VOL III COMPREHENSIVE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE DCI ON IRAQ'S WMD

Created: 9/30/2004

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Comprehensive Report

of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD

4

Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program

By God, spare us your evil. Pick up your goods and leave. We do not need an atomic bomb. We have the dual chemical. Let them take note of this. We have the dual chemical. It exists in Iraq.'

1 Saddam speaking about the Israeli. US, and UK intelligence services and Iraq's developmeni of binary CW' munitionspeechForeign Broadcast Information9.

Contents

Key

Fsolulion of Ihc Chemical Warfare

Regime Strategy and WMD

The tiarly

The Chemical Corps and AI-Hasan Ibn-al-llayiham Research

Full:

Foundation of the Al Mulhanna State

Agent deduction Begins and Al Mulhanna Stale Fsiablishmcnt Takes

Early WcaponiKshon: Simple

Permanent and Pivotal Strategic

Tbe Decline.

Destroying Iraqi

Recovery aid Transition.

Miscalculation.

Command and

Preamble: Muddling Ihrough After lhe Gulf

Iraq Could Maintain CW Competence With Relative

and

Creation of the Iraqi Industrial Comminee

The Power ol the

The BCl Master Plan for Sclf-Reliince: The List

Dual-Use Chemicals on the ListOU

Thionyl

Chemicals From the Usi Mose Toward

,,

State of Chemical Industry siBreak-Om

Suspect Munitions

Disposition of CW Munitions

1 Decision To Destroy Undeclared

Iraq Unilateral Weapons Destruction in

Destruction of Chemical Munitions, Bulk Agent, and

ChemicalMilitary* Depots and

Investigating Ammunition Supply

Investigating Captured Enemy Ammunition Points (CEA Consolidation

Annexes

Undeclared Research on Poisons and Toxins for

Mulhanna Chemical Weapons

Iraqi Industrial

Company's

Preliminary Assessment of Chemical Weapons

Warfare and the Defense of107

of Key Findings at Captured fincmy Ammunition Consolidation

ofraqi Ammunition Supply

Key Findings

Saddam never abandoned his intentions toW effort when sanctions were hfted and conditions were judged favorable:

and many Iraqis regarded CWroven weapon against an enemy's superior numericaleapon thai had saved the nation at least oncethe Iran-Iraqcontributed tothe Coalition1 from advancing to Baghdad.

mall number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpilehere are no credible indications that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitionsolicy ISG attributes to Baghdad's desire to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear of force against it should WMD be discovered.

scale of the Iraqi conventional munitions stockpile, among other factors, precluded an examination of the entire stockpile; however. ISG inspected sites judged most likely associated with possible storage or deployment of chemical weapons.

Iraq's CW program was crippled by the Gulf war and the legitimate chemical industry, which suffered under sanctions, only began to recover in the. Subsequent changes in the management of key military and civilian organizations, followed by an influx of funding and resources, provided Iraq with the ability to reinvigorate hs industrial base.

Poor policies and management in theeft the Mililary Industrial Commission (MIC) financially unsound andtale of almosi complete disarray.

Saddamumber of changes to the Regime's organizational and programmatic structures after lhe departure of Husayn Kamil.

Iraq's acceptance of Ihe Oil-for-Food (OFF) program was the foundation of Iraq's economic recovery andlow of illicitly diverted funds that could be applied lo projects for Iraq's chemical industry.

The way Iraq organized Its chemical industry after thellowed il to conserve the knowledge-base needed toW program,odest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from the decline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf war and UN-sponsored destruction and sanctions. Iraqigorous and formalized system of nationwide research and production of chemicals, but ISG will not be able to resolve whether Iraq intended the system to underpin any CW-related efforts.

The Regimeadre of trained and experienced researchers, production managers, and wcaponiza-lion experts from lhe former CW program.

Iraq beganange of indigenous chemical production projects5any of ihese projects, while not weapons-related, were designed to improve Iraq's infrastructure, which would have enhanced Iraq's ability to produce CW agents if the scaled-up production processes were implemented,

Iraq had an effective system for the procurement of items that Iraq was not allowed to acquire due toISG found no evidence that this sysiem was used lo acquire precursor chemicals in bulk: however documents indicate that dual-use laboratory' equipment and chemicals were acquired ihrough ihis system.

Iraqumber of new plants susrting In Ikehat enhanced its chemicalalthough its overall industry had not fully recovered from the effects of sanction i. and had not regainedechnical sophistication or production capabilities prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom

lOIFl.

ISG uitl not discover chemical process or production unit* configured to produce key precursor* or CW agents. However, site visits and debriefs revealed thai Iraq maintained its ability for reconfiguring and 'making-do' with available equipment as substitutes for sanctioned items.

ISO judges, based on available chemicals, infrastructure, and scientist dcbrielings. lhat Iraq at Oil1 probablyapability to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard wiihin ihreeix months.

A former nerve agent expert indicated that Iraq retained ihc capabitiiy lo produce nerve agent in significant quantities within two years, given the impon ol required phosphorous precursors. However, we have no credible indication* that Iraq acquired or attempted lo acquire large quantities ot these chemical* through its cutting procurement networks for sanctioned items.

In additionewts industry, Iraq was abk so monitor the location and use of all existing dual-use process equipment. This provided Iraq the ability to rapidly reallocate key equipment fee proscribedif required by the Regime.

One etfect of UN monitoring was toational level control system for important dual-useplants.

Iraq's historical ability to implement simple solutions to weaponization challenges allowed Iraq to retain the capability to weaponlze CW agent when the need arose. Because of the risk of discovery and consequences for ending US sanctions. Iraq would hate significantly jeopardized Its chances of having sanctions lifted or no longer enforced if the US or foreign entity had discovered that Iraq had undertaken anweaponization activities.

ISO ha* uncovered hardwareew military depots, which suggests thai Iraq may have prototypedCW'he available evidence i* insufficient :t> determine ihc nature ot ihc cflort or ihc time-tramc ol activities.

Iraq could indigenouslyange of conventionalhroughout. many of which had previously been adapted for rilling with CW agent. However. ISO has found ambiguous evidence of weaponiration activities.

Saddam's Leadership Defense Plan consistedactical doctrine taught to all Iraqi offier* and included ihe conceptred-line" or last line of defense. However. ISG has no information thai the plan everrigger for CW use.

reported high-level discussions about ihe use of chemical weapons in the defense of Iraq,acquired after OIF docs not confirm the inclusion of CW in Iraq's tactical planning for OIF. We believe ifiese were mostly theoretical discussions and do not imply the existence of undiscovered CW munitions.

Discussion* concerning WMD, particularly leading up to OIF. would have been highly companmenlaHzedUhin the Regime. ISG found no credible evidence lhat anvfwld elements knew aboul plans far CW use during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

of the Pedayecnio obiain chemical weapons for use during OIF, according to reporting, but ISG found no evidence thai Iraq ever came into possession of any CW weapons.

ISG uncovered information lhal Ihe Iraqi Inlelligence Service (IIS) maintained1et of undeclared covert laboratories lo research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence operations. The network of laboratories could have provided an ideal, compartmcnted platform from which io continue CWr small-scale production efforts, but wc have no indications this was planned. (Sec

ISG has no evidence that OS Directorate of Criminologycientists were producing CW or BW agents in these laboratories. However, sources indicateas planning to produce several CW agents including sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and Sarin.

Exploitations of IIS laboratories, safe houses, and disposal sites revealed no evidence of CW-related research or production, however many of ihese sites were either sanitized by the Regime or looted prior lo OIF.with key IIS officials within and outsideielded very liicle informafion about the IIS* activities in this area,

The existence, function, and purpose of the laboratories were never declared to the UN.

The IIS program included ihe use of human subjects for testing purposes.

ISGeries of key pre-OlF indicators involving the possible movement and storage ofweapons, focusing on II major depots assessed to have possible links toeview of documents, interviews, available reporting, and site exploitations revealed ahtrnate, plausible explanations for activities noted prior to OIF which, at the time, were believed to be CW-relaled.

investigated pre-OIF activities at Musayyib Ammunition Storagestorage site that was judged lo have the strongest link to CW. An extensive investigation of the facility revealed lhat there was no CW activity, unlike previously assessed.

Evolution of the Chemical Warfare Program

eriod of twenty years, beginningaboratory operaied by Iheervices, Iraq was able Iu begin and successfully undertake an offensive CW program which helped ensure lhe Regime's Internal and external hecurily.raq wasumber ofroduction plants, producing hundreds of ton*ange of vmipuniicd agents annually, for use against external and internal enemies of Ihe Regime. Thr program was supportedomplex web of international, weap-nniration and indigenous precursor produclion efforts. Iraq bred or droppedmunilions against Iranian forces and lis own Kurdish population during (he Iran-Iraq war and Ihen Laler lo help put down the Shi'a rebellion in

Iraq became the first nation loerve ageni on the baltlelield when it used Tabun munilions against Iran

During the Iran-Iraq war. CW use helped the Iraqis turn hack Iranian human-wave attacks when all other methods railed, buying time for Iraqi forces to regroup and replenish. Iraq again used CWto help crush the popular revolt

raq hadizable CWcomprising ihousands of short range rockets, anillery shells, and bombs, and hundreds of tons ol bulk ngem. It also haderve agent warheads form-range al llusayn missile.

Despite the provisions of UN Security Council Rcs-olution7 inhich called for Iraq to disarm, Iraq initially chose to retain CW weapons, precursors and associated equipment, making false declarations to the UN. Even when Iraq claimed io have complied withnd its successors. Saddam retained components vital loW program

Regime Strategy and WMI) Timeline

For an overview of Iraqi WMD programs and policy choices, readers should consult the Regime Strategy andet ine chart, enclosedeparate foldoui and in tabular form at the bad ofovering the periodhe timeline shows specifitbearing on the Regime's efforts in the BW. CW, delivery systems and nuclear realms and their chronological relationship with political and military developments that had direct lieanng on the Regime's policy choices.

Readers should also be aware that, al the conclusion of each volume of text, we have also included foldoui summary charti that relate inflectionrurning points in the Regime's WMDto particular evemvinitiottves'decisions the Regimeth respect to specific WMD programspoints are marked in the margins of the body of the textray triangle.

The Earlylow Start

The Chemical Corps and Al-Hasan Ibn-al Maylham Research foundation Iraq's interest in CW began in thend escalated in mponseerceived threat from Iran and Israel to comprehensive CW research program by the. The Regime initiallyumber Of Iraqi officers abroad for training in nuclear,and chemical defense. These officers laler formed the nucleus nf the Iraqi Chemical Corps, established

adre of Chemical Corps of ficets soughtto synthesize small quantities of CW agents (mustard. Tabun, and CS) for familiarization and the experience, according lo Iraq's Currently Accurate Pull and Complete Declaration (CAFCD) submitted to the UN inhe Iraqi General Stall approved (be request, and laboratories were built for the Chemical Corps at al-Rashad near Baghdad.

his initial effort had failed, and the US stepped in and founded the Al Hasan Ibn al-Hai-thent Research Foundation. The DS funded Al Hasan, svhose cover was as part of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. Iraq's various intelligence services remained involved, directly and indirectly, in CW and related activities for many years.

Hasan personnel were drawn from academia and the Chemical Corps. Al Hasan expanded with the construction of new laboratories in Baghdad and lhe selectionew productionorthwest of Baghdad, later lo be known as Al Mulhanna. Al Hasan's mission was to research the synthesis and production ofCW agents. It hadsuccess producing gram quantities of mustard, Tabun, CS and organophosphate pesticides like Malathion and parathion.

Iraq laler declared lhat the work al Al Hasan was suspended8 and ihe organization liquidated for failure io achieve its objectives, as well as forand fraud.

Amer al-Sa'adi found thai Al Hasan had made insufficient progress toward the goal of production. Havingresidential Decree dissolved Al Hasan.

That same year, the former head of lhe Chemical Corps, BG Nizar al-Atar. claims heive-year plan to the Ministry of Industry and MineralsW program lhat included lhe production of weapons, and some work continued.

By Ihe endeorganized Chemical Corps used ihe expanded al-Rashad sile to produce CW agents, ostensibly for the testing of CW defensive gear and detection equipment. The Chemical Corps, reinforced by many of the former Al Hasan staff, was also surveying the technical literature foron the production of ihe nerve agenis, Sarin and Tabun, research, which laid the groundwork for their nerve agent production processes.

Full: Ambition

Foundation of the Al Mulhanna State Establish men!

Once committed, Iraq spent targe amounts of money and resources on Us CW program (seehe outbreak of war with Iran0 and Iraq's failure topeedy victory appear lo have been Ihe impetus for the Ministry of Defense's launch of its industrial-scale, comprehensive, strategic CWResearchr ProjectThe objective was io produce CWTabun, Sarin, and VX, chemi-cal munitions, and while phosphorus (WP) munitions, (See

overed research and development for all aspects of CW, production of CW agenis and precursors, filling of CW munitions, storing of chemical munitions and agenis, and acquiringtechnical expertise to construct and maintain production lines.

The project also included5 and4

Agent Production Begins and AI Mulhanna State Kslablishment Takes Shape

ubsumed the Chemical Corps al-Rashad CW ctfons and their sitem northwest ofWiihin months of its inception.egan construction at the site on what was lo become Iraq's main CW production and research center. Wesl German businesses, using Easl German designs, supervised the creation of what was at the time lhe world's most modem and best-planned CW facilily under ihe cover of pesticide production.

Construction aciiviry23 was intense. Iraq's foreign coniractors, including Karl Kolb with Massar for reinforcement, built five large research laboratories, an administrative building, eight large underground bunkers for the storage of chemical munitions, and ihe first production buildings.

Iraq had acquired sufficient expertise during, despite fraud and failure by Al Hasan, to begin agent production immediately on completion of the first pilot-scale production line in the. For example,ons of mustard agent were produced at al-Rashad1fterame on line, both facilities produced agent.

tons of mustard were produced

Aboutons of Tabun were produced

Pilot-scale production of Sarin began

Work al theite did not pass unnoticed:

During the summerircraft attacked the Samarra'siie;

This was followed in6CUD attack.

esult. Iraqignificant portion of its Roland Air Defense System to Ihc Samarra' area to proteci lhe projeci.

As prodiiciion increased, Baghdad recognized that ils dependence on foreign suppliers for precursOisrogram weakness and took immediate steps towards self-reliance for precursor production. Iraq made plans to build ihree precursor productionear the town of Kallujah.ilometers west of Baghdad.

began constructing1 and III68 lo produce precursors.

The decision lo construct Ihe precursor production plants was lhe beginningignificant commit' ment of resourcesong-term CW program. In

usayn Kamil, assisted by Amer al-Sa'adi,lhe MIC and renamed lhe CW complex the At Mulhanna Stale Establishment (MSH).

MSE Redefines "Dual-Use"

The teem "dual-use" refers to resources that have both WMD and legitimate civilian or conventional military applications. MSE pursued legitimateprojects in addition to CW agent production, particularly after the end of the tnai-lraq war.and pharmaceutical research took place al Al Mulhanna alongside CW development, often involving the same people.

Tlie German fum Karl Kolb ttescribed theplains it built as "general multi-purpose pilotroviding Iraq with plausible deniability regarding the plants and distancing Karl Kolb from being implicated in contributing io WMD programs.

Pesticide research and developmentec-ondary responsibility for MSE. Pott-IMS, MSE unsuccessfully attempted toesticide production plantumber of leadingworldwide, in order to expand its background knowledge in organophosphorous production.

uring which time Iraq inlcrrupied CW production because there was no longer an immediate need for agent, ihe MSE CW infrastructure produced civilian goods, including shampoos, disinfectants, and simple pesticides.

Iraq also declared (hailW bomb casings0 rocket warheads, all reverse engineered from imported munitions.

Permanent and Pivotal Strategic Weapon The work underway al Al Muthanna Staleby theoi an indicatum Saddam intended IraqW effortignificant, large-scale program. Frominception. MSB's Research andAD) Directorateroad assortment of agents. Iraqi CW scientists urtdcrs-tood that they would gain (be greatestimpact byange of CW agents with different characteristics for different situations.

in'clnruie had individualdedicated to the development of mustard agents, nerve agents, and psychomimeticaccording to Iraq's declaration to the UNeporting from various sources indicates Iraq investigated mote thanotential CW com-poBavk,

Saddam belierrd Iraqi WMIt capabilities hadentral role ia the winning of the Iran-Iraq war and were vital lo Iraq'% national security sh-ategj.

became the first nation to use nerve agent on the battlefield when it used Jabun against Irany thr end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq had usedhemical munitions against Iranian human ware attacks and its awn Kurdish population.

raq hadizeable CW arsenal and hundreds of tons of bulk agent. Iraq had also produced nerve agent warheads for the 6S0 km al-Husayn missile.

Kefleeting those perceptions, andid lotrategic deterrent, MSE turned immediately after the Iran-Iraq wartrategy for maintaining an offensise CW capability In peacetime. With the end of the war inSI: slopped CW agent production, and focused on production ofproducts while continuing research lo improve production techniques, agent purity, and shelf life, although it restarted production

Muthanna's CW nerve agents containedthat affected agent stability and thus limited the shelf life of stored tilled munitions and bulk agent. This had not mattered during the Iran-Iraq War, when Iraq was using aaent as last as it could pnajuce iL but giten Iraq's intent io use chemical weaponstrategic deterrent, some stockpiling was essential.

A speech by SaddamubUclyIraq 'f CW research and production efforts in anticipation of ihe nexl war. Saddam claimed Iraqinary agent capability, an assertion that caught MSE scientists off guard, according lo Iraqicorroborated by documents the UN discovered at .Al Muthanna.

lessonth after Saddam's speech. Iraq restarted its CW production lines, tested CW warheads for al Husayn missiles, and reverse-ertgi-rtcered special parachute-retarded bombs.to the FFCD Iraq did not import any aerial tombs)

Al -Muthanna filled the ol-Husayn warheads and aerial bombstnury nerte agent component.

These weapon* were accompanied hy Jerry cans(he secondhemical that, when mixed with ihe weapons* contents, produced nerve agent. This was the mivhcfocc flight Iraqi 'binary' system. Iraqinary bombs and SO al-Husavniriary and

the subsequent first Gulf war. it is assessed that Saddam believed that the deployment of CW. and the delegated authority to use them, contributed to the US not driving onBaghdad.

The

Destroying Iraqi Weapons

During the Gulf war inoaliliott Forces destroyed or extensively damaged most of Iraq's CW infrastructure, including many of the agent and precursor production facilities at Al Muthanna. Then, inhe UN adopted Security Council

Examples ol Known Iraqi Use ol CW

The wa' Willi hen ended Iny this time, seven UN specialist missions had documented repeated use of chemicals in the war. According lo Iraq, rt consumed0 chemical bombs,rtillery shells0 short-range chemical rockets3raq declared it consumedona ol mustardons Ol Tabun. and over 6O0 tons of Sarin. Almosi two-thirds of the CW weapons were used In the lastonths of the war. Examples of CW use by Iraq:

In Iran-Iraq

3 Half Umran

3 Pan/win

4 Majnoon Island

4 al-Basrah

5 Hawizah Marsh

6 al-Faw

6 Urn ar-ttasas

t-Basrah

7 Sumar/tAehran

8 Hatabiabi Kurdish area

8 al-Faw

8 Fish Lake

8 Majnoon Islands

8 South-central border

ewerrari^ri/Kurdish casualtiesraniarvXurxfcsri casuali-esranian casualties0 Iranian casualtiesranian casualties0 Iranian casualtiesOOOs Iranian casualiresranian casualtieserveranian casualtieserves Kurdish/Iranian casualtieserves Iranian casualtieservess Iranian casualtieservess Iranian casualtieservess Iranian casualties

in Southern Iraq against the Popular1

Iti

arbala area NerveS, Shi'a casualties noi known. These are selected uses only. Numerous other smaller scale CW attacks occurred.

. whicheasefire in the Gulf war. Iraq was required io verifiably disarmrerequisite io lifting of the oil embargo imposed byf

Iraq initially chose not to fully declare its CW weapons andecision usually attributed to Husayn Kamil and implemented by senior personnel including his senior deputv, Amer al-Sa'adi.

Anticipating that inspections would be anand short-lived inconvenience. Iraqi leaders decided in early1 to hide significantof the CW program, including weapons, precursors, and equipment.

articularly invasive IAEA inspection inaddam ordered Dr. Mahmud Faraj Bilal. former deputy of the CW program, to destroy all hidden CW and BW materials,to an interview with Bilal after OIF.

Available evidence indicates Iraq destroyed Us hidden CW weapons and precursors, but keyand dual-use equipment were retained and were later discovered by inspectors.

For tht next five years, Iraq maintained the hidden items usefulW program restart but did not renew Us major CW efforts out of fear the UN sanctions would not be removed. UN sanctions severely limited Iraq's financial resources. Row materials, precursors, equipment, and expertise became increasingly scarce. The crippling of Iraq's CW infrastructure by the war, and the subsequent destruction and UN monitoring of much of the remaining materials and equipment limited Iraq's ability to rebuild orW program.

' The effects of .sanctions reverberated throughout the scientific community and affected all aspects of industry wiihin Iraq. Many scientists wereor had access to neither research and production materials nor professional development.

lahortly after Iraq revealed it. pro- b duction of bulk BW agent, Saddam's son-in-law and head of Iraq's WMD programs, Husayn KamU.fkd the country. Saddamecision at lhat time to declare virtually all hidden information and material they felt was significant on Iraq's programs, turning over WMD documentation, includingrunks of CW documents.

The documentation turned over by Itaq. allegedly hidden by Husayn Kamil. included results of Iraqi research material up8 that indicated more extensive research on VX than previously admitted.

The documents also included papers related to new agent research, mix-in-flight binary munitions development, and previously undisclosedof ether organizations in CW research.

ISG believes that none of these events weakened Saddam fs resolve toobust CW capability. Baghdad believed its need for chemical weapons was justified, based on ils fear of hostilities with Iran and Israel Tht Regime, we judge, was also motivated by an unstated desire to elevate Its status among Arab nations. ISG believes that Saddam deferred but did not abandon his CW ambitions.

Saddam implied, accenting lo lhe formerSecretary, that Iraq would resume WMD programs after sanctions In order to restore the "strategic balance" within the region and, particu-lady, against Israel

Saddam was fascinated by science and by lhei( offered for enhancing his military power base. He fell that possessing ihe technological capability to develop WMD conferred the intrinsic right on the country' to do so, accordingormer senior Iraqi official.

In, lhe Regime actively sought to achieve scientific excellence in Iraqeries of administrative measures, bul years of isolation from the international academic communityack of successful domestic research left Iraq's scientific infrastructure in decay.

According lo an Iraqi academic scieniisi, Saddam issued an edicthat all Iraqiaddress problems encountered in ihc military and industrial sectors. Thiseparture from past practice where the government denied such work to universities,

Following this order, Iraqi research universities were required to become self-funding. MIC projects accounted for much of the research funding during this time, accordingeading university scieniisi.

Saddam encouraged open forums for competition among scientists through committees and other programs, and he personally awarded lop scientists for exceptional work in technical fields, Saddam became personally involved in the direction of some of these programs, but many lacked unified planning or direction for research, and few were successful, according to Sa'adi.

Following Husayn KamiVs defection, Saddam look steps lo belter manage Iraqi industry, and with the creation of the Iraqi Industrial Commiiiee (IIC) inhe stage was setenewal of Iraq's chemical industry, lite IICange of projects aimed at developing an indigenous chemical production capability for strategically important chemicals lhat were difficult lo import under UN sanctions, according to reporting. (Sec

Recovery and

Iraq's CW program was crippled by Ihe Gulf "ar and the legitimate chemical industry, which suffered under sanctions, and only began to recover in the. Subsequent changes in the management of key military and civilian organizations, followed by an influx of funding and resources, provided Iraq with the ability to reinvigarate its industrial base,raq's acceptance of the VS OFF program6 qf was the foundation of Iraq's economic recovery andlow of illicitly diverted funds.

Iraq's chemical industry surged in the, when more financial resources became available to the Regime. Although Iraq still lagged behind

its pre-dulf war capabilities, it was able loortion of Us revenue to purchase new plants and renovate existing ones to renew ils basic chemical Industry.

Iraq was successful in procuring, constructing, andomplete state-of-the-artfacility for ammonium pcrchlorate through the Indian company NEC. Ammonium perchloratcey chemical for missile propcllants.

Iraq began refurbishing, and in some casesexisting chemical facilities with foreignFor example, the Al lliriq complex renovated its chlorine and phenol lines and restarted them inccording to reponing.

6he IIC coordinated large and important projects for the indigenous production of chemicals.

A written order from Saddam established the Naiional Project for Pharmaceuticals and Pesticides INPPPI. NPPP focused on the synthesis of drugs and pesticides, fot which Iraq in the pasi relied heavily on foreign suppliers.

The IIC examinedhemicals foro determine the feasibility of scalcd-up production. ISG notes that two chemicals on this list were compounds lhat arc consistent with an experimental VX pathway.

The process for veilinghemicals for economic feasibility and large-scale production was intensive and formalized. The IIC leadership built in several layers of review, research, and justification before compounds were selected for scale-up, raising further suspicion about the three compounds, partieularly dicyclocarbodUmidedehydrating agent that can be usedX stabilizer

Dr. Ja'far Dhia Ja'far. and IIC member, could not recall which projects were accepted for scale-up bui he knew that some compounds were dual-use and declarable lo the UN. and thai the NationalDirectorate (NMD) did not declare all of Ihe chemicals.

Reports of an unexplained discovery ofVX traces on missile warhead fragments in7 led to further tension between UNSCOM and Iraq. The uneasy relationship escalated with the discovery of the 'Air Force Document' (see RSI chapter) inhich indicated further Iraqi deception and obfuscation over Us CW disclosures. Iraq's anger about these two major issuesontributing factor lo Saddam's decisions to suspend cooperation srith UNSCOM and IAEA.

' The lack of inspectors allowed further dual-use infrastructure to be developed. The lack ofmonUoring emboldened Saddam and his UllcU procuremeni activities.

Concurrently, Iraq continued lo upgrade Usmanufacturing capability, pursuing glass-lining technology and manufacturing Us own multipurpose controllers.

indicates lhat research being conducted by State Establishment for Heavy Engineering9 was geared towardsrocess for glass lining steelmaking them corrosion resistant. SEHEE was focused on making cheaper, longer-lasting vessels, and reducing reliance on stainless steel.

recovered by ISG indicate that two teams, including one from the Al Majid Company had developed multipurpose controllers for typical chemical production by

There is an extensive, yet fragmentary andbody of evidence suggesting that Saddamtrategy toapability to return to WMD production after sanctions were lifted by preserving assets and expertise. In addition tocapability, we have clear evidence of his intent to resume WMD production as soon as sanctions were lifted. All sources suggest thai Saddamcompartmentalizaiion and would have discussed sornething as sensitive as WMD wiih as few people as possible.

Huwaysh claimed thai9 Saddam asked how long it would take toroduction line for CW agents. Huwaysh tasked four officials lo inv/esti-gaie, and ihey responded that experts could readilyroduction line for mustard wiihin six months. VX and Sarin production were moreand would lake longer. Huwaysh relayed this answer lo Saddam, who never requested follow-up information. An Iraqi CW expertestimated Iraq would requireew days to stan producingit were prepared to sacrifice the production equipment.

As the reality of the UN's impending return sank in, Iraq rapidly initiated steps to prepare for inspectors. Committees and groups were formed to ensure sites and key scientists were ready to receive the inspec-

the chemical industry began to recover, former CW scientists remained employed, primarily at Al Tariq Company (seeange of issues of interest to the UN and which Iraq claimed were part of its industrial chemical or defensive NBC interests. Wc have noi been able to confirm lhal any of these efforts were connected lo chemical agent production capability.

Scientists from ihe former CW program formulated agent simulants such us concentratedesticide, and locallyopyystem io disperse the simulant1

As had often occurred in the past, individualheads of depanmenis and security officials examined iheir plans of work for items orlhat would be subject to inspections. In every' relevant location in Iraq, lo some exient. normal work was disrupted in the effort to ensure Iraq was not suspected of undertaking proscribed activities.

Accordingenior chemist at the MIC. Huwaysh inssued ansame order issued several limes in theheld scientists personally responsible for any materials, equipment, or other prohibited items found by the UN.

Vice President Taha Ramadaneeting of over 'KMI scientists before Ihe inspectors returned, threatening scientists with dire consequences if the inspectors found anything that interfered with Iraq's progress towards ihe lifting of sanctions.

When inspections resumed, foreign experts were hidden from the inspection teams.

In Ihe final days of Ms Regime, Saddamlo pursue efforts lo enhance Iraq's industrial base, with plans underway for the constructionultipurpose chemical plant, and nine oil refineries in Southern and Northern Iraq. The plans for this chemical plant were the result of years of the HC's efforts lo coordinate research into the indigenous production of chemicals.

Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIM)lot of land west of Baghdad lhal il set aside for construction of this multipurposefacility, which was designed toear's supplyhemicals using onlyndependem pilot-scale production lines. (For more information, see Iraq's Infrastructure: Production Capability).

Construction was scheduled to begin inul was halted just prior to OTP. The plant would have provided Iraq wiih an indigenousproduction facility capable of producing large quantities of chemicals,elatively short lime.

F

Command and Conirol

Preamble: Muddling Through After the Gulf War

ISO believes that two of Saddam's primary goals after the war were to recover economically from war damage and to retain Iraq's capability toUs WMD program after sanctions were lifted or became ineffectual, inspections were removed, and the threat of force abated. During the Gulf war inoalition Forces destroyed or extensively damaged most of Iraq's CW infrastructure, including the ageni and precursor production facilities at AI Muihanna. Given ihe Iraqi government'sof CW data and production experience, the preservation of intellectual capital would be key to the eventual restorationost-sanctions CW program, and the Regime took explicit steps lo ensure theof its body of CW scientists.

Many former employees of Al Muthanna were deployed to Al Tariq and worked there until OIF.

In some cases, CW experts were diverted towithin ihe IIC or the MIM, according io interviews with multiple sources after OIF. Others were assigned to be instructors at chemical schools for defensive NBC work.

Of theformer CWaboutf whom are considered key CW experts from theAl Muthannaattempted to contact close to ISO to determine Iheir activUies1 and any efforts by the Regime to utilize Iheir skills for CW-relaled efforts. ISG was able Io identify initial location information forndividuals, many of whom were noi able to contacted.

on locations, employment, and availability, ISG experts were able to speak to nearlyormer key-CW scientists, none of whom claimed io have been involved in CW-rclatcd activities1 or to know any individuals suspected of involvement in such work.

* With the exception of one instance, when former VX expert Imad Husayn Al-Ani was apporached by 'Uday's officer3equest to make chemical agent, no other scientists claimed they had been contacted by Regime officials requesting assistance in CW work.

Iraq Could Maintain CW Competence With Relative Ease

The issue of retaining scientists in Iraqegime policy. However, given the command economy in Iraq, which ottered limited possibilities for work at private chemical companies, it is not surprising thai most key personnel from the former CW program remained employed in the government chemical sector. Former CW scientists became heavily involved in rebuilding Iraq's industrial infrastructure, and some experts were directedork projects within various military organization*.

Saddam instructed Directors General of Iraqi companies and other stale entities to prevent key scientists from iheMD program from leaving the country, according lo Dr. Ja'far Dhia Ja'far.

Iraqi scientists and engineers couldinimal CW production proficiency withoutin CW-rtlottd RSD and production because Ihey srere already experienced in key CIV agentprocesses. Largely based on datareviously published technical literature, Iraq had sufficientlyroduce nerve, blister, and psychological agents.

For instance, Iraqi research on VX started5iterature survey on the preparation and production methods ol VX. Based on their literature review, the best and easiest mcUiod was chosen for ihe preparation of VX agent, accoiding to Iraq's CW Full. Final, and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) to lhe UN.

CW agent purity, formulation, and production standards initlferiorestern standards wiih the exception of its high-grade"good enough" to produce harmful ageni proven successful during previous use.

Inadequacies In Iraq'sW program were probably caused by limited equipment and inferior precursor chemicals. Iraq could procure Ihe male-rials to address these problems if sanctions were lifted, intrusive Inspections removed, and threat of force abated.

lhe case of VX. which Iraq claimed it abandoned because of lack of success at large-scale production according to Iraq's FCCD. lhe scientistsbecame well aware of the factors resulting in unstable, poor quality (low purily) VX. (seeon VX in production section).

factors included low purity and instability of precursors, reaction temperature conirol. inadequate vacuum systems, and inadequate size of separation vessels.

and Development

Reflecting the importance ihe Regime attached to industrial and scientific progress and aiming tn recover from ihe war with Iran. Baghdad undertook in theentralized, national effort toIraqi industrial activities. By the, fueled by resources available through the Oil-for-Kood program, that effortpecific initiative aimed at boosting the capabilities of Iraqi pesticide and pharmaceutical industries, including theio manufacture dual-use chemicals. Although ISG found no direct evidence linking dual-useproduction to an aciive or latent CW program, research and development on types of specificlinked io Iraq's CW program raises concerns about the legitimacy of Iraq's chemical plans.

Priorraq's national research) capability was limited in scope, and efforts were largely concentrated in statesuch as the Al Mulhanna Stale Establishment (MSE) and at the university level.

* Iraq's industrial sector hud limited capabilities for research, primarily because it had typicallyturnkey facilities for industrial production from abroad.

ihe Gulf war, Iraq's ability totagnated, and the majority of MSB scientists were deployed io operate factories or manage criticalproblems caused by the war. The universities had no formalole and continued to operate iheir detrimentself-directed, isolated style.

The effects of sanctions and the prevailingsituation devastated the research community, preventing the intellectual capital of Iraq from participating in normal academic interaction.

In4 timeframe. Saddam issued an edict that all Iraqi universities address problems experienced in the military and industrial sectors, according to an Iraqi academic scientist. Prior to this, universities were not obligated to conduct applied research for cither sector.

In subsequent years, and in pan triggered by the surge of state funding from the OFF program, Iraq was able to begin implementing Saddam's edict and utilizing the intellectual capital of Iraq to help solve some of the shortages which had plagued Iraq's industrial and military sectors.

An upturn in the economy after years of sanctions allowed Iraq to reevaluate its research efforts anderies of projects to enhance its industrial base.

Creation of the Iraqi Industrial Committee

Saddam ordered Ihe creation of the IraqiCommittee (IIC) in5 to coordinate Iraqi industrial activities after IIusayn Kamil fled Ihe country according to documents. After the defection. Saddam assumed ihe role of Prime Minister as well as president of Iraq, and began attending the weekly ministers meetings. He ordered the establishment of the IIC and aEconomic Committee to prevent ihe weekly meetings from becoming too detailed, according to interviews wiih Huwasyh.

The RCCecree formally setting up the Industrial Committee and charged it lo deal with all scientific, technical, and industrial mattersthe entire Iraqi industrial sector, accoiding to interviews wiih Huwaysh and Ja'far.

Ja'far indicated that the IIC commissioned aaimed at developing an indigenous production capability for strategically important chemicals for domestic consumption that were difficult to import under UN sanctions

The IIC's membership included Ihe heads of Iraq's military and civilian industrial ministries and

included the Head of MIC, theof Industry and Mineralsheof Higher Education and Scientific Researchhe Minister of Oil. and ihe Iraqi Atomic Energy Commissionccording to multiple reports.

Saddam appointed Minister of Oil Amer Rashid as the fust IIC chairman, and he was followed by the Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research Abd Al-Kluliq ul-Ghalurrbd al-Tltwab Huwaysh later assumed the role of chairman of thewell aseputy Prime Minister of Iraq, aeccsrding tosigned by Huwaysh and other reporting.

Dr. Ja'far. as the Senior Advisor to ihe President, was appointed as an independent member of the IIC. He was neither subordinateinistry nor to the IIChe reported directly to Saddam's personal Secretary, Abd Hamid Mahmud. according to interviews with Dr. Ja'far. Ja'far also was made chairman of the Research andCommittee and the Technology Transfer Committee, which was later subordinated to the

nc.

The Power nf the IIC

ISG judges that thr IIC had significant influence over Iraq's chemical Infrastructure, industry, and research, even though tl had not been constituted with that aim in mind. In effect, the IIC was the driving force behind an extensile, centralized national infrastructure Improvement effortfocused on developing the pesticide and pharmaceutical industries and improvingbased nit interviews with IIC officials and docum entation.

ilC actively allocated research in Iraq,work at universities, state companies and government research centers (knemmrni ministry research resources, including the MIC's, wereby the IIC according to official reporting.

MHESR was the primary' channel forindustrial research to universities and educational research centers in Iraq, according to the same reporting. However, the Ministry could not dictate to universities whitl type of research iouniversities chose iheir own research based on their capabilities, according lo different official reporting.

Source Note: Principal source for IICJa'far Dhia Ja'far

Interviews with Dr. Ja'far Dhia Ja'far provide the basis of the majority of information ISG has olnained on key IIC projects such as the National Projeci for Pharmaceuticals and Pesticides INPPP) and the National Project for Active Chemical Materials, and their execution. Dr. fa'far was founder of the Iraqi nuclear program. Director of the Office of theAdvisor, and Chairman of lhe IIC's Research and Development and Technology TransferA very capable technocrat. Dr. Ja'far had unparalleled access as Director and supervisor of the NPPP and Chair of IIC'sevelopment Committee, which had oversight responsibilities for chemical research. Dr. Ja'far indicated he had near total control over the implementation of the NPPP. Much of Dr. Ja'far's information has beenby documents and other officials including high-ranking employees from MIC and MHESR.

The nC'i Master Plan for Self-Reliance: The Listhemicals

IIC placed greater emphasis on the synthesis of active chemical compounds lhan on, because Iraq was highly dependent on foreign supplies of these materials for production ofand pesticides. Several ad hoc panels drawn from the IIC's Research and Development Committee selected Ihe final "test"hemicals foro assess Ihe feasibility of scaled up production. The feasibility research was referred to asccording to an Iraqi academic scientist, aroundtems on the Listhemicals were so-called "first orderor lop priority compounds. There were also second-order emergency compoundshird-order tier.

The IIC distributed the final list of chemicals to Iraq's industrial Ministries, State companies, research centers, and universities, and instructed theseto bid on research contracts for the chemical research and development projects for which they

were best equipped to complete. IIC's Research and Development Committee identified the entities best suited for each project and awarded the contracts.

The IIC's Program for the Indigenousof Chemicals appears to have evolvedation-wide, pan-industry, pan-academia merit-based competition for projeci ideas and project implementation. According to official reporting, the work stimulated by Ihe IIC'somminee involved in promoting private-sector and university research, was scientifh catty credible and was selected on merit. Progress on the Program for the Indigenous Production of Chemicals was largely limited to economicstudies and small scale laboratory research, until approximatelyccording to Ja'far.

The Presidential Diwan reviewed and approved the final list and allocated approximately onedinars (approximately) perI0he IIC only planned toraction ofhemicals for scale-up alter the review and recommendation process was complete.

Studies included requirements for infrastructure, equipment, manpower, and chemical precursors, according to different reporting.

Dual-Use Chemicals on the Listhemicals

Past Iraqi use of Ihree of thesechloride, thiourea, andits former VX program raises questions aboul their Ugitimacy. Thionyl chloride and thiourea were usedX production route that resultedroduct with higher purity for the Iraqis which we assess could have been successfully stabilized with DCC.we found no information Unking this researchW program.

Imad Husayn al Ani, Iraq's former program director for VX. stated in an interview3 thai plans io produce thiourea and DCC. both of which he was unaware, indicated unequivocally [hat ihe Regime intended io reconstitutecries nerve agent program.

ISG has been unable to establish why thiourea and DCC were considered strategic chemicals. There were no constraints on Iraq's importation of thiourea and no identified industrial products or processes in Iraq that require DCC for their manufacture. In addition, Mosul University had not determined the economic benefit of producing IXC.

All three compounds were, however, part of Iraq's former VX program. Two of the compounds arc directly applicable to an experimental VX synthesis route which yielded higher purities for Iraq than the two main VX production routes which it declared

Thionyl chloridehlorinating agent used by Iraq in its former CW program. Iraq could have selected alternative chlorinating agents forthat are not controlled for importation or production for legitimate manufacturing purposes,

Thionyl Chloride

ISO does noi believe lhat the scale-up projeci extended beyond feasibility studies prior to OIF, and we are unsure of Iraq's intended use thionyl chloride (SOCIJ given its many industrial uses and potential industrialetter from the Office of the Presidential Advisor indicated that as ofhe office nod not yeteport on pilot-scale research projects for Idincluding thionyl chloride, Thionylontrolled OF precursor that Iraq had usedhlorinating agent in its sulfur mustard and nerve agent production processes upas part of the program for the indigenous production of chemicals. The IIC tasked the Jaber Bin Hayan State Company68 to research the small-scale production of thionyl chloride, according to repotting. According to official reporting, thionyl chloride production was reported to Iraq's National Monitoring Directoraie.

Jaber Bin Hayan8 achieved itsofercent purity on theilliliter scale, ihe company was charged1 with outlining the feasibility of

to official reporting and documents recoveredIC hard drive.

The same former CW official beloved that Jaber Bin Hayan otherwise would have been an odd choice, mainly because ils facilities and equipment are ill-suited to produce thionyl chloride compared to other MIC and MIM companies. The official opined that Jaber Bin Hi yen was lasted because it employed two chemisu *Ik> had forked on thionyl chloride at Al Muthanna in theW

Reportedly, the thionyl chloride ptoycxt was meant to suppon pharmaceutical production.

DCC

DCC was on the UN (rood's Review List, but is not restricted under the Chemical WeaponsSchedules of Chemicals or (he Australia Group international export control Regimes, and is available on the international commercial market. ISG assessed the Iraqi domestic market for DCC was small at the time of OIF.

Mosul University accepted the DCC tasking from the IIC inccordingosulreport to the IIC sentther reporting discussed their research results in synthesis and purification of DCC.

ISG discovered documents at ihe offices of the IIC in Septemberhad been subjected

to military action, looting, burning and deliberateIraq's intent to investigate production ot IK 1'

ormer high-ranking employee of the MHESR. the inclusion oi DCC among the ListbemicaJi tor the IIC was ccanmon knowl edge. He claimed thai DCC is used in the synthesis of variousnd the scientists working on it would not he aware of its utilityXeven thought it was describedotential VX stabilizer in the Iraqi Chemical Warfare FFCD.

Iraqis themselves differ over the economicfor DCC. DCC has several industrial usesehydrating agent and acid scavenger and is used in the industrial production oformer Iraqi CW scientist familiar with legitimate lab-scale uses of DCC in the production of pharmaceuticals was not awareommercial reason for the use of large amounts in Iraq. However, Dr. Bilal, the former heador the CW program, stated that DCCehydrating agent and thus would have applications in the pharmaceutical industry.

DCC did not move beyond laboratory research because Iraq did not have the raw materials toit, according to former high ranking employees of the MIC and MHESR. However, ISG recovered documents from the Technology Transfer Office that suggest DCC was planned by Al Majid Stalefor later production.

Inhe IIC asked the MIC if they had any companies capable of producing DCC AI Basel, Ibn Slna. al-Qa Qa'a. Al Tariq. Jaber Bin Hayan. and Al Kindi all claimed they could not produce DCC with the materials they had onenior chemist from the MIC.

The Al Majid State Company was ready toUniversity of Mosul. Chemistry Department's "cyclohcxanolymayid" precursor project to formal production even though no economic benefit had been determined, according to final research evaluation documents from Dr. Ja'far's office. ISG believes Ihc "cyclohcxanolymayid" is an odd notation or translationkylonexylcarbodiimide (DCC).

These documents also indicaterecursor chemical in the DCC production processby Mosul University and Baghdadresearched for production.

Of the three suspect compounds mentioned here. DCC was the only one included in the set otFlow Diagrams (PFDs) provided by the

Al Majid State Company for potential scale-up in the mulii-purpose plant. This could be an indication of Iraq's intent to produce DCCarge scale, although wc have no detailed information revealing the actual intended scale.

Iraq's Declared Work With VX Serve Agent

Iraq began research on VX inat failed lo declare any production or attempts to produce VX untiln6 declaration. Iraq claimed lo have unsuccessfully attempted large-scale VX production by two routes, and admittedtwo additional, experimental routes4

Iraq initially declared productionons of VX, then modified iis declaration several times lootalons produced alAl Muthanna with available pilot-scale equipmem. Iraq denied large-scale VX production or weaponization.

The two routes it claimed only to have researched, also known asnd D. provided higher purity and yield than the two mainnd B. We judge that Iraq would have been more likely to continue work on one of these two routes.

DCC and other dehydrating agents cannot stabilize lowX for long term storage.

Iraq claims not to have pursuedecause It did not have access lo keyand did not retain any prior slocks thai would have been necessary lo produce VX.

Iraq claimed to the VS that thiourea wasor too expensive, but thiourea is not controlled and is available on the open market for relatively low prices.

Iraq claimed to have conducted minimal research into route C, but according to UNSCOM reporting, Iraq conductedxperiments on route C.

Iraq had plans tohiourea and nitrogen plant, bath which are necessary for VX production via route C. according to UNSCOM reporting.

ISG during Us Investigation of the IIC program for strategic large-scale production noted threechloride, thiourea, anddirect applications to theX production process. The table below shows thai this route, which utilizes Iwo of Ihe three chemicals for production, can address prior Iraqi deficiencies in VX purity andif yield and purity can be maintained inscale synthesis.

Comparing routes Investigated by Iraq

A

B

C

D

90%

Id

reactant

Willi

ot sulfur

possible?

of declared prcduc'ion

e

only

only

DCC aod other dehydrating agents cannot stabilize low) VX for long term storage.

Thiourea

Thioureaeadily available commodity chemical not normally associated with CW agent production. It is used in the synthesis of dyes, flame retardants, pesticides and pharmaceuticals. However, thiourea was used by Iraq in successful synthesis ofVX prior to the (iulf war.

Methylhyroid medicine which requites thiourea for its synthesis,roject under the NPPP according to documentary

Considering that thionyt chloride and thiourea are two of the precursors needed lo synthesize VX using Iraq's investigative pathway and that DCC could potentially stabilize the product of Ihis synthetic route, ISG believes Iraq's interest in theseis suspicious. However, we note that these three compoundsmall part of the larger, more difficult organophosphorous synthesis component of VX production.

Al Maijd and IAEC engineerslant thai couldear's supply of each ofhemicals using onlyndependent pilot-scale production tines. The engineers supplied Ja'far with process flow diagrams (PFDs) and piping anddiagramsDs)lant.

the conceptual designs were given to Ja'far in laic 2IX)2.

production line was to be designed so that it was capable of producing multiple chemicals with only minor reconfiguration.

The multipurpose design is particularly interesting in the comexttatement made by General Fak Abdullahlast known director of the CWa conference9he future direction of Al Mulhanna thai "wc cannoteactor for each unil. Even in the drug industry, they lend towards the multipurpose reactors, God willing, we willoc must workanner compatible with our potentials."

Chemicals From the List Move Toward Production

Although ISG has multiple HUMIST andreports on the Program for the Indigenous Production of Chemicals and the SPPP, we have found no evidence thai any of the programsommercial production phase prior to OIF. Dr. Ja'far Dhia Ja'far could noi recall which projects were accepted for scale-up or the intended end-users, but he also knew some of the compounds were dual-use and declarable to the UN and that the NMD did noi declare all of the chemicals.

The Technology Transfer Committee awarded two contracts for the preparation of Process Flow(PFDs) for the produClion plant required to producetrategically important chemicals to the IAEC and to the Al Majid ChemicalCenter

Capability

Improving economic conditions and betterledevival in tbe Industry's fortunes by the latter half ofhough they still lagged behind pre-war capacity, the Regime envisioned further expansion in the new century and on the eve of OIF, Iraq had some capability to restore chemical weapons production-Iraq's CW infrastructureevere blow during Desen Slorm, and under subsequent UN sanctions and UN inipeclions. The entire industrial sector for years endured shortages of rawinfrastructure decay and declining production. Iraq's residual CW infrastructure was under Intense scrutiny by the UN, which set up additionalto monitor or destroy remaining materials and equipment:

he majority of CW production sites suffered extensive bomb damage, but many tilled munitions, bulk agent end precursors remained on sue under the control of the Regime.

Vital materials were unavailable or unaffordablc. and neglected plants detcrioraied while productivity declined. Electricity and water remainedwhich impacted on tin- ahiliiv to run chemical production processes.

The UN set up ihc Chemical Destruciwn Group, which operated in Iraq. tasked with the job of destroying the bulk agent, tilled munitions, and precursors left over from the former program. Remaining process equipment was tagged and monitored, asall dual-use processthroughout Iraq.

raq's capability to produce CW at

AI Mulhanna was completely destroyed, along with Iraq's supply of chemical precursors.

An improving economy Inin pan to tht OFFbelter management at MIC led to improvement in thr chemical industry, especially in production output. MIC and companies wiihin other Ministries continued to develop, expand, and

renovate the chemical infrastructure, andraq believed it had proven its ability to defyand revive itself, according to an Iraqimedia report.

he MIM began rehabilitating Al-Furat Stale Company for Chemical Industries' chlorine plant, employing technical teams and engineers from its own companies. According to ihe Iraqi economic media report, key parts for the plant thai were previously imported now could be produced indigenously.

Alsohe State Enterprise forIndustries sethlorine plant for water purification, according to Iraqi press reports.

Iraq continued to upgrade Its Indigenouscapability, pursuing glass-lining technology and manufacturing its awn multipurposeBeginninghe Baghdad State Enterprise Heavy Engineering Equipment (SEHEE) fabrication plantesearch effort lorocess for glass lining carbon steel reactors, making them corrosion resistant.

SEHEE's research was designed io boost company profits, make cheaper, longer-lasting vessels, and reduce reliance on stainless steel. Al-Oa Qa'a State Company, at that time, icquested SEHEEetereter tall glass-lined(large-scale) (or use in nitric acid production, according to reporting.

SEHEE was successful .ir lining small-scalebut tailed in its cllorts to glass-line vesselsarger scale. An inadequate furnace probably contributed to the failure at the larger scale,to reports from two different sources.

Two teams from IAEC and Al Majid Company by3 had doe loped multipurposefor typical chemical production, according to documents obtained by ISG.

Startingroduction of nitric acid, plastics, chlorine, and phenol was increased.

Iraq's capacity to produce nitric acid tripled8

Plastics production increasedercenteeting production goals that were sethe Al Majid Company was alsoew production line for PVC, according to Iraqi press reports.

Inraq restarted chlorine and phenol production at the Al Tariq's Fallujahknown as the Habbaniyah facilities. Iraq's keyrecursor production sites-based on(See AnnexTariq Company's Activities.)

A steady increase in spending and improvements to the industrial sector continueddditional inorganic chemical facilities werestrucled and other plants were renovated.

Iraqulfuric acid plant equipped withresistant equipmenteparate and isolated building at al-Qa Qj'j.

MIM planned to initiate rehabilitation of Al-Furat State Company for Chemical Industries'acid plant expecting to double its production, according to an Iraqi economics media report.

Iraqeparate nitric acid production facility at Karbala. which was completed shortly before OIK

Iraq's revUatization of Us chemical industryup until OIF, and Saddam had ambitious plans for improvements weU beyondith foreign assistance, Iraq renovated its nitric acid plant at al-Qa Qa'a. which was plagued by corrosionottleneck for Iraq's munitions production.

raqumber of improvements to the nitric acid plant at al-Qa Qa'a with equipment, materials and expertise obtained from Russia.Belarus, and Ukraine, according to

Dr. Ja'far. For example, corroded compressors were replaced with new compressors, which had belter, corrosion-resistant rotors.

to the same reporting, MIM alsothe constructionilot plant forat the Baghdad Plant for Medical Gases. The plant was designed to produce paracetamol from nitrobenzene, but it onlymall quantity of low quality material pre-OIF.

3 reporting, there were plans for the construction of nine oil refineries tn be built by eiUter MIC or MIM in Southern and Northern Irao, under the control of MlC.

Definition. "BreakoutSCa CW breakout capability to be theIraq to de novo produce and fieldCW rapidly. ISC considered abreak-out scenarios applicable to Iraq andexistingn example ofscenario would be wartime orihrcat'precipitaled production oflow-stability agents for immediatebreakout capability could beduring peacetime orhreat.

Though on an upward trend since the, Iraq's chemical industry was stilt not up to pre-Gutf war capacUy as of OIF. Technical problems and poor maintenance of aging equipment throughoutesulted in many chemical plants, including ethylene and chlorine production plants, operating at less than half capacity despite the improvements to the chemical industry.

coumry-wide chlorine shortage, for instance,ack of PVC production at the Az Zubayr plant, which was detrimental to Iraq's economy and downstream chemical processing.

within Iraq that still produced chlorinefrom corroded condensers, and were only able to produce aqueous chlorine. Iraq, prior to OIF,

State or Chemical Industry atBreak-Out Capability

imported anhydrous chlorine gjis Irom China, wiih the permission of lhe UN, for use wiihin itsand sewage treatment industries.

and phenol, both osiensibly produced indigenously, were imported by the resin facilily north of Baghdad becauseack of consistent, quality supply from local producers.

ISG judges that the longstanding intent of lhe Regime was lo restart WMD production once UN sanctions were lifted. Based on an investigation of facilities,nd production outputs. ISG also judges thai Iraqreakout capability to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard CW agent, bul noi men* agents

Iraq declared to the UN an experimental sulfur mustard production route from locally availablechlorine, and ethylene, all of which Iraq had access to at the lime of OIF (see

Iraq retained Ihe necessary basic chemicals iosulfur mustardarge-scale, but probably did noi have key precursors for nerve agentWiih the importalion of key phosphorus-based precursors. Iraq could have produced limited quantities of nerve agent as well.

Mustard production could have started wiihin days if the necessary precursor chemicals wereuitable production facility, otherwise production could have started wiihin weeks. Nerve agent production would have taken much longer, because of the compkuily of the process, according to Or. Mahmud Karajenior Iraqi scientist and CBW expert, and Ihe lack of advancedprecursors in country. Bilalovert offensive CW program was unlikely because the program wouldilling personnel.

Iraq at Oil'arge range ofproduction equipment, lagged and monitored by UNMOVIC, and procured far civilian purposes by non-CW associated facilities. However, ISG did nat encounter any production unitsconfigured to produce key precursors orCW agents.

Sulfur Mustard process and key chemicals/ associated Iraqi facilities.

hlorine (aq) = a2S - * Sulfur Mustard

Figure 2.

Phosphorus Chemistry ia Iraq

ISG did not find any phosphorus chemistry applicable to nerve agents al an industrial scale in Iraq, we judge that Iraq could not have produced nerve agents without imports of key phosphorus compounds.

Why does the indigenous production of nerve agent depend on phosphorus precursors?

The backbone and toxicity oferies nerve agents is based on the phosphorus-carbon bond. Creating this bond utilizes Dimethyl phosphitein most phosphorus-based agents. Other phosphorus containing compounds, such as phosphoric acid and phosphates used in fertilizer production, are not suitable for forming thebond.

What evidence of phosphorus did ISG find in Iraq?

ISG investigated four production areas suspected of conducting phosphorus chemistry:

The al-Qaim Superphosphate Plant was suspected by ISG of possible production of highly reactive phosphorus compounds. An ISG site visit revealed that by design, the plant could not be used for this purpose. At al-Qaim SPP. phosphate rock was crushed and converted into phosphoric acid.was then produced from the acid and sold on the local market.

Al Tariq Company was suspected of producingrocess that usually consumes similar precursors and employs similar chemicalas nerve agents. However, an ISG site visiteries of interviews with Al Tariq employees revealed that the company imports concentrated pesticides {expensive and unsuitable for nerve agent production) for dilution, formulation, andin Iraq.

' The Qubaysah White Phosphorus Production

I'm Hit', would have provided Iraq with theto convert phosphate rockotential nerve agent precursor. However,he facility was never fully completed, and no equipment was installed, according to ISG analysisilitary reconnaissance mission.

Munidons Production and Storage Facility: ISG discovered numerous barrelsof while phosphorus and munitions assembly lines, which we judge were intended for theof while phosphorus illumination rounds. This while phosphorus, probably imported and declared by Iraqould have been used to produce some nerve agent precursorsaboratory scale.

Iraq also possessed decUirable equipment for chemical production, which it had not declared to the UN. During ISGomplete process hall containing stainless steel reaction vessels of up to 3m* for the extraction of purity of essence of plant material was discovered at Samarra' Drug Industries.

By cannibalizing production equipment fromcivilian chemical facilities, it would have been possible for Iraq laW production plant. Alternatively, equipment that was less suitable could

have been reconfigured at an existing site and used for short-term limited production. Iraq hadand jury-rigged equipment in the past.

- According to Dr. Bilal. Iraq's hypotheticalmustard production could be achieved by using equipment that could be sacrificed, instead ofon specially lined vessels.

In an interview, MIC director Husvaysh said that Iraq would have been willing to use systems that would be disposed ofew production runs.

*orrosion resistant equipment could be used for most, if not all, CW agent chemical processes. However such equipment would wear out fairly quickly when used for some of the chemicalinvolved in the agent production, according to UNMOVIC.

wo-ton bulk storage cylinder found in the underground pilot plant at Al Muthanna. The storage container had been modified ineactor vessel probably for mustard production. This item escaped UNSCOM-directed destruction.

What is "corrosion resistant" equipment?resistant"erm usually applied to equipment where all the surfaces that come into direct contact with the reagents are made of high nickel alloys,alloys, tantalum alloys, termsilicons, ceramic orhighly corrosion resisiant to specific materials. Corrosion resistant equipment isused in litiorinaiing reactions, such as Sarin and soman production,W program, and for chemical processes requiring heal and chlorinating agents such as the manufacture of mustard and nerve agenis. Most commercially available materials used in the manufacture of chemical production equipment have some degree of corrosion resistance.

The IIC and the MIC often tasked universities to prepare these initial leclmical reports, feasibility studies and drawings.. as seen with the Listhemicals. The work Mosul University did in its report "PreparationicycIohexyls an exampleypical early-end feasibility study.

ortion of the lotal) for the oleum plant These drawings and plans are not merely academic steps toiven process. In many multi-step chemicalprocesses, minimal and safe operational performance would require most of these development steps; even for small scale facilities that have the capability to switch between products rapidly.

Weaponizatlon

Iraq's capability to produce CW munitionsarge scale ended with Desert Storm. However, Iraq retained the ability to retool existing factories lo produce new munitions, and would have relied on basic fabrication techniques to weaponize agent if it had chosen to do so.

Most of ihc Iraqi modifications for chemicalconsisted of simple machining and/or welding of aluminum or steel.

Although much of ihc Iraqi infrastructure to fill CW munitions was destroyed, lhc technology was basic and we judged it could be quickly recreated.

" The performance of the modified weapons was usually sub-optimal by Western standatds,the simplicity- orIraqi design approaches. However, the performance was usually good enough to meet minimum requirements.

A former Iraqi CW munitions researcherissenting opinion by claiming the ihread type on Ihe base plates would not be sufficient to keep the munitions trom leaking. Furthermore he claimed thaimm base plale found could not have beenhemical munitions because Iraq did not work on munitions this large.

No other significant munitions components of these sizes have been found to date. ISC therefore is unableatisfactorily to conclude the munitions type and caliber.

Inenior official at theAl Nu'man clusler bomb production facility gaveiter CW submunitions he claimed had been heldactory worker In his private residence to keep It from being looted. TheAlNu'manfacitity historically had been involved in attempts to develop chemical capable submunitions, which hadocus of Iraqi pre-Desert Storm munitionswork.

Munitions Activities

A number of unusual and unexplained items found al Taji ammo depot could have been used for cither conventional or CW weaponization. All Iraqi CW weaponizaiion experts who were asked by ISO were unfamiliar with these items, and although they could have been intended for CW delivery, the itemscrude prototypes and concept components that were foundon -Al Muthanna bunker.

In, UNMOVIC found several suspect items at the Taji ammunition depot, including sixmm rocket warheads andbase plates of varying sizes.

A number of scientists who were involved with Iraq's CW weaponization projects did not recognizemmmm base plates, shown lo them in photographs. They speculated lhat Ihcse base plates could have been used for CW muni-lions.

Disposition of CW Munitions

ISG expended considerable time and effortlongstanding Iraqi assertions about the fate ofCW munitions known Io have been in Baghdad's possession during the Gulf war. We believe the van majority of these munitions were destroyed, bul questions remain concerning hundreds of CW munitions.

SinceSG has recovered dozens of additional chemical munitions, including artillery tounds. rocketsinary Sarin artillery projectile (seen each case, the recovered munitions appear to have been part of theulf war stocks, but we can neither determine if the munitions were declared to the UN or if. as required by the UN, Iraq attempted to destroy them. (Sec

The most significant recovered munitionsmm binary Sarin artillery projectile which insurgents had attempted to use as an improvised explosive device.

jo

Post-OIF Insurgent Attempts to Top Chemical Resources

A group of insurgentsascent CW effort without CW scientists or industrial-scale chemical supplies. Afterroup ofto as the al-Abudkey supplies and relevant expertise from community resources torogram for weapontzing CW agents for use against Coalition Forces. The al-Abud network in3aghdadlacked the relevant CWdevelop chemical agents The group sought and easily acquired from farmers and local shops chemicals and equipment to conduct CW experiments An im estigation of these CW attempts suggests thai the al-Abud network failed to produce desired CW agents, how ever it remains unclear whether ihese failures deriveack of available precursors or insufficient CW expertise.

made ai lhe endavid Kay'sand ihe ensuing controversy prompted Iraqi concerns aboul renewed war with ihe United Stales, according to Dr.raj Bilal. Amir Rashid contacted Dr. Bilal and ordered that all hidden chemical and biological munilions be destroyed withinours. When Bilal responded thai ihis was impossible, Rashid directed that Bilal use the resources of the Iraqi Air Force and the surface-to-surface missile force lo accomplish the task. Dr. Bilal gathered his colleagues from Al Mudiarma State Establishment, went to the locations of the stored munitions, and began ihe desiruction.

Iraq declared some of the unilateral desiructidn-missiles and chemical munitions-to UNSCOM in2 bul continued to conceal theof the biological weapons program.

has alsomm chemical roundsmm anillery rockets which we judge came from abandoned Regime stocks.

1 Decision To Destroy Undeclared Weapons

An IAEA Inspection led by Dr. David Kay in late1 triggered Iraq's decision todestroy the undeclared weapons that had been concealed from the VS. according to multiple senior Iraqi officials. Dr. Kay's inspection team was blocked from sites in Abu Ghurayb and Falluuth. The Iraqis tired warning show over ihc inspectors' heads, but Dr. Kay and his group brought back video tapes and photos thai indicated Iraq was hiding undeclaredenrichment equipment Irom lhe inspectors.

Kay's inspection and the international uproar surrounding it caused constemalioneasuje of panic in lhe Regime's leadership, particularly Husayn Kamil, and Saddamigh-level committee headed by Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz to deal with inspection matters, according to multiple sources.

senior Iraqi scientist who directed the destruction of chemical and biological munilions con lends thai the decision to destroy the hidden materials was

Iraq Unilateral Weapons Destruction1

Iraq completed Ihe destruction of itstockpile of CW by the endith most items destroyed in July of thai year. ISG judges that Iraq destroyed almost all prohibited weapons at that time.

has obtained no evidence that contradicts our assessment thai (he Iraqis destroyed most of their hidden stockpile, although wemall number ofhemical munitions in early io

remainingeapons either escaped destruction1 oi suffeicd only partial damage. More may be found in tl* monlhs and years ahead.

Destruction of Chemical Munitions. Bulk Agent, and Precursors

ISG interviewed Dr. Mahmud FiraJ Bilal. the Iraqi scientist who supersised the destruction of Iraq's undeclared chemical munitions, alongumber of Iraqi higher officials who were knowledgeable of the weapons destruction. Although other sources hase corroborated parts of Di. Bilal's account. ISG's understanding of Iraq's chemical and biologicalagent unilateral destruction is heavily dependent

on Dr. Bilal's information, whicheakness in our analysis. Nevertheless, as with Iraq's long rangeweeasonably coherent, account of the disposition of the CW munitions, though we were not able physically to verify the story. Ihe UN has. however, verified some of it.

Iraq likely destroyed alloncealed CW Al Husayn missile warheads in the summerccording to Dr. Bilal based on UN-sponsored excavations. All were "binary" GB/GF nerve agent warheads filledixture of isopropanol and cyclohexanol and MPF.

Al Muthanna had dispersed4ombs along various Iraqi airbuses. Iraq did not declare some of these to the UN anddestroyed them in situ. The UN holds these as accounted for. although they were unawaremall percentage of them were used on the Shia in1 according to multiple sources.

Iraq disposedons of spoiled bulk VX nerve agent at the Al Muthanna State Establishment dumps ite.

Dr. Bilal also stated that Iraq destroyed thechemical agent precursors*.

ions oj ihe VX precursor phosphorus penla-sulfuteesiroyed by mixing ii wiih soil ai Saqtawiyah, nonhwesi of Faltujah. VNSCOM-sponsored excavations accounted for about ihis amount.

tons of die VX precursor choline destroyed at Qasr al-'ashiq near Samarra'.

tans of the mustard precursor thiodiglycol destroyed by burning at Saqlawiyah. Thiswas never declared lo the UN and had been stored in ihe city of Samarra'. When ihe rest of the unilateral destruction took place, no one remembered this stockonth after the rest of the chemical destruction. This realizationils destruction.

Muthanna Slate Establishment gaveisopropanol. and isopropyiamine lo various industries for use as solvents.

Iraq alsouantity of empty aerial bombs intended for CW use andm CW rockets.

Bilal insisted that Iraq's CW "Full. Final, andDeclaration" is completely accurate regarding the unilateral destruction of CW munitions.

UNSCOM had verified or accepted some of what Bilal said about munitions destruction, but other parts of the story remain unverified

Iraq presented supporting documents on thedestructionW bombs and UNSCOM observed remnants of bombs consistent with the declared quantity.

When considered with the number of declared BW Al Husaynhe total number of undeclared "special warheads"n the period2NSCOM recovered and accounted for remnantspecial warheads., UNSCOM recovered the remnants of three additional training warheads. Iraq provided supporting documents on the overall accounting for special warheads and on thedestruction ofarheads. We cannot be sure, however, that there were onlyspecial"in Iraq's inventory.

UNSCOM was not able to verify the quantity of VX destroyed, nor were they able to verify the destruction of al) VX precursor chemicals.

UNSCOM was not able to verify the destruction ofauge aerial bombs,erial bombs, andm rockets.

The destruction years ago of the hulk of Iraq's CW munitions not withstanding, ISG remains concerned about the status and whereabouts of hundreds of CW artillery rounds. Previous assertions that the munitions were all destroyed have been undermined by reporting that the munitions remain intact in an unknown location.

In9 Compendium, UNSCOM assessed that Iraq had not adequately accountedustard-filled artillery rounds il claimed lo have lost. This issue first surfaced6 because ofin Iraq's accounting of weapons holdings.

VX Weaponizalion

Iraq had not adequately addressed VX production and weaponizalionpoint on which Iraq's denials were contradicted hy UNSCOMISG Investigations into Iraq's work with VX reveals that Iraq did weaponize VXnderial bombs filled with VX on Iran. The bombs, originally declared to be parttorage stability trial, were in fad dropped on anIranian location

ChemicalMilitary Depots and Caches

Reflecting pre-OIF intelligence assessments lhat Iraq had stockpiled hundreds of Ions ofweapons, ISG expended considerable time and expertise searching for extant CW munitions. ISG inspected ammunition supply points identified from preliminary analysis of thesites in proximity to units possibly equipped with chemical-capable weapons and in proximity lo suspected decontamination activity.

ISG exploited munitions at captured enemy ammunition (CEA) depots established byForces after OIF lo serve as repositories for ammunition captured throughoui ihe country.

Teams also investigated other suspect locations identified prior to OIF as suspect CW locations, in particularepots ai which possible CW movemenl and storage activity was assessed to have laken place in lhc

Overall,odest fraction of rounds were identified for exploitaiion. The sites had been subject io looting during and after OIF, bombing of military installations during the war, andof large numbers of rounds by Coalition Forces.

Althoughraction of Iraq's total munitions inventory was identified and exploited for CWeview of high-priority facilities,caches, and locations identified prior to OIF as suspect CW storage or transfer sites, did noi reveal caches of CW weapons.

Investigating Ammunition Supply Points

ISG's investigation of Iraq's ammunition supplydepots, field ammunition supply pointsactical FASPs. and other dispersed weaponsnot uncovered any

ASPs can be divided into ihree diffentni classes: (I) Ammunitionield Ammunition Supply Pointnd IS) Tacticalitesdepending on permanence of structures and proximity to forward deployed units.

Ammunition Depots are permanent structures located far from the forward lines. They are fenced and guarded with hardened bunkers as well as revetments for open storage. Depots are designed lo supply munitionsarge number of differ-ent units andesultide variety of ammunition types.

FASPs are usually permanent siructures as well. As with depots, ihey are usually fenced and guarded and may contain bunkers or revetments. FASPs are meant tonialler number of units and willimited mixture of munitions. In US Army terminology, ihey would be equivalent to Ammunition Transfer Points, or ATPs.

TFASPs are semi-permanent structures in close proximity to the units that require the munitions. They may be fenced or bermed and contain mostly-open storage in revetments. TFASPs function as the immediate supply pointimited number of units and retain only ihe munitions required for those units. In US ArmyFASP would be equivalentache.

The enormous number of munitions dispersed throughout Uie country may include some older. CW-rillcd munitions, and ISG cannot discount the possibilityew large caches of munitions remain to be discovered within Iraq.

Investigation

7SG began ils search for Iraqi chemical weapons byet of facilities from theO sites at which Iraq stockpiled or deployedISG obtained fromatabaseSPs identified within the assessed "Red Line" surrounding Baghdad {seeor details on the 'RedLinehis list was narrowed down toites using two main criteria (see

Reportinguspect CW decontaminationaype water truck in proximity to thethe lime the targets were selected, the presence of these vehicles was regarded asof CW-related activity.

An anillery unit capable ofmm multiple-rocket launcher (MRL)mm CW rounds, also in proximity of the sile.

Ihc ASPs of the Republican Guard Al Madinah. Al Manawiah, Baghdad, and Hammurabi Divisions were of highest priority because of the units' trusted status and location during the combai phase of OIF. Exploi-laiion of lheSPs beganhorough review of all reporting the facilities to discern the status and change in the site during and after OIF. in order to narrow the list of sites to be visited.

revealedf theiles were cither empty, destroyed, or contained unidentified material with-an imagery signaiurc inconsistent with CW. One site was found louplicate locationifferent name and another was removed for lack of evidence. Teams from ISG visited ihe remaining eight sites.

ISG investigation of eight ASPs turnedealth of different Iraqi munitions including artillery shells, and rockets. However, we did not locate anv CW filled artillery.

Investigating Captured Enemy Ammunition Points (CKA Consolidation Points)

ISC capitalized oa efforts by Coalition Forces in3 lorogram to consolidate captured Iraqi weapons into seven pre-idenlified Captured Enemy Ammunition (CEA) Depots (sees ofoalition Forces have reviewed andotal3 weapons caches dispersed throughout tlie country,otalons of munitions. This represents only part of Iraq's pre-OIF munitions inventory, andraction of these were checked by ISG technical experts for signs of chemical agent (ill. (Sec

Many of lhe rounds were destroyed at theircache locations orEA depot; however. ISG technical experts have been working wiih CEA officialsvaluate munilions that were returned to consolidation points for storage or later destruction

ISG reviewed CEA inventory lists for chemical-capable projectiles, rockeis, missiles, or bombs, and conducted missions to the consolidation pointsay, catalogue, and analyze specific rounds for CW signatures. No CW munilions were found at these sites as of

ISG learns also sought unique munilionsby CEA as new shipments arrived onsite. No significant findings were reported.

ISG estimates that CEA risits allowed us to review at most aboutercent of Iraqi munitions. As ofEA hasotal9 cachesache isollection ofin any quantity) throughout Iraq. The breakdown of their activities follows:

To3 caches have been clearedotaldas of munitions delivered io Ihe CEA points, an average of aboutons ofper cleared cache. Of thatons of munitions have been destroyed,ons remain at lhe CEA points for future

aches remain outstanding, containing antotalons, an averageons per cache.

ISG conducted CEA visits atwo-pcr-month rale in4 and it is estimated thai ISG expens reviewedonsoercent of ihc grand totalxisting ions.

In addition to the CEAarge number of munitions were destroyed between OIF andhen CEA instituted its process. Officials at CEA have been highly efficient in destroying as much0 ions of munitions per month.

Recent data indicate that the grand total willio grow. Over the six-week period from lhe end of July to mid-September. CEA discovered anachesotalons ofdiscoveries continued to the time of writing. CEAotalons of munitions is the total tonnage, including munilions destroyed during OIF and scattered aboul the countryside. ISG believes ihis number is fairly uncertain, and could go considerably higher in the future as new caches are discovered. Weower limn on total munitions. Using this number, we estimate wc visited2 perceni (in round numbers.r less of ihe total Iraqi munitions stocks.

Although ISG onlymall fraction of the Iraqi munilions, we remain confident that wc have not destroyed chemical munitions in ihe process of destroying Iraqi weapons.

US military has high confidence thai the destruction process has thus far proceeded safely, with no release of chemicals connected with it.

amount of inspections ISG was able to carry out was consistent with the resourceshe safety factors invoked in carrying out the inspections of munitions facilities.

In addition to theASPs and CEA sites, ISGa systematic effort to review anderies of depots that factored prominently in pre-OIF assessments of possible CW transshipment activity inimeframe. Severalbased primarily on imagery Analysts al that time concluded lhat Iraq probably deployed CW munitions from depots to ammunition supply pointsIraq as part of ongoing preparations for war. The original list ofiles at which activity had been noted was narrowed to two main depots for intensive ISG investigation, including site visits, technical assessments, and personal interviews.

Imagery analysis observed indication ofmovement Iraqnalysis ofncreasedscrutiny andeview of munitions transshipment signatures throughout Iraq.

The key indicators lo identify suspect CWmovement and storage included the presence of special guards, vehicles assessed to betrucks, cargo vehicles, and Ihc grading of top soil near suspect bunkers.

ISG began an investigation of the II major depots by reviewing imagery reporting of the siles to determine feasibility for site exploitations and by

subsequent sile visits and identification ofand military officials who had previously worked there. ISG analysis revealed lhal most of lhc sites were destroyed or looted during or shortly after OIF, and ihe mililary officers who worked there provedto locate.

conducted an in-depth investigation of the Al-Musayyib StoragepriorIF to have ihc strongest indicaiors of CWin an attempt lo understand the nature of suspect CW transshipment activity there8Seeetailed account).

indicated Ihe presenceuspect CW decontamination vehicle at the Mfqdadiyah Depot north of Baghdad and prompted an ISG operation to recover two vehicles for exploitation.

The remaining sites were not visited because indicated looting and destruction lhat presented the discovery of any munitions remaining from pre-OIF.

u

Iran

Saudi Arabia

CoaMion torces since OIF have captured enemy ammunition fromaches and are consolidating weapons al seven depots throughoutarge percentage of captured ammunition has been destroyed and ISG hasortion ol the remaining munitions The attached map shows relative locations of ihe consolidation points and some ol the ISG fincfcngs at each site. No CW munitions have been recovered to date,umber ol chemical-capableempty andstill being analyzed.

Figureaptured enemy ammunition supply points

pot Name

'Indicators"

invesllgatlons

Miodadryah Ammuniuon Storage Facility

of Samarra'-type vehicle -Separately secured area urvdcr MEK control -Transshipment with stakebed trucks and

Samarra'-type4 -Transshipment with stakebed trucks and

Samarra'-type vehicle In3 -Visited by UNMOVIC3 transshipment

activity terminated

and acquisition of two 'Samarra'-type' vehicles from the Miqdadryah area; delated analysis of vehicles ir^luoed: noot decontamination activity

Hadlthah Site Command/ AmmunrJlon Depot Wesl

siaxebea2 -Former CWdean-up2

indicated srfe was entirely looted and destroyed NolSGexplotation.

Musayyb Barracks Brigade Headquarters and Ammunition Ordnance Depotn

of Samarra'-type vehicle late

2 -Transshipment with stakebed trucks and

Samarra'-lype vehicleSeparately securedrading ol the area2 -DeconWshdown ircncnos near entrance

investigation of site.

to include mutbptesiie visits.

debriefing ot toimer mililary

employees, and extensive doc-

umenl review.ndrngs included m

section below.

Ammunition Depot Taji"

wllh slakooed trucks and tanker2

-internal security tenls with tanker truck2

-Presence of tanker truck

site visits, bunkers

searched. -Foundm rockets, aluminum

lubes referred lo in Powell's

speech -Air delivery bombs, rockeis

Najaf Storage and Ammo Depot Areaf

security alter Husayn Kamelin5 -Presence ot Samarra'-type6 -Munilions transshipment8 -Dispersal aclivity wilhav secured9

visits by ISG. -Unusualombby onsrte contractors.

Rutbah Storage Fadlily

with covered stakebed trucks in

-AspersionyoitionsepOl3 involving Samarra'-type vehicle, stakebed truck, and prooaole security vehicle

-Presence ol Samarra'-lype vehicle

fodlcaled site was looted

-Remaining munitions cteared" ABD andS EOD comrade

-No ISG exploration.

FigureOepott of (West tcontnuett}

c

o

Annex A

IIS Undeclared Research on Poisons and Toxins for Assassination

The Iraqi Intelligence ServiceUndeclared Poisons and Toxins Research

The IIS MI6 directoraieet of covert laboratories to produce, research, and testchemical compounds, including the BW agent ricin. While there is no definitive evidence that MI6 scientists produced CW agents in these tabs, the Mlii directorate may have been planning lo produce several agents including sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and Sarin.

Siic visits to several MI6 labs, safe houses, and disposal sites have turned up no evidence of CW-rclatcd production or development, however, many of these sites were either sanitized by the regime or looted, limiting the obtainable information from site exploitations.

ISG has had to rely heavily on sensitive reporting to understand the activity that took place at these sites, and there has only been limited, uncorroborated reporting thatad produced CW agents. Several reports have stated that ricin was produced at one of these sites in the.

A former DS officer claimed thatlan to produce and weaponize nitrogen mustard in rifle grenades,lan to bottle Sarin and sulfur mustard in perfume sprayers andbottles which they would ship to the United States and Europe. The source claimed that they could not implement the plan because chemicals to produce the CW agents were unavailable.

ISG assesses that the IIS used these labs to develop substances that kill or incapacitate targetedIntentions of senior regime leadership with regards to these tabs have been difficult to determine

due to Ihe compartme riled nature of the work. ISG judges lhal these small-scale endeavors were no* panMD program.

hemical preparation division was responsible for producing and testing theseofecovered document lists ihe chemical preparation division's tasks which include developing substances which kill and paralyze, and concealing these chemicals in food and beverages. What IIS officers have told ISG about thepreparation division is consistent with Ihis documentary evidence.

same document lists lessozenas being employed by the chemical preparation divisionIS officers in other sections of MI6 were either unaware of the chemicaldivision's activities or unwilling to discuss them, as several IIS officers did not even list it as ones divisions.

Purpose of US CBW Research

We assess thathemical preparationwas not used as the method for maintaining the technical expertise required toarge scale CBW program,'s work was limited to laboratory scale production.

cientists employed in the chemicaldirectorate would have ihc knowledge lo produce CW agenismall scale given their scientific training, the link the IIS had io Iraq's early CW program, and lhe availability of coven chemical labs and equipment.

These scientists focused on lab-scalework, which would mean ihey would be less capable to manufacture CWarge industrial scale than the engineers involved in Iraq'sW program.

Several scientists inirectorate Ukely had the expertise to produce laboratory scale amounts of CW agent, and Ihe directorate had sufficientequipmeni available to engage in CW research end development.

Exploitation ofeadquarters building revealed ihai the directorate had large amounts of laboratory glassware and analytic equipment, which could be used for both legitimate work such as food testing and forensic analysis, and illicit CW production and development. However, precursor chemicals required for CW agent production were not found among the various chemicals located at the headquarters building or ils storage site in Djcrf al-Naddaf.

Iraq's prc-Gulf war CW programeavy IIS involvement prior to being relocated io the Al Mulhanna facility. Some of Ihc scientists who worked on CW agent production prior io the Gulf war still had ties toirectorate al the lime Of OIF.

There are indications that the former regime intended to useo retain the capability to produce CW agentmall scale that would not be militarily significant.

ormer IIS officer with direct access to theour man team was created in

o produce CW agenismall scale. The source believed lhat the secret US lab work wasby Saddam Husayn who tasked the director of the IIS lo set up the program.

same source reported thai Iraq dismantled ils capability to mass produce CW ageni in favor of retaining ihe ability to produce smaller, batch scales of agent ai coven labs. The source claimed thai the IIS possessed the equipment and chemicalsio produce CW agenis. We believe that this report is only speculatinglan toW production capability, because the source has stated several times that the IIS lacked theprecursors to produce chemical agent.

Future Plans To Produce CW Agent

ISG is unable Io corroborate the sensitivethat the IIS was planning to produce nitrogen mustard, sulfur mustard, and Sarin, but assesses that if plans to produce chemical agent wiihin the IIS existed, the MI6 chemical preparation division would have been the group tasked with carrying ihem out.

A former Iraqi intelligence officer reported lhal rhc MIA ehemtcal preparation AtWM planned lo produce anditrogen mustard using CS nfte grenades. The source provided ISCi v. ith two grenade launchers and cases of CS grenades hefficers were suppissed lo modify.

The same source Inlei reported that the IISlan lo produce Sarin and sulfur mustard, which Ihc US planned lo distribute to the US and Europe. The source claimed thai lhc director. Nu'man Muhammad al-Tikriti. gaveerfume-bottling machine that wax to be used to help carry out this plan.

Both of these plans arc emrtmely difficull tobecause;

The reporting oh ihis activity stairs il was never carried out

u cording lo Ike source of the aboveonly Padii Abbas al-Husayni, Adnan Abdul Razzaq,'man Muhammad al-Tdsruind Tahir Jaltl Habbush (the director of the IIS) knew details about the plans to produce chemical agent within Mlb. tSee figures

ariety of chenucaJ* including: Fluoro-acetaie. nnmsnarmnc. strychnine, thallium chloride, and various rvrurmaceutical products

Accordingecovered document, the chemkal preparation division was separated into two groups: One lhat produced the chemicals and one that tested ihe intelligence applicabilityhemical.

Repotting uatcs lhal persons associated with the intelligence applicationtested chemicals on mice. rats, rabbin, and pigs, and mixed chemicals with various foods to see if it changed theor smell of ihe food (see

hemical prevention division changed locations significantly during lhr pastrart, which may ha ve been done to avoid US' inspectors.

13 the MI6chcmical preparation divisionimes, from Rashdiyah. to Djerf ai-Naddaf. to the headquarters building in Karrada.mall house in Tan, and finallyesidence in Mustirnanyah *here the final operations of the division took place.

Repotting saysear of the UN was the driving force for some MI6 activity, such as concealing chemicals or closing down the

Rashdiyah site.

i.ahs and Related Activity

IjcploUations of IIS silet have corroborated the story that Ihe chemical preparation directorate was involved in Ihe research and development ofmaterials, but was noi producing CIV at the time of OIF. Exploitaiion teams have visited severalstorage areas, and destruction sites, but have only recovered materials which indicate the chemical preparation directorate was involved in the production of chemicals used lor assassination dt incapacitation purposes.

TTir activity which took place at the sarious sites focused mainly on thr production of chemicals and the testing of these chemicals on animals andtheir effects on food and beverages.

Multiple reportsecovered lab rxncbookihj: iSt MIA chemical prepM^IOBtflvMsi

Rashdiyah30he Rashdiyah site was an active MI6 site1 to some point in thehere the chemical preparation division researched ricin and other,elated chemicals.

Reportedly, ricin, PCP, andhemical extracted from the Datura plant, sveie researched at the Rashdiya site.

Reports state that the Ravhdiyah lab was eventually closed in theK and moved to the Djerf al-Naddaf facility

A former IIS officer listed the Rashdiyah "Fish Research Center" site asecret laboratory used by ihe IIS

The absence of laboratory equipment or chemicals is more likely the result of the facility not being uti-hzed by the MI6 since, rather than being caused by looting or sanitization efforts prior to OIF.

An exploitation of this site in3 uncovered chemical-resistant countcrtops and evidenceormer air handling system. No other signs were evident that this facility had been used as alaboratory.

Much of the chemicals and equipment present at (his facility were likely moved when the IIS departed thisormer high-level member of the Iraqi government with direct access to the information said that the IIS operated the lab.

Ricin and other chemicals were probably produced and tested on mice and rats al the Rashdiya site in the. The amount of ricin produced at Ihe she was no greaterew kilograms.

A high-level IIS source claimed thai Adnan Abdul Razzaq al-Ubaydi produced as muchg of ricinhich was partially used by Doctor Muhammad Abdul Munim al-Azmcrli forin the. The source claimed that he saw (he ricin. and Ra/zaq personally informed him aboul (he amount produced.

A mid-level IIS lab worker with direct accessihc Ricin production claim, and estimated that Ra/zaqg of Ricin at the Rashdiya site.

We hare received conflicting reports about what happened to the ricin produced at this site, and hare been unable to retrieve any of Ihe chemical

The US source gave two different accounis of whal happened to the ricin, in3 he said lhat the ricin produced was given to the direcior of the US, bul in September he claimed that Abdul Munim al-Azmcrli took possession of the ricin when the US left ihe Rashdiyah lab.

A detainee whoigh-level member in lhe IIS said that the ricin research was halted on the order

Of Husayn Kamil, and the research turned over to Dr. Rihab Taha. The source claims that lhe ricin produced ai the lab was destroyed.

He believeetainee who claims onlyof ricin was produced at the site is either unaware of the extent of.MI6's work on theor trying to downplay the quantity of Ihe production.

A detainee whoigh-level member in the IIS informed ISO thai Adnan Abdul Razzaq al-Obaydi produced riciniteiles North of Baghdad (likely referring io the Rashdiyahazzaq reportedlyew milligrams if ricin2 while researching his thesis on the extraction of toxins from natural substances.

The high level member of lhe Iraqi government who saidg of ricin was produced2 also said thatmall sample of ricin was producedhe detainee sourced above may have only been aware of therogress up

Reportedly, chemicals produced at the Rashdiyah site were tcsicd on mice and rais, which would have been unlikely to occur with ricin if only milligram amounts were produced (see

Djcrf al-Naddaf3oved Its operations from Rashdiyah to Djerf al-Naddaf in thehere scientists continued the production and testing of chemicals. The sile appeared to be sanitizedoalition team exploited it, but the IIS may have removed laboratory materials several years ago when they left the site.

ormer BW scientist, an NMD official went to the Djcrf al-Naddaf site7 or

nd though he was nor allowed in die facility, he believed il was involved in biological research because he saw people he knew from ihe IIS.

left) endhe Rashdiya site was where the IIS produced itcin in the, but no evidence of recent BUB activity was uncovered during the sue visa.

report statesroduced small amounts of Sarin and Tabun at this sitehich they were later ordered to destroy by the director of the IIS. While we have strong evidence indicating an IIS chemical destruction committee existed at this time, we are unable to verify that Sarin and Tabun were among the chemicals destroyed.

The direcior ol* lhe IISommittee to destroy Ihe chemical agents and any relatedequipment, which was later carried out al lhe Djerf al-Naddaf site, according loa senior IIS official.

We have been able io verify lhat Muhammad al-Qaisi. who Ihe source claimed was on lhelhal destroyed the CW ageni. probably worked on explosivesater merged withirectorate

A document recoveredomminee thatontainers ofW agent and precursor,n tlie comminee was

fficer named Muhammad Shukr, this is probably Muhammad Shukr al-Oaisi, who was later employedccordingeparate

director. Nu'man Muhammad al-Tikriti, admitted lhat he ordered the MI6io destroy several mustard and nervc-agem precursors inime frame, bul he did not say ihey destroyed Sarin or Tabun. According to Nu'man. the chemicals were destroyed because ihey wereisi of prohibited materials given to him by the National Monitoring Directorate.

MI6 HQ34

The SIeadquarters building in Karada housed several labs and contained chemicals andequipment, bul the sensitive reports we have on activity at this site do not indicate that CBW research or development was taking place.

former US officer with direct access claims lhat lhe MI6 Headquarters building was used inbiological weapons, bul the source seems to lack knowledge about biological sciences,evice he describes as being used io produce BW isevice used in analytic research.

The headquarters building contained several chemical and biological laboratories, but apparent sanitization efforts of the site make the purpose of the laboratories difficult to determine fromdata alone.

xploitation team found alab capable of growing small amounts of bacteria, analytical equipment, andchemicals such us solvents. According to the exploitation report, items appeared to have been removed from the site, and shredded documenis were present throughout the building.

A family that moved into the former MI6butldins said that after the coalition's primary visit to the facility in April. US personnel returned lo pie* up seseral items includingand equipment. Saniti/atron effort* may hase continued, because the team that returned to the site found burnt docu menu3

The equipmeni.nd literature found at lhe sile are consistent wiih sensitive reporting on ihc activities ofs chemicalivision, which does not have strong ties to CBW research or the developmrnt of assassination-related

' TheMI6chemicul forensic division wasfor testing food for the regime. Other reports corroborate that there was an Ml6 division which had the ability to analyze chemical substances and test food and other items for Ihe presence ofand toxins.

Accordingenior IIS official who has reported reliably in (he past, ihis building served aseadquarters, where research on toxins and their properties took place. However, the same source stated that (he work was solely for defensive

Laboratory analysis ol several samples laken at ihe site revealed thai lhe MI6 had samples ofcyanide, the pesticides diazinon and Mala-thion, the herbicide glyphosatr. and several olher innocuous chemicals.ould not be unusual lo find Ihese chemicalsaboratory examining foodstuffs for poisons or contaminants, becauseab would need standards to which it could compare analytic results.

Documenis recovered al lhe MI6 headquarters building include scientific text* on the extraction of loxic compounds, pesticides, detection of toxins in food, water contamination, microbial agents, and laboratory notebooks.

A few of the documents recovered indicate (hat

as intcrckled in CW related dual usesuch as orgaraiohmphoroushesis on the production and phy siological elTects of ricin and Hyoscine was also found on site. The paper was preparedfficer Adnan Abdul Razzaq in thesev Figures..

Illicil Activityrndquarters

77ie chemical preparation division may havechemicals which were used on IIS prisoners or unknown Kurdish individuals when it was located in the MM headquarters during the.

IIS officer wiih said that the director, Nu'man Muhammad al-Tikrili, may hase provided dimeihyl nitrosoamine to the direcior of the SSO in0 for usenidentified Kurdish

citizens.

- The same source claims (hat Adnan Abdul Razzaq al-Ubaydi used dimethyl nitrosoamine on prisoners under the control of the IIS M7 directorate starting

source informed ISO that when locaied in the Karada district, the IIS MIhemical preparation division worked exclusively on producing dimethylsubstance which, according to the source, can cause lung and liver cancer within three months.

b3he chemical preparation division's lab in Taji focused on the research of ihree chemicalbut the purpose of opening the lab may have been to give theovert location to produce CW agent for the regime.

toplop right) andbottomhe Mt6 headquarters building contained several small laboratories that appeared lo be Involved in analytic chenwstry work.

Theaboratory located near Taji was opened0 for the purpose ol* producingmustard, accordingormer IIS scientist. The live individuals assigned to work at the lab lacked the necessary chemicals to produce nitrogen mustard, so they workedlant-based anesthetic per the orderirector Nu'man Muhammad al-Tikriti.

The source said that while they were waiting for Adnan Abdul Ka//aq to send back precursor chemicals to produce the CW agent, the division researched the compoundsixture of fluomacctatc and thallium chloride,atural anesthetic extracted from the datura plant.

An exploitation team thai visited this siteon-residential drainage system and signs that chemical ventilation had been present, which help corroborate the source's claim that the house was usedaboratory.

A former IIS scientist who worked at the Taji lab said lhat lhe lab was Shui down and all theremoved when the US issued ils ultimatum to Saddam Husayn to leave Iraq inours (sec.

Mustansarlyah34he Mustansariyah the was Ihe chemicaldirectorate's final location, where the burial and destruction of chemicals took place. Research activity on chemicals was minimal at this site

MI6 director. Nu'man Muhammad al-Tikriti. said lhal when the officers in the chemicaldirectorate were based al the Mustansariyah househey did noi do any notable chemical work and spent most of their time destroying old chemicals and moving other chemicalstorage site in Djerf al-Naddaf.

ouse in Mustansariyah received equipmeni from the lab in Taji and CW precursors inccordingormer IIS officer with direct access to the information. The source believed lhal nerve agent production was being researched at Ihe site.

experiments occurred on lhe roof of lhe house, and lhat chemicals were buried on lhe property.

assess that this source had dircci access lo lhe movement and burial of chemicals, hut we believe the source docs noi hase authoritative access on information about lite identities of chemicals involved or lhe research activiiies of lhe Muslan-sariyah house. The small lime frame that ihc US was ai the site, combined wiih the time constraints of scuinghemical lab. make il unlikely thai extensive research look place al this site.

The exploitation of this siteew itemsthat the Mustansariyah had supported IIS chemical-related research, but the site was mostly

empty.

3 an exploitation leam visited thesite where it found US documenis and

a few laboratory-rclaicd items and chemicals, bul nothing appeared to be CBW related, 'lhe site was mostly empty, and appeared lo be recently cleaned and painted.

A high level member of the Iraqi government with direct access lo US activity accompanied tlieteam and pointed out several rooms that were used for laboratory chemical storage, but the rooms were empty leaving the impression lhat lhehad been previously relocated.

On the roof of the Mustansariyah building, the exploitation learn found chemical-resistant coun-icrtops, chemical fume hood face plates, and spare parts for fume hoods.

On lhe peri meter of the Mustansariyah site, the exploitation teamox of medication lhat was used to cause pain, humiliation, or death in Saddam llusayn's adversaries, accordingigh level member of lhe Iraqi Governmenl lhat had direct access to the information (see Figures.

Figuretopgurelop nght) too Figure l* (bottomhe Vl6ap spewed to bo sanloed by the tene it was inspected Cy rr* ISG. although sc^ro pry&col evidence co^otwated fno sources ctarrn 'bat trie house formerlyaboratory.

Site exploitations have verified lhat material was buried at the Mustansariyah site, although ISG has been unable to determine the identity of itemsat the site.

The exploitation team that visited thesite was able to excavate various vials and broken glassware that was buried in the yard, but the contents of these containers could not be veri-fied.

In September, an ISG exploitation team returned to the site to take various soil samples for analysis, which came up negative (or the presence of BW agents or toxins. The samples were not analyzed for the presence of suspect chemicals.

Accordinghemical forensic lab report, nochemicals were found in three contact samples taken from various locations in the house.

Salmadiyah Warehouses/Burial Site (Djerf3he burial and destruction of chemicals also occurred atarehouses located near Iheacility in Djerf al-Naddaf

' IIS officers moved chemicalsarehouse in the Karachi district of Baghdad to be disposed ofite in Salmadiyah inccording to reporting. The report stated that chemicalof various sizes were buriedeep pit and that several of the containers were broken cither during the move or when they were placed in the pit.

A former IIS officer with direct access to the information reported that chemicals stoted at the Mustansariyah site were moved to the warehouses in Salmadiyah where some wereum pit was near the warehouse where IIS officers took some of the chemicals and poured them directly into the ground.

eparate report, the same former IIS officer describes the chemicals as being CW components, but the source also describes the chemicalin non-scientific terms, such as "impressive

andhich indicates that he probably has tittle training in chemistry and may not have had direct knowledge about the identitv of the

former IIS chemist with direct access claims that material at the Mustansariyah site was relocated lo the Salmadiyah warehouses

The use of these warehouses for the storage of chemicals and equipment was corroborated, but the site was thoroughly sanitized after the just coalition visit, preventing complete exploitation of thecontents.

An exploitation team visited the sile in3 and found two warehouses which containedchemicals, lab equipment, and documents. The specific chemicals were noi detailed in thereport, bul no CW agents were present in ihe warehouses.

InIS officers destroyed the warehouse which contained the material, accordingormer IIS officer with direct access to the information (several other warehouses in the area had already been destroyed by coalition bombing).

US military officers revisited Uie sile inut found thai the warehouse had been destroyed (see..

Karwai Burial Sites (Al Adaim4

The IIS buried equipment and chemicals, which may have Included CW precursors,emote site North of Baghdad in the. ISG has been unable to corroborate that CW-related chemicals were hidden at any ofxploited siles.

An exploitation team originally visited the sites in3 where they recovered equipmcni used for animal testing, and burned CS grenades. Buried chemicals were also located, bul the teamthat sample analysis would he unfeasible, so the identity of the chemicals remains unknown.

Iraqi Regime Vie of Poisons and Toxins on Human Subjects

Involvement in Human Jesting In, and possibly into, Ihe IIS con-ducied truing of deadly chemicals on humanunder Ihe leadership of Dr. Muhammad Abd al Munim al-Azmerli, the head of the HS al-Hazen research facility.

Dr. Munim confessed to administering various chemicals to human tesl subjects. Dr. Munim suited thai former IIS director llanan al-'Dkrili ordered him lo carry out the testing program, along wtih Nu'man Muhammad al-Tikriti /who would later become the head of the MI6 directoratend AH Hassan Jasim twho administered the lethal doses).

According to Dr Munim. the poisons were being developed as assassination tools for ute overseas, and that the IISubstance that would not kill its victimours after it was consumed.

A high-level member of the Iraqi governmenl with direct access claimed Dr. Munim used poisons and loxms onprisoners, including Kurds. Iranians,audi Arabian. Thewere given lethal doses of vanoat substances including Lasix andarosoamine.

Dr Munim gave political prisoners poisoned food and gave other individuals injections. Thealso said that Dr. Munim tested explosives on human subjects, and that heick man."

According to sensitive reporting. Dr. Munim tested drugs which affected memory and sexual function on IS prisoners0that survived the drugs given to them by Dr. Munim were later executed.

The letting occurred at the M7 directorate's Haka-mut prison, where the victims were prisoners who were sentenced to death.

Dr. Munim said that subjects for the testing werehe directorate in charge of the IIS prison sysiem where enemies of the regime we incarcerated. The M7 directorate was alsofor interrogations and has been implicated in the torturing of inmates.

Nu'man Muhammad al-Tikriii denied beinginvolved with any of the testing activity, but admitted to witnessing Dr. Munim administer poisons to prisonersimes3 at lhe M7 Hakamia prison. Al-Tikrih slated that the poisons included tvanide. methyl micro chloride, thallium acetate, and sodium fluoride. "Methyl micropevhahry refers to liquid methyl chloride.

Dr Munim claimed he tested chemicalsnd used lithium acetate, strychnine. Iihrium. digitalis. <md cyanide.

The discrepancy between Dr. Munim and Nustories about the human testing activity may Indicate thai one or both individuals was not Intlng honest, or could not recall the details about the extent of the activity when discHtting it with ISC officials.

The admissions made by Dr. Munim and Nu'man both attempt to downplay the hitman tesnngDr. Munim claimed that the numbers ofwere small, and Nu'man insisted lhat he only witnessed the activity and did noi participate.

Dr. Munim and Nu'man's stories aboul ihe testing at Hakamia are significantly different in terms of dates and materials tested, even though bothadmitted to bavins direct knowledge on the activity

Neither indivsduaTs story matches informatiim provided by other sources who described the testing activity

Iraqi Regime llie of Poisons and Toxins on Human Subjects (continued)

Testing of Chemicals on Humans Multiple sources have described testing of chemicals on political prisoners within theirectorate of General Security (DGS, duringnd in the.

A former DGS biologist wiih direct access lo the information said lhal1 Departmentn DCS imputed toxins atut tested them on polili-cal prisoners sent from DGS headquarters. This departments official duties were for ustmg the food of Saddam's inner cmfe for poisons and con taminanu

According lo reporting, individuals were given milky liquidsHIS laltoratary runhich caused ihem lo dieeeks.

A Afferent report stales that DGS officers gave milky liquids to political prisoners, nho diedinutesntuming them

Possible IIS Human Tesi Site in Baghdad's Karada District

ISG has investigated the claim that human testing occurredesutenlial house in ihe Karada district of Baghdad near the Tlgris River. We hase tdrnltfied the building that the activity reportedly look place ut but hase been unable in corroborate shot any dlicit activity took place

to reporting, in1 ninewere brought into the house, tied .town lo beds, and had small tubes placed into each of iheir arms. The next day all of the prisoners showed signs of Needing fnrnt iheemale doctor gave eadi of ihe prisoners an injection, and ihe next tlas six of the prisoners were dead.

same report said thai the doctor performed autopsies on ai least one of the victims, whichthat she was trying to determine ihe effects of Ihe substances given to him.

" Based im highlv detailed information about the location and des, ription of the residence taken from ihe same report ISG managed to identify and exploit the suspect facility.

sue exploitation revealed no evidence of human testing or oiher CBW activity, bul ihe site appeared to be heai ily sanitized or looted. All furniture and fixtures had been sinppcdfmm thefacilitx. includ-mg floor ides. Based on the site layout of the residence, we assess that this is the seme facility the sensitive report referred to.

We have hern unable to identify Ihe exact purpose or owner of this house, but limited informationlhat it belonged lo the IIS.

Presidential secretary Abid Humid Mahmud. who was reported to have been at the sitelaimed lhal ihe holding wat used as an IIS guess house.

Daring the site exploitaiion. IIS business cants and partially bunted US documents were recovered.

Desplle the reporting, we do not believe lhat this facility was associated with the IIS MMi) chemical forrnsics branch.

Reportedly, this facility was used byramh and washe chemical analysis of unknown material

' This reporting appears lo be describing the activities of ihe chemicalivision ofMI6 (fomerly knownultiple reports indicate that theivision was based in the MI6 headquarters building, nhich is located im the same rood but further umm

A team relumed in August und excavated chemical containers, bul found thut several containers had been damaged in the buna)igh level member of lheovernment with direct access claimed lhat an autoclave and glove boxes were buried ai the sile.

The same source, which led the team to the site, claimed lhat lhe IIS buncd the CW precursor thio-nyl chloride, thinnykliglycol (which may be alo the CW precursorlassware, and chemical protective gear at the sile4ccording K> the source, the burial was ordered by Abdul Munimerli to bide the chemicalsnspector.

We have not been able lo corroborate ihe reason material was buiiedut Nu'manal-Tikriti staled that chemicals were buried duringimclrume In ihis area because they wereisl of prohibited materials provided by lhe National Moniioring Directorate.

'n. in mih in FfTorls

77ie itirectorate utilized vereral differentlo obtain chemicah and equipment, but faced difficnUiesprocuring Illicil materiah or item< that

woald draw aneniion to theork.

anouo turned chemicals were located al the burial sites.

high level member of ihe Iraqi governmenl with direct access to the information claimed lhat IIS officer Adnan Abdul Rarjaq was sent to Russiaetrocurement network to provide ihe MI6 directoraie with CW precursors.

Nu'inan Muhammad al-Tikriti said that the MI6 directorate never Iricd to procure CW precursors during his tenure as MI6 director. He said thatignificant store of chemicals in ihc Djerf warehouses that ii used,got any additional chemicals il needed from unspecified Iraqi ministries.

We have no evidence to suggest that MI6, the IIS directorate which has been linked toIraqi procurement efforts, to obtain prohibited CW chemicals or equipment.

Muhammad al-Tikriti claimed that MI6 met with M4 sourcesew occasions to obtain equipment. bul none of lhc materials Nu'man discussed were prohibited.

A former IIS officer with direct access said that Nu'man Muhammad al-Tikriti. the head. attempted to get several chemicals through M48 including Ihe CW precursor thionyl chlnride. The source claimed that M4 was unable io get the requested chemicals.

A recovered document discussesequest for laboratory equipment and chemicals. The document recommends M4easibility study lo find out if one of Iheir foreign agents could assist inhe items it needed.

A former mid-level US officer saidechnical papers toirectorate, bul did noi get any chemicals or equipment for Ihe directorate. The source said that MI6 had its own procurement group that made trips out ofurchase equipment.

Assassination Pen Found al al-Karwai4

The pen-shaped aula injector recovered at al-Karwai may have been one of several such devices the IIS had to perform assassinations of the former regime's key targets.

A former IIS scientist with direct access to the information stated that the IIS developed pen-shaped devices meant to be used for assassinations. Muhammad Khudayr al-Dulaymi. the director of IIS special operations, took one of the devices lo London8 for an assassination, but did not use il.

The same source claimed that Abdul Munim al-Azmerli gave the order to create lhe devices, which were produced.

An ISG exploitation learnevice (hat matches the descripiion of those renncstcdmerli buried at al-Karwai with other USThe device was tested for the presence of chemicals, bul none were found.

The large needle on the device makes it appear poorly suiled for covert assassinations, and the former IIS scientist said that the device's original use was for animals. This may indicate that the HS decided lore-existing device, rather than develop its own specially designed for human targeis.

urial/Disposalourceoalition exploitation teamite near Musayyib where chemicals may have been buried to avoid detection by UN inspectors.

CW related materials were recovered, but ihc teamarge amount of chemicals buried at the site. The sensitive source claimed that the MI6 buried lhe chemicals2 because Ihe IIS was worried the UN would think the MltVs chemical Stores were too extensive for legitimate use.

The head. Nu'man Muhammad al-Tikriii. claimed that hefficers to bury chemicals2 because they were old and were no longer usefulcientists (see Figures.

According to reporting, Ihe director of the IIS research center. Numan al-Nasiri (likely Nu'man Muhammad al-Tikriti. (he direcior ofas seen burying syringes, vials of liquid, cans, and bags of chemicals inu'man buried ihe ilems with at least one other IIS officerocation near ihc al-Samida depot and gave the .specific GPS coordinates. ISG assessed that this reporting did not merit full exploitation due to its inconsistency with other MI6 burial reporting and the sources indirect access to the information.

Historical US Tics to Iraq's CW program

Tbe IIS likely had the technical knowledge loseveral CW agents, including Sarin and sulfur mustard, because the IIS was instrumental inIraq's CW program in.

One US officer we spoke with was able torecount the formula for producing Sarin nerve agent, despiie not having worked on CWin recent years.

Iraq's FFCD slates thai effortsroduce CW ageni began at the al-Rashad site, where researchers were able io produce lab-scale amounts of mustard. Tabun. Sarin, and various pcslicidcs.

Accordingormer Iraqi Ministry of Defense scientist, the IIS beganesearch organical the al-Rashad facilityeam of approximatelycientists worked to produce mustard gas ai lhe location, and ihc effort was led by Dr. Muhammad Munim al-Azmerli.

ank ol Inelhylamroe recovered near Musayyih

arge amounts ol buried chemicals were located al Ihe Musayyib site.

A Ibrmci Iraqi Imelligence officer with direct access to the information said that Dr. Munim obtained the equations for producing chemical weapons and established laboratories in Salman Pak duringimeframe where he worked on Sarin, sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and tear gas (CS).

The IIS CW lab in Rashad which was operationalas relocated to Samarrand then moved to Salman Pak3 accordingormer IIS chemist. 'Ihc same source stated that CS (tear gas) and Sulfur Mustard were provided by the IIS researchers to the Iraqi military to use during the Iran-Iraq war.

Dr. Munim stated that the IIS chemical warfare research lab was located in al-Rashad, but was move to Samarra0 and then later to Salman Pak.

Annex B

Al Muthanna Chemical Weapons Complex

Background: Evolution of Iraq's Chemical Weapons Development Facilities

Iraq's pursuit of chemical and biological warfare programs dales back lo Ihehen mem-bers of ihe armed forces traveled overseas, including to the US and UK, In pursuit of CBW training. From this training. Iraq formed the Chemical Corps. With this foundationhange in political power from the Ba'thLst revolutionraq began aof organized research and development into an infant CBW program.

Junior Army officers were trained in United States and Russia in chemical warfare during. The Iraqi army then formed the Chemical Corps.

A division of opinion evolved in the chemical corps where the more Senior Officers desiredefensive CW program while Junior Officers favored both an offensive and defensive program. This rift in leadership opinion continued into.

The Ba'thist revolution forged contacts among Junior Officers of tbe chemical corps and Senior Officers of the Army enabling Iraq to embark upon an offensive CBW program.

Iraq's first attempt tohemical weaponeries of failures and limited.technological advances.

thehe Army developed the concept of "Scientific Centers forhe goal of the project was tohemical weapon, however after four years of poorlyresearch, the project failed to achieve the developmenthemical weapon.

The desire to undertake an offensive CW program continued,ore organized approach toa chemical weapon began4 under the

mililary leadership and Iraqi Intelligence Service HIS, oversight.5 Ihe Al Hasan institute (the first laboratory devoted to the development of CBW) was formed. Its main laboratory was at AI Rashad in suburban Baghdad.

The Al Hasan Institute was founded as the nucleus for chemical research dedicated to CW

Al Hasan was funded by the government through the Ministry of Higher Education, not Ihe military.

Ihe Al Hasan Institute was intimaiely supported by the IIS. The project was nothemical Corps project.

Two key military personnel founded the Al Hasan Institute, the first laboratory devoted lo Iheof CBW.

Ghassanaptain in the chemical corps, formed the Al Hasan Institute.

Faiz 'Abdallah Al Shahin, an Intelligence Officer, was Ghassanssistant.

The instituteentorship and overseas training program to fosier better-trained scientists and chemical corps officers.

of the more prominent Iraq chemicalexperts received their PhDs from lhc Chemical Warfare Academy in Moscow3

'Imad Husayn 'Abdallah Al 'Ani (Research and Development)

Salah-al-Din -Abdallah (Weapons Design Expert and Toxicity Research)

Hammad Shakir (Weapons Preparation Ex pen)

Iraq's second organized attempt at CBWended abruptlycandal and the Al Hasan Institute was abolished

The founder of lhe Al Hasan Instituteumber of staff were imprisoned far fraud and embezaJe-mem.

The program, though il made substamialin CW research and development, never succeeded in CBW production. The programfailed lo meet expectations.

volved from lhe Al Hasan Institute and began to materializevolved into Iraq 's third and most successful attempt iniable and productive CBW program, luading cameifferent ministry, leadership was changed, and resource* became more remotely located away from Baghdad.

5emnant of the Al Hasanand startedmall facilitym SW ol Samarra'. Iraq

The Ministry of Defense funded the project.

Ll. Gen. NizarAl-Auir spearheaded what laler became the largest campaign in Iheof chemical weapons in Iraq's history.

fter Saddam took power, Projecias greatly expanded. The project was renamed. With the Iran-Iraq war looming, Iraq made Ihc CBWop priority.

German firms were contracted to build equipment and facililies designed for the sole purpose of the safe, ct lkmass production of CBW agents.

Iraq's clue scientists were recruited. Research groups were coalesced and moved into thesenear Samarra'.

To maintain anonymity,as known to Ihe Iraqi*esticide production company. The State Establishment for Pesticide Production ISEPP) became the front company forquare kilometer industrial facility dedicated to CBW production.

as referred to as Ihe Samarra' Chemical Weapons Production and StorageThe name was chosen because of its close proximity to Samarra', Iraq.

as known to the Iraqi community as The Slate Establishment for Pesticide Production (SEPP).

Currently the complex is referred to as AlChemical Weapons Complex.

Within three,ad gone from concept to production for first generation Iraqi chemical weapons (mustard4 Iraq started producing Us first nerve agents. Tabun and Sarin.ive-year plan was drain up lhal ultimately led to BW production.8 Iraq had produced VX. The program reached Us zenUh in theuring the Iran-Iraq war.1raq producedons of CW agenis.

Initial research under an elite group of chemist* focused on mustard, hut rapidly progressed into Tabun and Sarinroduction efforts for mustard started atons of agent production1 and increased0 tons per year5 when the facilily annuallyons.7 Iraq producedons of mustard agenis and8 they produced close to .SOOionsrrfagcm.

Iraq producedons of46

bsentually they researched Cyclosarin and VX concurrently,4 Iraqons of Sarin. Iraq consianily increased Sarin production78 Iraqons of Sarin, respectively.

Cyclosarin was highly desirable to ihe liaqis because of its low volatility and the commercial availability of its precursor compound cyclo-hciLanol. These factors gave Cyclosarin several advantages; it was easier to work with in hotter environments, had enhanced efficacy and storage

life, and lhc precursor compound cyclohexanol was relatively cheap, commercially available, andio control by sanctions.

Iraqons of VX8 before ending production due io the end of ihe lian-Iraq War.

Production for Sarin, VX. and Mustard resumed

Daring the early years, Egyptian scientists provided consultation, technology, and oversight allowing rapid advances and technological leaps inWith Ihe Iran-Iraq war well underway, Egypt assisted Iraq in CW production:

gypt made modifications to Ihem Multiple Launch Rocket System to enable warheads to store chemical agents.

gypt exported Grad rockets wiih plastic inserts to hold chemical agent.

In the, Iraq invited Egyptian chemical weapons experts to Iraq to assist in producing Sarin munitions.

ecomes Al Muthanna6

ame change6 when the Al Muthanna State Establishment (MSE) oversaw operations and the facility became known asAI Muthanna (seehe secrecy of the facility began to trade in thea venue change in's production and research-.

BBC Panorama aired the documentary "Secrets of Samarra'necurity and secrecy were compromised for this clandestine CBW program.

original Director General Lt Gen. Nizar was relieved by Pub 'Abdallah Al Shahin7 (IIS agent and co-leader of ihe A) Hasan Institute).

Establishment was subordinate io the Ministry of Industrial Commission (MIC).

Research and production efforts underwent achangefter the Iran-Iraq war ended,ommercial product line was introduced. Despite the straleglc production change, Iraq always maintained the philosophyBW program would persevere; in times of war facilities would be utilized for CBW production and in times of peace facilities would be converted lo commercial entities with the ability to quickly revert.

Al Muihanna (previously) halted CW production focusing instead. purification and stability of CW agents during8 to

The rationale for stopping the chemical weapons production was lhat ihe CW agents at Al Muthanna throughout Ihe previous years were in ihe crude state, containing many impurities which affected the stability and consequently the storage ability of thes.

The need for CBW agent drastically subsided and resources begin to stagnate from ihe reducedrequirement

Personnel and facilities were redirected toand produce commercial products such as lice shampoo and petroleum jelly.

Al Muthanna. however, maintained its ability ioibrant CBW research, development and production program.

In order lo ensure seJfrrellanee, minimizeupon foreign resources, andBW programegitimate commercial entity. Director General Fa'iz in theegan producing, purchasing, and utilizing off-siteThe faculties contained the next generation equipment and were research capable-

upon foreign suppliers for precursors made the CW program vulnerable. Self-reliance for precursor productionriority.

wia" *ocr

fettat

utmwa

wo-

-

Figurel Mulhanna Chemical Weapons Complex.

BW program trailed lhe CW program, bul gained momentum5ompelling proposalby Pnifessor Nasser Aticrobiologist. Dr Rihab Rashid Taha.recruited to lead lhe new BW program for. Research startedat At Mulhanna7 was transferred to Salman Pak.

The State Organization for Technicalrecommended Dr Rihab Rashid Taha Al 'Azzawi be recruited to pursue the establishment of BW program.

aboratory was utilized atAI Mulhanna and staffed with scientists to develop Bacillus anihtucis the causative agent of anthrax, and botulinum toxin.

In7rogram was transferred to Salman Pak. Thereeadership change at Al Mulhanna and new management under General Shahin believed the BW work interfered with CW precipitating the location change.

The BW program remained under Al Mulhanna State Establishment control.

Muthanna CW Production Volumes

c

p

mustardtabun

sarin

VX

H mstaidtabun

sarii

VX

5 57 3

10 75 M) fl 70 30 49 X9 5

year

93

I.. declared production volumes otCWagenis.

Cenain CBW projects ai Al Muthanna wereand relocated to other locations. Al Muthanna began acquiring commercial chemical, biological and pharmaceutical facilities to conceal the CBW program within analogous commercial enterprises:

Laboratory

I. II, and III (also known as Habbaniyah III. II, and I) to coalition forces.

Serum and Vaccine Institute (SVIj at Al 'Aminyah.

Drug Industries.

As early asnder fear of hostilities from Israel, resources at AI Muthanna were focused to operate at full CW production capacity. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the same year precipitated an internationalS-led bombing campaign

quickly ensued and disabled At Mutlutnna'sability. After the bombings, reestablishing late Iran-Iraq war production rates proved difficult and dangerous. Al Muthanna was not able to recreate Iran-Iraq war CBW inventories.

0 Al Muthannats maximum annual production volume forts maximum annual production volume for Sarints maximum annual production volume for VX. Seeeclared Productionof CW Agents in this section for CW agent volumes.

On0 Saddam announced that Iraqbinary agents similar to the US and former Soviet Union and threatened to use them on Israel if the Israelis attacked Iraq with nuclear weapons.

Al Mulhanna Ixgan preparation, in lawor filling Al Husayn warheads wiih Sarin and ils mixture* and switched to producing tlie binary by

Production efforts intensified after

An order was issued by MIC in0 toall Al Mulhanna Stale EstablishmentTo implemeni this requirement, most nf lhe documents were transferred to air-raid shelters wiihin MSE

Al Mulhanna essentially ceased production in December0 and refocused resources onCW stockpiles and equipment foragainst the anticipated bombing campaigns, which started in

Al Mulhanna Chemical Weapons Production Facility Before and After Desert Storm

Al Mulhanna's ability to produce chemical weapons ended with the Girt/ war, and soon afterwards the UN resolution proscribed Iraq's ability to produce chemical weapons. The Fallujah satellite facilities (damaged during Ihe Gulf war and not destroyed byere repaired wiih the exception ofhich was not operational and operated as dual-use capable facilities. The majority of the Al Mulhanna complex was bombed during Desert Storm, completely incapacitating Iraq'sweapon production capabilities, however, targe stockpiles of chemical weapons and bulk agent survived.

Laboratories and production areas are shown below after ihc Gulf war bombing. Facilities boxed arc annotated. The facilities not boxed in the enclosure arc Iraqi decoys (sec

After the bombing during Desert Storm, the roofs on the research facilities collapsed incapacitating research capabilities alAI Mulhanna. The animal house was left.

During Desert Storm, the bomb assembly areaestroyed. The engineering support area andand Matciial Storage area experienced some collateral damage. Chemical and Material Storage Area where CW precursors were stored at Ihc end of1 were not bombed bul experienceddamageesult of ihc bombing.

The precursor and agent production area at Al Mulhanna was not completely destroyed during Desert Storm. Portions of tlie mustard (blister agent) production and storage area survived. The VX and Tabun production (nerve agent) facilities wereDecoy facililies that had been built on Ihe complex remained iniaci (seeor complete annotation).

The pilot plants survived much of Ihe bombing during Desen Storm. Several structures remained intact, including the Inlialation Chamber, Quality Control Lab and two production areas. The Sarin productiou area was struck bul not destroyed.

Piloi Planis included three main production areas: Pilot Plainroduced DM MPilot Planiroduced DMMP and MPC. Pilot Plantroduced DMMP, methyl phosphonylditluo-nde (MPF) and Sarin.

In the nonheasl portion of ihis area of ihe planluality control laboratory'. The laboratory was not struck during Desen SlOnii.

located in this section of the plain wasuard post andnon-productionlocated at thesection of this area. Neither facility were struck during Desen Siorm (sec

The weapons assembly area where agent was loaded into munilions was locatedilometers souiheast of the overall facilily. The remoteness of ibe location was chosen hy the Iraqis to avoid unnecessary casualties in the eventishap during the uploading process.

Then? ishampoo filling area locaicd on ihc northeast section of this portion of the facility.

Two Cruciform Bunkers were sealed containing munitions too dangerous for destruction.

Munitions Filling area suffered serious damage during Desert Storm. The entire operation wasdisabled except for two structures that were part of the Shampoo Filling Station at the northeast end of the complex.

Cruciform bunkers after Desert Storm are shown Figurehe overall facility contained more thanunkers and hardened facilities. The CW bunker storage area consisted of eight large, earth-covered cruciform bunkers and six dummy cruciform bunkers. Gulf war bombing completely destroyed one bunker because of secondary explosion and severelytwo others.

Al Muthanna State Establishment Post-Gulf War

2NSCOM's ChemicalGroup (CDG) oversaw destructionortion of lhc facility was transformedW agent destruction facility. An incinerator wasin the summer2 for the destruction of mustard agent at the munitions filling location. Chemical munitions stored throughout Iraq were to be gathered and destroyed at Al Muthanna. Seeor the location (note image was laken afterwas dismantled).

4 the facility was lhccollection and destruction site for all declared CW agents, precursor chemicals, and chemical production equipment.

24 and again, the CDG oversaw destruction0 piecesiters of chemical agents, and moreillion liters of chemical precursors.most of the facilities at the complex theestroyed and sold for scrap.

that survived Desert Storm was tagged by UN or destroyed, but the UN was never able lo verify that all equipment purchased for MSE was tagged or destroyed.

damaged by coalition bombing,concealing unaccounted CW equipment and munitions in the debris. Over the next ten years some of the facilities were rared by the Iraqis. Precise accountability of equipment and munitions is unvcrifiable, because the National Monitoring Directorate and UNSCOM did not always oversee excavation.

W production related activities ceased alike Primary Al Muthanna sile that once wasSamarra' Chemical Weaponsand Storagemall security detail remained. Two sealed cruciform bunkers containing the largest declared stockpile of chemical munitions, old bulk chemical agent, and hazardous material associated with the CW program remained Thearea al the facilityefuse area or junkyard for relics of Iraq's past CW weapons program.

damaged cruciform bunkers were used to seal damaged chemical munitions, residual chemical agents, and hazardous material.

- The contenis of the bunkers were declared io the UN but never fully. Ihc munitions inside the bunkers were damaged from ODS bombings; fires, leaking munitions and physical damage tomade the environment inside the bunker extremely dangerous.

National Monitoring Directoratemall security detail monitored the bunkers.

4 and OIF, Iraq requested VS approval to remove and relocate some of the equipment and facilities. Imagery analysis revealed in? that the Iraqis excavated many of the research and production buildings. Iraq had razed mostoftheAt Muthanna Complex byeaving only the southern part of the farmer chemical and material storage area intact (see

UN Criteria for CWIraqis razed and removed all existing struc-

tures for the hiologicaUtoxicological lab,Ihe UNSCOM-supenised destruction pro- research lab, and Sarin production facility. Ina CW facility was tedmicnllvto complete removal of the facilities, complete

destroyed under three differentwere excavated and removed. These

actions were undertaken after the NationalEquipment was permanently disabled by the Iraqis. jHg Directorate was displaced in Iraq andexamined and documented bytnternatioiuil scrutiny.

Equipmeni would be lagged dismantled, and reused by lhe Iraqis for other legitimate commercial use while being documented and monitored by UN.

Facilities destroyed from coalition strikes weir deemed unusable for CW development

Note: UN did not verify reusability of some ofconcealed wiihin rubble ofThe CW process lhat once occurredbombed facility was regarded as inoperable,of equipment reusability sometimes

Prior to OFF. Iraq removed buildings and their conicnishe northern section of lhe Chemical Precursor storage area. The facilities at the southern scciion of the facilily were removed by unknown entities beiween April and June

2 and OIF the Iraqis removed some of the facililies/warehouses (photohiswas probably not WMD related.

The majority of thethearea, pilot plant, pnsduction area, bomb produci. and engineering support weapons fillingbeen excavaied priorIF.

hows the Adminisrialion Area razed before OIF. One structure remained intacihe remaining administration buildings were removed

s the laboratory area, ll had been excavated and razed by lhe Iraqis0 and prior io OIF. The only facililies not razed by the Iraqis were lhe

The Tabun Production Facility was razedimilar fashion to the other nerve agenl production facililies In that all remnants of the existing facilily were removed to include foundations andtop layers of soil Portions of the VX Production Facility were filled with sand. The facility was not razed by the Iraqis, however all equipment were removed (see.

Figurehows ihc pilot planl area had been sealed alter ODS. Thisardened facility area, and the QC lab and Inhalation facility were still intact. The Sarin Production Facilily thai was bombed was excavaied and ihc non-hardened facililies in lhe area were razed.

Al Mulhannaeries of name changes and ultimately becomes theAl Tariq Company,4 MSE (Samarra' Chemical Weapons Production and Storage Facilily as well as Us satellite facilities) underwent strategic changes in key researchers and production. Resources were spent trying lo rebuild the satellite facilities; however, the site At Mulhanna {Samarra' Chemical Weapons Production andFacilily) remained essentially abandoned.

Key leadership ai llie facilily sought alternative employment.

lhe bulk of tbe technicians and certain keywere employed within Ihc Al Tariq Siale Establishment.

Several key figures are employed by, or consultants to NMD.

The Director General of Al Muthannaeadership position within Al Tariq.

storage area (noi bombed during ODS).

Exploitations of Al Muthanna

ISG conducted multiple exploitations of the Al Muthanna site to determine whether old chemical weapons, equipment, or toxic chemicals had been looted or tampered with since the last UN risk to the site. ISG is unable to unambiguously determine the complete fate of old munitions, materials, and chemicals produced aad stored there. The matter is further complicated by the looting and razing done by the Iraqis.

An exploitation of the facility reconfirmed previous imagery analysis that the ske remained inoperable from bombings and UNSCOM compliance,destruction of equipment and resources, and no significant production capabilities existed. Facilities and bunkers revealed no evidence of production since UNSCOM departed.

The teams found no new structures or any consiruc-tion activities except tor those declared by Iraq to UNSCOM. The facilities appeared to be abandonedIF.

Several pieces of equipment that were once used for CW production were found hearing no UN tags, and ihe ISG was unable to assess whether the equipmcni had been reused4 or intendeduture production processes and abandoned.

The tag system used by the UN was known to not be robust, and given the absence of inspecrors8raq would have had little incentive to maintain the tags in good condition.

The extent of ihe looting and unaccounted forof bombed facilities makes it impossible

io determine what, if any. equipment was removedither for legitimate industrial useenovated CW production process.

ISC exploitations indicate that the storage area stillhreat despite lesling. Chemical storage containers filled with unknown hazardous chemicals are showing signs of rusting-through and leaking.

bunkers and facilities arc currently scheduled to be scaled or resealed.

Stockpiles of chemical munitions are still stored there. The most dangerous ones have been declared to the UN and are sealed in bunkers. Although declared, the bunkers contents have yet to beThese areas of the compoundazard to civilians and potential blackmarkcters.

Numerous hunkers, including eleven cruciform shaped bunkers were exploited. Some of thewere empty. Some of Ihe bunkers contained large quantities of unfilled chemical munitions, conventional munitions, one-ton shippingold disabled production equipment (presumed disabled under UNSCOMnd other hazardous industrial chemicals. The bunkers were dual-use in storing both conventional andmunitions. Figureypical side-viewruciform shaped bunker

The conicnts of two of the cruciform hunkers bombed during Desert Storm showed severe damage. Due to the hazards associated with this location, Ihc UN decided Ii> seal the bunkers.

UNSCOM viewed the contents of the two bunkers; however an accurate inventory was not possible due io lhc hazards associated wiih that environment.

NSCOM relied upon Iraqi accountability of lhc bunkers" contents and assessed lite amount ofdeclared to be realistic.

held testing equipment showed positive for possible CW agent in the cruciform bunkers that contained munitionstorage bunker that contained bulk chemical sioiagc containers. Note: this is not unusual given the munitions once stored there and ihe conditions in which they were stored

An exploitation team observed Ihe old UNSCOM CW destruction area that contained large (some in excess ofeter) sloping trenches once used in the CW destruction process. Damaged chemical storage drums were visible at Ihe bottom of some of the trenches.

Drums and debris were visually observed in two of theurial trenches. The otherrenches appeared to be partially filled, no drums or debris was visually observed und they did not register positive for chemical agent, lhe two thai containedgallon drums and various metal debris did not register positive from CW. These wereof the incinerating pits and should ruse been covered

Bunkers tested positive for chemical agents and confirmed observations (hunkers contained large quantities of unlilled chemical munitions,munitions, one ton shipping containers. oM disabled production equipment (presumed disabled under UNSCOMnd other hazardous industriallso noted were hundreds of rusted hulk storage containers that once contained bulk mustard agent. Despite ihc presence of these chemical storage drums field testing concluded no CW agents were present.

The hardenedpiloi plant and animal compound were sealed prior to OIF and were breached, presumably by looters Sampling of both areas showed no es idenor or presence of chemical agents and the facililies were incapable ofchemical munitions.

MI the facilities (laboratories, pilot plant, bunkers, and animal storage area) inspected that wereto be sealedesult of UN resolutions had been breached. Kxptiiitaltnn of these faciUties revealed materials and equipment were removed, however the extent of looting makes it difficult to differentiate whether Iraqi government removed equipment1 while still under UN sanction or if it was looted after OIF.

Locks on metal doors were cut or concrete and bricks were breached producing apertures large enough for human entry.

Figurehows that bneked eniryways were breached. The debni in the corridor in ihe photo to the right apparently is from removed material inside the bunker. Maulve amounts of cylinders that once stored ehemlcal agents, primarily bulk mustard agent, now are stacked in huge bunkers.

this practice was consistent with Iraq sprogram involving the removal andof agent and equipment.

of hulk storage cylinders were preserved from the destruction processes that look place in the. They once contained chemical agents that were supposed lo he destroyed. The remaining cylinders contained residual material lhat was lo

be neutralized by adding caustic and water. Some residual or leaking caustic, now dried, is apparent from ihc white residue on the skIcylinder in Figureresidue runhis iswith Iraq's dcslruclion program involving die removal and incineration of agent and equipment.

learntorage cylinder with Ihe red and white plaslicec, and found it suspect. It was apparent that contents had been removed. Foi low-on analysis of Ihc drum revealed the drum was filled with petroleum products (prc-.umsbly fuelSO assesses ihe fuel oflHongi in the cylinders might be from residua] oil once used in/for ihc mustard incinerator. Since the oil was associaied with mustard destruction, it mightbeen regarded as hazardous material and thereby not discarded into the ens ironment. Instead it was placed into the contaminated storageand stored in the bunker with ihe rest of Ihe contaminated cylinders.

ISG also exploited the underground pilot plants, which also had been breached by looters, andeactor unit lhal wan suspecl.

The reactor should have been destroyed as part of UNSCOM inspections The plant infrastructure required lo operate the reactin was missingit inoperable

'Ihe reactor is madeecycled iwo-ion bulk mustard storage cylinder, similar to the ones viewed in the storage bunker above (see.

The team found the laboratory, production, and animal house area looted and inoperable. Again, equipment that should have been destroyed by Ihe UN was found here.

Cages thai once housed animals were strewn about the site. Some of tlte cages appear io have held dogs used to study the efficacy of CBW agent, and oihers were designed to hold pn mates based on the size and bar spacing on the cages despiie intelligence that Iraq never conducted research on primates. Scratch marks also were on the wall apparently from animals, probably primates.

An inhalation chamber was located at the site. Although it did not appear designed fur humans, il was large enough touman. Instead, the chamber apparently held cages which weie inserted for animal experiments (see. Note: there was no evidence recovered to indicate that humans svere used in the experiments. This equipment should hase been destroyed and verified by UNSCOM-

The team found multiple glass-lined reactionremnants from the former CBW programs, some which were US-tagged and others which did not bear tags. Inconsistencies in the destruction methods among reactors might allow for cannibal-tzation of parts to produce other reactors. The most interesting find is ihe reactor shown inhich not only was devoidN tag, but the glass-liner was still pristine wiih only minor chips.

reactor liner probably was chipped bywhen attempting to mose the reactor without the proper equipment. More importantly, there is no indication of where the reactor originated and where it has been since the departure of ihe UN.

eneral note, thereumber of possible reasons for equipment bearing no UN lags:

Equipment was destroyed in Desert Siorm and therefore was noi tagged;

Equipment was destroyed by UNSCOM and was tagged, but the tag was removed;

Equipmcni was lagged, and possibly moved io other facilities for useual-use item:

lagged or desiroyed by UNSCOM. Over tbe years, it may have been excavated by ihe Iraqis after UNSCOM left, or by looters after OIF.

It was apparent that some of the reactors wereto the facility for destruction while others were indigenous to the facility and destroyed on site.

A refuse area was exploited containing hundreds of empty munitions intended for chemical oragent filling. Warheads and peripheral hardware for brass and recyclable metals are still being looted. Old hardware destroyed under the auspice of ihe UN agreement and thousands of pieces of chemical weapons hardware that did not meet quality controls lay waste in ihc refuse area (sec.

Hundreds of mangled and rusted munition bodies and tail sections lay strewn about (seepper left photo).

Chemical bombs desiroyed probablyseepper right).

Chemical rounds (observed were defectiveempty of chemical agents (seeower left photo).

Chemical rounds (without agent) after explosive agent had been removedcavenger in order to recover brass components (seeower right photo).

The ISC found hundreds ofand metal foUchemical agents used as insert for munitions lying on the ground.

Two pictures Figurehow theihe left, the metalanister, and Iheolymeric canister that tits inside iheanister. There is no picture of the sister canister that connects to form the body of the warhead.

The team noted several sloping trenches near the site which we believe were once used in theprocess of CW rockets. Note: some of the trenches appear to be arrangedpecific process while some contained brick structures within the

Equipment survived bombing during Dcscn Storm, but was buried by rubble and subsequently noi

base (see. Upon completion ofother trenches were covered. It is uncertain if portions of the trenches were unearthed by looicrs or were not originally tilled.

of the trenches contained some drums chut were exposed and nisicd. Sampling of the damaged drums and surrounding standing water showed no presence of CW agents.

picture abose shows one of the deeper sloping trenches with exposed drums and debris. Aof bird droppings coated the area where birds had taken refuge in the sandy walls of the trenches.

The entire Al Mulhanna mega-facility was the bastion of Iraqi's chemical weapons development program. During its peak in theo, il amassed mega-bunkers full of chemical munitions, and provided Iraqorce multiplier

sufficient to counteract Iran's superior mililary numbers. Two wars, sanctions and UNSCOMreduced Iraqi's premier production facilitytockpile of old damaged and contaminatedmttnitionsfsealed inasteland full of destroyed chemical munitions, razed structures, and unusable war-ravaged facililies.8 Al Tariq State Establishment took over all remainingal Al Mulhanna.

Annex C

The Iraqi Industrial Commiilee

Saddam personally ordered Ihe creation of Ihe Iraqi Industrial Comminee (IIC) in5 to coordinate activities of the Iraqi industrial sector, according to documentary and other reporting. The IIC probably never developed formalized procedures for coordinating industrial efforts and its overall strategy and mechanisms for project implementation probably were somewhat nebulous even to its own participants. Looting, vandalism and destruction of documentation have complicated ISG efforu to fully understand the rote of the IIC andomplex, mteraependent web of constantly evolving committees, projects andwas responsible for national research and development for indigenous production of chemicals, based on ISG analysis of documents and reporting.

ISG has been unable to identify the policy direction for the IIC's operations and has obtained conflicting data about operational details.

IIC Subcommittees and Their Responsibilities

Thealuation Research Committee" Evaluation Research Committee In the first phase of projects, the Evaluation Research Committee evaluated Ihe initial work carried out and reported to the Central Evaluation Researchwhich in turn reportedhe DC. After all preliminary research had been reviewed, both the Evaluation Research Committee and the Central Evaluation Research Committee were disbanded and the research was passed to the Technology Transfer Committee, according lo reporting.

The Research and Development Commiilee' Technology Transfer Committee and Its Subcommittees

Dr. Ja'far chaired both the Research and Development Comminee and ihe Technology Transfer Comminee. The Research and Development Comminee provided oversight for chemical research for ihe strategic

research program, according to documents andand was responsible for prioritizing projects based on economic benefit and feasibility, according to different reporting. Other comminee members included Drs. Ahmad and Al Jabburi of ihe Ministry of Higher Education, Dr. Karim of Al Razi Center. Dr. Al Qurashi of the Iraqi Atomicrs. Naji and 'Ano of the Chemistry Department at Saddam University. Dr. Asawa of the Ministry of Industry, Dr. Rathman from the Ministry of Industry and Mineralsnd Drs. Hashim and Hamzah Yasin of the Mililaryccording to multiple reports.

The Technology Transfer Comminee, establishedas responsible for researching and acquiring strategic technologies from outside Iraq. Thistracked foreign technological developments by targeting students, attending trade shows andeducational exchanges, according io reporting. Different reporting indicated the Technology Transfer Comminee was responsible for the coordination of all medical and agricultural research in Iraq. The Technology Transfer Comminee appeared to share or subsume the responsibilities of the Research and Development Comminee probably because Dr. Ja'far chaired both.

The Follow-Up Committee for Pharmaceutical Research

This subcommittee was responsible for review-ing research reports, evaluating scale-up feasibility, and evaluating quality control testing of samples. Il reported directly to Dr. Ja'far at the Office of the Presidential Advisor. Once the committee approved the research results. Ihe organization received full payment for the work, according to Dr. Ja'far.

The Distinguished Industrialists Council Ihis body formed in1raqi industrialists met Saddam Husayn. The IIC was tasked to carry out several joint activities with this group of industrialists, including lhe setting upiudy to provide the correct requirements to the industrialisis. based on documenis recovered by ISG.

The Chemical Industries Commiiiee

Thisoint MIC-MIM oversight group under the IIC established to implement the National Project for Pharmaceuticals and Pesticides, according to

The National Project for Pharmaceuticals and Pesticides (NPPP)

The NPPP was established in9 in responseritten order from Saddam, who took personal Interest In Ihe program's progress. Three types of commercial products were targeted for indigenous production under the NPPP.

Drugs/pharmaceuucal/chemicals

Pesticide chemicals

Materials for medical diagnostic kits

Accordingormer high-ranking employee at Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Researchhich was the primaryresponsible for Ihe research, the national dreg program consisted of six categories of researchprimitive chemicals, activekits, pesticides and veterinary medicines. Two categories of required chemical research for the above products were identified,

of active chemicals required for making finished pharmaceutical products andctive chemicals" probably refers to biologically active substances).

t

on formulation technologies required tofinal drug products. Research on suchwould focus on formulating products for which Iraq already had the ingredients.

The National Projeci for Active Chemical Materials probably began9 under the NPPP on theof Ihe Minister of Higher Education andScUnhfic Research, Ha mam 'Abd-al-Khaliq 'Abd-al-Ghafur. Humam proposed the project lo Saddametter in which he indicated lha! he had many skilled chemists with little lo do. according to

reporting. Humam reported substances were placed on the list based on the need of the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the Ministry of Agriculture.

Ministries and companies from across Iraq'sand pesticide sectors initiallychemicals and materials that Iraq needed for research and development and eventual pilot production under the NPPP. Accordingormer high-ranking employee of MHFSR, the chemicals were needed because Iraq could noi obtain them under sanctionsowever, few of ihe hundreds of chemicals identified were restricted by sanctions.

The IIC, in consultation with technical experts from MIC. MOH. and MIM, evaluated theseMIM had primary responsibility forpriority "active" pharmaceutical chemicals, while MOH advised on final pharmaceutical products io be included on the list and MIC was responsible for evaluating pesticide-related chemicals for ihe list.

The IIC's Program for the Indigenous Production of Chemicals probably was moreoon to Iraqi science than most regime programs, because the program implemented some merit-basedand methodical science. According to reporting, the wort stimulated by ihe IIC's TechnologyCommittee was scientifically credible and was selected on merit.

Technology Transfer Committee headed by Dr. Ja'far was involved in promoting research by the private secior and in Universities. The Commiiiee stimulated work which lead io additional areas of research activity, according lo the same reporting.

In contrast, other regime programs promotingscientific achievement probably were corrupted by special interest groups who siood to gainor personally for successfully lobbying chosen projects irrespective of scientific merit

a knowledgeable person did not slcp in toaltcientifically invalid projeci. the project would proceed.nowledgeableobjected io an unsound projeci that scieniisi was accused of being enuenched in the system, according to 'Amir Hamudi Hasan Al Sa'adi.

MIC andMIM; Key Players in Iraq's Chemical Infrastructure

The chief mililary iradeMilitary Industrialization Commissioniheministry of civilianMinistry of Industry and Mineralshad subordinate production facilities which made conventionalequipment and materials for the military.

Although the MIC and the MIM were separatethey cooperated on military issuesequipment, spare parts, projects and vehicles. Dr. 'Imad Husayn -Abdallah Al 'Ani, former VX expert, was the Director of the Office of Technical Cooperation, and was responsible for lheand coordination between these two ministries and the Ministry of Defense as related to matters of supplying materials to the mililary, according to reporting.

' The Research and Development Office of MIM oversaw the Veterinary Center for Ihe Formulation of Drugs for Animals, ihe Ibn-al-Bayiar Center, the Chemicals Research and Development Center, the Ihn-Sina' Center and the Al Razi Center. The MICs subsidiaries included the Al Majid Company. AI Basil Center, and the Al Raya Center.

The scientific capabilities of ihe MIC and the MIM were comparable and most chemical research could be tasked to either, although pharmaceutical work was typically assigned to MIM, while pesticUles research and production was usually delegated by MIC, according to reporting.

Prior to OIF, MIM was under lest interrutlional scrutiny than the MIC, the key organization through which WMD activities were funneled under Husayn Kamil

Additionally, Ihe special interest groups found ways to bypass the mechanisms intended iounsound projects by suppressing bad results and evidence of failed tests, and by concurrently highlighting any experiment that was even partially successful.

One examplerojecioor scientific basis and no chance of success, according to Al Sa'adi,roject io use lasersisrupt weapon systems and computers of attacking aircraft. Although ihe experimenis were conductedraft not used by any potential enemies, and only one of several tests was even partially successful, the project wasuccess and the system was ordered into unit production.

Annex D

Tariq Company's Activities

The Tariq Company, also referred to at the Tariq facility and formerly the Tariq Stale Establishment, encompassed seseral facilities near Failujaheadquartrrs complex; Failujah I, Fallnjah II. and hallufoh III (abo know* as Habbaniyah III, II.esearch site in Baghdad referred to asnd several storageTariq was subordinate to the formerStale Establishment (MSE) chemical weapons (CW) research, production and storage facility near Samarra before it was destroyed. Itongof ties to Iraq's CW program, and throughoutontinued to house key CW scientists and maintain basic capabilities to produce at least some CW precursor chemicals. Iraq renovated keyand reinitiated production ot basic chemicals

Tariq chemical facilities were designed to he. and in the case of Failujah II previously used as. CW precursor production pianu.

Failujah II. while under previous state ownership, produced nerve agent and sulfur mustard precursors for USB itt the.

Tariq as2 employed some of the motepersonalmes associated with Iraq's former CW production programs.

In an effort to determine the nature and extent ofctivitiesSGeries of site visits. Interviews with key personnel, and document exploitation. Teams focused on evaluating activities of the two active Failujah plants andthe former CW scientists, many of whom had held important positions in the former CW program, about their efforts at Tariq after the Gulf war.

Based on these investigations, ISG assesses that the Tariq Company aid not provide Iraqreak-ant capability for nerve agent production.

(Formerly Failujahnstead of synthesizing precursors and pesticides on lite and

in Iraq, Tariq imported concentrated commercial pesticides for formulation, repackaging, and local

divtrihution.

Plant (Formerly Failujah lh:

leading up to OIF. ihis plant *as not fullyand was unlikely to have provided any basic chemicals such as chlorine or phenol to an Iraqi CW effort. Because of technical problems, ihe plant could not even supply local markets with its

orabs, (he Baghdad Research Lab-oratory, was closed at an unknown date,lo interviews wiih Huwaysh, and lie stated its employees did noi participate in any CW-relatcd research while il was open. Other ISG interviews indicate that the lab may have engaged in defensive nerve agent detector research.

Asariq scientists were still regarded by members of the Regime as CW experts.

When Saddam asked12 for anof bow long it would take Ioroduction line for CW. Huwaysheam of Tariq scientists io answer the question, according to an ISG interview With Huwaysh.

expert teamumber or Tariq employees, such as former directors Ghazi Faisal and Zuhair al-Qazzaz. according to the same

Wc arc considering ihe possibility thai Huwaysh confused Ihe details and actually was referringimilar incident involving him that occurredn the latteruery about how Iraq's CW capability would be limited by an UNSCOM-orderedof dual-use equipment raiher than how quickly production could be restarted.

former CW Personnel Employed by Tariq

Tariqarge number ofCW scientists and engineers from Muthanna State Establishment, especially within upper management of the company, throughoutnd up to

Dr. GhazJ Faysal: Worked to build Tariq under the OMI after MSE was destroyed in the first Gulf war. Served as the director of Tariq until moving to al-Basel center.

Dr. lyad Muhammad Rashid Rauf: DeputyDirector for the Tariq facility. lyad Rashid researched nerve agent production in the Salah ad Din Research Department of MSE.

Husayn Sharnki: Tariq research scientist.

Ihsen Abd al-Amir: Tariq research scientist.

Issam Daud Faysal: Formerly of the Al Karama Facility. Involved in quality control at MSE.

Brig.Eng. Hayder Hassan Taha: Director of the Chlorine factory at Tariq: previously workedhemical engineer in the Project Directorate in Al-Muthana State Co.

Staff Colonel Ra'd Manhal: Commercial and Planning director and NMD point of contact at Tariq, former director of the MSE munitions filling station.

Dual-Use Facililies

Pcslkide (Formerly Fallujah III) Instead of synthesizing precursors and pesticides on site and in Iraq, Tariq imported concentratedpesticides for formulation, repackaging, and local distribution.

' ISG interviewsenior scieniisi revealed thai around SO Ions per year of the pesticide Nugoz was imported, sometimes using false customs

research scientist stated that while Tariqa large list of commercial pesticides, the company did not produce pesticides at greater than laboratory scale, which he attributedack of glass-lined equipment available in Tariq.

Castor Oil Production (Formerly Fallujah III)

Castor oil was also produced at Tariq2ut ISG investigations did not uncover any indication that the ricin-containing mash was further processed or transferred off-site for any purpose. According to interviews with Tariq officials, they complied with UNSCOM regulations by burning the residual castor bean mash in pits near the Fallujah III facility.

Castor oil production ended2 because of rising prices of castor beans and decreasingInterest Two companies interested inTariq's castor oil were Ibn Al-Baytar and Samarra Drug Industries, but ultimately neither company purchased Tariq's oil because its process used solvent extraction and rendered the oil unfit forand medical uses, according to the same

An ISG site visit indicated that the castor oilplant appearede undamaged, but there was no evidence of any current activity. All of thebuildings were empty, possibly because of looters.

Tariq's castor bean supplier, the Company for Industrial Forests, had raised its prices0raqi dinars per ion (fromnd predicted that prices would increase) the next year, according to the same interviews.

Chlorine (Formerly Fallujah II)eedstock for some CW precursors, was produced at Tariq3ndthereafter: however, ISG has not discovered any information that indicates chlorine from the plant was divertedW program. During an ISG site visit, the director of the phenol planl stated thai

chlorine production had stopped months before OIF. Reporting indicates the facility was unable to obtainkey component of the technology atseparate the chlorine.

Members of the site visit team noted thatprobably older, used ones, were stacked by the roadside close to the northwest entrance. The director stated lhat they had been moved here to protect ihem in the event that ihe plant was bombed.

Chlorine from lhe plant was sold to local sanitation plants and also consumed onsiie lo produce other commercial waier purification compounds such

as sodium hypochlorite and calcium hypochlorite, which were sold for water treatment, according io the director.

Technical difficulties with the process resulted in lower production outputs6ccording to the director, the chlorine cells had been broken for several months and control valves, main instrumentation control panelstep downwere missing.

he Indian firm NEC Engineers Private,as recruited ta begin repairing the chlorine production lines, according to multiple sources. The plant direcior during the interview said NEC constructed the membrane cell equipment thai would be use io produce chlorine and caustic soda, bui one of ihc membranes was second-hand and perforated easily, which caused further problems wiih the

Once the project was completed, operationalin India was scheduled lor the planl engineers in. according to documenis recovered by ISG.

Tariq, along with MIC employees and afrom Iraqi Intelligence,ommittee to conceal imports from India's NEC engineershlorine plant repair, according to documenis recovered by ISG.

Byith help from the Indian firm NEC Engineers, the chlor-alkali plant was brought back on-line. Oneither the chlorine nor ihc phenol plants at Fallujah II were in working order. Wiih linle likelihood of any production in the near future, few employees were at the facility.

Phenol (Formerly Fallujah II)

Since5 commissioning, UNSCOM was suspicious of the true nature ofTariq's phenol plant because of its proximity ta Tariq's chlorine plantack of details about modifkalions performed at the plant. As of OIF, the plant was no longer inaccording to an ISG site visit and interviews with ihe direcior of the plant; ihe temperature control equipment was broken, as had been the case for some years, and was one of the reasons for ihe plant's low production levels.

Io the plant director, the phenol had mostly been for al-Ramadi facility, where ii was convertedesin, used for making molds.

esin facility north of Baghdad innd observed thai this large phenol consumer did not use indigenously produced phenol from the Tariq facility; rather, they imponcd phenol from Souih Africa, with UN permission.

processes at the phenol planlmall azeotropic ethanol distillation unit,from Al Mulhanna. The purified ethanol was then sent io SDI and hospitals for pharmaceutical purposes, according to the director.

additionarge list of industrial usesresin and fiberglass production, phenol could also be usedtarting block fot cyclohexanol. one component of cyclosarin, when reacted cata-lytically wiih chlorine. Cykohexano! can also be synthesized fromuch cheaper and more abundant chemical in Iraq, but we have no information lhal indicates Iraq used either process io produce cyclohexanol.

Research Activities

We assess Ihe bulk of Ihe Tana's research through' out theand stability oflegitimate and noi CW related;imited amount of defensive work with nerve agent simulants, and even gram-scale synthesis of agent may have occurred.

A research scientist reportedypicalresearch project included evaluation of the following factors: literature research on pesticides; availability and case of import of raw concentrated ingredient, emu Killers, and stabilizers wiihin Iraq: stability testing and physical properties testing of formulated product over time and temperature ranges; and field testingg pilot-scale

scientist confirmed to ISG that malathion. dichlorovosmine, the amine salt. had all been synthesizedaboratory scale.

Because of feared repercussions and the awareness of lhe dual-use nature of Tariq's products, officials at Tariq were often reported as hesitant to allow or support research lhat could be considered CW-appti-cable by the international community.

Faisal had instructed the researchers to avoid synthesis of organophosphorus compounds as it might cause them difficulties with the UN,to JJSG interviews wiih Tariq scientists,enior scientist claimed he did not know of any syniheiis of phosphorus based compounds.

Huwaysh stated thai he went out of his way to make sure that no CW research was going on, even to the point of canceling the Tariq research center in Baghdad.

Tariq, in addition to its own research for industrial processes, also bid for and won research contracts from the IIC listhemicals, none of which were phosphorus-related. Tariq's research anddepartment routinely reported the progress of these projects to Hamza Yassin, chief of chemical research and development at the OMI, according to reporting.

Tariq researchers evaluated scale-up feasibility of the following industrial chemicals: benzylacetyl chloride, sodium hydroxide:aluminum hydroxide, ortho-chloroanalinc, calcine, ferrous chloride, and mono<hloro acetic acid.

Tariq scientists have also participated in CWresearch, including the development of suitable nerve agent simulants for military training purposes and possible gram-scale production ofVX standards for testing detectors and studying its degradation

A senior scientist, when asked about military' equipment at Tariq, immediatelyussian-made detection system brought to the site by another senior scientist and used in simulant research.

A research scientist described larger-scale simulant research project2 thai had been directedresidential order, 'lhe research group produced

iters oferve agent simulant, and Tariqamineitrogen mustard simulant. The compounds were colored with dye, and thickenedolymer. He asserted that any symptoms from the formulated pcsiicidcs would passalf hour, according to ISG interviews with him.

Annex E

Al-Abud Network

Summary

Triggerederies of site exploitations andinraq Survey Group (ISG) beganetwork of Iraqito as the al-Abudin3 and4 actively sought chemical weapons for use against Coalition Forces. ISGeam ofoperators, analysts, and technical opssystematically investigate and disrupt the al-Abud network and diffuse the immediate threat posed by the insurgents, The team also focused on identifying links between al-Abud players and former regime CBW experts to determine whether WMD intellectual capital was being tapped by insurgent elements throughout Iraq. BySG was able to identify and neutralize the chemicaland chemists, including former regime members, who supported the al-Abudcries of raids, interrogations, and detentions disrupted key activities at al-Abud-telated laboratories, safehouses. supply stores, and organizational nodes. However, theleaders and financers within the network remain at large and alleged chemical munitions remain

Organization and Preparation

Fallujah-basedmostly to the Jaysh Muhammadin3 an inexperienced Baghdad chemist to lead the development of chemical agentstabun, mustard, and other nontraditional agents. The insurgents targeted the chemist because of his background inlimited and with no lies to former regime CWhis access to chemicals in Baghdad's chemical suk district. The insurgents appear to have recruited the chemist with financial incentives; however, debrielings of detained al-Abud network members suggest that thewas sympathetic to the insurgent's anti-Coalition cause.

After identifying their chemist, the al-Abud network sought chemicals and equipment needed to conduct CW experiments. The al-Abud network had Utile difficulty in acquiring desired chemicals after OIF; including malalhion pesticide and nitrogenprecursors. However, it remains unclear if iheir inability to acquire necessary precursor chemicals is attributedack of supply or CW inexperience.

The insurgents acquired most of the chemicals from farmers who looted stale companies and from shops in Baghdad's chemical suk.

The last component of the CW project involvedof the agents, lhc al-Abud network reliedolitical member of Jaysh Muhammad to provide the mortar rounds, which the insurgents would fill wiih agent for planned use against Coalition Forces. It remains unclear how the insurgents intended to utilize the rounds, cither fired as mortars or detonated as improvised chemical devices.

Initial CW Experiments

The al-Abud network first attempted io produce the nerve agent tabun in laicnd the experimentelf-admiiied failure because the insurgents lacked the necessary chemicals. The product of ihe first CW experimentixture of malathion and other chemicals, which by itselfoisonous compound if disseminated properly.

al-Abud network used their malathion mixture to "weaponize" nine mortar rounds. The mortars likely are an ineffective means of dispersing the malathional because the detonation of the mortar will consume lhc poison.

and tabun have similar chemicalhowever ii is not possible io create tabun from malathion. The al-Abud chemist understood ihis limitation, but probably continued with ihe experiments to appease the insurgents.

The al-Abud chemist abandoned his tabunafter initial failures, bul months later in4 he considered irying to produce tabun from the

prescribed precursor chemicals, noi malathion. Based on ISG investigations, the al-Abud network did not have the necessaryack of resources and insurgent backing probably forced the al-Abudto cease his attempts to produce tabun.

Mustard Experiments and Weaponizalton

After the initial attempt to produce tabun, the al-Abud network in late January and early4 began acquiring materials for the produciion of nitrogen mustard. The al-Abud network had Ihematerials, bui lacked the expertise, io produce nitrogen mustard.

Ihey failed to produce nitrogen mustard because (he chemisl used incorrect amounts of theand inadequate processes.

Following ihe mid-March failure to produceIhe al-Abud network sought the assistancemall chemical lab inrefine iheir processes. The younger chemist also failed to producemustard.

The al-Abud network approached the "chemist-for-hire" because of his reputationapable chemisi in Baghdad. Although he did not have any prior CW experience or previous ami-Coalitionthe young chemist willingly aided the al-Abud networkrofit-seeking mercenary.

Wiih time and experience it is plausible that the al-Abud network could have mastered Ihe processes necessary to produce nitrogen mustard. However, Coalition Forces disrupted the al-Abud network's ability to produce nitrogen mustard when they detained the younger and more experienced al-Abud chemist and confiscated chemical precursors,ihe young chemists' expertise, the network likely shifted its focus io the production of binary mustard.

In renewed efforts to produce mustard, the al-Abud network returned to ihe chemical suk in Baghdad to purchase necessary chemicals and began theof binary mustard rounds. Weaponization of binary mustard in mortar shells is relatively simple, however the insurgents poorly executed this

Kicin and Nonlradilionul Agent Production

The younger al-Abudthe urging of the other al-Abud chemist and motivated by financialproduced small quantities of ricin extract in4 using widely distributed icr-roris( literature. ISO exploited the young chemist's laboratory to reveal an operational labdesigned for producing ricinsubstance that easily can be convened to poisonous toxin ricin. The production of ricin likely occurred without the direct knowledge ot the al-Abud insurgents, but the chemists probably intended to sell the toxin for use against Coalition Forces.

* The lab setup coniained the necessary raw materials and equipment to produce small quantities of ricin andnot capableo hutass-casualty ricin attack. However, the lab could have produced enough ricin ioew isolateddisseminaled properly.

Wiihin the same timeframe of lhe tabun and ricin experiments, the al-Abud chemists prepared twoagenis, napalm and sodium fluoride acetate, for the laysh Muhammad insurgents in lhe al-AbudISG assesses their efforts to produce nontradi-lional compounds capable of causing mass casualties as highly unlikely.

Jaysh Muhammad

Jaysh Muhammad (JM) is an ami-Coalition group with both politically motivated and religiouslyelements lhal ISG began tracking after they produced chemical mortars. The politically motivated members are Ba'aihisi. pro-Saddam elements who tend to be of the Sufi religious soca. The Sufi enjoyed special status during the Regime and hold Izzat al-Duri, the ex-vice-president, in exceptionally high esteem. They were members of intelligence, security, and police forces from the previous regime,

According to detainee accounts. JM members, along wiih Fallujah based insurgents planned to use the CW rounds against Coalition Forces. Evidence suggests that JM acquired the rounds, although il remains unclear if they were used. Until wc arc able to capture the key figures of JM involved with al-Abud. it is unlikely we will determine what happened to ihc rounds.

Ties lo ihe Former Regime

has found no evidence lhat the recentweaponizalion attempts stem from the former regime's CW program orrescribed plan by the former regime to fuel an insurgency. However, many of the known al-Abud personalities have ties to the former regime through cither businessor political affiliations. Capitalizing on these connections, the al-Abudformera pre-OIF supplyto access chemicals and mortars.

The primary chemical supplier inhad business ties to former regime companies as well as personal relationships with MIC and Iraqi Intelligence Serviceacilitator for the al-Abud network, supplying chemicals and limited financial backing.

The leadership of Jaysh Muhammad is comprised of mostly Ba'athists with tics to the former regime. Insurgent knowledge of pre-OIF infrastructure enabled the network to source and generate much of its chemical-biological warfare capability. Whether due to previous positions held or personal contacts wiihin the former regime, much of the directderived from various former regime means.

The most alarming aspect of the al-Abud netwotk is how quickly and effectively the group was able to mobilize key resources and tap relevant expertise torogram for weaponizing CW agents. If the insurgents had been able to acquire the necessary materials, fine tune their agent production techniques, and better understand the principals behind effectively dispersing CW, then the consequences of the al-Abud network's project could have been devastating to Coalition Forces.

Despite the fleeting nature of the insurgent's initial attempts, the al-Abud chemists progressively gained experience with CW, and continued different approaches with the same goal.

The al-Abud network is not the only group planning or attempting to produce or acquire CBW agents for use againsl Coalition Forces. ISG focused on the al-Abud network because of the maturity of the group's CW production, as well as. the severity of the threat posed by its weaponizalion efforts. Recent reportingariety of sources shows insurgent's attempts to acquire and produce CBW agent throughout theatre. The availability of chemicals and materials dispersed throughout the country, and intellectual capital from the former WMD programs increases the fulure threat to Coalition Forces by groups such as the al-Abud network.

to the Insurgency

ISG has found no evidence to confirm or deny thai the al-Abud network is an integrated andpiecearger insurgency campaign in Iraq. However, the al-Abud network's efforts arc likely known to the insurgency because of ihe proximity in Failujah of the al-Abud leadership and insurgent Zarqawi network. Additionally, the majoriiy of figures in the al-Abud network are at least sympathetic to the insurgent cause.

Annex F

Detailed Preliminary Assessment of Chemical Weapons Findings

ChemicalFinds

Introduction

Beginning inSGeries of chemical weapons from Coalition mililary units and otherotal ofunitions have been recovered, all of which appear to have been part ofulf war stocks based on their physical condition and residual components.

The most interesting discovery hasmm Binary Sarin artilleryaerceni concentration ofinsurgents attempted to use as an Improvised Explosive Devicehe existence of this binary weapon not only raises questions about the number of viable chemical weapons remaining in Iraq and raises the possibilityarger number of binary, long-lasting chemical weapons still exist.

has no information to indicate that Iraqmore binary Sarin rounds than it declared, however, former Iraqi scientists involved with the program admitted that the program was considered extremely successful and shelved for future use. According to the source, General Amcr al-Saadi sought to downplay its findings to the UN to avoid heightened attention toward the program.

Under UN Security, Iraq should have destroyed or rendered harmless all CWbut we cannot determine without additional information whether the rounds we have recovered were declared or if their destruction was attempted.

Iraqi source indicated that when weapons were forward-deployed in anticipationonflict, the CW weapons often became mixed in with the tegular munitions, and were never accounted for again. Another source stated that several hundred munitions moved forward for the Gulf war, and never used, were never recovered by retreating Iraqi

horough post-OIF search of forward depots turned up nothing- if the weapons were indeed left behind, they were looted over theears between the wars.

Iraq's unilateral destruction of weapons1 was far3 UNMOVIC inspection at the Al Azziziyah Firing Range to attempt to accountombs hythe debris turnedombs that had survived1 explosions. So it is possible thatevenpits could have been lootedew surviving munitions.

Because of poor Iraqi inventory accounting, simple pilferage before or after1 Gulf war could have resulted in some lost munitions.

mm Chemical Munitions Used as an Improvised Explosive Device

Military unitsmm artillery round near Baghdad International Airport. Analysis of the residue at the bottom of the round by ISG field labs returned positive indications for sulfur mustard CW agent, 'lhc lab results, type and condition of the round, and the lack of markings indicate it is an Iraqimm round left over from theraqiThe lackriving band makes it difficult to determine whether the tOund was fired, where it was acquired, and suggests the band probably was looted (sec

Historical context: Iraq purchased thousands ofmm artillery rounds designed to disseminate smoke chemicals. The original markings were generally painted Over and the munitions filled with CW agent mustard.0 of these rounds were destroyed under UN supervision, but they hase not all been accounted for.

One of the key UN unresolved issuesustard-filled rounds. An ISG investigation into this issue yielded inconsistent information about the final disposition ofhells, with rme official claiming they were retained for future use. The ISG has not been able to confirm these claims.

m Binary Chemical Improvised Explosiveililary' unii near Baghdad Airport reported aI ED along the main road between the airport and the Green Zone (seehe munitions were remotely detonated and the remaining liquid tested positive in ISG field labs for the nerve agent Sariney Sarin degradation product.

The partially detonated IED was an old prototype binary nerve agent munitions of the type Iraq declared it had field tested in the. The munitions bear no markings, much like the sulfur mustard round reporteday (seensurgents may have looted or purchased die rounds believing they were conventional highmm rounds. The use of this type of round as an IED does not alltrw sufficient time for mixing of the binary compounds and release in an effective manner, thus limiting the dispersal area of the chemicals.

Historical context: Iraq only declared iis work on binary munitions after Husayn Kamil fled Iraqnd even then only claimed to haveimited number of binary rounds thai it used in field trialsN investigationsumber ofsurrounding the nature and extent of Iraq's work with these systems and it remains unclear how many rounds it produced, tested, declared, or concealed from the UN.

Historical context: Iraq declared in6 Full, Final, and Complete Declaration (FFCD) that timm sulfur mustard-filled rounds1fihose produced, Iraq has not been able to account for the location or destructionm shells. The bulkmm destruction occurred34 and many of the log entries show that the mustard was partlywhich is consistent with our findings in the recent sulfur mustard rounds.

mmrtillery Rockets

An Iraqi source turned over io Polish Forcesmm rockets obtained at Ihe Khamisiyahformer CW storage site declared by Iraq to havemm filled rockets (seeetails about the provenance of these rounds remain unclear but the source Sarin<Cyclosarin believes the missiles were housedunker struck during the Gulf war and subsequently hidden in canals and lakes in (he area. Analysis of the liquid residue revealed the nerve agents Sarin (GB) and Cyclosarin (GF) as wellumber of impurities and known degradation producis of GB and GF. Given (he age, leakage,of nerve agent, and small quantity ofliquid, these rounds would have limited, if any, impact if used by insurgents against Coalition Forces (see

mm Chemical Rounds

A military teamroup of Iraqiattempting to bury multiple projectilesocation near Canal Road in Baghdad (seehe individuals (led the site when fired upon, and the military team captured multiple artillery rounds and other weapons at the sile. ISG's field labs tested ihemm rounds and found some trace amounts of sulfur mustard and sulfur mustardproductsew of the rounds. Technical experts found that each rounduptured bursterwith UN destructionthat either Iraq unilaterally desiroyed the rounds or looters attempted to drain residual ageni from them (see

Historical context: Iraq declared havingthe following numbersmm nerve agent rockets, but made no distinction in its declaration about the type of sarin fill: GB, GF. or GBIGF mix. We suspect, based on data from the declaration and theeport that GBIGF-filled rockets were included in80 declaration figures. Although the origin of these rockets has not been clearly stated, the Khamisiyah Ammunition Storage Depot where Ihe rockets were foundong history of CW storage. Coalition bombing, and UN investigation.

Origin of Ihe Binary Sarin Round Used on BIAP

binary chemical round drionaied near iheInternational Airpon (BIAP) probably originatedatch that was storedl Muthanna CW complex basement during theor the pur-poirof leakage testing. Iraq placed at leastilled binary Sarin munitions,mmin Ihe basemen! of the Salah al-DinattheAl Muihanna CW complex. accordingeport.

The same report claims thatmm rounds were produced, and the program switchedmm rounds aftermm rounds were expended in testing. The report stated that all of the binary munitions with aluminum canister inserts (such as ihe one used on BIAPI should have been used infield testing, bul some may have been set aside for leak testing al Al Muilianna.

A different report staled lhal as8 no binary chemical rounds were stored at any other location besides the Salah al Din laboratory, and that the rounds were kept in the basement to lest for leakage and chemical degradation.

hird report speculated lhal binary rounds may either have been buried or mosrd to one of Two bunkers in thehen the UN ordered the Al Muthanna complex toarge number of chemicals and munitions. The same report said that Salah al-Din al-Nu'aymi. ihe manager of the binary Sarin munitions projeci, frequently stored munitions he was working on but had not tested in ihe base-mem of his laboratory at Al Muihanna.

fourth report saidinary shells were kept tn the 'special stores' at Al Muthanna as of Ihe. hut the source betieted thai these had been destroyed by UNSCOM. ISC has been unable to verify from UNSCOM reports that any binary shells were destroyed ai Al Muihanna.

The Technical Research Center (TRC, also worked onmm binary Sarin artillery sheds, but we have no reason to believe thai they possessed functional chemical munitions.

According to the Iraqi FFCD, the TRC conducted tab experimentsmm binary munitionsimulant to lest ihe mixing of the binary components No binary tests using chemical agent ai the TRC were declared.

According to one report, the Iraqi Intelligenceofficer All Muklif ran the binary program, and the deputy director of the Military Imdustnalitatuin Commission. Amir ol Saudi, ordered the work. The report claimed that al-Saadi provided the TRC with chemicals andmm rounds, hut ihe report did not elaborate on ihe work performedihe TRC.

The disposition ofmm andfor Ihe IS5mm artillery projectiles after Ihe Gulf war Is unknown, although il is possible that the rounds remained at the Al Muihanna complex and were looted after OIF.

' Even though Al Muihanna has been extensively une at gated hy UN and ISG teams, the complex coversquare miles, which makes it difficult to fultv exploit. An ISG team that went to the sile in January said lhat looters appeared lo have been at several pans of the Al Muihanna complex.

Several pans of the Al Muthanna complex were bombed or in poor condition ihroughout. These areasealth risk to exploitation learns, bul Ionics have shown themselves to be less risk-averse than ISG personnel It is possible lhat the round was removed from an area in Althai was deemed unsafe to exploit.

An alternate explanation is that rounds were moved out of At Muthanna and stored at alocation in the, where it was later looted ufier OIF. although we have no reporting io substantiate ihis possibility.

The actual number of filled binary artillery shells produced by ihe Iraqi CW program durings unknown, bui wr assess thatandful of filled binary rounds would haxr existed after the Gulf war.

Origin of Ihe Binary Sarin Round Used on BIAP 'continued)

eport, the National Monitoring Directorate only asked for the number of binary CW rounds Al Mutltanna tested, not the number it actually produced. The Iraqi FFCD from6 statesmmmm binary Sarin artillery shells were field-iesied.

If the numbermm artillery shells produced by Al Mulhannaew dozen, as was suited ui the aforementioned sensitive report, then the shells which remained in the basement of the Salah al-Din

Laboratory in theay have been ihe only tilled binary sarin rounds which existed at the time of the Gulf war.

Reporting states that lhemm binary Sarin rounds produced by Al Mulhanna lhal were not destroyed in field resis were in tlie basement of the Salah al-Din laboratory. The report stated that at leastinary munitions were placed there, although Ihey may havemm.ixture of both.

context; Prior to the Gulf war. lite Iraqis had stored SAKR munilions in bunkers at the Khamisiyah Depot and moved some of ihemearby depressionanal prior to the conflict to avoid combing. During the GulfUS ground forces captured die Khamisiyah Depot and blew some of the storage bunkers without knowledge ofCW munitions there.

UN inspectors have since visited the site and UNSCOM's figures formmindicate thatre not accountedcertainly the rounds iliat remained in Buildingfter its demolition.raqi's tooted the structure, and in doing so disposed of the contents,weapons. The likelihood is tliat the rounds were chucked into nearby piles of earth, which were in turn covered by more debris.

dd Himrtillery Rockets.2mmrtillery Rockets An additionalockets from the same cache described above (d) were identified at theDepot by Ihe same source. (Seewere returned to ISG for analysis and one was exploded onsitc because it retained an intact rocket motor ihat posed safely concerns. Most of ihc rounds had been severed, exposed io heat, or were partially deslroyed. Pour intact rounds were separated for testing andreliminary positive resulteries nerve agent. None of these roundsiquid fill line, suggesting the agent had degraded over time.ore rockets were discoveredere in deteriorated condition with only one imaci rocket wiih residual riot control agent present. (See

context:mmSAKR-I8 rockets were discovered at the Khamisiyah Depot. Please refer to the box above forhistorical context.

Annex G

Chemical Warfare and the Defense of Baghdad

ISG investigated reporting lhal Iraqefensive doclrint during OIF lhat included Ihe employmentredeyond which the Iraqis would have used available WMD against Coalition forces. Since OIF, we have conducted numerous interviews of senior regime officials and miUtary officers in an effort to confirm whether Iraq had weaponited CW ready to use or whether therered line" con* cepl that would haveW attack.

We believe that there wasred line" defense for Baghdad, but itimple multi-ring conventional defense lhat quickly broke down under Coalition assault, and not the coordinated, prepared plan depicted in prewar intelUgence reporting.

of .strategic planning at the Diwan and (lag-officer levels is lacking in any mention of CW.

Iraqi Genera's believed thereecret plan to use CW, but wc have found no evidence thai thewas involved in past CW uses-was part of any planning forCW use.

Prior to OIF. historical reports describe Iraqi plans for defensive use of CW to disrupt or halt the advance of enemy troops and to disrupt enemy staging areas before their attack.

earlyrior to Desert Storm. Saddam decided to use CW if Coalition forcesarallel extending west from Al Amarah or iftroops crossed the border into Iraq, according io reporting.

During the run-up to OIF, the Intelligencereceived additional information pointingred line" around Baghdad that, if crossed byforces, would trigger an Iraqi CW attack.

urdistan Democratic Party (KDPl member. Saddam in2 authorized the use of prohibited weapons at the discretion of four field commanders if US forces closed onOne of the four field commanders was Kamal

Mustafa, the Republican Guard Secretary. The "red line" was describedox around Baghdad encompassing the cities ofTuz Khurmatu. Bayji. Ar-Ramadi. Karbala. Al-Hillah. Al-IIillah. Al-Kut, and Al-Miqdadiyah (sec

Accordingenior Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, in earlyaddam had decided to use CW against US troops in the event of war.

Reportedly3 meeting, senior members of the Iraqi armed forces and Ba'ath party members discussed plans to release unknown chemical agenis by remote detonation in sixareas near the Saudi-Jordanian frontier and in western Iraq.

Accordingoreign government service, as ofm artillery battalion of the Baghdad Republican Guard Division in Al-Kut was under ordersse CW on Coalition forces if ihey approached Al-Kut. The battalion was reportedly equipped with CW shells, including mustard and unidentified binary agents, and was commanded by Col. Muhammad Ibrahim Sulayman.

Origin of Ihe RedSandhurst Approach

acquired from various military sources and documents indicates thai Iraqefense doctrine thatirective to defend to the tail by all means necessary once Coalition forcesed line. Sources report thai Saddam's Leadership Defense Plan was basedactical doctrine taught to all Iraqi Officers, but we have noi found evidence ihai lhe plan explicitlyrigger for CW use.

The defensive tactical doctrine was originally taught lo Iraqi Officers at the Royal MililarySandhurst. United Kingdom, in, and later similar doctrines were taught to Iraqi officers at British-style training courses in Pakistan. The fundamental principles an based upon concentric defensive perimeiers or layered defensive lines.

The defenses usually consisted of four lines:

inealong whichunits usually deploy:

ine (green) first line of defense against advancing units;

linemajorfallback positions for the units stationed at the bluetroops, supplies, and ammo stationed here:

:lo;cimi.-ni'osi defense lin,Im, of defense and final fallback position for troops. Advancing forces would meet lhe heaviesthere, and it was the final staging area.

Reporting indicates ihai the multiline defense was attempted by some Iraqi forces defending against Coalition advances during OIF.or results:

'nfantry Division used the method in defending the Khanaqitin BorderCoalition forces moved so rapidly and so many Iraqi soldiers deserted thai Ihc situation quickly became chaotic, and the notion of falling backtabilized Hue or lines was impossible.

In addition, theechanized Division used ihis doctrine in its defense ofKirkuk. but ils linesctdlapsed wide' Coalition ai' assault

: Struggling Toigh-Level Defense Strategy

Available evidence indicates lhat the Iraqi Pre-OIF defense strategy evolvedather short time, fromhrough Ihe end of that year, and transitioned to the level of detailed tacticalonly shortly before OIF (see Chapter I. Regime Strategic Intent).

as Coalition forces built up aroundaddam continued to believe that they would not invade or attack Iraq; this belief was dispelled only by the beginning of OIF itself;

perceived his aimed forces to be stronger than they were andoalition invasion, if it did occur, would never penetrate as far as

fuel. Saddam believedopular uprising would occur as the Coalition invasion progressed;

inner circle reinforced his faultyout of fear of Saddam's reaction.

High-Levet Discussions Began in Earnest Only inegime Defense Plan. Starting inhrough OIF, the Intelligence Community received reporting lhal lhe Iraqi regime intended to uscCW if Coalition forces invaded Iraq orBaghdad. Iraq's layered defense plan reportedly included tbe use of chemical weapons onceforces crossed the defensive "red line."aboul (lie deployment of WMD reportedly took place at various military levels, according lo multiple reports.

lux

Ineporting indicated Saddam Husayn hadool ofxperts and scientists to "solve Iraq's problems'* pertaining to the advancement, protection, and concealment of WMD programs. Rewards were reportedly provided to those scientists who came up with ideas for using WMD to thwart any potential US attack on Iraq.

at various levels indicates WMD use was discussed; however, no source has been able to provide detailed plans how Iraq was going to use WMDoalition invasion.

Reportedly both before and after OIF, planning an Iraqi defense strategy against Coalition forces underwent several stages. An initial plan appears to have been delivered by2 and most likely underwent revisions- until OIF.

senior Iraqi officer with direct knowledge of Iraqi war planning stated during OIF thateeting

inigh-level Republican Guard Commanders and staff officers received the final orders on how Baghdad was to be defended from LTG Al-Rawj.

prior to OIFenior active-duty Iraqi military officer indicated in early3 the RG leadership was preoccupied with tactical defense planningossibleattack. Defense plans were posited on three defensive lines, wiih the third arid final lineBaghdad and its suburbs. Conventional training had been intensified by senior command, bul there had been no increase in CBW training programs. Typical defensive chemical protection clothing and related materiel were provided, as were defensive chemical-warfare-related procedures.

Interrogations with several Iraqi division-level officers after OIF confirm that Saddam's Defense Plan was basedayered defense doctrine. The innermost circle of defense was referred to as the "rednce Iraqi troops retreated to the red line position, Ihey were lo "hold to the last"further retreat, presumably ready to employ all available weaponry (see

By April, lhc regime was nearing ils end. and ihc discussions il had were no longer useful:

Lalif Nusayyif Al-Jasimmember of lhc RCC and Deputy Secieiary of ihc Ba'aih Mililarylhal ai the lasi meeting he allended wiih Saddam and leading military and political figures inaddam was still asking "what kind of weapons preparations were accomplished and if any more were needed.'"

Al-Duri claimed thai preparations Ibr missiles and CW were not discussed but noted lhat the meetings were brief, which was unusual for revision and fine-tuningast-ditch defense plan. Olher attendees regarded this as the farewell meetings raiherlanning meeting. Tariq Aziz also substantiated the fact thai the last meeting with Saddam siill did not include in-depth tactical discussion Or presentation. This lends credencehc fact that ihc defense plan never came together at the tactical level (see

enotes Former Staff General Salih al-Salmani's impression of ihe red-line doctrine for the defense of Baghdad (the graphic provides anof the layered defensehis graphicimilar ton the previous page inthe layered defense and red line.

Flag-LevelKnowledge of CW Plans, but Conventional Wisdom Expects It

Af die same ihne as policymakers ai ihe Presiden-lial level were Irying lolan for defense againsl the Coalition, generals and high-level defense officials believedlan for CW use existed, even though they themselves knew nothing about ihe details.

Several high-ranking Iraqi military officials claimed CW was not part of an organized Iraqi Defense Plan but kept open ihc possibility lhal discussions look place in closed venues at higher levels. This suggests thai Iraqi conventional wisdom agreed that CW was partecret plan, even in the absence of direct evidence:

A major contributor to the Iraqi Defense Plan, former Defense Minister Sultan Hashem Ahmad Al-Tai, was captured hy Coalition forceshe Minister asserts thai at no lime was WMD discussed in strategy meetings to lay out an Iraq Defense Plan but does nor rule out ihelhat discussions ensued al higher levels.

Hashem was never directly asked if the red-line doctrine included lhc use of CW; however he firmly asserts thai WMD use wasopic of lhc defense plan and would haveopic for

a different, compartmentalized forum. Hashem also ttoied ihe large number of people who were shocked when Saddam announced in2 in an open forum thai Iraq did not possess WMD.

OIF, the commander of the Iraqi military's chemical corps. Gen. Amar Husayn al-Samarrai informed the CS lhal Iraqi leaders had intended lo concentrate their forces around the criiical cities of Baghdad. Basrah. Mosul and TiknI. with each city surrounded by several defensive layers. Samarrai was not aware ul" any offensive strategy io use CW againsl Coalition forces but indicated his yob was to make sure the Iraqi military was fully equipped tooalition chemical attack.

Investigation Into Nontraditional CWVedaaddam

Traditional tactics in lheW would have been under the control of Saddam and Qusay Husayn wiih the SSO and RG delivering andthe munitions either by missile (wiih heavy MICortar, or artillery. However. ISG also investigated whether there was any evidence of CW use planned by lhe two mosl skilled groups in unconventionallnontraditional tactics and methods, the Saddam Fedayeen and the IIS. specifically the special operations elemenis ofMI4 cooperating with MI6 technical experts.

There are no indications from the limited intelligence available that Fedayeen doctrine included the use of CWed line was breached. There is someto indicate that 'Uday wantedeploy CW, but was unable to obtain them.

Accordingeporting prior lo OIF, inUday Saddam Husayn sought CW agents from OMI and tasked Muhammad Khudayr Al-Hal-busidirector of IISasked Imad Hussayn 'Abdallah 'AI-'Ani (the father of Iraq's VXo provide an unspecified CW agent. Dulaymiourier whoihe message to Al-Ani. Al-Ani asked for two weeks to study feasibilityelaying tactic and replied after two weeks that OMI facilities were not capable of producing CW agenis and the required chemical precursors were not available in Iraq. However, after OIF Muhammad Al-Dulaymi was interrogated one asserted thai 'Uday Husayn never contacted him requesting chemical weapons.

At ihe onset ot Off (lateccordingoreign government service, an Iraqi securityindicated thai Iraq's chemical weaponshad been removed from Baghdadesult of the coalition air attack. He contends ihe bombing in late3 resulted in the inability to prepare chemical weapons immediately against Coalition forces.

Preliminary searches of the recovereddo not reveal written or recorded official documents regarding an Iraqi defense doctrine and execution orders for CW.

Post-OIF Reporting on Red Line

Interrogations, interviews, and documents obtained after OIF have confirmed that the "red line" was indeed part of regime planning, but they have notlan by Iraq to use CW at ared tine. Information from numerous mililary officials indicates mat Iraq was not able lo useweapons ai lhe lime of OIF, although ISG has not been able to locate and debrief some of the key Iraqi mililary commanders. Exploitation of mililary sites within the identified "red line" revealed no large cache of chemical weapons or indications that large amounts of chemical weapons were present (formformation. see

Reporting prior to OIF lhat Saddam in early2 authorized the use of prohibited weapons at ihe discretion of four field commanders was contradicted by one of the field commanders who surrendered to Coaliiion Forces inormer Siaff Gen. Kamal Mustafa claims he did noi have WMD ai ihe time of war and indicates that the 'red line' plan did. in fact, exist but was simplistic in nature.

According Io the reporting, "special weapons" could have been employed dependent on certain conditions, such as climate and troop disposition, once Coalition forces breached this red-lineThere were no indications of chemical weapon use when Coaliiion forces breached this zone, although sand storms and high winds, or dispersed troop formations, might have prevented the use of CW.

During Off, reportingormer senior Iraqi Special Security Organization Officer with direct access indicated in early3 the Iraqi Regime planned io defend Baghdad byseven rings of defense. Ihe source believed that "extreme defense measures" would be employed, and these measures would include WMD under the conirol of Qusay Husayn. The former officer also believed the defense plan was impenetrable and never executed becausereakdown of lhe Iraqi military.

Ill

No Evidence Ofne Defense Plan Wiih CW Use at (he Unit or SSO Level

Traditionally, the RG Deployed Chemical Weapons Under Ad Hoc Conirol of Ihe SSO. Past doctrine would have the SSO deliver unmarked chemical weapons to the RG. who would fire the weaponocation dictated by an SSO officer. We assess RG Commanders were not aware of SSO intentions prior to the chemical weapons use. This notionW use concept that would have been compartmcn-talizcd and therefore not discussed at most defense planning meetings.

Available evidence is not consistent, however,ompartmenled CW use program Involving SSO assets:

reporting from the Kuwaitource with good access indicates that, as ofth artillery battalion of the Baghdad Republican Guard (RG) division

in Al-Kut was under orders to use CW on coalition forces if they approached Al-Kut. The battalion, commanded by Col. Muhammad Ibrahimwas reportedly equipped with CW shells, including mustard and unidentified binary agents. However, this source was contradicted during OIFenior RG artillery officer with direct and indirect knowledge of information on the use of chemical weapons use forth artillerywho asserted ihaith did noi receive any chemical weapons.

source claimed thai, unlike ihe Iran-Iraq war, SSO personnel did not deliver ammunition during OIF. and the SSO officer attached toth. CPT Jamai Al-Tikrili, did not bring chemical weapons with him.

oenior scientific advisor to Saddam through interviews conducted after OIF shed light on the launch procedures for modern Iraqi missiles. He asserted that, because of the complexity and prototype nature of the new systems, technicians from the Military Industrial(MIC) would be heavily involved in missile preparations, aiming, and launching. RG and SSO involvement would be unhkeoctnne.TiK military would only provide ihe target by direction fromingle location."

A senior scientific advisor to Saddam throughconducted after OIF provided insight into the missile launching procedures. MIC lechnicians reportedly launched all available Al Samoud and Al Fai'h missiles. However, missiles experienced enough faults, due to their prototype status, that ihey required technicians to be on handto fix problems as they were delected. The MIC technicians then aligned-aimed the missiles and conducted the launch operations. The Iraqi mililary was responsible only for relaying iheio the MIC-OMI technicians.

All targeting information came from on location and field commanders had no say in ihe matter. Regarding WMD warheads and who would have conirol of the warheads (MIC. SSO or RG) ihe source states there were no WMD warheads.

Annex H

Summary of Key Findings al Captured Enemy Ammunition Consolidation Points

Exploitation of Captured Enemy Ammunition Supply Points

As ofraqi munitions caches had been found and scheduled for destruction.forces are almost finished with the process of consolidating the known caches into one of seven Captured Enemy Ammunition (CEA) Depots. In order to examine the maximum amount of munitions possible. ISG teams visited these CEA depots toroad spectrum of Iraqi munitions, possibly including WMD-capablc projectiles, rocket, missiles, or bombs. In addition to the assessment andof munitions, the teams also provided the on site contractors with handouts explaining which munitions are of interest to ISG and how to contact ISG should any suspected munitions be found, lhc seven CEA depots are listed in Table 1.

A variety of munitions were exploited by ISG teams. Highlights include the AI Fat'h missile and the 8lmm aluminum rockets, which figured prominently in the "aluminum lubess well as many other types of munitions including cluster bombs, rockets, and artillery projectiles (see

NajaT CEA Depot

An Najaf is located in centralm south ofhe An Najaf Depot containsntact eanh-cmered bunkers;estroyedand approximatelyn Najaf Depcc coven an areamm and is securedt barbed wire fence. The bunkers, located al the northen end of the depot, are in four major groups, each group consisting of rise pentagon shapedcontaining lis* bunkers each. The warehouses are located to the south infwarehouses by six rowsotal ofarehouses All of the warehouses were destroyed by unknown explosions.

An Najif ACP is currently under the operationalof Fosler Wheeler Tetra Tech.

An item of interest found at this site wasto be an Iraqi copy of the Spanish Fuel Air Bomb, and Surface-to-Air missiles. Bunkers, destroyed warehouses, and the revetments were exploited with no WMD weapons found (sec figures.

FigureHesm HE rockets.

unkermm artillery prxx/eailes.A Depot

Arlington CEA Depot is located north of Tikrit andm north at Baghdad and receivesfrom the northernf Iraq. The Arlington Depotntact earth covered bunkers,ntact and Iwo dcuniyed warehouses,evetments,ud huts, and open storage. Arlington comprises an areamm surroundedont fence and guard towers. Arlington CEA Depot is currently under thecontrol of US Environmental. Inc.

The bunkers are locutcd ai the north end of the depot, the warehouses are lo the soulh. Revetments are scattered ihough out the depot. Two of the warehouses were destroyed hy unknown explosions presumably prior lo Oil*'.

All bunkers and rrvcimcnts were neat, orderly, and easilyMultiple types of munitions were found including androp bombs, cluster bombs, rockets, surface-to-surfacend air-to-air missiles. Large quantities of ammunition were found including many lypcs of rockets. RPOs. artillery projectiles of various caliber, and small arms. The rrujonty of the munitions in the hunkers arc stored in their original shipping containers. The warehouses contained large quantities of artilleryk munitions, and limited quantities of antilank and antipcrwmnel mines. Thehousedm munitions. All of the bunkers and warehouses were exploited.

nchinm crates are indicative of theocket. Tlie teamong crates and inspectedf them. The otherrates were not checked due to safely concerns That is.nch king crates were at Ihe rearull hunker,oot wide center walk space between munilionsootandom sample of the long crates was conducted by goingale* deep near the center ofrates,rates high. After sampling ihc crates, the pile started to shaft. Wiih no room to escape if the crate piles collapsed, the learn broke off the exploitation

No WMD Munitions were found, (sec Figures..

AiZubayrChA Depot

The A? Zuhayrepot (alternate spelling Ash Shuaybah) vicinity soulh of Basra. AzZubayr containsntact andestroyed earthbunkers.pen storage pads, and an open receiving area for captured enemy ammunition being received at this local ton. Ammunition it shipped from southern Iraqi cache sues. Az Zubayr encompasses an areamm surroundedft fence and guardz Zubayr Depot is currently under the operational conirol of Foster Wheeler Tctra Tech.

Theesiroyed bunkers were completely leveled, with little of the foundations remaining. The west building is called Ihe missile building and is largely intact, wiih unexploded ordnance buried under thergc multi-roomed buildings were located near the bunkers to ihe east. Onsite contractors stated this area was originally Ihe Naval Munitions School for ihe Iraqi navy. The longest bunkert long, with both the entrance and the road network constructed below grade.

Multiple types of munitions were found, including airdrop bombs, naval mines, torpedoes, andThe destroyed hunkers were exploited,evidence of two Silkworm missiles (both were taggedN inspection team, however ihc label

number was unreadable. One of ihe open revet-menis containedpecialm green aluminum rockets. Presumably, these arc missiles associated wiih so-called "aluminum lubes issue" (see the Nuclear Section of Ihis report for more information).

No WMD munitions were found (sec.

Uuckmaster CEA Depot

Buckmasier CEA Depot is located in centralm north of Baghdad. 'Ihis depot is an extension of ihe Taji Depot and ammunition is shipped here from caches in central Iraq. Buckmasier comprises an area ofmm surroundedoot fence and guard lowers. Ihe bunkers are primarily located on the east side of the depot. Revetments and open storage are scattered throughout Ihe depot, primarily from Ihe center to the cast edge boundary fence.

Depotarth-covered bunkers,f which arc intact. Four bunkers were destroyed by US ground forces during OIF. Hundreds of revetments, in addition to mud huts and open storage areas, arc scattered randomly throughout the depot. Larger missiles, includingROGs, are stored in lhc open, along wiih French Exnccts and surface-to-air missiles.

All bunkers were orderly and easily exploited, as were ihe revetments. This is in contrast io ihe other CEA Depots exploited. Multiple types of munitions were exploited, including air drop bombs, cluster bombs, Al Qa'ombs, Al Fal'h missiles, lank munitions, rockets, surface-to-surfaceair-to-air missiles. RPGs, artillery projectiles of various caliber, and small arms. The majority of live munitions in tbe bunkers were slored in iheir original shipping containers.

of inteiest were Iraqi Fuel Air Bombs and numerous AI Qa'ombs along with several Al Fat'h Missiles.

J Far.

"Mm )

ssorted oomDs.

m rockels

projectiles being intermixed with broken white plastic shipping containers and discarded wooden shipping ctates piled on the floor. In contrast, some bunkers were well-organized, with munitions neatly slacked. All hunkersarge mix of conventional munitions (hat appearedave been stored for an extended time, due to the amount of dust accumulated on the crates and munitions.

At Jaguar Soulh and Jaguar Middle the warehouses were all destroyed, causing Unexploded Ordnance (UXOs) to be scattered around (he area by lhe explosions. Several of (he warehouses had(hai looters burned material around (he basemm artillery projectiles in order lo remove the brass rotating band. Presumably several of tbe explosions resulted from (he looters* activities-Artillery projectiles with red and blue bands were found in an open area beiween revetments in the northwest corner of lhe ASP. Munilions were also foundater-tilled wadi on the north side of Jaguar South, outside the perimeter.

Munilions of interestmm rockets,uster Bombs, and Spanishombs.

No WMD munitions were found (see..

Paladin CEA Depot

Paladin CEA Depot is located hOkm west of Baghdad. Munilions are shipped from central Iraqi cache sites. The Paladin Depot containsntact earth covered bunkers, seven bunkers being desenbed as large, two destroyed bunkers, hundreds id' revetments, and open storage for captured enemy munitions received ai ihis location. Paladin comprises an areamm surroundedfl fence and guard lowers. The bunkers are located at (he north comer, with thecattered throughout lhe depot. Paladin Depot is currently under the operational comrol of FODT.

The smaller bunkers were disorganized and the munitions were covered with dust and sand. Several types of muniliom were ciptoilcd. including air drop bombs, cluster bombs, rockets, and surface-to-surface, surface-to-air. air to-surface, and air-to-air missiles Large quantities of artillery projectiles were found, ol many lypes and variousm.m projectiles were dispersed throughout the bunkers. One item of interestreviouslymm smoke mortar projectile, later identified after searching DOD publications.

Tbe large bunkers were protectederm approx in tatelyeci high. The front entrancesrive through, and the bunkersan internal crane. An air handling system was incorporated into the side of the bunkers, suggest-

ing (hai they once weapons lhat contain sensitive electronics and guidance systems. No indications were seen to indicate an air filtration sysiem. These hunkers alsoentral power junction shedfeeieei wide,'cciome of the large bunkersmmwhile Others were empty.

missile containers were opened and the L'N lag data was recorded for alln sire, wiih (he exception of four that were physically inaccessible. The majority of ihese missiles were stored in iheir original shipping containers. Oneasand appeared to have been ejected from an exploded bunker.

al Samud or Al Fat'h missiles were identified, and no WMD munitions were found (sec.

Taji CEA Depot

Taji CHA Depot is located north of Baghdad and currently no longer accepts incoming munitionsEA Depot. This depot containsf which arc intact and roughlyamaged or destroyed. Munitions were shipped to this depot from caches within lhe Baghdad area of Iraq- Taji Depot comprises an area ofmm surroundedoot fence topped with several strands of barbed wire and guard towers. Some of lhe perimeter around the bomb and missile yard also-oot high bcrm.oeiers from lhe fence line. The warehouses comprise most of lhe area of the depot, with ihc bomb and missile yard in the southeast comer. Taji Depot is currently under lhe operational control of EODT

Numerous revetments are located throughout the depot, most of which were tilled with small arms munitions upm Ami-Aircraft Anillery. The open storage area south of Ihe warehouses is referred lo as the bomb and missile yard.

- Air deliverable bombs upg. larger missiles up io and including FROGs. and surface-to-airare stored in the open.

The (earn exploited all missiles, rockets, and bombs in lhc open slnragc area and rcvcimcnls wilhin ihc bomb and missile yard. Surface-lo-air missiles, rockets, and FROG missiles were neally stacked. Multiple types of munitions were checkedairdrop bombs, cluster bombs, rockets, surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and air-to-air missiles. The majority ofurface-to-air missiles were siorcd in their original shipping containers. The FROG missiles were stored in theeam also inspected eight Al Qa'ombs wiih ihe twisting weld none of the Al Qa' Qa'a bombs were found with till plugs.

Taji will eventually contain only smallm and less).

Munitions of interest were FROGmm rockets. Iraqi Fuel Air Bombs, cluster bombs, and Qa'ncendiary Bombs.

No WMD munitions were found (sec..

Annex I

Review ofraqi Ammunition Supply Points

Assessment ofmmunition Sites Identified Within the Predetermined "Red Line"

ISO inspected Ammunition Supply Points (ASPs) and Captured Enemy Ammunition Points (CKAs) towhether caches of CW (chemical weapons) had been destroyed or were in storage. Iraq stockpiled or stored munitions at more0 sites. ISG chose to make use of the limited time available forfocusing efforts on storage sites with the most potential for containing CW.SGethodology, beginning with sites near the so-called "Red Line" around Baghdad. (For information about the Red Line and ils use in Ihe defense of Baghdad, seefSPs within the Red Line around Baghdad. ISG used indicators ofas possible decontaminationnarrow the search u>ites. The results of thatsingle visit to each site thai visuallyajoriiy

of the munitionsno caches of CW munitions and no single rounds of CW munitions. Althoughraction of the hundreds of thousands of tons of Iraqi munitions weie inspected. ISG has high confidence that there arcresent in the Iraqi inventory.

Priority

Bks FASP.lXcon

E

FASP Taji South

Ma/har Barracks DIVQ

Tactical FASP Southwest

aiisl iioAmntAnunh.h>

i'

Musajvin outmmo uku ttcjxit lskandnriyah Tactical FASP

:

Shuaybah (Zabayr) Anuin> Slur Dpo East

Mn/hnr Tactical FASP

aswoh laetical FASP

E

(iharaibRcvctmcmA-8FASP

lacileal SAM FAS I*

Suwayrah Tactical I'ASP West

Kut FASP Northwest

al Tayaran POI Depot and Storage Area

Ainu tactical I'ASP

al-Siikr FASP

nl Husayn Tactical FASP

Asriynh Tactical FASP South

Amir tactical FASP Southwca

Banacks Military Exchange

Kut Barracks Nonhwcsi

Hawaii Tactical FASP South

SE

Miqdxiivahpoi

Biological Warfare

/ need these germs to be fixed on the missiles, and tell him to hit, because startingh, everyone should be ready for the action to happen at

Saddam Husyan,1

contents

Evolution of lhe Biological Warfare

The Regime Strategy and WMD

Evolution of the Biological Warfare

Arnb-tion The Early Year*.

Renewedand Near-Reaiitatioo:

The Beginning of Ihc Decline: Opportunity Through Ambiguity and the

End of the Game

Recovery and Transition

Research and

Building Human

Research

Iraqi BW Agent20

Bacillus anthracti ('Agent

aostridium botulmutn (Botulinum toxin. 'Agent

Clostridium perfrmgcns t'Agenc

Anatoxin ('Agent

Wheat Cover Smul ('Agent

Camel

Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic

Acute Hemorrhagic Conjunctivitis (Enterovirus

Other RAD Related to BW

Single Cell Protein

Growth Media

Drying ProccssATarrier/Panick

Production

Break-Out Production Capability

Mobile

Attempt* st BW Weaponuauon

The Gulf

ConceaJmetit And Destruction c4 Biotogicai

Initial WMI) Concealment

The Destruction of Iraq's

What Remained Hidden and Undeclared

Weaponization Related Activities in lhe Years Following Desert

Unresolved

Program

Research and

IIS

Disposition of Iraq's BW Program Culture57

Agent

Drying of BW

Bacterial BW Agent Production and

Annexes

BW

W Research and Development

Investigation of Iraq's Reported Mobile Biological

Warfare Agent Production

Suspected of Being Mobil BW Agent Production

i

Key Findings

The Biological Warfare IBW) program was born of Ihe Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and ihis service retained its connections with ihe program either directly or indirectly throughout its existence.

IIS provided the BW program with security and participated in biological research, probably for its own purposes, from the beginning of Iraq's BW effort in thentil the final days of Saddam Husayn's Regime.

addam Husayn regarded BW as an Integral element of his arsenal of WMD weapons, and would have used it if the need arose.

a meeting of the Iraqi leadership immediately prior to the Ciulf waraddam Husayn personally authorized the use of BW weapons against Israel. Saudi Arabia and US forces. Although the exact nature of the circumstances lhat would trigger use was not spelled out, they would appear tohreat to theitself or the US resorting to "unconventional harmful types of weapons."

Saddam envisaged all-out use. For example, all Israeli cities were to be struck and all the BW weapons at his disposal were to be used. Saddam specified that the "many years" agents, presumably anthrax spores, were to be employed against his foes.

ISC judges that Iraq's actions16 demonstrate that the state Intended to preserve its BW capability and returnteady, methodical progressrogram when and if the opportunity arose.

ISG assesses lhatraq clung to the objective of gaining war-winning weapons with the strategic intention of achieving the ability to project its power over much of the Middle East and beyond.weapons were pan of that plan. With an eye to the future and aiming io preserve some measure of its BW capability, Baghdad in the years immediately after Dcscn Storm soughi to save wbai it could ofnfrastructure and covertly continue BW research, hide evidence of that and earlier efforts, and dispose of its existing weapons stocks.

2raq greatly expanded Ihe capability of ils Al Hakam facility. Indigenouslyubic meter fcrmeniors were installed, electrical and water utilities were expanded, and massive newio house ils desired SO cubic meter fermeniors were completed.

With ihe economy at rock bottom inSG judges thai Baghdad abandoned its existing BW rxogram in the belief that itoientiai embarrassment, whoseould undercut Baghdad's ability to reach its overarching goal of obtaining relief from UN sanctions.

In practical terms, with ihe destruction of ihe Al Hakam facility, Iraq abandoned its ambition to obtain advanced BW weapons quickly. ISG found no direct evidence that Iraq,ad plansew BW program or was conducting BW-specifk work for military purposes. Indeed, from ihe. despite evidence of continuing interest in nuclear and chemical weapons, there appears toomplete absence of discussion ot even interest in BW at the Presidential level.

Iraq would have faced great difficulty in re-establishing an effective BW agent production6 Iraq stiltignificant dual-useuseful for BW if Ihe Regime chose to use it toW program. Moreover, Iraq stilt possessed lu most Important BW asset, the scientific know-how of its BW cadre.

attempt ioew BW program6 would haveange of major hurdles. The years following Desert Stormteady degradation of Iraq's industrial base: new equipmcni and spare pans for existing machinery became difficult and expensive to obtain, standards of maintenance

declined, staff could not receive training abroad, and foreign technical assistance was almost impossible to get. Additionally. Iraq's infrastructure and public utilities were crumbling. New large projects, particularly if they required special foreign equipment and expertise, would attract international anention. UNof dual-use facilities up to the endade their use for clandestine purpose complicated and risk laden.

Depending on its scale, Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW programew weeksew monthsecision to do so, but ISO discovered no indications that the Regime was pursuingourse,

spite of ihc difficulties notedW capability is technically the easiesi WMD to auain. Although equipmeni and facilities were destroyed under UN supervisionraq retained technical BW know-how through the scientists lhal were involved in the former program. ISG has also identified civilian laciliiics and equipmeni in Iraq that have dual-use application that could be used for the production of agent.

ISG judges that1raq appears to have destroyed its undeclared slocks ofBW weapons and probably destroyed remaining holdings of bulk BW agent. However ISG lacks evidence to document complete destruction. Iraq retained some BW-related seed stocks until their discovery after Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

After tbe passage of UN Sccurily Council Resolutionnraqi leaders decided noi to declare tbe offensive BW program and in consequence ordered all evidence of the program erased. Iraq declared thai BW program personnel sanitized the facilities and destroyed the weapons and their contents.

Iraq declared the possessionerial bombs andissile warheads containing BW agent. ISG assesses that the evidence for lhe original number of bombs is uncertain. ISG judges thai Iraq clandestinely destroyed aiombs andissiles. ISG continued the efforts of lhe UN ai ihe destruction sile bul found no remnants of funher weapons. This leases lhe possibility lhat the fragments of up toombs may remain undiscovered. Of these, any that escaped destruction would probably now only contain degraded agent.

ISG does notlear accouni of bulk ageni dcsiruciion. Official Iraqi sources and BW personnel, slate lhat Al Hakam staff destroyed stocks of bulk agent inowever, the same personnel admitdetails of the movemeni and destruction of bulk BW agent in lhe first halfraq continued to present information known to be untrue lo the UN up lo OIK Those involved did not reveal this until several months after ihc conflict.

Dr. Rihab Rashid Taha Al 'Azzawi, head of the bacterial program claims she retained BW seed stocks until2 when she destroyed them. ISG has noteans of verifying ihis. Some seed siocks were retained by another Iraqi official3 when ihey were recovered by ISG.

ISG is aware of BW-applicable researchut ISG judges it was not conducted in connectionW program.

ISG has uncovered no evidence of illicil research conducted into BW agents by universities or research organ izaiions.

The work conductediopesticide (Bacillus tliuringiensis) al Al Hakam5 would serve tothe basic skills required by scientists to produce and dry amhrax spores (Bacillus anthracis) but ISG has noi discovered evidence suggesting ihis was ihe Regime's intention. Howeveresearch andon biopesticide and single cell proiein (SCP) was selected by Iraq lo provide cover for Al Hakam's role in Iraq's BW program. Similar work conducted at the Tuwaitha Agricultural and Biological Research Center (TABRC) up to OIF also maintained skills thai were applicable lo BW. bui again, ISG found no evidence to suggest that this was lhe intention.

Similarly. ISG found no infoimaiion in indicate thai the work carried out by TABRC into Single Cell Protein <SCP)over story lor continuing research into the production of BW agents, such as C. botultnum and B. anlhracis, after the destruction of Al Hakam through io OIF.

TABRC conducted research and development) programs io enable indigenous manufacture ofgrowth media. Although ihese media are suitable for the bulk production of BW agents. ISG has found no evidence to indicate that their development and testing were specifically for this purpose.

Although Iraq had the basic capability to work wiih variola majorSG found no evidence that it retained any stocks of smallpox or actively conducted research into ihis agentntentions.

The IISeries of laboratories lhal conducted biological work including research into BW agents for assassination purposes until the. ISG has not been able to establish the scope and nature of the work at these laboratories or determine whether any of the work was related to military development ofBW agent.

The security servicescries of laboratories in lhe Baghdad area. Iraq should have declared these facilities and their equipmeni io ihe UN. bul they did not. Neither the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) nor lhe UN Monitoring. Verification, and Inspection Commission lUNMOVIC) were aware of their existence or inspected them.

Some of the laboratories possessed equipment capable of supporting research into BW agenis for mililary purposes, but ISG does not know whether this occurred although there is no evidence of it. The taboratories were probably the successors of the Al Salman facility, located Ihree kilometers south of Salman Pak. which was destroyednd they curried on many of the same activities, including forensic work.

Under ihc aegis of ihe intelligenceecretive learn developed assassination instruments using poisons or toxins for lhe Iraqimall group of scientisis, doctors and technicians conducted secret experiments on human beings, resulting in iheir deaths. The aim was probably the development of poisons-including ricin and aflaioxin lo eliminate or debilitate the Regime's opponents. Il appears lhal lesting on humans continued until the. There is no evidence io link these tests with ihc development of BW agents for military use.

In spite of exhaustive investigation, ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons.

Prior to OIF there was information indicating Iraq had planned andreakout BW capability, in lhe formei of mobile production units, capable ofgeni ai short notice in sufficientto weaporuze. Although ISG hashorough investigation of every aspect of this information, it has not found any equipment suitable forrogram, nor has ISG positively identified any siies, No documents have been uncovered. Interviews with individuals suspected of involvement have all prosed negative.

ISG harbors severe doubts aboul lhe source's credibility in regards to the breakout program.

ISG thoroughly examined two nailers captureduspecled of being mobile BW ageni production units, and investigated the associated evidence. ISG judges that ils Iraqi makers almost certainly designed and built the equipment exclusively for ihe generation of hydrogen. Ii is impractical to use the equipmeni for the production and weaponization of BW agent. ISG judges lhat it cannot therefore be part of any BW program.

Evolution or the Biological Warfare Program

Thesi rulejjy und WMI) Timeline

For an overview of Iraqi WMD programs and policy choices, readers should consul! lhe Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline rhari. enclosedeparate foldoui and in tabular form at the back ofovering the period. the timeline shows specific events bearing on the Regime's efforts in the BW. CW. delivery systems and nuclear realms and their chronological relationship with political and military develivpment* th.it had direct bearing on the Regime's policy choices.

Readers should also be aware that, at the conclusion of each volume of test. ISC hasoldoui summary chart thai relate, inflectionturning points in the Regime's WMDparticular events, initiatives, or decisions the Regime took with respect to specific WMD programs. Inflection points are marked in lhe margins of Ihe textray triangle.

Evolution of the Biological Warfare Program

For more thanears Iraqrogram of secret research, development and productionid toW capability with which to defend its interests and pro/eel ils influence beyond Iraq'sell-kept secret known to only aof leaders, Iraq's BWby Saddam Husayn. overseen by Huuyn Kamil Hasan Al Majid, guided by Dr. 'Amir llamudi Hasan Al Sa'adi. and closely linked to the IIS culminated in the first Gulf war iny which point Iraq hadmall but impressive arsenal of BW weapons comprisingombs, at leastl Husayn warheads rilled with anthrax spores, boiulinum toxin and anatoxin, as well as manyof liters of these agents stored in bulk, for use in Iraq's unsophisticated delivery systems. Iraq's BW infrastructure emerged from thai conflict damaged.

but not destroyed, and the in the wake of the war the Regime tried to preserve what it could of its BW program. Aiming to leave open the option ofBW activities once UN inspections were over and sanctions were lifted. Baghdad attempted to remove all possible signatures of its pan offensive actisT.icv Simultaneously. Iraqignificant denial and deception effort intended to conceal from the UN the true nature, scope, and ultimate objectives of the program.hese efforts had failed, and Iraq admitted its offensive program, leading6 to the destruction, at Saddam's ordris and under UN supervision, of most of the Iraq's BW physical

The destruction afthe BW infrastructure in thealted Iraq's BW activities, with theof its efforts to preserve Intellectual know-how, thr Regimes mosl valuable as.nl BW programs are primarily the product of trained innovative scientific minds. Extensive scientific laboratories and vast industrial complexes arcandful of dedicated, bright scientists, supported by dexterous, intelligent, and experienced technicians working with simple but effective equipment, materials, and animalsecure environment can accomplish most of what is required to lay the foundationsW program. In comparison to nuclear andweapons (CW) progranu. individuals' intellectual capabilitiesar greater role in determining the success or failurerogram than the physical resources to which they may have access. Thus, any accouni of Iraq's BW program istory of the key experts who are involved, and onlyistory of facilities and equipmeni (sec

Ambition: The Early.

Iraq's first foray into chemical and biological war- ^IJK fare (CBW) was rooted in the nationalist wave that swept the Middle East innder Egypt's president, Gamal Abdul Nasser, when Arab military leaders concluded the time had come to increase iheir understanding of lhe technology of modern warfare. Select junior officers in Iraq's armed forces traveled overseas for CBW training, among them Lt.

Nizur Al Aiiar. who utlendecl the CBW courses at Hon McClellan in the US and was later to head Iraq's CW program and introduce BW to Al Muthanna State Establishmenthe Iraqi Armya Chemical Corps, thus taking the first step that led to the acquisition of CBW. Following the Ba'thist revolution ol8 that brought Ahmad Hasan Al Bakr to power, senior army officers, encouraged by their technologically aware subordinates, decided to embarkW program. It was an amateur affair consisting of small groups trying to develop agent. By tbe, the attempt had failed.

harismatic officer. Ghassan Ibrahimaboratory,espectablebody run by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research carrying out legitimateresearch, named the Al Hasan Ihn-al-Haytham [Al Hazen Ibn-al-Haitheml Research Institute (seen reality, the instituteront foractivity in CW, BW, electronics, and optics under the patronage of the IIS. Ibrahim's assistant was an intelligence officer, Fa'iz 'Abdallah Al Shahin, who would later oversee Iraq's production of CW agents during the Iran-Iraq war andey role in the development of other nonconventional weapons, such as radiological bombs. He would also briefly supervise pan of the BW program. later still, Fa'iz would become Deputy Minister of Oil.

Al Hasanarge, coordinated effort to master the technologies associated with several aspects of modern warfare. Quickly Al Hasan establishedlaboratories at Al Rashad, NE of Baghdad, posing as 'The Center for Medical Diagnostics' and abiological center in the Al 'Amiriyah suburb ofurpose built closed-institute soon followed: the Ibn-Sina Center at Al Salmaneninsula formed by the Riverm south of Baghdad. The Ibn-Sina Center masqueraded as 'The Center for Medical Agriculture'. Afteremporary headquancrs in Sadun Street in the center of Baghdad, Al Hasanew headquarters and physics laboratory at Masbah nearby and later added an electronics laboratory at Tajiyat, north of Baghdad.

The generation of scientists trained and employed at Al Hasan, many of whom devoted more thanears of their careers to the pursuit of WMD. formed the backbone of Iraq's later CW and BWroup of nine scientists drawn from theof Higher Education, Defense and Health led the original offensive BW effon. conducting research into bacteria, toxins, and viruses, emphasizingpathogenicity, dissemination and storage of agents, such as Clostridium botulinum, spores of Bacillus anthracis, cholera, polio, and influenza virus. Later, in both chemical and biological disciplines, the Al Hasan Institute engaged prominent scientists to train and guide more Junior staff and chemical corps officers. Dr. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mun'im AI Azmirli. an Egyptian, mcntorcd the chemists and Dr. Muzhit IMudher. Modher] Al Falluji led the biologists. The Institute sponsored its staff to study abroad for PhDs in subjects appropriate for the CWffort. The Iraqi Regime rewarded success with promotion, high status, money, and material goods.

The second attempt to develop BW also faltered despite considerable effon. The Minister of Defense and Dr. 'Amir Al Sa'adi concludedhat Al Hasan had failed to deliver what it promised and that there had been academic and financial fraud. Arrests and imprisonment of several researchers followed for fraud and embezzlement surrounding the purported development of influenzaW agent. Al Sa'adi decided that projectailure, not having made enough progress toward industrial scale BW production and should be shut down, which the Iraqi government didonths before President Ahmad Hasan Al Bakr resigned in favor of his Vice President. Saddam Husayn. The facilities and staff wereout to various government establishments such as State Organization for Technical Industrieshe best personnel went to the IIS.9raq rebuilt and expanded the dual-usefor BW research, bul undertook little work of significance.

residential decree created theand Technical Research Directoraie (STRD) which laler became the Technical Research Centerechnical suppon agency for the IIS and to replace the Al Hasanover mechanism for continued work on Ihc development of chemical and biological agents.

The IIS continued small-scale CBW activities, recruiting chemists and scientists from universities and private laboratories and assigning them to Al Salman to conduct research.

*ilitarily relevant BW program restarted at the CW facility at Al Muthanna. UN inspectors were told that the initiative for this came from the Director General (DG)of Al. Gen. Nizar Al Altar, who then received etsdorsement from the Minister of Defense. ISG has been unable to establish the veracity of this story, although it is apparentW program started there4 under the auspices of the MOD. funded by the State Organization for Technical Industriesnd headed at the research levelew recmii, Dr. Kihab. Her direction, at least at the working level, was at this time given by Lt. Gen. Nizar who instructed her that henot wuni research io pinhelf. He named applied research lo iiulomb"

Renewed Ambition and

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war0 altered Baghdad's perception of the value of WMD and ledeinvigoration of the BW program. In the view of Iraqi leaders. Iraq's CW halted Iranian ground offensives and ballistic missile attacks on Tehran broke its political will.

to Brig. Dr. Mahmud Farraj Bilal Al Samarra'i. Iraq's war with Iran was lhc catalyst to reactivate Iraq's BWefforts. Iraq's success with CW during ils war with Iran only reaffirmed the potential value of unconventional capabilities like BW. He opined thai, "if the Iran war lastedaddam would have usedurther. Iraq's concerns about Israel and their WMD capabilities provided additional impetus totrategic counterbalance to deter foreign threats.

Bilal added additional perspectives on the strategic intent of Iraqi's BW program, which he describedtrategic capability that would

compliment Iraq's CW efforts with great potential for achieving surprise. Bilal also commented lhat Iraq consideredotential counterbalance to the Israeli threat, but acknowledged that Iraq lacked an effective delivery system toW attack against Israel.

* After the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. one of the country's most eminent microbiologists and one of its lew experts in ferntentalion. Professor Nassir Al Hindawi of Mustansiriyahroposal for BW research to the Presidential diwan. The leadership directed his proposal to Lt. Gen. Nizar, the DG of Al Muthanna. Al Hindawi convinced Saddam to utilize disease-causing agents to aid the war effon againsl Iran. The focus of his interest was developing botulinum toxin as tactical nerve-like BW agent and anthraxtrategic and tactical weapon.

In theaghdad stepped up the pace of It BW program significantly.he remnants of ihe first BW effort became formally part of Al Muthanna under the direction. Gen. Nizar Al Attar. According to UNSCOMormal research plan was drafted thai year committing lo BW research. Meanwhile, close by at the old facilities of ihe Al Hasan Institute. Al Salman wasarallel BW research program under the authority of the intelligence services that included research into an anti-crop fungal agent. Tilletia. and the developmentacterial spray device (known as the /ubaydi device, after itsl Salman tested the spray-device, mountedelicopter, with reportedly inconclusive results, al Khan Bani Sa'ad in

Inn returning from completing her PhD in the UK. Dr. Rihab was contacted by Ll. Gen. Nizar and directed to repon to Al Muihanna, where she took over technical leadership of the BW program and led ilcries of achievements. According to Dr. Rihab,here was an Informal decision made to revitalize the BW program. Three yearsear plan was drawn up that would lead to BWourse Dr. Rihab and her group implemented with urgency, authority, and great secrecy demonstrating considerable planning. Dr.

Rihabeam and commenced extensivesurveys, based initially on the citation indices of the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRIl publications of0. The team also started conducting toxicologtcal investigations. Under her leadership of the technical elements, the program moved steadilyenes of discrete phases.

r. Rihab ordered reference strains ofpathogenic organism*ariety of foreign sources and began basic research on candidate BW agents. Al Hindawi became an advisor to her

nder the guise of work at Baghdadshe successfully ordered multiple isolates of pathogens from llie American Type. such as ft. anthracis for use in the early BW agent research effort.

he program moved from Al Muthanna io Al Salman. Ihe group now under the control of Ahmad Murtada. DG of the TRC. recruited new staff and broadened its range of agents Murtada was an acolyte ol Husayn Kamil and relied on the Military Industrialisation Commission (MIO and its Senior Deputy, Dr. "Amir Al Sa'adi, for the weapons aspects ot Ihe prop/am. Equipment from the Al Taji SCP Plant was transferred lo AI Salman in August that year.

Alsor. Rihab and Dr. 'Amir Al Sa'adi discussed ihe possibility of developing asystem for ihe production of BW agents. She claims that the idea was largely 'Amir Al Sa'adi's and that she rejected Ihe proposal in favorixed production site at Al Hakam.

hey opened lhc facility at Al Hakam. Production of anthrax, botulinum loxin andpefringens started. Weapon development and testing followed.

InRC broadened the base of the BW program byycologist, Di. Tmad Dhiyab.eam that researched fungal toxins,trichoiheccne mycotoxins and later anatoxin. The connection, if any, of this work with the earlier fungal work at Al Salman, is unknown.

When Iraq iriedxpand die production capacity ul Al Hakam by importingubic metervessel* from the Swiss company ChemapS. the export licenseenied: this, despite implementing an elaborate deception planake production building at Al Qa'qa'a. However. ferTnentors and other equipment were requisitioned from an Iraqi veterinary vaccine plant at Al Kindi and transferred to Al Hakam in

i. Rihab sought topray dryer manufactured in Iraq for work at Al Hakam. Iraqi companies were able to fabricate the bodyryer but not the other components. In fact, there wasryer at Al Hakam that would, with some safety modifications, have been suitable for drying BW agent. This dryer had been transferred from the At Taji SCP Plant to Al Hakamevertheless, she sought from overseas adryer that could, without modihcaiioo. safely dry anthraxraqoreign manufacturer of dryersample of Bacillus thunngiensis (Bt) to be dried forover for the true purpose. The company did not supply Iraq with the special dryer.

Byraq was methodically advancing toward the acquisition afa BW component to Its

By ihe tune of Iraq's invasion of Kuwaithe BW program had moved into high gear

arsenal of WMD. Iraq had conducted laboratory and eroironrrwntal static and dynamic explosive field tests of wheat cover smut, aflatoxin, anthrax simulants (Bacillus subtdis andotulinum toxin, Clostridiumand non Following Saddam Husayn's speech0 that identified Israelhreat. Husayn Kamil ordered the BW program to go all out for weaponizalion. The program tookudden urgency and us direction changedfrenetic and convulsive efforts to adapt new weapons and acquire and expand BW agentreplaced the years of orderly progress.

with the aim of fielding filled weapons as quicklyossible. Also inl Hakam commenced production of Clostridium perfringens, the causative agent of gas gangrene. There is no evidence of the weaponizalion of this material and details of itsremain uncertain.

Botulinum toxin and anthrax were the backbone of the IraqiW program. In addition to the production activities at Al Hakam, the Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine planl (FIvlDV) at Al Dawrah was adapted for the production of botuli-num toxin and continued to produce the agent until they evacuated the site on ISwo days before the start of Desen Storm. While senior Iraqi officials deny production of anthrax al FMDV, the UN found traces of anthrax on two fcrmcntorsobile storage tank in the facilily. One source has informed ISG lhal the site did produce anthrax. ISG concludes thai FMDV produced anthrax. ISG does noi know whether lhe fate of ihis anthrax was ihc same as thai produced at Al Hakam.

Dr. Hazim 'Ali, recruited in0 iohe development of viral agents, took over the FMDV Plan! at Al Dawrah in September of that year, renaming il 'Al Manal'. He commenced work on viruses including hemorrhagic conjunciivis, human rotavirus, and camel poxiew toHazim's viral work was still in its infancy by the lime of Desen Storm and very little had actually been achieved.

In parallel wiih Ihe production of BW agents, other facilities wereerial bombs and warheads for the Al llusayn missile. Husayn Kamil had the final say over which agenis io wea-ponize. Although inl Mulhanna started adapting an aircraft auxiliary fuel lankeans of dispersing BWew days after the invasion of Kuwait, Husayn Kamil chose to useerial bomb and the Al Husayn missilebecause ihey were already in use for CW agenis. There was no discussion of how to weaponize BW agents because of lack of time and the pressing need to make decisions quickly. Additional weapons testingombs using an anthiax simulant, B. subti-lis. occurred leading up to the war. In addition, there is an unconfirmed report thai Bl was used in explosive testing of an unidentified BW munition at A) Hakam between0 and

l Mulhanna started adapting an aircraft auxiliary fuel tankeans ofBW agents. Iraq had previously anemptcd a

similar development in lhe CW field andetter, datedo Husayn Kamil, Gen. Fa'iz Shahin, DG of Al Muthanna, had referred io "successful tests of spraying mustard gas by planes which pros-ed io be veryt appears lhal the BW spray deviceontinuation of ihis earlier effort. Sometime in earlyeeting of the Iraqi leadership. Husayn Kamil told Saddam: "Sir, the besi way io transport this weapon (BW) and achieve lhe most harmful effects would come by using planes,rop duster, ioit. This is,housand times moreaddam responded that he wanted all options of delivering BW agent io lhe largets. The Iraqi Air Force dew ihe tanks with anthrax simulants tothe dispersion characteristics. The Air Force also experimentedemotely pilotedircraftossible delivery platformimilar lank sysiem. These trials only ceased when Desen Storm started.

Byeflecting the huge exertion of Ihe previous months, Iraq had produced large quantities of anthrax, botulinum toxin, Clostridium perfrln-gens, aflaloxin, and small quantities of ricin, and had moreW weapons deployed to five hide sites. In addition, Al Hakam protected caches of bulk BW agent containers by moving them from site to sile during the hostilities. The weapons and agent were guarded and ready for use. The Iraqi leadership decided policy for their use andIraq states lhat the opening bombardment of1 destroyed the only aircraft and spray tank ready for use. Despite this, work continued to complete another three tanks, with plans for aeight in preparation.

had Oiled ballistic missiles and aerial bombs, and was modifying aircraft fuel lanks io spray BW agents.

weapons, though not agent production, were not well designed technically and the result of an immature development program. In ISG's view, the weapons were subopiimal bui could have been effective in certain circumstances.

Iraqis were well aware of the shortcomings of lhe Al Husayn missile and. Ll. Gen. Hazim. commander of the Surface-in SurfaceForces openly admitted that the Al llusayn,W agent filled warhead, would fulfill ils purpose if after impact in an enemy countrymaterial survived lo enable ils detection as

a BW agent. Iteapon of terror. They were for use in extremis and only if an enemy directly threatened the existence ot the Regime in itsin and around Baghdad. Except for those in the know. Iraqi armed forces treated BW weapons as 'specialore ioxic type of CW weapon.

Saddam himself exercised control of Iraq's BW arsenal, and he was prepared lo use it against US and alliedforces in the event of war. At ain tarlye identified the targets for the BW weapons. Israel was to be first and all Israeli cities were targets, but he ordered thai strikes concentrate an Tel Aviv. VS forces were to be targets if Ihey attacked with unconventional forces. He also identified Riyadh andjeddah as targets.ranscript of discussions held al the time Saddam ordered the use of the more persistent Ipresumably anthrax) BW agents: "we want the long term, the many years kind."

Saddam envisaged all out use of the weapons. He said "we don't want to depend on one option" and that Iraqi forces must use all means, bombs,and spray aircraft, to deliver the BW agent. He pointed out that this wasife and death issue and all the criers about largets are sealed in writing andin case something happened to him.

The stockpiles of weapons und bulk agents remained in their hide sites unused and undamaged. Two officials shared the day-to-day responsibility; Dr. Bilal for the bombs and missiles and Dr. Rihab tor the bulk IIW agent.

The Beginning of the Decline: Opportunity Through Ambiguity and Ihc End of the

ISG assesses thatraq clung to theof gaining war-winning weapons with strategic intent that would enable the projection of its power over much of the Middle East and beyond. BW was part of that plan. With an eye to the future and aiming to preserve some measure of its BW capabil-Hy, Baghdad in the years immediately after Desert 'ott Storm sought to save what it could ofitsBW infra- structure, hide evidence of the program, and dispose of its existing weapons stocks. Following Baghdad's formal acceptance ofraq had IS days to declare its stocks of WMD. It did not do so, andetter dated ISo the Secretary General of the VN, Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz even denied that Iraq had any BW program. Baghdad's action in the following months and years indicate that it intended lo preserve its BW capability and return to the steady, methodical progressature BW capability when inspections ended and sanctions were lifted. The biopesticide program that was established after1 Gulf war. temporarily preserved Iraq's research, development andbase at Al Hakam and, whether intentionally or otherwise, achieved several objectives set out in the original Iraqi BW strategic plan draftedhese included industrial-scale production ofagenis. albeit nonpathogenic ones, and perfecting development of dry agent formulation.

Baghdad took early steps to protect what remained of the BW physical plant and equipmeni. During the first Gulf war, the onlydirectly relevant to Iraq's BW program that were destroyed were tbe research laboratories at Al Salman and the munitions tilling station al Al Mulhanna.was criticalhe BW program thai was centered on Al Hakam. AI Hakam at lhat time was unknown to the Coalition and therefore was noi attacked during the war. unlike the Abu Ghurayb Infant Formula Plant (the Baby Milk Factory) that the Coalition destroyed by bombing in the mistaken belief thai itey W facilily. Following approval ofn earlyaddam Husayn endorsed Husayn Kamil's decision not to declare Al Hakam as pan

of Ihe BW program and decided to convert ihe plani io commercial use prior io the arrival of the second UNSCOM BW team inusayn Kamil pressured Dr. Rihab to complete ihis transition quickly to save equipment and the jobs of theand technicians.

wanted to keep scientists employed, according Io 'Amir Muhammad Rashid Al 'Ubaydi. Moreover, he initially expected the sanctions would last no more than three years, and many Iraqis doubted the sanctions would be so comprehensive, according to several interviews with formerThese perceptions probably persuaded senior Regime leaders that ihey could weather asanctions regime by making limitedhiding much of their pre-existing weapons and documentation, and even expanding BWby enhancing dual-use facilities.

The advent of postwar VS Inspections posed serious problems for Iraq, andid lo hide Ihe true uses of ihe remaining plant and equipment the Regimearge scale deception effort, involving cleaning existing plants to remove traces ofBW activity, hiding relevant documents, destroying exist-Ing stocks of agent, andover slory forongoing BW-related work at Al Hakam.Iraq scoured the principal facilities to remove evidence of an offensive BW program. Theplant was vigorously decontaminated, research papers altered, evidence hidden or destroyed and the BW cadre agreed to provide false accounts of past events and future intern. In the summern the orders of Husayn Kamil relayed through Ahmad Murtada Dr. Rihab ordered lhat all documentswith the BW program be desiroyed and allactivities ai Al Hakam be stopped. She claims to have collected all documents,ew. and destroyed or buried the rest. She ordered all BWfrom Al Salman and Al Hakam toegal documeni stipulating, under the threat ofrohibition on speaking to UN inspectors about the production of, or progress on, any BW agent.

that order, the person in charge of physical security at Al Hakam witnessed Dr. Rihab remove aboutolectronic media disks (floppy disks) from her oflice.

Inaddamecretary. 'Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al Tikriii. asked Husayn Kamil if Iraq would declare the BW program to the UN. Husayn Kamil indicated that it would not be necessary and the he would order the scientists to hide all evidence of the program in their homes. Husayn Kamil arranged the collection of all documents relating to WMD and directed the Special Security Organization (SSO) to conceal them. This was to facilitate the reconstiiution of WMD programs after the UN departed. Inert is some uncertainty whether these documents are ibe same as ihose handed io the UN5 from Husayn Kamil's chicken farm.

Saddam also authorized Husayn Kamil to destroy, unilaterally, Iraq's slocks ofBW agents. There were three distinct phases of destruction, including clean up and sterilization of facilities includingAI Salman, Al Hakam. Al Manal and Al Safa'ah; destruction of munitions by TRC and Al Muthanna personnel; and neutralization and dumping of bulk BW agent. According lo some accounts given by former Iraqi officials, the clean up of ihe Al Hakam siie began inther accounts give the order as sometime in the summern any case. Dr. Rihab ordered MIC lo sanitize Al Hakam to destroy any traces of botulinum toxin and anthrax. The Al Hakam site was sanitized, which emailed the sanitizaiion of alldrains, equipmcni and sewers using formalin, alcohol and potassium permanganate.

J.VG, however, continues to harbor doubtsIraq's destruction of bacterial reference strains and isolates. According to Dr. Rihab, she destroyed these materials inut ISG can verify neither that the materials were destroyed nor the other details of Dr. Rihab's account. She maimains that shemall box containing no more lhanials of lyophilized bacterial pathogens,Ihose obtained from the American Type Culture Collection to ihe IIS inor safekeeping. Allegedly. Husam Muhammad Amin Al Yasin, who would eventually become the director of the Naiional Monitoring Directoraieeturned the box to her inhe also claimed thai she asked former TRC head Ahmad Murtada what io do with ihc vials. Murtada look the matter to Husayn Kamil.

who ordered lhe vials destroyed. Dr. Rihab claims she did this by injecting the vials withand (hen amoclaving the vials. According to UNSCOM data, all ATCC ampules were accounted for and (here should have been no remaining unopened vials from ATCC after the first UNSCOM BW inspection.

ISO judges ihe Regime look Ihese steps with the aim of restarting the BW program in the future.usayn Kamil reportedly announcedpeech to WMD scientists that Iraq's WMD programs would resume and expand when UN inspectors left. Al Hindawi recounted toonversation he had with "Amir Al Sa'adi aboul the fuiuie of (he BW program following the first Gulf war. Al Sa'adi referred to Husayn Kamil's intent as "His Highnessroad vision of thel Hindawi interpreted this to mean that Husayn Kamil intendedeactivate the program later.

Even as Baghdad took steps to hide itsBW infrastructure and cover the traces of its previous program, the Regime sought toovert BW development effort under ihe cover of civilian research. Inr. Rihabbriefed Saddam Husayn on the plan to convert Al Hakam for the production of biopesticide. In lhat same month, MIC and Saddam Husayn decided to develop programs for SCP and biopesticide, using Bt as the cove r.

* Dr. Bilal (old ISG, "Al Hakam was kepi as potential for the BW program in thee described lhat they decided they must do everything toii and staled (hat the entire bio-insecticide and SCP effort at Al Hakamover story" created by Amir Rashid. Dr. Rihab also stated that the intentroduce the SCP and bioinseciicide Bl ai Al Hakam was "lo cover the equipment."

ISG judges that In the wake of Desert Storm and destruction of much of the BW effort, Iraq'sobjective was to give ihe appearance ofwith UNSCOM while preserving Ihe intellectual capital amassed in prior years on BW. The Bt and SCP programs offered an effective justification thai allowed Iraq io keep Ihe Al Hakam site wiih itsequipmeni and skilled scientists in one place. Dr. Bilal related that after ihey created the cover story for

Al Hakam, an economic siudy of Single Cell Protein (SCP) was conducted highlighting thai Alroduction capacity was only kilograms while Iraq's calculated "legitimate" SCP need wasonnes per year.

Al Hindawi advocated ibe developmeni of SCP al Al Hakam. Ihe idea was endorsed because of his reputation in SCP production ihai was expected lo provide credibility for the program

io outside observers. Using SCP as an diernative feedstock, however, required very large rates of annual production (hundreds of tonnes) as well as large quantities of scarce methanol and ethanol for growth media.

Rihab was noi interested in SCP. Theof Bt pesticidesonvenient cover. The assertion that Al Hakam had been involved in biopesticide production1 provided what they hoped tolausible explanauon thai enabled Iraq to avoid declaring production of anthrax. She enlisted the support of Dr. Jabber Farhan 'Abd-al-Razzaq Al Ma'dhihi from ihe TABRC who had conducted research on Bl io assist in the development of biopesiicide production.

Ostensible biopesticide production at Al Hakam required both an expansion of the facilities andwiih the IAEC's TABRC. Ihc cover story-did not hi the limited capabilities thai resided ai Al Hakam: the production capacity of the plant was far too linle to be convincing thai it really was forSCP purposes. Realizing this, Baghdad began lo expand production capacitycollaboration on biopesticide production with experts from TABRC generated processes andthat would be directly relevant to any future Iraqi BW effort.

expanded Al Hakam's waier and electriciiyove ISG assesses would haveexpanded the site's potential to suppon planned biopesticide and SCP production, and also sought to transfer to Al Hakam any and all usable equipmeni to suppon ihe proposed biopesticide and SCP activity. For example, after UNSCOM's first visit io Al Hakam inl Hakamiter fermentorryer from

Al Muihanna in order to strengthen ihe cover story. Additionally. Baghdad sought to acquire necessary equipment to pursue BW-related work at Al Hakam.or example. Iraq attempted to purchase two turnkeyubic meter fermentor plantsussian Company that purportedly had expertise in botulinum toxin production. Iraqeal with that Russian Company for equipment andeam of Iraqi scientists andtraveled tn Russia, 'lhc deal fell through because the company did not receive an export license.

Collaboration with TABRC brought together group* of experts and organizations whose work had direct bearing on fulure BW work. Jabbar Al Ma'dhihi. Head of TABRC. for example was instrumental in designing the process thai resulted in reconfiguring Al Hakam to produce Bt bioinscclicide. Dr. Al Ma'dhihi alsoovel solution to Iraq's need for BW growth media. Unlike traditional bacterial growth media, Al Ma'dhihi's creation was cheap and of domesticfrom waste products from food and agricultural processes. He noted that his media induced% sporulation rates in Bt with little or no additional additives or intensiveof the fermentation process. In ISO's view, this media would probablyuitable media for anthrax spore production. Rihab, herself, has conceded that this media may suppon growth and sporulation of anthrax and admitted thai the use of this media would make monitoring difficult.

* Separately, Dr. Rihab described the purpose of her group's research into alternative media, which was to circumvent the effects of sanctions imposed on Iraq after0 invasion of Kuwait. Nasir Al Hindawi worked on alternative media tor Brucella. Mosul University, worked on planisource of peptone media for anaerobic organisms. Some of ihe plant media was purportedly suitable for growing pathogens such as Clostridium botulinum. Rihab was angry thai Mosul's research might auraci UNSCOM attention.

A strategic objective from the earliest days of the BW program was to produce dry agent. Dr. Rihab was aware lhal liquid agentelatively short shelf life and this was demonstrated to her whenhe found lhat liquid BW agent recovered from bombs and bulk storage containers "washe therefore found ihc work at TABRC on diying Bl by Dr. Al Ma'dhihi of great interest. Al Ma'dhihi was able to dry Bt al bench-scale and was working toward pilot-scale levels. This technology was directlyto drying anthrax although safety precautions would have been necessary.

Al Ma'dhihi used bentoniie provided by Al Hakam. The panicle size wasnd Al Ma'dhihi realized that this was too fine for agricultural work. However, such technology is applicable lu BW.

Dr, Rihab was pleased with the biopesticideAl Hakam produced. Al Hakam produced approximatelyons of dry formulated product each year2nl Hakam slowed down the production of Al Nasr in order to improve the formulation for Ihe fanners. However, there was disagreement among the developer, pro-ducers. and end-users on ihe utility and use of the Al Hakam's dry Bi product called Al Nasr (orFarmers found it cumbersome to use. having to apply it hy hand one plantime; spraying the productiquid slurry by mixing it with water was not successful. Al Hindawi stated. "The Bl produced there was not very popular with the farmers and wasrofitablehe former minister of agriculture conoboraied ihis view.

Dr. Al Ma'dhihi. the developer of this product, explained lhal it was intended to be used byihe dry material directly on io plants. He commented lhat farmers did not like the product because ihc powder was too fine; it aerosolizedloud when applied and did not form an adequate residue on the planis.

who produced Al Nasr, Dr. Rihab and Mr. Thamir 'Abdal-Rahman thought otherwise on lhc use and value of the product. They both described mixing the dry powder wiih water iolurry and spraying ihc product using hand sprayers. They ihoughi the product was well received.

ISC's assessment Is that whatever the intention of Iraq's Bt drying technology it was more applicable

to BW lhan biopesticides. ISG has learned more about ihc potential use of Iraq's biopesricide program for prohibited purposes from olhcr sources.

It was reported, but not confirmed, thatfrom the BW program at Al Hakam used other organisms to model work with anthrax

* The former chief anthrax technician stated to ISG thai ihe Al Hakam Bt fermentation line would fully support anthrax production. If virulent anthraxwere available, it would take by his estimate, one week to redirect the line to begin production of anthrax. He noted however that attempting to dry anthrax using the Al Hakam equipment was highly hazardous without respiratory protection oraround Ihe spray dryer.

inN inspector* confronted Iraq with evidence of imports ofbacterial growth media in quantities that had no civilian utility wilhin Iraq's limited biotechnologytep that ullimatety led to the unraveling of Iraq's cover storycontinuing BW-related activity.raq acknowledged that it used this growth media to produce iwo BW agents in bulk, botulinum loxin, and Bacillus anthracis spores,8Ihis precipitated Iraq intoull Final and Complete Disclosureraq presented the draft version ininal version followednly to be declared void less than two weeks later after Husayn Kamil fled to Jordan.

Most of what ISG knows about Iraq's BW endeavors dales from the period5 tofter his departure officials denounced "the iraiior" Husayn Kamil and blamed him for Iraq's failure io disclose the BW program earlier. Tariq 'Aziz claims he persuaded Saddam Husayn toullof Iraq's BW efforts to the UN.hort while information flowed freely and Iraq released aquantity of documents on its WMD programs in anticipation that Ihis would lead to the lifting of sanctions. (However, in ihe biological field there were onlytems, including notebooks, papers, receipts, photographs, videotapes and journal reprints.rogram thai had already lasted more thanears ihisodes!onsequence of the disclosures, ihe UN supervised the destruction of AI Hakam and disablement of FMDV in.

Iraq's disclosures on its covert BW program abnosl certainly were lied lo the disintegration of the economy, which had hit rock-bottom by5esult of UN-mandated economic sanctions. ISG judges thai Saddam was willing lo risk an clement of Iraq's WMD programid to gain economic and sanctions relief. Getting out from under sanctions, by this time, was an overarching Regime objective. BW research ai ihe time offered no real capability butposed the riskotential embarrassment lhal could only get in the way of sanctions relief.

eries of drafts. Iraqew "Full. Final and Complete Declaration" (FFCD) onhiseries of UN inspections lo verify the details and resulted in another FFCD, submitted inurther FFCD inespiie these revisions, the new FFCDs did noi supply any substantially new information and inerefore did not meet UNThe UN was unable to verify the contents of the documents in spite of two Technical Evaluation Meetings between Iraq and the UN in March andnd

Recovery and

With the bulk of Iraq's BW program tn ruins, Iraq6 continued small-scale BW-related efforts with the only remaining asset at Baghdad'sthe know-how of the small band ofBWand Uchniciani who carried out further work under the auspices of the Iraqi Intelligence Service.he combination of ihe destruction wrought during Desert Storm and the deliberate destruction of key BW facilities and equipment under UNSCOM supervision left Iraq with few physical remnants of its BW program. Numerous other dual-use biological facilities were subject io routine UN monitoring.

Many of ihc key scientists went to work for ihe NMD. Others pursued advanced degrees in Iraq's universities or went into the private sector, or work at other governmentABRC; while at least some continued to conduct small-scale biological research and devetopmeni in disperse locations under the control of the US.

is uncertain what lhc function of the multiple IIS laboratories was, and who the scientists were (see also CW section.ome of the work conducted there wasontinuation of ihe work at the Al Salman laboratories after their destruction in Ihe Gulf wax1 and that would include forensic related work, Other objectives were probably Io develop poisons foror debilitation. Whether any of the research was directly related to mililary development of BW agents is uncertain: ihe nature of some of the reported work would hase had direct application to dissemination of ricin.

Dr. Rihab hypothesized lo ISC thaiW program had existed ut Iraq prior to OIF, it would probably hare been conducted in secret within the intelligence community. However, ISG's inspection of assorted equipmcni and sites has not uncovered evidence of either the true nature of IIS laboratories orlinks between these laboratories and Iraq's BW effort. ISG notes, in any case, thai the tactic of using IIS and covert laboratories has historical precedence dating back to the program's origins in, when the IIS provided ihc BW program with security and participated in BW-related research. Revertinghis practice would minimize ihe evidenceto inspeciors. Ii would also leave ihe known and acknowledged BW workers free to deal with the UN inspection regime. However, ii would requite another cadre of scientists other than ones known to the UN to conduct ihis kind of research. The discovery of multiple IIS clandestine laboratories after OIF lends some credence io this assessment.

There is information thai suggests that upS laboratories operated in the greater Baghdad area at various limes up until OIF.

ISGossible DOS laboratory in Baghdad thatariety of chemicals but noequipment. Residents in the building alleged that the laboratoryiological one. Thelearn found several DGS administrative documents, some of which were from employees requesting approval for danger pay for iheirwork with biological and radioactive materials.

collected at ihe lime of OIF led to ihe discovery of assorted laboratory equipmentused by a' suspect BW scientistosque in Baghdad.

A clandestine laboratory was identified by an ISG team at the Baghdad Central Public Healih Labo-ratory in the summerccording lo on employee of the laboratory, the IIS operated aat lhat location for several years. In advance8 UNSCOM inspection, secret documents were removed and stored ai Ihc Director's house. In Decemberhe laboratory was emptied of all equipment and documents.

A former US chemist indicates this five-storyand adjaceni warehouse complex comprisesraining center al Djerf-al-Nadaf. SE oformer member of the NMD reported ihis sile as one of the three IIS locations wiihand activities intentionally noi declared Io the UN. Neither UNSCOM nor UNMOVIC were aware of Iheir existence and had not visited theseHe believes ihe buildingiological laboratory for unspecified work. Sile exploitationodern building thai probably housed both offices and al leasl one laboratory on the first floor. The building was completely looted, with very few remnants of equipment, materials, orNeighbors indicated thai lhc IIS removed everything from the sile just before ihe war.

Accordingormer mid-level BW scientist, Iraq conducted tests on prisoners using anatoxin4 at an undeclared clandestineormer member of the NMD indicated he visited78 to survey the equipmentdeclaration lo Ihe UN: he was told on-site lhat none of ihe equipment or activities there would be declared.

ISG also has evidence thai, possibly as recentlyn IIS chemist who immigrated io Iraq from Egypt, Dr. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mun'im Al Azmirli (nowxperimented on prisoners with ricin resulting in their deaths.

In the chemical field, ISG learned thai, in, the former IIS Directorate of Science andM9 (which later transformed) used this approach for research into lethal agents. The USuccession of four clandestinein At Taji and Baghdad63 to research and develop chemicals. It also included testing of chemicals on small animals like mice, rabbits and rats.

Additional reporting, though unconfirmed, indicateslso conducted BW related research at two covert laboratories. In the, Saddam tasked the US to do small-scale BW work in covert laboratories concealed within legitimate facilities. Funher unconfirmed reports indicated the IISBW and CW experiments and stored WMD precursor materials in residences and warehouses around Baghdad until at least

Research and Development

ISG judges lhal Iraq maintained Ihe expertise and equipment necessaryf bacteria, fungi, viruses, and toxins that could be usedgents up until Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in1

' ISG assesses lhat Iraq's bacterial and toxin BW agents were adequately researched and developed at the advent of the first Gulf warnd that Iraq had an extensiverogram in the years prior to that. By the time of Desert Storm, Iraq had weaponized Clostridium, Bacillusnd Anatoxin ('Agent C) by tilling liquid forms of these agents into munitions, although thesewere not the most effective or efficient for BW dispersal.

Despite evidence of Iraq's intent to develop more dangerous biological agents after Desert Storm, ISC uncovered no indications that biological agents were researched for BW purposesven though Iraqin some easesresearch capabilities lhal could have easily been applied to BW agents. ISG's investigations found no direct evidence thai the expertise or equipmeni were being used specifically for BW work. That said. ISG judges thain theas probably noi required. Additional agents would have required, in ISG's judgement, bui despite concerns that surrounded ihe possible addition of other, more pathogenic, agenis into the viral BW program, no evidence has been found by ISG.

ISG conducted site visits and multiple interviews invcstigaiing Iraq's possible possession ofand collected fragmentary and circumstantialefinitive conclusion is impossible, but, based on ihe available evidence. ISG concludes lhat Iraq intended to develop smallpox and possibly other viral pathogens like CCHF as potential BW weapons. Inr. Rihab informed Dr. Hazim Ali thai Husayn Kamil wanted him to work on "more dangerous" viruses. Accordingource. Dr. Hazim 'Ali was willing to work on other viral agents if Dr. Rihab provided him wiih

the materials. No additional materials wereIraq had the basic capability to work with variola major (smallpox) and may have conducted some preliminary basicow ever, ISG has found no conclusive evidence that Iraq retained or acquired any stocks of smallpox or conductedf pathogenic viioises.

ISG uncovered troubling information aboulW-related endeavours that raise concerns about the legitimacy of Iraq's activities and thai suggest to ISG Baghdad aimed at some future time to resume ils BW program.

IraqdecidedirKligenouslyioresearch and produce nutrient growth media thai could be used lo produce multiple strains of bacteria to include B. anthracis, but no direci evidence has yet been uncovered thai ihis media was used to produce B. anthracisr. Rihab described to ISG her BW group's research in developingproduced media to circumvent the effects sanctions imposed on Iraq after0 invasion. Research into alternative media for lhe growth of Brucella was conducted following the introduction of0 UN sanctions.

Multiple sources have told ISG thai the B. thuringi-ensis research and production at Al Hakam16 was done to provide cover for the equipment and capability ai this facility. ISfi has noi been providedood explanation as

to why an advanced capability to dry agentarticle size loo small for efficient biopesticide use was established as well. ISG judges that this work advanced Iraq's expertise and knowledge in large-scale dryingnthracis even if ihc agent itself was not reduced and dried.

has found lhat up io five DS laboratories operated in the greater Baghdad area up until OIF. Additional reporting, though unconfirmed,thativision also conducted BW related research in two covert laboratories. In the. Saddam tasked the IIS io do small-scale BW work in coven laboratories concealed within legitimate facilities. Funher unconfirmed reports indicated the IIS conducted BW and CW

experiments and siorcd WMD precursorin residences and warehouse around Baghdad ihroughnformation collected at the lime of OIF led to the discovery of assortedequipment purportedly useduspect BW scientist on the Black Listosque inA clandestine laboratory was identified by an ISG team at the Baghdad Central Public Health laboratory in me summerccording to an employee of the laboratory, the IIS operaied aat that location for several years. In advance8 UNSCOM inspection, secret documenis were removed and stored at the Director's house. Inhc laboratory was emptied of all equipmeni and documents.

Building Human Capital

Over the course of many years Iraq undertookefforts to create the cornerstoneational BWody of trained scientists with the professional skill and experience needed to develop and produce BW. Unlike nucleat and chemicalprograms, which require vast physicalexpensive equipmeni and substantial financial resources, human capital is the essential clementational BW effort, for scientific research underpins all aspectseveloping BW program. Iraq made Ihe mostimited pool of qualified personnel to identify and develop the requisite cadre of skilled scientists and technical personnel.

Trying io developadre for the BW as well as CW programs was an integral pan of the overall Al Hasan Ibn-al-Haytham Institute's goals. UN inspectors discovered that duringhe Al Hasan Ibn-al-Haytham Institute recruited lhe best and the brightest graduatingthe Universities of Baghdad. Colleges of Medicine, Science, and Veterinary Medicine, and lheof Muslansiriyah. College of Medicine. The Institute offered ihese studenis employmeni wiih incentives including opportunities for travel abroad and funher education, Studenis selected for biology thenwo-month training program at Ihc University of Baghdad, College of Veterinaryin "laboratory techniques andome were selected for graduate studies abroad and some for graduaie studies at the University of Baghdad or the University of Muslansiriyah, while others were given technician positions al the Ibn-Sina Cenier.

ISG assesses that al some point after theof Iraq's BW program in thehift in priorities occurred In which Iraqi BW personnel were selected for participation in the program more for their loyalty and dependability than for their technical skills, an approach that distorted the entire higher educational process and frequently ensured that the "best and the brightest" were replaced by the loyal and reliable.

senior Iraqi scientist described toractice that began in Ihend continued2ossible Husayn Kamil initiative This initiative reportedly named Al Mumiazin, or "thenvolved nominaiing candidates for post-graduate education based on their loyalty to the Regime, institution or superior rather lhan their technical competence. These "distinguished"reportedly had lesser grades and wereolder than published lequiremenis. according to an ISO interviewenior Iraqi scientist

a possible bid to counter the corrosive effect of selecting personnel for political and professional reasons, in the. Iraq established aprocess through which to conductinto possible BW related bacteria and toxins. This sysiem. used throughout lhe BW program, utilized companmcnicd small clusters headedenior scientist who had extensiveenior technician with extensivewiih eilher the agentlass of bacteria of interest according lo multiple sources whoin tbe former program.

Research Facilities

BW Agent Research

o develop BW sianed4 at the Al Hasan Ibn-al-Haytham Institute. Initially the BW effort was locatedouse in the Al 'Amiriyah suburb of Baghdad, and then moved lo AI Hasan site numberlso known as the Ibn-Sina Center, al Al Salman. The biological pan of ihe Al Hasanwas "research on microorganism tor mililaryt included antibiotic and environmental resistance, means of production, and agentAgents included Staphylococcus aureus. Bacillus species, Vibrio choleras, botulinum toxin, influenza and polio viruses, and others. Although therelevant piece of the Al Hasan biological program seems to haveiatus with the closure of ihe Institute, biological activities, not specifically directed toward BW weapons continued unabated at ihe Al Salman sile.

In the formative phases of the BW program, the Ibn-Sina Center was ihe primary center for. Someontinued unabated at Ibn-Sina Center, which began to broadenhen (jaq revitalized Ihc militarily relevant BW program in the, Al Muihanna was ihe primary site7 when the program again moved to the thn-Sina Center. However, Al Muthanna continued witharticipation such as thai wiih ricin and aflatoxin on behalf of Alontinued at the Ibn-Sina Center until mid to0 even after much of ihe BW program moved to the newlyAl Hakam facility

ith the compulsory acquisition of ihe Al Dawrah FMDV Plant and Ihe Agriculture Water Resource Center (AWRQ facilitynd production of aflatoxin moved to the AWRC.as conducted duringt TABRC. Al Hakam continued ioeyacilityhen il was destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. Additionally. Al Hamath, TABRC. and Ihe Tariq Facility (Failujah III) were also key sites during ihis period (fOT more complete information onacilities and ISO's exploitations, secn BW Research and Development).

Iraq's efforts to develop BW agents were extensive, and in the years leading up to the first Gulf war Bughdadide range of biological agents with potential mililary applications. ISG investigated the extent of Iraq's research prior io ihe war. and assessed the degree to which Baghdad pursued development of these agents in Ihc aftermath of Desen Storm.

Bacillus anlhracis ('Agent B')

Baghdad invested considerable time and effort prior1 in the development of anthrax as aweapon. ISG assesses that the effort ended with Desert Storm. However, studies of simulants aided the quality of any future anthrax products.

n growing the anthrax organism andsporulation was initiated at Al Hasan site numberut ihe work was terminated at ihe endas reinitiated5 at AI Muthanna. Although denied by Dr. Rihab, the studies may have picked up where the AI Hasan studies left off, and work progressed rapidly and included laboratory production, characterization and storage.

After the transfer of the BW effort from Alto Al Salman, scale up production and aerosol studies (dry and liquid) were conducted. Ainterest inuitable dry product and ihe efforts expended iouitable drying capability continued at Al Salman and later at Al Hakam.

Iraq obtained iwo capable dryers that wereinto Baghdadne of these dryers was located at Al Hakamraq also tried

to obtain an "aseptic" spray dryer (identical to ihose air-freighted to Baghdad, but with additional biological containment capabilities)his dryer was not delivered by the supplier.

tests (using simulantsnthracis spores) were conducted in80 aerial bombs. Dynamic and sialic trialsm rocket warheads tilted with simulant9rials wete ihenin0erial bombs, again tilled with anthrax simulant.

ISG continued to gain more insightork donehich reinforced the findings of UNSCOM detailed below. However, no new information has been obtained on H.onducted after6 destruction ofAl Hakam.

Ihamirey figure in Iraq's anthrax workoM ISG thai he attempted to obtain the Ames strain of B. anthracis which he considered "very virulent" while unending aworkshoput he was unsuccessful in that endeavor. Iraq declared researching different strains of B. anthracis. but settled on the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC)s the exclusive strain for useW.

Prior lo work on die pathogenic strains of B. anthracis. Dr. Rihab directed the scientists to use sunogates in their early and more advanced stagesnd production. Accordingly, experiments were done with surrogates, B. thuringiensis.subtilis and Bacillus megaterium, in order to determine appropriate growth conditions. Her logic was in part for safety. She wanted to permit die researcher to familiarize and learn proceduresonpathogenic organism before attempting to use pathogenic ones. These bacillus strains were used to simulate work on B. anthracis by researchers at Al Hakamimilar practice apparently was. Laboratory-scale work was done with the fi. thuringiensis Israeliensis strain at Al Hakam to determine optimized growth conditions. The main work, and ultimateof B. thuringiensis was conducted utilizing the Kurstakii strain. B. megaterium was researched al Al Salmanodel1 fermentor.

One large field experiment was also planned and, according to the source, the experiment involved spreading of ihc bacteria by an airplane. ISG found no funher information on this experiment. The information provided by the source confirmsknowledge about Iraq's use of B. thuringiensis, B. subtilis and B. megaterium as simulants for B. anthracis. However, as this is ^formation that comesingle source. ISG is unable tothe veracity of tlie claim of continued research into /i. anthracis at Al Hakam following1 Gulf war.

ISG found information that indicated that research into anthrax vaccines was conducted at the Abu Ghurayb Veterinary College (Baghdad University, College of Veterinarynfortunately. ISG was noi able to obtain further information as to what this research involved or what vaccine strain was utilized.

Clostridium botulinum (Botulinum tnxin, 'Agent A')

ISG has uncovered no further information to suggest that Iraq actively continued to research and produce C. botulinum for useW weapon following1 Gulf war.

n botulinum toxin was an integral pan of the Al Hasan site numberfTons appeared to be modest but were focused on growth conditions for maximizing loxin yield. This effort was terminated at the end8 when Al Hasan was dissolved.

Tests then were re-established when the militarily relevant BW program was revitalized5 al Al Mulhanna. Seemingly, building on ihe knowledge gained by the AI Hasan effort, rapid progress was made. Byefore ihe program was moved to Al Salman, inhalation studies on botulinum toxin were conducted in the 5m* inhalation chamber ai Al Mulhanna.

At AI Salman, siudies progressed lo where field vials on lhe dispersal of liquid botulinum toxin usingerial bombs were conducted infter the move to Al Hakamith ils larger agent production capability, sialicnd dynamicrials were conducted using

m rocket warheads at the Al Muhammadiyai lesterial bombs were also tested in0 as were the effects of metals (simulating ihe interior of munilions) on the agent

Clostridium perfringens ('Agent C') iVo infonnaiion was discovered lo suggestelated research into C. perfringens continued after1 Gulf war. Following Ibe end of OIF, ISG obtained infonnaiion relating to C. perfringens thai essentially confirmed previous UNSCOM findings regarding Iraq's work on this bactcriiumW agent.

In later. Rihab initiated research on C. perfringens, known as 'Agent G', to facilitate its useW agent. The developmeni of 'Agent G' occurred al the Technical Research Centerl Salman, and was directed by 'Ali Shihab during the. Dr. Rihab instructed the researchers to investigate ihc various strains and identify the most effective for usearge-scale BW agent. Accordingource, ihe intent of ihe research was io disseminate C. perfringens as spores.

The initial stage of the C. perfringens project focused onedium in whkh io optimize growth. Researchers procured Duncan and Strong growth media and modified the salt and nutrient levels. This initial research on media and isolates occurred in the beginninghe second phase of ihe research focused on bench scale production ofpores', wiih ihe first successful production of C. perfringens spores in

As pari ofthe second phase of research, the research protocol called for animal testing to be conducted quarterly and the results fcawarded via an official report to Dr. Rihab. ISG has two accounts for the testing thai occurred. One source describes research conductedmall aerosol chamber on rabbits and mice attempting toabraded skin in these experimental animals. The results obtained through ihese experiments left the test animals with lesions typicalnfeciion. The second accouni also involves the use of an inhalation chamber to aerosolize spores and infect the laboratory animals bul after autopsies were performed, researchers concluded that aerosolized spores may not he effectiveW agent. They then began injecting 'Agent G' via syringe and ihis resulted in successful tests using

guinea pigs and mice. The animals developed Gas Gangrene infections at ihe wound sites anddied. Results from the successful tests were reported io Dr. Rihab inho instructed ihe researchers lo move the production of 'Agcnl G*arger scale.

Anatoxin ('Agent C>

n aflatoxin began in8 based onnonmilitary work on anatoxin by Dr. Imad. Good progress was made which led to an initial weapons test inonsisting of sialic trialsm rocket warheads. Additional testing involved combining aflatoxin with CS and CN incapacitating agents as well as mustard CW agent. Studies included potency retention under conditions and temperature of deployment as well as effect of metals on the agent. This was followed by dynamic testing trials in1erial bombs and Al Husayn missile warheads were munitions selected for BW weaponization in

n individual at the Central Public Healthworked for ihe SSO and was responsible for checking Saddam's food forhaving an aflatoxinource wiih direct access but of unknown reliability. According to the same source, Ihc former director of CPHI. had been involved in offensiveresearch until ul

Debrielings since3 of sources formerly involved with BW efforts indicate thai Iraq at least continued research on aflatoxin throughout.GS forensics laboratoryl of aflatoxin for testing on humans, accordingid-level scieniisi who formerly worked in the BW program and visited the sile.

Brucella

Dr. Rihab supported inclusion of brucella inrogram and actively supported pre-Desert Storm research to that end. That initiative, however, appears to have ended in the wake ofthe first Gulf war.

Accordingource, Dr. Rihab wanted to addto the list of BW agents. Accordingormer

mid-level scientist who worked ai several Iraqi BW program locations, he conducted research onat Al Hakam prior to Desen Storm and later at Baghdad University2 using imported strains and patient isolates, respectively, according to the scientist. The research included isolating bacterium, growing it in culture, extracting and purifying ils toxins, and testing the toxin on mice. Although this research was not declared to UNSCOM, the scientist stated that his thesis was open.

Rihab and Ahmad Munada. the Director General of the former TRC, recommended that the scientist conduct the research as part of graduate degree on Brucella at Baghdad University under theof Alice Krikor Agap Mclkonian. Before the war, the researcher conducted laboratory work at Al Hakam and course work at the university. Rihab provided the Brucella abortus isolate the researcher used at Hakam but it was not from the B. abortus isolates obtained by Rihab from American Type Culture Collection: none of these had been opened. The scientist stopped research on Brucella during the war but resumed his work after that at theworking on isolatesospital patient. According to the mid-level scientist, the Brucella work was not secret and his thesis about the work was not classified.

afterthewar.workonBnice//ttrcstaned at the College of Science with an isolate from

a patient at the Ibn-al-Khatib Hospital and was coordinated through the Ministry of Health. During the project. Brucella was isolated and grown. The researcher extracted and purified the endotoxin, tested it on mice and determined the toxin was not as effective as Shiga toxin, ricin or botulinum. Rihabopy of the researcher's report and work on Brucella was supposed to start on the person's return to Al Hakam but it was put on hold by Dr, Rihab2 to focus on research and production of II. thuringiensis.

ons also conducted at lhe Abu Ghurayb Veterinary College, bul ISG has no information on the extent of this work.

Research into aliernative media for the growth of Brucella was conducted following the introduction of0 UN sanctions. This research wasout by 'Ali Shihab. ISG found no information to indicate ibe timescale of research, the results or whether Ihc research was successful.

After ihe establishment of ihe Al Razi Centerhe Microbiology department, directed by Dr. Antoine Al Bana. carried out research intokiis for Brucella. The facility was visited hy the ISG BW team who discovered Brucellaisolates obtained from Al 'Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute <ASVI) (seehe snains found were B. abortus and B. meliiensis. Although, pre-OIF. lhe facility had maintained lhe capability loconduci successfuln Brucella, there were no indications that this had occurred.

Ricin

The evidence surrounding Iraq's investigation of ricin for BW purposes is unclear, and thus ISG can offer no definitive conclusion. It Is clear that Baghdad had weaponized ricin in alimited fashion prior to the first Gulf war. There is al least some evidence of post-war IIS involvement in ricin research and possible human testing, but ISGno definitive information with which lo confirm reports of poit-war production.

n ricin had its origin in thet ihe Scientific Research Cenier (SRO.ctive collaboration was sought from personnel at Al Salman. The research proceeded apace with initial Held trials using ISS mm shells inhe work ai die SRC was initiated ai ihe behest of an offi -cial with the Internal Security Service who followed the efforts ihrough lhe field trial (see

ISGocused investigation into Iraqi work withtoxin derived from castor beans (Rici-nus communis) of the indigenous Iraqi R. communis plants. The search io dale has yielded conflicting information about the use of castor beans andricin work

ISO is aware from UNSCOM reporting lhat Iraqlimited weaponizalion of ricin prior to Desert Storm and that it conducted partially successful field trials with ricin. Based on this, ISG focused on two main themes: (I) pan of ihc Al Tariqknown as Failujahcastor oil production,he reported IIS work with the toxin. While ISG has not been able lo find direct evidence of recent ricin production, several sources have providedthai suggest that work on ricin toxin continued wellossibly until the beginning of OIF.

lhc ISO team examined in detail ihe Al Tariq Facilityite that supplied Al Tariq with castorthe Al 'Aziziyah farms. The learnumber of scientists and engineers employed at Al Tariqroup of farmers from Al 'Aziziyah, obtaining from eachry different picture about work at Al Tariq and Ihe intended use of the castor beans. Al Tariq staff employees maintained thai castor beans were used exclusively for lhc processing of castor oil for the brake fluid and tire production industries. They also admitted contemplating the use of castor oil as an anti-foaming ageni in the yeast industry. When promptedew more specifics, one Al Tariq employee explained away the aciiviiy as being pharmaceutical-related. Another shipment of castor beans,niversity, remains to be explained. For more information on this facility, see Annex 2.

ISG has investigated claims by former IISa former IIS eJiemlst and his former supervisor, the late Dr. Althe IIS produced ricin until at5 and possiblylthough ISG has not yet obtained direct evidence of ricin work.

Interviews wiih Dr. Alformer IISand scientific advisor iothat the IIS researched ricinW agente himself was directly involved wiih ricin workhen Husayn Kamil demanded ihebe turned over io Dr. Rihaboctor from the Ministry of Agriculture.

Dr. Al Azmirli claimed lhat2icin was being produced at AI Shameir Hospital in Al Rashad until ii was transferred to Aleparate former ILS official confirmed that Al Azmirli produced approximately twoof ricin al the Ar Rashidiyah plant1n exploitaiion of the Ar Rashidiyah plant corroborated the location and presenceacility, but ISO could not confirm thai ricin work had occurred there because of extensive looting.

Mun'im Mustafalose friend of Dr. Al Azmirli. reportedly told Al Azmirliroup of people was actively pursuing ricin for wcaponiza-tion. As oficin was being developed into stable liquid to deliver as an aerosol in small rockets, clusier bombs, and smoke generators, according io Al Azmirli.

Documents obtained from Dr. Al Azmirli'sincluded an MSc thesis on the topic of ricin written by 'Adnan lasim from Baghdad University.

ISG has investigated claims from several sources that work on ricin toxin continued wellossibly until the beginning of OIF. Thethat ISG obtained on the potential role of ricin in Iraq's BW program1 has primarily been based on single source reporting of unclear veracity.

The IIS was involved in the research and limited production of ricin for the developmentource stated thai 'Adnan Abd-al-Rasa'il Al 'Ubaydi was responsible for all research related to ricin conducted by the IIS.ew milligrams of ricin. The IIS was then ordered not to continue with the ricin projeci because Husayn Kamil warned ihe project. The source slated lhat all research and productionwere turned over io Dr. Rihaboctor from ihe Ministry ofroup in Al Hakam was then involved in ricin production

Accordingingle source, ihe MIC maintained fields of castor plants in the Al 'Aziziyah area for sale io ihc Al Tariq Company. According to

a SOurce, the castor beans harvested from these crops were allegedly used to make brake fluid and "chemicalhen asked if the "chemical weapons" were possibly insecticides or pesticides, ihe source staled thai die "chemical weapons" were used againsl humans. As lhc productingle source, this information is hard to verify.

During ihe approximate period4usayn Kamil. ihen Head of MIC, gave an order lo confiscate farmland lhat belonged lo the source in lhe area of Al 'Aziziyah. By Husayn Kamil's order, casior plants were to be planted on the acquired land and lhe MIC remained responsible forihc beans for each year's planting. The source also reportedasior crop was planted every year within different farming areas in theof the Al 'Aziziyah. To hide the fact that MIC possessed dedicated castorover Story was developed between MIC and the Ministry of Agriculture or Ministry for Industrial Craps. Wheat, com and cotton were subsequently planted in Ihe vicinity of the casior crops,cover crop.'" The Ministry of Agricultureover for lhe MIC in lhe area of Al "Aziziyah with offices for project managers. The same source indicated lhat the cover story was used lo deceive UN inspectors.

All (he casior beans grown at this location were delivered lo the Al Tariq facility. Accordinghe source no payment was ever made for the castor beans. The only paymeni (hat occurred for tlie overall transaction was to the farmers who worked in the fields. There were various project managers who handled paying (he farmers, who were on lhe payroll of the Tariq facility and ultimately MIC. The castor crops were planted in approximalely February and March, and harvested annually in September. Bach harvest yieldedkg of castor beans. The Al Tariq facility would normally send four or fivehe AI 'Aziziyah warehouse to take delivery of the castor beans.

During an exploitation of the TABRC facility, the teamiece of equipment theywas associated with de-hulling of castor beans (seehe exploitation team alsoon press containing an oily residue andample of ihis material. This materialositive tcs( for ricin.ositive result was obtained this discovery does not indicate on its own any illicit activity on behalf of the facility, as any step in (he production of castor oil willositive test for ricin. The scale of the equipment was small and no reason was provided as tn the purpose of the machinery.

ISGaboratory at Ihe Al 'Abud Trading Complex, Baghdad. Evidence of ricin was found in samples collecied. boih by field analysis and at ISG laboratory assays.

Based on ihc materials, equipment, and manual found al lhe site. ISG judged (he complex did noi appear to he related to the Regime's chemical, or biological weapons programs. Rather, it appears to he an extremist-run laboratory wiih equipmeni and reagents thaiinimum could he used toricin. Biological growth mediums andprecursors (tricthanolaminc) were also found in lhe laboratory

Wheat Cover Smut

n vvheat cover smui (bum of wheat) was initialed4 at the Al Salman site. After the BW militarily relevant program was moved from Allo Al Salman, the wheal cover smui project was mergedungi and fungal loxin group within Dr. Rihab's group. Smut spores were tested in Sialic field trials inesis to evaluate smut sporesarrier for aflatoxin were also part of lhe program. No additional information has been found by ISG related io Iraq's interest in and work on smui spores.

Viruses

Prior lo Ihe first Gulf war Iraqange of viral agenis as pan of Us BW program. ISG has uncovered no direct evidence Ioenewed interest or organized program lo re-etlahlish an Iraqi viral BW program and judges that Baghdad's viral BW effort ended

Researchers involved inW research ai the Al Hasan Institute reportedly attempted to develop influenza virusW agent and weren polioviruses. There were two virologists in ihe original group; oneS trainedDr. Muzhir Al Falluji, who had (raining andin animal orthopox (smallpox like) viruses; Ihe other was Dr. Muslih Aleirector of Ibn-Sina Center) who worked on poliovirus. Dr. Al Falluji raughl several classes ai the College ofMedicine. The Al Hasan Institute was closed9 and along with it, Ihe viral programs.

Iraq's viral BW program began its research and(R& D) phases in0 under theof Dr. Hazim 'Ali. This was the second known attempt by Iraq to conduct BW viral research.3he Ibn-Sina Center of the Al Hasan Ibn-al-Haytham Research Foundation conducted research at its Al Salman site.

Iraq subsequently revived its BW programme in the. The revival of the Iraqi viral BW program began in early to0 when Dr. Hazim 'Ali was chosen to lead the effort. Iraq's pursuit of viral BW beganears after the initiation of its research for bacterial and fungal agent development.

According to Hazim 'Ali. the viral BW program ended onhis information is consistent with an English-language documeni titled "Viral Agents Program" obtained through theof ISG. which states that work on the viral program began0 and wasonhen all specimens were destroyed. This is in contrast to information provided to UNSCOM that included laboratory notebooks and ISO information stating that Dr. Hazim 'Ali isolated and began growing camelpox in

Because of pre-OIF intelligence assessments about Iraq's possible possession ol' smallpox, ISGextensive investigations thai included she visits and multiple interviews to determine theof this assessment. ISG has collectedand circumstantial information that provides no definitive conclusions, cither way on this issue.

ISG has collected information from credible sources from therogram demonstrating Iraq's interest and intent in developing pathogenic viruses specifically smallpox.

Further. ISG assesses that Iraq maintained the capability in its personnel and basic equipment tonto viral agents including smallpox.

Finally coinciding with1 Gulf war. Iraq intended toroduction base to suppon pathogenic viral production.

Camel Pox

Iraq's interest in camel pox and ils inclusion in Ihe viral BW program have led ISC to assess thai camelurrogate for smallpox research, analogous lo the use of nonpathogenic Bacillusand Bacillus anthracts.

According to Hazim 'All, researchers in Iraq's BW program followed the practice of working with particularly pathogenic micro-organisms surrogates to facilitate transition to ihe actual pathogens. This approach permitted the researcher to familiarize and learn techniques, procedures and processes to increase the safety margin for the researcher and technicians.

Dr.wn words, Hazim's decision to work with camel pox was because "ii was near tohen directly questioned about Ihe possibility of smallpox in Iraq, she misspokeccasions saying 'Ihete is no camel pox in Iraq."

pox was one of the three viruses chosen for ihe viral BW program by Hazim 'Ali. According to Hazim, no experiments were conducted todie effectiveness of camel pox on humans. His decision to develop camel pox was based on his research of citations from standard microbiology and microbial infection textbooks. Hiswas that camel pox causes rare cases of human infection but these were not severe. Dr. Hazimationale for ihe utility of camel poxossible BW pathogen remains inconsistent with current and historical published scientific and medical

ISG has no information to contradict his statements lhat his research only succeeded in initial isolation of camel poxlinical specimen obtained from the Veterinary Diagnostic Research Center in Abu Ghurayb.

The camel pox sample (scab) was not availablebut by the end ofazim 'Aliample and successfully isolated the virus in chicken eggs. Chicken eggs were inoculated wiih the camel pox and the results were promising with some characteristic lesions (while pox marks)on the chorioallonloic membrane of the chicken egg. These lesions on ihe chorioallontoic membraneen-day old chicken embryo were characteristic of infections described in textbooks.

Hazim claims he cannot remember if animal testing occurred. Ihc source statedilot experiment should have been conducted with the isolate to assess for activity in an animal; rabbits are particularly susceptible to camel pox. However, he could not remember an actual test of the viral isolate on rabbits due to the critical time in which the test would hase occurred;1 Gulf war. Hazim does not believe that anyone else could have carried out thisin his absence or without his knowledge.

llazim investigated existing facilities in Iraq for scal-ing-up the production of camel pox if and when that was possible or necessary. He decided on using the chonoallontoic membrane method of viral eggAlthoughlan for large-scalehe inspected the Veterinary Service Center in Irbil. It was used in the production of animal vaccines for Newcastle disease and fowlpox. The Irbil facilityoderate scale egg production capability but according to Hazim an untrained staff. The large size of the facilily required was explained duehe fact that the amount of virus obtained through this method would onlyg of tissue.

This facility was autonomous to the Iraqi Government and an order to commandeer the plant for Hazim's activity was signed by the Minister of Agriculture. However, the order was never implemented.

Dr. Hazim 'Ali's performance in leading andIraq's fledgling viral BW research, based onby his colleagues, was underwhelming. Rihab described him asan to work byr. Nasir Al Hindawi commented Uiat Hazim 'Ali did notingle virus.

Smallpox

ISG concludes lhal Iraqntent to develop smallpoxtrategic viral BW agent and had Ihe basic capability to work with variola majorowever, ISG has collected no direct evidence lhal Iraq either retained or acquiredvirus isolates or proceeded with any follow up smallpox related research. ISG assesses, however, that Iraq did have the capability to conduct research into smallpox, if notanner up to Westernontainment standards. Iraq possessedsuch as Ihe Al Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Planl and At Rod Center had equipmeni that could potentially be used to work on high-risk agents such as smallpox.

Prior to OIF, the US intelligence community assessed thai Iraq probably retained samples of thevirus and may have been researching it for BW purposes, ll was also stated that it had no information indicating whether such work was ongoing. Despite the limited information gained by the UNlaimenior player in Ihe CBW program that the intent of lhe viral BW program was to sveaponize smallpox, ihc additional information uncovered by ISG has noi provided evidence offfort to wcaponize smallpox.

According to Dr. Mahmud Farraj Bilal Alenior official involved in the weaponization and testing of CBW agents, the aim of lhe viral BW program was intended for ihe weaponization of smallpox. He states thai Dr. Hazim 'Ali staned with Camel pox since it was easier to work with for development, but ultimately the program was intended to progress lo smallpox. Dr. Bilal did not knowact that samples of smallpox existed within Iraq but slated that 'Ali might obtain them from lhe Baghdad Central Public Health laboratory or collections al ihe Al 'Amiriyah Serum andInstituter. 'Ali Mukhlif. Dr. Hazim 'Ali's sponsor to work with the TRC. told Bilal the intention of ihe program and Hazim's activitieseeiing at Al Mulhanna

During investigations conducted by ISG and earlier by UNSCOM. Dr. Hazim "Ali occasionally referred io "smallpox" when questioned aboui iheir research and quickly retracted the statement io say "camelhe source was unable to provide anas io why he repeatedly made this mistake. This type of mistake added to the confusionIraq'sffons on smallpox. Hazim stated that he would not be surprised if smallpox isolates were found in Iraq andtwo culture repositories where viral cultures could be maintained over extended periods of time: Al Dawrah FMDV Plant and the Baghdadone were found by ISG. However, the CPHL seed stock repository was reported to hase been systemi-

cully looted post-OIF (sec below, under "Feasibility of Maintaining Smallpox Culturesnd the Al Dawrah FMDV Plant was effectively shut down and electricity turned off after it was rendered unusable

Contrary to comments made by Dr. Al Hindawi that there were no virologists in Iraq. ISC identified and interviewed closeozen, mosdy US and UK trained, highly capable PhD virologists. Several had experience with orthopox (smallpox like) viral research experience mostly with animal related pox viruses. One actually performed genetic engineering research on animal pox viruses attempting toecombinant animalouple hadworking with the smallpox vaccine strainHowever, none of Iraq's "besi and brightest" virologists were assessed directly involved in Iraq's BW efforts. After extensive interviews, none could provide direct information concerning the existence of historical or recent smallpox isolates or research. (See the accompanying lextbox on reported Iraqi retention of smallpox isolates.)

Iraqi Retention ofSnutilpox Culture*

cannot be certain whether or not Iraq had smallpox seed stock to OIF. ISG investigated Iraq's technical and practical capabilities to maintain viral or clinical smallpox isolates from then Iraq.umber of senior Iraqi scien-lists and virologists ISG could make no definitive conclusions. ISG notes the staled intent of Husayn Kamil0 to develop more virulent viruses as part of the BW program. While Hazim did notthis objective. ISG cannot rule out ihethat other, yet unidentified, researchers were given ihe responsibility to attempt to do so.

inistry of Health (MoH) reported to ihe World Health Organization that no smallpox cases had occurred in Iraq since an outbreaknd attested in wriiing iliat all remaining smallpoxand clinical specimens were destroyedhere was. however, no independent verification of the destruction of smallpox isolates or clinicallhat may have been retained hy either clinical or research institutes, and subsequent reporting on the subject is contradictory:

source ISG interviewed was an advisor to the Iraqi Minister of Health0e staied thai he% certain" that Saddam did not destroy the last smallpox samples.

' Conirarily, Rihab slated categorically lhat no isolates of any kind were inherited by her from iheW effort.

enior Iraq scientist at Al 'Amiri-yah Serum and Vaccine Institute, he was ordered by Mall urgently to produceillion doses of smallpox vaccinehis source was theresponsible scientist involved in this effort. By his accounis, the Iraqi MoH attempted to procure smallpox vaccine seed stocks from the World Heahh Organization (WHO)or this effort. The WHO refused Iraq's request citing ihe recentin the eradication program.

Intelligence reports dating back4 suggest that Iraq may have obtained smallpox cultures from

lhe former Soviet Union (FSUIiologist who had indirect access io ihis information staied thai Iraq acquired isolates of smallpox from Russiae went on to describe an effort to develop smallpox for the BW program2e described efforts to grow the virus in both eggs and tissue culture. This effort reportedly failed and ihe viral cultures were maintained at the CPHL The subject biologist is no longer in Iraq.

ISG has collected no information with which torefute or confirm lhe existence of smallpox isolates retained by Iraq from ihe period when the disease was still endemic, but if they were retained they would haveotentially serious threat in lhe contextenewed BW program.

assesses such viral cultures could remain viable for extended periods of time depending on the nature of the isolate, facility conditions and ihe overseeing scientist. Clinical smallpox specimens would be less likely to survive long-term storage unless they were held in liquid nitrogen. Frozen lyophilized smallpox isolates could, on the other hand, have an extended shelf life and probably remain viable for decades. Several institutes in Iraq had nitrogen freezer storage capabilities.

did learn that as lateraq wasihe viability of smallpox vaccine it produced

incientist who was involved in lhe production of the smallpox vaccine inas asked to test samples presumably from ihai Stockpile. The vaccine was found nonviable. At that time, he recommended ihai all remaining vials of thai vaccine be destroyed. He does not know if that recommendation was followed. Separately, ISG learned from Dr. Hazim 'Aliesearcher at the Baghdad University Medical College was actually producing smallpox vaccineor whom and for what purpose are unknown.

Baghdad College of Science was identified as one possible location for smallpox work prior io OIF. An ISG subject matter expert team visited the University of Baghdad, College of Sciences on three separate

occasions and toured the facilities in late May and earlyhe visit observed generally old. poor condition, and sparse laboratory equipment. The teamoomt markedStudies" which had locks on both doors. The loomarge autoclave. The room had iwo targe overlieadfume hoods ofthe type used in restaurants to Jtlter the air within the room. There wat one small plasticafety cabinet, several shakerlove box. old bottles of culture media. No freezers or liquid nitrogen containers were identified. During the course of its investigations, ISG inspected the At Hindi veierinary vaccine facility. This facility was similar in function io the one Hazim 'AH investigated in Irbil in0 thai produced Newcastle and animal pox vaccines.

* ISG inspected the production buildings and Observed that the equipment appeared to be for ihe expressed purpose of producing Newcastle vims vaccine in chicken eggs; however, this dual-use equipment was assessed to be easilyariola (smallpox) or other pathogenic viruses (see

ISG also visited ihe building where animal poxare produced in tissue culture. Theirwas that as with the Newcastle vaccine unit, ihe equipment in this building could also be used to produce large amounts of smallpox virus in tissue culture althinigh all equipment present is consistent with the expressed purpose of making animal

ISG learnedelevision news report lhal was broadcasted on Western television in3 that reported the CPHL had been looted of highly infectious virus such as smallpox, polio and influenza. ISG visited ike laner and iniervie wed seniorwho described the incident. Several visits to the CPHL and iruerviews with scientists and researchers have not shedfunlier light into the existence ofcultures being stored there. ISG didsecret lab" thai was operated there, which hadbeem vacated fahe nature oftlte. research in that laboratory was not determined.

Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever While Iraqi explanations for why CCIIF was not considered for the BW program remainsthere is little substantial information tothe explanation.

Hazim 'Ali argued against CCHF being considered endemic io Iraq but did not denyample could be obtained during the cyclical infection season. According u> Anioine Sabri Al Bana, Iraq's leading CCHF expert, the vims circulated widely in herd animals such as donkeys, sheep and goats.

Some cases of CCHF occurred in Iraq during the lime Hazim "AH was studying overseas and described an incident involving physicians, who unaware of the virus and its symptoms, were unprotected whilst ireaiing infected patients.esult, some of the physicians acquired CCHF and died. llazim 'Ali used thisexample to illustrate the introduction of the vims into Iraq and lhal il was noi actually endemic lo the country.

- According to Hazim "Ali, iwo researchers from the Veterinary Medical College worked together on diagnosing and isolating CCHF inhe duration of lhe experiment and the exient to which testing was conducted using animals, remains unknown. Hazim 'Ali claims not to know where exactly the practical isolation of the virus occurred becauseack of sufficient containment to work with the virus and no vaccine was available ai the time. The work of the two researchers was published. Isolation of the first case of CCHF in Iraq occurred

CHF outbreak occurred (hat resulted inases. Most cases were seen at the Al Khatib hospital, near Tuwaitha. south of Baghdad. The mortality rate even in treated cases approachesercent.

Acute Hemorrhagic Conjunctivitis

ISG has tnrestigated, but has found noto suggest lhal BW-related research into the contagious agent acute hemorrhagic conjunctivitis (AHCVf occurred after the alleged cessation of the

Iraqi viral BW program in1irain thai causes AIICV was introduced io Iraq in.

The documented work conducted on isolating AHCV was unsuccessful according to Dr. Hazimenior virologist involved in the Iraqi BW program attempted to isolate Rotavirus and AHCV from clinical isolates. When ihe source isolated AHCV and had evidently obtained cytopathic results, llie isolate was infected into Hep2 viro cells The results of the test were unsuccessful.

Rotavirus

According to the senior level viral researcher. Rotavirus, which causes an acute gastroenteritis, was chosen becauseheory at the time that as Americans were "morehey might be more susceptible to infection with rotavirus. Little new insinuation has been uncovered by ISGRotavirus, the third virus chosen for the Iraqi viral BW program.

Work was donesolate (he vims from clinical samples hu( ISG has no additional information to indicate (he success of these attempts.

Other RSI) Related lo BW Development

Biopeslicides

ISG judges that, following Desert Storm, inl Hakam shifted its focus from Bacillus anthracis production to Bacillusiopesticideimulant for B. anlhracts,echanism toey segment of Iraqi BW production base. This shift in focus allowed Iraq lhe opportunity to continue the pursuit of relevantandas (he development of an entirely indigenous growth media and the drying ofcould further achieve its desire for self-suflicicncy in BW.

Multiple sources told ISG that in order fur Rihab's former anthrax group to produce Bt, (hey required the assistance of scientists at TABRC who had

'Abd-al-Rahman, who was declared lo ihe UN as involved in Iraq's ft. anlhracis BW project, worked ai the TABRC oneeek beginning0CP project, according to an Iraqi microbiologist with direct access, but unknownThamir also was tenoned to have possibly. Ihuringiensis researcher at the TABRC. Jabbar Al Ma'dhihi, with some viability tests on B. ihuringiensis.

Multiple sources told us the primary mission of ihe TABRC was agricultural. Iheof TABRC'* activines involved cropand integrated pest management. As part of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) wilhin the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Complex, the facilityaiure scientific staff with expertise in recombinant DNA technology, microbiology, entomology, and access io agricultural pathogens, according to an Iraqi microbiologist of unknown reliability.

Dr. AlTABRCresearch into the hiopcslicidc B. ihuringiensis and consideted ileplacement for chemical pesticides in Iraq, according to an Iraqi scientist and former head of the anthrax program. Under Al Ma'dhthi's direction. TABRC reportedly conducted successful research into efficient small-scaleand drying of B. ihuringiensis that could potentially be applied to the BW agent. B. anthra-cis. ISG is uncertain whether informal or formal collaboration between TABRC and the Al Hakam factory occurred

Some of the research into the generic modification of ft. ihuringiensis done at TABRC in conjunction widi ihe Department of Biotechnology at Saddam University (now known as Al Nahrayn University)sed polyethylene glycolfusion methods, followed by screening, toew strain of ft. ihuringiensis thai would display high levels of biomass production as well as infectivity, according to an IraqiISGon thisthe TABRC had genetic engineering capabilities that could be applied to BW agents like anthrax, but have found no evidence to dale thai such work was done.

Simulants

Cell Protein

'simulants' are closely related to thethat they are substituting for, but lack theof the BW agent in humans. Thethe useimulant is that it can be safelya variety of purposes such as to accuratelymethods, storage conditions,parameters, and dispersal techniques.can also be usedariety ofactivities and therefore provide coverBW programs.

SCP is cell or protein extracts fromin large quantities for use as proteinfor example in animal feeds. SCP productionto alleviate problems of protein scarcity andused to replace costly com'entional sourcessoy meal andfishmeal. The use of agriculturalwastes for bioconversion to proteinand fodder stocks has the additionalmaking the final product cheaper.

Cell

ISG has found no direct evidence that theork carried out by TABRC into SCP was used to cover continuing research into the production of BW agents, like what was done alAI Hakam. Testing of samples taken during sile exploitations at TABRC and its SCP production subordinate, Al Hamath,S coalition BW exploitation team wen; negative for B. anthracis and C. botulinum (seeSG assessedhorough decontamination procedure or. more likely, that nor production of known BW agents occurred at these facilities.

An Iraqi microbiologist told ISG thai the TABRC's SCP academic research began in thend involved research, experimental testing, and pilot planl production. The work also involved the developmentrocess for upgrading the nutritional quality of the agricultural residues and wastes.

lhe Al Hamath facility workedroject for the pilot plant scale production of citric acid using Aspergillus niger. The process was abandoned when it was discovered thai the strain of A. niger used was unsuitable for use in submerged culture as the mycelium suffered damage under the continual agitation required for submerged culture.1 bloreactors from the abandoned citric acid production project were set aside for SCP work

at Al Hamath bui only one of the biorcactors was functional.

Growth

ISG fudges that beginning inraq decided indigenously to research and produce nutrient growth media that could be used to producestrains of bacteria to include B. anthracis. but no direct evidence has yet been uncovered that this media was used to produce B. anthracisr. Rihab described to ISG her BW group's research in developing indigenously produced media tothe effects sanctions imposed on Iraq after0 invasion.

Al Ma'dhihi was responsible for theof an indigenously produced media with ingredients that did not come under UN scrutinyesult of the sanctions against Iraq. Importantly, laboratory notebooks suggest the media was sery effective in inducing nearly one hundred percent spomlation of the B.nownfor the BW agent B. anthracis. with few or no additives or intensive monitoring of theprocess.

SGaboratory notebook dating back9 detailingconducted using Dr. Al Ma'dhihi's locally produced milk byproduct/com byproduct media and the B. thuringiensis variant Kenyae with impressive spomlation results. The notebook outlinedconcerning the effect of differentof the media and additives on spomlation of B. thuringiensis. These results were consistent with the claims made for the effectiveness of the media. One experiment detailed in the notebook showed thaiours growth of B. thuringiensis

in this locally produced media, thereer cent spore growthesulting viable counter milliliter.

Dr. Al Ma'dhihi's media was essentialossible Iraqi BW program as the media was made up ol the simple local ingredients, which arc bothof other food production processes. The milk byproduct, in particular,aste product. At Al Hakam. the corn byproduct was made fromproduced at the Al Hashimiyah State Factory in Al Hillah near Babylon. The milk byproduct was obtained from an unnamed dairy at Abu Ghurayb. Besides being indigenous and cheap it wasto monitor or account as partNprocess.

This locally produced media were utilized in the B. thuringiensis production process at Al Hakam and with growth requirements of B. thuringicm'tS being very close lo B. anthracis. the wheyVCSL media could potentially have been used at Al Hakam to produce B. anthracis. Dr. Rihab and Thainir 'Abd al-Rahman, the direcior of the B. anthracis project at Al Hakam. have both stated in interviews to ISG thai they are unaware of any tests on growing B. anthracis in the milk and com byproduct media. This is an odd statement becauseocument thai evaluated various growth media for growing Bacillus SpeciesB. anthracis-anommercially available media.

Thaoes further to state that there was no reason to replace lheedium declared as used in the anthrax programs as it was reliable, produced high sporulation rales and was made from simple sails commercially available within Iraq, and therefore there was no need to hide procuremeni signatures. However,edium (MGM) cannot be used alone to grow B. anthracis spores. MGM requires that the anthrax organism be grownery enriched medium first and lhal relative large inoculums be used in lhe last step ofthai usesedium. Thus using an alternative lo the enriched medium and MGM wouldaterial advantage to minimizescrutiny. Furthermore, al lhe lime ofof B. thuringiensis at Al Hakam. Iraq was under increasing scrutiny on ihe material balance of growth media from UNSCOM.

Dr. Rihab admined to ISG thai use ofocally developed milk and com byproduct B. thuringiensis media would permit evading monitoring of media to track fermentation activity.

anthrax expert's assessment was that it was highly probable that this media would achieverales of sporulation in anthrax production.

Dr. Rihab described to ISG her BW group's research in developing indigenously produced media lothe effects sanctions imposed on Iraq after0 invasion of Kuwait.

Dr. 'Ali Shihab did media work for an unspecified microbe. Shihab was Ihc lead scientist forperfr'mgens development. ISG assesses thai he was probably working on an alternative growth media for ihai organism.

Nasr Al Hindawi worked on alternative media for Brucella thatandidate BW agent undergoing basic research in the period coinciding with Desert Storm.

aghdad University worked on plantsource of bacteria growth media: the plant media was apparently suitable for pathogen growth, and Dr. Rihab had expressed her concern thai it might attract the attention of UNSCOM.

Aroundr. Al Ma'dhihi produced about five vials of B. thuringiensis formulated wiih bentonite and asked Tliamir. who waswith Dr. Al Ma'dhihieek al TABRC. for an assessmenl of their viability by re-growing ihemmall volume shake flask cullurc. One of Dr. Al Ma'dhihi's MSc studenis was working on ihis organism, although no other specific reason for this work was given. Thamir culturedtwo of the samples, with one of the resulting cultures exhibiting good activity of R0 ioercent mortality of test organism, the other performed poorly.

Multiple sources have told ISG lhatesearch and production at Al Hakam16 was done lo provide cover for the equipment and capability at this facility, yet ISG has not been providedood explanation as lo why an advanced capability lo dry agentsarticle size too small for efficient blopestidde use was established. An UNMOVIC documeni from3 on Iraq's Unresolved Disarmament Issues says lhat the particle size would have had linle use in agriculture and thai UNSCOM determined ihc B. ihuringiensis strain used did noi produce biopes-ticidal proteins, so il would noi have had any utilityiopesticide. ISO judges thai ihis work advanced Iraq's expertise and knowledge in large-scale drying of li. anihracis even if the ageni itself was noiand dried.

Iraq successfully dried B. ihuringiensis utilizing benioniiearrier and drying agent. Accordingource, only one grade of benioniie wasin Iraq and panicle size was dictated by this. Ihe bentonite was supplied through ihe Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIM) mining company. Talc was also successfully testedarrying agent but was determined to be too expensive forAcetone was experimented wiih at Al Hakamrying agent, but was found io be loofor large-scale production.

Accordingource, at Al Hakam the dried B. ihuringiensis was crushedm sized particles but ISG has found no information on who decided on this particle size. The same source claimed lhai ihe farmers using the B. ihuringiensis from Al Hakam did not like the size of the particles since it made direct dusting onto planis difficult. AI Hakam had plans to enlarge the particles to granular size but they had not completed this work when the facility was destroyed

Information sunounding the intended application of B. ihuringiensis remains conuadictory with no consensus on whether it was to be applied wet orenior researcher involved in the BW program has indicated thai the B. ihuringiensis was iniended for use against com borerset or dry application by farmers. Sources arc generally consistent in their assertion lhal the B. ihuringiensis was never iniended or tested for aerial application. Although theavailable suggests Iraq successfully dried B. ihuringiensis and producedOjim panicle size applicable for efficient BW agent dissemination. ISG has found no information thai Iraq actually used the same process lo produce wcarwnizablc dried B. aiuhracis.

Production Capability

ISCi judges that16 Iraqan expanding BW agent6 to OIF. Iraq still possessed small but significant dual-use facilities capable of conversion to small-scale BW agent production. ISG has found no evidence that Iraq used this capability for BW production.

Iraq maintainedtried to improve wheresmaller, but capable, "legitimate"capability at agricultural and educational sites that could have been used to produce small but significant quantities of BW agent. ISG, however, uncovered no information that Baghdad did so.

Samarra Drug Industries, for example, had the fixed assets that could be converted for BWeeks after the decision to do so, including utilities and personnel with know-how and equipmeni, not all of which had been declared to the UN. Site buildings contain numerousprocess tanks ranging in capacity-

iters together wiih ancillary equipment such as filter presses, autoclaves and bio-safety cabinets.

cannot disprove Ihe existence of Iraqifermentations systems that could have been used for BW. That said, no evidence has been found to date that there were such systems. ISG judges that the two mobile trailers found near Mosul and Irbil were not tor BW production (sec the accompanying annexes on mobile production facilities for funher information).

Iraq relied heavily on imported equipment and suppfte^ lo conduct Us BW program, wasupon dual-use civilian facilities togent, and took steps to mitigate the impact of sanctions on its ability to pursuegent production.

Iraq relied on equipment that had been imported for civilian purposes for the production of BW agent prior to the first Gulf war, and demonstrated the ability to quickly adapt civilian facilities to BW agent production. This equipment was relocatedurpose-built BW facility, Al Hakam. where the

production of botulinum toxin was startedlhe production of anthrax spores and C. perfringens (the causative agent of gas gangrene) followed later. Civilian facilities were requisitioned0 for the production of anatoxin (the Agriculture and Water Resources Center. Al Fudaliyah) and for theof additional quantities of botulinum toxin and possibly anthrax (the Foot and Mouth DiseasePlant, Alfter the war these facilities reverted back to their former use, and Al Hakam was disguisedCP (yeast)acillus(biopesticide) production plant.

Prior to the construction of Al Hakam, alternative locations and options were considered by the Iraqi authorities. Ihis included the possibility of having mobile production facilities. Pre-OIF intelligence reports indicated that Iraq had such facilities.

Baghdad's BW production centeredumber of importantfixedfacilities. The facility al Al Hakam was perltaps the most important, but Iraq pursued BWange of locations.

Iraq initiated production of BW agents (for field tests) at Al Salman7 using seven laboratoryliter vessels) and two smallfcrmcmors. Regarding ihc iwo small production fermeniors. one was acquired7 from the At Taji single cell protein (SCP)0 liter) and ihe oiheriter fermentoi purchased while lhe program was al Aledium capacity spray dryer also was transferred from the At Taji SCP Plant to lhe BW program

After ihe Al Hakam facility (northern production area) became functionaliteriter fermeniors were transferred to lhe new facilily.arger scale production capability was acquired by moving the Closiridial vaccineline from Al Kindi Veterinary Research Facility (laler named lhe Veterinary Vaccine ando Al Hakam. This collection of fermeniors andby the supplier io beofliter lank, andliter "tanks" andiler mobileiter fcrmcntors anditer "tanks" were all used in production of BW agents, Iraq asserted the mobile

lank was used only for storage and transport of bulkecond spray dryer that could produce smallof two air-freightedupplier to Baghdad inlocated at Al Hakam at the time of its first UN inspection in

dditional production capability was acquired for the BW program with the addition of Al Safa'ah (Agriculture and Water Resources Center at Fudaliyah) and Al Manal (Al Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vimsacilities to the BW program. Al Safa'ahizeable fermentation line consisting ofiter fcrmcntors andother tanks. Additionally, the facility had several incubators including one walk-in incubator, which allowed for some creative stacking of glass flasks said to be used for aflatoxin production. Al Manal had valuable high containment capacityiter mobile tank;iter anditer seed fermeniorsiter anditcr fcrmcntors;iter mobile tanks;iter,liter, anditer fcrmcntors. Of these, assortmentsiteriter fermeniors were used toapacityX concentrated) of agent per batch (not all of the available capacities were said by Iraq to be used in this production process) (sec

Additionally, other sites hadore limited scale, eg, Al Kindi Veterinary Research Laboratories (Al Kindi VVDP facility) and AI 'Amiriyah Serum Vaccine Institutet capability that would require modification on. Samarra Drug Industries. The Al Kindi VVDP facility retainediterduring Desert Storm, when the other tanks and ferine mors were transferred to Al Hakam. Production for viruses and bacteria employing glass flasks and embryonated eggs were less efficient bul ample.

Iraq declared work on larger-scale fermentation systems for SCP, andapability to produce large-scale quantitiesommercial biopesti-cide in the first UNSCOM inspections in the years immediately following1 Gulf war. Many former officials told ISG thai Iraq aggressively worked25 at Al Hakam to improve the production and processing of SCP and the biopesikide B. ihuringiensis in an attempt io save the facility from being destroyed by UNSCOM.

1raq continued to expand its dual-use production capability ai Al Hakamthe facility and equipmcni were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision inand associated equipmcni were transferred from Al Safa'ah to Al Hakam. Indigenously producedubic metersubic meters, were installed in the southern production atea. These were assessed by international experts as "not fancy but functional" although Iraq has staled to ISG thatubic meter fermeniors were not functional due to propeller shaft problems. Large physical plants were constructed in anticipation of acquiring twoubic meter turnkey fermentation systems. These were not delivered.

To avoid sanctions imposed after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Iraqrogram to develop the in-house manufacture of media and mediasuitable for the growth of bacterial BW agents, see Section. ISG site exploitations have revealed sites with the potential to undertake growth media production.

The large-scale production of bacterial BW agentsulti-stage process thairowth medium suitable for ihe selected organism togethertrain' of specialty, and fermentation equipment. Because of sanctions and UNSCOM inspections, beginning0 Iraq had difficulty obtaining an external supply of growth media for large-scale production of BW agent.N inspections, mandatory declarations and UN moniioring of growth media importation and use created further impediments for any Iraqiproduction effon. Rihab apparently began an effort0 first with some of her BW research-crs,and then later wiih ai least one scientist at ihe IAEC TABRC. to develop bacterial growth media from indigenous sources. Rihab stated that when the effort was initiatedhe intent was io circumvent sanctions placed on Iraq. ISG does not have evidence thai this effon was originally intended Io enable clandestine production of BW agents, but nevertheless provided some capabiliiy in this regard,

The production capabilities at Tuwaitha continued to expand during this period. The FMDV Plant at Al Dawrah remained functional until it was partiallyunder UN supervisionelecied fetmen-tots andas used in botulinum toxin production inremoved from the facility and destroyed at Al Hakam

Other facilities at AlDP Facility and AS VI recovered and made modest improvement incapability as did Samarra Drug Industriesuring this time frame two newKazi Institute andestablished in converted facilities. These organizations obtained highly qualified expertise, some of which were associated with the Iraqi BW program including Dr, Hazim "Ali, who headed Iraq's viral BW effort and was named Director of Al Razi Institute.

Beyond its important fad facilities, Iraq alsoimportant relocatable assets associated with its BW production efforts. The destruction in6 of the facilities and equipment involved in Iraq's BW program, including the equipmeni that bad been moved or installed at Al Hakamignificantly altered Iraq's dual-use capability, but did not eliminate all such capability.

At the Al Dawrah FMDV Plam,iier,iter, anditer fermentor as well asiter mobile tank were not destroyed under UN supervision in. These fermentors and tanks were not identifiedy UNSCOM as involved in Iraq's BW program. However. DNA evidence of fl. amhracis was found initer tanksiter fermentorll of these fermentors and tanks could be transferred from the FMDV facility to another sile or sitesew weeks after the decision to do so. ISG assesses ihese as relocatable production assets.

raq produced ai leastas many asmobile tanks that could beconvened into fermentors.iter lanks/fermentors were transferred from Al Kindi Vet Vaccine Facility ioAI Hakam. Of dieiteriter mobile tanks, onlyere ciicd as destroyed by Iraq.of such destruction ofnits was provided

io UNSCOM and stored al the UN Headquarters in the Canalis.emained after the alleged unilateral destruction of BW weapons and agents by IraqSG has determined that two more tanks were destroyed at Al Aziziyah. Of those remaining, fouriter imported tanks/fermeniors.

Rihab stated thai Iraq was able to produce one cubic meter model fermentors "with badocumentary evidence dated0 recovered by ISG indicates that Iraq convened one cubic meter storage tanks inio fermeniors thai are assessed to have been indigenously fabricated for Al Hakam under Rihab's supervision. These storage tanks have been an unresolved issue for ihc UN. Rihab denied receiving mobile tanks/fermeniors while aiAl Hakam

ISGocument thai indicatedne cubic meter tanks were connected prior0 to0 cubic meter fermentation planl (locationnother document indicates ihe delivery of anuch tanks

A spraysecond of two air freighted inio Baghdadvodel2 was located7 by UNSCOMarehouse in northern Iraq, the firstasaiAl Hakam1 and was destroyedefore lhe iwo weeks ii took toampling team, Iraq again relocated the dryer, completely disassembled it to cleanse andit and then reassembled it. Ihis dryer was under monitoring until8 by UNSCOM. lis present whereabouts is unknown.

ISO judges thatraqtried to improve wheresmaller, but capable, "legitimate"fermentation capability at agricultural and educational sites that could have been used to produce smaller, yet significantofBW agent, bul ISG has found no direct evidence to substantiate this possibility.

Break-Out Production Capability Pre-OIF

ISG judgesreak-out production capabil-ity existed at one site, the State Company for Drug Industries and Medical Appliances, SDI, at Samarra. Since Iraq could relocate production assets such as fermeniors, other sites wiih basic utilities could also be converted forull program tond production or even just large scale production would require months rather than weeks lo re-initiatereak-out

A break-out of large-scale proportion would require all three key production elements: fcrmcntor capacity, media capacity, and technicalreak-out capability must also take into consideration the scale and scope of the program being considered. Modest or small-scale break-outs would be easier and require less timeecision lo do so was made.arger scale and scope such as Iraq possessed0 would require more equipment, larger supply source, more personnelonger time period forstart-up. Iraq, having hadaturing program,ore group of experiencedetter siart lhan existedersonnel areassets as is growth media. While sanctions and inspections mayindrance to an ample supply of media, it would noi havehow stopper. Iraqilk and corn byproduct media that is judged to be adequate for the production of anthrax spores, albeiteduced production efficiency. Thus, the equipment for the scale and scope of abecomes the critical factor lorcuk-out capability.

ISO assesses the SDI to have the fixed assets lhal could be converted for BW agcnl production within four to five weeks after the decision to do so,utilities, personnel with know-how, and the(with slight modifications) required. Media and additional less-skilled personnel could be obtained (see.

ISO judges the movable assets at the Al Davvrah FMDV Plant could provide the cure of an alternative break-out capability ar any other suitable site in Iraq, perhapseeks after the decision to do so.ubic meter tanks or fcrmcntors presently unaccounted for arc other important assets that, if indeed still exist, could, when combined with the Al

Dawrah FMDV assets, exceed the capacityn this case media and personnel ate also movable asseis.

haq had shown the ability lo move fermentor assetsra. Iraq had also shown its ability to utilize small cadres of skilled personnel to lead clusters of less skilled personnel in lhc production process.

Iraq gained additional production and development know-how during thera.

Iraq has developed the capacity to producesubstitute media for Ihc production of some agents, such as com and milk byproduct media for anthrax spores.

ISG judges that Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) would likely be the agent of choice for breakout

It represented Ihc single strategic BW agent lhat Iraq had in ils historical arsenal.

Iraqrevious track record in large-scale growth, processing, testing and weaponizalion of amhrax spores.

Com byproduct medium, indigenouslyfor Bi production, would also be suitable for the growth of B. anthracis.

Mobile Assets

Prior toey source reported lhat Iraq hadobile BW capability designed to evade UN inspectors und to provide Baghdad the ability to produce BW agents for offensive purposes (see. According to the US Intelligence Community, this reporting was augmented by reports from at least ihree additional sources whoobile BW or fermenlalion capability existed in Iraq. The reported developmentobile BW agcnl production capability was acemral element in ihe pre-war assessment of Iraq's WMD programs and.esult, has been one ofthe key issues addressed by ISO.

MoQ'Ip ProolirTion Fne'lilips Foicnt

Figure II. Truck-mounted BWproduction unit, based on source reporting.

Regarding lhe mobile capabilily. ISO's BW team has focused primarily on following leads from the key source and ihe others wiih indirect or direct access to Iraq's BW activities lo bring us closer to anashether Iraq did indeed pursue anmobile BW agent production capability. The ISO cirbrt consisted Of debriefing over sistyand exploiting numerous sites identified as relatedransportable BW' production effort. However, ISG acknowledges that much of the siteeffort was hampered hy Iraqi posi-OIF activities such us turnover of employees and looting. Based on information collected by ISG, the key source was determined io be unreliable.

Debrietings and site visits have uncoveredthai differs with pre-OIF reporting, including denials of ihe existence of ihc program fromallegedly involved. ISG lias exhausted many leads and exploited many sites reportedly pertaining io Iraq's alleged mobile BW agent productionand have obtained no additional evidence lo corroborate the claim of ihc existenceobile BW program. As for other individuals lhat alleged Ihc existenceobile BW capabilily, ISG has noi been able lo corroborate this reporting and believe thai these individuals arc outside of Iraq.

for BW, bul ISG uncovered no evidence thai there were sucheport covering the detailed investigations of ISG is attached as Annex 3.

As part of its investigationossible Iraqi mobile BW agent production program, two mobile iraileis thai were recovered near Irbil and Mosul3 have been examined by ISO. These trailers had tanks or suspected fermeniors on board and were initially suspected to be partobile BW agent production program. ISG judges lhal ils Iraqi makers almost certainly designed and built the equipmeni exclusively for lhe generation of hydrogen. ISG judges that it is impractical to use the equipment for the production and wcaponi/ation of BW ageni, and cannot therefore be part of any BWeport covering the detailed investigation of the trailers by ISG, is aiiachcd as Annex 4.

has found no evidence in suppon ihc view lhat the trailers were used, or iniended to be used, for ihc production of BW agents, or ihe filling of BW

weapons.

Tlie design of the equipmeni makes il unsuitable foe the production of BW agent and impractical as panW weapons production system.

The information gathered, and ihe assessment of the equipment on the trailers, arc consistent with the theory ihai Iraq developed ihe nailers for hydrogen gas production.

These findings reflect the assessment solely of the two specific mobile units that were located, and do noi necessarily mean thatapability or intent did not exist.

cannot disprove the existence of Iraqi transport' able fermentation systems that could have been used

Wcaponl/ation

Between thend the start of Desert Stormraq attempted toange offor the dispersion ofBW agent. In the dash to field viable BW weapons the workers in the program adapted robust bombs capable of mounting on many types of aircraft and warheads, including the AI Husayn missile. They also worked furiously to ready an aircraft spray system.

The scientists and engineers conducted weapons trials over some three years with both simulants and BW agents, on occasion using living animals as targets. Delivery systems testedelicopter-bome spray system, aerial bombs, artillery shells, multi-barrel rocket launchers, long-range missile warheads and an aircraft mounting of an adapted auxiliary fuel tank.

In the haste to prepare1 conflict, systems tried and tested with CW agents were preferred;erial bomb and the Al Husayn warhead, charged with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. Additionally, engineers at

Al Muihanna rushed the auxiliary fuel tank, modifiedpray system, of theircraft into service (sec.

- Prior lo Desert Storm, Iraq had dedicated complimentary programs to develop spraythat could effectively disseminate either CW or BW agents. These spray dispersal systems were intended for use in conjunction wiih various developmental unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) programs. Initial testing was quickly beginning to show progress by the time of Desert Storm. Since that time however, while their desire for these systems remained, their developmental work shifted focus. Due to the attention of the UNSCOM inspectors, the developmental effort shifted away from the more controversial sprayoward completing the Irmger range UAV goals.

ISOimportantthe former Regime clandestinely desiroyed almost all of Iraq's biological WMD and long-range missilesumerous interviews wiih high-ranking Iraqi political figures. WMD scientists, and mililary and security officers indicate thai aflera brief period of concealmentraqi leaders decided to destroy Iraq's undeclared weapons stockpile in secret.

Shortly after the passage of Security Counciln earlyraqi leaders also decided to erase all traces of therogram.

By the autumnraq probably accomplished both lhc destruction of the weapons stockpile and surviving evidence ofthe BW program.

Interviews conducted by ISG haveeasonably coherent picture of this unilateral destruction, with few conflicting details, although important questions about the disposition of bulk BW agent and bacterial reference strains remain.

ISG judges lhat the former Regime destroyed most of its hidden stockpile of BWeweapons probably either1 or suffered only partial damage. It is thus possibleew more will be found in Ihe monihs and years ahead.

ISG bases its reservations on ihc following factors:

'Ihe security situation in Iraq has limited the physical verification of Iraq's unilateral destructionexcavating and counting weaponfor example.

Many of ihe officials interviewed by ISG had previously lied-or told half-lrulhs-to UNSCOM. and they may have lied lo ISO as well, though ISG assesses that most were being open and truthful.

The continuing exploitation of Iraqi documents may produce evidence that conuadicts the assertions of ihe Iraqi officials.

The efforts of the Iraqi Interim Government and Coalition forces may yet result in the discovery of unacknowledged WMD stockpiles left by the former Regime, though ISG judges this to be very unlikely.

ISG has not discovered any evidence that Iraq has conducted research or trials dedicated to theof BW agents since declaring its offensive pro-gramraq pursued some delivery systems projects until OIF that could have provided some BW utility and whose origins lay in die development ofBW and CW dispersion systems.

Iraq continued to develop delivery platforms for small payload weapons up io OIF. ISG has not identified any specific payloads for these systems- By (heir nature, ihese platforms were expensive and limited in number. They would have far greater utility for special weapons, such as BW or CW agent or radiological material, rather than conventional warheads. The Delivery Systems Team has reported on UAV thai operate autonomously and remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) lhat were operaiedround station.9 RPV was the latest developmentoncept ihai commenced in the Technical Research Center

he home of Iraq's BW program in thens. After. Iraq continued to work on the development of UAVs and RPVs. Ihe Al Quds being one example.

Although the Iraqis made significant initial progress in their spray dissemination programs, disregarding the definite adverse impact in Iheir research fnw Desen Storm, they were still significantly shon of lhe target goal. Perfecting just Ihe sprayeras optimizing lank pressures, noulc designs for droplet size and concentrations, together with determining operational flight

use withhemicalW mission in mind was still years from (ruition. lhe aircraft or UAV carrier platforms also weic far from beingHowever, the "know-how" and the same "experts" still existed and the technology necessary is largely duplicative with agricultural uses.it was potentiallyatter of iterative analysis and experimentation toapable CBW >pray dissemination system.

Attempts at BW Weaponization

In common with much else in Iraq's BW program, progress was steady and planned, except when the exigencies of impending waronvulsive change of pace and direction. Thus, having toxicolog-ical and production aspects in hand, some scientists and engineers turned their attention to weaponization. Starting with small-scale animal tests using small quantities of agent dispersedetonatoronfined space they progressed, step by step, toward full-scale weapons trials using viable BW agent. Dr. Rihab and her team, assisted by MIC consultants, evaluated many types of weapon. The initial trials were modest andW agent simulant. Next, individual weapons charged with viable BW agent were fired statically. Eventually, trials used salvoes of rockets at iheir operating range. The rationale for the choice of weapon types and agentsatter thai, even now, Iraqis are reluctant io talk aboul. Alorganized lhe trials and advised on the weapons technology.esult, the thinking appears io hase followed CW lines. Until ihe imposed requirement to weaponize at pull speedhe latter field trials aimed at amassing data for the delivery of anthrax. This may have been an attempt toeans of denying ground in from of an invading enemy, and would parallel the use of CW agents such as mustard. Following the instruction from Husayn Kamil these trials siopped and efforu switched to longer range delivery systems such as aircraft bombs and sprays and ballistic missiles.

Atrial Bombs. Dr. A) Hindawi and Dr. Rihab state that their first weapons-related field trial consisted of lhe explosive detonation of iwo cylindersmunilionsrial using an Iraqi manufacturederial bomb charged

with botulinum toxin followed insing animalsridarget. They reported repeating this trial later ihc same month.'Zubaydi' Helicopter Spray Device. As early7 under the auspices of ihc residual Al Hasan BW program at Al Salman. Iraq started efforts lo develop BW aerosol dissemination systems- Dr. Tariqniversity professor interested in "detecting bacterial organisms in lheoordinated these tests. He had proposed reverseebulizer system. In rime, his work led to developing better spray systems in suppon of his research. TRC was keen to exploit his researchurposes. The first known field lesi occurred In8 ai Khan Ban) Sa'ad. These early tests involved rotary sprayers mournedelicopter.

Artillery Shells. According io one of the scientists involved in TRC's Ricin program. Dr. Lu'ay Qasim. Al Muthanna technicians detonatedm artillery shells tilted with the agentround test at Jurf as Sakhr.

m Multi-barrel Rockets. In lhe following year.

TRC team, assisted by Al Muthanna,the dispersion achieved byand salvoesm multi-barrelsystems. Weapons were filled withtoxin, afiatoxin, wheat cover smui spores,

Fixed-Wing Aircraft Spray Systems.The "Thu-al-Fiqar" project started inoon after lhe publication of an Israeli newspaper article described how an aircraftiological weapon could kill the majorityarget population under favorable conditions, Husayn Kamil ordered Altoapability ioW agent from an aircraft.esult, two independent working groups were established; one group consisted of expens from Al Mulhanna, the Technical Research Center (TRC) and the Iraqi Air Force, while ihe other group was restricied to the Military Research and Development Center (MRDC) al Baghdad's Al Rashid Airfield. These projects may have their origins inCW rather lhan BW.etter datedecember

Fa'iz Shahin. DG of Al Mulhanna,Husayn Kamil. referred to "successful tests ofmustard gas by planes which proved to beThis may account for the speed withMuthanna was able to advance wiih ihis task.

Mirage Fl Auxiliary Fuel Tank Spray System. The Al Muthanna group worked on modifying Mirage Fl auxiliary fuel tanks to disperse the BW agent. The first tank modified contained an electric fuel valve adapted to feed agentrude ven-turi outlet. This tank was installedirage Fl and one tield test was performed at Abu 'Ubaydi Airfield near Al Kut. This unsuccessful test led to more tanks being modified for testing by adding two more valves and outlets and strengthening the structure of the tank. Various combinations of water with other additives were tested with differing degrees of success. It eventually was determined that under proper circumstances (correctof additives and flightcceptable results were achievedhe liquid dispensed was deposited on the ground in the testing areas asowever, when simulated BW agents were then tested, the results were unsatisfactory.

enior NMD official recently reported on his pre-OIF research ofPV development projeci andBW spray tank project, as well as the9 RPV project. Tl* purpose of the research was to prepare the NMD to respond to urgent requirements from UNMOVIC. The NMD official said his investigation confirmed lhat thePV had been intendedission to deliver CBW agents and lhal therojectelated effon to develop an aircraft-mounted CBW spray lank. While ihePV effort failed, lhcpray tank development, on the Other hand, was considered successful. While varying in some minor details concerning the liming of some test events, this NMD officialcorroborates the UNSCOM report,

The GulfWar

By the stan of1 Gulf war. Iraq had produced significant quantities of BW agents. Theof these agentsudimentary understanding of BW weapons and agentDr, Mahmud Farraj Bilal Al Samarra'i, theAl Muihanna official who headed the effon io weaponize CBW agents, described this aspect of the BWas 'immature'. Iraq had no operationalwith these agents or BW weapons, had limited delivery systemsmploy them, and had noemployment doctrine. Dr. BHal's philosophy was io adapt chemical weapons for BW agent use Though Iraq had made initial efforts toward theof more advanced aeiosolizaiionsenior BW managers dismissed this approach in favor of tried and tested CW systems.

Based on an apparent press anicle, Husayn Kamil and his Deputy 'Amir Hamudi Hasan Al Sa'adiompanmented program to develop aircraft spray tanks andet aircraftemotely piloted vehicleraq conductedsuccessful field trialsiter fuel tank mounted on aircraft. The UAV effort failed to reach an operational developmental prototype prior

ISG recovered documents that provided insighl into Iraq's perceived success in BW weaponizalion. According to 'Amir Al Sa'adi, who coincidentally evaluated Dr. Rihab's professional work, he annotated her award nomination package0 and cited lhc conventional explosive dissemination munitions, aerial bomb, artillery, and rockets as inactive. He judged efforts for spray system as noi reaching weap-onization with the research as incomplete.

i

Concealment And Destruction of Biological Weapons

Iraq's Initial

'equired Iraq lo disclose fully Us weapons' programs and stockpiles, yet the former Regime decided later that month only lo declare partially their programs and weapons.

the week following the passage of, MIC Senior Deputy Dr. 'Amir Al Sa'adieeting of all the senior managers from thechemical, nuclear, and biological weapons programs. These program heads brought with them inventories of weapons, missiles. Launchers,equipment, hulk agents, raw materials, and production machinery, along with recorrunendarions of what to declare and whatide.

Al Sa'adi and the program headsapereries of options for Iraq's response io the resolution. These options, according lo Al Sa'adi, included:

Declaring everything and actively cooperating with inspectors.

Declaring all sites and weapons but sayingabout activities under development such as the nuclear program, and not volunteering information responding to questions when asked.

Hiding everything. They based this calico on the Coalition's claim that it destroyed everything during the war.

A fourth option may have called for Iraq toimple declarationew lines and lo lei ihe UN respond with clarification of whai was required.

or iwo of the optionsrovision that Iraq should unilaterally destroy the biological program. Another option called for Iraq lo declare only BW research and development work.

Al Sa'adi submitted the options to Husayn Kamil, not directly to Saddam. Husayn Kamil later gathered Al Sa'adi and several of the program hends ami gave them instructions regarding the declarations. He did not base his instructionsingle recommended option but contained elements from several options. After the initial declaration in April. Iraq altoa more detailed declaration inI.

Saddam was involved in the decision is not clear, though ISG judges thai he was probably involved. Once Husayn Kamil made the overall policy for the declarations, Al Sa'adi, inwith the program heads, decided whichand programs lo declare.

Senior Iraqi officials have stated several reasons for Iraq's retention of weapons and its failure fully to declare iu programs.

Husayn Kamil decidedull dcclaraoon-io include the nuclear and BW programs- would be embarrassing to Iraq and would bring undcsired iniemational scrutiny, according io one participant in the1 meeting.

Former Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz stuied thai Husayn Kamil originally wanted to keep the concealed, undeclared weapons for use in the future, and he speculated thai Kamil probably wanted to use them against the United Stales, Israel, ot Kuwait.

Former Oil Minister and MIC Deputy. 'Amii Muhammad Rashid Al 'Ubaydi, speculated to ISO thai Iraq did not declare all of its weapons in order toeterreni againsl the United Stales, which continued to menace Iraq from Kuwait and southern Iraq at the time of the initial declaration.

Another official believed lhat Iraq's decision not to declare all of Iraq's weapons came from Saddam who was afraid of Iran. Israel and perhaps other neighbors. Post-war Iraq was unstable, and Iraq found itselfelpless and defenseless position.

Another official believed Iraq retained missiles and launchers because Iraq was experiencing serious Iranian-instigatedhia uprising- and Iraq warned to keep the missiles in case war developed with Iran.

ihe period shortly after ihe passage of, most Iraqi officials did not think that ihe resolution would be vigorously applied, and they expected ihai inspectors would only operate in Iraqouple of months.

Because of Husayn Kami's decision inraq only partially declared Us holdings ofweapons and missiles,id noi declare ils biological and nuclear weapons program al all. Iraq concealed the undeclared weapons to varying degrees.

concealedombs containing BW agent ai Airfieldn western Iraq and at Al 'Aziziyah to the southeast of Baghdad.

Iraq also concealediological ageni-filled Al Husayn missile warheads;n lhc embankment of the Tigris Canal northwest of Baghdad, andarheads in the Al Mansuriyah former railway tunnel to the northeast of Baghdad. These warheads contained botulinum loxin. Bacillus anthracis spores, and aflatoxin. though the number filled with each agent is still uncertain.

also concealed an undetermined amount of bulk BW agentuccession of locations around the periphery of Baghdad.

Tbe Destruction of Iraq's BW

An IAEA inspection in late1 triggered Iraq's decision unilaterally to destroy theweapons lhat had been concealed from the VN, according to multiple senior Iraqi officials. The IAEA's inspection team was blocked from sites in Abu Ghurayb and Failujah. The Iraqis firedshots over the inspectors' heads, but thebrought back photos indicating Iraq was hiding undeclared uranium enrichment equipment from the inspectors.

* The IAEA inspection and the international uproar surrounding it caused consternationeasure of panic in tbe Regime's leadership, particularly Husayn Kamil, and Saddamigh-level

committee headed by Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Azizeal with inspection matters, according to multiple sources.

senior Iraqi scientist who directed ihe destruction of chemical and biological munitions contends thai the decision to destroy the hidden materials was made at the end ofhe IAEAand the ensuing controversy prompted Iraqi concerns aboui renewed war wiih the US.to Dr. Bilal. 'Amir Rashid telephoned Dr. Bilal and ordered that all hidden chemical andmunitions be destroyed wilhinours. When Bilal responded that this was impossible, 'Amir Rashid directed that Bilal use the resources of the Iraqi Air Force and the surface-to-surface missile force io accomplish the task. Dr. Bilal gathered his colleagues from Al Muihanna. went to tbe locations of ihe stored munitions, and began the destruction.

Interviews wUh high-ranking political figures,of military industries, WMD scientists, and disarmament officials indicate that Iraq decided in the spring1 to eliminate evidence ofthe BW program. All ihe interview subjects agree thai Iraq accomplished this elimination by the autumnhough there arc still important questions about ihe timing of the effort, the amounts and origins ofdestroyed, and whether Iraq initially planned totock ofBW.

The Iraqi leadership regarded the BW program as politically dangerous for Iraq and made the decision lo destroy the BW program, according lo Tariq 'Aziz.

Husayn Kamil actually made the decision io destroy weapons and evidence ofthe BW program in April at the same lime thai he decided not io declare the program, according to NMD head, Husam Amin.

In earlyusayn Kamil verbally ordered Technical Research Center (TRC) head .Ahmad Munada io destroy all biological agents, along with all documentation for their research, development, and production, according io Dr. Rihab.

MIC direcior 'Amir Rashid also indicated lhal lhe destruction decision came from Husayn Kamil. who then relayed ihe decision ihrough

Al Sa'adi and himself, lo TRC head Murtada for execution.

The BW program's destruction occurred in three distinct phases;

The cleanup and sterilization of research andfacilities, including Al Salman. Al Hakam. Al Manal (Al Dawrah. FMDVnd Al Safa'ah (Al Fudaliyah)

destruction of munilions by the TRCGroup and Al Muthanna personnel

deactivation and dumping of hulk BW agent-Concealment of Ihe production aspects of the BW program required the thorough cleanup of Iraq's BW research and production facilities, whichbegan shortly after lhe destruction decision. Cleanup was completed prior to ihe arrival of the first UNSCOM BW inspection inccording to TRC bead Dr. Ahmad Murtada.

TheW research and developmentat Al Salman, located three kilometers soulh of Salman Pak. which Coalition bombing had badly damaged during1 war, was funher destroyed with explosives, and the site graded andeview of reporting from lhe summer1 indicates this activity began in early1 and was complete by the end of lhat monih.

The Al Manal production facilily was cleaned up, equipment noi originally pan of the facility was laken to Al Hakam. and the site returned to ilsowner-beforc the first UNSCOM inspection inccording to Dr. Rihab. although MIC did not formally relinquish control until

Al Hakam. one of Iraq's major BW ageniplant, was not damaged during1 war. and Husayn Kamil sought to maintain the facility-with its specialized equipmeni and work force- byivilian cover story to explain theof the large-scale production equipment. The plant was convened for production of biopesticide and single cell protein.

Iraq destroyed its BW weapons in the summerccording to multiple sources.

Bilal of Al Muthanna was responsible for destroying lheerial bombs and Al Husayn missile warheads-because no one within theirectorate had any experience with weapons, while Al Muthanna personnel were very familiar wiih them. Bilal was assisted by SinanMuhi Mustafa Al 'Ubaydi and Isma'U Ahmad Salih Bashir Al Bashir of TRC.

" There were two sites wiihin the 'Aziziyahrange for ihe destruction ofWf ihem, according to Dr. Bilal. Deactivation of the ageni within ibe bombs with formalin and potassium permanganate (for botulinum loxin and anthrax bombs) or bleach (for bombs containing anatoxin) was followed by destruction of ihe bomb casings wiih explosives.

The Al Husayn BW warheads were chemically deactivated by Al Hakam personnel at theirsites (the Tigris Canal embankment and the Al Mansuriyah former railwayhen taken io An Nibai and destroyed with explosives, according to Bilal and Rihab.

Iraq's BW declaration indicated IraqW0 botulinum toxin.nihrax.natoxin) andl Husayn BW warheadsnthrax,otulinum toxin,NSCOM. UNMOVIC. and lhe Iraqis themselves regarded these numbers as soft estimates because of the lack of documentation.

UNMOVIC-monitored excavations at the Al 'Aziziyah destruction site in February and3 unearthed evidences. into the* excavated under UNSCOM supervision.esult, UNMOVIC consideredS accounted for at Al 'Aziziyah.

Ii also appears lhat Iraq destroyed ils stocks of bulk ageni in lhe summer or aulumnut Iraqi accounts of this destruction vary in timing, amounts, and location.esult ISG still does notlear picture of bulk agent destruction. Thereumber of inconsistencies in the accounts of the officials involved.

iter storage tank of anthrax instorage al Al Hakam remained there during1 war, along with two one cubic meter tanks on trailers. The trailers had flat tires and the large tank was not transportable. The disposition of this material is unknown, accordingormer BW program official.

In the summerl Hakam personnelanthrax stored in an unknown number of one-cubic meter stainless steel tanks using formalin and potassium permanganate. They dumped the anthraxeptic unk for an unspecified period, then trucked the deactivated anthrax to an area near the production bunkers at Al Hakam and dumped it on the ground.

Inl Hakam personnel removed some of lhc Clostridium botulinum and Bacillusproduced at Al Hakam and stored it in ain Ar Radwaniyah untilccording to Dr. Rihab. This agent was supposed to return to Al Hakam for disposal bul was not. Later, Rihab's staff destroyed and disposed of the BW agent in ar-Radwaniyah. This concealment and destruction was never declared to the UN.

An Iraqi BW program official inadvertently told UN inspectors about the dumping of an unknown number of one-cubic meter stainless steel tanks of anthrax in the desert northwest of Baghdad near An Nibai inccordingormer BW official.

Al Hakam personnel reportedly iransponed several one cubic meter tanks of botulinum toxiniters of Clostridium perfringens to Airfieldn western Iraq in1 as the war was about to begin. At some point, unidentified personnel loaded these tanksruck and drove them around Baghdad until September orraq had told the UN it destroyed the material inhis was not so. The tanks probably returned to Al Hakam where, followingdisposal occurred, though the Iraqi NMD could not confirm this, accordingW program official.

source indicated thatiters ofperfringens at Al Hakam remained there until the destruction of Al Hakam. but thisis not supported by other sources. Another source maintains that researchers tested this agent inound severe fungal contamination, and assessed that the agent was no longer

The Iraqis also apparently desiroyed tanks of anthrax at the 'Aziziyah firing range, the site ofomb destruction. The number of containers and (he amount of agent destroyed is unclear.

Three one cubic meter tanks of anthrax stored at the "Aziziyah Dring range were ordered desiroyed inccordingarticipant in theAfter gathering debris from ihe destruction, he reported to his supervisor. Dr. Bilal. thai the lanks had been desiroyed. However, an entry in ihc log book of ihe officer in charge of the 'Aziziyah range only lists ihc destruction of two of the tanks, and therefore ihe source believed thai one of ihe containers still cxisis ai Al "Aziziyah.

Two destroyed one cubic meter bulk storage and transpon containers -along with partshird container-were found at Al 'Aziziyah during Iraqi excavations of the site jusi prior to OIF, according Dr. Bilal. If true, it would accouni for lhc missing third anthrax tank. Other participants in3 excavations have not confirmed ihe finding of ihis third container.

Iraq declared thai all bulk agent, including anthrax that remained alter the filling of weapons, had been stored at Al Hakam and was unilaterally desiroyed there in July andccording to UNMOVIC. UNMOVIC also noted thai UNSCOM found evidence of anthrax disposal ai Al Hakam bul considered the evidence insufficient to support Iraq's siatcments about the quantity of anthrax destroyed and the circumstances surrounding that dcsiruction.

The problem of accounting for the destruction of bulk agent is part of the larger issue of Iraqi BW agent material balance. ISO cannot arrive ai an agent material balance because it still does noi know with cor.tidcncc:

amount of each agent produced at eachfacility

The amount of each agent used in weapons lilting

The number of weapons filled with each agent

The amount of bulk ageni of each type destroyed.

It is not clear whether ihe original decision tolhe BW program called for the destruction of bulk agent and BW munitions, or if Iraq initially planned to conceal and retain ihe bulk agent and tilled munitions. Kamil's original plan may have only encompassed lhe cleanup and conversion of the research and production facilities.

The BW munitions were all destroyed in lhe summerccording to multiple sources, but Iraq was also engageduch wider campaign of unilateral destruction during this period that also encompassed the chemical and missile programs.

Iraq apparently destroyed much of the bulk BW ageni inul some reportedly remained hidden until September orccording to one BW program insider.

A letter written by Husam Amin to Qusay Saddam Husayn, as head of the Iraqi SSO. supports lhe judgment lhat Iraq unilaterally destroyed most of itsWand BW weapons and long-range missiles. The letier. written in5 shortly after Husayn Kamil lied to Jordan, listed undeclared capabilities that Kamil might reveal io ihe UN.

The letter poinis out lhat "the destfuction of the biological weapons occurred in the summer1 (after the ceasefire) and noi in ihe fall0 as in lhe Iraqi declaration" to lhe UN.

The letterumber of undeclared. weaponization of BW agents, BW production ai the AI Dawrah FMDV Plant, therogram, and oihcr mailers, but contains no mention of any existing undeclared CBWor missiles.

Husam Amin acknowledged writing the letter, and ISO Judges that the letter is authentic.

What Remained Hidden and?

ISG's investigation found no evidence lhat Iraq continued to hide BW weapons after the unilateral destruction1 tvas complete, and ISG fudges that most of the documents and materials hidden by the Special Republican Guard15 were Indeed surrendered to the UN. However, Iraq continued to conceal document'8

For several years. Special Republican Guardconcealed the "know-how" documenis. which Husayn Kamil ordered collectedhese officers used safehouses in the Ghaziliyah and Hay at Tashri neighborhoods of Baghdadarm in Abu Ghurayb to hide ihe documenis.

eeks before the arrival of the UNMOVIC inspectors in Iraq. NMD employees reportedly were ordered to collect all documenis indicating discrepancies between the number of chemical and biological munitions destroyed or used and lhe lotal number produced. Thesewhich filledoxes, were being turned in to the US to be hidden or disposed of.

ISG investigations also determined thai Iraq failed to declare Io lheumber of significant capabilities and activities. Examples of such omissions include:

and disposal of bulk BW agent, including anthrax, at Ar Radwaniyah

Weaponization Related Activities in the Years Following Desert Slorm

Various reporting indicates an interest in acquiring systems for the dissemination of CBW. Acquisition related efforts were usually couched in generic terms, such as "aerosol systems" or "aerosolnd typically associated by the Iraqis wiih agricultural use. It would also appear thai there may hase been plans io keep the spray technology remnants of the CBW programs hidden from UN inspectors.

counting of Iraq 'sAI Husayn Missile "Special" Warheads

to Iraqi declarations and Dr Mahmud Farraj Bilal. Iraq had producedspecial" Al Husayn warheads, includinghemical warheads, andiological warhead'.

Inraqi initially declared to the UN only SO warheads-all of them chemical. Iraq destroyed these under UNSCOM supervision. Of theW warheads:

ontained unitary Sarin fCB> nerve agent

contained the cyclohexanolHsopropanol mixture tltat was lhe basis for Iraq's "binary" GBIGF nerve agent. The methylphosphomc difiuoride (DF)for these warheads was also destroyed.

In addition 'lo iheseeclared chemical warheads. Iraq initially concealedndeclared chemical warheads from UNSCOM. which it destroyed in the summerll were "binary" warheads filledixture of cyclohexanol and isopropanol.

After Husayn Kamil fled Iraq inraq clarified that thel Husayn warheads actually consisted ofhemical andiological warheads. Of theiological warheads. Iraq declared and Dr. Bilal believes thai:

5 contained "Agentspores

I6containedtoxin

To verify Iraq's claims, UNSCOM sampled remnants of warheads destroyed at An Nibai and found traces of anthrax in containers of seven distinct missile warheads. In response. Iraq changed its accouni of BW warheads. Dr. Bilal clarified tlxat no one knew for cenain the number of warheads fillediven ageni because the Iraqis kept no records of lhe filling operation.

Of thespecial" warheads that weredestroyed by Iraq, UNSCOM recovered and accounted for remnants

The Al Husayn warhead "material balance" is thus:

75 Total "special" warheads produced by Iraq

30 Destroyed under UNSCOM supervision

20 -Binary" CW warheads unilaterally destroyed at An Nibai

25 Deactivated BW warheads unilaterally destroyed at An Nibai

45 Toatl warheads unilaterally destroyed

45

otal "special" warheads destroyed

4 contained "Agent

elicopter was equipped wiih9 drop tanks al At Taji Airfield by Dr. Imad Abd-al-Lalif Abd-al-Rida'Ali Shihab. He reportedly did this ioequirement from the Minister of Agriculture to replace its aginghelicopters. No other helicopters wereUNSCOM tagged lhe helicopter and while inspectors agreed it was only for agricultural use, ii was kepi under close scruiiny. ISG recovered these lanks in4 and have conductedsampling and forensic analysis lo determine whai materials were disseminated from these tanks.

but have not discovered any materials relating either directly or indirectly to BW.

9 RPV, UAVs and ballistic missileare addressed in lhe Delivery Systemsof this Report.

Detailed' Accounting ofW aerial bomb -material balance"

thus;

declared and Dr. Mahmud Farraj Bilal contends ihai Iraq originallyomb casings for use as BW. Some of these were coated internally with epoxy for filling with "Agent A" (botulinum toxin) and "Agent B" (Bacillus anthracisr. Bilal maintains that Iraq unilaterallyW aerial bombsn the two months prior to the outbreak of warraq excavatedestruction sites in 'Azitiyah and recovered the remnantsombs, including eight or nine intact bombs. UNMOVIC. however, acceptedere accountedfor at 'Aziziyah.

Six more bombs were found to be defective prior to filling. Al Hakam personnel discarded these six bombs in the Euphrates River. Later. UNSCOM retrieved these from the river.

Dr. Bilal claims lhat the Iraqisideotape of the UNSCOM-supervised destruction ofrombs atAl Muthannahey noted thatf lhe bombs destroyed had black-stripe markings, indicating they were epoxy-coated and intended for BW use. Bilal believes that theofombs destroyed on the tape showed those manufactured for BW use.

200 casing manufactured for BW use

nilaterally destroyetlat Aziziyahntactith UNMOVIC accountingnd Dr. Bilal.

r 61 asings deestroyed at Al Mulhanna under UNSCOM supervision

Defetive casings discarded inteh Tigris 6 River by Al Hakam personnel

asings manufactured for biological use accounted for.

Dr.ecent thinking onestruction at 'Aziziyah and AI Mulhanna is at variance with what Iraq told UNSCOM during the. At lhat time, Iraq asserteds were destroyed at -Aziziyali and thatere destroyed at AlWhen these are added to the six disposed of in the Tigris, the number equalsases originally manufactured for BW use. Dr. Bilal now contends lhat Iraq's prior claimestroyed at 'Aziziyah was based on the diary of an officer at the range and was inaccurate. Bilal's asseriion thatrmpty cases were destroyed at Al Muthanna is at variance with UNSCOM data that indicates ihais were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision at Al Mulhanna.

Unresolved Issues

Inhen VN inspectors departed Iraq, many contentious issues remained unresolved. Additional issues have emerged from ISGISG investigated these matters with interviews, site visits, documents searches and material sampling. ISG made progress understanding most of ihe unresolved Issues,ew vital areas remain outstanding. With the degradation ofthe Iraqi infrastructure and dispersal of personnel, it Is increasingly unlikely that these questions will be resolved. Of those that remain, the following are of particular concern, as they relate to the possibilityapability or the ability toew one.

ISG cannot determine the fate of Iraq's stocks of bulk BW agents remaining after Desert Storm and subsequent unilateral destruction. Thereery limited chance that continuing investigation may provide evidence to resolve this issue.

The fate of the missing hulk agent storage tanks.

lhc fateortion of Iraq's BW agent seed-stocks.

nature, purpose and who was involved in the secret biological work in the small IIS laboratories discovered by ISG.

Through an investigation ofthe history of Iraq's bulk BW agent slocks, it has become evident to ISG thai officials were involved in concealment and deception activities.

ISG judges that Iraq failed to comply with UNSCRs up lo OIP by failing lo disclose accuratetotals for B. anthracis aod probably other BW agents and for noi providing the true details of its1 disposal of stocks of bulk BW agent.

Officials within the BW program knowinglythis deception right up to OIF and beyond, only revealing some details well after the conflict.

Those concerned put two motives for thedenial and deception in relation lo undeclared dumping of BW agentite in Ar Radwaniyah:

members of tbe program were too scared to tell the Regime ihai ihey had dumped deactivated anthrax within sight of one of Ihc principalpalaces.

the accouni would only complicatewiih the UN and would have no affect on Ihe material balance.

More detail on these subjects, where it exists, is included in ihe appropriate section of the report.

Program Direction

Decision Making, Command and Control and rationale of Iraq's BW Program. Dcspiie access to many of Iraq's senior political and military figures, including Saddam, many aspects of the BW program remain opaque to ISG. Specifically ISG learned very few new details of Ihc following:

The role of lhc military and intelligence services in defining the requirements for ihe BW program.

The rationale behind key decisions such as the reasons for starting the program, Ihe selection of agents and weapons.

'Ihe military response Io meet the requirementsW program.

The doctrine for the use of BW weapons.

The procedures for ihe release of BW weapons and who was lu make Ihe decisions.

Research and Development

Genetic Engineering and Viral Research., Iraq devoted increased resources and effon to its biotechnology and genetic engineeringoncern thai Ihe UN continued lountil iis departure. ISG has talked ioand workers in the biotechnology and genetic engineering fields, and viral researchers specifically. Despite an extensive interview program and

mis site visits that have included sampling, ISG found no evidence of activity likely to contribute directly to BW.

BW Agent Simulants. The UN deemed Iraq's accounting of its production and use of BW agentBacillus sub-tills.lichenfarmis. Bacillus megaierium and Bacillus ihuringiensis to beSG remainsin simulant work because these items may be used not only to simulate the dispersion of BW agents, develop production techniques, and optimize storage conditions, but also the equipment used for their manufacture can also be quickly convened to make BW agent. It permits maintenance of techniques and provides continuing familiarity with the process to preserve skill levels. Iraq continued its work on Bacillus ihuringiensisio-pesticide carried on benioniie. at Tuwaitha after the destruction of Al Hakam.esult of interviews with the former staff of Al Hakam and principal researchers at IAEC. ISG has discovered lhat this research also includedof benioniie not onlyarrier but also as means of enabling the speedy production of slurry from lhc stored dried biopesticide.

IIS Laboratories

ISG hasumber of small IIScontaining biological equipment. Therethat anatoxin and ricin work has beenby the IIS intond thatoccurred Given the historicalof the US with Iraq's BW program, it isthat the nature, purpose and thosethese small IIS lahoraionei have not beenby ISG This is an unresolved issue thai will

Seeds! ocks

Disposition of Iraq's BW Program Culture Collection

Doubts persist regarding Iraq's destruction ofreference strains and isolates. According to Dr. Rihab. she destroyed these materials inr. Rihabmall box containing no more thaniah of lyophilized bacteria] pathogens,those obtained from the American Type Culture Collection lo the US inor safekeeping.

Husam Amin returned the box to Dr. Rihab inr. Rihab ostensibly asked fomser TRC head Ahmad Murtada what lo do with ihe vials. Murtada took the mancr io Husayn Kamil, who ordered ihe vials destroyed. This was accomplished by injecting lhc vials withnd then autoclaving the vials. ISG cannot verify thai these materials were destroyed or the other details of Dr. Rihab's account. Givenstorage conditions, ISG assesses thai these seed stocks would still he viable.

Agent Production

Anthrax. The UN could not confirm, and in fact its evidence contradicted, ihe quantities of anthrax declared by Iraq as having been produced, used for trials, filled into weapons, and desiroyed. The UN assessed that Iraq probably had greater stocks of the agent on hand1 than it declared, probably for use in the Mirage Fl drop-tanks, and questioned Iraq's account of destruction of the agent ISG has interviewed mosi of the key Iraqis who admitted working with the agent, and has obtainedexplanations of the events. The details are in Annex A.

t Toxin. Iraq's declaration of the amount of botulinum toxin it produced, used in experiments and trials, filled in weapons, wasted during handling, and unilaterally destroyed is derived from calculations, or contrived from Ihe numbers of weapons stated to have beenof these figures is verifiable. ISG teams have interviewed principal engineers andinvolved with botulinum toxin; there has been no newinformaiion.

Mycotoxins: Aflatoxin. The resources thai Iraq devotedhe manufacture, testing and filling of weapons with aflatoxin has puzzled investigators since Iraq first declared the agent. There is little doubt that Iraq conductedrogram, but the UN assesses it almost certainly overstated theraising the possibility thai some of thedeclared to have contained aflatoxin may have contained other BW agents, There is no evidence lo support Iraq's claim about the numbers of weapons rilled wiih the agent, and most of ihe limited number of staff involved in aspect of the effort have not been located. ISG has not determined the rationale behind Iraq's choice of aflatoxin for its offensive BW

Wheal Cover Smut The UN was not able to verify the amount of wheat cover smut produced, used or consumed owingack of sufficient documentation from Iraq. Iraq had stated it produced smut coated with anatoxin, but neither this statement, nor the destruction of the wheat cover smut could be verified. ISG has not discovered any new information on this agent.

Clostridium perfringens. (C. perfringensHrtcagent of gasone of the first agents Iraq examined. Despite its interest and various fragments ofinterest in cluster munitions and an awareness of the usen anti-personnelUN found no evidence to indicate thatourse was pursued. An ISG team obtained two vials of C. perfringens as well as one vial of C'.botulinum type B.id-level scientist who formerly worked in the RWThis matter is addresses in Section

Ricin. Unlike other BW agent programs, work on ricin emanated from the IIS, and almost certainly was based on its limited developed use as an assassination weapon. Iraqimited weaponsprogram until Desert Storm thatest using anillery shells charged with ricin. Later Iraq expanded into the manufacture of castor oil. which yields the material from which ricin is extracted. Although this manufacture was later abandoned. Iraq retained the ability to restan such production in volume. ISG has pursued the Tariq castor oil facility and its possible role in ricin production as well as the security services' interest in and use of ncin.

Undeclared BWaddition lo the BW agents listed above, Iraq may have investigated variola majordditionally ihe amount of peptone or tryptonc soya broth (TSB) growth media imponed by Iraq and not accounted for give rise io concern about the possible production of Yersinia pesiisrancisella lularemis (tularaemia) and Brucella speciesSG has examined smallpox and Brucella, but has noi uncovered any information on plague or tularaemia.

Drying of BW Agents

Iraq actively pursued the goal of drying its BW agent for improved storage and optimal dispersion andThe UN was unable io determine whether Iraq dried any of Ihc bulk agents it produced, although it possessed the expertise and equipmeni lo do so. ISG hasuccessful program for drying the anthrax simulant. Bi: safely of the drying process would affect its application to anthrax. ISG found no evidence of dried agent

Bacterial BW Agent Production and Storage

Production Equipment. Thereumber of critical items of equipment and materials normally required for the production of bacterial BW agents. Iraq was able to manufacture fermentors. separators, senling tanks and growth media, oftenower quality than those it formerly imported, and all of which have commercial purposes. Thisaspectital prerequisite forW program and could lead io lhe possibility of making mobile BW facilities. ISG investigated tbeinfrastructure needed for such activity and ihe particular possibilityobile BW program. ISG discovered no evidence toenewed interest in manufacturing equipment for BW purposes.

Im' Stainless Steel Mobile Tanks.raq producedm' stainless steel mobile lanks.The tanks are significant because they were used io store and transport bulk agent, and with modification the imponed tanks could be used for fermentation purposes to produce BW agent Al Hakam already possessediter stainless steel mobileIraq claims to have unilaterally destroyedf ihe Im1fiter fermentorsNSCOM verified these figures from remnants presented io inspectors in the. ISG has identified the remains' tanks. Thus out of an originaltems,litcr fermeniors are still to be found. There aretems unaccounted for. Additionally, ISG has learned of additional production0 (see.

Al Husayn Biological Warheads. Iraq declared lhal itotal ofl Husayn warheadsW, claiming to have filledith botulinumith Bacillus anthracis spores,ith anatoxin. There is evidence only to confirm lhalslainless-sieel agent containers weredestroyed to account for the declared quantities of BW warheads. It is not possible to conclude that all ofarheads were destroyed or that only three agenis were used.

A Rombs- Iraq declared lhat it ordered the manufactureA bombs for BW, but reportedly did not fulfil that quota and instead usedombs. Iraq claimedombs were filled withith botulinum toxin,ith Bacillus anihracis spores,ith anatoxin. Investigations by ISG al the Al 'Aziziyah site confirmed that hy the beginning ofutombs had been accounted for. indicating that at leastombs remain unaccounted for. Because all lhe known physical evidence has now been investigated, it is unlikely that ihis matter can be resolved without ihe discovery of documents or new testimony from those involved.

Spray derices andRPVs. Iraq showed ainterest in the use of spray deviceseans of dispersing BW agent. The program slatted wiih the adaptation of hclicopler-bornc agricultural spray equipment and progressed ihrough experiments withnd Mirage Fl aircraft. Inircraft were adapted for remote operation, bul there is no evidence of spray tanks being fitted to them. The Mirage Fl used an auxiliary fuel lankrial spray system. Iraq claims thatf these tanks were modified and lhal lhe original lank and aircraft were destroyed in opening bombardment of the Gulf waro evidence exists to support the destruction of the aircraft and tank, although the remains of ihe other tanks have been verified in Ihc past Recent ISG investigations have discovered very large numbers of drop tanks, bui none that had been modified for trials Or useW weapon.9 development program continued up to OIF and Iraq possessed approximately9 aircraft that could be adapted for remote operation. Drop tanks existed for thissome in use at the same sile that had been used for helicopter spray trials.

Annex A

Bulk BW Agenls

Background

Underraq was requited toall aspects of its weapons of mass(WMD1 program. However, four years passed before Iraq admitted it had an offensive BW program. Even after Ihis, despiteabout the consequences of not disclosing everything completely and truthfully from the UN, Iraq chose defiance. Iraq never disclosed ihe true. anthracis and probably other BW agents it had produced2 as weB as several locations where bulk BW agent was stored, and in one case, destroyed,lo multiple sources. UN inspectors on many occasions asked members of Iraq's BW program about additional storage sites, suggesting that they suspected, or knew ofite or sites, but Iraqi officials persisted with their deceit until OIF and beyond.

ISO Investigation

Disparities in Declarations Concerning. anthracis Production Information obtained by ISG from several sources with access to Iraq's former BW program and other telated historical information show that Saddam's Regime probably did not declare the production of thousands of liters of B. anthracis. This information appears to suppon pre-OIF judgments made by the Intelligence Community and UN inspectors that Iraq did not disclose the total amount of BW agent it had produced, and therefore continued to be in violation of UNSC resolutions. Although ISG assesses there to beery small chance that Iraq kept some of this undeclared B. anthracis until OIF, ISG has been unable to obtain evidence to substantiate preservation or complete destruction of the agent.

Iraq produced much more B. anthracis9 and1 than it declared to the UN, according to an individual that worked in Iraq's former BW program. This individual told ISG lhalg) of the peptone growth media Iraq declared as "lost" actually was used to produce the B. anthracis thai was noi declared. Enriched mediums, such as peptone were used by Iraq lo produce seed B. anthracis for the bulk production process.

' BW agent production continued at Al Hakam until the day before the start of Ihe first Gulf war in Januaryto Iraqi declarations, which stated that production ceased ai the end ofihe FMDV Plant was used to produce B. anthracis. according to an Iraqi formerly involved in biological agent research.

UNSCOM found B. anthracis in iwo fermeniorsobile storage lank ai the FMDV Plant lhat was "consistent with the strain used in Iraq's BWaccording to an UNMOVIC document on Iraq's unresolved disarmament issues (UDIs) aswo pieces of the equipment that tested positive were destroyed by UNSCOMnd subsequent sampling of the FMDV Planl in6 did not detect B. anthracis on any remaining equipmcni.

Iraq's Military' Industrialization Commission (MIC)ortion of the production facility at the FMDV Plant from0 until1 forwork lhatmell of peptone two to threeeek, accordingurrent assistant manager of the FMDV Plant who has worked there since the. ISG judges some of ihis secreiive MIC work was the botulinum toxin production Iraq declared ii produced ai ihe FMDV Plant in November andowever, the continuous peptone smell outside of these dates fits with information from the individual lhat worked in Iraq's former BW program, who told us that the peptone declared as "lost" was actually used to produce more B. anthracis than was declared at both the FMDV and Al Hakam.

UNSCOM and UNMOVIC could not verify the amount of BW agent Iraq declared producing because ofin ils reporting of the amount of media and fermenlor time available to produce the agent, according lo the UNMOVIC documeni on Iraq's UDIs.

repeated attempts by ISG to confirm this information with interviews with key personalities who would be knowledgeable, no further information or physical evidence has been collected up to this point.

Undeclared Movement and Destruction of Balk BW Agent

ISG haseries of interviews and site visits lo uncover more information on ihc movemenl and destruction of ai leasi some bulk BW agenthen Iraq disclosed ils offensive BW programhose involved decided noi to disclose ihe movements and destruction areas associated with hulk BW agents.

A scientist who worked for the former Iraqi Regime told ISG lhai Iraq desiroyed three ionsi Al 'Aziziyah. ISG assesses lhat this three ions ofnthracis onlyortion of thai noi declared to the UN.

An assistant of Dr. Rihab told UN inspectors in7 thai he had laken an unspecified number of one-cubic meter tanks filled with B. anthracis

i nto the desert nonh of Baghdad nearbai and dumped the agcnl there inccording io ihe Iraqi formerly involved in biological agent research.

chief reason offered for not declaring agent disposal at Ar Radwaniyah was fear of informing Regime officials that Dr. Rihab's BW staff had deposited deactivated B. anthracis and probably at least one other agent in an area surrounded hy Special Republican Guard (SRG) barracks and wilhin site of Ihe Ar Radwaniyah Presidential

Palace.

i

high up the chain of command this knowledge of undeclared movement and destruction went is yet to be determined. Evidence suggests that ihc Head of ihe Technical Research Centerhmad Murtada, the official responsible to Husayn Kamil for BW, knew, but he denies it. Il has yei to be determined if 'Amir Al Sa'adi. Husam Amin, or the Vice President and the Higher Committee also knew.

This deception, in effect, prevented any possibility of the UN accepting ihe Iraqi account of its BW program. Whether those involved understood the significance and disastrous consequences of Iheir actions is unclear. These efforts demonstrate ihe problems lhat existed on both sides in establishing iruth.

Annex Ft

BW Research and Development Facililies

Iraq's BW program was initiated in4ouse in Al 'Amiriyah, but soon after completion of basic buildingsew site, AI Hasan's Ibn-Sina Center, or siteor later Al Salman) the program was transferred to Ibn-Sina Centerhis site was heavily bombed1 and was effectively not functional after lhat lime. After the initial constructionlinic, telephone exchange inacteriology laboratory building which appeared to have functional highcapabilily. On ihe back of ihis building was an attached animal house. Next in lineirus laboratory, companmentedaboratories. This representedven before the transfer of the new BW program from Al 'Amiriyah, plans were already established for another facility (the green cube) "Phasehich became available about the same lime as the dissolution of lhe original Al Hasan Institute. The remaining biology program along wiih elements of the CW program was then cmplaced in ihis building as was ihe newly created Research and Technical Center (later to become ihen tbeas completed in the form of the Toxicology laboratory io which ihe militarily relevant program was transferred

Reviializaiion of Iraq's mUiiarily relevant BW program was located at Al Muthanna37 when it was relocated to Al Salman. However, Al Mulhanna continued to providessistance0 particularly studies on afla-toxin and ricin as well as weapons field trials.

For many years, both before and following Desert Storm, the IIS conducted research and development of biological agents, such as ricin and anatoxin, atfacilities discovered by ISG. Brief descriptions of these laboratories are presented below, The Al Safa'ahl Salman and Al Muthanna sites were no longer functional1 and thus funherare not provided. Al Hakam, Al Manal. TABRC, Al Hamath. and the Al Tariq Company are deemed toignificant1 BW relatedand ihe descriptions follow. Baghdad University,

College of Veterinary Medicine, al Razi Research Institute, al Kindi Veterinary Vaccines and DrugAl 'Amiriyah Serum and Vacccine Institute have the facilities and expertise to play an important rolerogram.

Al Hakam

The Al Hakam facilily was destroyed by Ihe Iraqis under UNSCOM supervision6 because of the discovery of lhe key role tl played In lhe Iraqi BW program. Historically. Al Hakam was Iraq's primary BW ageni production facility, producinganthracis, Clostridium botulinum. Clostridium perfringens and simulani, Bacillus subtilis, for testing and ultimately, weaponization purposes. Following ihe first Gulf war, lhe AI Hakam plant was directed by Iraq to change ils focus lo civilian projects, whkh had been selectedoser for its former BW program.

The civil projects chosen to replace the production of BW agenis and using the same equipmeni ai Al Hakam were the production of biopesticides (B.CP and biofenilizers. Theat Ihc facility was considered dual-use and the production of materials such as B. thuringiensisnown stimulant for the BW agent B. anthracis) and SCP (whose equipment could be used toC.ed io the fear that Al Hakam could potentially be producing BW ageni or at Ihe very least, be maintaining the infrastructure and production expertise necessary io quickly reactivate Iraq's BW agent production capabilily.

Al Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Plant

The FMDV planl was declared to UNSCOMacility that was used to produce botulinum toxin for offensive BW purposes from0 untilfter Iraq acknowledged its role in its BW program, UNSCOM disabled the FMDV plant's high containment air handling system6 byixture of concrete and foam into Its ducting. No laboratory or production work is currently conducted al the FMDV plant. The plant is

cuirenily being usedentral storage and disiri-buiion depot by the State Company for Veterinary Medicine. ISG has no information to suggest thai the FMDV facility* was involved in any BW-related research after ihe end of the first Gulf war in

Freezers were discovered by ISG containingof perished isolates of foot and mouth virus. The facility was also storing laboratory equipment from other facilities and archives from otherinstitutes. No research or scientific activity was occurring at the facility.

Accordingource, the FMDV plant onlyvaccine up. The Main vaccine it produced was for Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD)fort also produced

and Asia (forhe plant exported its FMD vaccine tother countries in ihe region.. MIC took over lhc FMDV plant. While the MIC was operating the facility, they gave the FMDVmall area in which to conduct work that was separate from MIC activities. None of the workers from the FMDV plant were said to hase been brought in to help MIC. However, ihis is contrary to what was communicated to UNSCOM.

cameras were installed ai the facility by UNSCOM5 lo monitor the activities at the facility uniil and following ihc removal and destruction of some key equipment. Cameras were also mounted in the plant's production department. Until some lime prior to OIF, tapes were retrieved every two weeksocal security company on behalf of the UN. The purpose of the cameras, after the building was rendered harmlessas to assure the equipment was not removed and installed ai another location without proper notification to the UN.

Tuwaitha Agricultural and Biological Research Center

ISG investigated work into Bacillus Ihuringiensis and Single Celt Protein carried out at the TA /INC. ISG exploited TABRCuring thesignificant documentary evidence of ongoing research relative to Bt at TABRCumber of equipment items which were capable of being used for production of smatl-to-pitot scale quantities of biological material Numerous fermeniors and bio-reactors were found, some of which should have been reported io UNSCOM or UNMOVIC but were not. The underground storage of laboratory equipment was likely to protect that equipment from coalition bombing.

was pan of the IAEC wilhin ihc Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Complex. Its mission was primarily agricultural science research andand the majoriiy of its activities was directed toward crop improvement and integrated pest management. This facilityature scientific staff with expertise in recombinant DNA technology, microbiology, entomology, and access to agricultural pathogens. The center had research and development arrangements with other Iraqientities and possessed numerous pieces of equipment that could be used for either peaceful purposes or for development and production of BW agentsual-usehe facility was locatedigh-security complex associated wiih other facilities of interest,

ISG assesses lhat TABRC was not involved in any significant BW-specific activity. Work with Bl appears ta have been laboratory scale only and primarily directed toward expanding the insect host range ofBt isolates. There was no evidence to suppon earlier ISG contentions lhat attempts were underway ai TABRC to engineer B. ihuringiensis io be pathogenic for humans.

conducted detailed site exploitations of TABRCeriod of several days. Thewas made that the site contained numerous pieces of UNSCOM-iagged equipment, as well

as multiple pieces of undeclared equipment, that would be useful for BW agent production. The equipment rangediter double-jacketed stainless steel fermcntor to aniter fermemor. ISG found no informationany of Ihis equipment was cilher intended or used for BW purposes.

AI Hamath

The Al liamath facility was exploited onhich determined that the area was used for agricultural purposes and ihe activities assessed lo have occurred at the site were determined not to be BW-related. The facility was heavily looted before it was exploited inocal national at the site reported thai the facility had been under mililary control and prior lo UNMOVIC inspections ihe mililary had removed all the equipment from the site. Field laboratory analysis of samples taken from Ihe barren facility also indicated no evidence ofCW orBW related materials inbmitted samples.ABRC began ibe constructionilot Single Cell Protein (SCP) plant at Al Hamath. located at the same sile as the Official Rest House, to conduct larger scale SCP work. The project for the pilot plant scale production of citric acid had been started using Aspergillus niger but the projeci could not be made to work.

production method chosen was growth inculture raiher than in solid-state. Process equipment. mixing vessels, tanks, fermentation vessels) was commissioned and fabricatedThe strain of A. niger used in this process proved unsuitable for use in submerged culture as the mycelium suffered damage under the continual stirring/agitation necessary in submerged culture. In short, the project could not be made to work.ollection of process equipment already in place at Al Hamath, it was seen as convenient io co-opt and reconfigure Ihe equipment for SCP

source indicated lhat ihc SCP process was set up in the northeastern corner of the larger of ihe two main buildings at Al Hamath. Tbe remainder of Ihc space in the larger hall was devoted to theof fungal biopesticides. PgxdtanKtS. Irichodermu) crown in .solid-state culture on nulled corncobs. The fermentations were conducted in the rooms (offices) pre-existing in that building.

Al Tariq Company'sallujah III Site

The Al Tariq Company produced castor oil2sing an Iraqi-designed and produced crushing mill purchased locally. Al Tariq officials complied with UNSCOM on the requirement that they bum the bean mash left over from production while UN inspectors remained in Iraq. This open pit burning of mash was no longer observed after the plant was reccmstructed,Desert Fox bombing, and went operational. The mash, which took days io bum and created significant smoke, was burned in piis near the Failujah IIIAt one point, Al Tariq officials considered using ihe bean mash in animal feed, but this idea was never implemented.

Fanners ai Al 'Aziziyah claim iheir land was taken by Husayn Kamil45 to be utilized as dedicated lands for ihe growth of caster planis, the end user of which was exclusively the Al Tariq facility. The MIC reportedly worked inwith both the State Company for Industrial Crops and the Ministry of Agriculture to plant "cover crops" -other crops such as wheat-in order to mask the growth of Ihe castor plants.n employee of the Al Tariq Facility named "Husayn" told an individual al the farm that the castor beans were being used by Ihc Al Tariq Facility in order Io "produce poisons thai would kill humans,"

Historically this site has been of concern because the castor oil plant could have potentially been used in the first step, mainly the castor bean mash, in the production of ihc BW agent Ricin. Iraq stateddifferent ways in which ihe ricin in the mash was being inactivated; yet UNSCOM showed that active ricin could readily be isolated from the mash after the castor oil was removed.

During this lime period, officials from Ibn-al-Baytar expressed an interest in purchasing castor oil from Al Tariq for use in pharmaceuticals. The Al Tariq facility's oil was not competitively priced, however, and because ii was extracted by solvents instead of cold pressing, Al Tariq'soil was not considered io be "foodr appropriate for

medical/pharmaceuticall one point. SDI purchased five tons of Al Tariq oil forpurposes, but upon sampling the oil,deemed it as inappropriate for medical use and sent all of the castor oil back to Al Tariq. Because of these issues, Ibn ai-Bay tar decided to procure castor beans directly from the same source as Al Tanq, the Company for Industrial Forestsfter production endedl Tariq was left with unwanted castor oil, but no customers. The leftover castor oil was kept in barrels at Fallujah HI.

During the work ofndumber of facililies have been identified as having carried am or have been assessed as capable of carryingn viruses. These facitities include the Al Kindi Company for Veterinary Vaccines and Drugs, the Al 'Amiriyah Serum and Vaccinethe Al Rod Research Center, the Al Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine plant6 when UNSCOM disabled lhe air handlingaghdad University CoUege of Veterinary Medicine at Abu Ghurayb and Al Hakam before Us(aho. Al Hakam and Al Dawrah FMDV facilities are described above.

An inventory' of UNSCOM tagged equipment was conducted. Four pieces of dual-use laboratorywere noted missing.

ISO assesses that the research expertise available at the Al Razi center could potentially have been used to research viral BW agents.

Al Razi was established2 under lheof Saddam Husayn. Dr. Hazimenior personality related to the Iraqi viral BW program, and Athir Al Duri were responsible for serting up the facility with Dr. Hazim 'Ali in charge of the virology department and Al Duri director of the bacteriology department.

" The virology department at Al Razi was involved in work on Hepatitis and mumps diagnostic kits, using positive seta obtained from the Ministry of Health. Ine facility also had an animal house where they kept sheep, goats, rabbits and mice. No primates were seen by the source but monkey cages were seen6elivery from Al Muthanna.

Al Rati Center

ISG determined that the Al Rati Center is no longer suitable for research or production of anyactivity because of extensive lootingSSG has no information to suggest that Al Rnzi was actively involvedf viral BW agents for the Iraqi BW program. An ISG visit to Al Razi found numerous vials of lyophilizcd bacteria and yeasts that werethe site including; Vibrio cholcrae. Salmonella typhi. Salmonella paratyphi. Clostridium difficile. Clostridium welchii. Saccharomyces cerevisiae.melitensis. and Brucella abortus. In addition, numerous vials of lyophilized avian influenza were also noted.

Several burn piles consisting of burned documents, vials, chemicals, electronic media and small pieces of equipment where located around the building. The piles seemed to be an organized destruction effon given stir rods located with some of the piles.

Baghdad University, College of Veterinary Medicine, Abu Ghurayb

ISG found no information to suggest that theof Veterinary Medicine, Baghdad UniversUy,ole inhase of the viral BW program. ISG has uncovered no substantialbetween the BW program and the College of Veterinary Medicine.

The College of Veterinary Medicine was capable of viral research. The faculty at the College ofMedicine possess the requisite knowledge and skill to grow and genetically manipulate potential BW agents. Based on the faculty's description of the equipment that was looted, the College had adequate resources to grow agents such as high-risk virus. However, the remaining equipmeni found3 by Ihe assessment team at the facility is inadequate io conduct any significant research or production of BW agents.

Al Kindi Company for Veterinary Vaccines :ind Drugs

All known UNSCOM tagged equipment at the Al Kindi Company for Veterinary Vaccines and Drugs was present at the site. The site isnormally, althougheducedenior employee explained that they were still in the process of trying to reinstate die Quality of their vaccines and had not yet developed elaborate plans for the future.

to Desert Storm, the facility was believed to be involved in Iraq's BWoreign companyomplete vaccine production line4 for the facility toixture of veterinary important Clostridial species. It was most of this vaccine line that was acquired by Al Hakam and used at that facility priorresently the company is able to produce viral disease vaccines for poultry to include; Newcastle, fowl pox, and gumboro; and viral vaccines for livestock to include rinderpest, sheep pox and goat pox. Bacterial disease vaccines include: cnterotoxacmiaemorrhagicblackleg (C. perfringens,nthraxl Kindi Company did not sustain any damage during OIF, and no looting had taken place, since the employees stayed in the buildings and guarded them. No seed cultures were lost, since the company has generators that supplied power to the refrigerators and freezers without interruption.

n UNSCOM Team found that the facility was the sole Iraqi producer of veterinary vaccines required to protect against animal viral, bacterial, and parasitic agents (including7 UNSCOM report indicated Al Kindi personnel had the expertise toW production facilily as well as apparent access to military significant microorganisms, and would have been able to easily convert veterinary vaccine production to production of human vaccines.

The Newcastle vaccine product lines at Al Kindi demonstrate an ability io scale up large quantity viral production. Al Kindi Company had the facilities that would enable mass production of smallpox virus in either cell culture or fertilized eggs, and in either liquid slurry or lyophilizcd form, however, noof intent to do so was found by ISO.

Role of Al -Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute (ASVT) In

ISG has uncovered no evidence to supportlASVIfor possible use as an offensive BW agent. The AS VI is the only facilily in Iraqto be associated with smallpox, albeit with ihe smallpox vaccine. The Institute continued toa smallpox vaccine through to ihe.

iscovered no indications ofBW activity at the facilily. All equipment and material observed appeared related to scrum and vaccine storage, quality control and very limited organic productionAn ISG assessment on the facility slates ihai ii is unlikely that ASVT was involved in suspicious BW-relaied activities other than possible temperaturestorage. Laboratory resulis from samples taken from lhe site were negative for BW agent signatures.

ASVI produced limited quantities of bacterial and viral vaccines and diagnostic reagents and kits for human use. According to Hazim 'Ali. head of the Iraqi vita! BW program, any smallpox isolates would hase been stored at cither the ASM or the Central Public Health laboratory. The direcior of AS VI slated,ecent interview, thai ASVI produced three and half million doses of smallpox vaccineonth after the start of the Iran-Iraq war, eight years after lhe last smallpox case in Iraq and ihc year it was declared eradicated in ihe world. The director staled lhat vaccine might have been for defense against an Iranian BW attack, but il is also possible lhat lhe vaccine could haveefensive measure for anticipated Iraqi smallpox use against Iran.

* From ils inception, ASVI has not had the biosafety equipment, procedures or technical expertise to work with dangerous pathogens. Economicand impon restrictions funher impeded their ability to perform even basic research. Inhe facility was extensively looted with reconstruction efforts al the facilily focus on replacing air conditioning units, doors, windows andonsistent source of electricity. As of latehrough its affiliationumanitarian organization, Kimadia State company for Marketing and Medical appliances, and lhe Iraqi

Minislry of Health, lhe facility was able io import small amounts of vaccine an other reagents. These were to be stored and later distributed by the facilily.

5SVI produced smallpoxutilizing the vaccinia strain; samples of the vaccine were cultured and collected from bovine calf skin. Production of smallpox vaccine was conducted under the auspices of the World Health Organization (WHO)5he WHO vaccine was produced and stored in liquid form but7SVI alsoowdcred/lyophilized vaccinia product. InSVI requested Vaccinia seed stock from the WHO to produce more vaccine. The request was denied due to tbe disease having been eradicated, and the WHO ordered ASVI not to proceed with its vaccinia work but the Iraq Ministry of Health ordered it io produce the vaccine.he viral research branch responsible for the smallpoxproduced and subsequentlyillion doses of the vaccine in liquid form. These samples were assessed tohelf life of three years. Therams of bulk smallpox vaccine preparation was storedowdered/lyophilized form. This preparationhelf lite ofears.

The vaccine produced as by ASVI in response to the request trom the Iraqi Ministry of Health was manufactured by strengthening some vaccine it had previously produced and stored. The strainas having been used was Lister. The material was strengthened by three times inoculating rabbit skin and then infecting calf bellies. Each calf belly yieldedoses of the vaccine. The scientist responsible for conducting the work left ASVI2 and there were no tests of vaccine efficacy, such as neutralizing antibodies, in humans inrams of material were tested6 and found to be nonviable.illion doses of vaccine were tested andto be nonviable also. It was recommended that the vaccine be destroyed bul ISG has been unable to confirm or deny this claim.

raqHO questionnaire regarding lhe reporting of smallpox vaccineactivities, vaccine stocks and seed virus strains. Their response indicated that ASVI maintained two smallpox vaccine seed vials that Iraq had obtained from ihe Netherlands7 andials of Brucella antisera that had been produced inand mislabeled as vaccinia. In4 inventory submitted to the NMD listed the facility as possessing two vials of "smallpox seed. During meetings with UNMOVIC in2 regarding ihcntisera vials and the two seed stock vials. Antoine Al Bana took one of theials for analysis and an UNMOVIC inspector also took one. Al Bana determined thai there was nothing viable in the vial that he analyzed.

Two vialsof smallpox vaccine seed stock labeled "Rijkslwere discovered at ASVI. These two large vials may

be the seed vials referred to in4 report to the NMD. however. SMEs note that the vials were markedly different in content and appearance. No locally produced vials labeled "Elstree" wereat ASVI. ISG is awaiting confirmation on the contents of these vials.

GS intelligence officer whosecurity ataboratory at Al Salman and Al Hakam, an individual connected with ASVI90 had HS connections and supported Rihab's BW efforts at Al Hakam. The individual had frequent contact with Dr. Rihab beginningihab made frequent visits to Al 'Amiriyah Sera Vaccine Institute where she and the individual conducted unidentified BW related research. At ASVI. the individual source had access to special laboratories and conducted unspecified genetic research. The DGS officer stated that the source helped Rihah in her work. The DGS intelligence officer also staled that lhe source was an IIS officer and that his work was related to the IIS. When asked how he knew this he stated thai Rihab was under constant surveillance by the IIS and that he learned the source's affiliation from other IISThe individual left ASVI1 to work at Baghdad University.

All buildings, which were found lo be heavily looted during April andre nowrestored with equipment replenishment in progress. The UN tagged and untagged dual-use equipment found and the site were consistent with the declared purpose of the site.

State Company For Drug Industries and Medical Appliances

ISG exploitation af Samarra Drug Insustries' ISDI) location revealed industrial scale utilities and numerous, dual-use Jacketed vessels, some of which had not been declared to the UN. ISG found no evidence that equipment at Samarra bad been modified to serve as fermeniors for BWISG assesses, however, that the staff possessed the required expertise for bulk BW agentand that Samarra potentially would have been capable of limited breakout production ofBW agent within one month prior to OIF.

SDI belongs to the State Company for Drugand Medical Appliances, which, in turn, is pan of the Ministry of Industry and Materials (MIM) and under its direction and control. The main activities of the sitend production and formulation of pharmaceuticalechnical group within MIM provides guidance and direction forcompounds to be researched at SDI. Staff protected the plant post OIF and hence minimaltook place.

facility appears to be producing its full product line except for antibiotics.

Site buildings contain numerous jacketed process tanks ranging in capacity0 liters together with ancillary equipment such as filter presses, autoclaves and bio-safety cabinets.. and 6)

All equipment was assessed to be in good working condition.

ISG judges thatliter industrial scale tanks at Samarra are compatible with their declared

usc-ihe manufacture ofthat they would require considerable modification to function as fermeniors for BW production.ISG also judgesiter and possibly some or all ofiter stirred, jacketedcould be pressed into service for BWwilhin one month.

An ISG team was reluctantly admitted to ahall containing tiers of linked, jacketed, stainless steel vessels, of Soviet origin, which were piped to receive steam. Some of these vessels were fitted with aeration rings and glass viewing ports hut no stirrers/agitaiors were evident. (Figureone of these vessels had been declared to the UN.

The plant general manager asserted that thesewere for solvent extraction of natural oils from plants, and thai they were lasi used. ISG judges the vesselsotential dual-useand thai they could be adapted to function as fermeniors for production of BW agents.

High quality industrial scale steam and waterwere available on sile. (Figure 8)

Laboratories of the Iraqi Intelligence Service

ISG interviewed several sources and identified several suspect clandestine laboratories thai reportedlybiologically related research. ISG has not been able to determine whether these laboratories were panlandestine BW effort.

The lactic of using IIS and covert laboratories has historical precedence dating back to the programs origins in. Reverting to this practice would minimize the evidence available to inspectors. It would also leave the known and acknowledged BW workers free to deal with the UN inspection regime. However, it would require another cadre of scientists other than ones known to the UN to conduct ihis kind of research. The discovery of multiple clandestine laboratories after OIF lends some credence to this assessment.

ISGossible DGS laboratory in Baghdad thatariety of chemicals but nu laboratory equipment. Residents in the building alleged that the laboratoryiological one. The investigating team found several DGS administrative documents, some of which were from employees requesting approval for danger pay for their hazardous work with biological and radioactive materials. This warehouse complex, adjacent totory IIS laboratoryas reportedormer mid-level IIS chemist totorage facility for US chemicals andA separate former IIS officer indicated thisormer IIS training facility and hide site; materials were reportedly moved from the IIS safe house (siteo this warehouse in the beginningo avoid discovery by UN inspectors.

During the first exploitation inhe exploitation team found large quantities of liquid and dry chemicals, equipment, documents, and otherof which were partiallyisit to the site in Julyompletely looted warehouse complex with no remaining evidence of chemicals, equipment, orormer IIS officer indicated that other ITS officers returned to the site in late April to destroy the remaining materials.

Though not BW, ISG learned thai the Chemical Preparation Division of IIS's MI6 Directorate of Criminology used ihis approach for lethal chemical research. The USuccession of fourlaboratories in At laji and Baghdad63 to research and develop chemicals. It also included testing of chemicals on smalllike mice, rabbits and rats.

There is information that suggests that upIS laboratories operated in the greater Baghdad area at various limes up umil OIF.

Additional reporting, though unconfirmed, indicates lhal lhe MI6 Division also conducted BW related research in two coven laboratories as well. In the. Saddam tasked lhe US to do small-scale BW work in coven laboratories concealed wiihin legitimate facililies. Funher unconfirmed reports indicated the US conducted BW and CW experiments and stored WMD precursorin residences and warehouse around Baghdad Ihrough

Information collected ai the lime of OIF led to ihe discovery of assorted laboratory equipment purportedly useduspect BW scientist on the Black Listosque in Baghdad.

An ISG team at Ihe Baghdad Central Public Health laboratorylandestine laboratory in the summerccording Io an employee of ihe laboraiory, lhe IISaboratory at lhat location for several years. In advance8 UNSCOM inspection, secret documenis were removed and stored at lhe Director's house. In Decemberhe laboratory was emptied of all equipment and documents.

Annex C

ISG Investigation of Iraq's Reported Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Capability

Summary of Pre-OIF Intelligence on Iraq's Mobile BW Program

Accordinghemical engineer whose reliability ISO now believes is highly questionable. Iraqa mobile BW capability designed to evade UN inspections and to provide Baghdad the ability to produce biological agents for offensive purposes. The chemical engineer staled that seven production units had been built, three of which had begun ageni production runs. He identified six locations of the seven plants, as well as key engineers and personnel involved in the design, construction, and operation of Ihe units (seedditional sources reported before OD? on the existenceobile biological capability in Iraq:

Iraqi civil engineerosition to know the details of the program reported Ihe existence of transportable facilities moving on nailers.

additional source reported thai Iraq hadmobile production systems mounted on road-trailer units and on rail cars.

Objectives of Investigation

Because Iraq's reported mobile BW ageni production capabilityey element of the prewarof Iraq's WMD programs, it was an important issue addressed by ISG. and the BW teamariety of collectors and analysts againsl thisissue wiih the intent io do lhc following:

Locate and debrief Iraqis identified as being directly involved in the planning, design,and operation of the BW agent production plants.

the sites named as having an involvement in the program, as well as ancillary sites and companies connected io the cover story.

In the wot? of ISG's investigation, ISG is unable io confirm the existenceobile BW agentcapability in Iraq. Key personnel in the rnobUe program ivere said to hare been involved in both BW activities at Al Hakam and ihe design andof legitimate seed purification plants. Keyinclude:

All individuals thai ISG questioned deniedobile BW agent production capability.

Individuals linked to sites lhat were part of the investigation deny that Ihe sites were used by the military or intelligence services, or used to conceal specialized equipment, trucks, or railcars.

Two key sites thai reportedly housed production unils bear physical features lhat ISO assesses prohibit their use in the manner described by ihe source.

' ISO has not been able to determine the involvement of other sites reported by ihc chemical engineer to have been linked to the mobile program largely due to post-OIF events al lhc sites, such as turnover of personnel and looting.

ISG established thai ihe chemical engineer had access to both Iraq's seed purification project and BW program, there are concerns regarding his employment and whereaboutshich is the period that he claimed to hove been involved in the mobile BW program.

Origins of Iraq's Mobile BW Program

Many of ihe key personnel that ISG investigated were employed ai the Chemical Engineering and Design Centerhich later became part of the Sa'ad Center. By the very nature of their employment, these individuals were involved in both lhc design and construction of the single cell protein lines at Al

Hakam which could haw been used for BW agentthe design und construction ofseed purification plants. Background on these (wo programs:

BW Program. Prior to1 Gulf war, IraqW program that had researched, developed, produced, and weaponized agents. After the war. Baghdad effectively hid its offensive BW program from UNSCOM inspectors forears. Iraq claimed lo have destroyedgents and weapons completelyut UNSCOM was unable to verify this claim. By the departure of UNSCOM inspectorsraq's declared BW production capability in known fixed facilities had been dismantled.

Seed Purification Project, Iraq's mobile BW program reportedly began amid the UN inspection process and operaied under the cover of the seed purification project facilities. ISG investigations show thai the seed projeci began4 on orders of Husayn Kamil as part of Iraq's effort Iu improve and modernize ils agricultural sector, and involved the creationtal of (en legitimate, although inefficient and low quality, agncultural seed sorting and fungicide treatment systems that were designed

toreater capacity and lessealth risk lhan seed purification plains available to Iraq at the time. Ihc seed purification units were designed, fabricated, and installed by the CF.DC. Theconsideredobile System bul decided on fixed plants installed in buildings. The final planl design was based on theerman-inanufactured seedplant in Tikril. The seed purification project occurred in (wo phases, concluding7 when all ten plants were transferred to Ihe Mesopotamia Slate Company for Seeds, also known as lhe Al Nahrayn Company.

Denials or tbe Existence of Mobile BW

ISG identified nearly ninety individuals lhal could have been involved or were linked to sites or the source lhal became part of the investigation. Of these individuals, ISG located and debriefed over sixty. While many liave corroborated some of theon personnel and of the Sa'd Center and some legitimate activities (he source claimed were cover activities, none have provided evidence to

ale lhe claimobile BW program. The levels of coopcralion from these individuals varyranging from active cooperation to denials and evasiveness:

Most of the individuals identified as being involved in ihe mobile BW program were associated wiih ihe CEDC and responsible for both the seedprojeci and the single cell protein project that was lhe cover for the Al Hakam BW facility. ISG spoke io nearly all of these individuals and, while they have acknowledged their involvement in both of lhe projects, they have consistently denied lhe existenceobile BW program,

Several key Iraqi engineers were debriefed. Each engineer denied both the creationobileprojeci and thai ihe seed purificaiion siles were used as legitimate cover forgent production units. ISG officers found some of those interviewed lo be less than forthcoming, but were unable to judge if the interviewees wereinformation on ihe alleged mobile BW projeci or some other project they did not want to reveal. Dcbricfings of High Value Detainees illVDs) have not yielded any new insights inio lhe existence of mobile BW ageni production capabilities in Iraq.

Personnel from Al NasrAlAzim Statea company ihai produced fermentors, heai exchangers, and vessels for Al Hakam. have denied that they produced components for any mobile BW systems during.

from the Al Nahrayn Company denied that three of its siles housed mobile BW agentunits. ISG officers assess thai the AlCompany has usually been forthcoming and accommodating to requests for information and siie vislts.The current occupants of the As Suwayrah Store, Tikril Industrial Facilily. and Mosul Rail Station also deny thai Ihe facilities were utilized for transportable activities, as reported by lhe source. However, in the case of Tikril, although thecompany that runs the site occupied the facility when the production units were allegedly present, current siie personnel were hired after OIF and do not have historical knowledge of lhe facilily.

Exploitation of Mobile BW Agent Production Sites

Since stand-up, ISG has exploited many sites in Iraq identified toonnection to ihe mobile BW program, including the five reported production sites thai remained intact after the warremain between pasl descriptions of sites and physical features at lhe sites as found by ISG. Investigations of six additional sites have notlinks io the mobile BW program, which may be partially due lo post-OIF activities, such as turnover of employees and looting of facilities.

Djerf-al-NodafSted Purificaiion Facility, Reported Mobile Sile. ISG icams visited ihis site six limes io examine ils physical features and debrief siteihc teams determined that ihe facilily is in fact operaied by the Al Nahrayn Company and it's involved in seedigh-bay building adjoining the primary warehouse of interest was built4 andegitimate twe-story high seed purification unit However. ISG also discovered differences between physical features present ai ihc facilily and those reported pre-OIF.

officers were unable to locate any evidence of reported vehicle entrances on (he ends of the building that was said lo have housed the BW production unit In ihc course of inspections. ISG found thai the building is constructed ofsheet metal; ihcrc were no indicaiions thai Ihe meial on lhe ends of the building was altered to accommodate and then conceal the past existence of doors. The current siie manager, who is aemployee at ihc site, and an engineer involved in the seed purification projeci. denied the past existence of the doors on the ends of ihe building.

Two twe-rncter-high block walls around ihree sides of ihe building prevent vehicle access into the building ihrough ihese reported vehicle cnoancesSG determined ihai ihe walls were con-smiciedhich is when lhe BW production unit was reportedly on site.

a small building on-site was theof the power supply for ihe mobile production units. An ISG examination of the reported power supply building revealed thai lhe building consists

of two small rooms, which site personnel explained were constructed for security personnel andThese indiv iduals said that ihe power supply for Ihc site came from the local power grid.an external generator for electricity to certain places ai the siic cannot he ruled out.

ISG has determined thai ihc primary warehouse has undergone some modifications since ine dale of informationransportable BWto ibe facilily. This indicates thai the building was altered, thereby raising ihe possibility that other less detectable modifications have occurred:

one-meter high concrete wall was discovered around the internal perimeier of ihc building. Site personnel report that Ihe wall was built9 io prevent seeds from pressing against the sheet metal walls.

A tile Boor was found in one corner of ihe building, indicatingoom had been present and removed. Siie personnel indicate thai an office was present in this location, but was removed9 Ioihe need for greater space required for ihe seed purification activities.

Al Ahrar Seed Purification Facility, Reported Mobile Site. ISG exploited lhe Al Ahrar seedfacility, the primary candidate for Ihc site in the An Numaniyah area that reportedlyobile BW ageni production unit. Exploitation reveuled that, allhough it is operaied by the Al Nahrayn Company and is pan of the seed purification projeci. il mosl likely did not house mobile production units.

facility contains four adjoining warehouses, each large enough to accommodate semi trailers; however, it was determined that the doorways of ihe warehouses, assessedase housed production units, are too short lo accommodate tractor-nailers the size of the described mobile fermentation unitshere were no signs that ihe doorways had been altered. In addition, site personnel deny the past presence of trailers with fermentaiion-like equipment They slated thai CEDC employees, including individuals allegedly involved in ihe mobile BW program had been to the site as part of ihc seed purificationigh-bay building adjacent lo the warehouses contains two legitimate seed processing units that arc similar to the one unit locaied at ihe Djerf-al-Nadaf facilily.

Investigations of the four remaining reported production sites have yielded no evidence of their involvement In the mobile BW program

TiktitIndustrial Facility Northwest, Reported Mobile Site. This siieeported location of iwo transportable BW plants using ihc cover of seed purification. ISG exploitation of the siie revealed lhat the warehouse, which is currently usedtorehouseonstruction company, was large enough to accommodate tractor trailersowever, ISG found no evidence to suggest thai the building is or was equipped with false walls for concealment of any such units. In addition, tbe sile personnel explained thai lhehadlastics factory fromntil lhe construction company look over the grounds. Although they had no first-hand historicalof ihe site, the site personnel siaied lhat the facility had no connection to seed purification and had not been usedide siie for tractor trailers.

Plant Protection Division As Suwayrah Stores, Reported Mobile Site. The As Suwayrah Slores was identified as ihe mosi probable candidate for the sile in lhe Al 'Aziziyah-Sarabadi area. ISGof the site determined that ihe facility is astorage site with no association with the seed purification project Measurements of the suspect warehouses indicate thai the facility is large enough toobile BW agent production unit; however, ISG has not been able io confirm if such

a unit had been present in the past. Site personnel, who liad been hired after OIF. had no historical knowledge of the activities at the facility: however Plani Proteciion Division Management withknowledge of the site deny thai Ihe facilily was used io hide vehicles or production equipment.

Rail Yards, Reported Mobile Site. Therepair station ai the Mosul rail yardswas the location of the single rail-mounied BW agent production unit. While this site is not directly involved in the seed purification projeci, lhe current Direcior General of ihc Al Nahrayn Seed Company stated lhal lhe company was ordered io conceal seed purification equipment in the railduring8 Desert Fox campaign. An ISG inspection of the facilily revealed lhat it is capable

of accommodating rail cars. However, long-time employees at the rail yard stated that the repairhad never been used to conceal unusualrailcars, or trucks.

Agricultural Facility, Reported Mobile Site. This site, which reportedlyW ptoduction unit in the, was completely destroyed by looters betweenay andl Nahrayn officials confirmed that their site in Huwayjah had been destroyed

by looters and deny the past presence of mobile platforms for BW agent production. They stated that, while this site was an agricultural processing facility, it had no connection to the seed purification project.

ISG exploited three additional sites, but were unable to ascertain their link to the mobile BW program due to post-OIF activities, such as turnover of siteand looting:

AI Mlshraq Sulfur Facility, Possible ReportedSite. ISG assesses that the Al Mishraq Sulfur Facility could haseispersal site for the rail mounted BW production unit housed in Mosul. ISG exploitation of this site revealed no evidence of the unit, and site personnel claimed that they had never seen rail cars with fermentation-like equipment in them.

Habbaniyah Barracks, Reported Dispersal Site. Reportedly, containers of BW material from the mobile units were concealed from UN inspectors by burial at the Habbaniyah Barracks. ISG exploited ihe site io find evidence io suppon this claim;looters had removed, among olhcrence that reportedly would have provided ato assist in locating ihe burial site.

Baghdad Unidentified Facility 'Ali AdDayyan. This site, also known as Buetha, is along the Tigris just south of Baghdad and was reported to have been associated with the BW programISG exploited the site and determined that ii had been an orange grove and chicken farm ai one time but could not confirm an association with the mobile BW program. However, locals stated that it had belonged to the Iraqi Government

Other Leads

In addition io infonnaiion now judged unreliableey source, ISG also has sought to vet theby other sources who indicated before OIF thai Iraqobile capability. ISG has not been able to corroborate this reporting, and ihese individuals are believed lo be now outside of Iraq. Since it began its investigation. ISG also received information on aBW mobile capability from two other sources separate from ihose mentioned by the pre-OIF sources, but neither lead has confirmed the existenceobile BW ageni production capability:

Nu'man "Ali Muhammad Al Tikriti. director ofection of the US.eference io Ihc MIC0 having at least one transportable facility for work on either biological or chemical warfare agents, accordingormer IIS officer. Nu'man denies knowledge of any attempts by Iraq io manufacture or use mobile facilitiesr CW program.

ormer senior officer in the Iraqi Army told us that he heard from his nephew, who was involved in making weapons, thai Iraq had "portablefactories or laboratories" making BW agentsebriefings ofthe nephew have determined thai he had hearsay information regardingof prohibited BW-related equipment to evade UNSCOM inspections, He claimed io have had no knowledgeobile BW agent production

Individuals Debriefed

ISG has debriefed key individuals and visited key sites regarding the planning, design, manufacture, and operation of the reported transportable BW agent production plants.

Some of these individuals were key players directly involved with running the BW program, whereas others were either heads or associated wiihareas of the BW program. ISG interviewed

key figures, such as ihe suspected head of the BW program, the former Deputy Minister of Agriculture, ihe National Monitoring Directorate representative Io the Ministry of Industrialization and Minerals, the director of the MIC. the former Minister ofand Minerals, the Minister of Transportation and Communication that had involvement in the BW program, and other important individuals that had suspected involvement with Iraq's BW program.

In the area of mobile production equipmcni and facilities, thereumber of key individuals interviewed. Some of these individuals included the Director of IIS Directorate of Criminology MI6 thai reportedly discussed mobile plaiformshe directorossible dispersal site for rail mobile units, managerseported mobile BW agcnlsite,ormer military officer whoknew thai Iraq had "portable biological factories or laboratories" making BW agenis

Annex I)

Trailers Suspected of Being Mobile BW Agent Production Units

ISG assesses the capability of two mobilewith tanks or suspected fermeniors on board that were recovered near Irbil and MosulSG judged the mobile units were impractical for biological agent production and almost certainly designed and built for the generation of hydrogen.

Initial Assessments ami Sampleeam of military expertsreliminary technical licld investigation ofoon after ils capture. They assessed the trailer io be panossible Iraqi mobile BW weapon production system, wiih its equipmeni being capable ofimited biological batch productionecondwas undertakeneam of scientific experts, alter Al Kindi personnel suggested lhc trailers were for hydrogen production. Their report concluded. "Ibc trailers have equipment and componentscompatible with biological ageni production andi'or chemical processes that might includeproduction."

Iraq's Consideration of Mobile BW AgentSystems. Several events underpin the continuing suspicion that Iraq possessed mobile facilities and laboralories.

In, the Technical Research Center (TRC) al Al Salmanobile laboratory for forensic purposes in supportroposed meeting ofthe Arab league or Arab Games in Baghdad. The meeting did not lake place in Iraq, bul Al Salman retained lhc laboratory.

Later,7 Dr. Rihab, head of the BWgroup, and Dr. 'Amirllamudi Hasan Al Sa'adi, MIC First Deputy and right hand man of Husayn Kamil, discussed ihe possibility ofa transportable system for the production of BW agents. The idea was largely Al Sa'adi's; Rihab rejected ihe proposal in favor of the moreroute thai, in lime, ledhe construction of Al Hakam, Iraq's major BW research, development, testing, production, and storage facility

(see

ISG Assessment of the Trailers

In response to questions raised by these earlieream, comprised of specialists in feimenia-lion technology and bio-manufacturing,omparative assessment ofthe trailers with respect to ihe two major uses postulated;

clandestine mobile BW agent production platform.

uniis for hydrogen production.

This assessment focuses onecause it appeared Iuomplete set of equipment The 'reactor vessel' was considered to be ihe key component of ihe system for evaluation because to determine its purpose asio-fermeniorhemical reaction vessel for hydrogen generation, would resolve the debate over lhc function of lhc whole assembly of equipmeni mounted on Trailer I.

Discovery and Initial Exploitation of Suspect Trailer-Bonie Equipment

ll was againsl this background lhat Coalition Forces discovered iwo nailers in Northern Iraq in April andnrailer (trailer I) was recovered after its discovery in Irbil. This trailer appeared io be complete wiih all equipmentecond, similar trailer (naileras later identified and recovered in3ite adjacent to the Al Kindi research facility al Mosul. Some items of equipment were missing from this trailer bed.

The Trailerslandestine BW Agent Production Platform

The crucial item of equipmcni for the production of BW agents is ihc fcrmcntor. This provides andan aseptic and controlled, optima) environment for growth of ihc selectedennen-lor. regardless of ihe particular microorganism being produced, be it BW ageni or noi, must possess certain essential design features in order to achieve these

tcria. The most critical of these is the 'sterile integrity" of the ferinentor and its associated pipework, in order toonoculture and prevent the ingress of 'foreign' microorganisms lhat might outgrow and displace the required agent.

ISG has found no evidence lo suppon ihe view thai ihe equipmenilandestine tote in iheof BW agents; and ISG judges the equipmeiu's configuration mates ils useermenlorfor the following reasons:

Thereritical absence of instrumentation for process monitoring and conirol of the process.

The positioning ofthe inleis and outlets on the reactor make even Ihc most basic functions (such as filling completely, emptying completely, and purging completely the vessel) either impractical or impossible to perform.

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A working reactor of the size of thai on ihecould produce onlyiters of xlO coneenlrated BW agent per week, not enough loingle missile warhead.

Innalysis was carried out on seven samples taken from key equipmeni locations on the trailer, including powder and slurry taken from Ihe 'reactor vessel'. No evidence of BW organisms was defected. The complete absence of proteins and ihe minute amounts of phosphorus and sulfur present were deemed inconsisieni with normal bio-production.

The Trailers as Field Units for Hydrogen Cas Production

After re-examining the equipment found on trailers in northern Iraq and reviewing previous reporting, documeius, and results of chemical andanalysis. ISG judges that theAl Kindt General Establishment at Mosul designed and built the two trailer-borne equipment systems as hydrogenfor Republican Guard artillery units for use with radiosonde balloons. Although the equipmeni is poorly constructed, it is consistent with the hydrogen generation process detailed in documents from the Al Kindi Company.

The equipmeni on Trailer I. although poorly constructed, is consistent with the hydrogen generation process because:

The reactor design and sizing, large entry port to "load" lhe reacior. tlie scoop io "load" iheand aluminum hydroxide found in the bottom of die reacior arc all consistent with production of hydrogen. Hydrogen may be produced bysodium hydroxide with aluminum powder and water. The rate of reaction, and Ihe (emperaiure and pressure in ihe reactor is controlled by the rate at which water is added. The by-product is aluminum hydroxide.

A peristaltic pump io compress the effluent gas is necessary for handling flammable producis.

A high-capacity cooling system for ihc reactor is consistent wiih lhe duly associatedtrongly exothermic process, such as thai used for iheof hydrogen.

A pressure-relief valveent extending above ihc vehicle, spark resistant lighting,elescopic lightning airesior found on lhe completed trailer indicate precautions taken with the handlinglammable, lighter than air gas, such as hydrogen.

Moreorer, reports and other documents provided by high-ranking officials from Al Kindi, detailing milestones in the manufacture and testing of the trailers, are consistent with the reporting on their stage of construction. For example, the date of the

Iraqi Icitcr requesting an extension of Ihc contract due to late deliveryreactor vessel' corresponds with lhc observed lack of consiruciion work on Trailer 2.

The two trailers were located in laic2 at the Al Kindi facility in Mosul. Reporting indicated that at least one of the trailers had arrived on the siteare chassis fittedloor/bed.eriod ofonths between2 andoth trailers had had sufficient equipment addede described as two 'possibleBW production related trailers'.

The location of Ihe trailers, together with the addition and removal of structural features and equipment during their construction and testing, is consistent wiih information in Iraqi reports and documents.

Iraqis have staled ihe trailers were constructed toobile capability for hydrogen gasSeveral documents give credence io ihis claim.

Al Kindi in its submission for Ihc2 semi-annual declaration to UNMOVICproduction station for gas (see"

A teller from ihe Al Kindi General Company io the 'Americann Mosul, explains thai ihe trailers were manufactured as 'hydrogen field production systems' for ihe Republican Guard.

Copies of the original contraci and associatedthai describe Ihe requirements, specifications and testing were provided by sources lhat had first hand know ledge of ihe manufacture and use of the trailers.

The Al Kindi Material describes ihe process employed on ihe trailers as an anempt to improve upon one originally developed in Russia for the production of hydrogen for use in meteorological balloons.

It is interesting to note that the Al Kindi material also includes comments (some of which are not par-ucularly favorable) received from Ihe IraqiGuard Artillery in relation lo the suitability

of ihe process for the job it would be required lo

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do. In summary, iheir coitclusion is (hai (he process plant/trailer combination is loo bulky and (hai ihc trailer is not rugged enough for lhe process io beruly mobile "field"maller capacity planl might be more compatible with ihe needs of meteorological units requiringin terms of hydrogen availability.

lhe level of detail provided in the Alighly credible case for hydrogen generation. It would have been extremely difficult io fabricate datahis level of detail

Detailed Assessment Of The Suspect Trailers Recovered From Irbil and3

F.valuation nf the Possible Use nf the Trailerslandestine BW Ageni Production plalform

Air Supply

Air is used in ihe process io provide aeration for ihc reacior. for transferring liquids as required ihroughoui the process, and after Ihe production cycle forvessels and pipework ihai have had coniact with ihe inoculum, ihe culture broth, and/or contaminated gases. Air is drawnowar) compressor selimple activated carbon, compressed and fed to the integral) of ihe compressor set. Compressed air from lhe compressor reservoir is fed cither directly lo the reactor viarank ofK" bottleshe air siored in ihis cylinder bank is available as an emergency reserve for use to shunt liquids around the process as required without having to rely on ihe compressor set The air supply sysiem may be vented via.

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The Minplcs notesign thai will provide vlenlc compressed air to theEPA filler could be lined to address this problem, although ihis would notinor modification.

I jitge amounts of compressed air are required for each production cycle) and ihe risk of(failure) of any given batch is increased il process air is not sterilized.

The low pressure compressor set is of standard reciprocating design and will not ptmide "oil-free" air Oil-free air compressors are often specified in lermentalion installations though in Ihis particular concept li.e. the production of "fire-and-lorgct" BWt is unlikely toritical factor

These trailers were not designed with anaerobicin mind. Although it would be possible tbut extremely inconvenient) to connect nitrogen cylinders lo the sparge system, il is noteworthy lhal no provision has been made on the trailers for the

storage of gas cylinders other than the fivefor air storage. These cylinders are permanent fixture* and cannot easily be removed/substituted with other gas cylinders containing N^ orSG concludes that anaerobic fermentations. CI. botulinum and CI.ould not normally be conducted on the trailer.

Water Supply

Waterrovides water for dilution of medium Concentrate, for wash-down, for charging the chilled water system, and for chiller system make-up.and/or wash-down water can be introduced to the processoutes:

Indirectly, viandnto. This route could be used for providing process water for medium concentrate dilution) to the reactor. When full,s isolated from the systementednd its contents delivered via flowmeterartridge. and positive displacement pump P2 into the reactorN.B. The reactor must also be vented during this process via Ihe overpressure relief assembly bypass valve

Directly (andntoiand. This route would he used forwater for wash-down or cleaning, and possibly as part of the postproduction purging cycle.

Comment and assessment

simple cartridge filter) is notesign that will provide sterile water to the process. This filler assembly is located at very low level. The whole filler assembly would need to be repositioned and repipedterile water filter is lo be fitted. This isinor modification.

nd T3 lack any form of liquid level indication and will be difficult lo use when fed by.

Chilled Water System

The chiller system provides cooling water to thethe gas-drying condenser, and the high-pressure gas compressor.

Prior to first operation, the chiller circuit must he filled with water from lhe water storage. When this has been done Ihe sysiem should require little by way of make-up waier because itealed system and little evaporation can occur. Cooled water is circulated around the system by

Comment and assessment

Notwithstanding the other loads on this process (UP compressor and effluent gasSG believes lhat the cooling load presented by asmall fermentation operation al perhaps40'Cypical temperature range for H. anthra-cis) does notooling plani of the size specified for the process as found.

However, il would be fair to say that the output of this unit can be modulated and the fabrication shop may not have had ihe luxury of choice and was obliged to use equipmeni available al Ihe time.

Metered Water Supply System)

The metered water supply sysiemented supply vessellowmeter, an in-line cartridge filterosing pumpsee

Note thatan only receive water from lhe main water lank. Il may receive other liquids through (he venio long as ihe vessel is aspirated viand lhe air supply line vent. Ihc valve arrangement docs no! allow liquidse received from.

Comment and assessment

s noi equipped with any form of liquid level indication and will be difficult to operate because of this.

The glass finer cartridgeill not remotemicrobial contaminants from ibe water supply and therefore the process water treated by this means will not be sterile. In ISG's view, neither the medium concentrate nor the inoculum should be inttoduced to the process via. The medium concentrateomplex medium and may contain aggregates that will collect on and bind the in-line cartridge. The inoculum will have been prepared under sterile conditions and it makes no sense to filter things that are already sterile..

A large amount of process water is required for each production cycle (as dilution water and for systemhe risk of contamination (failure) of any given batch is increased if the process water is not sterile. In this regard, il is important lo ensure lhat the initial seed culture contains sufficient viable organisms in log phase to ensure (hat potentialmicroorganisms cannot compete.

ould be ineffective if used for dilution water either. Running the wateriller that is incapable of removing any solids smaller than fine sand panicles will make little difference to the fermentation performance.ilers of dilution water is required for each production run. Given that the capacity ofiters, Ihis vessel would need to be recharged twice during the operation. The maximum flow rate for the metering pump is onlyiters/minute. This makes charging the reactor an unnecessarily lengthy operation.

Inoculum and concentrated culture medium vessel IT-3)

s piped up to receive process waterl may also aCIransfer vessel for theand the growth medium (possibly as avia valvef used in this way.ust first be aspirated throughn the air line. The inoculum and the growth medium would be transported to the trailer in prcssunzable containers with suitable fittings such thai the cotnems could be "blown"y usingool pump or from the onboard air storagelexible hose.

During the production cycle,eeds lo be empty because all process air required by the reactor has to be passed through il.

Comment and assessment

purpose ofs not entirely clear, Itotally closed, untagged tank havingedicated ventiquid level indicator. Avessel lo use.

The only ways to tent this vessel are vian the air supply line or through the reactor and out via the over-pressure bypasseither method would be available during the production cycle because the air supply system will already be in use.

As piped up, liquid contained inannot be passed to. This means that neither the medium concentrate nor the inoculum can be metered into the reactor. Also, it means that the only entry point by which concentrated medium and/or inoculum can gain access to the process is via.

Steam and/or hoi water required (providedtand-alone utilities vehicle) would be admittedhe process via

There is no convenient coupling present ator attaching temporary hoses for passing steam, inoculum, or concentrated growth medium into.

ihe production cycle,ust be empty because process aeration is required.

is assumed that the air feed pipe docs not extend intoecause, if il did. lhe vessel would he impossible to fill.

Reactor

The reactor)essel fabricaied intainless steel und ts ol an unusual design for the cultivation of microorganisms in lhat its principle features are:

flat baseemispherical lop

the exception of what would he the air sparge inlei and lhe drain point, all other connections andaccess way are side mounted

vesseltainless steel)covers the top of the reactor within but the base of the vessel is not cooled.

is no means of assessing liquid level in the vessel.

The vessel is provided with an air supply, ansafely relief valve plus manualrain point, an effluent gasemperatureressure gauges,pare unusedslub. The vessel jacket is provided with Iwo chilled water inputs, one cooling water returnemperature gauge,ressure gauge.

If the process were to be usedobile BW agent production unit,ould be used for lhe production of Ihe BW agent. Ihe inoculum (prepared elsewhere and delivered to thehe growth medium (prepared elsewhere and delivered to the Trailer probably would be suppliedoncentrate) and dilution wuler are fed into the vessel. Stirring and aeration of the culture is achieved by injecting low pressure compressed air inio (he reactor (presumablypargesed air could escape from the reacior through lhe effluent gas outlet connection.

Commtnl and assessment

Reactor capacity. Tlie dimensions of boih(the Mosul Trailer and Ihc Irbil Trailer) were taken, and these measurements are representediagram in ihe appendix. The reactors are, for all intents and purposes, of the same capacity. The internal height of ihe reactorm and its nominal capacityearing in mind lhat the placemen! of the reacior connections limits ihe extent to which the reacior can be filled in practice, ihe total usable-capacity of the vessel (ie. loihe level of the efflucnr gas outlet)llare prone ioight-glass permits operators to monitor the foaming and hence control it by adding reagent or adjusting other parameters. This design has no sight-glass. Under noshould any liquid be allowed to enter the gas recovery system as this would,hort time cause (he ca(asirophic failure of ihe highcompressor. Thisimitation of the maximum volume at which the reactor can beISG would expect (he working volume of this vessel io be in the region1f the total usable volume of lhe reactor) (sec

tirring. The air supply pipe penetrates the vessel onlyepth ofmmistancemm beiween the end of Ihc air supply pipe and ihc base of ihe reactor. The sparge tube musi extend io ihe base of ihe reactor if any aeration and stirring is to be achieved, bul no sparge assembly orlexible hose of suitable diameter has been found. In one Trailer (Mosul

tlie less complete of lhehe air supply pipe is threaded presumably to receive an air sparge ring attachment whereas in ihe other Irbil Trailer the air supply pipe has no thread or other titling. That there shouldifference between the sparge tubes is somewhat puzzling. The mosl efficieni way to achieve maximum oxygen transfer rate isse an impeller (mechanical stirrer) under lurbulenl flow conditions. Direct air injection alone will provide some mixing of the reacior contents but is not an efficient method of transferring oxygen into the culture medium. The consequence of (his is lhal ihis reactor will require much more air lhan would be necessary under (he impeller option (see Effluent Gas Collection).

' Vesstl venting. The vent valve of lhc reactor is not fitted al ihe lop of the vessel as would normally be expected but raiher at the1 mm above the base of ihe reacior. This distance corresponds to ihe highest venting points ofthe reactor (the emergency pressure relief outlet and the effluent gashis means that the reactor cannot be filled to capacity. fors noted in above, the total useable volume ofthe reactoriters and the useable working volume willilers.

* Antifoam addition. There is no antifoam addition point on lhc reactor and no sight-glass by which to gauge whether or not aniifoam addition is required. Although antifoam may be incorporated in ihe culture mediumtandard component medium prior to its inuoduction to the reacior, il is unusual to find that the production cycle can be completed without the addition of further amounts of anti-foam. The consimciion ofthe rcsictor indicates that this process will be conducted at pressures up0 bar gauge; under such conditions the culture would be particularly prone to foaming at certain limesormal production cycle. at start-up of the effluent gas collection compressor and at sample collection).

Process monitoring and control. The reactor vessel is not provided with any prober aport. An assessmentrevious reportthat the operators of ihe plant would run the process accordingtandard operating procedure and would require no knowledge of ihc ageni being produced. pH change is normally monitored during Ihe production cycle. Culture mediums are usually buttered to cushion Ihc effect of microbial activity as the production cycle progresses bul, more often lhan not, the addition of acid or alkali is usually requited at some point during Ihe cycle. Anport svould be required on the reactor for ihis purpose. Dissolved oxygen concentration is also an important parameter (particularly in cases where the aeration system is notrobe location point is required for this. ISG maintains lhatthese monitoring and control ilems, anywould be almost impossible to control.

The level of instrumentation provided is insufficient for the purpose of producing BW agents on abasis. Without sight glasses or level indicators it is impossible to assess liquid levels in any of the vessels. Furthermore, ihc process would need io heayout and disposition of vessels will not permit gravity flow from one place to another) and as such would be veiy hazardous io operate when producing highly toxic BW agents. Technical operators would have to be aware of the nature of the work they were conducting.

Reacior harvest and cleaning. Reacior discharge takes place via drain4engthinner diameter) pipe extending over the edge of the trailer (seet would be normal lo see some foim of coupling or flange on lhcpipe but the end is not even threaded. As it stands, the only way to transfer the reactor contents would he lolexible hose over the discharge pipe ouilei. The reactor contents would have in

be "blown" by compressed airontainer or equipment of some kind, either on ihc ground or on anotherit an unnecessarily risky operation. There arc no suitable receptacles on the trailer. The drain valve is sited some 2cm above the Hoor of the vessel. This means lhal ihe reacior can

be completely emptied. To carry over some of the culture to the next production cycle will not cause any problem (aparteduction in productivity) so long as tire culture remains sterile. Where it is critical is in the eventontaminated or failed batch. Removing by hand the highly toxic remnants of the failed batch from the reactor would be no easy task. At Al Hakam, Iraq's principal BW facility, the production run failure rate was reported as running atoer cent. The productionwere far better than (hey would be on these trailers, so ISC would anticipate high failure rates using this processobile BW agent production platform.

Sampling. No dedicated sample port is provided. The only means of sampling mid-cycle would be from the drain valve located at the base of the reactor. The dispositions of (lie drain valve and the outflow of the discharge pipe are such (hat two operatives would be requited to perform (heoperation (see

Productivity Issues

orking volume of onlyhiscould hardly be describedroduction scale unit. Each cycle will be approximalelyours in durationulture lime ofours plusours turnaround) and would be expected to yield only someiters of lOx concentrated BW agent. On (hisroduction cycles (aiays' production) would be required to produce sufficient BW agentomb (Fill capacity

Effluent Gas Handling

Effluent gases from the reacior exit ihc vessel and are cooled by passage Ihrough the. Condensate is collected in the knock-outnd the dried gases are passedigh pressure compressorarticulates. The gases arc

compressed tour and passedtorage bank comprisingbottlessuch that the processholeero effluent signature. all air input during complete cycle, less an amount of oxygen removed forbut plus, the carbon dioxide respirationome personnel who have exploited lite equipmeni maintain that if this system was to produce BW agent then the effluent gases would be collected in order to reduce the risk of detection.

Comment and assessment

The notion of collecting and storing effluent gases from this processompletely impractical and unnecessary proposition and is discounted. ISG found no testimony or evidence, physical, documentary or circumstantial, lo support any such procedure.

requirements. Conducied ai ambient pressure,

a mechanically stirred reactor will normally require an air flowhe reactor working volume per minute at Ihe start of the process cycle. The air rate will increase toolume per minute as ihc cell density increases. In this case. Iheworking volumeiters andhour fermentation run is assumed al an average air flow rate5 reactor working volume per minute, the tolal air consumed for the complete cycle willote thai this estimate is conservative because it assumes air rates characteristic of mechanically stirredThe reactor on the trailer has no stirrer.

Storage capacity. In contrast to this,K" Bottles, each pressurizedar. would hold the equivalentombined storage ability off air from the reactor if al almosphenc pressure. When set against1 of effluent gases producedingle production cycle, the effluent gas storage system capacity falls far short of the duly required.

is unknown what would happen lo "K" buttles once pressurized. The operators would still have io lake them away for discharge.

Evaluation of Other Possible Uses of the Trailers

umber of uses have been proposed for the trailers. ISG found no evidence lu support those uses. It is ihe view of ihe ISG that none is feasible.

A number of potential uses have been suggested for the trailers:

Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU)

-Possible Chlorinization fuel Plant

-Possible Chiller Plant

lant

-Possible CW Production (least likely)

Although the chiller unit could obviously be usedtand-alone basis, there is no evidence to support any of the remainder, thus (bey are discounted.

Evaluation of Ihe Technical Detail In Documents Pertaining to the Trailers Recovered From the Al Kindi General Establishment

Process Outline

The pn>ccssydrogen generator. For theof Im'of hydrogen, ihe Russian equipmentg Al powder. lOOg of NaOH (solidndf water. The reactor size. Rudimentary means of cooling of reactor contents and product H, was provided. The Iraqis identified Ihe following problems with the Russian system:

Thermal ronaway of the reactor (lack of effective cooling and temperature readouts).

Lack of control of gas flow during hydrogenbecause of the use of flexible hoses and lack of pressure regulation systems (operator hazard judged "high"!.

Process was skid mounted and was heavy andto handle.

Russian version of the process was suitable only for filling balloons directly, there being no gas storage capability.

There was no pressure relief valve (PRV) on the reactor.

The Iraqis set about designing and building an improved version of the Russian equipment in order to overcome tbe above limitations. Specifications of the major equipment items are listed.

Major Equipment Items Main Reactor

Produced by Al Nasr Al Azim Company; pressure tested toar gauge: wallm; reactor internalmm;mm: manway accessressureempafety valve; gas draw-off pipe diametertainless steel; reactor jacket fabricated in stainlesshickness 3mm; annularmm;m; cooling water inlet/outletempressure gauge; reactor gas draw-off pipe contained within cooled water jacket extension: complete assembly mounted6 baseplate with height ofm.

High Pressure Air Compressor Diaphragm type with capacity0 ft'/minar. Fed by gas from the reactor after having passedondenser stage to remove water vaporarticle filter. After compression, the gas is fed to filling pipesressure regulator valve.

Water addition system (to reactor)

High pressure pump atar is used for thisWater can be drawn from either the main tank (workingiters) or from the secondary tank (workingll water passing to the main reactor is measured by an in-line water meter.

Air Bottle Storageottles provided to supply air. This system is connected to the secondary tank (wotkingiters).

Chilled Water System

Twinan assembly. Outputooling tons wiih an outlet temperature of .VC-HrC. Motor rated aiP DWM Kaplan. Circulation pump capacityVhr.

Motor Control Center

Contains all switches, starters, relays, and ancillary equipmeni necessary for the operation, monitoring, and control ofthe process.

Trailer

The entire plant is mountedm) andigh (sec.

Process Description

Thisatch process designed lo produce sufficient H, toBottlesressure ofar. ThisI2kg of Aluminum0g flaked/granulated NaOH,iters of water.

Aluminum powder is distribuied in an even layer over the base of the reactor and the NaOH layered over it. The reactor is scaled and water is added according to the following schedule;

5 liters (monitoring increase in pressure toar).

5 liters (monitoring pressure rise toar).

5 liters (monitor pressuretart draw-off and compress ihe gas to ihe storage cylinders

ours.

Add the finaliters of water and continueoff the gas evolvedylinder pressurear is reached. Reactor temperature should noi be allowed to exceedduring the abovewater is normally only used in ihe summer months because ii slows down the reaction.

The Opinions of Ihe High-Value Delainees <HVD)

Shortly after the discovery of the trailers,five HVDs and one senior Iraqi scientist were shown theand their opinions were noted. The sixall had intimate involvement with Iraq's BW program, or its concealment. All denied having seen the trailers previously or knowing anything about them. They were puzzled andide range of opinions. Those who were asked dismissed thethat they were for the production of hydrogen.

Dr. Rihab Rashid Taha Al Azzawi. head of theBW program, was quite sure il wasW laboratory because of the absenceteam generator, appropriate filters, essentialand ports for adding reagents.

Prof. Nasr Husayn Al Hindawi. who was anto Dr. Riliab andetainee,rittle less" sure that they were foruse. Prof Hindawi had also been shownof the equipment

Dr. Mahmud Farraj Bilal Al Samarra' i. responsible for weaponization aspects of the BW program, said they were not for CW agents: he% sure" they were for BW, later he dropped this.

Dr. 'Amir Hamudi Hasan alhemical engineer and Senior Deputy at MIC to Husayn Kamil. explained "Anyone who told you this is bio should bee pointed out that it was also unsuitable for CW agent production. Later he putheory that they were designed toenhanced fuelissiles as part of the Iraqi Air Defence effort. He claimed the energetic

fuel would increase the range of the weapon system.

Minister'Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh. former Minister of Militaryand head of MIC. was sure thai it was noi biological; he thought ithemical process, but not military, although it might he forAV.

Husam Muhammad Amin Al Yasin, Head of the National Monitoring Directorateissile expert, did not express an opinion about use, but stated that the vessels should have been declared to ihe UN, and if this had not been done itlear violation.

The high-pressure compressor is set to provide compressed hydrogen atar toK" Bottles. On completion of filling, the tiller regulator valve is closed and the compressor switched off. Theand process pipework are depressurized and the whole system vented to air.

Afteruns, the residueixture ofI) remaining ai the bottom of the reactor is removed and discarded.

Process Trials

Onhe process was trialed at lhe Al Kindi Company in ihe presence of(rom the Republican Guard Artillery Trials and Acceptanceylinders were filled to aofar. The hydrogen was used lo inflate andeteorological balloonm'> loaded with radio and radar deflection equipment. The process was signed off and handed over.

Cost

illion Iraqi Dinars for each trailer. Notes on the Process

(Several points were noted by the Republican Guard in connection with the suitability of the process for its stated use.)

" The process is notrue "field" system because it is not rugged enough and is both large and heavy.

lhe gauges require external protection (operator

safety).

All pressure and temperature gauge connector stubs need to be shortened, protected, and insulated.

A smaller capacity plant might be more compatible with the needs of the Met Sections of those forces thai need to be self-sufficient in hydrogen.

The target purity for the hydrogen productf lhe performance characteristics of lhe balloons are to be achieved. This purity cannot be guaranteed and therefore balloon performance is compromised.

(Tear operating instructions lo be displayed on (he trailer.

Trailer needs to be lightly armored (shrapnel proof),

2 Xfire extinguishers areg total).

Il would be possible tomaller version (enhanced(he various pieces of equipment needed could be procured.

Evaluation of the Documents Pertaining to Ihe Trailers Recovered from the Al Kindi General Establishment

Republican Guard urging them to collect theequipment. They did not do so. Al Kindi was vtill assembling the second trailer when OIF started. Roth trailers remained at Al Kindi at the it an of OIF.

On3 the first trailer, with itslargely intact, was recovered from looter, and exploited by Coalition personnel. Onhe second trailer was recovered from Al Kindt. It appeared to have suffered some looting. It too was exploited by Coalition personnel.

The exploitation effort included visiting Al Kindi. Managers, engineers, and scientists who had been involved in (he project were debriefed. They provided copies of sur^iorting documenis. The equipment was measured, photographed, and samples taken ofwithin the first sysiem.

Al Kindi and the Republican Guard Commandontract on1 under which Al Kindi would produce two fndrogen generating units for what was described as weather air stations0 Iraqi Dinars. Work was scheduled to lastonths1ork went more slowly than planned Al Kindi blamed the Stale Enterprise for Heavy EquipmenLs Engineering (SEHEE) in Baghdad, thethat fabricated the reactor vessels. There were discussions concerning the provision of towing vehicles, an item missing from the original contract. Al Kindi failed to achieve the coniraci completion dale innd informed lheGuardix-month delay. Inn lu semi-annual declaration to ihe UN, Al Kindi listed the 'production station for H2 gas' along with many other projects (hen on hand. The first of the two trailer-borne units was completed inoint Al Kindi and Republican Guard group tested (he system onhey concluded that, although the equipmeni producedhe specifications, there were manyfeatures. Despite this, in latehe Military Industrial Commission (MKl wrote to (he

Documents

Al Kindiozen documents and working notes. This material was translated and analyzed. For ease of understanding this material is presentedhronology:

ontractMD/KG/2UU1 for the fabricationydrogen generation units is issuedotal costraqi Dinars. Theare listed.

tart date of Al Kindi contract for (he production of the trailers.

5l Kindi letter IO Republican Guard discussing use of small towing vehicle to pull trailers.

ISl Kindi letter to Republican Guard informing them of late running of contract.

After ISndaled chart labeledProgress.

/heoretical end dale of6-month extension requested.

l Kindi mentions the station for generating hydrogen gasNMOVIC.

Ul

eport issued by theof the Republican Guard Artillery, the Branch of Examination and Acceptance of the Republican Guard and the Working Group from A) Kindi. The report reviews what has been achieved against the provisions of the contract. All the items listedto the requiredest produced hydrogen in the capacityightning rod was in place for safely. The observations include statements thai the system is not field-worthy because it is heavy andowing vehicle, and ii needs for protection. Al Kindi is recommended lo address the necessary changes.

8nspecified RCi correspondence referred to in3 lener.

op Secret letter from MIC to Al Kindi requesting action on observations on coniraci.

etter from Republican Guard to Al Kindi with observations on the trailers.

5IC letter to RGhe letter discusses the procurementowing vehicle.

2rSetter from Republican Guard CoS to Republican Guard Anillery Commander discussing TS correspondence3 requesting an opinion on an unspecified matter in connection wiih the coniraci.

IIhe day thai the equipmeni was tested. Shortlyigned log of the results was produced.

IC leuer lo lhe Anillery Command of ihe Republican Guard, discussing the3 rest results fornd requesting lhat the vehicle be picked up as quickly as possible.

nurdistanPany (KDP) elemenisractor and trailerheckpoint ai Talln northern Iraq. The trailer was stolenooterruck park in northwest Mosul near an ammunition plant. Upon investigation, it was apparent thai the trailer may be part of the Iraqi transportable CBW system. US forces then moved the trailer io Irbil air base for further

investigation. The gooseneck trailer has two rear axles and accommodation in the framehird also at theelescoping rod, which could raise roughly nine meters, was located at the rear left comer of lhe trailer. Roughly three to four inchesolid light brown materialne half-inch liquid layer was inside. Despite wearing protective mask, an ammonia odor was noted. 'Ihe pH of the material wasusted hand shovel was locaied ai the base of lhe reaction vessel. Color coded valves had been taped to prevent overspray during painting; masking tape had not been removed from one valve indicating that the valve had noi been used since lhe trailer was painicd.

nformationechnicaland intrusive examination by coalitionof the equipmeni and piping sysiem resultedow schematic consistent with batch production of biological (likely bacierial only) agenis. This unit does not appear io perform any function beyond the production of biological agenis.

S forcesecond 'suspected mobile BW agent production' trailer outside Al Kindi Research. Development. Testing and Evaluation Center in Mosul. The nailer was partially assembled, lacking many components. Design and components were nearly identical io previously exploited 'suspect BW production' trailer. US forces locaied the trailer ouiside ihe main gate of Alarking loim west of the center main gate andf lhe administration offices. The trailerual axle flat bed with welded steel caging for walls and roof. The lop caging (roof) of the trailer had been displaced in two areas. The cage above lhe water reservoir had been unboiled on one side and bent down lo eye level. The cage above the compressor housing had been unbolted on both sides and placed on the decking of the trailer. Various components were installed oron the nailer. From front tn back, thereater chillcT with four fanargesieel watermall stainless steel tank on three legs, the main stainless steel reactor, ahousing with compressor, and the compressor motor. Some of connections (piping) were in place

bclwccn components and others ended abruptly. Nn wiling or other electrical components wereumber of attachment brackets were localcd on the decking of lhc trailer. Tne trailer appears to be aused armor or heavy equipment transporter. Overall layout of this trailer was very similarhc mobile trailer previously reported. The underside of the trailer had been recently painted and showed neither signs of wear nor any din or mad debris. The trailer was found without (ires and had been placed on concrete blocks.

etween Ocinbcr 2CXII andhe State Establishment for Heavy Equipmcnis Engineeringabricated Iwo reactors, under requirements generated by the MIC. The liistwas delivered in2 to Ihc Al Kindi State Establishment inodified second reacior was delivered to lhc same customer innEHEE (Al Nasi Al Azim Stale Company)etter from MIC's Al Kindi State Establishment to fabricate two stainless steel jacketed reactors. According to ihe letter of request. SEHF.F. would receive unspecified materials from Al Kindi in Mosul. SEHEE's Ri'ad factory, building number six. received the work-order, after being processed through Ihe company's design, technology, and planning departments. The head engineer for building number six is engineer Najro. Al Kindi dedicated engineer Mahmud Salch as the primary coordinator on the projeci in an effort to emphasize the importance of the project and ensure any design or fabrication problems were quickly rectified. Mahmud Salch visited SfcHlib routinely lo monitor progress and provide guidance.one and two were built using stainlessn Ihe fabrication of both ihe inner and outer shells. When source asked how the first reactor performed, the Al Kindi representative indicated live reactor wasccording to the source, Ihe firstwas only hydnisialieally tested, because reactor one's manhole diameter was too narrow forequipment. During the initial hydrostatic test, reactor one was designed ioar. Because the source could not verify welds of reacior one with radiography, the Ri'ad factory was limited to hydrostatically testing ihe reacior one toar When this was explained, Mahmud Salch0

bar test would be sufficient, because the vessel would only contain 'hydrogen'. Subsequently, reactor two's manhole was widened to the diameter ofnches to allow for radiography of interior welds.

reliminary analysis of samples from the Suspect transportable biological production trailer reveals negative results for chemical and biological agent signatures. An analysis with hand held assays and polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was conducted3 to determine the presence of theBW agents: anthrax, plague, Ricin, botulinum toxin. SEB. tularaemia, Brucella, and smallpox. No positive results for any BW pathogens or lOxins were noted. Chemical analysis of ihrcc samples from this exploitation was conducted by the CB1ST chemical laboratory using gas chromatography, mass spectro-photometryll samples were negative for chemical warfare agents wilhin ihc detection limits of the analytical instrumentanogram per microlitre)

he designer of the trailers explained that ihe equipmcni was for hydrogen generation.

4over letter from DO Aluthority in Mosul,ntitled 'Mobile Hydrogen Field Pnidueiionhe letter mentions the customer as the Republican Guard. Artillery Corps (Contractho required two trailers lo produce hydrogen gas for meteorological station purposes. The letter alsothe declaration lo UNMOVIC of the equipmeni onl Kindi offers to demonstrate the use of ihe equipment io generate hydrogen. The documents attached are:

-List ofersonnel who worked on the projecthemistechnical observers).

-Technical reportpp on ihe hydrogenproduced inMIC TS letter to Al Kindi dated

Letter from Republican Guard HQ fo Al Kindi

chart labeled Technical Progress.

-Project report given to UNMOVIC, dated

-Undated Republican Guard Report to Al Kindi about the tests.

-Copy of contractated

Kindi letter to Republican Guatd discussing use of small towing vehicle,

-Letter from Republican Guard COS to Republican Guard Artillery Commander discussing3 requesting an opinion on an unspecified matter in connection with the contract. Letter dated

-MIC letter to the Artillery Command of Republic Guard discussing (he* test results, dated

-Information letter, handwritten in Arabic, log of test results on3 with recommendations .

IShree sources from Al Kindi provide details of reactanis and miscellaneous technical points.

Models and Military Use. The hydrogen trailer production system was modeled after the previously-used versionobile hydrogen gas generator, that produced hydrogen gas that was fed directly in to weather balloons without being condensed into cylinders. The model was the older hydrogenunit lhat originated from Russian technology. The mobile hydrogen generation system was used instead of transporting gas cylinders inio the field because it was practical and economical to produce hydrogen on site for the military. The use of the mobile unit alleviated the logistical concerns of transporting the hydrogen to the field. The system was large and heavy because il was developed and used by ihe IraqiThat is. it was designed to be durable and easily operated. No other methods of producing hydrogen gas were investigated. The trailers were modeledimpler version (hat directly produced hydrogen without condensation of the gas inio cylinders. The sources did not request any outside assistance from either foreign or other Iraqi facililies for ihe design or manufacture of the mobile hydrogen production system.

Chemical Reaction. The production of hydrogen from aluminum, sodium hydroxide, and watereliable method that was previously used by ihc militaries in Iraq, Russia, and other countries. There were iwo methods in which water could enter the reacior. The first was via an air pressure system and the secondirect feed method. Thus, the air was used only lo push ihe water into ihe reacior. and it would noi enter il. The water was not purified or tillered prior lo use in the system.

Design, The reacior was designed specifically for the hydrogen production system. Specifically, thewas designed by lhe senior engineer and technical assistant to the director inhe reactor was constructed of stainless sieel to prevent corrosion. Inlets and outlets for the various gases and liquids in the reacior were placed in accordance with the most practical locations. The reactor jacket was designedperate in an even cooling layer to uniformly reduce the temperature within the reactor. Thewas arrayed on the trailer in the most practical manner to ensure ils effectiveness.

Products. The hydrogen was transferred from ihe reactor via the pipe in the lop of the vessel. The two at the top arc supply pipes, the one on the upper hack goes to the compressor. The hydrogen itilter io remove residual water and particulates, and ihen was compressed into ihe cylinders.

Safety. Safely precautions were developed during ihe production and handling of hydrogen. An oil-free compressor was placed on the trailer to compress ihc hydrogen as it was produced. The system was grounded to prevent any accidental ignition of the gas. In additionetal groundetal pole was attached to ihe trailer to actightning rod to prevent sparks.

Financial Aspects. The equipment was purchased under normal purchase protocol. The reactor and low-loader were ihe most expensive pieces of equipment. Components were selected and purchased based on their availability in the open Iraqi market. Improvised equipment, such as the use of oxygen or nitrogen cylinders, was used instead of more difficuli-to-obiain parts.

Materials. The reactant materials, including (hepowder and sodium hydroxide were obtained from the Iraqi market and were stored al Al Kindi. The trailers were designed in operate Ibr several runs before cleaning, and the by-products were lo be removed by scooping out Ihc residual solids and running waler through ihc reactor for cleaning. The hardest piece of equipmeni to acquire was Ihe reacior The delay in delivery from the production company caused the contract io be delayed fur sit months.

, coop tor solids Operation. Ibc equipmeni was operated based on the

logical design developed by the sources. The system

was In be powered by one of two methods. The lint

method involved the direct use of an electric source

and lhc second method was toenerator. The

generator could be towed or located nearby ihe trailer,

ocation that would not cause potential ignition of

the hydrogen.

Transportation of the Trailers. The chassis (low loader) was used to support the weight of lhcand because it was readily available in ihe market. The system was io he pulledtandard Cab. The nailers were never moved to the test site. The cylinders containing the hydrogen produced on the trailers were Ihe only item(s) taken lo the test site. The hydrogen was used to fill meteorological weather balloons al ihe lest site. The sources last saw both trailers at Al Kindi. The first trailer was complete and ready for delivery, and ihe second trailer was incomplete. The source alerted the Republican Guard to quickly come and get the complete trailer from Al Kindi, bul they were never taken from Al Kindi prior to or during the war. Thus, no one used lhc trailers during ihe war.

'IS

Glossary and Acronyms

or Acronym

28th April Group

roup

AAM

ABD

ABS

ADDP

ADN

ADN

AEST

Agent "A"

Agent "B"

Agent "c

Agent "D"

Agent "G"

AHCV

A1IF

AK-20

AK-27

Al Husayn Project

AINiCo Anthrax AP

ARADET

ASB

ASP

AS VI

ATAP

ATCC

or Definition

A research group paralleling the work ofour-man air defense missile system research group. Air-to-Air Missile. Airborne Division (US).

The Scientific Bureau for Drug Information and Medical Appliances. Accelerated Device Development Program. Ammonium Dinitrate.

Ammonium Dinitramideolid-propellant oxidizer).

Albostangy Equipment Services and Trade.

Botulinum toxin.

Anthrax.

Aflatoxin.

Wheat cover smut.

Gas gangrene.

Acute Hemorrhagic Conjunctivitis. Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride.

A liquid-propellani oxidizer (IRFNA4 by weight) used in SA-2.

A liquid-propellani oxidizer (LtFNA4 by weight) used in SCUD.

Project under Husayn Kamil io identify ihe steps required touclear weapon.

Aluminum-Nickel-Cobalt.

A disease caused by ihe bacterium Bacillus Anihracis. Ammonium Perchlorateolid-propellantrab Company for Detergent Chemicals. Arab Scientific Bureau. Ammunition Supply Point. Amcriyah Sera and Vaccine Institute. Anti-Tank Ami-Personnel submunitions. American Type Culture Collection.

ATGM AVUS

Guided Missile.

Atomic Vapor Laser Isoiope Separation.

AWRC AYC AZ-tl

Bacillus Anthracis

Bacillus subtilis

Bacillus ihuringiensis

BbVd; bpd

BCP

BIAP

iimi:

BOP

Botulinum toxin Breakout capability

BW

CA CAD CAEC CAFCD

CAM

CBI

CBJ

CBS

CBW

CCD

Warning and Control System. Agriculture Water Resource Center. Akashat Yellowcake.

A liquid rocket fuel, composed% DFTA plusDMII).

Causative agent of the disease anthrax.

Simulant for BW spore agents.

Natural hactcrial insecticide and simulant for anthrax.

Barrels per day.

Border Control Checkpoint.

Baghdad International Airport.

Be Imctaic ncrgo.

Balance of Payments.

A toxin usedW agent.

Knowledge, infrastructure, and materiel, whkh usually lie beneath Ihe threshold of suspicion, but which can be rapidly adapted or reorganized to allow for weaponizalion processes to be undertaken. Such capabilities require pre-disposed resources and often employ dual-use technology, equipment, or knowledge.

Bacillus Ihuringiensis.

Biologicalitem of materiel that disperses oriological agent including arthropod vectors; Biological

Commercial Attache.

Computer-Aided Design.

Abrasive Import and Export Corporation.

Currently Accurate. Full, and Complete Declaration. The declarationto the UN by Iraq, as required by UNpage document was presented to the UN

Computer-Aided Manufacturing.

Central Bank of Iraq.

Central Bank of Jordan.

Central Bank of Syria.

Chemical andapons.

Charge Coupled Device.

Congo Hcmorthagic Fever.

Double Basesolidcast and then cured).

DestructionN body operating in Iraq2 to

Enemy Ammunition Point.

Engineering and Design Center.

Command. (US).

Error Probable.

Evaluation Research Commiiiee.

and Guidance Missile System.

Intelligence Agency (US).

Industries Comminee.

for Industrial Forests.

Joint Task Force 7.

Clostridiumagent of the disease botulism.

Clostridiumagent of gas gangrene.

Media-Processing Center. Baghdad.

Numeric Continued devices or machines.

Nacimul de Encrgia Nuclear. (Brazil).

C02Dioxide: common laser medium useful for US.

of Ministers.

of Start.

Post.

Provisional Authority.

Public Health laboratory. Baghdad.

Precision Machinery Impon and Export Corporation.

Processing Unit.

gaserve agent).

Steep Liquor.

Vapor User, useful for US.

CW Hera of maiencl that disperses or disseminates a

chemical agent; Chemical Warfare.

.Dichloride.

olid propcllant comprising nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine

Delivery Sysiem

DETA

DF

IXi

DGMI

DGS

Dhafir Projeci

weapons dcvclopmcm.

DIA

DIO

D1S

Diwan

DMA

DM)

DMMP

DOCKX

DOZ

DPBK

Dual Use

ECCM

ECM

ECM

EDB

EDC

EDD

EEDDC

EGC

EMIS

means of delivering or transporting conventional or unconventional weapons in the form of weapons platforms, such as rockets, missiles, spray devices, unmanned 3erial vehicles, or other types of vehicle. Delivery is defined as the positioning of the weaponoint from which it was designed io operate independently.

of the two components ofiquid rocket fuel. Deutrium Floride. Direcior General.

Directorate of General Mililary Intelligence.

Directorate of Genera) Sccurily.

High-explosives development program io suppon nuclear

Defense Intelligence Agencyefence Intelligence Organisationefence Inlelligence Staffhe Presidential Office. Di Methyl Aminerecursor forirecioraie of Mililary Inlelligence. Dimethyl methyl phosphonatc. Document Exploitation. Dioctyl Azelaic.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Technology, materials, equipment, or knowledge capable of use for both legitimate and proscribed purposes. The object per se is not one or theis dependent on intentions.

Electronic Counter-Coumermeasure.

Fleetro-Chcmicaf Machining.

Elect ronic Countermcasurcs.

Extruded Double Base.

Engineering Designorganization (Formerly0 Groupnd later EDD).

Engineering DesignMIC organization renamed theDesign Center

Electrical Engineering Design Center.

Eli-Gaz-Com.

Electromagnetic Isotope Separation.

EOD BP

BTOC

liU

EUC

BW

FAE

FAO

FASP

FCDC

FEAL

FFCD

Fissile material

FMD

FMDV

POO

FRJB

FROG -7

Front Company

FRY

FS

identity that is declarede the final consumer of an exportedhem. service, material, training, or apparatus. The eniiry is notthe purchaser

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Entry Points.

Exiemal Technology General Corporation. European Lmon.

End-User Certificate. An end-user certificate is an internationallybut noi internationally standardized, documentary method of declaring ihe end user of any of the above. The end-user certificate isoolprixif system and has been frequently abused. Due to corrupt practices and outright fraud, end-user ccrtilkales can be completely false or deliberately deceptive in their declarations of the end user.

Electronic Warfare.

Fuel Air Explosive.

Food and Agriculture Organization.

Field Ammunition Supply Points.

Foreign Currency Disbursement Committee.

Food Examination and Analysis Lab.

Full. Final, and Complete Disclosure. The series of Declarations Iraqto the UN. detailing its WMD programs. Separate documents were submined for CW. BW, nuclear, and ballistic missiles.

Materialapable of undergoing nuclear fission.

Foot and Moulh Disease.

Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine.

Fiber-Optic Gyroscope.

Factory tot Repair of let Engines.

Free Rocket Over Groundattlefield artillery Rocket (also known as LUNA).

A firm or commercial enterprise purposefully established and uwned by Iraqi procurement authorities to purchase or otherwise illicitly acquire items prohibited by UN sanctions. The from company would operateovert and clandestine fashion with the intention of avoiding international scrutiny and deceiving any monitoring authorities concerning the nature of goods procured, the source of goods, the transport routes used for importation, the :in.irc il aspect* ol il kit trade, and ihe even;ual Iraq;i 1

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Fedayeen Saddam.

Soviet Union.

and Conirol.

agent.

agent.

Communications Headquaners (UK).

Domestic Produci.

Establishment.

Engineering and Biotechnology Research Council/Center.

Establishment for Engineering Technologies.

chemical agent.

Intelligence Directorate (Jordan).

Positioning System.

Review List.

roup whose focus was gaseous diffusion and later gas centri-

fuge: later separated from0 and renamed EDD, and then EDC under MIC and MIMI.

PC3 group whose focus was EMIS; later pan of PC3 under

miml

C3 group whose focus was suppon activities, to include plan-

ning, purchasing, administration, technical and fabrication: later pari of PC3 under MIMI.

Groupat Husayn project; renamedhen transferred to Office

ater part of PC3 under MIMI.

Support Equipmeni.

Survey State Enterprise.

Commiilee.

Developmeni Index.

Explosive.

Enrichedtermigh) of

sotope: generally weapons-gradeFrequency; Hydrogen Fluoride,

Inspection Comminee.

High-Valuedetainee who, due lo his ot her senior position in Ihe mililary. sccurily.

scientific/technical, or governmental structures of Saddam Husayn's Regime, may have knowledge or insights of relevance lo ISG's mission.

Husayn Projeci.

Kong Shanghi Banking Corporation.

irrpB

HUMJNT

HVD

IAEA

IAEC

IAF

IAH-AJfl

IC

ICC

ID

IED

J1D

DP

ILS

IIS Section one nxc

IMF

IMU

INOC

INP

INS

Intellectual capital

INVO

IRFNA

ISG

jark:

Terminated Folybutadieneolymeric solid-ptupcthuiiuman Intelligence. High-Value Detainee.

International Atomic EnergyUN's nuclear watchdog

Iraqi Atomic Energy Cc^nmiuion. Iraqi Armed Forces.

Ibn al Haytham-llanham (Khadimiyah).

IbnInstitute "located at Salman Pal).

Industrial Committee. Iraqi Chemical Corps. Iraqi Dinar.

Improvised Explosive Device. International Industrial Development. Ion Implementation Project. Iraqi Intelligence Service.

IIS internal section responsible for creating (root cotrrpanics in Iraq and facilitatingU1 these companies.

asportation Company.

International Monetary Fund.

Inenial Measurcmeffl Unit.

Iraq National Oil Company.

Iraqi Nuclear Piogrum.

Inenial Navigation System.

A cadre with engineering and scientific knowledge. Iraq Nuclearhce. Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acidiquid rocket oxidizer comprising nitric acid.

Iraq Survey Group. The organization stood up by the Coalition in3 tourvey of Iraq's WMD programs and to locate Captain Speicher. Ituliiagency intelligence collection and analysis organization, formed of mililary and civilian personnel from the United States. United Kingdom, and Australia, lit mission is to organize, direct, and apply capabilities and expenise in Iraq lo discover, take custody of. and exploil information and material of intelligence value on individuals, records. WMD samples,systems materials, facilities, networks, and operations.

Join! Air Reconnaissance Inlelligence Centre (UK).

Delegation.

International for Industrial and Commercial Agencies.

Democratic Pany.

Gosudarstvennoy Bczopasnosti.

Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing.

Korea's Korea Mining Development Corporation,

Attack Cruise Missile.

Metallurgy Testing Laboratory, Tuwaitha.

ratio (of missiles).

Diameter Missile.

Enrichedterm designating uranium5 isotope.

Isotopeuranium enrichment technique using lasers for

isotopic separation.

LRBM Ballistic Missile.

Missile.

Units.

of the Director, IIS.

of Administration and Accounting, IIS.

of Data Processing and Information Security. IIS.

of Foreign Clandestine Operations, IIS.

f the IIS. formed of three sections: the internal, foreign, and

trading sections.

of Counterintelligence. IIS.

of Internal Security. IIS.

of Investigation and Prosecution, IIS.

of Liberation Movements. IIS.

of Communications. IIS.

of Studies and Research, IIS.

Mland Preparation Institute. IIS.

of Accounting, IIS.

of Clandestine Operations. IIS.

of Special Operations. IIS.

of Legal Affairs, IIS.

Preparations Division, IIS.

of Signals Intelligence, IIS.

M20

M2I

M22

M23

m40

MABOT

MANPADS

MAPO

MEASI

MEK

MFA

m<iRS

MHESR

MIC

MIM

MIMI

mio

MGM

MLIS

MoA

MoD

MoF

MoH

MoO

MoT

MoTC

MOU

MOST

MPC

MPF

MPS

MR DC

ol Residency. IIS.

The primary IIS body handling procuremenl of specializedK also known as the Technical Consultation Company or the Trade Office.

Directorate of Surveillance. IIS.

The Al Ghahqi Project, responsible for explosive* in IIS.

Directorate of Protective Services, US.

Directoraie of MIC Security. ILS.

Directorate of Opposition group activities. IIS.

Mina al Bakr Offshore Terminal.

Man Portable Atr Defense Systems.

ethyl) Axiridinyl Phosphinc Oxide.

Middle Fast Advanced Semi-Conductors .Inc.

huliq.

Ministry ol' Foreign Affairs.

Merc am: Grid Reference Syslem.

Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research.

ndustrialization Commission.

Ministry of Industry and Minerals.

Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization.

Military Industnalknown as MIC.

edium.

sci Isotope Separation.

Ministry' ul Agriculture. Ministry of Defense. Ministry of Finance. Ministry of Health. Ministry ol Oil. Ministry of Trade.

Ministry ot Transport and Communication. Memorandum of Understanding. Ministry of Science and Technology. Mcthylphosphonyl Chloride. Mcthylphosphonyl Difluoride. Mclhylpbosptvonihinic Dichloride. Mililary Research and Development Cenier.

Rockei Launcher.

Survey.

Stalean organization within the MIC.

Technical College.

Technology Control Regime.

Tetroxioe.

doped yttrium aluminumlaser

medium.

dopedlaser medium.

Further ^formation.

Geospatial Intelligence Centerormerly NIMA.

Mobilization Committee.

Monitoring Directordte.

Monitoring Group (IAEA).

Industries Corporation.

Perchlorateolid-propellant oxidizer).

Project for Phannaceuticals and Pesticides.

Treaty.

Security Council.

Nuclearcomplete assemblymplosion type, gun type, or thermonuclear

type) in its intended ultimate configuration which, upon completion nf the prescribed arming, fuzing, and firing sequence, is capable of producing lhe intended nuclear reaction and release of energy.

Device.

Goggles.

Desen Fox.

Desen Storm.

Iraqi Freedom.

of ihc Iraq Program.

for Food program.

Officeto research uranium enrichment, known as the Office of Studies and

Development untilenamed PC3 in9 after transfer to MIMI.

Oil lor Food Program

OMI

OMV ONAREM OSD PC3

PCI3

POCI3

PFD

PFP

PID

PPD

PPE

PPRC

rotocol

OC

R50

R60

R100

R120

R&D

RCC

RDC

RDT&E

RDX

program established byn. The scheme allowed (he UN io aulhonzc sales ol" Iraqi oil. wuh ihc intcniton of allowing ihe Iraqis lo buy food supplies wiih ihe revenues gained. In practice, trade under (he OFF process opened the door for Iraq lo develop numerousand illicit money-earningercentage of OFF money was used io finance UNMOVIC.

Organization of Military Industrial wtm synonymous with the MIC. lhe preferred usage.

Ongoing Monitoring and Verification.

Office National De* Resources Miniercs (Niger).

Office of Studies and DevelopmenL

Petrochemical Projecifor Iraq's clandestine nuclear research

anil develop roe in project under MIMI.

Phosphorus Trichloride.

Phosphorus Oxychloride.

Process Flow Diagram.

Process Mow Plan

Piping and Insirurneniaiion Diagram.

Plain Protectionof Ministry of Agriculture

Personal Protective FquipmeM.

Pulse Power Researchihe al Tahadi Suie EsUbUsbrnem

Projeci lor ihe reverse-engineering oflaier SCUD)

Official vel of rules and guidelines established by stale panics lo regulate activity. In this instance, it refersystematic code of behavior fortrade between Iraq and ils protocol partners: Egypt. Jordan. Syria, and Turkey.

Quality Control.

EMIS separator with central orbit radiusm. EMIS separator with central orbit radiusm. EMIS separator with central orbit radiusm EMIS separator with central orbit radiosm. Research and Development. Revolutionary Command Council. Research and Development Comminee. Research. Development, Test and Evaluation. Tetra methylene tctrandiamine (an explosive).

Reconstitutedterm describing Uie restart or renewalrogram based upon and using

technology, materials, equipment, and knowledgeormant, hidden, or previously interrupted program,

Guard.

Guard Forces Command.

Rhoda minemedium for dye lasers.

toxin usedW agent, derived from the castor bean

Laser Gyro (pan of an ins),

and News Analyzing,

Osmosis.

Grenade.

Piloted Vehicle.

Strategic Intent.

missilealso known as Volga).

Arm, Fuze, andterm used in weaponry including nuclear

Missile.

Apparatus for the Protection of military industrialization

Cell Protein.

Council Resolution (of uie United Nations).

Company for Veterinary Medicine.

Digital Hierarchy.

Drug Industry.

Establishment.

Establishment for Extraction and Mining Operations.

Establishment for Heavy Engineering Equipments.

Enterprise for Petrochemical Industries.

Establishment for Pesticide Production.

Forces.

Forces.

Institute for Engineering Industries.

Intelligence.

International Peace Research Institute.

Intelligence and Military Security Service.

Launch Vehicle.

I i

SOE SOMO

son

SPO

SRBM

SRC

SRG

SSM

SSO

STAD1

STRD

SVI

SWB

TABRC

TACrCO

ICC

TDI

TEA

TECO

TEA

TEL

TEMPS

TFASP

TG-02

.vylidene).

TIS

TNRC

TNT TOSSCO TPAO TPIC

Matter Expert.

State Owned Enterprises.

State Oil Marketing Organization.

State Organization for Technical Industries.

Special Projectsoflice in MIC; also known as the Master Subjects Office.

Short Range Ballistic Missile.

Scientific Research Center.

Special Republican Guard.

Surface-to-Surface Missile.

Special Security Organization.

Staff Training and Development Institute. Tuwaitha, (IAEC).

Scientific and Technical Research Directorate, which later became iheResearch Center.

Sera and Vaccine Institute.

Summary of World Broadcasts.

Tuwaitha Agriculture and Biological Research Center. Trading and Agriculture General Company. Technical Consulting Company.

Toluene Dilsocyanatcross-linking agent inriEthylAminc.

Technical Corps for Special Projects.chemical agent precursor. Transporter Erector Launcher.

nder Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty.

Tactical Field Ammunition Supply Point.

A liquid rocket fuelixtureEA.

Thermal Imagery Sight,

Tuwaitha Nuclear Researchprincipal center of research and development in Iraq's nuclear program.

Tri Nitro Toluene (an explosive).

Technical Oilfield Services and Supply Company.

Turkish Petroleum Company.

Turkish Petroleum InternationalPAO Subsidiary.

Trade Intermediary'

TRC

TSMID

TTC

TVC

l

u"

UAE UAVDMH

UEffi

UF4

UF6

UGF

UHF

in

UNCC

UNDP

UNESCO

UNICEF

UNGA

Unilateral Destruction UNMOVIC

UNOPS

UNSC

UNSCOM

independent commercial entity that links the consumer of products and services to other manufactures, vendors, transporters, financiers, and/or consultants or other service providers. Trade iniermediaries were used by ihc Iraqi Regime. Some were cognizant of the illicit nature of trade andcolluded with Iraq, while others were deceived by the Iraqi Regime and were innocent tools of illicit Iraqi procurement activities.

Technical Research Center.

Technical and Scientific Materials Import Division.

Thermal Tracking Camera.

Thrust Vector Control (of rocket engines).

Uranium.

UNSCOM inspection number. United Arab Emirates. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. Uranium Tetrachloride,

Unsymmeirical DiMethyUnsymetrical Di-Methyl. Hydrazine-onc. One of ihc two components ofiquid rocket fuel.

Ur Engineering and Industrial Establishment.

Uranium Tcua fluoride.

Uranium Hcxufluorioc.

Underground Facility.

Ultra High Frequency.

United Nations.

United Nations Compensation Commission. United Nations Development Program.

United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization. United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. United Nations General Assembly.

Destruction of weapons, equipmeni. or documents by one pany only.

Uniied Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission. Set up by4 on9eplacement for UNSCOM. lis first Executive Chairman was Dr. Hans Bltx. Uniied Nations Operations. United Naiions Security Council.

United Nations Special Commission. Set up by. to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical, and missilenspections of nuclear capabilities were carried out by the UN's International Atomic Energy Agencynd Ihc Iwoworked alongside each other.

UNSCR

UNSCR

UNSYG

U02

U04

UoB

URENCO

USD

USSR

UTL

UXO

VHF

VP

VR

VVDP VX

Weapon ization

WFP

WHO

WMD

Yellowcakc

Nations Security Council Resolution. United Nations Security Council Resolution. United Nations Secretaryranium Dioxide. Uranium Tetroxidc. University ol Baghdad. European Enrichment. US Dollars.

Union ot Soviet Socialist Republics. United Telecommunications, Limited. Uncxploded Ordnance. Very High Frequency. Vice President. Video Reconnaissance.

Veterinary Vaccine and Drug Productionighly toxic CW nerve agent.

The application nf tci hnology, materials, equipment, and knowledge tothe effect* or physical principles that have been proven in laboratory or otherwise controlled conditions toeapon.

World Food Program

World Health Organi/alion.

Weapons of Mass Destruction Weapons lhat are capableigh order of destruction and/or being used inanner as to kill large numbers of people. Can be nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological weapons but excludes the means of transporting or propelling lhewhere such meanseparable and divisible pan of the weapon. Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons need to beertain size to count assingle chemK.il or biological anillery rounds would nor be considered to be WMD. due to lhe limned damage they could produce.

A form of uranium ore concentrate.

Regime Inlleclion Points: Key Chemical Weapons Activities Across the Regime Timeline

I ran-Iraq war led Iraq toward insolvency and decline and highlighted active WMD programs economic and military decline threatened the Regln Saddam survived

recoveryore con Ik) Regrne posture

Economic growth emboldened illicit programs while Regime governance structures degenerated

MISCALCULATION Poor strategic decisions Ml Saddam Rotated and exposed

of OFF

lo Husayn KamiIkixng Imq

SosportVonofCo-opentOonwithUHSCOU

u^H

tnleelgence Service founded CW research under civilian coven Chemical Corps tor* over and started censtrucoon of Muthama lor. production, and storage. Buiiangof completelyrecursor production planis In Failujahignificant corrvritment to lone-term CV/ program. Iraq planned. Put rated, to acquro industrial capacity to make phosphorous

Iraq Became the first notion toerve agent on tie batBefietd when II used Taoun aganst Irany the end of IT* Iran-Iraq war. Iraq Ma usedhemical munitions against Iranian forces ond its own Kurdtoh population

t,lraqtiadamasseds5ueableCW arsenal, eomprtsng thousands ot short-range rockets, artillery shells, and hundreds ofloris ol but! agent It had abo produced SO nerve agent warheads form- range Al Husayn mbslto

During Ihe Irarvtraq war. CW use helped turn back Iranian human-wave attacks when ml othrir methods tailed; Regime believed CW saved Iraq Horn disaster. Reflecting theseJotrategic deterrent. Mjtnanna turnedfter the fan-Iraq war to the improvement ot lis CW program. Regme conducted the devebprnenl ot next-generator weapons,true bnary systems. Regime concealed procurement networks and sources

Saddam assessed that tie existence ot WMD contnbiited to the US noi going to Baghdad In die

segtme used CW attack against

that inspections would be ineffective and short-toed, tne Regime decided in1 lo hide significant undeclared componentshe CW program; Including weapons, precursors end equipment, baa conceared me extent ot ne knowledge ol CW agent picducSon and procurement to preserve the program

a particularly effective International Atomic Energy Agency inspection inaddam rteckted lo urriateraVy Oeslroy the most damrang evidence This undocumented and unwitnessed destruction of undeclared munitions snd agent, when sionty revealed over succeeding years, created an atmosphere of distrust of al Iraqi declarations. Tho UN subeequently supervised Ihe destruction cf the Muthanna facility and the declared weapons

reaction to theflght of Husayn Kami. Saddam decided to declare furtier detans cf Iraq's CW programs, and turned over WMD drxumentation. includingteel bunks of CW documents. The evidence revealed now ageni research, true binary munitions development, and much more8 research on VX than had been admitted previously

the Husayn Kamli ncioeni Saddam personally ordered the creation ot Ihe Industrial Commltlee to coordinate Iraqi industrial activities. The programentralized national effort lo improve industrial infrastructure and develop chemical production capabilities as the Iraqi economy n* rock Bottom

Crr :io-.t'pl.nrn wis thr.

founraikm ol economic recovery. The chemical industry surged In Ihe, aso nee became available Iraq sMBehind pre-Gurt war capaonoes but il was able toortion of revenue k> purchase new plants and renovate easting ones, to renew its basic chemical Industry

Saddam remained committed to Industrial Co mm Bee propels lor enhancing Iraq's hdusBlal base. The Corrmuee rednfluence over the cnermcal industry's research agenda

he Industrial Committeerocess toall asose chemicals needed by Iraq, some of when were dust-use srd had potential to hiprove the amiled capability lo produce CSV agents

Iraq atso continued to upgrade v. mniu1ic:jri(igcapabiili. pursuing glass-lining technology and manufacturing Its own

PTfflfflfHtrrr"'

ontinued on the Industrial Committers list oflratogc chemicals ai universities and companies nationwide, but fewer man 2S0 projects were approved tor scalhg-up This included research and development for Die production cf racycUhesylcnrodlniideX stabilizer

i The National Project for Pharniaceurjcais and Pesticides was establishedhiten order from

Throughout Die period. Saddam remained cornmatod to advancing capacitiesiew toward future reconstitutionariety cf WMD programs. There were indications that Saddam planned to restart programs prohibited By the UN upon the termination of sanctions

Plans were madeodem mule-purpose chemical production facMy west of

ti ol Saddam appeared to

The InduSMal Committee allocated appro*or rhe censbvekon of en Integrated production racllfy But ihe corstrucBon wss canceled immediately prior lo Operation Iraqi Freedom

Saddam's intent lo maintain WMD capabKBes and programs was wallhe Regime and often expressed privately

i Red Une' defensive measures continued to Be part of Regime miliary planning. But there was no evidencean by Iraq to use CW at ared line as the Ifcdy conflet jsp-oaclierl

cn an upward trend since die. Iraq's Chemical industry was still noi up to nil capacity inBut there was some evidenceheoreBcai break-oul capability (Or sulfur mustard CW agent

Regime Inflection Points: Key Biological Weapons Activities Across the Regime Timeline

The If an-Kaq War led Iraq toward insolvency and decline, and highlighted active WMO programs

Economic and maaary docane threatened the Regime but Saddam survived

Economic recoveryoro confident Regime posture

TRANSITION

Economic growth emboldened illiot programs while Regime governance structures degenerated

MISCALCULATION

Poor strategic dedscns left Saddam Isolated and

Doctiion not to moke ruH miD OWoBsiwe

AcoapUmtx ot OFF

fa&sforito&ti

to Husayn Kamifirming Uaq

SusponstonofCO-ocxyxfton *w> UNSCOM

HMD

ot Kuwait

Economy

Iraqesearch insBtute trial investigated BW at purpose-ttulll radUhes at Ai Satmari Thetatteredut the fedRkis were retalnod and work corenuodo* level Iraq rarivfgorated effortsdove top an offensive BWhe. Tne offensive BW program was one ol Iraq's most carefully guarded

l Mtrtharna commencedgainst the backdrop o> the Iran-Iraq war.7 therogram was relocated again to the al Salman sile, ccenckleril with Husayn Komi's ascendancy to Oireclor General ot me Miliary Industnal Commfcfjon

The production facility al Al Ha ham ccrnmenced operationsnd weapons and agent lesong proceeded. Bolufmim toxin and arshnu wore tne BacKbone ol theW program

Inusayn Kamil ordered the BW program to go all out tor weepomzaijcx weapons were made, filled, and were ready lor use by1

raonwed number ol tactical and strategic BW weapons. The opening aerial bombardment of the GJf war destroyed Iraq's moil capable BV/ deavory system

i FoCowing Ihe Golf war. under flio direction of Husayn Kamil, Iraqefensive BW program only, deliberately conceelng the offensive BW program. Saddam endorsed Husayn Kamil's plan not lo declare Al Hakam as pad of the BW program andreserve ft under cover of commercial animal feed production

addam authorised the uNateral destruction of weapons snd bulk slocks, and Ihe Regime atMmpied to preserve Its main research, proaucbon and storage facility, Al Muthanna. with an elaborate cover program Allne program was lo be erased and BW personnel sanitized the tacttties and destroyed lhe weapons and tier contents. This deception plan laled and the program was destroyed under UN supervision6

1raq almost eertalrry destroyed its undeclared Stocks ol BW weapons one probably destroyed its remaining hotOYigs of bulk BW agents and seed stocks ciandeaSiiey

Regime actions In the months and years following tha Gulf war Indicated that Iraq intended to preserve its BW capability and returnature BW program whan tie opportunity arose

few weeks Before Ihe ftght of Husayn Kamaraq admited Its BW program was offensive. This led to the UN-supervised destruction of much ol Hs BW physical infrastructure al Al Hakam and Al Dswra: and the disclosure of as cadre ol BW spectators

The Iraqi economy rvt rock-bottom Innd Saddamwilmg to nsk protongng sanctions to sustain active WMD

fter more thanears ol systematic and rnethodoloslcal effort, the Iraqi BW program had not achieved maturity. It is likely tiat Iraq abandoned Its existing SW program6 and in practical terms, although BW knowledge and know-how remained. Iraq abandoned its ambition to procure BW weapons qucMy

During three decaoes. kaq pursued the statue conferred by lha pessesson of WMD and BW was part ot mat amt*on The retenfon ol tie BW program had proved costly to Saddam's overarching pnonty Of removing the stranglehold of ocornrnc sancoons. It appears that the Regime optedW program urftl after tho end of sanctions Compared to tha CW and nuclear capabilities, the Iraqi BW program could be quicklyelahvely smal physical base would be required for BW and Ihe know-how was 'on-the-shetf among Ihe BW scientific cadre

Original document.

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