resulted in losses0 of0illion in investments,4 million to North Korea,3 inith no prospect tn light

of recovering ihcmhen by the end of the contract Hyundai wit) have paid the North Korean2 million for iu exclusiverighu. Hyundai has also reached agreement with North Korea on settingigantic industrial park in Kaeaong to produce goods valueda year when it is fully operational, but lacks financial resourcesevelop the site. Other chaebol have been much more cautious in iheir North Korean investments. The Kim Dae Jung government has beenfor pushing large businesses into North Korea. It is rumored ihai the government has been particularly solicitous of the financial health of lheHyundai companies.

Medium and small-size businesses that have invested in North Korea have been hurt by management problems, poor infrastructure, and inter-Koreanproblems. In1 North Korea blocked the major shipping route for POC trade owingisagreement with the major inter-Korean shipping company, which refused to use North Korea's higher-pricedcontainers.

In addition lo taking the burden of financing North Korea's development off die shoulders of the government, business mvesiment is seenay to increase social contact and to make North Korea economically dependent on South Korea and the outside world, thereby making it more difficult for tbe Kim Chong-il government to revert to iu hermit existence.otalouth Koreans visited lhe North (notio Mountraveling for business purposes).

South Korean Popular and Political Response lo Engagement

South Koreans want peace with North Korea in order io pursue theirdreams. Exceptrief period during the family reunions, when South Korean societysea ofouth Koreans have learnedive without the North.

Tbe public waa firmly behind the idea of the0 summit, withercent favoring ibe idea. The summit exceeded the expectations of most Koreans in terms of the cordiality of the meeting, leadingercentost-summit survey sample to dub it5 perceni lo expect the Joint Declaration to be implemented, andercent to expect that ihe meeting would change North Korea for lheevel of optimum that might be characterized in the words of Samuel Johnson as the triumph of hope over experience. Someercent said they were willing io pay more taxes to aid Northigure that has been fairly constant in recentercent6 andercent. The most urgent issue was considered to be lhe reunion of separated families, whicherceni of live respondents. Yet in another poll taken ut the same

lime, althoughercent expected the summit to change North Korea.ercent of the respondents still considered North Korea to be an "enemy" (althoughercent qualified this by agreeing that the North had thetoeunification3 percent viewed North Koreaartner, andercentartner who could potentially become an enemy.

The public pessbiusm over engagement that appeared in the autumn0 can be attributed both to North Korean foot dragging in the unplemen-tation of the social and security aspects of the Joint Declaration andlowdown in the South's economic recovery. The public expectedand gratitude tor aid, but the North Korean government accepted tbe aid as its due and always asked for more.oll conducted inercent of respondents approved of the government's food aid to the North,ercenteturn trip to Seoul by Kim Chong-il, andercent supported President Kim's engagement policy. But onlyercent believed that North Korea would implement the Joint Declaration (down fromercent immediately after thendercent felt that the pace of North-South engagement was too rapid.oll conducted two weeks later, Kim Dae Jung's approval rating had slipped toercent (downoints from the previous3 percent of respondents were concerned about tbe condition of the economy,ercent supported the engagement policy, butercent believed that the government was making too many one-sided concessions to Northoll taken in the middle of0 foundercent of respondents complaining that the government hadservile attitude" in its negotiations with the North.

Inter-Korean relationsew experience for the South Korean people. The norm of reciprocity is strong, but the North Korean Government, by refusing to admit its mistakes and blaming the outside world for itsshows tittle appreciation of how the South Korean people feel.Kim, caught in the middle, is forcefullyong-range strategy that tolerates this North Korean attitude in the short term. But publics are notoriously short-term in their flunking, and tbe engagement policy is bound to raise more hopes than it fulfills. The Kim Dae Jung administration has not been transparent in its conduct of engagement. In difficult times leaders oftenosition considerably ahead of the public, but in doing soacklash of rsiblic opinion if their policies fall short of success. President Kim may have overreached himself.

President Kim's engagement policy initially received comkiexablepolitical support, reflecting the overwrteuriingly positive public response to the summit But with Kim's Millenniuminority in the

National Assembly, and Kim in his last iwo years of office, politics is emerging from the background- As the public becomes more skeptical of the prospectsuwlamental change in North Korea. Kim's policies will look increasingly like abasement And if Kim has engaged in irregular or extra-legal deals to forward his policy, his well-meant efforts may come back to haunt him and the engagement policy in the years ahead.

Implications of Engagement

What engagement means to South Korea depends upon how engagement is defined. If defined as contact, then engagement to date must bereat success. If defined by its confluences, the results have been encouraging compared to past engagement efforts, but meager by the standard expected tor relationsoiiiogeneous people. If judged by intentions, it is hard to say lhat the evidence suggests any change in the Kim Chong-il regime's coninutment to keeping up the barriers around its totalitarian socialist system.

Future consequences of North Korea's engagement depend upon whether the engagement events to doteorth Korean policy of shallow and limited engagement, or whether they signal lhe beginningeep and total engagement. Engagement according lo the first scenario is buln North Korean government distrust of and hostility loward South Korea. North Korea would be expected to address engagement issues in (heorder economic, political, social, and finally military. Aid agreements will dominate engagement in the early years. Political destabtii/ation will also be high on Pyongyang's agenda, for old Communist habits die hard. Social and military engagement will be used as rewards by the North Korean regimeaintain the Dow of economic aid thai supports mc Kim Chong-il government and pacifies its people.

Engagement according to this scenario is likely to become embroiled in South Korean politics. Opposition parties will make hay from publicwith the lack of progress in social contact and threat reduction. The prospects for Kim Dae Jung's Millennium Party will be dim. On lhe economic front, limited und sporadic government aid. supplemented by increasing amounts of NOO aid from those South Korean constituencies that value their ties to relatives in lhe North, will keep North Korea on life support. Trade and investment will grow slowly. Social contact will remain at the level of several hundredew thousand controlled personal and mailevel the Kim Chong-il regime will consider to be sufficient to uphold its end of lhe Joint Declaration agreement.

Even though Umired, this level of engagement will convince the South Korean public that the threat of invasion from the North has virtuallyThe South Korean military will begin re-aligning its forces to cope with threats from larger neighbors by putting more money into highweapons systems and thawing down its infantry forces. In itspolicy, Seoul will gradually reduce its security ties with the United States, especially those aspects of tbe alliance targeted at North Korea, such as US Army troops stationed in Korea. South Korea will become more active in dialogue with its neighbors to coordinate efforts to cope with North Korea.

On the other band, deep engagement, springingew-found trust and acceptance of South Korea by the Kim Chong-il regime, willpursue military, political, social, and economic engagement,in the direction of complete reunification. The focus will be tm results rather than process.

Engagement will receive the support of all South Korean political parties, although there will always be roomusting over specific engagement programs. Pleased by the changes taking place in North Korea, the South Korean public will accept higher levels of taxes to support North Korean aid programs. Since the South Korean economy alone does not have the resources to turn around the North Korean economy, international financial institutions and wealthier nations, particularly Japan, will be asked to open their purse strings, and will probably do so. Trade and investment from the South will rapidly increase, although the economicf the two Koreas will not be realized in tbe form of company profits for years to come.

The opportunity for extensive inter-Korean social contact will be the most dramatic, and the most threatening, aspect of full engagement Thousands of families will be re-united Tens or hundreds of thousands of Northwfll try to move to the South. The social control and legal aspects of the border breakdown will threaten overwhelm the South Korean Government, which bas to dateery cautious approach in its acceptance of North Korean defectors.

The military trends accompanying timited engagement will be magnified in tbe full engagement scenario. The South Korean defense budget willUS forces will be phased out In foreign policy. South Korea will begin to turn away from its security relationship with the United States and explore new relationships with China, Japan, and perhaps Russia. Theidentity of Koreans will draw them into Asian relationships, although continued globalization will keep the door wide open to American influence.

These are mere speculations. It is loo early to predict with any confidence which of these two scenarios is more probable. Evidence favoring the first scenario includes the fact that previous inter-Korean agreements have after all amounted to very little, and that in tbe current engagement North Korea is eager for economic talks bul stalls on social and military talks. Evidence for the second scenario is found in the fact that engagement contacts have been far more extensive this time around, and the North Korean economy is in much greater need than it was ai the time of previous engagements. Whether or not to factor in thenourcerr>ents of Kim Chong-il regarding tbe need for "new thinking"oot point, since these pronouncements are exceedingly vague (he says he wants to remake North Korean industry with all new technology, but gives no indication how he could afford to dond in any case are almost swallowed upic usual (loud of propauatKla extolling the irnportance of absolute obedience to Kim and sacrificial support for the North's military first policy. In reality, the roost likely course of events will lie somewhere between these two scenarios.

Inter-Korean engagement is complicated by the impact of the Korea policies of the United Stales. Japan, and China. For example, while South Korea may be satisfied toontrolled engagement process even if it does not yield substantial social consequences, the status quo will not satisfy the United States, which seeks to turn back North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities. As President Kim Dae Jung's influence wanes, inter-Korean engagement may come under greater control of the United States.

Engagementrocessact. The South Korean people have gained tremenctous confidence in their ability to lead Korea along the path ofeven though some of this confidence may be misplaced The two Koreas have taken an irrevocable step toward reconciliation, and barring outside-initiated event s. it is almost inconceivable that they will ever again sink lo the level of fratricidal warfare. This is something that President Kim Dae Jung can honestly boast about, and to Koreans, it is the single most important goal that could be achieved.

The Ultimate Oxymoron: Japan's Engagement With North Korea

D. Cha edmund walsh school of foreign service and department of government georgetown university washington, dc

Overview

Over theizzying array of countries have cinbarfccdath of engagement with the reclusive Democratic Peoples' Republic of Koreat the front of this list of countries, which started with Italy and includes Britain, Australia, Canada, Belgium and most recently Germany, stand the United States, the Republic of Koreand Japan. Given the baJJ<eotury of Cold War conflict in which the three allies'with North Korea were constructed, and the crises,9 over nuclear weapons and long-range missile tests, tbe notion of engagement with the DPRK appears almost oxymoronic.

In part, this assertion derives from the nature of engagementiplomatic tool. Engagementtrategy that employs positive incentives to achieve peaceful change when an existing power structure or hierarchy isbyhe use of engagement, therefore, historically and theoretically presumes at least three things:

Some confidence that interests and intentions between the "engager" and target state arc somehow mutually compatibleameoordination game where engagement plays important enabling functions pike transparency and communication!)

Some confidence that the target state's intentions areeeks non-revisionist or non-revolutionary outcomes,egree of opening; otherwise, engagement isostly and futile exercise.

If not hihen some level of confidence that engagement can create the conditions forrthe hope that the benefits accrued to the target stateesult of engagement canransforming effect on its underlying preferences and intentions."

In On* seme, engagement it different from conuinmeai which uses deterrence and threeis

of punishment (cegative sanctions) to deal with the challenger, and" For recent conceptual and applied studies of engagement suategjei, see Randall Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History anda Alistalr lain Johnston and Robert Rossngaging China (NY:; Victor Chi, "Democracy aadhe Dilemma of Engagement" io The Two Koreas and ihe United States.; Richard Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan. "Terms of Engagement Alternatives to Punitive2: and George Shimbaugh, Stales, Firms and Power: Successful Sanctions In US Foreign Policy (NY: SUNY.

None of these condition* have been established in the DPRK case, yet engagement continues, largely led by the political successes in the North-South dyad created by the ROK's sunshine policy.

1 am not opposed to engagement.ave arguedeeas the necessary current strategy with North Korea even if onengagement and certain instruments associated with the policy (most notably the Agreedbsent,bove, provide the best (or only available) window on whether DPRK intentions are ultimately amenable to peaceful resolution of conflict on the peninsula However, of the "big three" currently seeking engagement with theelieve Japan's engagement with the DPRK is the most contradictory and therefore the least likely to be successful.

As argued in this paper, three reasons substantiate this claim. First, Japan has fewer oppominities than Seoul or Washington to distinguish DPRKbehavior from the underlying intentions. Second, if the South Korean case is any indication, historical reconciliation remains an almostobstaclehe modest advances in Japan-ROK interactionositive example what is absent in the DPRKnd third, the strategic priorities that inform Seoul and Washington's engagementare not necessarily in tune with that of Japan; and this, in turn, cculdJapan evenest case scenario of engagement bearingeginhort erocirical overview of Japan-DPRK normalizationhen offer the three reasons that make engagement roost problematic for Japan and evidence in support of theonclude with observations about the future and the implications for trilateral coordination.

Empirical Overview History, Events, and Issues9

There have basically been four attempts by Japan at engagement with North Korea. Efforts at improving relations took place during the detenterain of Japanese officials went to P'yongyang (most notably Tokyo Governor Minobe Ryokichi, the Japanese Dieteague for Promotion of Friendship wilh North Korea, and memorandum trade agreements were signed. In theth. ooilitional high-level initiatives were made through personal emissaries of PrimeNakasone Yasuhiro. Finally at the end of the Coldelegation

Victor Cha, "Eagagini Nonh KoreamtHmIJ; aod Cha, T* Thereational North KoreanorSmmry Dialog* (December

" Portotts of the eaaxnul overview arceicenwdfroin Victor Oia. "Japan-KorraSIS Companaive Conneciioni wwwcsk.crg/pacrbrtciVOOaOjeper^

led by then LDP strongman Kancmaru Shin returned from P'yongyang0 with grand aspirations for normalization that led to talks

The fourth and current period began with the resumption of preliminary normalization dialogue between Tokyo and P'yongyang inwo sets of talks (foreign nunistry and Red Cross) took place in Beijing with the latterhumanitarian cooperation agreement" in wbich the two sides agreed to resume home visits for Japanese spouses of DPRKhe two delegations also committed to advising their respective governments to address in prompt fashion each side's key humanitarianfor Japan, the alleged abduction of citizens by the DPRK; and for P'yongyang, the provision of food aid.

Japan and the DPRK followed through on the December meetingsopening round of formal normalization talks in April

ever, any hopes of success were quickly dashed as both sides Laid out their terms of negotiation. Kojiro Takano, Japan's ambassador to KEDO and chief negotiator to Ihe talks, and Foreign Minister Yohei Kono emphasized the criticality of resolving the abduction issue, while DPRK counterparts firmly entrenched themselves in an immoveable negotiating position demanding colonial0 billion in material compensation, and dismissing Japanese counter-demands for addressing of the ballistic missile threat and abduction issues. Another set of talks in May were

Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea- Japan(Stanford, CA: Stanford University; Jung-Hywi Shin.Relations (Seoul: Kyunghce University. Chong-slk Lee, JapanThe Political Dimension (Stanford:; Chae-Jin Lee and HideoPolicy Toward Japan and Korea (NY:; Brian Bridges. JapanEdward.seful new study on Japan-DPRK retariona,Koh, From Discord in Collaboration (book manuscript,.

" Io eariyapan partially lined miction* on the DPRK. including the ban on charter flights and residences on unofficial contacts with DPRK authorities (imposed after the8 Tnepo-donghis was followed in early Decemberupra panion Japanese delegation ltd by former Prime Minister Tcmwchi Mursyama to P'yotiKynng. The three-day visit was both expiatory and goodwill in nature, largely fra die purpose as described by Japanese officials of cultivating an "atmosphere" conducive to the resumption of dialogue. The meedngs took place without preconditions on either side, and the former Premieretter from Prime Minister ObucM io DPRK leader Kim Chong-il expressing hope for improved relations. Japan subscquciwly lifted remaining(ihe meal tignilicant of which was on food aid) alter the Murayama mission.

MOFA talks were conducted at the dkectot-gcncral level (led by Anamigeneral of the Asian Affairs Division of Japanese Foreign Ministry, and tbeby Oh Woollok. director general ofh Bureau of tbe DPRK MinistryAffairs).

* Japan io early0hree-year suspension on food aid to the DPRK and committed toons of nee through the Worid Food Program, meeting an important pre-condition for tbe North to start normalization talks. P'yongy ant's reciprocalo Iwii into ihe Issue of abducted and/ur miotingadt it marginally easier domestically for the Obuefai government to start the talks.

scheduled but later indefinitely postponed by P'yongyang in spiteoodwill gesture by Japan to deliver tbe first installment ofon cornmitment of humanitarian rice aid to the DPRK.

our-month hiatus, Japan offered token amounts of aid through international channels to help jump start another round of normalization dialogue. The aid was offered after the normalization talks but the pattern of what Bob Manning has termedS-DPRK context asin advance orclearly set In the Jnpan-DPRK context. Talks resumed in0 with some encouraging signs, producing agreements in principle on timelines for the return ofis sets Most important it also appeared tu produce an implicit DPRK acceptanceormula on the difficult issue of compensation. roUowing the model of5 pact with South Korea. Japan proposed to offer not historical compensation but "economic aid" (the North could call itit wanted to its domestiche North did not ouuight reject this idea which gave optimists the impression that they may be amenable to the formula In addition, optimists hoped that the aid package to come with normalization would then prompt the North to resolve the abducuons issue in some political fashion.

Pursuant tu the meetings, confidence in Japan was bolsteredhird round of homecomings for Japanese wives (residing in North Korea) ina new bargaining chip for lhe Normo itically important for Japan and relatively costless for theremier Mori and Kim Yoog-nam agreed to meet at the UN Millerinium sumrnil in New York (before the North's much publicized problems ai Frankfurtapanese investors expressed interest in Hyundai projects in North Korea (the Mt Kuingang tourism complex and the Kuesong industrialndew turn in the path lo noimalization. pro-North Korean residents in Japan were allowed to visit relatives in the South for the first time andassociations in Japan representing the two Koreas began talks."just as momentum appeared to be buildingtring of positive outcomes, another round of talks in late-October brought tbe processcreeching hall as the North rejected out of hand Japanese attempts ioon the proposals made in August,

Japan's Engagement Dilemmas

The last round of normalization talks made explicit the material quid pro quos that were in play for the two sides- Tokyo wants satisfactory resolution of the abduction issue and some assurances on DPRK missiles that might

come with the establishment of normal dhplomarjc relations. It is willing to provide occaaioruu disbursements of food aid as goodwill gestures to bring tbe Northtable, Pyongyang seeks the large influx of funds to come with rsarrnalizariao settlement and is willing to grant temporary homeland visits for wives as goodwill gestures.

To an objective observer, these two positions may not appear itreconcilable, and indeed, there mayarrowing of the gap in the near future.the problems for Tokyo with regard to engagement with P'yongyang mn deeper than the stated issues. In short, these problems have to do with DPRK intentions, history, and subtle differences in the security concerns that inform Japanese invesiment in engagementis the ROK and United States.

Tactical Behavior and "Baskets" of Transparency-Building Issues The first deeper problem for Japanese engagement is the inability toclearly between DPRK tactics and intentions. As noted above, engagement strategies conceptually are likely to be successful if there is some sense on the part of the implemcntcr that the target state's intentions are amenable to reform and opening Engagement will not be successful if the target's mtcntksns are revisionist or aggressive. Tbe most dangerous and costly engagementne in which the iou^ernenter goes forward despite uncertainty about the target's intentions, or sunply assumes that engagement will transform those revisionist intentionshamberlain's Munich Pact).

In the case of the DPRK. the future greatly hinges on the extent lo which DPRK intentions have changed fundamenlally from revisionist andonesore cooperative and moderated outlook Both skeptics and optimists would agree lhal the recent spate of "smile" diplomacy conducted by P'yongyanghange in tactics largely for the purpose of regime survival. The as-yel unanswered question is whether (here is more behind the smile. In other words, all that the North has urriertaken in terms ofJune summit, family reunions, normalization with some European countries, and Kim Chong-il's trip toconsonant with nothing more than tactical changes in behavior. There is no sense in these actionsundamental change in underlying rjreferratces is driving the new policies.*

" DPRK scOont iodieajm of deeper changes in preferences over tactics would geoeraJtyhe security arena. Uruakr "roue dsrakamacy" whichPRK bargaining eenpee-hve are reiauvely ece-Jesi vw appear to offer nemficaat payoffs ia terns of eceocw engagement by outers, change* id the ccarvsodoaal eadflary srruadce or reissues would be an imporaritAnjubcy. the recent let ot" ajreenwro between tbe two nalnanet tn enable coooecuoa of tha railway link through the DMZ offers some positivess vela.

Proponents of sunshine re*pond by arguing that encouraging tacticaland spurring some economic growth in the North will in effectrocess of change that willoderating effect on DPRK intentions.lassical liberal interdependence argument may be true. At the same time, there is little in the past history that makes one confident about such lessons applying to North Korea. The periods in history when the DPRK has been economically strong have been exactly those periods when its external behavioris the ROK was fax from moderate.

The inability to distinguish between tactics and preferencesroblem faced by all three allies' engagement policies with tho North. Indeed, all three have been willing to risk some opacity on Pyongyang's underlying preferences and pursue engagementindow on these intentions. The dilemma for Japan, relative to the other allies, is that there are arguably fewer "baskets" of transparency-building issues on which to engage in order toetter sense of DPRK intentions. For example, all three allies couldetter sense of DPRK intentions through implementation of nc Agreed Framework or throegh tension reduction in then addition to this. Seouleighty basket of issues, including family reunions, infrastructure rejuvenation projects, ministerial meetings, and summits, on which to gauge further DPRK intentions.esser extent than Seoul, Washington tooasket of issues incl jding MIA remains and terrorism where DPRK concessionsindow oo whether intentions rather than tactics are changing.

However, for Japan, the basket of transparency-building issues islighter. Home visits for Japanese wivesotential vehicle by which to communicate political goodwill, but even wilh DPRK concessions, there is little value-added in terms of understanding preferences. Similarly, the abduction issue hasajor impediment to normalization talks, but actions by P'yongyang to resolve this issue, again, do notense of "costliness" on Pyongyang's part and create confidence that preferences or aggressive intentionsis Japan are changing (missiles are dealt withhe Norm arguably could communicate its good intentions by acknowledging that Japan is noarget of its nuclearoweverypothetical presumes that P'yongyang would admit that ittrategic doctrine and possessed nuclear weapons, neither of which seems likely in the current situation.

" In particular, whether ihe DPRK agree* to roqaeas to amend its Nuclear Deelareuon will be an important lest of whether interstices hate changed.

" There is no espUck stalemeet oftrategic doctrine: however, giten the range of their operauunal miniles, circular probability errors, and iMerest In crude nuclearooU deduce that ihe Ncnh aeeks ao eiittem.al cnekcar drfrreo: against ibc US hy he jteg Japan hostage with ihe threat of nucleai letartaoon For these arguments, see Victor Cha, -Hypotheses oo DPRK Strategicn The North Korea* System1 forrhcoming).

7tt

Historical Animosity

One response to the above di scussion might be to advocate that Japan expand the list of issues on which it could engage the DPRK. In other words, create new avenues by which to build transparency and confidence that the DPRK's recent opening is weU-mtended. However, the problem here is that historical animosity places inherent limits on the range ofissues.

As is well-known, while historical animosity between the two Koreas and Japan date back to the late sixteenth century Hideyoshi invasions, the defin-ing eventodern context was Korea's colonial subjugation to Japan0n the Japan-ROK case, the relationship, although plagued by history, did have elements of admiration that are completely absent in the DPRK case. Enmity stemming fiom the colonial periodand has become deeply ingrained in the Korean mindsetariety of formal and informal institutions. Antagonistic images are passed downhrough family folklore, chauvinist histories taught in secondary schools (probably exponentially more so in the DPRK than in the ROK andnd government propagimcla-perpcluaicd stereotypes such that the negativismart of one's identity. North Korean self-identity becomes constructed in linear opposition to Japan.4*

Moreover, North Korea's thaw in relations with the United States and ROK have counterintuitively increased history-based irrvectives against Japan. For example, in spite of the positive atmosphere after the June summit, which Japan supported whole heartedly, one cannot help but thinkit uneasy with the emerging constellation of relations. Because DPRK rhetoric with regard to the United States and Seoul moderated after the summit, the result was that Japan became the target of propaganda with laser-beam intensity.

The likelihood of th is situation being rectified is low. First, one can assume that the DPRK is undergoing significant internal adjustment as the domestic images of Seoul and Washington are probablyrocess of rapid reconstruction. Toimilar transformation with Japan would appear to be difficult, particularly if DPRK identity and national purpose needs to be constructed negativelygainst an adversary).

Second, Japan's relations with the ROKositive example of the missing elements to any form of Japan-DPRK historical reconciliation.

eganvdy-construtted iiaucnaliams and rationalist myth* are not unique to Korea: how -ever the degree to which this Identity is so viseerally framedast aggressor may marginally distinguish the Korean case. Byulyatriooc institution In Ibc US, but Its construction Isro-American holiday more than an eaplkatry anti-BtTtUh one.

Historical enmity has certainly not been eradicated from Seoul-Tokyobut the relationship has progressed to the point where historical issues do not persistently lead to diplomatic breakdowns and political crises as was the case in. In part this process ofand closer relations was spurred on by basic security threats in the post-Cold Warut also critical to the processemenstrated willingness on the part of South Koreans to look forward and stop dwelling on the past This was particularly evident at the Kim-Obuchi summit in October l'W8 What t the Sum mil wasthe colonial apology, the fishery tones agreement, the commitment to joint navalor the joint action plan, all unprecedented accomplishments of their ownut particularly telling was how Kim Dae-Jung spoke ofas equally responsible as Japanese for putting the history issue to rest and moving forward. Kim called 'infantile" the fixationears ofJapan-ROK interaction at the expense0 years exchange; and cooperation, and praised Japan's peace constitution and role as an ODA provider. These were extremely important signsillingness in the South to change the terms of the relationship in their own minds and to move beyond demonized images of Japanormer colonizer.

This ability to "moven my opinion, was directly linked to two trends-democracy and development. As South Korea embraced democracy and progressed toward economic prosperity, its enhanced intemMional prestige (reflected in events such as8 Seoul Olympics, UN membershipECD membership2 World Cup withrowing self-confidence among Koreans that reduced nationaland xenophobia, andess petty, less emotional am'tude in dealings with Japan. As generations of Koreans continue to liveemocratic and developed society, they cultivate norms of compromise, nonviolence, and respect for opposing viewpoints that become externalized in their altitudes toward Japan. In addition, future Korean leaders not having experienced the occupation are less apt to carry the historical/emotional baggage borne by their predecessors, and mote apt to engage in rational and logical dialogue.

Japan-ROK relations therefore offers one of the best examples of historical recrnKiliation in tbe regionuxtaposed to Japan-Chinand if the factors responsible in ROK case are at all aWe to be generalized, this augurs extremely poorly for achieving similar results in the DPRK case. None of the factors in terms of democracy, development, or leadership are present in the North Korea case. This assessment does not deny that asettlement may still occur between Tokyo and P'yongyang, but il does mean that historical reconciliation under current conditions will not

occur in spite of any material agreement.ormalization settlement would resultituation similar5 where material incentivesand economics)ettlement, but perceptions and attitudes remained highly antagonistic. From the Japanese perspective, this then begs two questions: why press for normalization, if Japan will $tfn remain demonized in DPRK rhetoric; and why press for normalization, if residual historical enmity ensuresettlement will provide little in termsmdow on DPRK intentions?

Misaligned Strategic Priorities

The third obstacle to Japanese engagement is perhaps the most problematic. This has to do with erisuring that Japanese security interests do not get obscured by the whirlwind of activity on the peninsula. While Tokyo fully supports the sunshine policy, conservative circles in Japan are rightfully worried about being entrappedosition where the thaw on thegives rise to three negativereater DPRK obstinacy in talks with Japan;OK aid that may bolster Die North's missile threat: andOK requests for Japanese assistance to North Korea.

The third negative is probkmatic barring any movement on the missile issue as Japan cannot simply dismiss ROK requests given the priority placed on mamtaining trilateral policy coordi nation over the past two years.meeting these requests from allies without any tangible improvements in normalization dialogue or moderation of the DPRK threat are not only domestically anathema but also could be self-defeating for the dialogue itself (in that P'yongyang can get something torhis complexity of this mixed motives were reflected in Japanese government reports on the DPRK in the middle0 from the primeffice, foreignand JDA each trying to reconcile competing Imperatives of dialogue, deterrence, engagement, and support of trilateral policywith the allies

In the context of trilateral policy coordination, what is perhaps mostas one looks down the road of Japan-DPRK dialogue is that even best case scenarios appear somewhat unsettlingapanese security perspective. As noted above, the engagement dilemma for Tokyo isover whether DPRK opening is tactical or represents deeperof preferences toward reform. Among the three allies, onepectrum of views on this issue: At one extreme, the Kim Dae Jung and the ROK sunshine policy banksransformation of preferences; in the middle stands the United States which hopes for the same but theis palpable; and at the other end stands Japan. The latter statement may sound strange, given that Japan has remained in line with the Perry process of trilateral coordination and supports the engagement policy. But how

much of this support stemselief in engagement per sc and how much stems from Japan's ctorifullyood airy?

One could argue that Tokyo sits at the farthest end of this spectrum aot because it is inherently more pessimistic than Its allies, but because even in an optimistic extrapolation of the current situation, it may end up in the wont-off position. In other words, the critical fork in the road (hat will prove the current worth of these engagement initiatives is whether DPRK cooperation will move beyond the economic issues to the harder military and security issues.est cane scenario, one might imagine the North forgoing development and testing of the longer-range ballisticnd II) because these have the highest value-added for theNorth can expect asvmmetnc returns and/or compensation for givingpotential" program (TDI)uture oneest-case scenario, the North might even agree to mililary hot lines, advanced notification and observation of troop movements andregular meetingsilitary committee, and even some mutualforce reductions. These sorts of concessions (admittedly very optimistic) by the North would satisfy South Korean. Japanese, and USregarding peninsular security and nonproliferation, but what they would not address aro Japanese concerns about the North's medium-range missile arsenal.

With an estimated rangeilometers and pay loads0 kg. the No-dong is among the North's most developed missileafter thendstimated that the DPRK produced betweenissiles of which one-third were sold to foreign countries. Unlike the Tacpo-dong program which is still in the development and testing stage, experts estimate that the No-dong became operational4 and that Ihe North has deployed between four missile battalions (about nine io ten launchers per battalion) to as many8 at various sites inland and along the northernrguably these deployed capabilities are the most immediately threatening to Japanese security. At the same time, they also constitute theoperational security capabilities that P'yongyang is least likely to part with. Japan may therefore he stuckockard place. The "final bargain" for the DPRK in The future may be to trade some coo-venuonal arms cuts and its potential long-range ballistic missile aspirations for money and the guarantee of regime survival. This may bring aof nonprolifetation and peninsular security threats for the US and ROK,

- These include underground sitesYoungjeodong, Yanagangm from ihc Chinesehinori, Pyonabu* province snd new bales ac YangUm. lagans province and Sangnam. rlambuk province (Chcum1 |Yoo YOTg-won. N*occessed at the Nopaui Dairyarch

but it will not bring security to Japan as folly as one would hope because of the residual and teal No-dong threat

Such bypothciicols about tbe future may be farther forward than people like to think. After all. there is enough uncertainty regarding North Korea in the present. Nevertheless, thisery real problem down the road, and it is one that will test tbe trilateral coordination process among the allies.most problematic, itilemma that arises for Japan if things with North Korea go the way we want them to. "Be careful what you wish for" must be in the minds of some far-sighted Japanese strategists as they adhere with trepidation to the trilateral process of engagement.

Dilemmas of Engagement

To sum up then, there is no denying the Japan-DPRK normalizationwill continue, and indeed, there may evenettlement in the future. But such progress only would mask what are some intractable dilrrnimas for Japan.

Engagement's value-added?

The benefits of Japanese engagement with the DPRK are unclear. DPRK acts of cooperation and reciprocity based on the current set of quid pro one* in the rwcroalizadon talks would not offer sufficiently convincing evidence that DPRK intentions have changed (versus merely tactical behavior).

Evenormalization settlement were reached,ettlement would be would be pragmatically-driven and effect oo real change in the level of animosity given residual historicalmeaning from Japan's perspective that the critical question of DPRK intentions still remains unanswered.

Dilemmas-Defining engagement's successes?

noted above, this dilemma is the counwrinmitive regardingsuccess. Even if US-Japen-ROK engagement resultsissile deal with tbe United States and conventional force reductions on thethere is the distinct possibility thateal will not address with equal expedience the deployed No-dong threat on the ground and therefore still leave uncertain DPRK in tendons to Tokyo (while perhaps making them at the same time more positively transparent for the US and Seoul).

The more US-ROK-Japan engagement is successful at achieving progressis US-DPRK and DPRK-ROK, tbe less likely there will be parallel progress oo the Japan-DPRK dyad.

Moreover, the more engagement succeeds in thawing relations with .Seoul and Washington, the more likely that residual historical crimity will focus on Japan as the primaryicious circle results where Japanese support of engagement could be conceivably self-deleoiing.

The Dead End at the End0

A microcosm of these problems were evident at the endapan approached the0 round of normalization talks with thetoreakthrough. Prime Minister Mori Yosbiro (al the advice of Kim Dae Jung)ersonal letter to DPRK leader Kim Chong-il requesting summit talksn advance of the October-end normalization talks, Tokyoontributionons of rice to the Northive-fold increase over pastaving greased the wheels, Japanese negotiators then put forth the proposalurportedercent in grant aid andeicent in loans)uid pro quo for North Korean moderation of the missile threat andresolution of the alleged abduction of Japanese nationals, which would lay the groundworkove to political normalization of relations. Despite Japanese hopes of ending the0 with any progress. Pyongyang's continued intransigence dashed all suchhile Japanese negotiators did not expect their counterparts to outright accept this idea, there were indications based on the last round of negotiations that P'yongyang wouldpositivenstead, the North responded that such attempts to side-step an admission of colonial repentance wasinconsistent with the notion ofew era of cooperaion (which in no uncertain terms also cnticized the South for "selling out" in5s some observers noted, the North was also clearly abstaining from any cc-mrnmrienis with Japan while the possibilityS presidential visit hung in tbehe disappointment among Japaneseat this outcome was palpable and manifest in very frank publicthat talks would not restart until sometime1 in part because as one official pute have exhausted what we have in our pockets."

Ai Issue wasroposalormalkabon seuleroem formula similar to5 pact with South Korea which offered economic aid and loans In lieu terming ihb explicitly as colonial compensation.Interviews.

Conclusion

The current constellation of forces suggests that despite all of theseinsurmountable problems, Japan-DPRK talks willikely focus of activityn Japan, Tokyo probably took their best shot atreakthrougheak Mori government,o-confidence vote in late November, now faces rnounting criticism from the domesticat its overly conciliatory efforts to woon SeouL what is certain to be more difficult economic times in the new year will increasingly make it difficult for Kim Dae Jung to continue financing the sunshine policy with the North off tbe backs of the South Korean taxpayers. And in the US, Clintons non-visit and the transitionew Bush administration means lhat Washington will, at best, reluctantly continue pursuing engagement with the North.

If one believes that the North pursues only one bilateral channelime (to maximize leverage by playing the others off the chosenhen this confluence of factorsew algorithm0 saw activity on the North-South and US-North Korean channels wiih thenervously trying to keep pace, lack of movement on the Seoul and Washington channels in1 may incline P'yongyang to focus more on Tokyo. At die sameori government (if it is stilt around) will need toomestic opposition impatient with "soft policies" toward the North. Whether this new algorithm creates opportunities for progress in Japan-DPRK relations is, frankly, anyone's guess but not anistic proposition given the deeper dilemmas lhat Japan faces with engagement.

ebruaryationwide opinion poll registered peiblic approval for the Mori Cabinetercent (downercent inee Yomiuilori Cabinet's Support Rating Sinkshe government's lowest approval rating since fonnaooo of tbe cabinet inunction ofinvolving the LDP; however, they render virtually impossible any bold moves by the government on North Keren.

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Chinahanging North Korea: Issues, Uncertainties, and Implications?54

Jonathan D. Pollack The major developments in North Korean diplomacy and external relations US Naval War College over the past year have required all outside actors to reassess their policy assumptions and expectations with respect to the Korean peninsula. Among the outside powers, the developments in Chinese-North Korean bilateral relations seem second in consequence only to the North-South summit and subsequent negotiations between P'yongyang and Seoul. The pivotal talks that resulted in President Kim Dae-jung's visit to P'yongyang werein secret in Beijing and Shanghai,ighly discreetrole by Chinese officials. Kim Chong-il's late0 visit to Beijing only weeks prior to the inter-Korean summitegree of consultation and coordination in Chinese-North Korean relations rarely seen in the past, and far in excess of the prior uneasy relations between the younger Kim and his Chinese counterparts. Subsequent developments, induding Kim's1 visit to Beijing and Shanghai andentify much more explicitly with China's economic strategies,confirmed the changes in Sino-North Korean bilateral relations. Though none of these developmentsmooth evolution in future ties, theyajor change in the atmosphere and potentially theof Beijing-P'yongyang relations.

To further consider these trends and possibilities, this paper will seek to place Chinese-North Korean relations in their larger context. Although the Chinese have long considered security and stability on the peninsula very important to Chinese interests, Beijing has generally preferred to wield influence quietly and indirectly. For much ofhis wasirtue of necessity. There seems little question that the major breakthroughs in Chinese-ROK relations over the past decade were deeply alienating to the North Korean Ieadeiship. As Chinese leaders (most notably, Dengwith long standing personal ties to Kim II Sung and his closewithdrew from leadership roles or passed from the scene, relations between tbe two capitals seemed increasingly tenuous. The highest ranking Chinese official to visit the DPRK over the entire decade was Minister of Foreign Affairs Qian Qichennd only then to notify Kim II Sung of China's impending diplomatic recognition of the ROK. Byull array of ranking Chinese leaders (induding President Jiang Zemin)the South over the course of. Indeed, China's Minister of

M Paper prepared tor deliverycouerence on Northnd Implications, cc^spoascted by Use Federal Reiearch Division. Library otasd the National Inielligence Council. Washington, DC Ziheexpressed in Ihis paper are entirely myhould not be at ui bused to the Naval War College or to ihe US Government.

Defense Chieteran of the Korean War, paid an official visit to the ROK inear prior to visiting the DPRK stillRC ally. These diplomatic slights wereby the cessation of heavily subsidized largesse that Beijing and(but especially Moscow) had long provided the North. With China nxrving ever closer to the ROK despite heated North Korean objections, relations with the Northubordinate factor in Chinese foreignwith P'yongyang relegatedarginal role in Chinese regional policy calculations.

However, the nuclear crisisnd the intensive diplomacy evident since that lime inescapably returned North Korea to the Chinese policy agenda But there is lime first-hand knowledge of interactions between Beijing and P'yongyang during the mid- andndeed, much of what is known or inferred about Chinese policy calculations toward the North derives from consultations between Chinese officials and American and South Korean counterparts during the latter half of, wtten the Uniied Stales sought to induce North Korea to freeze or sharply curtail its nuclear and missile activities, and when the ROKirect dialogue with P'yongyang. But these exchanges reveal far more about Chineseof US and South Korean policy initiatives that tbey do about China's readiness and capability to exert influence over North Korean policy nnaking.

Thus, the extent of Chinese leverage over North Korean decision- rnaking and the willingness of China to expend political capital in dealings with tbe North remain the subject of ample debate among analysts. Many observers assert lhat China has been able to wield Influence over North Korean policy at various critical Junctures, while stilleasure of plausible deniability over its actkms. For example even during the deep chill inrelations evident during. the Chinese and North Koreanestablishments maintained intermittent contact and exchanges, befitting their status as past allies and neighbors. There are also commonalities in the design of the failed North Korean satellite with early versionegree of unreported scientific collaboration, much of it with important notional defense implications. Others, however, have remained highly skeptical of the exienl of Beijing's involvemcnl in North Korean affairs, even when various issues seemingly touched on criticalsecurity interests. Even in the aftermath of Kim Chong-il's long awaited visits to China, there is skepticism that the Chinese are prepared to do more than extend the North Korean leader an extra measure of courtesy and leadership attention. Thus, some see China's readiness to host Kim Chong-il as an effort to propitiate the North Korean leadership, ratherundamental effort to reshape poiilical and economic developments In the North.

But numerous observers believe that Kim's open endorsement of Chinese economic reform presages an effort by Pyongyang to remake North Korea along comparable lines. According to tins mterpretaticn. North Korea hopes to achieve an cccascjnuc rraussfc*manoo through domestic economic reform and Infusions of foreign capital while retaining absolute power in the hands of Kim and his key lieutenants. Under such conditions, China couldwield decisive inflisence over future policy choices In the Norm. It bears emphasis, however, that these are inferred North Korean policyrather than Chinese commitnsents. Thus, there areongyang's needs and expectations, and what Beijing may feel is in its interest to undertake.

However, without understanding the larger context of Chinese policyanalysis of likely Chinese policy calculations remains highlyThere is little consensus among analysts about why and how much North Korea matters to China (especially in comparison to China'sties with thehether and how the developments of the past year have altered Chinese policy assumptions, and the readiness of Beijing to incur significant political and economic commitments to the North. Equally or more significant, the Chinese recognize that the prospects for change in the North willuch wider range of Chinese political and security interests Indeed, it seems quite likely that the Chinese view their stakes on the peninsula more in terms of taMar iwlflcations for regional securityhole, including critical issues in US-China relations. Should North Korea sustain iu accommodation with the South (including steps to reduce the risks of renewed warfare) and exercise credible longer term restraint in its missile development, deployment, and exports, this could induce significant changes in longer term security trends on the peninsula and in Northeast Asiahole. These trends would be broadly supportive of Chinese regional security objectives, and might persuade Beijing to lend fuller support to North Korea's domestic goals. Contrarily. the North's unwillingness or inability to sustainpolicy change, including credible threat reduction toward the South, would sharply diminish the prospects for improvements in US-North Korean relations, narrowing China's room for policy maneuver, and reducing Beijing's incentives to devote renewed attention to relations with the North.

But officials in Beijing also recognize the depths of the domestic crisis that North Korea ccctirroes to face. Though the Chinese have rarely discussed North Korea's internal development in much derail, the basics seem beyond dispute. Notwithstanding its modest ecxaxxmic recovery of the past year. North Koreaystem and society in paralysis and acute decline. Without major energy, food, and humanitarian assistance from the outside world (including fromorth Korea's prospects appear decidedly

grim.cultural base, while always problemaiic in the past, seems unable in rise above subsistence levels, and its education, public health, and social welfare functions are in utter shambles. The stripping of the North's industrial base has been equally pronounced; grievous energy shortages make the prospects for any sustained economic recovery in the absence of massive external assistance highly uncertain. Chinese scholars in private conversation draw obvious parallels to the disasters that befell China in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward: the Chinese readily recognize the social and political pathologyegime still in the pervasive grip of the cult of personality.

The Chinese are therefore heartened by the seeming interest shown by Kim Chong-il and his closest subordinates in exploring ihe possibilities of ecc-Dornk change in lhe North, with China presumably seenelevantBeijing is equally gratified by the North's willingness to enter nto direct negotiations with the South and to sharply curtail its half century of ideological and military hostility directed against the ROK. For reasons lhal we will explore subsequently, the Chinese leadership sees such changes as substantiating its preferred outcomes in relations between tbe two Koreas and in regional politics, ecooornks, and securityhole The intercom nectedness of Chinese policy objectives at these levels warrants particular mention. But it remains less clear how the Chinese are likely to balance their various interests and prospective policy opportunities in coming years.

At tbe same time, the Chinese very likely entertain few illusions about the prospects for an early and easy transition in the North. Kim Chong-il may have indeed concluded lhat there is no alternative for regime viability than to accommodaie to tho outside world, which in turn is expected lo yield extensive assistance from external powers. Bui there is little reason Io believe thai the North Korean system is even remotely prepared for the stresses il will experience should meaningful change be attempted,major alterations in the scope and magnitude of foreign involvement in the North. It is telling that neither of Kim Chong-il's visits lo China hasignificani complement of economic advisers, wiih theweighted heavily inward senior generals and party and government onViali However, some reports suggest lhat Kim willhird visit to China in tile springith his delegation expected ioumber of senior economic advisors. Despite such indications, it is highly unlikely thai the Chinese are prepared toighly interdependentwith Kim Chong-il. They do not desire an overly encumberedwith lhe North, hut rather one that will improve lhe prospects for normalcy, prrxu'ctability. and incremental accommodation between North and South.attern would permit China to advance its larger goals in regional security and regional economic inlerdepctidence. while enabling

simultaneous if asymmetric ties between China and the twouch fuller relationship with P'yongyangil likelihood have to await far mote definitive indications of policy change in the North.

But the Chinese are also seeking to ensure that major changes inexterna! strategies are not unclertaken to the detriment ofIn this regard, the Chinese would seem likely to preferalanced relationship toward the various majorprecluding any state from wielding disproportionate influenceNorth. In view of the intense nationalism that pervades Northlife, the notion of any external actor exercising preponderantover deci sionm aking in the North seems almost laughable. Indeed,may well feel tbat their current position on the peninsulaoptimal) is far stronger than that of any other major power. Anby North Korea to curry increased favor with China providesample flexibility and latitude in its relations with Seoul. Indeed, asof the past year demonstrate, the Chinese are better ablea role between the two Koreas than anyone else, and this appearsa role that Seoul especially has grown to value. Thoughnegotiating behavior (to be briefly examined below) providesof brinksmanshipegotiating tool, the returns on suchhave diminislied over time.orth Korean leadershiptn perturb or

complications for Chinese regional security strategy, and may also inhibit future US policy options, including accelerated pursuit of ballistic missile defense in East Asia or plans for national missile defense. Beijing may well be counseling North Korean restraint in this regard, in that neither has incentives to provide the Bush Administration with additional justification for some of its proposed defense programs. That said, neither has anmeans to prevent unilateral ptusuit of such programs.

But Beijing has consistently had to react to activist US strategies toward the North, hoping to inhibit courses of action could undenttine China's security interests. The Chinese can point to the extraordinary gyrations in US policy toward the North during die mid ando illustrate thisOn repeated occasions, the United States sought Chinese support for programs to curtail North Korean nuclear and missile development, with the Chinese consistently demurring from any options that tilted toward the coercive end of the spectrum. It was only following protracted negotiationshe Agreed Framework)ubsequent policy reassessment and proposal to the Northhe Perry report) that the United States decided to forego or at least defer more coercive strategies. Somewhathowever, the repeated twists and turns of US policy enhanced P'yongyang's bargaining power.

Il was widely assumed by Atncrican policymakers lhal lhe Chinese saw (he prospectorth Korean nuclear weapons breakthrough as profoundly destabilizing to peninsular and regional security. Il is far less certain,thai the Chinese were ever persuaded that North Korea was embarked onrogram, perhaps explaining the seeming equanimity wiih which Beijing viewed many of North Korea's actions. Si ill unresolved, however, is whether Chinaredible enough relationship with North Korea during those years to secure direct assurances from P'yongyang on thisquestion. Regardless of the answer, some Chinese analysis viewed the North's threatened withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty and its subsequent efforts to defy the inspections regime as designed principally to exploit one of its few sources of meaningful leverage.onsequence, the Chinese repeatedly counseled diplomatic negotiations as the preferred means to rcHtrain North Korean activities, simultaneously warning of the major risks posed by more coercive strategies.

Even as the Uniied States has subsequently acknowledged Chinesein defusing the nuclear crisis, few officials have ever characterized this role in any detail. Repealed American urgings lhal Beijing toko steps ccrnrnensurslB with what US officials aeemed lhe gravity of developments on the peninsula fell largely on deaf ears in Beijing. All too often, ihe tenor of US-Chinese exchanges seemed formulaic and unsatisfactory, with the Chinese repeatedly counseling patience and urging the actions of all sides to conformnspecified actions conducive lo ensuring stability. Chi nescseemed especially insistent lhat no undue pressure be brought lo bear on North Korea, even when P'yongyang was especially defiant on matters related io their nuclear weapons and missile development programs. Though Beijing at tiroes voiced irxtirect criticism of Ihe North when P'yongs ang's negotiating behavior seemed especially egregious, theoften seemed more concerned that US actions might Induce an even larger crisis.

During the mid to, US worries about P'yongyang's nuclear and missile programs were abetted by widely expressed fears of the prospectystemic meltdown in the North that mightarger regional crisis. Here as well, most Chinese expressed comparable skepticism about USarguing that the North was prepared to tolerate unspeakable privation among lis citizens (including, for example, widespread malnutrition andwithout modifying its regime goals. Although the Chinese did concur in various multilateral initiatives in pursuit of enhanced normalcy on the(in particular, the four party talks inaciliunrvc role did not constrain China from reserving its own optionsrisis-even as its officials remained highly elusive in characterizing their potential behavior and policy objectives under more stressful circuiiislances.

Despite China's seeming detachment during much of the diplomaticof the mid to, this may well have reflected China'sabout the efficacy of seeking to compel North Korea under duress, ratherrue reflection of China's abiding concerns about instability on the peninsula. Indeed, even as China routinely dismissed the prospects for internal unrest or systemic meltdown in the North. Beijing as well asopted to increase their food and energy assistance to the North,in the interests ofuch more substantial crisis. In retrospect, this may also haveeans for the Chinese to quietly rebuild their diminished political capital with the successor leadership in P'yongyang, without China foregoing its mcreasingly consequential rela-tionships with the ROK. Thus, Chinese leaders may now believe that North Korea sees no practical alternative to enhanced economic and political engagement with the outside world. South Korea and China appear to wield enhanced influence in this altered policy errvironrnent, while also enabling Beijing toar more coherent policy toward both neighboring Korean states.

Under these circumstances. Chinese policy objectives on the peninsula seem likely tnalance among four separate but overlapping(I) the management of bilateral relations with the North, in so far as North Korean policy permits an active Chinesensuring aand growing relationship with the ROK for both developmental and securityomplex mix of collaboration and competition in relation to US regional policies;ndirectlyorerole for other major powersussia andhe Chinese do not believe it is practicable or advisable to exclude any of these outside actorsole on the peninsula or in regional diplomacy related to Korea. However, Beijing has reason to believe that it enjoys substantial political advantage in comparison to other major powers. This judgment reflects Beijing's geographic proximity, its growing links to the Southcreasing closeness of Chinese-South Korean relations in the aftermath of inter-Korean summit, and Ihe evident receptivity of North Korea to an enhanced Chinese political and economic role in peninsular affairs.

But it seems highly doubtful tbat the Chinese feel fully confident of the sus-tairability and predictability of long term ties to the North and to the Kim Chong-il leadership. Beijing recognizes that Fyorigyang's negotiatingoften favor sequential approaches toward different major powers, with alternating periods of cultivation and disengagement North Korea maythat it hasuch more problematic period with the United States, thereby underscoring (he need to shore up other sources of support The logic of accelerated ties with China partly emerged out of these

ul Ihis implies (hat North Korean policy calculations arctactical rather than stratesnc. Some of this adjustment could also extend to relations with South Korea, which seemed relegatedideline roleihe inter-Korean summit, as Pyongyang assiduously curried favor with the United States in the waning months of the Clinton Administration.

Although it is not possible to discern the full scope andurrent bilateral ties between Beijing and P'yongyang, press coverage of Kim Chong-il's January visit suggested an appreciable wanning of relations among senior leaders. The available evidence suggests that the visit was arranged either in great secrecy, in great haste, or both. Though the Chinese appear disinclined to chase after Kim Chong-il. they clearly recognize the possibilities for exploiting Kim's evident interest in Chinese economic development However, it is possible that Kim might misconstrue what he observed in Shanghai and Beijing, which represents the cumulative results of two decades of economic reformecade of greatiy accelerated development in both cities. If Kim believes that North Korea could rapidlyomparable plan, he is certain to be disappointed. In this regard, the Chinese have undoubtedly emphasized that autarkic economies must walk before they can run. The question is how much effort China itto undertake with the North. Beijing can be expected to counsel patience, prudence, and practicality as the watchwords for achievingchange in the North; the question is whether North Korea is prepared to listen and is able to implement meaningful policy change- Suchassuming they develop further, willood deal about the potential for Beijing to exploit its current opportunities with the North Korean leadership.

On balance, however, the Chinese seem mcUned to lead by power ofrather thanajor role within the North Korean economy. This could extendeightened Chinese rote in training North Korean managers, and in otherwise seeking to facilitate the Norm's economic recovery. But it seemi highly unlikely lhat the Chinese will undertake major investments in North Korea Limited numbers of Chinese have had"on ihe ground" experience in the North, and if anything this is likely to caution tbe Chinese from substantial direct involvement. Bul suchare necessarily conjectural. North Korea's current needs areIts economy and society are functioning at minimal capacity. Despite South Korea's incentives to help stimulate atodest economic recovery in the North. P'yongyang may soon confront the upper limits of an "aid baaed- foreign policy. Except in certain areas such as food and energy supplies, the Chinese are very unlikely toajor assistance role. What might happen if conditions go from bad to worse takes us beyond the scope of this paper, but it should not be excludedelevant concern.

Relations with the South, therefore, will continue toar morepriority for Beijing, both with respect to economic development and in terms of regional politics and security. The Chinese may moeed perceive some common ground with the North on specific security concerns,rger stakes exist with the South, especially in terms of potential transitions in the scope and character of the US-ROK alliance, Although President Kim Dae-jung has repeatedly emphasized the singular importance of the US-ROK allianceS military presence on theore definitive movement toward non-adversarial relations on the peninsula would heighten callsedefinition of the bilateralefashionedwould seek to conform to the new security landscape that mightemerge on the peninsula, with or without unification. There is every reason to believe that the ROK leadership will be highly attentive to China's security equities and that die Chinese fully recognize this essential fact In the absencerofound deterioration of Chinese-ROK relations, aconfigured alliance that either sought to exclude China from Itsframework or that presumed the prospect of future adversarial ties with China would elicit little support among South Korean policy makers. There seems little doubt that China remains quietly but seriously focused on these larger issues, even as it recognizes that such possibilities willdepend on the elimination of die North's capacity to threaten the South, or the ultimate unification of the peninsula.

China and the United States are both highly attentive to how the postulated North Korean threat continues to shape US regional security strategy. Korea remains the final Cold War frontier, where the threat of large scale armed conflict directly involving US forces remains essentially undiminished from decades past North Korean conventional and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities constitute the central concerns and underiying rationale in planningajor theater war (MTW) in Eastypothesized future North Korean ICBM capability constitutes the principal justification for movement toward national missile defense (NMD) as well as an array of theater missile defense (TMD) programs. These factors would seem toample incentive for China to encourage internal change in the Northangible degree of threat reduction.

But the Chinese are realists: they recognize that military power constitutes the principal foundation of the power of tbe North Korean state, with the North Korean People's Army the most powerful mstitution within the DPRK, and the ultimate guarantor of the power and prerogatives of Kim Chong-il. No matter what the prospects for economic change in the North, the underiying power structure persists as an enduring element in the North Korean system, and is unlikely to be modified in significant fashion at an early date. At the same time, the Chineseundamental strategic

divergence: the United States, the ROK, and China allormal peace agreement mat would ratify the end of the Korean War. whereascontinues toilateral peace agreement with Washington that would provide the North the separate security guarantee it desires from the United States. It remains very difficult to see how these views can heBut there seems little doubt that North Korea's longer term political, economic, and military evolulioo assumes central importance in the future geopolitics of Northeast Asia, and lhat the Chinese will continue to seek opportunities to fashion such an evolution to Beijing's advantage. Thefor the Chinese is how realistic they judge Ihe prospect for meaningful change that does not generate instability within the North, and whether they can pursueoal at acceptable cost and risk. The answers to these questions remain far from clear.

The Chinese also recognize that there are ample risks and uncertainties posed by the prospect of major change in North Korea. Beijing above all seeks incremental movement that does not induce abrupt disequilibrium or acute internal conflict.ime of continued uncertainty about the North's longer term directions and prospects. Beijing will seek to facilitateand economic recovery where possible, keep North Koreanrealistic, and limit the possibilities of unanticipated change. Tb the extent practicable, Beijing will also seek to coordinate iu strategies with the ROK, which it tacitly recognizesar more viable and meaningfulon llie peninsula. Though the Chinese will likely remain wary ofoverly enmeshed in US strategics toward the North, they also seem likely to test the possibilities to workew administration toward complementary objectives on the peninsula. Multilateral cooidinalion involving Japan and Russia may also emergeolicy option under some cirrnomsuuices- However, the ultimate determinant of future outcome rests with the North Korean leadership, and whether it will prove capable ofon its current opportunities to advance longer term stability and security on the peninsula.

Engagement With North Korea: Implications for the United States

McDevitt

Center tor Strategic Studies of the CNA Corporation

This paper addresses the implications for the United States of engagement with North Korea by Ioolring at three facets of the issue: overarching policy perspectives, security policy implications and military presence andimplications. Before coining to these points it is important at theto appreciateonceptual departure the notion of engagement with North Korea is for two generations of American policy makers.

Since its0 surprise invasion of South Korea, North Korea has been considered annd likely military foe of the United States. This characterization has never beenubject of speculation orscenario creation that often characterizes discussions of potential threats. No, North Korea hasdeadno doubt aboutno further discussionnemy.

Being an "official" enemy means, among other things, that the nation in question is the object of deliberate war planning, is the focus of deterrent deployments of US forces, is used publicly to argue for certain size and capabilities in the armed forces, is commented upon in tbe most negative terms in open Congressional testimony, and becomes the object of intense sustained intelligence scrutiny.

Because North Korea is an "official" enemy, it is not consideredor undiplomatic to refer to North Korea as such, or to hold openon Capitol Hill discussing the rwobabuities and implications of war with North Korea. Over time North Korea has come tonique place in the pantheon of American enemies that US officials mention whenour de horizon of where the United States might be forced tosort of security danger equivalent to theost wanted list" in which P'yongyang was either number one or two. It isto realize that North Korea has been on this list longer than any otheryears and counting. North Korea has the dubious distinction of being America's longest running enemy.

When talking about 'engagement" with North Korea, the most fundamental implication has to do with the security paradigm that has shaped dunking about North Korea for decades. Does it remain remains valid? Theassumptions that American policy makers embrace will shape the course, nature and degree of an engagement policy with North Korea. Some of the

obvious considerations are: should North Korea be ccmsidcred an aggressor state, is America's relationship with P'yongyang really shifting fromto coexistence, and finally has the United States reconsidered its vision of the future of the Korea peninsula to include the possibility of two Korean states peacefully coexisting for an indefinite period of lime?

The Overarching Assumptions North Korea: An Aegressor Stale?

Virtually all US experts nave approached the issue of dealing with North Korea with caution given Ihe bloody history of (he past SO years, the near hair-trigger military posture on the peninsula, and the neednsure lhat Washington and Seoul, and now Japan as well, are in step regarding any policy initialises toward the North-One need only read recent Posture Slalements from General Schwartz. Commander of US Forces in Korea and the Combined forces Commander (CFC) to be reminoed of the continued military threat posed by lhe North, Military professionals in Korea responsible for its defense pay closeto the military capabilities of lhe Democratic Peoples Republic of Koreaxamining North Koreatrictly capabilities point of view is reason for concern. The forward deployment of North Korean forces along Ihe DMZ with long-range artillery and rockets dug in close enough lo the DMZ lo be able to reach Seoul create real problems for officers andresponsible for the lives of americans and South Koreans under theirwho arc accountable for the successful defense of the South. Although determining capabilities isrecise art, ilinely tuned intelligence gathering and estimating process lhat provides aaccurate judgment on North Korea's military muscle.

Far more difficult is trying to discern North Korean intentions.orth Korea still have the desire to reunite the peninsula by military force? Has it forward-deployed its forces so thai il is optimally positioned tohort notice invasion? Or is its forwardefensive concept of operations designedry to hah an invasion in ita tracks. In plain words, is North Korea's deployment positioning for an offensive or forward defense intended lo deter the United States and ROK from moving North?

A growing consensus in Washington seems to be thai Pyongyang'scarry more weight than Pyongyang's military capabilities; probably because observers believe that North Korea's ecocernic mess hasits military readiness. Furthermore judgments regarding North Korean leadership have been transformed. Far from the buffoonisli portrait

im Cbong il is now assessedhrewd politician who has closely examined his situation, forsworn reunification by conquest, and concluded that tbe only way to save his regime, other than through genuine reform, which would probably unseat bun, is to engage the United States, South Korea, and others to boil out tbe economic mess North Korea is in. But, as individuals who worry most about North Korean capabilities are quick to point out, "Chairmans ROK officials now call Kim Chong-il, hai nol to this point done anything to reduce his Own military potential, and may in fact, not be free to do so.

This is simply not an intellectual exercise, trying to parse capabilities versus intentions. To morviduals who most determine the pace and scope ofif any, thisentral issue. If one makes North Korean intentions the most important determinate of policy and conclude those intentions areand defense, the paradigm one uses to dunk about shaping policy is very different from the one that assumes that North Koreas recent opening isactical ploy based on survival and ultimately forceful reunification remains Pyongyang's ambition. The tolerance for risk is much higher in the former case. In the later case, policy options one might feel comfonablc in advocating tend to be strictly bounded by considerations of North Korean military capability. The range of options available to the policymaker and the degree of tolerable risk decisionmakers are willing to accept in the military dimension, particularly changes advocated as unilateral indications of good faith by the United States and the ROK, dtarnatically narrow unless North Koreas military undertakes similar and verifiable actions.

On the other hand, if officials in Washington and Seoul conclude that the North has neither the desire nor intent to invade the South, even if itsbegins to turn around, then it is reasonable to speculate that anpolicy could lead to adjustments in US military posture without msisting on some form of North Korea military reciprocity. In such an event, policymakers would be more apt to countenance unilateral redeployments or even removal of some US forcesorth Korean quid pro quo.

Recent history suggests thatourse of action is neither far-fetched nor out of the question. Recallhe US Department of Defense announced planshased downward adjustment of US presence in Asia, especiallyentral dement of that adjustment involved areduction (not elimination) of US ground combat presence in Korea. The ROK Army was judged strong enough to hold the line on the ground. The focus of US presence in Korea was to be concentrated in airpower and the ability totrod uce US ground forces that were dispatched from the United States. The South Koreans were to assume the "leading role" in their own defense.

The fact ihu this plan waa never executed in full wai not becausehad misjudged risk or thai North Korea's intent to invade was reevaluated. Coocerns surrounding the North Korean nuclear program brought italt. Then Secretary of Defense Cheney judged thatconventional military forces from Korea at the same time ihe USG was attempting to heighten Congressional and international concernNorth Korea's development of nuclear weapons appeared inconsistenl and sent confusing signals to Capitol Hill and friends and allies whosethe United States sought in the United Nations.esult, the US plan was "frown" indecision that the newly elected Clintonvalidated

Could such an approach become one of the implications of an engagement policy? Possibly. Many factors would have to be taken into account,unilaterally giving up the leverage of using US reductions to force North Korean reductions along the DMZ, and the overall irrmact on USinterests in Asia. Also, asomestic factors related lo ihesize of the US military could alsoole.

This point is not raised to advocate ihis particular policy line. Rather il is made to highlight an important implicationolicy of engagement. Does engagement contributeerception that North Korea longer harbors aggressive intent against the South? If lhat is theange of security policy options regarding conventional force evolution, that for years have been overshadowed by concerns with nuclear weapons developments and long-range missiles, could once again become prominent.

From Confrontation to Coexistence

Closely related to perceptions of aggressive intent is the overallof North Korea in the hierarchy of threat, which is mentioned in the introduction. Engagement is likely io change threat perceptions. North Korea could easily lose its place as an official or "certain" enemy and slip into the ihadowy uncertainty of "potential threat" Assuming that North Korea will do tbe minimum necessary in terms of reciprocity to keep the United States and ROK from throwing their hands up in disgust, il is easy toS policy approach thai it less concerned about the threat posed by the possibility of North Korea's aggression and remains more focused on North Korea's long-range missile development and "halted" nuclear weapon program. This is what has been US policy for the past several years.

Ever since tbe Nuclear Framework Agreement was concludedur policy toward North Korea has assumed two parallelone, ensure

deterrence bytrong military position in the ROK and on the other deal with the nuclear and missile threats by what could beasten tose this characterizationescriptive rather than pejorative sense. This diplomatic approach falls into the realm of "least barf choices since there are no viable coercive options that make sense.

In Washington, the imminent collapse of North Korea scenario so popularew years ago is today scarcely discussed. The resilience of the North Korean state, the massive infusion of aid, and most of all the realization that China is willing to do whatever possible to keep North Korea afloat have combined toew consensus in Washington. North Korea will not collapse;eparate state it is going to be around for many years. The so-called Perry Initiative (led by former Secretary of Defense Williamnstigatedongressionally mandated review of US policy toward North Korea, has reached the conclusion that the United States must engage North Korea, live with it, and not hasten its demise Perry represents mainstream, but certainly not aD, opinion in Washington that the best policytep-by-step process that leads to normalized relations with North Korea in returnorth Korean rollback of its long-range missile and nuclear program.

One of the major implications of an engagement policy is the impliedthat North Korea's nuclear program and long range missiles are intended as defensive capabilities being assembled at greatuarantor of last resort for regime survivability. The nuclearand long-range missiles are manifestationseak and insecure North Korean regime and therefore can be bargained away once an engaged North Korea feels that regime survival can be assured through diplomacy, international agreements and economic development. One of the potential contradictions of engagement is the belief by many that these rudimentary capabilities are the only leverage P'yongyang has to "force" engagement and that without these threats the international community would be largely indifferent to the fate of North Korea.esult North Korean will never bargain themleasterifiable way.

The balance of this paper assumes that the Perry formulation is the most viable course of action, and engagement is the way in which this approach can best be opcrationalized. Rather than confronting, or ignoring. North Korea, (he only hope the USO has for achieving US objectives is to coexist with North Korea, thorough engagement work to reduce its sense ofand eventually through the process of engagement convince North Korea it can ensure its future without the threat of nuclear weapons and long-rangem going to assume that North Korea has forsworn military aggressioneunification strategy and is much more concerned with stepping back from the brink of collapse and working to ensure the

DPRK surviveseparate sovereign entity. While not absolutelythis is the case, to do otherwise would notull exploration of what an engagement policy that seeks coexistence might mean for the United States.

"One Democratic Korea or Two Kerens?"

For decades, official US policy regarding reunification mirrored Seoul's. Specifically, we opined lhat the United States favored peaceful reunification that resulteddemocraticiplomatic code for reunification on the ROK'* terms- While equating the ROK with democracy was. for manyolicy of bypecnay. at least Seoul had some of the irappings of democracy and was infinitely preferable to the Communist dictatorship in the North, which had no prospects whatsoever foremocratic state What US policy really meant was lhat reunification would take place under South Korean auspices, with the P'yongyang regime disappearing. Because no one expected lhat P'yongyang would be intentionally complicit in its own demise, and the United States was unwilling IO countenance two Korean suitesossible outcome, US policy options were severelyin dealing with thehad we wanted to.

But now. if "engagement" becomes official policy, decades of "one Korea with Seoul as the winner" will be jettisoned. Actually, this evoluuon has been going on for some time.eries of incremental steps since the Nuclear Framework Agreementhe United States has beena de-facto "two Korea" policy. It has been working to keep theregimeather than taking opportunities to hasten its demise.

An official policy of engagement would merely validate what has been going for six years, and, since Kim Dae Jung became President of the ROK, keep us in step with Seoul. The mutual objective is no longer reunification, butKorean states peacefully staring ihe Korean pen insula

Within the context of US objectivesost-Cold War environmant that is no longer zero-sum based, this policy transition makes perfectly good sense with one disturbing exception. The regime that we propose to coexist with, and actually help to survive, is one of the most dictatorial, beriightrdly repressive regimes on the face of the earth. It is regime that has killed or let die hundreds of thousands of its own citizens and, over the years, hashorrendous acts of terrorism and criminal behavior.agging concern remains; helping this regime to survive, US policy may actually be allowing this incredibly militarized society to catch its breath, remvigoraie its military readiness and become an even more dangerous state in the future

So. as it happens, one of the biggest implications of an engagement policy is that we compromise our own ideals to dealeprehensible regime and hope that this compromise will lead to the greater good of removing once and for all the prospectar of reunification on the Koreans well as removing the potential threat of North Korean nuclear-tipped ICBMs that could hit the United States-

Security Policy Implications

Shifting to implications for securityey assumption is that should engagement lead to any political change for the better between the two Koreas that also reduces the risk of surprise attack firm the North this willrofound impact on the strategic situation In both Korea and Ihe whole of Northeast Asia.hange in the strategic environment in Korea wouldajor reevahiarion on the part of the United States and its allies of what the mission, overall size, rrulitary composition and location of US forces stationed in Bastto be.

The United States has indicatedumber of occasions that it wouldto retain US forces in Koreaolitical settlement between the two is reached. Prom the US perspective the key issue has always been whether the government of the ROK would continue to welcome US presence afterWould Seoul be able to diplornatically accomplish North-South reconciliation without giving ground on US presence? Or would USbe the major sTumbling block on the way to permanent reconciliation?

This author has heard in conferences and other interactions with colleagues from both Korea and China that the United States does not favor inter-Korean coexistence because it wouldhange in militaryin Asia. The hypothesis behind these assertions is that ihe United States is worriedoss of political influence in the region if US military presence were diminished becauseraw down or withdrawal from Korea.esult, the United States would somehow seek to interfere with or slow down efforts to achieve reconciliation. One of theolicy of engagement would be that it would put this line of speculation to rest, Furthermore, uncertainty surrounding the rise of China among most of the countries of Asia makes it unlikely that US influence in the region will wane no matter what theorea.

Presence in Korea In the Context of East Asia

When considering the implications of engagement with North Korea on US presence in Korea, US forces there must not be considered in isolation. If the risk of war in Korea dissipates, the United States would still seek to maintain

US forces In East Asia lo maintainission thai transcend* events in Korea. The larger context of region-wide presence mustoint of departure for considering options about the future.

Over the past decade the question of US forces stationed inhasentral, if not the central, focus of US security policy in the region. Two interrelatedthere ahould be any permancnl forward presence al all. and, if so. what theand military nature of those forces shouldbeen the tiiematic centerpiece of US regional strategy and dialogue with East Asian nations. Besides deterring war in Korea, US forces are welcomed by most of the countries in lhe regionalancing or countervailing presence to the uncertainty createdhina that is rnooernizing mititarily. andedge against the remote possiNlityililarily assertive Japan.

Today, US forward-presence forces areorce for regional stabililyorce for deterrence because they blend multi-service capacities well tailored to address the three most dangerous security uncertainties found in Asia: the possibility or war in Korea, the possibility of military conflict over Taiwan, and the conflict over sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. Forward-deployed forces are relevant because they have the proper blend of capabilities to deal with the most aedible military problems in lhenot all of the problems, but the most likely problems.

A quick survey of the major elements of US forces illusrrates this point. The ground forces in Eastinh US Army) and Okinawa, Japan (III US Marine Corps Expeditionarylargely oriented toward Korea. In addition to their major role in any Korean contingency, the Marines stationed in Okinawa alsoegional crisLs-response role when they are embarked in ihe Amphibious Task Force located in Sasebo, Japan. The US Seventh Heel, whose flagship and aircraft carrier battle group are in Yokosuxa. Japan, would alsoey role in any Korean contingency. But because of the maritime nature of the vast East Asian region, ihemobility of the Heel resultsecidedly regional rather lhanoperational orientation. The numbered US Air Forces in Northeast Asia, ihc 7th in Korea and lhe 5th in Japan, are largely focused on Korea as well. But. air forces also are inherently very mobile, and Ihc tactical aircraft located in Japan could be employed region wide.

As practiced today, the mission of deterrence in Koreailitarily credible land and air force physically stationed in Korea with Ihe promise of swift and massive reinfercemeni from the United States. Thai mission also counts onmall bul rmiirarily significant force (those thai areio regional stability) elsewhere in East Asia, available fororean campaign, lo diminish the possibilityurprise attack could succeed before reinforcements from the United Stales arrive.

nu

V'.VS -*

eneral proposition, almost all military forces are conceptuallyIn that they can be shifted between missions. However, reality imposes real restraints. Primary mission tasking commands the bulk of training time and readiness focus. In Korea, foringle-minded preparation for war in Korea is manifested by established lines of commumcation, in-place logistics support, and administrative arrangements that include integration of ROK draftees into US units, and command relationships that include integrated ROK-US staffs. It would be very difficult today to employ US forces in Korea on an off-peninsula regional basis even if all political and policy-level inrnediments and treaty obligations could be overcome.

Necessary Conditions fbr Evolutionary US Force Changes In Korea

A central promiseolicy of engagement is that it will lead to theprecondition for US force evolution, that is, military security for the ROK. If engagement facilitates coexistence, US presence could be reduced when the ROK felt itself strong enough to manage its own defease without foreign assistance.

The most immediate security concerns in Seoul are reducing the risk ofattack and the vulnerability of the capital to bombardment. Force reductions, thin outs of North Korean artillery rubes, elimination of ballistic missiles, reduction of reinforcement capabilities, verifiable bans on various forms of weapons of mass destructionnd continued successful inhibition of the DPRK nuclear program all help with these goals.

But Surprise or short warning attack is the central military issue. As long as North Koreas army remains postured very close to the DMZ it couldlaunch an invasion wiih little detectable preparation. Therefore, the warning time necessary to ready defensive forces can be defined in terms of hours or, atew days. The only miUtarily practical way to reduce the possibilityurprise invasion or attack wouldubstantialof military forces to some considerable distance from the DMZ. They would have to be moved far enough back from the DMZ thatofficials be confident they could detect the movement and preparation of North Korean forces for an invasion far enough in advance to permitthe readiness of ROK and any US forces in Korea, as well as initiating the process of reinforcement before an actual attack.

Therefore, one important implication of engagement wouldolicy focus on creating the circuinstances necessary for confidence buildingto be put in place that reduce worries about surprise attacks.

OtT-Ppnlniulfl Mission* Tor Forces Id Korea

Because change in ihe securely situation in Korea will probably comeil is likely thai changes in US posture would also come slowly, in an evolutionary step-by-step process. An early step wouldutuallyagreement between the ROK and the United Slates that US forces stationed in Korea would be available for regional missions.itcd States would want to be confident its forces based in the ROK would be available for deployment elsewhere without ROK agreement aboui such redeployment

This is another central issue. If the ROK could not commit to such an agtee-meni. the United Stales would have to face some difficult considerbuoos even if the ROK government was willing to have US forces in Korea onlyaguely defined mission of Korean defense.

One such consideration would be the overall security situation in East Asia, especially the way in which China was perceived by the nations of the region. If China loomedatent threat, or became particularly assertive, thai would be the major factor. Sustaining forces in Korea solely in defense of Korea would have some continued credibility.

hina that makes the rest of the region nervous, theotal withdrawal from Korea would have on the willingness of the people of Japan to continue to host US forces would alsoerious consideration.ack of nexifailiiy in the use of US forces in Korea be an acceptable trade-off for continued access to facilities in Japan? Possibly; but domestic factors in the United States would alsoonsideration.

The US servicesArmy and Airwant to have greater flexibility in meeting worldwide commilmenls and not be willing to tie down forces in Korea that was not under some threat of aggression,might balk atommitment of US forces lo Korea, that could not be employed elsewhere,ompelling threat.

For its part Seoulotentially serious problem with allowing forceson its territory to leave on missions conceived by the United Suites alone. Because of geography and history Seoul will certainly be veryto its relationship with Beijing. China might insist that if the ROK wanted some US forces to remain, they could not be available for missions outside Korea, such as protecting Taiwan. Since China has been clear thai it opposes US forces in East Asia "aimed att is likely this wouldajor issue. The point being that despite the declaratory policy of both the United States and tbe ROK that both capitals want US forces to remain, even after reunification, circumstances and geopolitical considerations may frustrateest intentions.

Military Implications

Hypothetical OfT-Peninsula Force Structure

If we assume however that all of these issues can be resolved, whatesidual Korean-based US forceegional mission look like?oint of departure the conceptual relationship between forces in Korea and forces in Japan and elsewhere in the region woold be reversed. Forces in Korea would have to be consideredupporting component of all the US forces stationed in East Asia, uKluding obviously, those stationed in Japan. As opposed to today where tbe forces outside Korea are considered acomponent to the forces in Korea.omponentarger force whose potential area of operation is tbroughout East Asia, forces in Korea must be configured inay that they can be moved rapidly off the peninsula by either air or sea.

In practical terms this suggests Airan Air Expeditionary Forcepermanently assignedase in Korea or one that rouitionally deploys from the United States. It also means that any ground forces would have to be equipped with tanks, artillery, and other vehicles that are light enough to be moved easily. Today the US Army has airborne and light infantry forces that fit within this category. The Army is also experimenting with differently sized and equippedrigade-sizeat least on paper, would appear toegional mission originatingase in Korea. Finally, in terms of land forces, US Marines also fit the category of mobile forces. It is certainly conceivableortion of the US Marines currently in Okinawa could be relocated in Korea and conduct regional missions from Korea. Any military forces based in Korea that have the capability to conduct combat operations beyond Korea would also have the capability to conduct those operations in Korea in the defense of Korea. Thus, even if the primarywas off-peninsula these forces would also contribute to the overall security ofno specifically singled out enemy.

Changed Command Relationships

One of tbe major implications of an engagement policy with North Korea would be the ripple effects it would have on the existing US militarystructure in East Asia. Changes in the US presence in Korea, and indeed probably in forces in Japan as well, would also trigger changes in command arrangements both within Korea as well as among all US forces in East Asia.

The command structure in Korea isor. io official parlance,ihe device known as ihe Combined rurces Commandhich is charged wilh fighting in ihe defense of ihe ROK. Theof CFCS Army four-slat general whotaff composed of ROK and US oincen; Ihey are totally integrated, in that United Stales and ROK officers serve side-by-side, and each country has officers who are in charge of various elements of ihe staff. This is similar to ihe NATOstaffs in Europe.

The concept behind an integrated command is the military doctrinalof "unity ofingle operational commander must be responsible for all the forces likely to be engaged in combat. This sort of command arrangement is especially well suited for defensive alliances in which the forces have as iheir primary mission repelling an invasion. Since off-peninsnla missions would probably be al the initiative of the United States, in pursuit of objectives mat might only be in the interest of the United States, an integrated staff could create serious difficulties. lAs we have witnessed recently in the Balkans when the mission is offensive or "out of area" in nature, combined staffsolid political consensus regarding campaign objectives and the military means to be used inthose objectives.)

If, in the case of Korea, the mission of US forces is splitess well-defined threat to the ROK with no specific designated enemyS regional presence mission beyond the Korean peninsula, does perpetuationombined CFC command structure make sense?

Some would argue yes. an integraied command structure for Korea and eventually perhaps for all of Northeast Asia, would be one way lo preserve regional stability and actatalyst for bringing the rmhtaries of the region together. But, because China continues to oppose military alliances as "relics" of the Cold War, and would be concerned that any sucharrangement would be "pointed athef such an arrangement would probably come over the strong objectioni of China.

That may not matter if China is so assertive that the other countries of East Asia feel threatened. But if China remains focused on economicand shows every indication oftabilizing force in East Asia, it seems doubtful that such an integrated command structure would bepossible.

However, others could argue that an integrated command could easily encumber unilateral US action, especiallyaiwan crisis. It is an article of faith among US commanders toaximum amount of (legibility in

force deployment and operational decisions. An independent US command in Korea would be tbe best way to enable fiexibiliiy.

Prom an ROK perspective,S officer in command of both ROK and US forces when the threat from the North has abated isransition to an ROK general officer in command of CFC would solve ROK sovereignty concerns, but raise additional issues for the Unitedthe issue of US forces under foreignInircumstances this issue could be avoided by simply not assigning forces in Korea toUS nor Korean. CFClanning headquarters whose staff and facilities would focus on Korea-defense related contingencies.

To execute regional missions, today's existing stovepipe commandcommand for the US forces in Japaneparate one for the US forces inbe mod ified.ingle US officer responsible for "regional stability" put inUSub-unifiedreporting to QNCPAC. Alternatively, the current stovepipes could be preserved and each command redesignedoint Task Force commander, each reporting to CDNPAC. The result of this arrangement would beJoint Task Force Korea and Commander Joint Task Force Japan.

The United Nations Command in Korea is the other major command that would be affected by change in Korea. Its mission today is armisticeOnce the Armistice Agreementissupersededbyapeace treaty, it is difficult to imagine tbe UNit currently functions with the United Suites acting as the surrogate for the UN, and the United Nations in New York studiously ignoringcontinue to exist.

Some sort of reconstituted UN authority over US forces in Korea could become an issue for the North Koreans. North Korea may press for UN mvolvement to reassure themselves that US forces remaining in Korea would not have freedom of action, or it could totally oppose any continued mvolvement of the UN as an affront. There are so many variables on this issue that it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore them. The main point is that the current UN Command is unlikely toeace treaty.

In sum, there are many alternatives to existing command arrangements, but three main points seem clear. One, the United States Is unlikely to have any command authority over ROK forces; two, the UN Command as it exists today is likely to disappearoutical settlement replaces tbeand three, whatever arrangements are made, they will be evolutionary and suited to the political and strategic realities existing at the time The current arrangements have remained in place for so long because thesituation in Korea has remained staticong time. For command

arrangcmctiis ro be effeciivc and satisfy both the military and political requirements of alliance warfare, they must be based on the realities of the moment; not on an uncertain future.

Tbe Impact on National Military Strategy

Today, the requirement to deter North Korea makes it difficult toajor change to the overall size and composition (the balance of Army. Air Force. Navy, and Marine Corps) of US presence in the region. Bui. an engagement policy that that created an atmosphere in which Seoul and Washington base calculations more on Pyongyang's intentions than on its military capabilities could lead to unilateral changes in US presencean engagement policy that ledutual pullback from the. DMZ or other verifiable confidence-landing measures that make the prospect of North Korean aggression remote would be sufficient toajor recvalnation of the roles and missions of US force* in East Asia.

In fact,eevaluauon would encompass the whole of US miitary strategy. Ever since2 Bottom-Up Review conducted by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. America's armed forces have been sized and organized to he able to respond to two nearly simultaneous "major theater warscharacterization intended to capture (he idea of aconltict on the scale of Desert Storm. From the beginning. Korea has been considered one of the two-theater wars planning cases, and fully SO perceni of USpower is earmarked for Korea if conflict breaks out. (Conflict in the Persian Gulf is the other canonicalbsent another plausiblewar" scenario, peace in Korea couldramatic impact on the size and composition of the entire USthe ground forces.

Once ihe prospect of war in Korea is perceived to be remote, US security strategy for East Asia willresh publicly coherent case forpresence that makes sense in the capitals throughout Asia as well as in Washington. Declaratory US policy regarding US presence would no longer include deterring conflict in Korea, nor presumably, ai least in the near term, containing China.

A new rationale for US mililary presence in East Asia will probably revolve around the idea of "regionalctually, sustaining stability isew idea or rationale for US presence. Preserving stability has long been an avowed rationale when discussing America's mililary role in East Asia. What is new is that sustaining regional stability would become ihe primary mission locus for US presence and no longer share pride of place with lhe easily comprehended mission of ceterrence in Korea, or. during the Cold War. containing the Soviet Union.

no

Il is fair to pose the question why could not the public rationale also include deterring conflict in other potential hot spots in East Asia; especially across the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea? Without becoming entangledong digression about deterrence; the difference between deterrence in Korea and deterrence across the Taiwan Strait is in declared US policy. In Korea the USreaty obligationirm commitment to respondorth Korean attack: with overwhelming force. No such treaty or explicit obligation exists regarding Taiwan or the South China Sea. The United States has been insistent that these issued be resolved peacefully, but for good reasons has not elected to commit the United Statesuaranteed military response. Withoutommitment, an avowed and openly planned for deterrence mission in these two cases is not diplomatically wise as it would almost certainlyilitarily confrontational aspect to our relationship with China. Some things are best left unsaid

A policy of engagement with North Korea seems likely to leadajor reassessment of US security strategy in East Asia. Not onlyewfor continued US presence be necessary, but once that rationale is decided upon, the next step wilt be to "translate" that rationaleroper forward presence force structure that makes good military sense. Forshould "stability" become the rationale for presence, how is this vague notion transformed into the proper mix of Army. Navy, Air Force and Marines thatcombat credible" force able to accomplish the stated objective?

Forces that are responsible for tasks throughout all of East Asia, beyond but not excluding Korea, must have flexibility in administrative and support arrangements. These forces would have responsibility for maintainingthroughout the region. This is why forces would remain in Korea after some sort ofontribution to maintaining regional stability. Translating the vague notion of stability into specificrequirements is necessary to determine the precise mix and size of US armed services that woulduture residual force in Korea. But, in general the main cTiteria are:

They must not be tethered to specific crisis scenarios so they can respond quickly throughout East Asia.

They must have the political or policy freedom from the host country that permits them to use bases for contingencies not directly associated with the defense of the host country.

* They must be agile enough to carryide range of (asks anywhere in the region. This agilityomNnaiion of the characteristics of Ihc forces themselves as well as their (raining and command arrangements.

Because ihey are not "tethered" to Korea, the forces lhat today are located inthe Navy, the US Army Special Forces in Okinawa, some of the Marines, and some of the Airwhat could be termed "the regional stabilityn the future, any forces in Korea with regional responsibilities would need similar flexibility. Thisask tor the Joint Staff and Pacific Command Io puzzle over, because ii is on of the logical consequences of engagement.

Conclusion

This paper has discussed many, but certainly not all. of the implications thai an engagement policy with North Korea could precipitate. Over tic short term it seems likely that an engagement policy would continue to focus on slopping the development, testing and export of long range missiles and keeping the North Korean nuclear program in its current state. But, this near-term focus ought not be allowed to blind policymakers to the essential longer term payoff of an engagement policy; specifically reducing lhe threat of North Korean surprise attack, getting Seoul out from under the gun of artillery and rockets, rolling back the North Korean long range missileand accounting foe the still unaccounted for reprocessed plutonium thai ihc IAEA found missing. This is on ambitious, and perhaps unrealistic long-term agenda. But. unrealistic or not, it needs to be pursued if there is be long-term peace and stability in Korea.

For the United Slates, recondliation and peaceful coexistence in Korea wouldajor shift in ihe strategic landscape of Bait Asia. After almostears of beinghange in Korea willajor reevaluaiion of the rationalization, size, and mix of US forcesin East Asia. Because the United States has maintained some sort of military presence in East Asia dating back to the formation of the US Navy East India Squadron5 it does not seem unreasonable to believe lhat Washington will continue toigh value on sustaining presence in the region under any circumstances

Losing tho "figleiif" of deterring war in Korea afterears of using it as one of tbe principle rationales tor that pre-scnce will almost certainly bring Ihe relationship between forward presence and China into sharp focus, even if in the unlikely event Taiwan is no longer an issue. The Chineseaccept US presence today largely because they share our ceneem

about inBtability on tbe Korean peninsula. Once thai rationale dissipates, Chinese concerns about US military power "on ourill almost certainly become more vocal. Thus, it is incumbent upon US policy makers who will be narrowly be focused on the Korean peninsula in the day to day execution of engagement with North Korea, to step back andonger look and mink through the regional implications thatolicy will inevitably trigger.

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