Comprehensive Report
of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD
ep
Transmittal Message
4
Iraq has endured decs numbing to consider the waste of: conflicted with the region and the confrontation over cooperation. Ultii
Weapons of Mass Destructionrew upon to advance his ambitions, ingfully WMD in Iraq means
The Iraq experience with WMD st died on battlefields, and civilians tions have ground civil society down; excruciatingcomply the lives of loved ones.eature of the intellectual elite.
The international community placate, or ignore Iraq producedmay not have understood where if munity's focus on Iraq and WMD cics. Had the events ofut, he deeply miscalculated
Saddam, his family, and collapsed. Saddam's hugeand led them to nothing risk and chaos. In manvj the decay that Iraq decayed.
Dynamic Vice St the Regime's experience static accounting of theinto context the WMD activities.
ig hopes and accumulating tragedy. It is resource potential. Saddam's ambitions inity. True lo his name, he too often chose risions led to total collapse.
element in lhe range of tools Saddam end in itself. Therefore, to examine mcan-of Iraq concomitantly.
wars. Thousands of victims terror campaigns. War andevels. The most talented of Iraq have faced t's directions or risk careers, their lives, and pan ofbest and the brightest was a
Regime. Various attempts to coerce, co-opt, understandable that Saddam
the international corn-by serendipity as wcU as considered nationale still in power.
busted, and and brightest filled with way in exploring on Iraq as il
concerning ysis rather than simple om. The report will put
s of the Regime with
versus another. They deserve al least an aitempi to look al ihe dynamics ratherescriptioningle frameovie. It deserves calculus not algebra. This report will deny the reader any simple answers. Il will seek Co force broader and deeper understanding from multipleover time.
governmenl documents or parliamentary records reflecting Saddam's decisions on WMD. The Regime simply did not operate that way. An obvious corollary is that not finding such documents is not meaningful one way or the other.
of his top advisors and ministers is also in other countries. The testimony of such what ii is in tlte Iraqi context. These indi-in other countries.
ability to divine what he wanted and ived knew how to relate in this whai Saddam wanted because
The Regime WasSaddam Is Different. The former Regime was Saddam, and he was the one person who made impodanLdecisions. It was his assessment of the utility of various policy options that wasSaddam's calculations of risk and timing lhat mattered.
A corollary to this is that the rel very different from lhat of similarly individuals is interesting, but must be vidualsole and existence vastly
Those around Saddam knew iheir to be able to respond favorably to his environment, This mean! that they they did not want to he in a
cards close while he allowed goals and objectives. He tended to pronouncing on ihcm one way as implicit rather than explicit. lial direction mayhat we cannot see it in than explicit of diminishing ihe
in this light, idebriefer. exceptistory will viewnd informal discus-
Complicating their lives was lhe minions lo debate. Saddam did allow ideas to floai up and he or the other. This meantoronsequence exisl. bul ii docs not meanhe usual ways. Implicit direction. This realily of life in ability to document
i Saddam, specifically
s. These discussions months, Some vital insights that may be considered opportunily to defend his legacy, very likely contradicting
Saddam's Views. Debrieli There was no incentive shape his legacy. Therefore. Saddam sions on events
The debriefing strategy regarding his previous acli were conducted and
emerged during ihese discussions^which elicitedevelatory. Undoubtedly, Saddam wift continue-to lake ad his past actions and state his case while attempting lo shape previous siatcmcnts and actions.
We have tried lo sod through the data available and have tried to judge candid views from Saddam on WMD as well as his likely vision of lhe future of Iraq and lhe role of WMD. What seems clear is lhal WMDool of power or leverage thai varied in its utility in advancing toward his goals for himself and Iraq.
where Iraq was reconstructing the hi in the era of Saddam Hussein" demonsiraiing his assumption that he cissism characterizes his actions, and,
Iran. Saddam sustained the historical threat of Iran was noiimple sense of lhe long-standing rivalry over military leader. This was an important obvious that Iran was pursuing the Persian menace loomed large and
Gulf Stales. Saddam viewed ihe Gu Ihe West. His Regime viewed lhe good fortune of sitting on large Iheir oil. In particular, Saddam and by extension in the Western Saudi position of leadership in the oil markets and the prestige
United Suites. Saddam's view of* prestige far beyond his ir the lasi superpower. To the derived prestige from being equally prestigious for himuring the last decade to.
Saddam apparentlylhe region would reel, bute tested' Iraqis close to the dialogue with Wa in (he Israel Palestine if Iraqecurity reli
cily. the bricks were molded with the plirasc. "Made bricks forged in ancient Babylon and remembered over the millennia. Thislways visible, it is always Ihere.
toward the Persians. His view on the llation, but includes the emotive conicntis own desire lo be seen as an hisloric onas il became denied. From Saddam's viewpoinin history.
the respect they were accorded in simply enjoyed the geological respect: the West simply wanted Ii position of leadership in OPEC an objective to supplant the to undermine their influence in ihe United States.
mm
accrued power and leader to stand up lo enemy. Saddam have been es were made.
lanceave been cor-throughoul lhe
. il i
; very senior among olhers)ffers to assist allowed lhat. ibe inclined lo dispense with
Saddam refused lo admil thai Iraq lost che waris diplomats were always quick to point ouc that the resolution ending the warease-fire agreement,eace treaty orThis was not simply bombastic propaganda. Saddam saw it onlyemporary setback. Indeed, Saddamemarkable ability to recover from this loss. Following the warebellions had broken out in all but two provinces. From this new nadir, Saddam restored
another instance ,decade that followed, his struggle
frontation with the United Scaces on many lishes. It must be said that, as much as
and British patrols (and. it may he jhisattle he was fightingot with almost no cose co himself, lisypically shrewd method of
his internal power and control with of his use of chemical munitionsinternational constraints continued
Levers of Power/Prestige. Saddam con fronts. The main military front wasaddam hated che incrusion over his recalled, wich the Frenchery favorable exchange ratio. He and he could readily sustain ihe exercising leverage.
in all the
art. engineering, of these functions, and in factears before Ihc disasters of war. sciences. In his view, the mastail accounts, and by the evidence seen by Saddam as both co the Persians in
: also did i
Saddam believed Iraq andilitary, economics, construction,ell-funded educatione aspired to che prestige; advanced and poCcnt were of the massive effortowerful lever and symboleighboring Iran.
useo
lot
uality II aspects of hisbehavior luals as well as intcr-iiate servants severelynd Saddam might cook
example, Presi-rar Wcapon,program. Ja'far Dhia Ja'far.o wor&'qn ihe'nuclear weapon program.
ly those who supported him. New carsmall
Saddamemarkable sens to influence. He consistently rule. Reward and puni> he desired. The approach national relations. His: punished or jailedeal for them hii
Jail was frequently on Ihe dential Advisor and leader jailed by Saddam and rcl
Saddam also, of course, token of appreciation.
The same duality of pressure and reward was used by Saddam internationally. For example, in the spring and summerraq attempted to bring to closure the disarmament inspections of UNSCOM byeal. UNSCOM experts had been pressuring Iraq to acknowledge an Offensive biological weapons program. Tariq Aziz informed UNSCOM Chairman Rolf Ekcus that, if his upcoming5 report to the Security Council was positive in the missile and chemical weapons areas, then Iraq would "satisfy" Ekeus in the hiological weapons area.
may have evidence before ihem and noi recognize il because of unfainiliarily wiih ihe subject. Often ISO found no evidence of one thing or another. It may beore accurate formulation might be wc recognized no evidence. 'Ihisundamental conundrum in assessing alien
environment alien to Ihosc accustomed leader can be as compelling and real as world of Saddam, it would bv surprising lo tD. This would especially be ihe case important to understand what one should
affects how evidence is viewed. The key ing of how the West viewed their tern technocrats studied in Bagh-Wesi (many, if noi most, speak
It is vital to understand that in such an to Westerngut explicit guidance. Indeed, in the find explicit direction related to sensi for programs of presidential interest expect to see and what one should not
Related to thisurther important Regime figures in the WMD area had programs than the other way around, dad compared with how many key English).
how their country was to elude such examination as a
An Iraqi minister4 urse had been subject to However, il reveals some-imagery anduch as cruise II destroy Ihc to this understand-on. They they woulde could not resolve obvious. It affected the
ccurred while UNSCOM me used to conceal material Id give instructions on such directly connected to
Likewise, many yearseing examined. It might well be result.
Two examples from interactions asked. "Why do you Americans several bombing attacks, and the thing about American buildings with some function, missiles. Implicit in this capability. Discussions and ing of the American disassociated capability take key equipment into our targeting data we were ex
A second example of Iraq was attempting to invest! from UN inspectors. The sensitive matters. Hence, inspectors investij Ihehe Diwan, the Special Security Organization, the Special Republican Guard, etc. In effect, the inspectors were modeling an organization chart that branched out from the President. These organs became high-priority targets for the UN inspectors. This was perfectly logical from their perspective.
Of course, one effect of this investigation waseach ihe Iraqis how wc investigated and what wc looked for. And. like the previous case where Iraq reacted by dissolving Ihc image thai we looked for, it should be expected lhat Iraq would avoid using entities that would show up on organization charts or lhat would follow the types of order we had earlier iried lo picture.
The Regime, drawing on Ihe experience ofith Ihe UN and given the priorities to which il subscribed, scrambled Ihe lypes of signatures they knew we would be searching for. This contribuled lo lhe difficulty in verifying what happened lo Iraq's WMD.
ew key inflection points when analysts studied individual programs bearing with the events lhat would have filledelate WMD lo other changing factors.
the overall intentions of the of the evidence of the ele-having the picture on the box covere pieces.
over the lasiears. Thisaddam made clear decisions in mind contemporaneousision of Saddam is usedevice
Through this methodology an attemptaddam. With this ments of the WMD programs can be jigsaw puzzle to guide the assembly
erspectives regarding Saddam's experience with WMD it was their firm conviction that in the war against Iran. Missiles were used) countered the
Throughout this report, timeline events going on thai impinge on
use WMD (CWandBW)MD if Saddam had would have
Key Inflectionew WMD after1 Gulf war. previously had been very positi the use of ballistic missiles and allowed them to hit Iranian ci Iranian "human wave" attacks.
lift-was to me during the past1 were
he inspectors were more
was stillBaghdadoal of preserving future WMD options, own borders just two months earlier.
In addition, ihe Iraqis believed contribuled substantially to demonstrated ils worth to wailed until he finished his been much different.
Therefore, ilng the of sanctions get oui of the UNears. This defining momcnlsfor
During the first few ins serious and intrusive than roundeduge array less initially chose to Indeed. Iraq used CW against Shia within
Baghdad was found blatantly cheating. The immediaie consequence during this period was lhat the UN Security Council, including the Uniled Slates, did not restart the recently ended conflict but didew resolution on1) demanding more access and more inirusive rights for UN inspectors. The message was ihus mixed. The UN Security Council could agree on demands but not on enforcement. What was the impression received by Saddam? He was clearly refusing cooperation with the UN resolutions. Saddam crushed inlernal dissent.
including Ihe use of chemical weapons, jusl as he did in ihe. Yet military force was not used againsi him. However, more intrusive legal strictures were imposed. Saddam identified the envelope of limits around him.
Regime continued to mix compliance despite internal reluctance, particularly Husaynesolved to eliminate the summer1 in support of the do enough to be able to argue thai capacity that Baghdad thought could and no admission of biological was io defeat the UN constraints. Di struggle.
From the evidence available through clear that the guiding theme for WMi many years atreat cost and lime asthe vital ending international sanctions
Sadtlam continued to see the uli impression about possession as intellectual capabilities. As UN that could support full WMD reac would support long-range missi, had forsaken WMDtrains of sanctions decayed, of supporting future WMD
Yet. Saddam was not wi UN Securityugely weakened at that time, rcfusin demanded that grams. This Saddl Ihu not temporary.
eginning ofOU-fi sion to accept the Oil-for-in
with defiance. Il now appears clear that Saddam, of Ihe head of Iraq's military industries,
of WMD weapons during the course of of gelling rid of sanctions. The goal was lo with UN requirements. Some productionivilian function was retained, all. But the clear prime theme of Saddamactical reireat in his ongoing
ntsange of Iraqis, it seems leclual capacity achieved over so
e again with asead uld threaten the prime objective of
he purposely gave an ambiguous kit direction lo maintain the itant expansion of activities missile work continue that believed that Saddam available and the con-would have the effect
/point, wascci-in trouble. The economy was the dinar and the impact of sanc-
gamble lhal the time, Saddam was in capacity. which of Iraqi WMDpermanent.
The UN system for controlling Iraqi ample opportunities forscaping the fetters of the sanctions
As experience grew with the process of oil liftings wasplendid below market substantially:onsiderable amount ofystem, could not legally receive easl trader designated to lift Iraqi oil. these allocations to those he deemed,
Saddamual approach ing of ihe innocent Iraqi civilian: same lime he gave prominentoil allocations. He gave indivi Regime. This worked with indivi
The Regime's strategy was: were actively violating Ihe resoli
of Inspections. and the UN inspectors wereThe potential of Ihe ir Council was seen as collapsed appeared The divisions in the Kingdom on one: France and Russia^to do mc
Al lhe same time. Bi if not weakness, certainly UNSCOM surfaced its. lions, weapontzed VX in:
the unintended consequence of allowing jis process suited Ihe objectives of Saddam of UN Security Council.
program. Iraq found that the allocation influence. Iraqi oil liftings were priced tl loanker full of Iraqi oil wasmposed upon il by the UN could be pocketed byis style of influence, distributed for sanctions.
he emphasized lhe suffcr-sanclions were immoral. Ai ihe ig influential UN-officials lucrative support and friendship to the
of Ihe Sccurily Council
Security Councilhe Security untilhe Uniled competition between
ed States as indicating,hen contrary io its declara-concluded that there was norap, not a
he United States and United Kingdom reacted militarilyircumscribed bombing campaign that took place between the time President Clintonreviously scheduled visit to Israel and the beginning of Ramadan, about four days later.
Ihe Iraqis were losing iheir stigma. The Baghdad International Fair in1 was attended by hundreds of companies. Theotel was tilled with businessmen from all over lhc world. The Arab summit in Beirut in2 offered the headline photo of Taha Yasin Ramadan embracing his Saudi counterpart. Funding filled the coffers of various ministries. The Iraqi OPEC delegations were treated with as much or greater interest than the Saudis. The
his position as the only Arab leader willing to the positions of the leadership in neighbor-ulations, being sympathetic to thehis stance. Saddamowerful
nment policy of the United Stateshere was considerable commitment and had developed economic and politi-ive. ihey had firm allies, and it mechanism to implement the Oil lapse or removal ofas within reach.
ng sanctions changed follow-Ihis.
Stales. Baghdad fully grasped implications for Iraq's position InternaiHMial atmosphere and2 Slate of theccwgnJ/cd.SiiU. he tried to bargain with the rw'inspeciioij^JTTic^li.tricring cost him.
c militarybound liaq. Kt'iorts to secure Kwcrc pursued^ In tne'Securityr>ii)eiitiiiiibinldinj; that would beresiiltfui Hugh at lhc UN General agrecd'lo uik'ohdiliorial acceptance ot the
Oil Minister was treatedock star. The oil markets were extremely sensitive to thefor Iraqi oil on the market. In fact, the very uncertainty about Iraqi oil gave Baghdad even greater leverage over ihc international community since, by its whims, energy prices would vary significantly and have corresponding effects on the world economy.
In international politics, Saddam cap stand up to the Americans. This posi ing countries like Saudi Arabia and ians. saw Saddam as bolder than iheir lever against these governments at vi
From Baghdad the long struggle lo out through Ibe UN sanctions seemed lant involvement on the part of stales like cal stakes in Ihe success of lhc Rcgi appeared Ihc United Stales was in For Food program was being corru was foreseeable. This goal,
1 The ing II
Reflectingll-formed neiiher the effect of the attacks in ihe United Nations. Theiplomatic position became cIcarJj^Kaftlam speech. Heeriousness he't|ad hot carl Security Council rather lhan ouuiglit accept.
Washington wasdgc arKjcx'pcasI access and support lor potential mihlar^tfcfi-tougher resolution was paWd (UNSCk ingty hard lo delicti. jWiatwMy.ifuIlO^ng'tbi Assembly in
UNMOVIC weapwis
The work of UNMOVIC irlspcclors on lhc ground was pursued energetically andharged political environment. Iraq-was surroundedrge and expensive, militaryorce for any length ofmpossible. It wastable situation, and Saddam realized his position far too laic.
Readers of this report can weigh for themselves the actions laken by all governments in response to Saddam and his WMD ambitions. Ilomplicated storyong period of lime.ihis report will illuminate some of ihe important dynamics and Ihc trends.
Charles Duelfer
Special Advisor io ihc Director of Central Intelligence Baghdad.4
Acknowledgements
This report is lhe product of the hundreds of individuals who participated in lhe efforts of Iraq Survey Grouphe Australian. British, and American soldiers, analysis, and supportwho filled its ranks. They carried oul Iheir roles with distinction, and their work reflects creditably on the commitment of Washington. London, and Canberra to firmly supportong and difficult period.
Two of our colleagues gave Iheir lives during ISG's field inspections. Ongl. Sherwood R, Baker and Sgt. Lawrence A. Roukey died while providing sccurily for one of the mosl critical ISG investigations when an explosion destroyed the facility being inspected. Their memory has been present throughout lhe creation of ihis report.
The analysis and case officers who came to Iraq, mosl for lhe first lime, worked hard lo develop the information io support Ihis report. They labored long hours to develop intelligence reports and the lexl lhal became thisifficult lask lo which they responded with enthusiasm.
This report also builds upon the workroader universe of people who have striven tothe role of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq during the pasl decade or more. United Nations inspectors and analysis around the world have wrestled wiih this issue trying to sort out reality and develop policies to mitigate suffering and avoid conflict. Hopefully this report will provide some answers or al leasi more dala for const rut live review.
Mention musi be made of the Iraqis themselves. It is important for an ouisider to undersland fully the dilemmas encountered and choices made by individuals under the former Regime, many of them energetic and brilliant people who participated in the programs and decisions addressed here. ISG analysis have spoken with many ofin detention and free. Some have tried lo help us understand what happened; others were loo fearful to help. Still others had manyto reveal as little as possible.ope thai lhe characterization of events offered here will be seenair representation by those who are, after all, ihe real experts, the Iraqi participants.
The tragedy of Iraq is perhaps best seen on lhe individualave known many of iheir most senior technocrats and political leaders forave spent hours wiih ihem intrying to unravel circumstances and events. We have met in large government offices, the Untied Nations, in laboratories and now in jails or tcnls. They are some of ihe besl andthe country has produced. How they dealt wiih the moral dilemmas of pursuing careersegime like Saddam's is difficult to understand. Some clearly did so with relish and happily reaped the rewards ihai were bestowed. Others, with belter intentions, had limited options, given the naiure of the Regime. Through ihe accideni of birth. Ihey were placed in circumstances most of us arc never tested by.
The new Iraq could benefit from the talents of some of these technocrats. Tlte new Iraq should seek recompense from some others who profited from the promotion of the worst deeds of (he Regime. Readers of Ihe procurement and finance section of the report will gain someof how rewards were dispensed.
Many Iraqis over many years tried hard to explain Iraq and these programs to me. This was not easy for ihcm and carried substantialm grateful to them beyond words.
The intelligence services of ihrcc nations supportedong and demanding task. In the United Kingdom, mention must be made of SIS and the Defense Intelligence Service (especially the Rockingham group) for their long support. In the United Siaies. both the Defense Intelligence Agency and Central Intelligence Agency sustained the process at substantial cosi. Australiasome of lhe best intelligence analysts anywhere. While these institutions expressed interest in the finding and certainly were curious where their pre-war assessment went wrong, they did not try lo steer in any way the judgmcnis included here.
In the end. this is not an Intelligence Community product. Rather, it is my independcnl judgment as the Special Advisor lo the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraqiave had theof many people,hose the directions and methodologies, which are not lypical of the intelligence community. Yet. in futurehose ihe frame of reference outlined. Where there were decisions to be made on interpretation or judgment, they are mine.
This will not be the lasl word on the Iraqi experience with WMD. Many may argue with the interpretation given here. To further lhat public debate, and in the interest of the historian to whom this subject is likely lo be of considerableave been firmly committed to making this reportave also opted on ihe side of inclusion ofven if sensitive for one reason orather than exclusion. The data can be interpreted by others, now and in the future, lo form (heir own judgmcnis.
ffer my thanks lo former DCI George Tenet who offered me lhe opportunity to pursue thisas given neither guidance nor consirainis. and tasked only to find theave tried to do thai.
Charles Duelfer
Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence
Comprehensive Report
of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD
4
Scope Note
This report relays Iraq Survey Group's findings from ils creation in3 until4 and provides contest and analysis to ISG's physical findings. It also auempis to place the events in their Political-Military context. For the purposes of this report, the term Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) refers to the definition established by the Uniled Nations Security Council in the context of UN Security Council
The United States' investigation of Iraqi WMD activities began during Operation Iraqi Freedom itself. In prewar planning, it was assumed chemical and possibly biological stocks were likely to be encountered and perhaps employed. Forces were equipped with protectiveilitary unit designated Expeditionary Taskas deployed during the war to investigate suspected locations for WMD slocks. Many sites were inspected but with an aim of discovering WMD. not inspecting and developing an analytical assessment of the Iraqi programs. Wartime conditions prevailed with concern about force protection primary. The work ofas therefore aimed al discovery of possible WMD locations (toot lheof evidence toicture of what happened io the weapons and programs.
This early approach, perhaps logical if the goal was simply to find hidden weapons, undermined the subsequent approach of piecing together the evidence of the Iraqi WMD programs such as they existed. In fact, combined wiih the chaos of the war and the widespread lowing in Ihe immediate aftermath of lhe conflict, il resulted in the lossreat amount of potentially very valuable information and material forull picture of Iraqi WMD capabilities. Sites were looted. Documents were cither ignored or collected haphazardly or burned by cither the Regime or Coalition forces.
Toore systematic collection of evidence lo build an understanding of Iraqi WMD programs. DOD stood up ISG under the military command of Major General Keiih Dayton. He broughtnique blend of collection, analytic, and force maneuver assets io conduct both tbe ongoing WMD investigation and secondary lasks that included countcrtcrrorism and the search for Captain SconS Navy pilot shot down1 during Desert Storm.of ISG included:
Analyticin the functional areas of Iraqi WMD from the CIA. DIA. DOE. State. DOD. as well as United Kingdom and Australia gathered and analyzed data loicture of Iraq's WMD program and plan further collection. Several participants were former United Nations inspectors with long experience in Iraq.
Documentationforward linguistic element in Baghdad) identifies documents of immediate importance from the millions recovered in lhe course of the war andarge facility housing moretaff members in Qatar recorded, summarized, and translated documenis. At the time of this writing, this facility houses aboulillion pages thai have been scannedatabase.hird ofthat appeared of direct relevance lo ISG'sbeen examinedinguistisl prepared.
Recently. ISG obtained0 boxes of additional documenis. which had been stored in Coalition-occupied buildings. Many of these documents arc from the Iraqi Intelligence Service
and the Baaih pany. Thisolume roughly equivalent to the total received tohuge infusion. Triage of these document will probably take several months. New information will inevitably derive from this process, but may not materially affect Ihe overall elements of this report.
Interrogation andhad dedicated linguists and debriefers for the so-called High Value Detainees. Statements by former key players in the Regime formed an importantsource, bul must be evaluated very cautiously since the prospect of prosecution inevitably affected what they said. It is also important to understand that the population of senior detainees held at the Camp Cropper facility interacted freely among themselves. They could consul! on what they were asked, and the pressures and tensions among detainees over cooperation with ISG certainly affected their candor. In addition, debriefers were not experts in the field of Iraq or WMDeneral rule. ISG compensated by having subject mailer experts presenl as often as possible.
Technicallaboratories, one British and one American, analyzed materialsof being related to WMD. Samples included nerve agent rounds, mustard shells,ide range of dangerous chemical substances.
Explosive Ordnanceteam was always on hand to deal with unexploded ordnanceregular feature of Ihe Iraqi landscape
Movementcollection of teams to provide transportation and prelection for ISG investigators.
HUM1NT Collectionofficers lo establish connections to individuals useful to the investigation of WMD infrastructure, security, and other support.
Supportsecurity, logistics, communications, computers, housing, food, etc.
National Geospalial Agency and National Security Agency representatives wereart of ISG lo bring analytic and technical collection assistance lo lhe investigation.
The Director of Ceniral Intelligence provided additional analytic and collection support andenior Special Advisor for Iraqi WMD to provide direction to the overall effort. David Kay was the first Advisor, serving in Iraq from June untilnder his direction, ISGystematic survey and examination of the existence and location of WMDDr. Kay provided an initial report io the DC1 in3 on lhe early findings of lhe investigation. Under his leadership, ISG interviewed many key participants in the WMDundertook site visits, and began the review of captured documents. Under Dr. Kay, ISG focused on leads from Iraqi sources, documents, and physical evidence. Dr. Kay believed that, if ISG were to find any WMD in Iraq, the Iraqis would probably have to lead ISG to it.
Work in Iraq was very difficult Contrary to expectations, lSG's ability to gather information was in most ways more limited than was that of United Nations inspectors. First, many sites had been reduced to rubble either by the war or subsequent looting. The coalition did noi have lhe
power io secure lhe various silcs Ihoughi io be associated willi WMD. Hence,ilitary unit moved through an area, possible WMD sites might have been examined, bul they were left soon after. Looters often destroyed the sites once Ihey were abandoned.
A second difficulty was the lack of incentive for WMD program participants to speak with ISG investigators. On the one hand, those who cooperated risked retribution from former Regime supporters for appearing to assisl lhe occupying power. On the other hand. Ihere was substantial risk that ihe Coalition would incarcerate diese individuals. Hence, for the mosl part,related to Iraqi WMD tried lo avoid being found. Even long after ihe war. many Iraqiand engineers find little incentive to speak candidly aboul the WMD efforts of the previous Regime. This is exacerbated by iheir life-long experience of living with the threat of horrible punishment for speaking candidly.
The third constraint was the growing risk from the insurgency. From roughly3 onward, it was very difficult lo simply travel to points of interest by investigators. Armored cars and protection by military units were required. Many ISG armored vehicles were damaged or destroyed by hostile fire or improvised explosive devices, and two miliiary personnel lost their lives assisting Ihe investigation. SGT Sherwood R. Baker and SGT Lawrence A. Roukey.
A fourth hurdle was thai, given the difficult conditions existing in Iraq, many individuals had little interest in remaining in Iraqengthy lime, and typically an analyst would come io ISG forouple of months, which produced great inefficiencies: Individuals would become familiar with certain Iraqi issues and ihen depart. Many detainees were interviewed multiple limesumber of analysts seeking answers lo ihe same question. The only ISG member who was present from the beginning until ihe drafting of this report was the ISG Chaplain.
Despite theseore of knowledge was built, and some long-term Iraqi experts became key members of lhe ISG team. Several were former UN inspectors wiihecade ofwith the Iraqi WMD programs and. indeed, lhe Iraqi participants in WMD programs. Their background and knowledge were invaluable. For example, il is much more difficult (though still quite possible) for Iraqis lo deceive investigators ihey had known forears or more. At any given lime. ISG staff included approximatelyoraq WMD experts, ihough as time went on. ii became more difficult toruly expert cadre.
A timeline methodology was used to integrate key element of lhe analysis and to assist lhe building of lhe corporate knowledge base. Through regular meetings of all functional teams, analysis of the range of events that interacted wiih respeci lo WMD was conducted. This work was much aided by the regular participation of Saddam's debriefer. Relevant data points were identified and manipulatedimeline tool, and major inflection points thai related io Saddam and WMD were established. These were then used by learns, especially ihe Regime Strategic Intent learn, lo cue further analysis and io develop their respective portions of the report.
Looking io lhe future, there will continue lo be reports of WMD-related material thai must be addressed. Virtually every week some WMD-relaiedinvolving Ihe delivery of items thought lo bereceived and investigated by ISG. Thisontinuous lask ihai often requires the removal of dangerous objects (like mortar rounds or dangeroushis element of ISG work account for much of lhe effort of many of lhe staff during lhe pastonths. The necessary investigation of all reasonable leads has led to do/ens of missions that
have been important, though they have found no significant stocks of wmd. such missions have included, for example, extensive underwater searches using sophisticated sensor equipment in iraqi lakes and rivers.
since there remains the possibility (though small) of remaining wmd, such reports will continue to be evaluated and investigated as judged necessary.
Sources of Information
iraqi detaineesajor source of information. many wmd-associated figures have been detained at camp cropper where the so-called high-value detainees are incarcerated. analysts questioned them repeatedly about aspects of the program and regime decisionmaking. their answersarge part of the data isg has used in ihis report, but must be considered for what they are. these individuals have had long experience livingevere regime thai imposed harsh consequences for revealing slate secrets and have no way of knowing whai will happen to Ihem when they get out. certainly there are strong regime supporters among the camp cropper population. the word inevitably circulates among ihem who is cooperative and who is not. once released, such detainees may fear for their lives from regime supporters.
another consideration is that many senior regime figures arc concerned about prosecution and will shape their tales to serve their interests. thereendency, for example, to blame the dead guy_for example saddam's son qusay or son-in-law and former top weapons development manager. husayn kamil.
on the other hand, some of these individuals have been long-term technocrats with no particular love of the regime. of these, some have been quite helpful, particularly with former inspectors whom they have known well over the years. nevertheless, ii must also be remembered dial their perspectives, even if honestly conveyed, may not reflect the views of the regime leadership. it has also been the case that with the regime's hypersecurily measures, compartmenlalizalion was quite extensive. for example, many very senior iraqis did noi know whelhcr iraq had wmd or noi before the war.
the documentation thai isg has accumulated is extensive. ii has yielded importani nuggets, which pop out as linguists make Iheir way though the massive amount of material. theof the task is huge and complicated by the potential of errors in transliteration or in lhe original documenis. since it is impossible to forecast when relevant documenis will be found in ihis largely unordered collection, it may well be thai documents or electronic media may emerge that could significantly add lo the themes and background presented here.
a vital pan of ihe picture of how the regime proceeded with respeeln sanctions isin its implementation of the oil for food program. we received much detailed information from lhe iraqi oil ministry, stale oil marketing organization, and individual participants. the data presented here are intended only lo demonstrate the tactics and strategy of ihe regime. iraq sought to influence these data links to many countries and individuals. this report slops at that point. the report does not intend lo analyze or assess the implications for non-iraqis.in iraq's voucher system may have been perfectly legal and appropriate depending upon the
circumstances. Others are charged with investigating these transactions. What is clear is that the Regime sought to reward and influence using this tool.
Physical inspection of sites has been pursued to the extent possible. Thisangerous activity under the circumstancese had two fatalities, and ISG teams have been shot at many times with some serious injuries. Many armored cars have been destroyed in attacks. This has made site investigations more difficult.
Moreover, many locations associated with the previous WMD programs and sites underby the United Nations have been completely looted. In fact, the sites that filled the database of monitored locations arc radically different postwar. Equipmeni and material in the majority of locations have been removed or ruined. Often there is nothingoncrete slab at locations where once stood plants or laboratories.
A final consideration of the work of ISG concerns the return of sovereignty to Iraq. Sinceraq has been responsible for its own lerriiory. and lhal includes matters associated with WMD questions. ISG has been consulting with the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) concerning ils work. Gradually, more cooperation in investigatory work can take place. Iiaiural transition of responsibility and knowledge to the new governmenl.
WMD concerns are noi merely of historic interest. ISG chemical weapons (CW) and counter-terrorism experts uncovered and (racked down an active insurgent group thai had been using former Regime CW experts to attempt to create and use CW for use against the Coalition. This was dubbed the Al Abud network after the location of the firsl raid where insurgents were found attempting lo acquireery aggressive investigation by ISGeries of raids have apparently been successful in containing this threat. This hasajor success, bul will require sustained attention by both Coalition and IIG since terrorists have long demonstrated an intention to obtain WMD and use it. This could occur inside or outside Iraq.
While the future size and direction of the Iraq Survey Group are currently under review, the requirement remains io colled further information related to threats posed by residual elements of the former Regime's WMD programs. There will also be new information from individuals and sources, which will come to light. Moreover, certain defined questions remain unanswered. For example, wc cannotirm view on the possibility thai WMD elements were relocated out of Iraq prior to the war. Reports of such actions exist, but we have noi yet been able to investigate this possibility thoroughly. Likewise, there remains some uncertainty concerning reports of mobile BWwc have conducted an extensive investigation and weaucity of confirmatory information, there is still some possibility thatapability did exist.
As new information becomes available and is analyzed and assembled inio meaningful packages, further unclassified additions io this report may be issued.
This report addresses the actions and considerations of the Regime until ii fell int attempts to show the WMD programs and iheir context It combines analysis of both physical evidence and an examination of the considerations of ihe Regime leadership with regard to WMD. The report is noi intended lo be predictive bul should provide data from which others maysuch questions and indeed, consider implications for other circumstances elsewhere.
Regime Strategic Intent
We will never lower our heads as long as we live, even if we have lo destroy everybody.
Saddam Husayn,1
Contents
KeyI
Who Made Iraq's Strategic Decisions and Determined WMD
Saddam's Place in the
The Apex of
Personalized
Saddam's Unsettled
A Few Key Players in an Insular
Saddam Calls the
Saddam Shows the
I larvesting Ideas and Adviceyzantine
ulture of
Saddam Became Increasingly
Saddam's Command By
Saddam's Effect on the Workings of the Iraqi
Suspicion of
Powerless
The Higher
The Foreign Policy
Saddam's Grip on National Security and WMD
Saddam Holding
Saddam and Fiscal18
How Saddam Saw His
Mining Respect and
Mutuality of19
Dazzled by
How Saddam Saw
Saddam's
Saddam's Personal21
Saddam the Dynasty
Saddam and His Sense of
. Dominance ind Deterrence Through
Saddam's Rote in WMD
What Saddam Thought: The Perceived Successes ot
What Saddam Thought: External
The United
WMDReal ora* a
Saddam'* Pnoriliration of Gcningrom Under
1-Jtom lo Lift
Realigns Saddam'* Veiled WMD
Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline
Ambition at
Scientific Research and Intention to Reconstitute
Reaction to Sanction*
HuMiyn Kamil's
Cooperating With UNSCOM While Preserving
Recovery
Impact of the "Chicken Farm"
Looking Ahead to Resume WMD
Guarding WMD
Iraq'* Internal Monitoring Apparatus: The NMD and MIC
Suspending Coc1>erauoo WHh
Transition
Nullifying All Obligation* To UNSC
Preserving and Restoring WMD Infrastructure and
lumping Up Key Revenue
Miscfllcululion
Renewing UN
Iraq's Other Security
Sorting Out Whether Iraq Had WMD Before Operation Iraqi
Alternative Hypotheses on Iraq's Nonuse of WMD During Operation Iraqi
C. Irak'sService.
Key Findings
Sadaam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted.
Saddam totally dominated the Regime's strategic decision moking.Hc initiated most of the strategic thinking upon which decisions were made, whether in matters of war and peace (such as invadingaintaining WMDational strategic goal, or on how Iraq was to position itself in the internationalLoyal dissent was discouraged and constructive variations to lite implementation of his wishes on strategic issues were rare. Saddam was the Regimetrategic sense and his intent became Iraq's strategic policy.
Saddam's primary goal13 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security of Ihe Regime. He sought to balance the need to cooperate with UNgain support for liltingith his intention to preserve Iraq's intellectual capital for WMDinimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed, this remained the goalhe end of the Regime, as the starting of any WMD program, conspicuous or otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions andolitical end to ihc embargo and international monitoring.
The introduction of the OU-For-Food program (OFF) in6ey turning point for Ihe Regime.
OFF rescued Baghdad's economyerminal decline created by sanctions. The Regime quickly came lo see that OFF could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both lo further undermine sanctions and to provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-relaied development.
addam had managed lo mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their international support. Iraq was within striking distancee facto end lo ihc sanctions regime, both in terms of oil exports and the trade embargo, by the end
Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq's WMDwas essentially destroyed inwere removed and Iraq's economy stabilized, but probablyifferent mix of capabilities to that which previously existed. Saddam aspired touclearan Incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and Ihe resulting economiche intended to focus on ballistic missile and uictical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities.
' Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi officials considered Iran to be Iraq's principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also considerations, bul secondary.
- Iraq Survey Croup (ISO) judges that events inndhaped Saddam's belief in the value of WMD. In Saddam's view. WMD helped to save the Regime multiple times. He believed that during Ihe Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attacks on Tehran had broken its political will. Similarly, during Desert Storm. Saddam believed WMD had deterred Coalition Forces from pressing their attack beyond the goal ol' treeing Kuwait. WMD had evenole in crashing the Shi'arevolt in the south following1 cease-lire.
former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, hisunderstood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions co them.
Former Iraqi Regime Officials Varied in Their Level of Cooperation
The quallrv of conperuiinn and assistance provided to ISG by former senior Iraqi Regime official* in custody varied widely. Some obstructed all attemptslicit informaluut on WMD and illicit activities of the former Regime. Olhers. however, were keen tn help clarify every issue, sometimes to the point of telfincriminalionxtremes of cooperation are epitomized by 'AH Hasan Alkey Presidential Adviser and RCC member and Sabir 'AbdudAzi: HtaaynAlormer Lieutenant General who served in both theof (ieneral Military Intelligence and the Iraqi Intelligence Service. 'Ali Hausn Al Mapdloquacious on manyut remained adamant in denyinginvolvemem in the use of CW in auatks on ihe Kurds and distemNing in any diwusston of the subject. His circumlocution meruit to matt other senuiive subjects of Regime behavior. By contrast. Sober has been forthcoming ta the point of direct associatione range of Iraqi activities, includint the management of Kuwaiti prisoners, lhe organiuttion of assassinations abroad by ihe former Iraqi Intelligence Servicend the torture of political prisoners.
Who Made Iraq's Strategic Decisions and Determined WMD Policv
Saddam's Place in Ihe Regime
The Apex of Power
Saddam con/rolled every peat position of authority in Iraq and formally dominated ih state, admin-UtraUve, Ba'th party and military hierarchies. By
ihe time of Desert Siorm. therenothreatis position of authority. He had also appointed tumsell "Paramount Sheikh"l to dominate the country 's tubal system, lis the, he began seeking more formal control over the nation's religious structures.
Saddam was simultaneously President, Prime Minister. Chairman of the RevolutionaryCouncil (RCO. General Secretary of the Ba'th Party, and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Also directly reporting to him were the Republican Guardpecial Republican Guardcdayeen Saddam, the lour intelligence agencies, the Military- Industrialization Commission OHO* and ihe AI Qud% Army.
Tartq 'Aziz says thai Saddam had enhanced the role of the iribal leaders, giving them money, weapons, land and authority, to turn litem into an instrument of suppon for himself.
bul share his thought* with lew advisors. He was cool under pressure. Iacii his Inmost suppon-crs. such as 'Ahd Hamid Mahrnud Al Khatab Al Nasiri. the former presidcnlial secretary1haracterize his decision-nuking style as secretive.
AbdalUh Al Mullahformer Deputy Prime Minister13 and Minister ol Military Induciruliuiiofl7 totherebig gap" between Saddam ant) his advisois and lhat. despite the lengthy pondering of an issue, he could beat the point ol decision. IW example. Huwaysh. while notosition of power ul Ihe lime, pointed to the sudden and unconsullative manner in which Saddam ordered the invasion of Kuwait, despite the amount of planning and forethought that had gone into the scheme.
Saddam hadetailed, technical interest in military affairs during Ihe Iran-Iraq war. frequently visiting army units and piving direct instructions, whether or not the dcieme minister or the chief-of-staff was present In contrast, limned evidencethai1 Saddam attempted to detach himself 1mm the minutiae of working wiih the UN.
Nevertheless, Saddam was ptonr to take personal control of projects that spanned militaryhigher education, electricity, and air defense, according to former Presidential Advisor 'Ali Hasan Al Majid.
Rule
Saddam dominated all Iraqi institutions by thefh anil increasingly administered by personal direction. Major strategic decisions were made hy Saddam's fiat alone, although subordinates acted upon what they perceived lo be indirect or implied orders from him. Moreover. Saddam, particularly early in hi* rule, was fond of micromanagement in all aspects Of government.
Former advisors suggest that Saddam was healthy, rational and deliberate. He would ponder keyas the invasion ofor months
Saddam's I'nsetllcd Lieutenants
Most of Saddam's key lieutenants were active, experienced and committed to the Regime, bul by Ihehey were tightly constrained by their fear of Saddam, isolationoss of power. Many acccrtfed thr limits of their personal influence in return lo* membershiprivileged class, becauseersonal identification with the goals of the Regime and realization of the personal consequences should it (all.
Key Iraqi Organizations and)
INoie. Names bolded and italicized have been interviewed by ISO)
Prime Minister Vice President Vice President Secretary of the President Deputy Prime Ministers
Chairman, Presidential Divvan
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defense
Army Chief-of-Staff
Minister of Military Industrialization
National Monitoring Directorate
Committee of Three (Military Matters)
Council of Ministers Rcvolulionaiy Command Council
Committee ofhe Quartet")
National Security Council
Higher Inspection Committee
llusayn Sadilam llusayn
Tana Muhyi al Dm Md'ruf [still al large) Taha iatin Ramadanh mud Al Khatab Al Nasiri Tariq 'Aiiz 'Ista
Ahmad Husayn Khudayr Al Sajnarra'i
Hikmai Mirhan Ibrahim Al 'Azzawi
'Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh
Ahmad Husayn khudayr Al Samarra'i
Sabri Ahmad Al Hadithi
ultan llashim Ahmad Al Ta'i
Staff Oen. Ibrahim Ahmad 'Abd-al-Saltar Muhammad
'Abd-al-Tawab 'Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh
Husam Muhammad Amin Al Yasin. Director
Qusay Saddam Husayn (deceased)
Staff Gen. Sultan Hashim Ahmad Al Ta'i
Staff Gen. Husayn Rashid Muhammad 'Arab Al Tikriti
Heads of all major department*
Saddam Husayn (Chairman)
Ibrahim Al Duriairmanj (still at large)
Taha Yasin Ramadan Al Jimwi
Taha Muhyi-al-Drn Ma nifai large]
Tariq 'Aziz Issa
'Ali Hasan Al Majid
Mizban Khadr Hadi
Muhammad Hamzah AI Zubaydi1 >
'Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri (still at large) Taha Yasin Ramadan Al Ji/iawi Tariq 'Aziz IssaHasan Al Majid
'Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri (Chairman) (still at large)Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al Nasiri(Secretary) Qusay Saddam Husayn. Special Securityeceased |
Tahir Jalil Habbush. Iraqi Intellitrrnce Service (still at large] Zuhayr Talib AbdalSattar. IXiMl Rafi' 'Abd-al-Latif Tulfah Al Nasiri. Directorate of General Security (still at large)
',1/
Taha Yasin Ramadan Al Jizrawi) Tariq 'Aziz Issa) 'Abd-al-Tawab 'Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh Naji Sabri Ahmad Al Hadithi Husam Muhammad Amin Al Yasin say Saddam Husayn |dcccased| nir Muhammad Rashid Al 'Vbaydi 'Amir Hamudi Hasan Al .SVniff (scientific advisor) Ja'far Diya' Ja'far Hathlm Iscientific advisor)
" Tariq 'Aziz described the requirementseader in Iraq as "power and an irone was happy initially wiih Saddam's use of these attributes and "for the first ten years wc thought he was doing the right thing."
RCC member Muhammad Ham/ah Al Zubaydi was totally acquiescent, uncritical, and thought Saddam wasood president."
According to former Vice President Ramadan, when Saddam announced to the RCC0 that he was going to invade Kuwait, only he and Tariq 'Aziz expressed doubts about the plan, but they felt they could only do so on preparedness gtounds. Nevertheless, the invasion resolution passedand whatever dissent Ramadan and Tariq 'Aziz registered was insufficiently robust to have stayed in the memories of other participants in the meeiing.
Saddam's lieutenants in the RCC and other upper echelons were seen by lower levels of the Regime and the public as powerful andSaddam was keen to maintain ihisOpposition io his lieutenants" views from within the Regime was discouraged as criticism of them reflected on him. "When he gave his trust to someone, he didn't want to hear criticism about thatccording to 'Ali Hasan Al Majid.
A Few Key Players in an Insular Knvlronmenl
Iraq's policymaking on national sccurily issues, including WMD. retted wiih Saddam and ma/or decisions were by Ms fiat. Heew btng-sening advisors, bul large deliberative bodies tike the RCC. lhe lla 'th Party leadenhip. Cabinet. Minitfriei. the military or the intelligenceand industrial eilablithmenl were incidental lo critical decisions. Saddam reserved the right to make final decisions, and lormer advisors reveal that he often disregarded their advice. Saddam made tew public statements regarding WMD. and hiswere tightly companmcnted and undocumented after. Saddam's advisors have revealed
Life NearCharacterization
mucheliberate, secretive decision-making style, which accounts for the lack of information (for example, lhe lack of documentary' evidence) on his strategic intent for WMD. Many, however, believe thai Saddam would have resumed WMD programs after sanctions were lifted.
Saddam maintained continuity and secrecy by repeatedly turningew individuals and small-compartmented committees for foreign policy and national security odViVe. Tariq 'Aziz, although deputy prime minister, served as the pre-eminent foreign policy advisor from the early years of the Regimeaddam praised 'Aziz for his knowledge of the wesl and foreign affairs, indespite 'Aziz falling out of favor in the later stages of the Regime. Two successive commiuccs deliberated over foreign policy issues referred to them by Saddam: the Political Operationsond its successor lheof Four (the "Quartet"6, (see Annex A. Tbeand Disharmony Among Saddam's lieutenants for additionalAdditionally, Iraq established the Higher Committee1 to orchestrate relations wiih UN Weapons inspectors (see section on the Higher Committee).
Saddam's Iraq was similar to other dictatorships. The primary characteristics of such regimes are. Hi an almost exclusive relianceinglehis perceptions andear andtile dissent from the "leader's"omparimented expertise with little or nohe passing of misinformation through the chain ofnternal personal conflicts among second and thinl tierecond level of leadership whose power andis derived entirely from above, noi particularly from the constituencies theyvoidance of responsibility. Toward the end of his rule Saddam became more reclusive and relied even less upon advisors for decision-making, while turning more and more to relatives.
and governmental organizationsand legitimized Saddam's foreign policy decisions more than they directed them. Saddam routinely met with the Cabinet, its committees and the RCC. but participants say they often had Utile latitude, lie also mci Itrquently with key technocrats, such as in the Minister ot Military Indusinaliraiion. who oversaw MIC. Detainees from various organizations suggest they carried out national security policy rather than created it, although Iluwaysh had considerable autonomy in his planning efforts. Nonetheless, evenavored technocrat. Iluwaysh found his decisions subject lo Saddam's changes.
ull giasp of international affairs, accordingatiqaddam perceived Iraqi foreign policy through the prism of the Arab world and Arabic language. Mr listened to the Arabic services of Voice of America and the BBC, and hb press of Hccrs would read him translations of foreign media, bul he appeared more interested in books and topics about the Arab world. Secretary of the President *Abd claimed that Saddam was open to Americanwatched classic L'Sthat he did not perceive the US-Iraqi relationship to he necessarily one of conflict. SaddamS interviewer he tried toWestern culture, and admitted he relied on movies to achieve this.
Sndduin (alts Ihe Shols
Saddam's command style with subordinates wai verbal and direct. Detainees frequently mention verbal instructions from Saddam, lbs subordinates regarded these commands, whether given in private or in public, as something to be taken seriously and at face value. Saddam wason issuesersonal or state security nature, which were one and the same to him. The Regime did not lake action on WMD or security issues in away using the Iraqi equivalent of public policy statements, cabinet minutes or writtenexecutive orders.
Former Director of the Directorate General of Military Intelligence Discusses Information for Strategic Operational Planning
"We gathered information from the five embassies where we havettaches: Jordan, Turkey. Qatar. Yugoslavia and Russia Another source is thehas everything. For example, the attache' in Qatar reports that the coalition (as it prepares for war/0fOO ItroopsJ arrixing. We could see it on the Internet, aswas all there. For anothern-iw that there wasstorage equipment in Qatar and Kuwait, equipment without personnel. fWe got these messages hyj electronic formal or the officer would hand-carrynformation link In Iraq"
Instead, voluminous lilcs were often kept on personnel management issues, and trivial and non-otlicial aspects of even very junior peisonrtel were recorded.
Ofllcul record keeping was highly inconsistent in content and loon. Access to electronic inlonrution technology varied widely. Even manualwere not available in some places. Pre-elec-tronic copying systems such as carbon paper do not appear to have been widespread. Hand-written records (including many of limited legibility) areigh level order in theirected that fop Sccrcl orders were lo be hand-wnttenvoid the need for typing stall to see them.
Saddam's subordinates feared him and toughl la anticipate hit wishes on matter* where he had not jet issued characteristically clear andorders. Alike very least Ihey would seek la amid outcomes he was known to driest or dnlike. Senior subordinates would in these circumstances issue instructions reflecting what they believed was Saddam's line of thinking on an issue. His moreassociates, such as Kamadan, found Saddam to be predictable and they were able to work to the limits of his tolerance. That said, tear of Saddam meant that rumor aboul his wishes could acquireInrcc and make Regime attempts to change course sometimes awkward to implement. MIC naff, for example, initially did not belierr that Saddam had decided to abandon the program to withhold information from inspectors. They were aitaslamed lo the earlier Saddam-endorsed policy of deception, and feared transgressing what ihey earlier knew to be Saddam'* wishes. Vice President Ramadan had to be dispatched in1 to personally explain lhe new policy lo skeptical and fearful MIC stall,
spoke for three hoursass meeting of MIC suflo overcome their skepticism, according to Huwaysh.
Saddam't penchant for both centralized verbal instruction and administrative comparimentauon lent itself to accidental or intended competition among sut-irdinaies.when accompanied hy his encouragement of huckchannc)ee Harvesting Ideas and Advice
in Byzantine Sellingccasionally led lo two (or more) teams working the same problem. This was particularly the case in security andues. allowing the possibility that more lhan one "order" might he giien Saddam uj* normally able io realign projects when he needed to but checks and balances among political and security forces of UK Regimeeature ot his rule lo the end.
Intended competition resulting from two"orders" possibly occurred in WMD activities. For example, me Regime had two competingmissile programs under Ra'id Jasim Isma'tl Al Adhami and Mu/hir Sadiq Saba' Al Tamimi ins well as the separate devclopmenl of Iwo different binary CW rounds hy ihe Al Mutfianna Stale Establishment (MSF) and the Technical Research Centre (TRC) in lhefis.
Saddam Shows the Way
Saddam gave periodic unambiguou* guidanceider audience than hit immediate tubordinaies.
He wrote his own speeches. He was unafraid of detail and personally intervened with instructions in alt areas of govemmem administration at all levels. ProHems arose it Saddam or his lieutenants had not grven junior subordinates his views on an issue, leaving ihem in doubl about policy or their authorityystem where conformity was valued andlo follow orders often brutally punished. Iniiia-tive suffered and lhe system could be indexible as it worked on old interpretation* of Saddam's wishes. This latter problem became acute alter 1WX when Saddam became more reclusive and hisspeeches became lessroblem also arose when subordinates occasionally moved ahead ol Saddam's decisions, relying on older guidance to anticipate his wishes.
ustodial interview. Saddam said major speeches he drafted and gave, such as the0 speech, on why Iraq could not give up its strategic weapons capability if ils neighbors did not. were intended io shape internal and external conditions, in this case the positions of both Iran and Uie UN.
Saddam also wrote key upccches ol officials, notably lhat of Foreign Minlstei Naji Sabri Ahmad Al Hadithi to the UNGA onollowing President Hush's 'Grave and Gathering Danger' speech to the same body oneptember.
Abd-al-Tawab 'Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh said Saddam "intervened in all of his ministries and agencies where and when he saw fit."
Saddam appointed Ramadan to lead the "Higher Committee"2 to implement UN Security Council Resolutionamadan was unsure of his authority lo deal with UN inspectors under this arrangement, and he would guess at both the limits ol his authority and his personal safety from Saddam'situation compounded by the inability to contact Saddam at critical moments.
Tariq "Aziz said that in reporting to Saddam on the proceedings of the Committee of Four (thechairman 'Izzat Ibrahim Al Dun would guess at what he thought Saddam wanted to hear. 'Ali Hasan Al Majid supported 'Izzat Ibrahim in thb approach.
Ramadan pointed to the overactive attitude of factory managersn Mocking UN inspectors as an example of Iraqisosition Saddam wanted them lo take, when in fact his policy had movedifferent direction.
Saddam was strictly opposed tothe sense of Regime personnel .soliciting bribes orpublicthe part of family members or subordinate members of the Regime, seeing il as corrosive of respect for authority. Personalcould be punished drastically and Saddam issued many directions about what he expected in terms of personal financial behavior. Instead. Saddam reserved for himself the right to dispense the fruits of the Regime, thereby making those who benefited from power sure they were doing so exclusively at hb will.
to 'Ali Hasan Al Majid. Saddam required all official personnel lo submit periodic ^memories of Iheir assets. Assets could not be above "sufficient" levels, nor could assets be listed under other people'sc directed that half of hidden property be giveneward to whoever reported the deception.
Harvesting Ideas and Adviceyzantine Setting
Saddam did not encourage advice from subordinates unlets he had first signaled he wanted it. Advisory groups he established, such as the Committee of Four (the Quartet) on foreign, political and strategic policy, considered only those issues he referred to them Committees generally assumed Saddam alreadyreferred position on such issues and commonly spent nine trying to guess what it was and tailor their advice to it. More conscientious members of the Regime sought to work around sycophantic or limid superiors by cultivating alternative, direct lines oftodevelopment lhat pleased Saddam because il put another check on subordinates, lhc result, however,orrosive gossip culture in senior government circles that lurther undercut any semblance of developing policy through conventional government procedures.
thought Saddam's preference for informal chains of commandossip culture
in hb immediate circle lhat undercut good policy development.
- 'baal Ibrahim Al Duri. Ramadan, and 'Ali Hasan Al Majid in the Quartet would usually argue lor whatever policy they thought Saddam would want, according lo fariq 'Aziz.
In some areas, alternative channels wereSpecial Security Organization (SSO)were able lo regularly bypass superiors, and senior SSO officers hypaxied the SSO Director if they had links lo Qusay Saddam llusayn. Similarly, oenain sec-lions of the SSO could bypass the SSO Director and report straight to Saddam.
Saddam claimed he regularly met with lhc Iraqi people a- he found them to be theource of accurate information. Additionally. Saddam said he found women to be great sources of information, particularly within the various government
Saddam's interest tn science meant that some Iraqi weapons-related scientists were able to use back channels to by-pass military industry gatekeepers such as Huwaysh. Ihis enabled them lo sometimes
secure -Saddam's support lor odd or marginalof little use to defense. For example, retired defense scientist 'Imad *Ahd-al-Latif 'Abd-al-Ridha secured Saddam's backing in0 for the Al Quds UAV program over the objections of Huwaysh. The project never progressed beyond two prototypes and Huwaysh stated that the program was ultimately an expensive failure.
Saddam wasccording to 'Abd: if he received reliable information he would make good decisions, but if the inputs were flawed, the resulting policies would surfer.
"Abd said key Regime members "habitually"from Saddam unpleasant realities ofndustrial and military capabilities and of public opinion. Fear of the loss of position motivated this deception, which continued until the final days Of the Regime.
Asked how Saddam treated people who brought him bad news, 'Ali Hasan Al Majid replied.on'tSC assesses thai 'Ali Hasan Al Majid has never known any instance of anybody bringing bad news to Saddam.
a Culture of lies
Tne growthulture of lying to superiors hurt policymaking more than did the attendant gossip. Lying to superiors was driven by fear of the Regime and the inability to achieve results as resourcesunder sanctions in the first half of. Lack of structural checks and balances allowed false information to affect Iraqi decision making with disastrous effects. Saddam knew his subordinatesendency to lie, but his earlier efforts to check their claims by "ground-truthing" them through personal tours of inspection decreased8 as he became more reclusive.
Tariq "Aziz asserts that before Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Iraqi military lied to Saddam about its preparedness, which led Saddam to grosslyIraq's ability to deter an attack.
Several sources claim that reporting up the party, government, and military chain of command became less trustworthy before Operation Iraqi Freedom. Key commanders overstated their combat readiness and willingness to fight, and Saddam no longer sought ground truth by visiting units and asking pointed questions as he had during the Iran-Iraq war. He instead relied upon reports by officers who later admitted misleading Saddam aboutreadiness out of fear for their lives.
Saddam Became Increasingly Inaccessible
Saddamense of his omnipotence among hisondition that increased8 as Saddam became more physically reclusive. The former workaholic and micromanuger appeared less engaged alter this time, although he would involve himself in issues of interest, such as air defense. Saddam's inaccessibility was driven by an extreme fear of assassination and also apparentlyersonal prioritization of other activities, including writing. While there is no evidence Saddam's control of the Regime slipped, many of his lieutenantsharp lessening of Saddam's attention to detail and an absence of his previous desire to "ground proof high level advice through field inspections. They suggest his formerly detailed interest in military affairscompared to that shown during the Iran-Iraq war or Desert Storm.
By Saddam's own account, he had only used atwiceor fear of being locatedS anack.
According to Ramadan, he never phoned Saddam directlyever privately socialized with him and was oflen unable to locate Saddam for days, even in periods of crisis. SimplySaddam couldroblem even Ibr senior officials. Ramadan said, "Somelimes it would take three days to get in touch with Saddam."
Hikmat Mizban Ibrahim Al 'Azzawi. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, thought that because of extensive security measures, there was little possibility that Saddam would beHikmat said Saddam was confident no one could assassinate him because no one knew where he slept, and ministerial meetings were held at undisclosed locations. Ministers were picked up and driven to the meeting locations in vehicles with blacked out windows, and they were never told where they were once they arrived at meetings, accordingormer senior official.
According to 'Ali Hasan Al Majid. notice of RCC meetings was given only hours and sometimes minutes before they occurred; ii was normal for RCC members to be collected by official cars, and then be switched to different cars between thepoint and the meeting place, and sometimes the meeting place would be changed as well.
Despite the extensive measures used to protect Saddam, his family, and senior leaders, anattempt in6 seriously wounded *Uday Saddam Husayn. 'flu's critical failure of the Regime's security infrastructure is likely to have contributed significantly to Saddam's withdrawal.
Saddam was more reclusive during his last years as president, accordingormer senior official. He lost much of his contact with the government He still attended RCC meetings, but he met only infrequently wiih the Quartet. Beginningwhen he was writing hisaddam would often come to his ministers' meetings unprepared. "He had not even read the summary notes his staff prepared for him for theccording lo the Minister of Military Industrialization.
Tariq 'Aziz slated that during. Saddam became less involved in tactical issues andmore on strategic matters. During the, he spent more time in his palaces; subordinates had to forward documents to him because they could no longer communicate directly with him. 'Aziz claims lhat in the months before Operation Iraqi Freedom, he had little interaction
with Saddam and he was reduced to spending the time watching TV and reading newspapers (part of 'Aziz's isolationesult of the growing prominence, at 'Aziz's expense, of Foreign Minister Najilthough Saddam still sought detailed reporting, he did not process it with the diligence that characterized his approach toecade earlier. In 'Aziz's view, Saddam listened less to advisory boards such as the Quartet and rejected their advice more frequently. Instead, he turned more toward family members, such as Qusay.
Saddam's Command By Violence
Saddam used violence liberally as an administra-live method, lo ensure loyally, repress even helpful criticism and lo ensure prompt compliance with Ms orders. Saddam's use of violence stood in stark contrast to the public image he created of afather figure, interested in all aspects of Iraqi life, from children's poetry to public hygiene.
uring Saddam's transition from Vice President to President, he directed the executionnumber of the leadership" for supposedly plot-ling with Syrian Ba'lhists againsi him. Tariq 'Aziz described ihis episode as the crudest action he witnessed under Saddam.
'Abd-al-Tawab 'Abdallah Al Mullah Huwayshthataddam ordered the execution ofealui Minister Riyad Al *Anielative of Huwaysh) and delivery of the dismembered body to the victim's wife. Riyad. in response to an appeal by Saddam for creative ideas on how to end the war with Iran, had made the fatal mistake of suggesting that Saddam temporarily resign and resume oflicc after peace was achieved.
Muhsin Khadr Al Khafaji, Ba'tli Pany Chairman in the Al Qadisiyah Oovcmoraic, "never refused to do anything he was asked to by Saddam as he fully expected tn be executed if he failed to comply with orders given to him. In. (he) witnessed
a number of soldiers being executed after they deserted."
Saddam's Us by Threat
Exec ul
Effect on the Workings of the Iraqi Government
af Presidential violence was widespread under the former Regime, hut some situations merited explicit threats. The return from fordan in6 of Saddam's son-in-law. Htisayn Kami! Hasan Al Majid. "the traitor" was such an event. This SSO administrative order was found after Operation Iraqi Freedom:
An administrative order
The order of the Special Security Organization
The traitor Husayn Kami} Hasan is to be treated as any citizens in the state and his, or his traitorous group's orders are not to be obeyed in any way or in any location in the country. Anyone who obeys his orders will be punished by execution, by order of Ihe Leader, The President, God Bless Him.
This order is posted by the Security Unit division manager and il is limed below.
Dated
Suspicion of Structures
Saddam profoundly distrusted constitutionalbecause they risked accruing power indepen* dent of his. The legally powerful cabinci never met in later yeaneliberative body. When it didinformation or ratificationSaddam avoided agendas. The same occurred at RCC meetings. Instead, when business required an agenda, such as dealing with issues requiring cross-ponfolio decisions. Saddam met Ministers individually or as sub-committees. Likewise, attendees often had no preparation for what Saddam might raise.
"Meetings of the political leadership were not
times they were convened
without knowing the subject of Ihe meeting. He would simply raise anithoutccording lo Tariq 'Aziz.
Powerless Structures
Iraq under SoMam had all the formalstructures and staffodern state, but they did not make natioiutl strategic policy. Iraqkilled foreign ministry and ablein all branches of government. They could route proposals upward in the Regime almost to its end, but not if they conflicted with Saddam's strategic intent or if they proposed an alternate national strategy.
Iraqull array of government organs familiar to any "Western" country; president, national assembly, judiciary, civil service; but their actual functions and relationship with each other bore no resemblance to Western counterparts. Instead, they filled control or cosmetic roles inof Saddam's dictatorship. Ihey played little part in the effective chain of command under Saddam, and they did notecision-making orrole comparable to nominally similar organs in Western states.
After the bVlhisi seizure of powerhe RCCey Regime institution. It gave Saddam the right to make emergency decisions in its name in, and he used this authority to reduce the RCC toi propensity extended to Saddam assuming authority over national policy on WMD development and retention.
Accotding to 'Ali Hasan Al Majid, the RCC hud voted ino allow Saddam to makein its name. Since then, Saddam made such decisions -whenever he liked.'" By. RCC members often first heard on the radio or television about decisions made by Saddam in iheir name Moreover, only Saddam could call an RCC
According to Ramadan, the RCC discussed UNSCR 6X7 alter Desert Storm, but llusayn Kami! was placed in charge of implementation, even though be wasCC member.between Saddam and Husayn Kami) on WMD therefore bypassed the RCC.he RCC bad no collective decision-making about retention or development of WMD.
addam would usually haw hisdrafted by the Legal Office in the Presidendal Diwan and then proclaimed without rclervnce to the Cabinet ot lhe RCC.
Muhammad Hamzah Al Zubaydi said ol the RCC, that Saddam made decisionshere was never any objection to his decisions."
Similarly, membership of tbe RCCatter of Saddam's fiat,eflection of internal party election or opinion. Saddam had "Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri, Deputy Chairman of the RCC, oidei members who he wished lo move off the RCC to retire. Soon lo be cx-mcmbers were told not to submit iheir nominations lorimilarly. 'Iwatindividuals chosen as new members they were tohemselves as candidates, according tomzah
'Ali Hasan Al Majid saidon't remember the Cabinet ever discussing foreign affairs" and thai
the Foreign Minister reported directly to Saddam. Saddamigh degree of personal control by taking over leadership of the ministers' council and by getting involved in its details. Heenhanced his control through regular meetings wiih experts and leaders in industry and acadenua, according io Ramadan.
The Higher Committee
Saddam established the Higher Committee in1 following Desert Siorm to manage Iraq's rcht-lionship with the UN on WMD disarmament. The Commitlce was alsotrategy 'orwhat WMD information would be disclosed to the UN. The Higher Committee displayed from the oulsel all the dysfunctional cliantcterisiies of admin istraiion under Saddam. Ii was beset by hackchanncl communications to Saddam from individualthat prevented the Committee from developing policy on WMD lhat was not prone to intervention from Saddam. The Committee was plaguedack of transparency, gossip and family court interests. According io prcsidcniia) secretary "Abd Hunid Mahmud Al Khatab Al Nastri. the Committee was disruptedhilosophical tug-of-war between Husayn Kami I, Saddam's favorite son-in-law andindustrysought to limit UN access io hidden iiikUmi and biologicaland Tariq 'Aziz, the chairperson, who pursued greaterwiih the UN. including advocating earlyof OFF. This unresolved dispute contributed to Iraq's conflicted posture in dealing with VSSCOM.
Saddam gave theubstantial amount of working level leeway, according to the 1'oimei piesidenhnl secretary. He only wanted to retain oversight on decisions that lhe committee found insolvable or costly, such as tbe destiuclionarge industrial complex.
Nevertheless, Husayn Kamil sought to undermine Tariq 'Ariz's influence by going directly to Saddam and misrepresenting UN policies to him. He sought to mm Saddam against the UN by telling him that UNSCOM wanted to destroy facilities created
solely for civilian use when ihe realiiy was ihey were dual use facilities, according to the former presidential secretary, 'Abd.
Husayn Kami! masterminded the undeclared destruction of large stocks of WMD inhis undermined Iraq's and specifically Tariq 'Aziz's credibility with the UN. Husayn Kami! also persuaded Saddam to hide and io deny the existence of Iraq's nuclear programonceal the biological weapons program, and io reject early UN oftenorerunner lo the OFFof monitored oil saleseans of limited sanctions relief.
Tariq 'Aziz said that in contrast he soughtfrom the UN in return for Iraq's gradualwith UN sanctions. He cooperated with the UN. hut was undercut by Husayn Kuinil'sand was unable to extract concessions, an outcome that eventually led Saddam and otherto criticize him, according lo the presidential secretary.
The Foreign Policy Committees
Saddamommittee called the Political Operations Room1eliberative body to provide political advice. The committee,Foreign Minister Ahmad Husayn Khudayr Al Samarra'i. Prime Minister Sa'dunariq 'Aziz and either Latif Nusayyif Jasim Al Dulaymi or Hamid Yusif Hammadi.ystem in which ministers met with Saddam individually to discuss Such issues. Tariq "Aziz was assigned to chair the committee when Saddam fired Ilamid in
Important decisions were left to Saddam, although the committee sought to react quicklyecondary political developments by issuing statements and comments according to Tariq 'Aziz.
Saddam created the (Committee of Four, or Quartet,6oreign policy advisory body to replace the Political Operations Room. Vice Presideiu 'Izzat
Ibrahim al Duri served as the informal chair and Tariq "Aziz, Vice Presidcnl iaha Yasin Ramadan and 'Ali Hasan Al Majid, who was put on ihe committee to monitor the others, served as members. Saddam set the agenda, which was ad hoc and varied. The Quartet might consider WMD-relatcd topics such as UNSCOM cooperation, but it did not address overall strategy for acquiring or employing WMD. according to Tariq'Aziz.
Neither Ihe Political Operations Room nor Ihe Quartetolicymaking role. Instead, they offered advice, but only on issues referred to them by Saddam. They had none of the proactive or directive powers normally associated with such seniorin the West or elsewhere. Moreover, they were weakened by the Byzantine administrative practices common to the higher levels of the Regime.
Quartet addressed an extensive range of topics, including policies toward Russia, France. Syria, the UN and the Kurds. Il also discussed the Arab-Israeli situation and the dispalch of envoys. 'Izzat Ibrahim wouldew working minutes,with any of ihe other members, after the mccling and forward them to Saddam.
The Quartet assigned specific governmentto research specific topics and provide answers to Saddam, if the president required it, but did notedicated assessments stall of its own.
The RCC also considered foreign policy issues but usually in the form of briefings from Saddam or expert staff and usually did little more than endorse the decision Saddam had already determined. It served increasinglyorum for Saddam to make announcements orace-saving foil to explain Iraq's policy changes.
would on occasion elicit foreign policy advice from the RCC, bul would not accept it very often, even after lengthy discussion, according to former Vice President Ramadan, lhc RCC at other times would simply parrot what they knew was Saddam's opinion. Saddam was more inclined to accept RCC advice about more junior levelappointments.
The RCC represented the outer limit of awareness in government circles of WMD in Iraq and was not pan of the normal decision-making process on the issue. Saddam's address to the RCC in2 announcing Iraq had no WMD was news to many members. WMD-relatcd topics were never discussed outside the RCC and rarely outside the Quartet members, according to the formersecretary. The RCC had no role in WMD or missile strategy, according to former Vice President Ramadan, and did not usually consider military' issues, according to Tariq 'Aziz.
- Saddam approached the RCC for recommendations on how to deal with1ut he opened the discussion by stating that Iraq would not accept reconnaissance (lights,with scientists, or visits to presidential sites such as palaces. These topics would not be open for discussion. Ramadan, along with other keyrealized limited compliance with1 would be futile and counterproductive, but he did not use the RCC to debate Iraq's response tonstead he first used the Higher Committee to lobby Saddam to approve UN over (lights and to allow UN inspectors to interview Iraqi scientists, but without success. FacedN ultimatum to agree, and with Saddam in one of his periods of self-imposed seclusion, Ramadana rare display of independent decision-making and exercised his own authority to authorize the UN over flights.
Saddam's Grip on National Security and WMD Development
Saddam'sfar ciril and constitutional forms of administration meant hr turned to an array of security and military induitrial organizations to implement policy or la pro tide technical adnce during Oie sanctions period. Paramount among these were the SSO, IIS, RG. MIC and the armed forces, all of which answered directly to him.
Saddam addressed military and militaryissues directly with the people he installed
in the positions of Defense Minister or theof Military Industrialization, according to the former Defense Minister, without lhc lilter of the Cabinet, the RCC or any equivalentational Security Council. Similarly. Saddam discussed any Republican Guard issue- directly with Qusay and the RG Chief-of-Staff.
defense minister, who had no authority over the Republican Guard, forwarded all other military matters of any significance to Saddam, according to Tariq 'Aziz.
Saddam had direct command of the Iraqiservices and the armed forces, including direct authority over plans and iFpcralions of both. The Directorate of General Military Intelligence (DGMI) and the IIS assembled detailed orders of battle and summaries ol the general militaryof potentialarticularly Iran, Israel and ihe United States, and gave them lo Saddam and his military leadership. The IIS alsoarge coven procurement program, undeclared chemicaland supported denial and deception operations (See Annex If "Iraqi Intelligence Services" andIraqi Security Services" for additional
intelligence services collected foreignand relayed the raw reporting to Saddam via his presidential secretary, 'lhc Regime tightly controlled dissemination of such material. Mateual going to Saddam would not necessarily be shared with the responsible deputy prime minister or the military.
Saddamold on the state and its securityextended lo the military-industrial complex. MIC osetsaw Iraq's substantial and centrally planned military-industrial infrastructure. MIC at certain limes in its history covered all Industrie* and most activities that supported the research, development, production and weaponizalion of CBW agents and missilesystems. While as an institution MIC hadcontinuity, substantively ihere were two MICs, each distinguishable by unique historicaland iu link*rominent leader. Both leaders were close proteges nl Saddam and answered
directly and continuously tit him. Husayn Kami)the tirst MIChich continued in variousa major overhaul inhis flight to JordanAbd-al-Tawab 'Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh restructured the organization7 into its second form, which remained until the onset ot Operationrcedom.
Both Husayn Kamil and Abd-al-Tawab 'Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh represent partial anomalies in Saddam's command and control structure. Saddam was interested in iheir loyalty, discretion andto achieve results. Ihe assets they commanded were not threats to his rule in (he way the army or the Ba'th Party could be. Both Husayn Kamil and Huwaysh were therefoic given mure license and less direct oversight than the army leadership oi Ihe RCC. although Saddam would often ask about particular projects or facilities. Ironically, in Husayn KamU's case, this lack of oversight eventually created major problems for the Regime.
- When Husayn Kamil assumed responsibility for military scientific research adn industryaddam gave him broad administrative and financial jiahnrity to consolidate Iraq's research, development, and industrial resources into military capabilities essential lor winning the Iran Iraq war. Husayn Kamil had notable successes, developing long-range missiles and BW and CWfor Saddam In (lie aftermath of Desert Storm, Husayn Kamil used MIC in attempts to conceal banned weapons and deceive UNSCOM inspectors. His capricious and self-serving k'adership of MIC and lack of uccoumability eventually destroyed its institutionalrocess further aggravated by his departure
IC was on the verge of collapse. The Ministry of Defense, MIC's primary customer, had lost confidence in in ability to meet military production requirements. To halt (he slide. Saddam plucked 'Abd al Taw ah 'Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh from nine years of bureaucratic exile, and installed bun as ihe Minister of MilitaryHuwaysh instituted unci organizational and financial reforms, centered on mandatory planning and personnel accountability.IC was thriving, its total revenues increasing over forty fold as had its revenue base, despite continuing UN sanctions and coalition attacks on its luulilies.
The Military Industrialization Commission
As an institution, the MIC had historical continuity emerging inrom the State Organization for Technical Industries ISOTII as the "MilitaryOrganization" progressing through the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMIf. and finallyransforming into the MIC.
The MIC ran Iraq's military-industrial complex, including at certain times, all weaponization of chemical and biological agents and delivery systems. Iraq's nuclear program, however, was separate from MIC's institutional framework through much of its history. Operation Desert Storm destroyed much of Iraq's military-industrial infrastructure, including many chemical bombs and rockets. But, despite the war. some of Iraq's WMD arsenal remained intact, and was preserved by the MIC. The MIC assisted in concealing banned weapons and tittempting to deceive the UN weapon inspectors uphen Husayn Kamil Hasan Al Ma/id. Saddam's son-in-law and MIC director, fled to foraan {see the "Husayn Kamil" text box for additional information!.
he Iraqi Ministry of Defensehad lost faith in the ability of the MIC to develop or produce the goods required of it. Re-creation of the MIC began7 under Huwaysh. who9 had reorganized and completely restructured theSaddam's gmwing confidence in Iluwaysh saw him eventually appointed as the Minister of Military Industrialization and. later, as one of the Deputy Prime Ministers of Iraq. The MIC's re-tmergence provided the research, development ami industrial base upon which Saddam hoped to rebuild and modernize Iraq's military-industrial capabilities. Huwaysh introduced mandatory planning, financial Oversight and personal accountability in order to set the organizationirdern accountablebase. Salaries were raised and re-engagement with the MoD took place. Universities wereto contribute to MIC projects and research, while prinf action was outsourced to the private sector, with considerable success.
Saddam Holding Court
Saddam mad* shells af stale initiations that in most other countries would be orgam of executive power. Under Saddam, they existed largely lor appearance and as lightning rods (or blame. For example, the RCC would be summonedublic session .sootentially embarrassing change of course could be attributed to the RCC. rather than be seen as an earlier misjudgmcm on Saddam's part. This division of responsibilities allowed Saddam to lake the credit, while institutions took the blame.
For example, according to Taha Yasin Ramadan, he. the RCC and the Higher Committee assumed responsibility for embarrassments such asto UN "tniiusiom" and agreeing2 flights. Blame shilling was typical of Saddam. Nonetheless, from lime lo lime in uncomrovcrsial non-crisis situations. Saddam would revert back to formal decision-making stiuctures to conductRamadan commented that he did noi know what would prompt Saddam lo retort to the formal chain of commandarticular point of lime.
Saddam and Fiscal Policy
Saddam ignored his economic advisors in theof Finance and Planning with respect to strategic planning. For example, Saddam entered the Iran-Iraq *ar heedless of Ministry warnings about theconsequences. He had no plan or strategy for bow the war was lo be hnanced and generallylittle interest in economic policy. He showed little concern about adjusting disastrous economic policies (such as those causing inflation) in theof social stability. He did. however, pay close attention to disbursements He made sure he could lake lhe credit (or public secinr pay raises or special allocations such as bonuses lo particular sections of ihe Iraqi population. He took less inlerest in whether such outlays were alfotdalilcheit effect on fiscal management.
senior Iraqi Finance Ministry official said the Ministry consciously conducted its budgeting ins if foreign debt did not exist. Internal debt was paid hy printing dinars and concocting artificial exchange rales, regardless ol the inflationary
Saddam appointed Ilikmal Mi/bun Ibrahim Al 'Azzawi as Finance Minister5 and Deputy Prime Minister and head of Uiee reported directly lo Saddam and not to lhe cabinet. Saddam gave direct instructions to lllkm.it on hoss to allocate funds lor salaries, bonuses, farm subsidies and to adjust ration prices, according to 'Ah Hasan Al Majid
matter* were Saddam's thirdpriority alter security and political management, but ahead of technical, industrial and socialaccordingAhd-al-Tawab 'Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh reviewing4 the last years ol Saddam's governance. Huwaysh'* description of Saddam's financial discussions, however, shows Saddam was preoccupied with disbursalv and cash flow, not fiscal policy or maciocconomicHuwaysh based his view ol Saddam'*on the order of precedence of lhe four Deputy Prime Ministers who wcie responsible respectively for international security (Tariq 'Aziz),managemeni through the Presidential Diwan (Ahmad Husayn Khudayr Alinance (Hikmat) and finally Huwaysh.
is
How Saddam Saw His Subordinates
Mining Respect and Expertise
Saddam recognized and respected talent and public esteem in individual subordinates and urea experts, bul not to the point where they could contradict his goals, power or his judgment. Hextract what Ihey could contribute to the Regime, while keeping ihem politically isolated. Saddam was carefuleep subordinates frompopularity.
According to 'Ali Hasan Al Majid. "If some person makes good work and gels ihe admirationhe Ba'thists. he docs not keep thaie never let an official admired by the Iraqis [stay) in Ihe same position for more than three years."
Mutuality of Fear
Saddam feared lhal his subordinalet could gather enough strength to challenge his position, orarticular policy, and he acted to pre vente was
routinely suspicious ofthose with long standing loyalty. His subordinates remainedof him. and they were incapable of common action againsi him or key policies.
Tariq "Aziz said that he opposed the invasion of Kuwait, but could not dissuade Saddam. Asked why he did noi resign in protest, he denied he thoughi he would be killed, bul. there would be no income, noariq 'Aziz denied Saddam killed anyone personally while President. "But he would tell lhe sccurily services to take care of thingsand they would take care of it."
Ramadan hclicvcd thai fromraqi policy toward tlw UN and the United Slates was taking the Regimeisastrous war. but he said.ouldn't convince Saddam lhat an attack wasidn't try that hard. He was monitoring my performance in managing IL'Nj inspectors."
'Abd-al-Tawab 'Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh was sacked as Minister of Industry8lash with Husayn Kami! and was ostracized for nine years. He believed he only avoided prison because of Ramadan's intervention with Saddam. According to Huwaysh, no minister ever argued in meeiings against Saddam's slated position becauseas unforgivable. It would be suicide."
'Ali Hasan Al Majid said he feared Saddam and cited the killing of many people close to Saddam as the basis of his fear.
Huwaysh said Saddam "loved lhe use of force."
Fear worked both ways. At Saddam's "one-on-one" weekly meetings with individual heads of security agencics. he would always be accompaniedodyguard, according to Hamid Yusif Hammadi, Minister of Culture and Information. "Saddam did not trust anyone, even his cousin "
Nevertheless, Saddam said he believed "Goodrelations bring out the besi in people."
Dazzled by Science
Saddam was awed by science and inspired by the possibilities il offered for national devehipmenl and military power. Saddam had an enthusiastic altitude toward science dating back to when, in the, he found himself in charge of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAHC) as nan of his responsibilities as Vice President. Saddam venerated Iraq's historyenter of scientific achievement under individuals like the famous mathematician and astronomer Ibn Al Haylhameespect for many aspects ofto the end. bul became less interested in detail and more detached from developments in Iraq'sinfrastructure.
Deputy Prime Minister 'Abd-al-Tawab 'Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh believed Saddam hadpecial affection for his nuclear scientists" from iheof the Iraqi nuclear program in.
Hasan Al Majid noted Saddam's expansion of the university. to the point olniversity in every govcrnorate of the country."
kept three scientific advisers on his staff: 'Amujn Al Sa'adi. former deputy ditecior .ii MIC. who held thai poMtion sinceAmir Muhammad Rashid Al 'L'baydi. the former Miniciei of Oil. and Ja'far Diya'Ja'fai Hashirn, former head of PC-3.
an Can Be Destroyed, But Not Defeated"
Ernest Hemingway, "The Old Man and the Sea"
Saddam's fondness for certain examples of Western culture was highly selective and did notophisticated awareness of Western cultural values or motivations.unlike otherthroughoutupon foreignexamples to reinforce his view of himtelf and his own behavior, not to moderate il through the developmentroader, global or moreperspective. One of Saddam's favorite books is Ernest Hemingway's The Old Man and The Sea. the Nobel Prize- winning story of onea poor Cubanhis struggle to master ihe challenges posed bv nature. Saddam's affinity for Hemingway's story is understandable, given the former president's hackgnmntl, rise to power,of himself and Hemingway's useustic setting similar to Tikrit to express timeless ihemes. In Hemingways story. Santiagoreat mariin. which drags his boat out to sea. When the mariin finally dies. Santiagoosing battle to defend his prize from sharks, which reduce the great fish, by the time he returns lo his village,keleton. The story sheds light on Saddam's view of the world and his place in it.
The parallels lhat Saddam may tune drawnand Santiago were in their willingnesssuffering anil Itardship tooint andwillingness lo inflict pain on the victims ofto accomplish their objectives.to 'greatness' is marked fry Jail and exile,as violence. Saddam tended to characterize,very Hemingway-esque way. his life as aagainst nverwhebning odds, but carriedcourage, perseverance and digntty Certainlycontest of the "Mother ofis subsequentUN sanctions. Saddam showed aarising fromindsetefusalconventional definitions of defeat. Muchultimately left with only ihe mariin'sas the trophy of his success, to Saddam evenvictory was by hiseal one.
How Saddam Saw Himself
Saddam's Psychology
Saddam 's psychology was shaped powerfullyeprived and violent childhoodillage and tribal society bound by powerful mores. Many of his associates noted how early experiencesasting effect on Saddam's outlook.
'Ali Hasan Al Majid thought that "As any village child, he was affected by the traditions and customs of hisou sec him having an influence onraqis because they have come from the same country and tribal origin."
'Abd-al-Tawab 'Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh believed much of Saddam's personality was shaped by the circumstances of his childhood, particularly his violent and xenophobic guardian uncle.
Saddam had few friends among top leaders even in. These tics diminished fur-ihcr5 and he focused more on relatives, according to Tariq 'Aziz.
Saddam's Personal Sccurily
Saddam thought he was under constant threat and he prioritized his personal safety above all administrative Issues. 'Abd-al-Tawab 'Abdallah Aluwaysh said Saddam put lhe priority for personal safety ai the absolute peakierarchy of interests. Some of his fear was well founded, but he grew increasingly paranoid asrogressed. His personal security measures were extreme. For example, the SSOaboratory specifically for the icsting of Saddam's food. An outgrowth of his fear was the building ot multiple palaces, in pan designed to foil attempts by attackers or assassins to locate him. The palaces also reflected lhe faci that Saddam increasingly saw himself as lhe stale and that what was good for him was good tor Iraq.
Saddam wentalace and mosque building extravaganza in lhe,0 consiruction workers, when much of the economv
was at Ihe poim of collapse. His rationale for this was concern for his personal security. He staled lhal by building many palaces the US would be unablescertain his whereabouts and thus target him.
Military officers as senior as the Commander of lhe SRG, who was responsible for physical proicction of Presidential palaces, were barred from emering any palace without prior written permission.
'Abd-al-Tawab 'Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh attributed much of this paranoia to Saddam's sense of betrayal following ihe defection of Husayn Kamilhohc had previously seen as close io himon. The attempt on 'Uday's life inlsoeep impact on Saddam, because lhe extensive security infrastructure designed to protect him and his family failedpectacular and public way. The attack marks lhe start of Saddam's decreased visibility with senior officials and increased preoccupation with Regime security.
Saddam the Dynasty Founder
Saddam's resort to dynastic and familial means of imining Iraq did the most lo undermine institutional decision-making. Saddam saw the state in peisonal terms and his career was markedteady retreat from die Ba'thist idealodern state tomodeledural Arab clan. Hisbecame reliant on family and clan members throughout. Tariq 'Aziz and Taha Yasin Ramadan commented on the growing and corrosive influence of lhe Tikriti clan on stale conirol at this lime. Relatives dominated leadership positions and progressively diminished the policy (as opposedoercive) role of the Ba'th Party, livery senior non-TLkriti in the Regime has pointed to Saddam's increasing and destructive resort lo family and clan members to staff sensitive government positions.while inclinedynastic succession, Saddam prioritized preservation of his legacy. He was still searchingompetent and reliable succession that would guarantee his legacy at the lime of his fall.
Saddam gradually shifted his reliance on advice from technocrats io family mcmhcis5 onward, according to Tariq 'Aziz. This favored
family, who was noi necessarily competent, such us 'Ali Hasan Al Majid, weakened goodaccording to Conner Vice PresidentNonetheless it was accentedeemingly normal part ol administration in Iraq.
Ramadan thought. The last three years with Saddam bothered me the most. Inert were too many relatives in sensitive jobs.as put in charge ofas qualified to do the job. My staff will tellould have fixed il"
He said, "Saddam was weak with his familyHe punished them, but let them go right back to doing what they were doing in the firstoreover. 'Ali Hasan Al Majid thought the only occasions he saw Saddam yield under "pressure" was in dealing with relatives. "He used to stand by their side regardless of any reason."
It seems dear that Saddam was grooming Qusay as his heir by gradually giving him increasingstarting in ihc late IWOs. According lo 'Ali Hasan Al Majid. "He was paving the way for his son Qusay more than 'Uday, because Qusay was lovely,obleor many senior Iraqis, however. Qusay's significance stemmed from his perceived influence on his father. These former senior officials dismiss Qusay'. intelligence and leadership ability. Saddam gave him security, and some military responsibtliocs. but never significant polirical.or economic tasks in government. There wasiew rhat Qusay already had more responsibility than he could handle.
Saddam gave Qusay control of the RG, SRG. ami SSO. He was elected1 to the Ba'th Partytepping-stoneventual RCCwhich would have been the mostmarl of his growing importance in the Regime hierarchy.
Saddam also assigned Qusay to theatchdog2 in response to Saddam's dissatisfaction with committeeto the UN. according to Ramadan.
The Heir Apparent
Different sources portray Qusay Saddam Husayn,otential succestor, as ambitious,and fawning.
' Qusay8 began to marginalize certain senior Regime officials who had been appointed by Saddam and installed his own trusted aides in key positions, uvluding within the SSO. accordingormer senior official.
Qusttyember of the tmilitary) Committee of Three, which controlled armed forces officer promotions and recommended to Saddam General Officer appointments and promotion. He showed himself profoundly suspicious of recommendations fnwn within the army and oflen disregarded them, accordingormer senior officer.
Qusay was keen to provide Saddam with good military news, according to Walid Hamid Tawfiq. However, he lived in fear of incurring Saddam's displeasure and optimistically exaggeratedlhat he gave in Siiddam.
Ihe former MIC director, Iluwaysh, recounted thai on one occasion inhen he met with Saddam and Qusay. Qusay boasted to his father.
we arr ten limes more powerful than" Immediately disagreeing. Huwaysh said. -Actually, weimes weaker thanecause Ihe people are not ready to fight" Saddam did not respond, but Qusay was angry lhat Huwaysh had contradicted him.
Saddam and His Sense erf Legacy
Saddam was most concerned with his legacy, and he saw il in grand historicis management of the present was alwaysiew io itsin ihe future, and this tended to distort foreign protagonists' perceptions of his current motivations. He wanted to be remembereduler who had been as significant to Iraq as Hammurabi. Nebuchadnezzar nnd Salah-al-Dinis problem lay in how to define and to achieve Ihis greatness. Even what it was
onsist Ol' was hazy. His drive lo preserve his place in Iraqi history outweighed even his feelings toward his family. Saddamynasty as seemingly ihc best way to guarantee his legacy, but he was clear about the distinction between dynasty and legacy and of the two. he was most concerned about legacy. At the time of the fall of ihe Regime, he was leaning toward Qusay as successor, but with his second son still very much on probation.
A US interviewer noted Saddam spoke of his place in Iraqi history and his family in the same context, hutar greater concern for the former.
-Abd-al-Tawab -Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh thought Saddam saw himself in "larger lhan lite" terms comparable to Nebuchadnezzar and Salah-al-Dinore modestly. Saddam when speaking to 'Ali Hasan Al Majid compared his rule to Al Mansur. the Abbustd Caliph who founded Baghdad, and Al Hajjaj, the Umayyad founder
of Arab rule in Iraq. 'Ali also thought Saddam "dreamed of making Iraq the biggest power in the region and the Middle Hast."
to Huwaysh, Saddam's economic vision forout tena recreaiion of Iraq's industrial strengthlannedeconomy lhat would not be dependent on oil cxpons. Saddam, however, had no plans for an information-based or service sector economy, nor waslace for tourism. The likelihood was that even with peace and no sanctions, Iraq would have been as self-isolated and unconnectedree world as it ever had been under his rule.
ominance and Deterrence Through WMD
Saddam's Role in WMD Policy
Saddam's cenlralily lo ihe Regime's politicalmeant that he was the hub of Iraqi WMD policy and intent. His personalized and intricate administrative methods meant lhat control of WMD development and its deployment was never far from his touch (see the "Excerptslosed-Door Meeting"is chain of command for WMD was optimized for his control rather than to ensure the panicipation of Iraq's normal political, administrative or military structures. Under this arrangement, the absence of information about WMD in routineand ihe Iraqi military's order of battle would not mean it did not exist. Even so. if WMD existed, its absence from Iraqi military formations and planning when war was imminent3 would be hard to explain.
As with past use. Saddam would have rigorously and personally controlled ihe relevant formations, and have had sole release authority. Saddam's doctrine in the Iran-Iraq war was to separate WMD control from the military's leadership, but lo have its use(and controlled by security agencies) if miliiary operations required il.
The defense ministry and the senior military staffs formulated national wai plans, but according lo Staff Gen. Sultan Hashim Ahmad Al Ta'i, the formerof Defense, these organizations did notWMD in Iheir planning, training, and supply systems during the Iran-Iraq war. Sultan'showever seems thin given the likely degree of planning and training necessary for the extensive use of CW by both sides during lhc conflict.
* During and after the, the few times Saddam evidently asked about the potential of certain Iraqi WMD options suggest he was not consistently focused on this issue. He asked ad hoc questions about feasibility of reconstitutingand confined his confidences to hinting that Iraq mighl reconstitute WMD after sanctions. While
he may have said he had lhe desire, no source has claimed lhat Saddam had an explicit strategy or program for the development or use of WMD during the sanctions period. Given the sensitivity of the subject, however, to share such thinking with anybodyew close associates would have been out of character for Saddam, This lackormal statemeni would chime with his autocratic style ofgiven pastwith UN inspections searching for documents.
spoke often in one-to-one sessions wiih first Husayn Kamil and later 'Abd-al-TawabAl Mullah Huwaysh on research and industrial issues supporting WMD. There arc no indications thai Saddam Issued detailed written instructions
to either individual to direct WMD work, as was the practice inhen the programs were highly active.
re are multiple references, however, to Saddam ordering the MIC lo pursue military technology "pet projects" he had received from otheragencies, individual scientists, or academics. Often the projects' proponents had exaggerated iheir technical merits to obtain Saddam's backing. Desperate to find and exploit any potential military advantage, Saddam would direct the projects for further research and development. However, none of these projects involved WMD.
Saddam's rationale for Ihe possession ofWMD derivedeed for survival and domination. Thisixture of individual, ethnic, and nationalistic pride as well as national security concents particularly regarding Iran. Saddam wanted personalowerful Iraq lhat could project influence on the world stage, and alhat guaranteed both. Saddam sought lhe further industrialization of Iraq, held great hopes for Iraqi science, and saw himself as lhe liberator ofHis vision wasseemingly moslterms of leaving Iraq militarily strong, within appropriate borders and safe from external aggressors, especially Iran. WMD was one of the means to ihcsc interrelated ends.
Saddam felt lhat any country that had theability to develop WMD had an intrinsic right to do so. He saw WMD asymbolormal process of modernity. Saddam's national sccurily policy demanded victory in war. deterrence of hostile neighbors (including infiltration intond prestige and strategic influence throughout the Arab world. These concerns led Iraq to develop and maintain WMD programs.
Saddam sought foremost personal and Regimeagainst several foreign and domestic enemies. At ihe same time, he sought to restore Iraq's regional influence and io eliminate sanctions.
In particular, Saddam was focused on lhe eventual acquisitionuclear weapon, which Tariq 'Aziz said Saddam was fully committed to acquiring despite the absence of an effective program
What Saddam Thought: The Perceived Successes of WMD
The former Regime viewed the four WMD areas (nuclear, chemical, biological, and missiles)Differences between the views are explainedomplex web of historical military significance, level of prestige it afforded Iraq, capability asoercive tool, and technical factors such as cost and difficulty of production. We would expect to see varying levels of auention to the four programs and varying efforts to prepare for. or engage in, actions to restart them.
Saddam concluded that Iraq's use of CW prevented
Iran, with its much greater population and tolerance for casualties, from completely overrunning Iraqi forces, according to former vice president Ramadan.
Iraq used CW extensively in the Iran-Iraq-
o repel the Iranian army.
Iraq suffereduantitative imbalance between its conventional forces and those of Iran.
Saddam's subordinates realized thai ihe tactical use of WMD had beaten Iran. Even Taha Yasin Rama-
Iraq'sW1 Against Internal Unrest
former Regime also saw chemical weaponsool to control domestic unrest, in addition to their war-fighting role. Inhe former Regime used multiple helicopter sorties to drop CW-filled bombs on rebel groupsan of its strategy io end lhe revolt in lite South. That the Regime would consider this option with Coalition forces stillwithin Iraq's boundaries demonstrates both the dire nature of ihe situation and the Regimes faith in "special weapons:'
bul two of Iraq's provinces1 were in open revolt and the Regime was worried. The fall of Karltala deeply affected key decision-makers. Accordingormer senior member of the CW program, the Regime was shaking and wanted something "very quick and effective" to put down the revolt.
' In the early morning1 anIraqi requested permission to use "liquids" against rebels in and around An Najaf. Regime forces intended lo use the "liquid" to defeat dug-in forces as partarger assault.
Husaynhen Director of MIC, ordered senior officials in the chemical weapons program to ready CWfor use against the revolt. His initial instruction was to use VX. When informed ihai no VX was available he ordered mustard to be used. Because of its delectable persistence, however, mustard was ruled out and Sarin selected for use.
On orQ0 aerial bombs locatedat the Tamuz Airbase were readied for use. AI Mulhanna Stale EsiaNislimeni IMSF) technicians mixed the two components of the Iraqi "binary" nerve agent system insides. Explosive Imrsier charges were loaded inio the bombs and lhe weapon* assembled near lhe runway.
Helicopters from nearby bases flew to Tamuz, were armed with thes and other conventional ordnance. Dozens of sorties were
flown against Shi'a rebels in Karbala andenior participant from the CW program estimates thatos were used. Other reporting suggests as many asay have been dropped. As ofozenelicopters were staged at Tamuz Airbase.
helicopters were used during the Iran-Iraq war to drop chemical munitions, aixording io an Iraqi helicopter pilot
' Following the initial helicopter sorties, lhe senior chemical weapons program officer overseeing the operation received an angry call from Husayn Camel's office. The caller said the attacks had been unsuccessful and further measures were required.s were designed for high-speed delivery from higher altitude and most likely did notproperly when droppedlow-moving helicopter.
As an alternative tos, lhe Af Mulhanna Stale Establishment began piling CS Hear gas) into large aerial bombs. Over the next two weeks helicopters departed Tamuz Air Base loaded with CS-filled bombs. One participant estimated lhat moreS filled aerial Itomhs were used on rebel targets in and around Karbala and Najaf.
Trailers loaded with mustard-filled aerial bombs were also transported to lhe Tamuz Airanicipant in the operation staled thai mustard gas was not used on the rebels because of theof discovery by ihe Coalition. According to the source, ihe mustard filled bombs were never unloaded and were not used.
Reports of attacks1 from refugees and Iraqi military deserters include descriptionsange of CW and improvised poisons used in the areas around Karbala, Najaf. Nasiriyah. as well as Basrah.
dan, one of Saddam's more independent-minded underlings, acknowledged that the use of CW saved Iraq during ground lighting in the Iran-Iraq war.
Saddam announced at the end of the war thai ihe Iranian army's backbone had been shattered by the war. according to ihe presidential secretary. Saddam staled that Iran would be unable to confront Iraqecade. Political divisions in Iran, weaknesses in Iranian military capabilities, and Iran's inabilityustain long-term offensive operations also reduced the risk of attack, according to ihe former chicf-of-staff.
ammadi, former Secretary of the President and presidential office, said that after Ihe Iran-Iraq War. Saddam was intoxicated with conceit. He believed he was unbeatable. He spoke of this to the Iraqiofficials and to visiting dignitaries from other Arab countries."
Saddam concluded lhal missile strikes on Tehran, laleintheIran-Iraq war,along withtheAIFaw ground offensive had forced Iran lo agreeease-fire, according to the fornur Minister ofIndustrialization.
' Saddam's logic was that live "war of thewhen Al Husayn missiles were fired al Iranianfrom February to Aprilshown lhat Tehran was more vulnerable to missiles because its population density was greater than Baghdad's. This gavetrategic incentive to maintaincapabilities.
lo Saddam, Iraq accelerated its missile development after Iran demonstrated the range capability of its imported ballistic missiles in. Saddam said missile technology had been important to Iraq because Iraq could build its own ballistic missiles whereas Iran could not.
Saddam saw Iraq's nuclear programogical result of scientific and technical progress and was unconvinced by the notion of non-proliferation. He considered nuclearymbolodem nation, indicative of technological progress, aof economic development, and essential to political freedom at the international level (what he described as "strategice wanted nuclear weapons to guarantee his legacy and to compete with powerful and antagonistic neighbors; to him, nuclear weapons were necessary for Iraq to survive. Saddam wished to keep' active and his scientists employed and continuing iheir research.Saddam, "am the Godfather of the IAECove theaptured audio lape. Saddam saidonversation (of unknown date) wiih Tariqand other unidentified senior officials:
This conversation was very useful. We haveook at the international siltuition, and arrangetense) our present and future steps during theseelieve that lite USA is concentrating on the Tar East, and all of the areas of South East Asia, for two mainand Pakistan. The existence of the nuclear weapons in other countries makes the USA and Europe gel worried. Having nuclear weapons in these areas, with their economicknown by the VS. gives thesehance to face the European countries and theong time ago economic recovery existed in only in two areas of the world. In the last fifteen years Japan appears to have improved itself to what they see now. Not only Japan but all of these countries have developed economically When it appears that there are nuclear weapons in Korea others will be allowed, under the doctrine of "self defense and balance ofo create the same industry.esult, when South Korea or Japan decides to create nuclear weapons they won'tong lime to produce it. The money and the weapons will he in an area outside Europe and the USA. At the same lime there wilt be more pressure on China to stop iheir (South Korea or Japan'sl nuclear experiments. When nuclearare allowed in different places ihis pressure will decrease, and China will have the chance ta develop lis nuclear programs wiih less pressure from USA and Europe.esult, as it was previously with China, with the high technology, will put ihe USA and Europe in the siluation we mentioned before: they will be. worried about their international trading and iheir inlernational effect. This is what die USA is interested in.
Excerptslosed-Door Meeiing
Between Saddam and Senior Personnel, January
Iraqi Regime routinely, almost obsessively, engaged in the recording of its high level meetings, not in the conventional documentary form of more ordinary bureaucracies, but by way of audio ami videotapes. Despite ihe highly secret and sensitive nature ofCBW. even discussions in this area are known to have been recorded in this manner. Below is an example Of an audio recording recovered by ISC. probably made during the second week tifaddam and senior officials move from making routine, even Jocular, small talk al>oui ceremonial clothing, to engagingetailed discussion of chemical and biological weapons. Tbe following are excerptsomersalionuarter of an hota between Saddam, director of the MIC Husayn Kamil Hasan al Majid. Iraqi Air Force Commaruler Muzahim Sa'b Hasan MuluimmadAI Masiri, and. at least, one other senior official in which they discuss lhe prospect for WMD attacks on Saudi and Israeli Cities (seeaddams Personal Involvement in WMD Planning" for tbe complete meeting
Begin Transcript:
Speakerir, the design of the suit ishite shinollar (neck line! like disMasho.
Saddam: Then my design is right.
Husayn Kamil aiul Speakerbsolutely right, sir...
ant lo make sureihe door please (doorgerm and chemicalas well as the chemical and germ bombs, are available to {those concerned', so that in case we ordered an attack, they can do it without missing any of their targels?
Husayn Kamil: Sir, if you'II allow me. Some of the chemicals now are distributed, this is according to lhe last reponfrom the Minister of Defense, which was submitted to you sir. Chemical warheads arc stored and are ready at Air Bases, and they know how and
when to deal with, as well as arm these heads. Also, some other artillery machines and rockets {missiles) are available from the army. While some of the empty
"stuff" is available'for us, our position is very good, and we don'i have any operational problems.in lhe past, many substantial items andwere imported: now. we were able toocal project, which was established to comply with daily production. Also, another bigger project will be finalizedonib. as wellhird project in lhe coming two to three months thai will keep us on iht safe side, in terms if supply. We. Sir. only deal in common materials like phosphorus, ethyl alcohol and methvl.
Saddam: what is it doing witbeed these germs to be fixed on the missiles, and tell him to hit. because startingh. everyone should be ready for the action to happen at anytime,onsider Riyadharget...
Husayn Kamil: (doorir. we have three tvpes of germ weapons, but we have to decide which one we should use. some types slay capable for many years (interrupted).
Saddam: we want lhe long term, the many years kind...
Husaynhere lias toecision about which method of attack weighter bombighter plane.
Saddam: Wiih them all. all theant as soon as possible, if we are not transferring thetolear order to /those concernedf that the weapon should be in their handsight even givenon-returnTranslator Comment: to have access to the weapons: to take them with them and not lo returnill gise them an order staling that al "onef I'm not there and you don't hear my voice, you will hear somebody else's voice, so you can receive the order from him. and then you can go attack yourarn the weapons to be distributed toant Riyadh and Jeddah. which are the biggest Saudi cities wiih all the decision makers, and the Saudi rulers live there. This is for the germ and chemical weaponslso, all the Israeli cities, all of them. Of course you should concentrate on Tel Aviv, since it is their center.
Husayn Kamil: Sir, the best way to transport ihis weapon and achieve lhe mosl harmful effects would come by using planes,rop plane: to scatter it. This is.housand times more harmful. This is according to ihe analyses of the technicians...
Saddam: May Cod help us doe will never lower our heads as long as we are alive, even if we have to destroy everylx>dy
Iraquclear program shortly after the Ba'lhists took powerhe program expanded considerably6 when Saddam purchased the Osirak reactor from France, which was destroyed by an Israeli air strikeaddam became very concerned aboul Iran's nuclear weapons program late in the Iran-Iraq war and accelerated Iraq's nuclear weapons research in response, according to Vice President Ramadan. Massive funds were allocated to develop infrastructure, equipment, scientific talent, and research. Byraq wasew years ofuclear weapon.
Coalition bombing during Dcscn Storm, however, significantly damaged Iraq's nuclear facilities and the imposition of UN sanctions and inspections teams after the war further hobbled the program. It appears Saddam shifted tactics lo preserve what he could of his program (scientific talent, dual-use equipment, and designs) while simultaneously attempting to rid Iraq of sanctions.
In comparison to Iraq's nuclear and CWthe BW program wai more dependentmaller body of individual expertise. Iraq's BW program began innder President Ahmad Hasan Al Bakr. Scientists conducted research into fundamental aspects of bacteria, toxins, and viruses, emphasizing production, pathogenicity, dissemination and storage of agents, such as Clostridium botulinum. spores of Bacillus anthracis. and influenza. Despite investing considerable effort in this first attempt. Iraq's BW program faltered.fter Saddam assumed the Presidency, Iraq reorganized its CW and BW effort. Iraq rebuilt and expanded the infrastructureesearch9ut undertook little work on military applications, aside from assassination-related research for the IIS (seeIraq's Intelligence Services" for additional information).
At the height of the Iran-Iraq warhe Regime revitalized the BWew BW group was recruited and research began on gas gangrene and botulinum toxin.he Regimeear plan leading to weaponization of BW agents. Byraq was methodically advancing toward the additionW component to its WMD arsenal. Inusayn Kamil gave orders toBW as quickly as possible and byhen Iraq invaded Kuwait, the BW program had moved into high gear to field BW-fillcd weapons. By the time of the Dcscn Storm, IraqW program thai included production of large quantities of severalbotulinum toxin, Clostridium perfringens. aflatoxin. and small quantities of ricin. Iraq successfully weaponized some of these agents into ballistic missiles, aerial bombs, artillery shells, and aircraft spray tanks.
The Coalition destroyed all of Iraq's known BW facilities and bombed some of the suspect BW sites during1 Gulf war. After the Desert Storm, the Regime fabricated an elaborate cover story to hide the function of itsroduction facility at Al Hakam, while at the same time it continued to develop the sites potential. The UN suspected bul could not confirm any major BW agenl production sites until Iraq partially declared its BW program prior to the departure of Husayn Kamilraq eventually owned up lo its offensive BW program later lhat year and destroyed the remaining facilities6 under UN supervision.4 until their departure at the endnd from2 until the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. UN inspectors monitoredites deemed to have some potential useW program. Iraq's actions in the period up6 suggest that the former Regime intended to preserve iu BW capability and return fo steady, methodical progressature BW program when and if the opportunity arose.imited evidence suggests lhal Iraq abandoned its existing BW program and lhat one Iraqi official considered BW personnel io be second rale, heading an expensive program that had not delivered on its potential (sec the BW chapter for additional inibrma-tinn).
Whal Saddam Thought: External Concerns
Saddam viewed Iraq as "underdeveloped" and therefore vulnerable to regional and globalSenior Regime members generally ranked Tehran first and Tel Avivore distant second as their primary adversaries, but no Iraqi oecision-
maker asserted lhal either couniry was an imminent Challenge1. late during Ihis period. Saddam became concerned about themilitary imbalance between Iran and Iraq: Iran wa* making significant advances in WMD while Iraq was being deprived ol the opportunity lo maintain or advance lis W'MD capacity. He also privately told his top advisors, on multiple occasions, that he sought totrategic balance between the Arabs andiftcrent objective from deterring an Iranian strategic attack or blunting an Iranian invasion.
Accordingamid Mahmud. Saddam "desired lor Iraq io possess WMD. nuclear,and chemical because he always said that he desired for balance in the Middle Easladdam said this was because there were other counines in lhe area lhat possessed such weapons, like Israel, and others on the way to possession, like Iran.
Iran
Saddam believed lhat WMI) wa% necessary lo court' ter Iran. He saw Iran as Iraq's abiding enemy and he sought io keep it in check. Saddam was keenly aware that, in addition to lhe potential of invasion. Iranian infiltralors could cause internal unrest. Therefore, the orientation of most Iraqi ground forces toward the Iranian border remained unchanged throughout the sanctions period. Saddam argued Iraqi WMDwhile driven in part by the growth of Iranian capabilities, was also intended to provide Iraqinning edge against Iran.
Saddam considered WMD as the only sureto an enemy developing VV MD ol its own He said Iran was the main concern because il wanted to annex southern Iraq. Saddam said US air strikes were lessorry lhan an Iranian land attack.
Ramadan ihought WMD pnigrams mighi only be suspendedhort period of time in order to normalize Iraq's relations with the international community, and would have to be resumed if no substitute counterbalance to Iran was forthcoming.
and (he Ouartci discussed Iran many limes, according to ollicials close lo Saddam. Iloih 'Aziz and Huwaysh have stated in interviews thaimain focus was lhe danger from Iran.
haliq (MEK) facility in1 with more lhanissiles. Earlier strikes on MEK targets had occurred in4 andut Iran had onlymall number o( rockets.
Saddam was very concerned about Iranianproduction capabilities. partKularty Us nuclear weapons program, according lo former Vice Presidentinistty ol Delenve conlerenceinhat Iranian WMDooming menace to Iraq and the region, accordingensitive source. Atlendcdenior officers, the conference discussed Iran's pursuit ol nuclear weapons, acquisition of suitable delivery systems, and possession of missiles capable of carrying CW or BW warheadsange0 kilometers. Saddam believed that Iran hnd benefited from the breakup of lhe former Soviet Union by gaining access to WMD as well as conventional technologies.
Iraq) mililary iroops trained wiih lhe expectation lhal Iran would use CW if Ii ir invaded. If Iraq came under chemical or biological attack, the army would attempt io survive until the international community intervened./ also expressed hope that the close UN monitoring ol Iraq might force international intervention in this scenario Saddam fell lhat the Uniled Stales would intervene to protect oilfields, accordingormer senior Iraqi official.
A former Corps commander slated that believed ibe next war would he foughthemical environment with heavy reliance upon missiles. Iraq assumed that Iran could manulacture CW and would use ll. accordingormei senior Iraqi intelligence officer. The Iraqis had identified Iranian nuclear and chemical facilities as wellactories in Iran that Ihey assessed produced missile components.
Xraqi leaders determined lhal Tehran was moreong term danger lhan anone because of deficiencies in Iranian readiness and morale when compared againsi Iraqi training and
Iraqi Intelligence Collection Against Iran
intelligence services collected foreignon Iran and relayed the raw reporting to Saddam via his presidential secretary. Thetightly controlled dissemination of material. This raw intelligence that went to Saddam would not necessarily he sharedwith the deputy primeor military.
The National Security Committee, the body that coordinated Iraq's intelligence services, advised the vice president in1 that Iran would remain Iraq's foremaw enemy and that thewould rely heavily on missilesuture war, according to captured documents.
IIS conducted extensive collection operations against Iran, accordingormer IIS seniorand various captured documents. Intelligence collectionhole targeted Iran's weaponsits nuclear program, economic issues, and international relations. Human intelligence sources were the primary means of intelligence collection against Iran, supported by signals intelligence conducted by the IIS Directorate for
- OS hadfficers to wort the Iranian target, accordingormer senior IIS officer. The IIS relied heavily on thend independent assets in every province lo monitor Iranian military and WMD developments. The Iraqis also studied Jane's publications for information on foreign weapons systems. One senior officer spotlighted how important the Internet was to theirof general threat capabilities.
DGMI maintained0 files on Iranian order of battle, including JfJOO photographs, accordingormer intelligence officer.reports with detailed, tactical information about Iranian infiltration attempts also weredirectly to Saddam, according to captured documents.
The RG and Air Force provided detailed air order of battle information for Israel and Iran,to captured Iraqi doc uments. The documents assessed probable Israeli Air Force tactics against Iraqi forces. Alt/tough much of this information could be obtained from open sources, it isthat Iraq could "mine" it and apply it to military planning.
Iraqi intelligence collected on the Iranian nuclear programus did not contradict Iranian Claims that their reactors being used for peaceful purposes, according to the former deputyof the IIS. Regardless. Iraq assumed Iran was attempting to develop nuclear weapons. IIS assets often passed along open source information as if it were intelligence, allowing disinformation to reach the upper levels of the former Regime. Iraqi leaders acknowledged Iran's advantages in population, income, and access to international armsas Iraq's former ally Russia began to arm Iran.
Some Iraqis also believed lhc intema-lional community would halt if not deter an Iranian invasion. Saddam accordingly decided to useas his primary tool against Iran, but he never wielded rt successfully. Iraq really had no coherent policy on how to deal with Tehran after Dcscn Storm, although, from the Iraqi point of view, the immediate risk was deemed to be low.
According to the former Iraqi Army Chief-of-Staffran would have difficultyarge surprise attack because Iraq would detect the extensive mobilization required for it. Iraqiobservers would detect Iranian troops as they assembled along probable invasion corridors.
- Iraqi units were at least as good as their Iranian counterparts. The former Iraqi Army COS said Iran enjoyedqualitative -ground superiority, according to the former defenseAlthough sanctions would haveajor impact. Iraqi forces arrayed along the border could survive the first two echelons of an Iranianforce without resorting to WMD. After that they would be overrun.
One senior Regime official, however, said that although the Iranian threat was real. Saddamit. Iraq consideredistorical enemy with desires for Iraqi territory.
Israel
United States
can never he stability, security or peacethe region so long as there are immigrant Jews usurping the land ofaddam Husayn, Baghdad TV political disCussiun.!
Saddam's attitude toward Israel, although refketing defensive concerns, was hostile. Saddam considered Israel the common enemy of all .Arabs and thisthe attitudes of the Arab street inionist state. Moreover, it was reported that he considered himself theSalah-al-Din (Saladin)ivine mission to liberate Jerusalem. Thisactic to win popular support in countries like Egypt. Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. He was aware of his prestigehampion of Palestine against Israel and consistently called for the liberation of Palestine from the "river to the sea" and warned that any Arab ruler who abandoned the Palestinians wouldeavyne said publicly:
"When we speak alwut the enemies of Iraq, this means the enemies of the Arab nation. When we speak about the enemies of the Arab nation, we mean ihe enemies of Iraq. This is because Iraq is in the heart, mind, and chest of the Arab nation"
Saddam implied, according to the former presi-dential secretary, that Iraq would resume WMD programs after sanctions in order to restore the "strategic balance" within the region. Saddam was conscious of Israel's WMD arsenal and saw Israelormidable challenge to Arab interests. Israel appeared toival that had strategic dominanceossessed WMD and the ability to build relations with countries neighboring Iraq, such as Turkey and Iran, which could destabilize Iraq from within using ther Kurds. Iraqore focused risk of air and missile strikes from Israeli strategic forces, ratherroundormer senior official. Israel's bombing of Iraq's Osintk nuclear reactor spurred Saddam to build up Iraq's military to confront Israel in the. Other Iraqi policy makers stated they could otherwise do little to influence Israel. Saddam judged Israel toesser adversary1 than Iran because Israel could not invade Iraq, according to former Vice President Ramadan.
Saddam did not consider the Unitedatural adversary, as he did Iran and Israel, and he hoped that Iraq might again enjoy improved relations with the United Slates, according to Tariq 'Aziz and the presidential secretary, Tariq 'Aziz pointederies of issues, which occurred between the end of the Iran-Iraq waro explain why Saddam failed to improve relations with the United States: Irangate (the covert supplying of Iran with missiles, leakedontinuing US fleet presence in the Gulf,CIA links with Kurds and Iraqi dissidents and the withdrawal of agricultural export credits. After Irangate. Saddam believed that Washington could not be trusted and that it was out to get himHis outlook encouraged him io anack Kuwait, and helps explain his later half-hearted concessions lo the West. These concerns collectively indicated to Saddam lhat there wus no hopeositivewith the United States in the period before the attack on Kuwait.
Although the United States was notatural adversary, some Iraqi decision-makers viewed it as Iraq's most pressing concern,to former Vice President Ramadan. Throughout, Saddam and the Ba'th Regimefull-scale invasion by US forces to be the most dangerous potential threat to unseating the Regime, although Saddam rated the probability of an invasion as very losv. Throughout the UNSCOM period, Iraqi leadersumber of feelers to the United States through senior UNSCOM personnel offering strategic concessions in return for an end to sanctions. The stumbling block in these feelers was the apparent Iraqi priority on maintaining both the Saddam Regime and the option of Iraqi WMD.
ustodial debriefing. Saddam said he wanted to develop better relations with the US over the latter part of. He said, however, lhat he was nothance because the US refused to listen to anything Iraq had to say.
harles Duelfer of ISC said lhat4oth he and UNSCOM Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus were approached multiple limes by senior Iraqis with the message that
dadialogue with the United States, and that Iraq wasosition to be Washington's "best friend in the region bar none."
While Iranore enduring enemy,he temporary challenge Irom the United Slatesore immediate danger. Those who had detailed information about US capabilities also concluded there was little Iraq could do toSIraqi military commanders who did perceive the risk ot invasion realized thai the imbalance in power between Iraq and ihe United Slate* was so disparate lhat they were incapable olS invasion. Even if Iraq's military pcrtonned bener duringIraqi Freedom, Iraq would only have increased ihe number of Coalition casualties without altering the war's outcome, according to lhe former defense minister.
Saddam failed to understand the United Stales, its internal or foreign drivers, or whjt it saw as itsin the Gulf region. Little short of lhe prospeci of military action would gel Saddam lo focus on US policies. He told subordinates many times thatDesert Storm the United States had achieved all it warned in the Gull. He had no illusions about US military or technological capabilities, although he believed use Uniled States would not invade Iraq because of exaggerated US leant of casualties. Saddam alsoore pessimistic view of the United States. Byaddam had persuaded himself, just as he didhal the United Slates would not attack Iraq hecuute it already had achieved its objectives ofilitary presence in lhe region, according to dciainee interviews.
Saddam speculated that (he United Slates would instead seek lo avoid casualties and. if Iraq was attacked al all, the campaign would resemble Desert Fox.
Some Iraqi leaden did not consider the United States toong-term enemy, but many knew little about the Uniled Slates and less aboul itspolicyrmei advisors have also suggested thai Saddam never concluded that the United Slates would attemptverthrow him with an invasion.
Iraq's Limited Intelligence on US Military Operations
Iraq derived much of us understanding of US military capabilities from television and the Internet,to the former DGMI director Iraq obtained onty limited infarmatih-ilitary capabilities from its own intelligence assets, although ihey closely monitored the US buildup in Kuwait.
army staffomprehensive study on how US attacks againu Iraq might unfoldccording to captured documents. The assessment evaluated the size, (imposition, and probableof US forces and identified the US aircraft carriers immediately available to attack Iraq.
- The DGMI provided the Higher Military College an assessment about how lhe US XVIII Airborne Corps might attack Iraq, according to captured documents. The AI Bakr University was using this information in computer modeling and war gaming
collected reliable tactical intelligence against US forces in Kuwxiit and even knew when Operation Iraqi Freedom would start, accordingormer field-grade Republican Guard officer. One senior officer spotlighted how important the Internet was
in,bri p,thi!il:ci
Saddam, however, portrayed the United Stales and Israel as inseparable and believed Israel could not attach Iraq without permiision from the Uniled States. In FebruarySaddam slated in abroadcast. 'The United States and Israel are one
thingrulers of the United Stales have
oy in ihe hands of the Zionist ociopus. whicb has created the midgei Zionist entity at the expense of Arabs in occupied PalestineIn May of the same year he stated. "We will draw the sword against whoever attacks us and chop off hisaddam directed the Iraqi media "to highlight the motive of the covetous (US) leadership (hat succumbs to (he wishes of Zionism" and "seeks to establish an artificial homeland at ihe Aruhs'amadan noted lhat the Regime considered Israel to be an extension of the danger posed by the United Stales.
Saddam's handling of Iraq's response lo1 attacks probablyack of understanding of US politics and may explain why Baghdad failed to appreciate how profoundly US attitudes had changed followingaddam's poor undemanding of US altitudes contributed to Hawed dec is ion-making, according io TariqAbd-al-Tawab 'Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh. Saddam rejected advice from his cabinet to offer condolences after the attacks:
Ministers discussing the attacks recommended that Iraq should issue an official statement condemning the terrorists and ottering condolences to the people of the United States, despite American hostility toward Iraq.
Saddam refused on the grounds thai he could not extend official condolences, given the hardships the Iraqi people had suffered at the hands of the USany US apology. Saddampy after ihettacks because it hurt the United States, according to Tariq 'Aziz, and he declined to issue any statements of condolence.
Saddam's response dissatisfied most ministers, who saw the catastrophe as being beyond state-to-siate relations. They feared that official Iraqiwould associate Baghdad with Al Qa'ida. Moreover, they perceived that the net result of the .truck would align the United States against Islam and the Arabs.
Saddam dismissed these concerns, but heTariq 'Aziz lopeople to people" program by privately expressingew US officials.
Iraq's media was unique among Middle Eastern services in praising the attackers, according to the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
Former Iraqi officials concluded, time and time again, that the threat inherent in their WMDand weapons delivery systems helped preserve Saddam's Regime.
addam threatened "by God. wc will make fire eat up half of Israel, if it tried (lo strike) againstaddam's staicmcm was panengthy speech in which he denieduclear weapons program. His warning might have been mcani to deter Israel from preemptively attacking an indusirial facility, which manufacturedcapacitors alleged to be used in Ihe trigger of
a nuclear device, as it had done when ii struck the Osirak reactor in
Prior to Desert Storm. Saddam threatened to use missile- and aircraft-delivered chemical andmunitions to deter Israel and the coalition from attacking Iraq or at worst unseating ihe Regime. Former Iraqi officials concluded the threat inherent in iheir WMD arsenal and delivery systems helped preserve the Regime when Coalition forces did noi invade Baghdad
Saddam's public and private statements01 reveal that Iraq envisioned using WMD against Israel and invading Coalition Forces under ecnain conditions. Iraq later declared io UNMOVIC inspectors ihai jusl prior to lhe Gulf war it dispersed CBW muniiions io selectedand other locations. This includedspecial warheads" for the Al Husayn missile deployed at lour sites, with the warheads and missile bodies stored separately. Iraq lold UNMOVIC thesewere only to be used in responseuclear attack on Baghdad, and that lhe government had delegated retaliatory authority to field commanders. (See "Excerptslosed Door Meeting" inset below for additional information).
Public statements, intensified research andproduction, weapon Izaiion, and dispersal of WMD suggest lhat Saddam sought lhe option of using WMD strategically before and during Deserte hoped to prolong the war wuh lhe United Slates, expecting ihai the US population would grow war-weary and slop the attack.
Saddam announced on ihe eve of the groundlhat lheusayn missile was "capable ot carrying nuclear, chemical and biologicalHe warned lhat Iraq "will use weapons
thai will match ihc weapons used against us by our enemy, bul in any case, under no circumstances shall wc ever relinquishe explained that "Iraq" included territory extending from "Zakho in the north to the sea in the south, all of Iraq."
Saddam warnedtatement lo Ihe press in3 "any attempt to strike against our scientific or military installations will be confrontedreciselsouranic citation he rarely used "God be my witnessave delivered theeimilar construct0 warning to Kuwait.
Ml) Possession' Kraieterrent
The Iran-Iraq war and the ongoing suppression of internal unrest taught Saddam the importance of WMD to the dominance and survival of the Regime. Following the destruction of much of Ibe Iraqi WMD infrastructure during Desert Storm, however, tbe threats to the Regime remained; especially hisof the overarching danger fromrder to counter these threats, Saddam continued with his public posture of retaining the WMD capability. This ledifficult balancing act between the need to disarm to achieve sanctions relief while at the same timetrategic deterrent. The Regime never resolved the contradiction inherent in Ihis approach. Ultimately, foreign perceptions of these tensionsto the destruction of the Regime.
Saddam never discussed using deceptionolicy, but he used to say privately that the "better pan of war wasccording to 'Ali Hasan Al Maud. He staled that Saddam wanted to avoid appearing weak and did not reveal he was deceiving the world about Ihe presence of WMD.
" The UN's inconclusive assessment ot" Iraq'sof WMD, in Saddam's view, gave pause Io Iran. Saddam was concerned that the UN inspection process would expose Iraq's vulnerability, thereby magnifying the effect ofown capability.
Saddam compared the analogyarrior striking the wrist of another, with the potential effect of the UN inspection process. He clarified by saying that, despite the strength of the arm. striking the wrist or elbow canore decisive blow tothe entire arm: knowledge of your opponents* weaknesseseapon in itself.
Saddam's Prioritization ofOul From Under Sanctions
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait0 ted to the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory trade and financial sanctions underhese sanctions remained in place after the military ceasefire onhc "Political Ceasefire" incorporated in] explicitly linked Iraq's WMDro Iraq's right to resume oil exports Withdrawal of wider sanctions was made dependent on ihis step.
Saddam continually undcrcvtimaicd the economic consequences of hi*is belief thatwould prove inelfcctivc led him to conclude he could avoid WMD disarmament. (Saddam may have been encouraged in this beliefiss-appreciation of the relative effectivenes* of sanctions against the apartheid regime in Souths earlyowever. Saddam began toore soberof the power of sanctions and their deleterious effect on Iraq.
The compounding economic, military, and mtrastruc-lurc damage caused bynot lo mention iheir effect on internal opinion inSaddam by the mtd-VOs tin the need to lift sanctions before any thought of resuming WMD dex eloprnent could be entertained. Saddam's proximate objective was therefore lifting sanctions, bul efforts had lo be compatible with preservation of Regime security.
While il appears that Iraq, by Ihe, was essentially free of militarily significant WMD slocks. Saddam's perceived requirement to bluff about WMD capabilities made il too dangerous to clearly reveal
ihis to ihc international community, especially Iran.irect approach to fulfillment of, Iraq was lell with an end-run strategy focusing on ihe de lacio elimination of sanctions rather than Ihe formal and open Security Council process.
In the. Saddam rcafi/ed he had no WMD capabilities but hu ego prevented him fromacknowledging thai the Iraqi WMD program was ineffective, according lo the formerof Higher Education and Scienlilic Research Humam 'Abd-al-Khaliq 'Ahd-al-Ghafur. He added that Saddam never talked openly about Muffing in regard to WMD.
Efforts To Lift Sanctions
As part of his efforts to escape sanctions. Saddamigorous campaign to shapeopinion, ihe Regime drew attention tofrom poor sanitation to the absence of electric power; the main effort, however, focused on ihe impact of sanctions upon children, especially those under five years of age. Sanctions did indeed have an enormous impact upon Iraq, and Saddam's campaign utilized and amplified that impact. The campaign eventually involved everyone from ministers of the Iraqi Government lo journalists around the world, humanitarian groups, and UN officials.
The londtin ObserverBC2which aired2 and exposed Saddam's tactics. "Small coffins, decorated with grisly photographs of dead babies and theirdays', 'four days', written useful for the English-speakingparaded through the streets of Baghdad on the roofs of taxis, llie procession ledhrong of professionalhcre is only one problem, the program observes: because there arc not enough dead babies around, the Regime prevents parents from burying infants immediately, as is the Muslim tradition, to create more powerful propaganda. An Iraqi taxi driver interviewed on the program observed. They would collect bodies of childicn who had died months before and been held for massestern source visited an
Buying Your Way Out
ay of 'generating international support, the Regime gave to others an economic state in the Regime's survival; an example of this is the curious cash dislwrsementenior member if Russian Intelligence.
According to 'Abd llamid Mohmud Al iXhutah Al Sastri the Secretary of the President. Tariq 'Aziz and the Iraqi Ambuso Ruwia. 'Abhat Al Kmifadhi. arranged tbe paymentillion VSOemale colonel in ihe Rmiuan Imelligence Service. She wanted 'Aziz to accommodate the companies nominated hi the RuMian Imelligence. Sadduim was approached with this isxmr by 'Aziz Junng or after the Council of Monsters meeting, later. Saddam culled Abd and told him inall from Tariq 'Azi; lo authorize the payment and channel II through Muhib 'AbdalRaziaq. the director of the lurouniing office of ihe Presidential Diwan. Ihe payments were imule in installments ratherump-sum over every six months starting on or about
Iraqi hospital and. in the absence of hisas shownumber of dead babies, lying stackedortuary, waiting for the next official
Saddam used Iraq's oil resources, in what Baghdad perceived tooderately successful attempt, to undermine and removeanctions. Iraq's proven oil reserves arc assessed to be second only to those of Saudi Arabia, with estimates ranging8illion barrels (the most commonhe former Regime played its "oil card" in two distinct ways: first, Saddam cither stopped or reduced oil exports to increase upward pressure on world oil prices. Iraq successfully used this tactic from9 through theecond, Saddam attempted to link (lie interests of Other nations with those of Iraq through the allocation of OFF oil and trade contracts, which were grantedompanies whose governments were willing to exercise their influence within the Security Council to lift sanctions. This cfl'oit also included the award of oil contracts to individuals and groups willing lo use
iheir influence wiih their governmenis io encourage policies favorable to removing sanctions.
The condition of international oil markets after the adoption of OFF6 enabled Saddam to use ha oil resources in disputes with, and he did so until other oil producing nations began to cope with his tactics. Saddam intended Io use the threat of higher oil prices, or market uncertaintyo influence un decision-making toward Ihe removal of sanctions. He was initially successful, but he could not sustain pressure on oil markets, in part because he could not always lime his threats to when the balance between world supply of and demand for oil would favor upward pressure on prices. Second, nil-producing states eventually started to adjust (heir production and exportsessen the impucl of Saddam's tactics.esult. Saddam had far less effect than he wished or intended.
Saddam stopped oil exportsn an effort to prevent the passage ofhich called for sanctions renewal. Oil prices increased slightly morearrel between November and December and byollar beiwecn9secevertheless,4 was adopted.
Saddam reduced Iraqi oil exports from January through0 in an effort to force theof spare parts held up by un. The pricearrel of oil increasedn9n March. The un released the parts, Saddam started exporting, and the costarrel of oil felln April.
When the United States and United Kingdom announced plans in1 to impose "smartaddam once more slopped exporting oil io hall lhe effort. This lime, however, the pricearrel of oil declinedn Julyricen May. Saddam restarted exporting ihe following month, August.
' The Iraqi Presidential Council in0taff paper proposing lhal Iraq threaten to withdraw oil from die OFF program to induce upward pressure on world oil prices. Tlie paper claimed (hat this would compel Ihe United States
and United Kingdom to teniove their objections to contracts being held up in UN. The paper also assumed that there was insufficient excess capacity among oil producing nations lo counter Iraq's move The Council, however,and didapprove the proposal.
addition. Saddamsurcharge" on Iraqi ot) exports inhe UN objected to the surcharge because it would give Iraq more money than il was authorized under tht OFF program. Attempting lo defeat lhe UN's objections, Saddam once again stopped oil exports inand between0 and1 oil increasedarrel but thereafter declined. Saddam resinned oil exports bul ihestayed in place, although "undei Ihe table."
The former Regime also uied Iraq's oil resources to seek diplomatic support for the lifting or easing of sanctions. According to Rashid, in7 Foreign Minister 'A/i/ and Vise President Ran'.Ltdan approached himropose selling oil only lo those who were "friendly" toward the former Regime. By "triendlyRashid said thai 'Aim and Ramadan meant "those nations that would help [Iraq] get sanctions lilted er individuals who vsert inftucnua! with iheir government leaders and who could persuade them to belp get sanctionsaddam ordered thebe undertaken.
gave preferential treatment to Russian and French companies hoping for Russian and French support on the UN Security Council. (Sec the Regime Finance andureimnt chapter for additional information.)
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Iraq's Surcharge on Oil and Regime Decision Making
description of ihe surcharge episode by ihe former Minister of Oil, 'Amir Muhammad Rashid Al 'Ubaydi,etainee, provides an interesting example of the Regime's decision-making process.
In the autumnhe talkurcharge began. Saddam never asked me about the surcharge. He talkedroup of sycophants who simply told him hereat idea. Huwaysh wouldecommendation and Saddam would follow him blindly. Huwaysh suggestederceni of the oil company's profitevereeting and without me it wasroper meeting. Ramadan formed ata determine how to divert some fixed imri of the buyer's profit margin to the Iraqi Government. The idea was supported by both Ramadan and 'Aziz-They finally agreed onarrel.
Whatherance, Italy. Spain, Russia) refused to buy from us. (The effect of the surcharge was io remote Iraqi oil from theowever, the individuals with whom we were trading had contracts with the tradingI went lo the trading companies to get them to share iheir profit margin with us. They refused Saddam was very critical of my effortsidn't careost my job.
A new committee was formed. This committee included the sycophants and iheent to therought the three top experts
from SOMO. They told the committee lhal il was impossible to do more thanarret.ihe committee recommendedents. What happened? They slopped buying from us. Our exports werebd over ihe lime period in question.
After twoent to Saddam and got him to lower the price toents. Our exports rose. The companies put pressure on SOMO to lower the price.
A ihird meeting wasarticipated together with SOMO. 'Aziz and Ramadan supported me. but ihey were afraid to speak up. Finally we decided onarrel selling to the IIS andarrel Selling lo Europe.
Now ihe problem became how to explain the situation to OPEC. We couldn't tell them about the surcharge because it was illegal. Of course we thought the oil was Iraq's and we could do what we wished with it. But lhat was not the international situation.
This situation remained through partecided to fight. No one was lifting Iraqialked to Foreign Minister 'Aziz and he pointed out that we had lost all our friends. So we finally went back loarrel for ihe last part
Overall, we lostn exports.
nlyf Iraq'siscovered fields had been exploited. Development of these reserves in the post-sanctions period would provide the former Regime with greaier leverage in ihe world oil market. Accordingly, Iraq entered into lucrative oil exploration and exploitation contracts. The lion's share of these contracts went to Russian companies. For example, Lukoil4 billion contract7 to develop the second Ourna field, and in1 Zarubezlichneft and Taineflontract worthillion to drill in three Iraqi oil fields.ontract wasnotRussian firms to begin exploration of several liaqi oil fieldsen-year period.of these contracts was to commence during sanctions and be fully implemented once sanction had been lifted. Iraq hoped these contracts would provide Russia, and other nations,ignificant economic interest in pushing for the removal of sanctions.
A Russian delegation traveled io Iraq toexpertise on airframes and guidance systems for missiles.
Under OFF.erceni of ihe Iraqi commas went lo Russia.
Iraqi attempts to use oil gifts to Influence Russian policy makers wereavish and almostscale. Oil voucher gifts were directed across the political spectrum targeting the new oligarch class. Russian political parties and officials.ussian oliganh contmlUrd company received in excess ofillion barrets 'amountingrofit of nearlyillionther oligarch companies such as Gazprom and Yulas metred lesser amounts: the Liberal Democratic Parry leader Zhirinovskyecipient, as was the Russian Communist party and ihe Foreign Ministry itself, according to Iraqi documents. (See Oil Voucher Allocations within the Regime Finance and Prttcurement chapter forinformation.)
Iraq's Relationship With France
farmer Iraqi Regimeelationship with France to gain support in the UNSCfor lifting lhe sanctions. Saddam's Regime, in order to induce France to aid in gelling sanctions lifted, targeted friendly companies and foreign political parties ihai possessed either extensive business ties to Iraq or held pro-Iraqi positions. In addition. Iraq sought out individuals whom they believed wereosition to influence French policy. Saddam authorized lucrative oil contracts be granted lo such parlies, businesses, and individual*.
raqillion dollars to lhe French Socialist Party, accordingaptured IIS reportAbd-al-Razzaq Al Hashimi, former Iraqi ambassador to France, handed the money to French DefensePierre Joxe, according the report. The IIS instructed Hashimi to "utilize it io remind French Defense Minister. Pierre Joxe, indirectly aboutrevious positions toward France, in general, and the French Socialist parry, in particular".
'Aziz says he personally awarded several French individuals substaiuial oil allotments. According to 'Aziz, both parties understood that resale of the oil was to be reciprocated through efforts to lift US sanctions, or through opposition to Americanwithin the Security Council.
As ofraq had awarded short termunder the OFF program to France totalingillion, equaling approximately IS percent of the oil contracts allocated under the OFF program. (See the Regime Finance and Procurement chapter.)
The IIS flagged two groups of people to influence French policy in the UtVSC: French Governmental officials and influential French citizens. IISrecovered by ISG identify those persons of interest, to include ministers and politicians,and business people. Onhe Baghdad periodical Al Madaist of names of companies, individuals and other groups that received oil allocations from the former Regime under the auspices of the OFF program. Theseindividuals often had little prior connection to ihe oil industry and generally engaged European oil companies to lift the oil, but were stillosition toubstantial profit for themselves.named included Charlesormer French Interior Minister, who received almostillion barrels; Patrick Maugein, whom the Iraqisonduit to Chirac (which we have notho receivedillion barrels through his Dutch-registered company. Michel Grimard, founder of the French-Iraqi Export Club, who receivedillion barrels through Swiss companies and the Iraqi-French Friendship Society, which received overillion barrets. The French oil companies Total and SOCAP receivedillion andillion barrels, respectively (see Oil Voucher Allocations of the Regime Finance and Procurement chapter for additional information).
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Saddam's Veiled VVMl) Intent
Regime Mind WMD Timeline
For an overview of Iraqi WMD programs and policy choices, readers ihould consul' the Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline chart, enclosedeparate foldout and tabular form at the buck ofovering the period from IsVIVhe timeline shows specific events hearing on the Regime's efforts in the BW. CW. delivery systems and nm tear realms and their chnmiilogu al relationship with pediticol and military dnelopments that had direct hearing on the Regime's policy choices.
Readers should also be a* are lhal. al ihe conclusion of each volume of ten. wr haw also included foldout summary charts lhat relate inflectionturning points in ihe Regime's WMDparticular events, initiatives, or decisions the Regime look with respect lo specific WMD programs. Inflection points are marked in the margins of the body of the textray triangle.
In the years following Iraq's war with Iran andof Kuwait, Saddam's Regime sought to preserve Ihe ability to reconstituteWMD, while seeking sanctions relief through the appearance ofwiih the IM Special Commlsshtu (UNSCOM) andondoring Verification and Inspection Commissionaddam's initial approach under sanctions was driven by hu perceivedfor WMD and his conndcncc in Iraq's ability to ride out inspections without fully coopcraung-Inieiwoven into this basic fabric of Iraq'swith the UN were equally significant domestic, intcmaiional. and family events, all influenced by and reflective of Saddam's vtraicgic intent. These esents can be divided into five phases that cover the entire0
The opening years of Saddam's Regime are definederiod of ambition.01 period is dominated by the Iran-Iraq war and its aftershock.
The war was costly in financial, human and materiel resources and led Iraqeriod of insolvency and decline. Funher, the war taught Saddam the importance of WMD to national and Regime survival; in doing so, however, it also highlighted Iraq's active WMD program lo the world.
A sharp increase in the price of oila series of earlier spikes, provided Saddaminancial base that he hoped to use to improve Iraq's civilian infrastructure and modernize its military. Indeed9 gainsew plateau for higher prices (morearrel) through thendard currency windfall for Iraq
9 Islamic revolution in Iran, however,Saddam's plans. Although Ayatollah Ruhol-lah Khomeini threatened lo "export |his| revolution to the four comers of thee viewed his best opportunity to be among Iraq's Slii'a majority in southern Iraq. Khomeini therefore supported Shi'a demonstrations9 and an civil unrestaddam sought to punish Khomeini for his meddling and also soughteestablish total Iraqi control over the Shalt al-'Arah waterway, Iraq's primary outlet to the Persian Gulf.addam had agreed under duress to share the waterway with the Iranians. In the fallith Iran's military weakened by internal purges, Saddam believed an attack would belie aUo felt that attacking Iran would enhance his prestige with fellow Arab leaders who feared Khomeini's influence. Saddam launched inwhat he expected tohortcampaign to lake and hold territory in southern Iran to cxton concessions from Khomeini and possibly cause his Overthrow. The plan backfired. After several initial Iraqi victories, stiff Iranian resistance, stopped and then tolled back Iraqi gains with heavy casualties on both sides. This pattern of brutal thrusts,and prolonged stalemate continued for another eight years, eventually drawing in the United States and the Soviet Union (both supportinghe UN, and several other regional and Third World states.
Hostilities ended inith no change from0 political status quo, after both parties agreedease-fire on the basis of UN Security Council. The warignificant toll on Iraq, which lost anandO0 prisoners and0 billion, much
of il borrowed from Gulf neighbors and the Soviet Union (foraving survived. Saddam learned that defeating superior numbers of Iranian forces, especially massed infantry attacks, required the use of CW. He was also convinced that Iraq's ability to retaliate with missile strikes against Tehran in8 "War of the Cities" finally forced Khomeini to agreeeasefire, The importanceutually supporting system of WMD, with theater ballistic missiles in securing Iraq's national security became an article of faith for Saddam and the vast majority of Regime members.
Despite Iraq's heavy burden of debt after the war. Saddam emerged with an experienced and expanded military force, poised to dominate the Gulf. Etvnomic difficulties were Saddam's main motive for the invasion of Kuwait, with irredentistecondary concern. Absorbing Kuwait as" province was viewed as having historicaland being the key to revitalizing Iraq's economy. Saddam had planned for an invasion of Kuwait for some, weeks beforehand, but the timeframe in which to conduct the attack had not been formalized. The Impulsive deciuon to invade in0 was precipitated by what Saddam chose to perceive as Kuwait's arrogance in negotiations over disputed oil drilling along the common border.
As in lhe Iran-Iraq war, Saddam's ambition led him to miscalculate the impact of his actions. He wasfor lhe harsh reaction to lhe Kuwaiti invasion by the United Slates and the other permanentof the UNSC. especially ihe Soviet Union, and surprised by the condemnation of fellow Arab leaders, many of whom he knew detested the Kuwaitis. In the face of Ihis criticism, however. Saddam refused to back down, believing he could prevail, just as he did against Iran. While Coalition forces ousted Iraq from Kuwait, Saddam maintained his grip on power inside Iraq, as well as his conviction lhat the key todefending Iraq was to possess WMD and an effective means of delivering them.
77re costliness of Ihe Iran/Iraq war and the resulting invasion of Kuwait usherederiod of economic and military decline. Theense and difficult period that threatened Regime survival. The Iraqi economy hit rock bottom5 and forced Saddam to accept lhe OFF program the following year, bolstering the position of the Regime generally and Saddam's survival specifically.
. passed onequired Iraq's unconditional acceptance of an ongoing monitoring and verification presence to verify Iraq's compliance with the weapons-related provisions oflso required national implementing legislation to ban future Iraqi WMD work. The former Regime refused to accept these provisions untilHowever, national implementing legislation was not enacted until Februaryhe former Regime objected io me open-ended nature of long-term monitoring, because Iraq equated the presence of inspectors with the continuation of sanctions. As ihiscontinued, sanctions took their toll on the Iraqiand private-sector revenues collapsed, rampant inflation undermined business confidence, and Iraqis at all levels wereihe former Regime ino end cooperation with inspectors unless the oil embargo was lifted. The Iraqi Government was unable to invest in rebuilding its infrastructure, alreadyby the Gulf war and the Iran-Iraq war.
The "no-fly zones" over northern and southern Iraq, patrolled by Coalition aircraft, were an affront to Iraqi sovereignty. Although severely weakenedIraq used troop movements inio southern Iraq4 to threaten the Kuwaitis and into northern Iraq6 to punish disaffected Kurds. Iniemally, the departure io Jordan in5 of Saddam's son-in-law and close confidante Husayn Kamilfurther disarray among senior members of the Iraqi Regime. Through it all. Saddam endured and his desire io end sanctions and rebuild his WMDpersisted.
Selected UN Security Council Resolutions
prilthe UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and required Iraq to accept
"the destruction, removal. Or rendering harmless, under international supervision" of its chemical and biological weapons and missilesange greater lhan ISO kilometers and their associated programs, stocks, components, research, and facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency tlAEA) was cltarged with abolition of Iraq's nuclear weapons program.
5proposedIraq to export oil to pay for food, medicine, and compensation payments to Kuwait and cost of UN operations.
5 AugustIraq'sviolation" Ofnd demanded that Iraq provide "full, final, and complete disclosure" tFFCD) tf its WMD programs, provide inspectors with "immediate, unconditional, ami unrestricted access" to inspection sites, and cease ail attempts lo conceal material or equipmeni from its WMD and missile programs.
eptemberimmediate release offunds from escrme to finance payments for the purchase of foodstuffs, medicines and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs, and confirmed that funds from other sources may be deposited in the escrow account to beavailable lo meet Iraq's humanitarian needs, and urges that any provision be undertaken through arrangements which assure their equitable distribti-I'ton io meet humanitarian needs.
1 OctoberUNSCOM and IAEA plans for Ongoing Monitoring aruj Verification fOMV) to prevent Iraq fromits WMD programs.
4 AprilIraq to exportf petroleum and petroleum products everyays, placed Ihe funds in an escrow account, and allowed Iraq to purchase food, medicines, and humanitarian supplies wtllt lhe proceeds. Laid the grourulwork ofwhai came to be known as the OU-For-Food Program.
6 approved afor monitoring Iraqi imports and exports as required by. The mechanism allowed the UN and the IAEA to monitor the import of dual-use goods in Iraq.
archSecurity Council endorsementemorandum ofbetween lhe UN Secretary General and lhe Iraqi Regime that governed the inspection ofpalaces and oilier sensitive siles.
9 SeptemberIraq's decision io halt cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA inspections in8 asa "flagrant violation" of ils obligations and demanded that Iraq restoie cooperation with UNSCOM. The resolution suspended sanctions reviews but promisedcomprehensive review" of its situation onceresumed and Iraq demonstrated ils willingness to comply.
5 Novemberondemned Iraq "flagrant violation" of earlier UNSCRs in suspending cooperation with UN monitoring activities in Iraq on
ecemberlite UN Monitoring. Verification, and InspectionIUNMOVIC) to take over ihe responsibilities mandated to UNSCOM under. It also linked Iraqi cooperation in settling disarmament issues with the suspension and subsequent lifting of sanctions.4 also abolished the ceiling on Iraqi oil exports.
82 declared Iraq in material breach of its obligations under previous itsolutions. required new weapons declarations fivin Iraq, and included stringentfor Iraqi compliance, including access io all sites, interviews with scientists, and landing and over flight rights.
.Scientific Research and Intention to Reconstitute WMD
Many former Iraqi officials close lo Saddam either heard him say or inferred lhat he intended lo resume WMD programs when sanctions were lifted. Those around him al the time do not believe that heecision to permanently abandon WMD programs.5addam encouraged Iraqi officials to preserve the nation's scientific hrain trustfor WMD. Saddam told his advisors as early1 thai he wanted to keep Iraq's nuclear scientists fully employed. This theme of preserving personnel resources persisted throughout the sanctions period.
primary concern wasadre of skilled scientists to facilitate reconstitution
of WMD programs after sanctions were lifted, according to former science advisor Ja'far Diya' Ja'far Hashim. Saddam communicated his policy in several meetings with officials from MIC. Ministry of Industry and Minerals, and the IAEC. Saddam instructed general directors of Iraqi state companies and other state entities io prevent key scientists from theMD program from leaving the country. This retention of scientists was Iraq's only siep taken to prepareesumption of WMD. in Ja'far's opinion.
secretary 'Abd Hamid Mahmud wrote that1 Saddam told the scientists lhal they should "preserve plans in their minds" and "keep the brains of Iraq's scientistsraq was to destroy everything apart from knowledge, which would be used toMD program.
Saddam wanted people lu keep knowledge in their hcads rather than retain documents that could have been exposed, according to former Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz. Nuclear scientists were told in general icrms that the program was overnd Tariq 'Aziz inferred lhat the scientists understood that they should not keep documents or equipment. 'Aziz also noted that if Saddam had the same opportunity as he did in. he probably would have resumed research on nuclear weapons.
said that Saddam stated on severalthat he did not consider ballistic missiles to be WMD and therefore Iraq should not be subject to missile restrictions. Ja'far was unaware of any WMD activities in Iraq after the Gulf war. but said he thought Saddam would reconstitute all WMD disciplines when sanctions were lifted, although he cautioned that he never heard Saddam say this explicitly. Several former senior Regime officials also contended that nuclear weapons would have beennotof Saddam's future WMD force.
to two senior Iraqi scientists,3 Husayn Kamil, then the Minister of Military Industrialization, announcedpeecharge audience of WMD scientists at the Space Research Center in Baghdad that WMD programs would resume and be expanded, when UNSCOMleft Iraq. Husayn Kamil's intimate relationship wiih Saddam added particular credibility to his remarks.
Reaction to Sanctions
Baghdad reluctantly submitted to inspections, declaring only part of its ballistic missile andwarfare programs to the UN, but not its nuclear weapon and biological warfare programs, which It attempted to hide from inspectors.usayn Kami! and Qusay Saddam Husayn attempted to retain Iraq's WMD and theater missile capability by using MIC, along with the SSO. RG. SRG, and Surface-io-Surface Missile Command to conceal bannedand deceive UNSCOM inspectors.
MIC organizations-the Technical Research Center and the Al Muthanna Slate Establishment-dispersed Iraq's biological and chemical bombs and missile warheads in cooperation with the Iraqi Air Force and Surfacc-tn-Surfacc Missile Command prior to Desert Storm. These undeclared or partially declared weapons remained in dispersal sites,until
Husayn Kamil
Bom5 within thr Al Majiit branch afSadilams family. Husayn Kamil was the son of Saddam's first cousin on his father's side. Kamil Hasan Al Majid 'Ahd-al-Qadir. More importantly. Husayn Kamil becameum-in-law. married3 to Saddam's eldest and favorite daughter. Raghad Husayn Kamil began his rise to power within the Regime's security services as part of Saddam's personal detail. Anording to Tariq 'Aziz. Husaxn Kami!econd lieutenantSaddam becamt president in
addom oppmnted him Director of the SSO and later Supervisor, or "Overseer"!MushrifL of thr RC (mclimhng tbe SRCt In effect, he controlled ail. Saddam's security orxtwuzationi. an unprecedented level of Mat fortingle indivulual.addasn appointed llmasn Kamil as Overseer ofIndustrialization.e to Minister of Industry and Military IndialruiliziUion IMIMI)8 after acquiring the Ministries of Heavy Industry and Light Industry as well as exerting contnA over the Ministry of Petroleum, tlw Atomic Energy Commission, and Petrochemicallande suite nuclearusayn Kamil was. very likely, the second most powerful man in Iraq.
Husayn Kamil recehed bnnul administrative atul financial authority fmm Saddam io trmsolitlatc boih Iraq's rtseanh and development programs, and as industrial resounes into military pnnlui lion,WMD and missile delivery systems pmductum. Although not trchntcalls trained. Kamil oversaw Iraq's program to modify the Regime 'i Scud missiles to the longer-range Altaruaii. and theand production of nerve agents, including Tabwn. Sarin and VX
His relationship with Saddam gave Husayn Kamd opportunities to act outside the law and wiih minimal personal and fiscal oversight. Because of hit family ties and proximity lo Saddam, he could have anyone fired or placed iiiuler suspicion. Although 'Amir Hainudl Hasan At Sa 'adi was ihe Deputy Director of MICey subordinate, Kamil did not rely onormer subordinate noted: "Husnyn Kamil did noiighi-liand man. as he was toois smeexsoi at MIC,s also one of Kiimil'x former subordinates said, "No one in MIC could conirol him and everyone feared him."
Saddam Husayn's familyKwnil on far left: Kamil in uniform (left).
5 the impact of sanctions meant Iraq was on ihe verge ofcapricious and self-serving oversight of MIC, his lack of accountability, and ihe intrusive nature of UN inspections combined lo eroticilitary industrial capability. Husayn Kamil. his brother Saddam Kamil. and their wives and children 'Saddam Husnvngrandchildren)fled Iraq and sought political asylum in Jordan
Various reasons may explain why Husayn Kami! left Iraq. The most important reason may have been the growing tension between him and his bitter family-rival 'Vday Saddam Husayn. According to King Hussein of Jordan, "as far as we know; ihisamily crisis, in ihe personal context,airly longurther explanation revolves arourul the terrible State of the Iraqi economy under sanctions and the possibility that he wanted to escape Iraqopular or irilial revolt unseated Saddam and his family. For his part. Husyan Kamil said's rule had "lost its creditability on Iheand Arabnd thai his defection "shows to what extent Ihe situation in Iraq has deteriorated" The Iraqi media and leadership first accused him of financial improprieties, and then said he was "no more than an employee in this state and hiswere limited" Finally, they made him ihe ultimate "fall guy "for all Iraq'sihe Regime's decision io imadc Kuwait, louplici-ions relations wiih UNSCOM.
Despite llie level of invective on both sides, Husayn Kamil. Saddam Kamil. and their families decided
Husayn Kamil (continued)
return to Iraq inupttosedly wish the promiseardon from Saddam. Upon their return from Jordan, he and his brother were detained, separated from their families, and placed under house arrest. Within days, Saddam's daughters divorced their husbands. While under house arrest Husayn Kamil and his brother were confronted by 'Ali Hasan Al Majid and members of their family tribe, come to reclaim "tribalusayn Kamil, his brother
Saddam, their father, their sister and her children were tilled in the ensuing shoot-out. Saddam Husayn "explicitly enttorsed the killings, which, as he saw them, 'purified' and healed the family byfrom the 'hand'an 'ailing finger.'" Trying at the same time to distance himself, however, he assured his listeners that, had he been notified about it ahead of time, he would have pret-ented the assault, becauseean it."
The Surfacc-io-Surface Missile Commandundeclared Al Husayn and Scud missiles, launchers, and chemical and biological warheads.
Particularly in the, ihe SRG concealed uranium enrichment equipment, missiles, missile manufacturing equipment, "know-how" documenis from all the programs, as wellupply ofmaterials.
Tbe RC Security Directorate of the SSO conveyed instruction from Husayn Kamil and Qusay to the SRG elements thai were hiding material andand SSO political officers al SRG units often knew the whereabouts of the hidden material.
Senior Regime members failed to anticipate theof sanctions and the rigor of UN inspections.
Saddam initially expected the sanctions would last no more than three years, and many Iraqis doubted the sanctions would be so comprehensive, according to several detainee interviews. These perceptions probably persuaded senior Regime leaders that they couldhort-livedregime by making limited concessions, hiding much of their pre-existing weapons andand even expanding biological warfareby enhancing dual-use facilities.
Following unexpectedly thorough inspections. Saddam ordered Husayn Kamil in1 to destroy unilaterally large numbers of undeclared weapons and related materials to conceal Iraq's WMD capabiHties. This dcsiruction-and Iraq's failure to document lhe destruction- greatlyUN verification efforts and therebyUN economic sanctions on Iraq. According to Iraqi Presidential Advisor 'Amir Hamudi Hasan Al Sa'adi. the unilateral destruction decision was comparable in iis negative consequences for Iraq wiih the decision lo invade Kuwait.
Intrusive inspections also affected potential WMD programs by guaranteeing the presence oflearns in Iraqi military, and research andfacilities.
Sanctions imposed constraints on potential WMD programs through limitations on resources and restraints on imports. The sanctions forced Iraq lo slash funding thai might have been used tothe military establishment and complicated lhe import of military goods. Rebuilding the military, including any WMD capability, required an end to sanctions.
The economic bite of the sanctions instead grew increasingly painful and forced the Regime to adopt an unprecedented range of austerity measuresisclosure of new evidence of Iraqi WMD activity following Husayn5 flight to Jordan undermined Baghdad's case before lhe UN.
Husayn Kamil's Departure
Senior Iraqicaught off-guard by Husayn Kamil's flight to Jordannhe Regime was forced to quickly assess what the fallout would be from any revelations and what damage they would inflict on Iraqi crcd-
ibility with UNSCOM. Iraqi demands to endand threats to stop cooperation wiih UNSCOM became increasingly shrill in the two months prior to Husayn Kamil's defection. Vice President Ramadan said onune thai Iraq had decided "not to continue cooperation wiih the Council" if UNSCOMChairman Rolf Ekeus'5 report to the Security Council did not bring aboutositivethat contributes to ending the siege imposed onnuly, the anniversary of the Ba'th party resolution, Saddam again threatened to siopwith the UN unless sanctions were lifted. Two days later, after meetings wiih his EgyptianIraqi Foreign Minister Muhammad Sa'id Kazim Al Sahaf insisted thai Iraq had complied wiih ilsunder UN resolutions and demanded the oil embargo and other sanctions be lifted by the Security Council after the nexi review oneptember.
By ihe time Husayn Kamil fled. Iraq already hadanother "full, linal. and complete declarationn iis biological program to UNSCOM. On
1raq had admitted to the production of bulk biological agent, but had denied weapomzing it. To maintain lhe appearance of cooperation, however, Iraq had to provide more infonnation to inspectors and withdraw the earlier FFCIj. After making such strident demands of Rolf Ekeus and lhe UN. Iraq was nowgreatwithdraw its threat io cease cooperation wiih UNSCOM and admit lhal its biological program was more extensive than previously acknowledged.
Husayn Kamil's flight sci lhe stage for further disclosures to the UN. particularly in the BW and nuclear fields, lhe UN responded by destroying extensive dual-use facilities critical to the BW program, such as lhe facilities at Al Hakam and Dawrah. The revelations also triggered contentious UNSCOM inspectionsesigned lo counter Regime deception efforts and led to showdowns over access lo sensitive facilities, includingsites.
After Husayn Kamil's departure,and other nuclear officials assembled and signed documenis affirming they would hide neither equipment nor documenis. accordingormer nuclear scientist.
lhe director of lhe National Monitoring(NMD) responded to llusayn Kamil's departure by insulting representatives in each ministry and company, accordinghe former Minister ofIndustrialization 'Abd-al-Tawab 'Abdallah Al
Mullah Huwaysh. These individuals, fully aware of all the UNSC resolutions, were lo report anyto lhe NMD. When they detected potential violations, such as trying to procure materials and conducting illicit research, they halted them.
Cooperating With UNSCOM While Preserving WMD
Iraq attempted to balance competing desires to appear lo cooperate wiihV and have sanctions lifted, and to preserve the ability to eventuallyits weapons of mass destruction. Iraqiunder sanctions reflects the interplay between Saddam's perceived requirements for WMD and his confidence in the Regime's ability lo ride oulwithout full compliance, and the perceived cosh and longevity of sanctions. The Iraqis never got the balance right.
According to 'Abd Hamid Mahmud. Saddam privately told him thai Iraq would reacquire WMD post-sanctions and lhal he was concerned aboul Iraq's vulnerability lo Israeli WMD and Iran's growing nuclear threat.
Baghdad tried to balance perceived opportunities offered by denial and deception, and diplomacy, against costs imposed by the continuation of sanctions, the UN's introduction of more rigorous inspection techniques, and Coalition air anacks.
Saddam repeatedly told his ministers noi ioin WMD-relaied activity, according lo Tariq 'Aziz.
A former MIC employee stated he was directed to sign an affidavit3 acknowledging helhat he was under orders io comply wiih UN restrictions and that the penally for non-compliance was death. Heimilar affidavit
nd againnder orders fromof Military Industrialization 'Abd-al-Tawab 'Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh through his
owever. Husayn Kamil stated tosecretary 'Abd Hamid Mahmud thai it was not necessaryeclare Iraq's BW program to ihe UN and indicated thai he would order the scientists io hide all evidence in their homes.
the Iraqi Regime's deception strategy responded only to the movemeni and actions of the UN inspectors.1he Iraqis modified iheir tactics to continue ihe concealment of proscribed materials. During the early phases of lhe inspectionsNSCOM inspectors often gave notice of inspection sitesours in advance of rnoseroents. This gave Iraqiayemove materials, If required. The materials could then be returned when the inspection was complete.
The continual decline led lo lhe economic lot point$ and convinced lhe Regime ta adopt different tactics.
Iraq's economic decline forced the Regime to accept the UN OFF program; this resulted in economic recovery andore confident Regime posluie.
The tightening economic sanctions,W program, tbe flight ol Husayn Kamil, and the subsequent failure of Iraq's attempt lo disclose the "chicken farm" documents sent ihe nationownward spiral. If Saddam was going to dohad to be soon. Iraq'sacceptance of UNSCROil-For-Foad program approved hy the UN onprilits negotiation of the formal, unchallenged trade protocol with Jordan set the pattern for similar illegal deals with Syria and Turkeyhese became the foundation for Iraq's economic recovery-Although initially approved by lite UN inraq waited until6 to accepi,
and it wasn't until December6 lhat the actual implementation of Ihe program began funding this recovery.
According to Tariq 'Aziz. Husayn Kamil's defection was the turning pmnt in Iraqi sanctions history in that afterwards Saddam agreed lo accept OFF. In the, Saddam and his advisors had failed to realize the strategic trade (and thereby political) opportunities lhal OFF program offered Iraq. France. Russia and China pushed Iraq to accept OFF because the Iraqis had consistently complained about uie deprivation sanctiom had imposed on Ihe populace ('Aziz had repeatedly tried lo gel Saddam lo accept the program during then the opinion of senior Iraqi leaders, OFF allowed Iraq lo rejoin the world ot international trade and its position began to improveAziz said Iraqile became "lessnd ihe Iraqi Governmenl increased the amount of rations being provided.
Prior io lhe implementation ofhe former Iraqi Regime struggled wiih its Kurdish enemies in northern Iraq, and used military force to recapture the city of Irbil inoalition military retaliation appeared in lhe form of Desert Strike and the subsequent extension of Iraq's No-Fly-Zones, further constricting Iraqi controlled airspace. Russian and France continued to chide lhe United Slates for. what they viewed as. US unilateral action against the sovereignly of Iraq.
Iraq's relationship with UNSCOM remainedEarly Iraqi hopesuick resolution otinspection issues were swallowed up in ever increasing mistrust and substantive disputes between the two sides. Saddam had hoped lo gam favorassive lumovcr of W'MD-rclatcd documenis lhat the Regime "discovered" nlamil's "chickenhich validated suspicions about Iraqioperations mid raised additional questions. UNSCOM. however, became more suspicious of Iraqi motives and Ihe relationship steadily deteriorated, despite intervention by the UN Secretary General. Eventually, the balance tipped against compliance with inspection requirements in favor of pursuing other avenues of sanctions relief.8 lo suspend cooperation wiih UNSCOM
and ihc Inicrnaiional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) eventually led to UNSCOM'* departure and amilitary attack against Iraq. Dcscn Fox.
Saddam later regarded the air strikes associated with Desen Fox in8 as the worst he could expect from Western military pressure. He noted, but was less influenced by. the limits of international tolerance shown in the UNSC to his hard-line against UNSCOM. He over-estimated what he could, in future, expect from Russia, France and China in the UNC in terms ofore vigorousresponse.
Iraq accepted OFF in6 and oil began to flow inevenues from this program gradually increasedII billion annually8 (see the Regime Finance and Procurement chapter).
Saddam distrusted OFF because he felt it would relieve international pressure on the UNSC to expeditiously lift sanctions. For the same reason, he refused in1 to acknowledge. to gamer international suppon by claiming that sanctions were starving the Iraqi people.
Impact of the "Chicken Farm" Documents
The release of long-concealed WMD documentation planted al Husayn hamit's farm innd Iraq's declarations in6 revealing new aspects of Ihe WMD programs were major turning points in the Regime's denial and deception efforts following the Desert Storm Iraq considered thetoeasure of goodwill and cooperation with the UN; however, the release of thesevalidated UNSCOM concerns about ongoing concealment and created additional questions from the international community. In an attempt lo comply wiih UN requirements:
The Iraqi leadership required WMD scientists to sign an agreement6 indicating that they would turn over any WMD documents in their houses and lhat failure to do so could lead toaccording to reporting.
* Huwaysh.7 ordered his employees to sign statements certifying they did not have any WMD-relaied documents or equipment. Ihc penalty for non-compliance was death. His scientistsrooms full of documents, which MIC turned over lo the National Monitoring Directorate. Huwaysh was unsure what ihe NMD ultimately did with them.
Although Iraq's release of the "chicken farm"initiallyore positive atmosphere with UNSCOM, the relationship grew strained as UNSCOM and the IAEA inspections became more aggressive. The release destroyed the international community's confidence in the credibility of follow-on Iraqi declarations of cooperation. UNSCOM concluded that it had been successfully deceived by Iraq and that the deception effort was controlled and orchestrated by the highest levels of the former Regime. UNSCOM therefore directed its efforts al facilities associated with very senior members of the Regime and designed inspections to uncoverrather lhan weapons. The situationreached an impasse then escalated to crisis and conflict. From this experience. Iraq learned to equate cooperation with UNSCOM with increasedprolonged sanctions, and the threat of war. In response. Baghdad sought reliefeakening of the sanctions regime rather than compliance with it.
Looking Ahead to Resume WMD Programs
The Regimeoken effort to comply with ihe disarmament process, but Ihe Iraqis never intended to meet Ihe spirit of the UNSC's resolutions.acts of complianceoven desire to resume WMD activities. Several senior officials also either inferred or heard Saddam say that he reserved the right to resume WMD research after sanctions.
Presideniial secretary 'Abd Hamid Mahmud.etainee, wrote: "If the sanctions would have been lifted and there is no UN monitoring, then it was possible for Saddam to continue his WMDand in my estimation il would have been doneotal secrecy and |withj concealment because he gained1 and UNut in another debrief. Huwaysh said it wouldonths toustard program.
7ft* Saga of Ihr "Chickenocument*
Husayn Kamil Hasan Al Majid and Qusay Saddam Husayn were behind an effort lo conceal WMDand strategic materials lhat only ended after he [led to Jcdan inlter the fast Iraqi declaration inl,Hmsavn Kamil ordered thai all 'know how'atalogs, anddocumenis from the WMD and missile programs should be gathered and given to ihe securityfor safekeeping. The Director General af each Military Industrialization Commission (MIC) Estab-lisliment was lo gather hismporiant teclmical documents, and they were told dial the documenis were so important that the documents were to be destroyed only by the security services. Establishments were asked to deliver their documenis to MIC security elements, which trucked thementral rendezvous point in Baghdad where the trucks were turned over to the Special Security Organization (SSO) and the Special Republican Guardn two or three occasions in April andIC security officers turned over iruckloads of program documents.
A separate effort collected the documents of theuclear weapons organizatum. Security personnel hid these documentsime in Duluiyah and Tarmi-yah. Some nuclear documents were also loadedailroad car and shuttled between Baghdad and Hadithah in western Iraq.
The documenis were later deliveredouse that belonged SRG training officer Ll. Col. Sufyan Mahir Hasan Al Ghudayri in ihe GhaziUyah section of Baghdad. After Sufyan transferred to the Republican GuardRG Chief of Staff Col. Walid Hamid Tawfiq Al Nasiri took control of the documenis and moved themew safe house in the Hay at-Tashri section of Baghdad near the Republican Palace.
An SRG element led by Col Najah Hasan Ml At Na/ar was also selected to conceal several truck-loads ofbillets and maragini steelhad been purchased for the uranium centrifuge enrichment program. The SRG loaded this material onto civilian truck* and drove them lo mri-ous locations outside of Baghdad to evadeCol. Walid also managed and coordinated this activity.
Husayn KamiFs flight to Jordan raised concerns that he would tell ihe UN about ihe hidden documents and materials. Qusay summoned Col. Walid lo his office and quizzed Walid about the documents. Walid explained to Qusay about the Hay at-Tashri safe house. Shortly after this meeting. Walid was ordered by his former SRG commander. Kamal Mustafa 'Abdallah. to move the documents out of Baghdad. Walid used seven to nine SRG trucks to haul the documentsarm near 'Aqarquf. west of Baghdad, where ihey were storedumber of days. When Walid inquired of Kamal Mustafa what he should do wiih the documenis, and Kamal Mustafa told him to bum them. After nearly two days of burning, Walid and his crew destroyeduarter of the
Al thai point, Walid was contacted by Khalid Kulayb 'Awan Juma', the head of the SSO Republican Guard Security Directorate, who ordered thai the documents be moved to Salman Pak and from thereinal destination. Walidonvoy of trucks carried lite boxes of documents in the middle of the night to Salman Pak where they were guided to Husayn Kamil's "chicken farm" near Alumber of people in civilian clothes met the convoy when ii arrived at the farm and directed the unloading of ihe vehicles. The boxes of documents were all unloaded at ihe farm'clock in the morning.
Walid also reportedly called Col. Najah the same night and directed Najah to meet his convoy of trucks containing the aluminum and steel at the SRG office in Amiriyah. Col Walid subsequently led the convoy to llusayn Kamil's farm where these vehicles were also unloaded.
UNSCOM Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus and IAEA Action Team leader Mauricio Zifferero were in Baghdad al Ihe invitation of the Iraqi Government. They had conducted several days of talks with the Iraqis and were about to depart for Amman. Jordan to talk with Husayn Kamil. Husam Muhammad Amin Al Yasin, Director General of the NationalDirectorateelephone call from presidential secretary 'Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab AI Nasiri explaining that Ekeus andshould view some documenis fourul at Husayn Kamil's farm.
The Saga of the "Chicken Farm" Documents (continued)
Amin was aNe lo reach Fkeus about one hour prior to Fkeus' scheduled departure from Baghdad. Ekeus. along with the IAEA's Gary Dillon, set off for Husayn KamiFsfarm. guided by two minders sent by the presidential secretary.
Reponedlv. the original plan for the documents was to burn them all. and Walid and hii crew had begun that process at the farm in 'Aqarquf. Then someone had the "bright idea" to incriminate Husayn Kamil in the concealment of the documents, so they took the materials to his "chickenhenexamined the material at the farm, they noticed the presence of pebbles among the dusl on top of the document boxes, as though someone had simply thrown dirt on top of the boxes in an attempt to make it appear that the boxes had been at the farmong time. When the UN began an inquiry into how the documents were discovered at the farm, the Iraqis produced several fanciful stories that quickly unraveled.
had said lhat alter sanctions Iraq would resume production ol WMD to "achievebalance and protect the dignity of Iraq and Iraqis and the Arabccording to former presidential secretary 'Abd. 'Abd wroteetainee. "lieould say if only Iraq possessed the nuclear weapon then no one would commit acts of aggressionr any other Arab country, and the Palestinian issue would be solved peacefully because of Iraq."
Saddam would have restarted WMD programs, beginning with the nuclear program, after sanctions, according to Tariq 'Ariz. Saddam never formally stated this intention, according to 'Aziz, but he did not believe other countries in ihe region should
be able to have WMD when Iraq could not. 'Aziz assessed that Iraq couldMD capability within two years of the end of sanctions.
inteni lo maintain and compartment WMD capabilitieswell known and often acknowledged by high level authorities, accordingenior Al Kindi State Company ofbcial. The Minister of Military Industrialization allegedly told the source lhat SaddamMD program "on the shelf" Huwaysh.ritten statement, explained instead that Saddam bncled senior officials on several occasion* saying, "We do not intend or aspire to return to our previous programs to produce WMD. if the Security Council ahules by its obligations pertaining to these resolutions
.addam reiterated this pointabinet meetingccording to Dr. Humam 'Abd-ul-Khaliq 'Abd-ul Ghufur. the former Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research.
> Huwaysh believed lhat Saddam would base his decision regarding future Iraqi WMD development on how the Security Council followed through on its promise in paragrapho establish "in the Middleone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles (or theirf this promise was not fulfilled. Iraq should be free to act in Hi own interests During an earlier debrief Huwaysh speculated lhat Iraq would havemany of its proscribed programs within five years if OIE had not occurred.
ustodial interview, Saddam, when asked whether he would reconstitute WMD programs after sanctions were lifted, implied lhat Iraq would have done what was necessary.
Guarding WMD Capabilities
The abortive efforts to outwardly comply with Ihe UN inspection process< onward slowly shifted lo increased efforts to minimize Ihe impact of ihe inspection process on Regime security, military, and industrial and research capabUities.. Iraq continued elTons lo hinder UNSCOM inspections through sue saniriza-tion. warning inspection siies prior lo the inspectors' arrival, concealment of sensitive documentation, and intelligence collection on the UN mission.
Increasingly afterraq burned documents, barred access to sites io UNSCOM. banned US inspectors, and threatened to shoot downissions until the UN forced compliance in November of the same year.
Sccurily Services
of Denial and Deception
Iraq placed high priority on monitoring UNteams, as well as the political dynamic of UN policy toward Iraq. Former Regime officials state that the Iraqi security services, along with select military elements, played critical roles in guarding Saddam and other key members of the Regime, enforcing Regime policies, and protecting Iraqi military and security activities. (SeeIraqi Intelligence Services" andIraqi Security Services" Annex for additional information.)
The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) The IIS, responsible for counterintelligence, was the lead organization charged with monitoring UN inspection activities and personnel. IIS directorates carried out human, technical and electronicof the UN in Iraq to detect intelligence agents and to predict which sites were to be inspected so that those sites could be sanitized.
personnel accompanied all UNSCOM and UNMOVIC inspection convoys, accordingormer senior Iraqi official. The IIS believed that all foreigners were spying on the security of Saddam Husayn or were seeking military or security information. The IIS believed that UN Security Council1 was very tough and that
it was important to engage in counterintelligence activities to protect against the loss afimpotzani information. IIS "minders" traveled withintercept equipment in their vehicles in order to listen to UNSCOM communications while on the move, though this strategy was not used against UNMOVIC24 out of fear of detection.
' In the early and. thellS wastasked with clandestine monitoring of UNSCOM weapons inspectors and their communications, as well as attempting to recruit or turn UNSCOM members, accordingormer IIS official. As soon as the UNSCOM mission began focusing onsites, the SSO became actively involved in the inspection process.
personnel were directed to contact facilities and personnel in advance of UNMOVIC siteaccording to foreign government information. The IIS developed penetrations within the UN and basic surveillance in country to learn futureplans. IIS officials also had the responsibility of organizing protests at UNMOVIC inspection sites.
to presidential secretary 'Abd Hamid MahmudAl Khatab Al Nasiri, during theaddamresidential decree directing the IIS to recruit UNSCOM inspectors, especially American inspectors. To entice their cooperation, the IIS was to offer the inspectors preferential treatment forfuture business dealings with Iraq, once they completed their duties with the United Nations. Tariq 'Aziz and an Iraqi-American were specifically tasked by the IIS to focusarticular American inspector.
' The IIS Directorate of Signals Intelligence (MIonducted surveillance and collection activities directed against UNSCOM and the UN. accordingormer MI7 officer. As with the rest of the IIS effort. MI7's objectives were the identification of spies and intelligence activities and theof inspection sites before lhe inspection took place.umber of techniques including signals intelligence collection from fixed sites and mobile platforms, ihe bugging of hotel rooms, and eavesdropping on inspector conversations. The IIS also intercepted inspectors' phone rails. As notedid not carry out these activities2
UNMOVIC inspections2he IIS was determined noi io allow inspection teams to gather intelligence as the Iraqis perceived had been done in the past. Members of the US Directorate of Counterintelligence (MS)increased their physical observation of UN personnel during site visits, having as many as five minders per inspector. The IIS also attempted to be extremely cautious in monitoring UNMOVIC inspections in order to avoid international incidents or being caught hindering inspection activities.
Security Services (continued)
Special Security Organization (SSO) The SSO was primarily responsible for the security of the President and other key members of the Regime, security of Presidential palaces and facilities, and ensuring theof key milium units, principally the RG and SRG. SSO personnel also played an important cocedinating nde between Husayn Kamd Hasan Al Majid ami the SRG elements that engaged in concealment of weapons, documenis. and materials in then SSO element also coordinated flight planning fur UNSCOM and UNMOS'K aviation elements and pro* used warning of UN flight activities lo the Iraqi Government The SSO reportedly worked with the IIS toatabase of inspectors.
SSO minders also actompamed inspection teams involved in inspections of "sensitive sites? which included RG. SRG. ami security service sues. Their role, ostensibly, was to facilitate quick access to
the facilities and prevent controversy.2 andSO minders accompanied many inspection teams because of the requirement laid down by UNSCRo provide immediate access to all facilities, including presidential sites. They also served to warn Saddamecuritylhal inspectors were approaching presidential locations.
Qusay also ordered SSO personnel lo bide any orders from Saddam when UN teams came to inspect SSO sites, according to two high-level SSO officers. They were also to hide any contingency war plans, anything dealing withamily, SSO personnel rosters, or financial data which could haveisk to Iraq national security. Officers would keep materials in their homes and return it once inspectors left.
SSO recmiled sources on inspection teams to uncover information on planned inspection visits, accordingorrnci SSO sccurily officer When ihe SSO officer assignedn UNSCOMteam learned which site was due for inspection, he notified lhe largel sile via walkie-talkieredetermined code system. The SSO officer on-siichad authority lo use whatever means wasio keep the team trom entering the site before it was fully sanitized.
Concealmeni failures ultimately compounded issues raised by UNSCOM. The most notorious failure wasiscovery in8 discovery of Ihe "Aircumenr which called inio question Iraq's declaration of destroyed chemical munitions. Inspectors found the document despite extensive Iraqi efforts id sanitize the site prior to inspector arrival. The discovery resulted in adecreeommittee io purge such documents fiom MIC facilities to prevent other such occurrences.
Iraq's Internal Monitoring Apparatus: The NMD and MIC Programs
fter ihe Air lorce Document incident. Saddam personally ordered lhe establishmentocument Committee under the purview of the NMD to purge all MIC csiahlishments of records of past-prohibited programs io prevrm their discovery.
The NMD oversaw the destruction ol redundant copies of declared documents, as well as continued the concealment ol documenis of nasi programs that would cause additional problems wiih the UN. Financial documents ihnl were deemed toolo destroy bul too controversial to declare were placedockbox in the carepecial agent of the Iraqi Intelligence Service.
According io NMD Director Husam Muhammad Amin, the NMD continued in iu role of enforc-ing UNSC resolutions, devpiie ils subordination to MIC and ihe departure of UNSCOM inspectors onx example, the NMD carried out the destruction of missile productionsuch as die XMi-gallon mixer, thai MIC had reconstructed against Sccurily Council resolutions
VX Warheadhe Iraqi Air Force Document Story
events inurning point in UNSCOMllraq relations: The detection ofVX-related compounds on ballistic missile warhead fragments and the discoveryocument describing the use of special weapons by the Iraqi Air Force. Both events convinced inspectors that their assessment ofIraqi concealment was correct. Conversely, the discoveries convinced Iraqi authorities of the futility of continued cooperation.
"You overlook many truths from aAlSa 'adi in reference to anabic proverb
In order to verify Iraqi declarations and special weapons accounting, wipe samples of ballistic mb-sde warhead remnants were taken by an UNSCOM sampling mission inhese samples were analyzed by laboratories designated by the Special Commission, which detected the presence ofproducts of nerve agents, in particular VX,umber of warhead remnants, tn addition lo theseX stabilizer and Us degradationwere identified in some of theecond round of sample testing was conducted by the United States inonfirming the previous findings. However, subsequent analysis performed by French and Swiss labs was been inconclusive.
InS, in multiple statements, including from Iraq's Foreign Minister and Permanentto the UN, Iraq categorically denied die outcome of the testing and argued that the results could not have been accurate since VX was not used in any kind of munitions in Iraq due to continuous production failure. According to the farmer the Minister ofIndustrialization, the Iraqi leadership viewed this episode as one more example of collusion between the US and UNSCOM to discredit Iraqi compliance efforts and lengthen sanctions.
UNSCOMeport to the Security Council, which stated thai the existence ofVX degradation products conflicted wiih Iraq's declarations that the unilaterally destroyed special warheads had never been filled with any CW agents.
In response. Iraq claimed that the contamination of the warhead fragments had been ihe resulteliberate act of tampering mth samples taken to the Untied States. In public statements following an8 announcement of Iraq's suspension of cooperation with UNSCOM. Tariq 'Aziz denied Iraq had any weapons of mats destruction and accused UNSCOM of catering to hostile American policy by-prolonging the inspection process. Said 'Aziz, "the manner in which the inspection learns have acted recently is neither honest nor fast. This policy serves the Unitedavehe impression that UNSCOM is backts old games andl Sa'adi saw the VX issue as the critical catalyst in feeding Iraqi distrust of UNSCOM and convincing Iraqi officials thai no matter wliat they did, il would never be enough to achieve sanctions relief. He summed up the matter by stating, "We tostfaiih wiih UNSCOM after VX; we determined ihey were after us by hook or crookV
Onnother incident created abetween UNSCOM and Iraqi officials. During an inspection of die operations room at Iraqi Air Force Headquarters, an UNSCOM teamocument containing information about the consumption of special Ichemical) munitions during the Iran-Iraq War.
According to Husam Muhammad Amin, formerof ihe National Monitoring Directorate, "Il was laziness on behalf of ihe Brigadier that ihe document was found. The Brigadier hud more than one luiur to hide the document while the inspectors waited at the entrance of ihe Air Force command. The Brigadier Has sent to court and his Judgment was imprisonment0 years in jail"
The inspection team felt iluu ihis document could be helpful in Iheir efforts to verify ihc material balance Of Iraq's Chemical munitions. Rather than takeof ihe document, ihe chief inspector on the teamopy. Initially Iraqi officials On the scene agreed; then reneged, saying inspectors could only take notes on the document oredacted
VX Warheadhe Iraqi Air Force Document Story (continued)
copy. The chief inspector objected lo lliese restrictions after which Iraqi officials seized the document from ihe chief inspector's hands and refused UNSCOM any further access lo ihe papers. According to Amin, Iraq considered any documentation or discussions detailing the use of chemical weapons toed-line issue. Iraq did not want lo declare anything that documented use of chemical weapons for fear ihe documentation could be used against Iraq in lawsuits. Iraqi Regime leadership was concerned Iran would seek legal reparation* for ihe death and suffering of Iranian citizens due lo Iraq's use tf CW in.
8raq was unwilling tor the Air Force document. According lo Tariq
'Aziz, "In most cases Saddam listened and agreed
with meould lell him lltat we must be forthcoming with iheowever, 'Aziz added,
"The Higher Committee did noi want to release lhe document to the UN because the delivery times uiul methods contained in lhe document were thought to behen pressed further on why the Iraqis
were so adamant about maintaining the Air Force document 'Aziz paused, then slated. "We did not have to hand over the document because itatter of our national security."
his role prompted MIC lo undertake an iniemal deception campaign to withhold informa-lion regarding the procurement of dual-use material from ihe NMD. which was viewed as an obstacle io MIC progress.
MIC employees9 had lo sign anstaring thai they would not import restricted materials or withhold documents, accordingormer senior Iraqi officer who worked in MIC. The Minister of Military Industrialization claimed that although heesearch that would violate UN sanctions, some scientists conducted research in secret. Ihc deputy of NMD requested scientists to turn in documents thai mighi be stored in their homeccordingensitive
Suspending Cooperation With UNSCOM
The tension that had built between Iraq and UNSCOM7 began to ease8 with UN Secretary (ieneral Kofi Amman's visit inand the subsequent draftemorandum of Understanding that restricted the criteria for presidential siteonth later, the UNSC decided io review the status of sanctions every sixty
days, giving the former Regime hope thai the end of sanctions was nearing. These two concessions to Iraq Calmed the situation and gave the appearance that things *ere moving forward. Over lhe summerowever, pressure on Iraq began lo build again as the VX findingsune, and the Air Force document was discovered in July. Tariq 'Alia,arefully scripted eart) August perlarmancc. demanded that UNSCOM Ficcutive ChairmanButler report to the Sccurily Council lhal Iraq had met ils disarmament obligation, hut Butler refused to do so.
UNSCOM and the IA FA failed to close any ol the outstanding WMD case files during ihc summer ofhigh Iraqi hopes io the conirary. Saddam's profound sensitivity over palace inspections and growing Iraqi bitterness about prolongedwiih the UN without getting anything in return also complicated Iraqi-UN relations, 'these eventsbreakdowns in the process thai probably would have occurred whether or not Itaq retained WMD.
Saddam. Tariq 'Aziz, and other senior.*
officials realized b*hat Iraq would not ^ST be able to satisfy UNSCOM and the UN Security Council and have sanction* bfted. This led Saddam to suspend cooperation with I'SSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)ugust and to halt all UNSCOM activities in Iraq,
including monitoring, onctober. liven (hough Saddam revoked (his decision onovember (under ihe ihreal of tin American airt had so poisoned the atmospheie with UNSCOM that the relationship could not be repaired. UNSCOMreturned in November andutetter to (he UN Secretary General onecember. UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler noted thai "'Iraq's conduct ensured thai no progress was able to be made in either ihe held* of disarmament ox accounting for its prohibited weapons programmesIraqi behavior, the VX detection, the Air Forceand other indications all conspired to eliminate any UN acceptance of imperfectater lhat day UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors withdrew from Iraq; in ihe early morning hours ofecember the Coalitionour-day bombing campaign against Iraq designated Desert Im. Onecember. Baghdad declared that UNSCOM would never be allowed to return to Iraq.
The suspension of cooperation with UNusherederiod of mixed fortunes for the Regime. This transitional phase was characterized by economic growth on the one hand, which emboldened and accelerated illicit procurement and programs. On the other hand Saddam's increasing physical leclusiveness and the nature of the revenue streams weakened the routine functioning of the Regime and its governance suuetures.
Ai the conclusion of Desert Fox onice President Ramadan announced the end of Iraq's cooperation with UNSCOMress conference in Baghdad. Hehe issue of UNSCOM is behind us now. The commission of spies is behind us now. Ii no longerll thai has lo do wiih inspection, monitoring, and weapon* of mass destruction is now behindhe Security Council, however, created ihree panels tm9 under the direction of Brazilian Ambassador. Amorim to re-stan the process olThe panel on Disarmament and Current and Fulurc Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Issues reported its results on9 andto ihe Security Council lhal iiew monitoring and verification apparatus, within the existing framework of UNSC resolutions, to replace UNSCOM and tackle remaining Iraqi disarmament issues. Iraq's agreement to inspections, however, was still neededuccessful effort. Thefrom the panels formed the basis ofatified ons first priority was the establishment of the UN Monitoring. Verification and Inspection(UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM. The Security Council in0 appointed Hans Blix as UNMOVIC's Executive Chairman.Iraq's cooperation with UNMOVIC so inspectors could return, howevei, look nearly three more years.4 also included language at Russia's insistence that obligated the Security Council tolifting economic sanctions.4 also provided the background to Iraq's failure lo accept renewed inspections0 to
Despite the end of the former Regime'swith UNSCOM, the OFF program continued without interruption. The Security Council not only renewed the original OFF mandate under, but raised the revenue ceiling for Iraqi oil exports in October 1W9 withbewas then eliminated withlthough the resolution reaffirmed sanctions) While the former Regime managed to collect significant hard currency revenues by illicitly exploiting llie OFF contracting process, Saddam chafed under OFT controls, even as benefits to the Iraqi people increased and the Security Council raised oil production ceilings. Onpeech commemoratingof the Ba'thisi revolution in Iraq. Saddam staled. "Arab oil must be for the Arabs. It has become clear now that the oil is lor. The United States determines the amounts and prices of oil, with
the help of its fleets and ihe <xcupation forces
in the Arabian Gulf countries (and is) now dictating to others what they should kII or manufacture, the goods and commodrtics they purchase, how much and how many.ituation makes economic progress an unattainable wish in our greater Arab homeland."
The former Regime attempted to use Iraq's oil resources to leverage thr world community, and9ith varying
or suspended oil production in an attempt to influence decision-making in the Sccunty Council. Iraq controlled the contracting process for both selling its oil and arranging purchases ofgoods and it took advantage ot lax UNTo try to gamer diplomatic support in the UN. the former Regime ensured thai Chinese. French and Russian energy firms, as well as others representing states sympathetic to Iraq, were prominent recipients ofoilconiracts. Iraq also nunipulaled oil contracts by imposing an illegal "surcharge" on every barrel sold. Furthermore. Iraq's neighbors Syria and Turkey negotiated formal, but technic all) illegal tradewhich allowed Iraqrovide oil at discounted prices for hard currency or items it could not obtain through OFF. Trade with Syria flourished, providing Iraq with the largest share of its illegal hard currency revenuesSee Syrian Trade Protocol, under the Regime Finance and Procure ment chapter for additional information.)
Saddam invested hit growing reserves of Hardin rebuilding hit military-industrial complex, increasing its access ta dual-use items andand creating numerous military research and development projects. He also emphasized restoring Uk viability ot (he IAKC and Iraq's former nuclear scientists. The departure of UN inspectors and Iraq's refusal lo allow their rc(urn permitted MIC topreviously restricted dual-use materials and equipment lhat it needed lor both weaponsand civilian applications. In addition. MIC had greater flexibility in adapting civilian technology to military use. Yet without impcciors io cemfy Iraq's ultimate compliance wrth UNSC resolutions, tbe UN could perpetuate sanctions indefinitely. The actions of Minister of Military Industrialization 'Ahd-al-Tawab Al Mullah Huwaysh reflected this situation: he said he gave explicit directions to MIC leadership and workforce to avoid any activities lhat wouldlifting UN sanctions. Hut. according io reports from hise disregarded UN restrictions: acting, as if Saddam had instructed him to do so and justifying his actions by idling his employees that no mailer how much evidence Iraq provided it would never satisfy the UN. For example,0 the repair ofgallon mixers, and two solid propellanl casting chambers2
rendered inoperable by UNSCOM inspectors, lor possible use in building solid propellanl missiles Ihai exceeded (he ISO km range restriction lixed by.
While international sympathy for Ihe plight of ihc Iraqi people increased and support for sanctionseroded. Saddam was unable lo capitalize on these shifting moods to strengthen his bargaining position with (he UN Isolated internally by hisover personal security, and externally by hit V. "to misreading of international events. Saddam missedajor opportunity to reduce tension* with the L'niled States following the IIttacks. By failing to condemn lhe attacks and express sympathy lo lhe American people. Saddam reinforced US suspicions about hn connections to Al Qa'ida and certified Iraq's credentialsogue suic He told his ministers that after all (he hardships the Iraqi people had suffered under sanctions he could noi extend official condolences io the Uniled Slates, the governmenl most responsible lor blocking sancnons relief.ractical standpoint. Saddam probably also- thai his behavior loward the United Stales was of lillle consequence, aswere on (he verge of collapse.
Nullifying All Obligations To UNSC Resolutions
Saddam, angered by sanctions,nd the Desert Fox attacks, unilaterally abrogated Iraq's compliance with all1 Gulf wara secret RCC resolution, according to both presidential secretary 'Abd Hamid Mahmud and IHwanmad Husayn Khudayr. Tension within (he former Regime over the inspections process had been buildingut Saddam did not formalize his decision lo cut Iraq free from UN-imposed limitationshe RCC resolution was unique because of ils confidential nature, according io Ahmad Husayn. The RCC never repealed the resolution nor publishedr secret RCC resolution most tiketya personal and impetuous swipe by Saddam at those he saw at hisattempt by Saddam toegal foundation for future action, as well at preserve hi* standing in Iraqi history.
According lo 'Abd Humid Mahmud. on ihc second day of Desert Fox, SaddamJ he cease-lire principle is over; lhc US broke iIk international law andounlry. whichember in iheeesolution which called for the RCC "lo cancel all the international obligations and resolutions, which Irao, has agreedAbd said that Saddam blamed the Untied Stales for attacking "Iraq without the IN permission, and IpulUng) the inspectors out ofesult.ad] ihe nght to cancel all these resolutions to get rid of the sanction which was imposed lor more than seven years."
The RCC resolution formally ended all Iraqito abide by UN resolutions. Ahmad Husayn Khudayr recalled that Saddam's text ordered Iraq to reject every Security Council decision taken since1 (iulf war. including. Ahmad said the resolution was worded in careful legal terms and "denied all the previously accepted (resolutions) without any remaining trace of them Im the Iraqi
Saddam stressed to all those present in (be office that bis decision was secret and not to disclose it until the decision was publicly announced,to 'And this admonition was also passed to RCC members.
later lhat evening. Saddam addressed the RCC; Tariq 'Aziz. Taha Yasin Ramadan, and Taha Muhyi-al-Din Ma'ruf were among those present. Saddam asked the group's opinion of his draft resolution. 'Abd remembered. "Tariq 'Ariz slancd talking, because he has an experience in internationalpolitics and was following the UN resolutions1ndeader of thelhat worked with the WMD inspectors in Iraq. He supported the resolution along with Ramadan and Taha Muhyi-al-Din Ma'ruf."
Saddam signed three copies of the RCC-approved resolution. One was passed to 'Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri,nl lo Ahmad Husayn Khudayr, and the last was held by 'Abd. According to both 'Abd and Ahmad the resolution was kept secret for the remainder of the Regime. 'Abd noted, however, that Saddam said, "Oneill declare thisThe secret ruilurc of the RCC resolution meant that it did noi see widespreadin ongoing administrative processes, notably NMD operations.
He do not know what measuret were laken by ike former Regime after Ibe secret resolution was approved,umber of events mat be linked
lo it The former Regime made public staiernetits and undertook potential WMD-rcbicd activities tbat would seem tn follow from ihe8 RCC resolution (for more information, see examples9 in the "Preserving and Restoring WMD Assets and Expertise" sub-sectionAbd and Ahmad, however, claim lhat ihey know of no specific responses by the former Regime to the resolution. 'Abd staled that no action was taken because the secretlis apparentnot distributed and remained limited to the three original copies.
Yasin Ramadan, also present for the secret RCC decision,ress conference shortly after the end of the Desert Fox campaign and repeatedly termed Iraq's compliance with UN requirements
as something in the past: "The same applies to the blockade, which has lasted loo long and which is now behinde declared. "There are no terms [to end thec don't accept anyEverything in the past is behind usI am not talking about the detailsm saying is that all that has to do with inspections,and weapons of mass destruction is now behindN inspectors were denied access to Iraq untilhen the threat of wai caused Saddam to relent.
to explain Saddam's motives behind the secret resolution. Ahmad Husayn Khudayr offered thai Saddam might have been attempting to saveby publicly accepting UN mandates but rejecting them in private. By doing this he could then reveal the resolution in the future and claim that he had never really slopped fighling. However. Ahmad's reasoning is debatable; Saddam passed Ihe secret order in Ihc midst of ana more resolute frame oflhan immediately prior to an act of forced compliance.
Preserving and Restoring WMI) Infrastructure and Expertise
There is an extensive, fit fragmentary andbody af evidence suggesting lhat Saddamtrategy toapabiUty to return to WMD after sanctions were lifted by preserv ing assets and expertise. In addition to preserved capability, we have cleat evidence of his intent to resume WMD as soon as sanctions were lilted. The infrequent and uninformed questions ascribed to him by former senior Iraqis mayack of deep background knowledge and suggest that he had not been following the efforu closely. Alternatively. Saddam may not have fully trusted those wnh whom he was discussing these programs. Both factors were probably at play. All sources, however, suggest that Saddam encouraged comrsinmcnuli/ation and would have discussed something as sensitive as WMD with as few people as possible.
, the overall MIC budget increased over forty-lold from5 billion loillion.? it hud grown torillion. MIC's hard currency allocutions2 amounted io4 million. MIC sponsorship of technical research projects al Iraqi universitiesfrom aboulrojects7
IC workforce expanded by fifty percent in ihree years,employees0'
Accordingud-lcvel IIS official, the IIStargeted scientists Irom Russia. Belarus. Poland. Bulgaria. Yugoslavia, China, and several other countries to acquire new military and defense-related technologies for Iraq. Payments were made in US dollars. The Iraqi Cmiemmeni also recruited foreign scientists to work in Iraq as freelance consultants. Presumably these scientists, plus iheir Iraqi colleagues, provided ihc resldeni "know how" to reconstitute WMD within two years oncewere over, as one former high-ranking Iraqi official said was possible.
met with his senior nuclear scientists9 and offered to provide them wiih whatever ihey needed, and increased funding began lo flow iollccording to the formerof Militaryat ion. Saddamarge budget increase for IAEC and increased salaries tenfolde also directed the head of the IAEC lo keep nuclear scientists together. Instituted new laws and regulations to increase privileges forcientists and Invested in numerous new projects. He also convened frequent meetings wiui the IAEC lo highlight new achievements.
asked9 how long it would lake toroduction line tor CW agents, according to lhe former Minister of Military Industrialization. Huwaysh investigated and responded that experts could readilyroduction line for mustard. which could be produced wuhinnsonths. VX and Satin production was more complicated and would take longer. Huwaysh relayed ihis answer lo Saddam, who never requested follow-upAn Iraqi CW expert separately estimated Iraq would requireew days to start producingit was prepared to sacrifice lheequipment.
Imad Husayn 'Ali Al 'Ani, closely tied to Iraq's VX program, alleged lhat Saddam had been looking for chemical weapons scientists0 ioecond location, according io reporting.
stated that1 Saddam approached hiministers' meeting and asked. "Do you have any programs going onon't knowmply ing chemical or biologicalprograms. Huwaysh answered no. absolutely not. He assumed that Saddam was testing him. so Huwaysh added lhal hceauvc ihcsc programs were prohibited hy the UN, he could noi pursue ihem unless Saddam ordered it. Huwaysh said Saddam seemed satisfied, asked no further questions, and directed no follow-up actions, 'lhe incident was perplexing io Huwaysh, because he wondered why Saddam would ask him this question. While he had no evidence of WMD progiums ouistde MIC. Huwaysh speculated lhat Ousay hail the ability within the SSO lo compartmentalize projects and select individuals to do special work.
Saddam stated to his ministers that he did not consider ballistic missiles to be WMD, according to Huwaysh. Saddam had never accepted missile range restrictions and assessed that if he could convince the UN inspectors he was in compliance regarding nuclear, chemical and biological weapons then he could negotiate with the UNSC over missile ranges.
Saddam stated publicly in1 lhal "we arc not at all seeking to build up weapons or look for ihe most harmfulowever, we will never hesitate to possess ihe weapons to defend Iran, and the Arab nation".
Purported design work done0 on ballistic and land attack cruise missiles with0 km suggests interest in long-range delivery systems.
raq began serial production of the Al Samudhort-range ballistic missile thatUN rangefirings hadexceeded UN prescribed diameterofm. Iraq's production ofl Samud lis, even under sanctions conditions, illustrates that Iraq sought moteandful ot ballisticbut was deterred by the existing trade
Saddam directed design and produclionm range missile inccording lo Huwaysh. Saddam wanted the missile withinear. Huwaysh mformed him, later that year, that Dr. Muzhir Sadiq Saba' Al Tamimi's twin Volga engine, liquid-propellant design would reachm and would lake three to five years toSaddam seemed profoundly disappointed, left the room wiuiout comment, and never raised the subjeel again.
Other reports suggesi workallistic missile designed to exceed UN restrictions beganigh-level missile official of Al Karamahh Slate Company said that7 Iluwaysh requested him toolgair defense missileurface-to-surface missile. When lhc official briefed Huwaysh on the results, however, he said
Huwaysh ioM him to slop work immediately and destroy all documentary evidence of the tests. Innother missile official said Iluwaysh ordered 'Abd-al-Baqi Rashid Shi'a, generalat ihe Al Rashid State Company toolid-propellani missile capableangem. The missile official speculated Huwaysh's order came dirccily fromenior level official at Al Karamahh, alleged that0 Huwaysh ordered two computer designs be done to extend the range of the al Samud, onem and the other0 km, which werehim inuwaysh disputes all these accounts,
* As lateraq's leadership discussed no WMD aspirations other than advancing the coun-iry's overall scientific and engineering expertise, which potentially included dual-use research and development, according to the former Minister of Military Industrialization. He recalled noamong Regime members about bow toWMD expertise per se, but he observed there were clear efforts to maintain knowledge and skills in ihe nuclear field.
p Key Revenue Streams
Baghdad made little overall progress in lifting sane-lions between8 andespite Russia's pressure to include language in4 that provided for the end of sanctions. The former Regime, however, was able to increase revenue substantially from several legitimate, and illicit sources. Iraq started to receive ihe revenues of OFF inevenues from this program increased2 billion7eak7 billion0 (sec the Regime Finance and Procurement chapier).
According to his former science advisor. 'Amir Hamudi Hasan AI Sa'adi, Saddam, byad concluded thai sanctions had eroded to the point that it was inevitable they would be dropped.
The Regime also sought diplomatic suppon for the lifting or easing sanctions by tying other countries' interests to Iraq's through allocating contracts under the OFF program and entering Into lucrative construction projects to be executed when sanctions were lifted. In addition, Iraq held conferences to recruit and cultivate "agents ol influence" to build pressure for lilting sanctions.
Iraqillion agreement for Ruv si an exploration of several oil tie kityear period. Follow-on contracts called foripeline running from southern toIraq. Performance would start upon the lifting of sanctions. Under OFF,ercent ot the Iraqi contracts went to Russia. The Iraqis gavetreatment to Russian companies mainly to try to gain Russia's suppon on the UN Securiiy Council. 'Ihc Russians. French, Ukrainians, and othersin reducing the amount of OFF money Iraq paid lo the UN Compensation Committee (for Gulf war reparations) fromoercent thus adding significantly to Iraq's income stream.
The Regimeavorable relationship with France because France was influential as amember of the UN Security Council and wasood position to helph liningriots.
Iraq awarded short term contracts under OFF to companies around the world. As ofrench companies had contracts
'Aziz personally awarded several individuals substantial oil allotments. All panics understood that resale of the oil was to be reciprocated through efforts to lift UN sanctions, or through opposition to American initiatives within Ihe Security Council.
The Miscalculation phase was markederies of poor strategic decisions that left Saddam isolated
and exposed internationally. 'Ihis period wasby the ill-considered reaction of lhc Rcgimc-diiven personally1 terrorist attack. This refusal to publicly condemn theaction led lo further international isolation and opprobrium. This was the first of several nuscakula-tions that inexorably led to Operation Iraqi Freedom
Following President George W. Bush's State of Ibe Union speech onenior members of the Iraqi tiovemment weic nervous about both Iraq'she "Axis ofnd the promise that "the United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most desiiuctiveome ministers recognized that the United States intended to lake direct unilateral action, if it perceived thai its national security was endangered, and argued lhat the best course of action was to "step forward andalk with thelso concerned with the assertiononnection between Iraq andhey felt they must "clarify" to thethat "wc arc not with theaddam's attitude, however, toward rapprochement wiih the UN was well known and remained unchanged, lie had posed io his ministers on numerous occasions the following rhetorical question' "We Cananctions with inspectors or sanctions without inspectors, which do youhe implied answer was "'we're going to have sanctions one way or Ihe otherong time because of the hostile attitude of Ihe United Stales and Great Britain,"
Iraqi statements on renewing cooperation with the UN varied, perhapslash between the private views of some oflicialv and Saddam's policy. Vice President Ramadan on HI2 told journalists at the opening of the Syrian Products Exhi-Ntion in Baghdad that Iraq was ready loialogue with the UN Secretary General for "return of international inspectors to Iraq without anyFour days later Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri "ruled out that Iraq would send any signals to Ihe UN regarding its readiness to agree on the return of international inspectors."
Dialogue, however, did begin between Iraq and the UN. Senior-level talks occurred in March and2 at UN Headquarters in New York among Secretary-General Kofi Annan. UNMOVIC
live Chairman Hans Blix. IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei and an Iraqi delegation headed by Naji Sabri. The results of these meetings were mixed, although both Naji Sabri and Annan agreed that the talks hadositive andexchange of views on the Iraq-UN relationship. Inaji Sabri and Annan met again for talks in Vienna, and Naji Sabri noted that it wouldhile to reach agreement on issues where there had2 years of lack of contact"ears ofespite the positive tone of thesevery little substantive progress was made: Iraq still refused to accept4 or to allow UN weapons inspectors to return.esult,1 imposed sanctions more harsh than those of
President Bush's speech to the UN Generalonmphasizing the threat Iraq's WMD posed to global peace and security, unsealed Saddam and the former Regime'sMosl ihilling la them was the promise that "the purposes of the United Stales should not be ^nj doubted- The Security Council resolutions will bejust demands of peace and sccurily will beaction will be uiusyouiable" Accord-ing to 'Abd-al-Tawab 'Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh. Saddam was "very Miff when be discussed this situation with his ministers some dure weeks later, and was obviously still "feeling the pressure."there was an even greater fear among the Regime's ministers that tbe United States unilaterally would attack Iraq, than when Bush made his "Axis of Evil" speech inaddam told them. "What can Ihey discover, when we haveut some of the ministers were not as sure. Huwaysh said he began to wonder whether Saddam had hidden something:ot, bul wondered why Bush believed lhat we had thesee said Huwaysh could not understand why the Uniled States would challenge Iraq in such surl and threatening terms, unless it had inefutaMe udormattori.
The Security Council's unanimous decision2 lo adopthich found Iraq in "material breach of all ils obligations under relevantlearly demonstrated the seriousness ot the internationalequired that Iraq "provide UNMOVIC
and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wished to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA chose to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC's or the IAEA's choke pursuant lo any aspect of iheirNMOVIC and IAEA were instructed "to resume inspections no later thanays following adoption of ihis resolution and to update lhe Councilays thereafter."
Having held out for so long. Saddam initially did not accept much of what1 required. Although Russia and France were putting pressure on Iraq, Saddam fell the risk of war and evenwarranted re-acceptance of inspections.to Vice President Ramadan, Saddam eventually permitted UNMOVIC greater latitude than he had initially intended. Military leaders were instructedeeting in2 to "cooperate completely" wiih the inspectors, believing full cooperation was Iraq's best hope for sanctions relief in the face of US provocation. Accordingormer NMD official, one of ihc Regime's main concerns prior to UNMOVIC inspections was interviews of scientists. When asked why ihc former Regime was so worried if there was nothing lo hide, the source staled that any suchwith foreigners was seenhreat to the sccurily of ihe Regime.
Iraq's cooperation with UN inspectors was typically uneven, and ultimately the Coalition considered the Regime's efforts to be too little, too late. Byaddam believed military action wasHe also fell lhal Iraqi forces were prepared io hold off the invaders for atonth, even without WMD. and thai they would not penetrate as far as Baghdad. He failed to consult advisors who believed otherwise, and his inner circle reinforced his rtlisperceptioris. Consequently, when Operation Iraqi Freedom began, ihe Iraqi armed forces had nomilitary response. Saddam was surprised by the swiftness of Iraq's defeat. The quick end to Saddam's Regimeimilarly rapid end lo its pursuit of sanctionsoal it had been palpably close to achieving.
Renewing IN Inspections
Iraq allowed the UFA and UNMOVIC to resume inspections in2 in the lace of growing international pressure while apparentlyurge of cooperation might bring sanctions to an end.
as during the period of the UNSCOM inspections, the Higher Committeehis time headed by Vice-President Ramadan, in order to prepare tor ihe UNMOVIC missions. According to Tang, 'Aziz. Saddam believed that the goal of these inspections was to deprive Iraq of any scientific, chemical or advanced technology. Saddam said. "These people area gameame with them."
Saddam assembled senior officials in2 and directed them io cooperate completely with inspectors, accordingormer senior officer. Saddam stated that the UN wouldeport onnd lhat this report would indicate that Iraq was cooperating fully. He stated thai all Iraqi organizations should open themselves entirely to UNMOVIC inspectors. The Republican Ouard should make all records and even battle plans available to inspectors, if they requested. The Guard was to be prepared to have an "open house" day or night tor the UNMOVIC inspectors. Husam Amin met with military leaders again on3 and conveyed the same directives. During this timeframe Russia and France were also encouraging Saddam to accept UNand to allow inspections without hindering them.
The Higher Committee gradually addressed UN concerns as Ramadan related Baghdad's original opposition to the UNlights and conducting private, unmonitorcd interviews with Iraqi scicniist* These actions eliminated major stumbling blocks in potential Iraqih UNMOVIC.
Saddam hoped io get sanctions lifted in return loret of UN inspections that found noof WMD. according to statements ascribed to himormer senior ollicei. Thedirected key military units to conduct special inspections to ensure ihey possessed no WMD-assoc iatcdme nt.
Upon the direction of UNMOVIC. Baghdad slancd destroying its al Samud II ballistic3 despite disagreements over the actualrange ol the missile.
Beginning onovembermil United Nations withdrew all its personnel onNMOVICnspectionsues, including XX sites itsiied for the first time.
The NMD published the Currently Accurate. Full, and Complete Declarationnd it attempted to resolve the pending issues of the UN's Unresolved Disarmament Issues. Iraq's Proscribed Weapons Programmes until theof the war.
Iraqi military industries several times requiredto sign statements ac know (edging theon conducting WMD research.inimum, the forms would have provided documents to offer lhc UN. bul they may also have stopped "freeand thereby ensured that any WMD research underway was tightly controlled to avoid inadvertent disclosures.
MIC on3 ordered the generalof its companies to relinquish all WMD to the NMD and threatened severe penalties against those who failed to comply, according to documentary' evidence.
The NMD director met with Republican Guard military leaders on3 and advised them they were to sign documents saying thai there was no WMD in their units, accordingormer Iraqi senior officer. Husam Amm told them that the government would hold them responsible if UNMOVIC found any WMD in their units or areas, or if there was anything thai cast doubt on Iraq's cooperation with UNMOVIC. Commanderscommittees lo ensure iheir units retained no evidence of old WMD.
Iraq's National Assemblyaw banningeasure thai had been required under paragraphf ihc Ongoing Monitoring and
lion Plan approved under UNSCRnd one Iraq had refusedass despite UN requestsnaddamresidential directive prohibiting private sector companies and individuals from importing or producing biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons or material, according to documentary evidence. The directive did notgovernment organizations.
Iraq's Other Security Concerns
Iraq engaged in dental and deception activities to safeguard national security and Saddam's position in ihc Regime. These surveUlance activities and the suspect vehicle movements in and around sensitive sites made it difficult for Western intelligence services to distinguish innoculous security-related measures from WMD concealment activities which added to lhe suspicion of Iraqi actions.
Accc*dingormer senior SSO officer, prior to any UN inspection visits, the SSO leadership would mstruct the chiefs of each SSO directorate toanything to do wiUi the President or his family, any documents referring to the Scientificdocumenis pertaining to human rightsdocuments pertaining to prisoners in custody, and photos of senior Regime personnel.
The IIS was deteirnined not io allow UN inspection teams io gather intelligence at sensitive sites, which lhe Iraqis feared had been done in the past.of the Directoraie of Counterintelligenceeighieived their physical observation of UNduring site visits to prevent this, according to sensitive reportingource wiih excellent access.
Huwaysh instructed MIC general directors lo conceal sensitive material and documenis from UN inspectors. Ihis was done to preventfrom discovering numerous purchases of illicit conventional weapons and military equipmeni from firms in Russia, Belarus, and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.
Saddam was convinced that ihe UN inspectors could pinpoint his exact location, allowing US warplanes lo bomb him, accordingoirner
high-level Iraqi Governmenl official.esult, in8 when inspectorsa'th Party Headquarters. Saddam issued orders not to give them access. Saddam did this to prevent thefrom knowing his whereabouts, not because he had something io hide, according to die source.
In order to preserve his dignity and security, Saddam wanted io ensure lhal he had absolutely nowith UNMOVIC inspectors. SSO "minders'* used radios to alert Saddam's security personnel of UNMOVIC's actions so he could avoid contact with inspectors. Accordingormer senior Iraqi official, on one occasion when inspectors arrived at asite. Saddam left through the back gate.
Sorting Out Whether Iraq Had WMD Before Operation Iraqi Freedom
ISG has not found evidence that Saddam Husayn possessed WMD stocksut the available evidence from itsdetainee interviews and documentopen the possibility that some weapons existed in Iraq although notilitarily significant capability. Several senior officers asserted that if Saddam had WMD available when3 war began, he would have used ihem to avoid being overrun by Coalition forces.
'Amir Hamudi Hasan Al Sa'adi told an emissary from the RG leadership, onhat if Saddam had WMD. he would use it, accordingormer officer with direct knowledge of Iraqiground operations and planning.
Accordingormer senior RG official, Iraq had dismantled or destroyed all of ils WMD assets and manufacturing facilities. Had Saddam possessed WMD assets, he would have used Ihem io counier lhe Coalition invasion.
If he had CW. Saddam would have used il against Coalition Forces lo save the Regime, accordingormer senior official.
Iraqi military planning did not incorporate ihceven the threat ofWMDccording to 'Ali Hasan Al Majid. WMD was
never pun of (he military plan crafted to defeatoalition invasion.
military officers and former Regimeere uncertain about the existence of WMD during the sanctions period and the lead up to Opera-Hon Iraqi freedom because Saddam sent mixed messages. Early on. Saddam soughtoster the impression with his generals that Iraq couldoalition ground attack using WMD. Then,encs ol meetings inaddam appears to have reversed course and advised various groups ot sensor officers and officials that Iraq in fact did not have WMD. His admissions persuaded (op cornmanders lhat they really would have to tight the United States without recourse lo WMD. Inaddam created further confusion when he implied to his ministers and senior officers that he had some kind of secret weapon.
Prior toaddam told his generals lo concentrate on their jobs and leave the rest to him, because he had "something in his hand". "somcihmg up hisccording io Minister ol Military Indusirializaiion 'Abd-al-TawabAl Mullah Huwaysh.
Saddam surprised his generals when he informed Ihem he had no WMD inecause his boasting had led many io believe Iraq had some hidden capability, according to Tonq "Aziz. Saddam had never suggested io them that Iraq lacked WMD. Military morale drooped rapidly when he told senior officers they would have to fight the United Slates without WMD.
Saddam spoke al several meetings, including those of the joint RCC-Ba'th National Command and ihc ministerial council, and with military commanders inxplicitly io notify ihem Iraq had no WMD, according io the former presidentialllcdn Miliar oMniaU to corroborate what he was saying.
In Saddam's lasl ministers* meeting, convened in late3 just before ihc war began, he told ihc attendees at least three limes, "rcsisl one week
and afterill lakehey took ihis io mean he had some kind of secret weapon. There are indications thai what Saddam actually had in mind was some form of insurgency against the coalition.
Just before the war began. Saddam reiterated the same message to his generals. According to Huwaysh. Saddam told them "io hold thefor eight days and leave the rest lo him. They thought he had something but it was all talk."
Saddam believed thai the Iraqi people would not stand to be occupied or conquered by the United States and wouldto an insurgency. Saddam said he expected the war to evolve from traditional warfare to insurgency.
Alternative Hypotheses on Iraq's Nonuse of WMD During Operation Iraqi Freedom
The view has been advanced widely that ifSaddam had WMD at ihe lime of OIF, he would hare used il. In Ihe event, there are no indications that WMD was med during OIF.
If Iraq possessed WMD Saddam may have eon-eluded, given his perception of the Coalition threat, he would not needlo use WMD. Militaryconsistently over-reported iheir combat capability and Saddam had concluded most Iraqis would tight to defend the country. He may noi have realized that his Regime could not be saved until it was too late lo deploy CW from existing storage areas toforces. Saddam told his debriefer that it was clear to him. some four months before the war, that hostilities were inevitable. Despite this knowledge, it seems lhat Saddam and those around him misjudged the nature and intensity of ihe conflict. It is possible that Saddam's public statements and those to his chief lieutenants were intended to reassure rather than confide.
Former Director of Directorate of MilitaryStaff Ocn. ZuhayrTalib 'Abd-al-Satan 'Two to three months before the war.usaynroupfficers. He asked why the Americans would want to come here.
Minister of Defense Sultan Hashim Ahmad Al Ta'i: "We knew ihe goal was lo make
the Regimeihoughi lhc forces would
arrive in Baghdad or outside Baghdad inaysonth. We accepted that ihc cities on the way would be lost. All commanders knew this and accepted it. Saddam Husayn thought lhat ihc people would, of their own accord, lake to the streets and light with light arms, and that this would deter the US forces from entering ihe cities."
Former commander of ihe NebuchadnezzarGuard Division, Staff Maj. Gen. Hamid Isma'il Dawish Al Raba'i: "We ihoughi thewould go to Basrah, maybe to Amarra, and then the war wouldusay Saddam Husayn never look any information seriously. He would just mark on ihe map. He thought most of us. were clowns. Wc pretended to have victory, and wc never provided true information as it is here on planet earth. Qusay always thought he'd gain victory. Any commander who spoke the truth would lose his head."
Saddam's draft speeches and public addressesthisattack was unlikely,toTaricj 'Aziz.
Saddam was convincedhow of force would be sufficient to deter an invasion. The United Slates would seek to avoid another Vietnam, accordingormer senior Ba'th party member.
Saddam had concluded time was on his side and thai the Coalition would never be allowed tn anack. according to ihc former science advisor,
If WMD slocks existed, timing was the problem^ The Coalition attack moved so rapidly lhat Suddam was unable to exercise any options to use WMD and when he realized the end of the Regime was near, he was not prepared tactically lo use any WMD he might have had. Based on the statements of former senior officers, the Iraqiihehad no plans for employing WMD. had not practiced lactical use of WMDad no available stockpiles of WMD, had not deployed any WMD to tactical units, and had no spe-
Tartq 'Aziz an Saddam's Overconjidence Debrief,4
Debrief er: Yon appeared confident. Your public slate-ments were exactly what yonIraq mis prepared to defeat any American invasion.
'Aziz: Ofaid these things: Howayhink we areistake; we are not prepared for anhai would bead to say these things because ihis was myposition, but ii wasew weeks before the attacks Saddam ihoughi lhal the VS would not use ground forces; he thought that you would only use your air force.
Debrief er: Wasn't he aware of the buildup offorces in the region?
'Aziz. Of course he was aware, il was all over ihe television screen. He Ihoughi Ihey would noiround war because il would be too costly to the Americans. He was overconfident. He was clever, bul his calculations were poor. Il wasn't that he wasn't receiving ihe information. It was right there onbut he didn't understand international relations perfectly.
merited that all systems broke down and there was no chemical ammunition distribution system duringnits had received chemicalthey would have buried it, not lircd it.
General 'Amir Husayn Al Samarrai. commander of the Iraqi chemical corps, said the Iraqi army had no plans to use chemical weapons during OIF,to reporting. If there hadtrategy for regular army forces to use chemical weapons, he wouldknown about it.
The Commander of 2nd RG Corps stated il was his lirm belief that Iraq did not have chemical weapons.
If WMD txhttd, Suddam may hare opted not to use it for larger strategic or political reasons, because he did not think Coalition military action would unseat him. II he used WMD. Saddam would have shown that he had been lying all along lo the intrmaliocu] community and would lose whatever residualsuppon he might have retained in therom the siandpoint of Regime survival, once be used WMD against Coalition forces, he wouldllie chance to outlast an occupation. Based on his experience with past coalition attacks, Suddam actually had more options by not using WMD, and if those failed, WMD always remained as the final alternative. Although the Iraqi Government might be threatenedoalition attack.ultimateif he could hold out long enough, he could create political and strategic opportunities fur international sympathy and regional support to bluni an invasion,
- AskedS interviewerhy be had not used WMD against the Coalition during Desert Storm, Suddam replied, "Do you think we arc mad? What would the world have thought of us? Wc would have completely discredited those who had supported us."
Iraqi use of WMD would deeply embarrass France and Russia, whom has cultivated Iraq.
Use of WMD during Operation Iraqi Freedom would serve to justify US and UK prewar claims about Iraq's illegal weapons capabilities.ustification would also serve to add resolve to those managing the occupation.
Annex A
Theand Disharmony Among Saddam's Lieutenants
The Quartet comprised four of Saddam Husayn's most senior lieutenants in the last years of his ride and provided high-level advice to Saddam on challenges facing Iraq. The four were as experienced,and loyal individuals as Saddam had available. Nonetheless, little of their advice was taken that diil not conform toxisting views.roup as senior as the Quartet had so little influence on the Regimes strategic policy indicates that the strategic intent of the Regime waslone. The Quartet had differing views on Iraq's way forward on WMD, but the more cautious preferences within the group had little influence over Saddam's actions.
This portion of the Report is largely based on testimony from former Regime officials who were active in many of Iraq's former governing, economic, security and intelligence organizations. While they were critical to our assessment of the former Regime's WMD strategy, the detainees would often minimize theiror knowledge of sensitive issues. Tlie placement of blame or knowledge with individuals, who were notosition to contradict their statements, such at deceased or fled to another country, wasommon occurrence. Notwithstanding, most detainees were very cooperative and provided insight into theof the former Regime. Original documentation captured during Operation Iraqi Freedom has served to confirm, supplement, and reinforce detainee statements.
A Core of Lieutenants
addam Husaynommittee of senior Regime figures, known as Ihe Committee of Four, or Quartet, to advise him on foreign policy and other national issues. For all bul the lasl months of ilsir was compnscd of Vice pTcsidenl Taha Yasin Ramadan Al Jurawi, Revolutionary Command Council Vice Chairman 'Wai Ibrahim Al Duri. Deputy I'rimc Minister Tariq 'Aziz. 'Issa and 'Ali Hasan Al Majid (aka Chemical 'Ali).
The Quariei wasniform group. Ramadan, in an organizational sense, and "Aziz, philosophically,old-slyle Bu'thism. 'Uzal Ibrahim wasribalisi as well as an advocateore religious complexion for the Regime. 'Ali Hasan was Saddam's closest relative in the government before lheOf Qusay to the Ba'th leadership and he served as ihc family's man in Ihe Quarlci.
How Much Power and Influence'.'
Quartet comprised some of the Regime's most senior and experienced individuals, but it did notignificant impact on the Regime's policy on any critical issue. Instead, ihc Quartc! had only Ihe appearance of power. Il did not command its own agenda; instead it advised Saddam only on issues he chose to refer io it. Likewise, the Quartet offered no proactive advice and had no executive power or policy-determining role, and itedicated staff to conduct analysis or write assessments.
Personal divisions in the group hindered any attempt to influence Saddam as US pressure on Iraq began to mount, particularlywomembers claim to have been private dissenters from the policy of obstructing WMD disarmament, but there is no evidence Ihey attempted to press Saddam on the issue through the Quartet. Quartet members were personally distrustful of colleagues lo the point of fear. Mutual distrust and the group's widely varied experience of the outside worldits ability to speak decisively on strategic and foreign issues.
Longstanding conflicting lines of communication to Saddam further eroded the Quartet's effectiveness and solidarity. Dackchanncl communications to Saddamixture of his rule. Saddam'sreclusivcness after the mid-ninctics increased this practice and the Quartet was immune neither
ts members using backchannels againslnor to disrupting effects of such practices on the body's effectiveness, izzat Ibrahim reported his summary of Quartet recommendations, often only to have them contradicted by Tariq in separate discussions with Saddam.
Quartet, however, was solidly united on issues unrelated lo Iraq's external problems. All Quartet members espoused hate of Shi'a, Kurds, democrats, communists, clerics, monarchists, free markets and most other Arabs. This unity did noi iransfcrommon coherent view of the wider world orommon assessment of how to deal with Iraq's confrontation with the Coalition, or how to manage the crisis.
imited ability to shape policy, the Quartet still carried considerable prestige among more junior levels of the Regime The Quartet'sreassured Regime supporters that Saddam's decisions had the benefit of the best minds in Ihc leadership. Conversely, the individual networks of subordinates and followers of Quanei members meant that theremm transmission ofintention* through gmrrnmem The Quartet was seen from below as powerful, esenthe Regimelieutenants such as the Quartet members were personally liulc more than reflections of Saddam's own authority.
Chainstnnuind
Saddam was formerly an uhlc Administrator within standard civil service mid military structures, but starting in the, his methods changedSaddam duplicated his mastery of formal administration wiih increasing icsortetwork of family and personal relationships, using verbal instructions heedless of formal chains of command His motives appearaveombination of Increasing obsession with personal securityriontizaOon of personal interests.
This cfcseloprncnt blurred Iraq's formalfor developing dale policy. Saddam had always retained the prerogative of final policy determination, bul thr process by which be formed policy became progressively less clear, even to senior participants in the system.
- As Saddam became less wedded to formalthe Quartet an advisory body to begin wiih- was poorly placed to lock into formal chains of command and determine outcomes.
Tire striking feature of the Quartet's members was their inward /ocas, ihey were not cosmopolitan and theii insularity hurt their ability to appreciate or assess what other countries saw as their interests and how Iraq's behaviour might create conflict. Theincluding 'Aziz,indset of Iraq versus the world. lather than Iraq as pan of tlie world. Even the globetrotting 'Aziz remained focused on Saddam's will and his exclusive power to determine Iraq's course.
With the partial exception of Tariq 'Aziz, the Quar-let hadimited and hazy view of the United States, its interests and how policy was formed and driven in Washington. At no stage didtraicgic concepi of what the US wanted with Iraq, where common ground andreally lay, and the nature of the challenge the US or Coalition presented. Nor did theytrategy tor dealing with the Wcsi, apan from tactical games at the UN.
unilaterally on Iraq's deteriorating relationship with the Wesl, which was coincidenlal with such change, ihey did not seekapitalize on Iraq's potential significance in global trade through ils place in the oil market. The Quartet never deliberated over globalizationoncept and how to position Iraq within it.
The Quartet's view of the rest of the Arab world was almost as limited. Most members of the Quanet had negotiated for Iraq with oiher Arab states, but the Quanci had no strategy for building an6he Arab world was notesource for Iraq, either to bolster efforts against Iran or to act as intermediaries wiih ihc Wcsi. Insicad, ihc Quanei seems io have shared Saddam's aversion lo some Arab states. Saudi Arabia, inandome extent Egypl. The Quanet was not pan-Arabist like Nasser or Ghaddan. Yet 'Ali Hasan was surprised3 lhal no Arab slate protested against the attack on Iraq.
Saddam shared this myopic view. Saddamiew of US goals, but il was wide of Ihc mark: he said he believed lhe US had achieved all il warned in ihc (mil alter Desert Storm andontinuing "Vietnam syndrome" about casualtiesull invasion of Iraq. Only in very2 did Quanet members Ramadan and Tariq come lodisagree with Saddam's view of USand conclude that Iraq's ability to manage Coalition pressure was collapsing, but Ramadan and Tanq have since been concerned io portray themselves as. by then, loo fnghtened andio avert Saddam's collision with Washington.
" Saddam may have been closer io lhe mark in his sense that ultimate US policy in Iraq was Regime change. According to 'Ariz, Saddam decided at lhe ume of Irangaw (the coven supply of missiles to Iranhai the United States could noi be trusted to support Baghdad. 'Ali Hasan said lhat inongressional calls for lhe overthrow of Saddam meant lhat iherc was no ptospccitrategic dialogue with Washington.
Ihc Quanet had little appreciation of global change since ihe end of the Cold War or how it affected Iraq's interests and options. Instead, ihey focused
Instead, the Quartet's concept of who were Iraq's 'friends' harked back to Baghdad's perception of the different circumstances of the Cold Warf lhe UN as lhe pivotal player (France and Russia) and (very rarely) Malaysia, which was ai ihe time Chairman of ihe Organization of the Islamic Conference.
Regime Strategic Goals
The Quartetommon set of strategic goals, which were driven by Saddam. All Quartetprioritized security against Iran before all else They saw Iran as bigger, hostile and that it bad in the years since the Iran-Iraq war overtaken Iraq in WMD development. The Quartet recognized no progress toward containing Iran would be possible without first getting out of sanctions.
* The Quanci did not publiclyarticular strategic role for Iraq. Privately, it was not aof regional hegemonism. whether over Kuwait, or ihc region, nor did it consider ihe use of WMD io ihai end. Ramadan and 'Aziz had thought the auack on Kuwait was lolly and Ramadan opposed ii in the RCC.
Opposition to Israel was ritualistic. Quartetsaw Israelecondary threat compared to Iran. Israel had no land border with Iraq and was unlikely toustained attack on Iraq.
Shaping RegimeWMD and the Lieutenants
All Quartet memben were convinced that WMD had saved Iraq in the war against Iran. 'Ali Hasan and 'Izzat Ibrahim were personally involved in the use of chemical weapons (CW) in securing the Regime during the Shi'a Intifada by virtue of having held area commands in the region of unrest, although much of the physical organization of CW use lay with Husayn Kamil. But none saw the Quartet as an originator of WMD policy, nor saw themselves as promoters of WMD.
weapons (rather than WMD genetically) wereuartet issue. Among the leadership, nuclear weaponsoal appears to havearticular priority of Saddam himself. 'Aziz believes Saddam was 'fully committed toa nuclear weapon* throughout his career, bul there is no evidence that Quartet members were enthusiasticuclear program and no hint of Saddam referring the issue to the Quartet at any stage.
Ramadan said that he, andesser extent Tariq. opposed WMD in the later sanctions period because it created more problems than benefits. Ramadan during UNMOVIC tried to rid Iraq of WMD. in particular by pursuing an untrammeled access policy, but alleges he was frustrated by Saddam and his relatives.
it was on the cost/benefit analysis of WMD in terms of Iraq's economy and diplomatic relations that lhc most distinct policy cleavage in the Quartet emerged. Ramadan, andesser extent Tariq, believed strongly that Iraq's advantage lay inrid of WMD.ove would lilt sanctions, normalize relations with the West and then allow reassessment of how to deal with Iran. Ramadan
and 'Aziz would not have ruledeturn to WMD. but they were more focused on the outcome of containing Iran raiher than the means. 'Ali Hasan and izzat Ibrahim were more motivated by catering to Saddam's views, and neither advocated anythinking about WMD and containing Iran. Therefore, thereivergence of ends versus means, with Saddamotemic attachment to WMD despite theiew not shared by all Quartet members.
ever present danger of Iran was the mosi important long terra factor in Quartet thinking. Ihe Quartet thought Iraq was losing an arms raceostile larger neighbor, lb the extent that there was support for WMD development among Saddam's subordinates. Iran was the most important driver. Those prepared to support WMD disarmament to achieve peace with the UN. would probably not have ruled out WMD rearmament if il wassubsequently to counter Iran.
was also some acceptance of Saddam's notion that WMD was the right of all nations and his opposition to multilateral countcrproliferation. Quartet thinking was influencedelief lhat WMD is inseparable from industrialization and that dual use is inevitable.
Fear and Loathing in Baghdad
Saddam did not trust the Quartetersonalsense. Only 'Izzat Ibrahim was allowed to drive himself lo meetings with Saddam (the others were collected and driven in darkenedhough his mobility seems to have been curtailed toward the end. Quartet members were physically frightened of Saddam. Ramadanontinuing fear ofand lhat his son-in-law was jailed for two years. 'Aziz's son /ayyid had also been jailederiod. 'Ali Hasan also was seen by his peers asdespite his blood relationship and toadying.
Iraqiofol
Security
The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) served the Regimeortvcnliunal imelligence service, bul it also undertook denial and dcccplion operations to ihwart UN inspectors and for the illicit procurumcnl of dual-use materiel and military equipment. The Directorate of General Security (DCS) and Directorate of GeneralIntelligenceowever, generally performed intelligence and security operationsomparable fashion to Other countries* intelligence services. This annex williew of the most recentslnx-lures of these security services.
Thereew particular intelligence entities specifically invoked in the WMD story:
IIS M4 collected overseas imelligence againsl UN Missions dealing with Iraq
5 provided support to sensitive, and sometimes illicit, procurement
4 conducted surveillance of all UN missions within Iraq
ti conducted "special substances" research and development
IIS MI7collcctcd signals intelligence againsl ihe UN
ssisted the aforementioned directorates in human Surveillance
rovided security to Military Industrialization Commission and Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission facilities
ortion of the Repon is largely based on testimony from former Regime officials who were active in many of Iraq's former governing, economic, security and imelligence organizaiions. While ihey were critical to our assessment of the former Regime's WMD strategy, ihe detainees would often minimize their involvement or knowledge of sensitive issues. The placement of blame or knowledge with individuals, who were notosition to contradict their statements, such as deceased or fled to another country, wasommon occurrence. Notwithstanding, most detainees were very cooperative and provided insight into the inier-work-ings Of the former Regime. Original documentation captured during Operation Iraqi Freedom has served io confirm, supplement, and reinforce detainee statements.
The Iraqi Intelligence
Service
L A
IIS Structure and Functions
The original mission of the Iraqi Intelligence Serviceommonly known as the Mukhabarai, was foreign intelligence collection, domes-tic countennlclligencc, and clandestineactivities (or intelligence TahirJalH Haoftusfi. services worldwide -but the former Regime also used Ihe service, beginning in lateool for the Military Industrial Commission (MIC) and ils illicit procurement efforts. The IIS consisted of over twenty compartmenled directorates, under the leadership ofTahir Jalil Habbush. The IIS also assisted in the obstruciion of UN inspection missions andof sensitive materials, equipment, andfor the former Iraqi Regime.
Ml.Offlee of the Director
Ml was the executive directorate of the IIS.branches provided administrative functions, public relations, the creation of cover documentation for field agents, and general supponhe entire service. The most recent director of Ml was Khudayr Isma'il Ibrahim Al Mashhadani.
irectorate of Administration and Accounting This directorate managed daily administrative affairs and provided the following services: salaries and retirement services; logistic suppon, includingand medical services; and liaison withministries and directorates. M2 also supervised house rentals for each IIS directorate. Fverymaintained at least one safchouse for relocating operations from regular directorate offices. Husayn Muhstns director, held his position for the eight years prior to OIF.
irectorate of Data Proccssinn and Information Security
Commonly referred to as the Computerand often mistakenly translated as Finance, M3 focused on the training and use of information tcch-
Arab Countries
yria. Lebanon, and Jordan
gypi and Sudan
orocco. Tunisia, and Algeria
audi Arabia. Kuwait, and the Gulf Slates
ran and Turkey
alestine and Israel
nited States and Europe
cientific and Technical Intelligence Department
Special Projects
Commercial Section -Accounting Section -liaison Section
nology in the IIS. Sad 'Abd-al-Rauaq Al Majid Al Tikriti was responsible for the information,and file storage for the IIS.
irectorate of Foreign Intelligence
M4 was the primary directorate for foreigncollection and foreignis also referred to as the "Secret Servicehen literally translated. Collection primarily focused on political and economic information; however,regarding the military, media, health, and the administrative capabilities of foreign countries was also collected.
M4 was headed by Hasan Izbah Thalij Al 'Ubaydis the director. Hasan reported to IIS Deputy Director Khalil Ibrahim Al Sultan, who was responsible, andirectorates. Previously, Hasan had been the M2 Director and the Office Director of Ml,
A fifth division within M4 targeted Iraqigroups operating outside of Iraq. That division, however, was separated from M47lie M4 and MS directorates exchanged information whenever members of either directorate discovered intelligence related to Ihc otherrcsponsibi lilies.
Admin atfabtw ft Accffirtls
M3 Infrrmeiion
Ferns"
Cootilrr-
liKdllnCIKC
liHmol
iilv
ft PrcMCuliM
MWMHOB
Studies ft It uium*
Mil
Traminj ft
Pur,in
Mil
Accounting
Ml)
I jrCe'.Ln?
Spec itt Oncotic**
Cnmrnolc
Ml? Sliiuli
'illl'll
MIR Rmrfracy
Ml*
PlOKCIl
Scientific andTcchnical Imelligence Dcpanmenl. headed by Mulhanna Muhammad Ahmad Al Bayaiii aided MIC's "Special Office" lu facilitate theof sensitive items and material through foreign channels (see Regime Finance and Procurement chapter for additional information).
because thai was itshakir Karhut headed this section until OIF and worked under Mu'uyyid 'Abd-al-Jalil. the headccording to high level officials within the former Regime, these two wee heavily involved in collection efforts against the UN.
Directorate of Counterintelligence
M5 conducted domestic moniluring andoperations within Iraq. Five divisions wilhin M5 focused on specific regionsts sister directorate. Muhammad 'Ahd-al-Wahhab Fada'am was the M5 Director0 until Ihc fall of the former Regime; he was preceded by Ma'ad Ibrahim Alnd Khalil Ibrahim 'Abdullah.
onitored all internationaloperating within Iraq, including Ihe UN. As statedormer manager wilhin the MS"Itonitored the UN inspectors
the iis general affairs divisions the mosl recent sub-directorate. it was specifically created to acl as the "catch-all"ilhin iraq- section is operated more thanomestic businesses within iraq, such as restaurants, hotels, travel services,shops, and truck service ccnlcrs, in order to collect information on foreigners routinely entering iraq. other sections reportedlyforeign journalists, the media, andstudents within iraq.
irectorate of Inter ml Security
Khalid Nnjim "Abdallah Sultan Al Tikritituff ofecurity officers who acted as political minders within the IIS. Personally appointed by Saddam, the Mfi director had sweeping powers of investigation and financial authority.
atellite office of Ihc SSO. M6 and its three divisions monilurcd lhe loyally of all IIS employees. The tirsi division supplied liaison officers to each IIS directorale and was responsible for technicalthe archives, and security ol the MIC: the second division was responvihlc lor political mail, diplomatic couriers, and information security; and ihe third was responsible for ihc physical security of IISand its arsenal.
irectorate of Investigation and Prosecution
M7 oversaw the Hakamiyah prison facility inand was last headed by flaythim Khali! Ibrahim Al Rawi. M7 had suh-dirccioratcs io investigate Arabs and foreigners, as well js for prison management and administration. Mb and MIOollcn providedsupport in internal investigations and
irectorate of liberation Movements
In the opinionormer US officer, theolitical olhce instead of an intelligence collection or exploitation directorate. Formerly directed by Khalid Al Dun. MK was responsible for supplying administrative support for approved Palestinian organizations, receiving guests,hospitality, and arranging visits with officials. The source also stated that ihe M8 director reported directly to/ on matters concerningcoming to baq Irom Syria.
irectorate of Communications
M9 dealt with landline and wireless communications requirements between all IIS diiecioraies. The IIS primarily used landlines for communications sccurily: wireless communications were used only as anif the land lines weie down, llie last director nf M9 was Shibli Muhammad "All. Information is noi yet available in regardshen M9 assumed its benign role of communic.ilions.
. M9 developed chemical and biologicalroduced toxins, poisons, and lethal devices for intelligence or assassination operations, and tested Us products on prisoners. In
ibc early 1UWK M9 was known as the IIS Science and Technology Directorate, which had lour divisions: Hngineering, Chemical, Mechanical, andubordinate section headed by Dr.'Abd-al-Mun'im Al Azmirli, established labs alter the start of the ban-Iraq War for theof chemical and biological weapons.to Nu'man 'All Muhammad Alormer department directorJ, prisoners from Al Hakamiyah Prison were used and killeds products in
as removed from M9nd it was assigned as its ownl retained most of its previous siructuie except for ihc Explosives Section, which was removed from its ranks entirely and also assigned as its ownSee the hilts and hill sections of this annex for additional information).
MIO, Directorate of Studies and Research
lso referred to as the "analytic directorate."
was responsible for seeking, compiling, translating, and publishing open source materials from foreign governments, agencies, and organi/ations.investigated political, economical, social,and military topics and in-house linguists made translations, llie director of MIO was Anmar Latif Nusayyif Jasim Al Dulaymi.
Mil, The Training and Preparation Institute
The Training and Preparation staff, approximatelymployees, prepared lectures and intelligence courses for both new and current IIS olficcrs and employeesearly curriculum. The director ofas Mu affiq Saleh Al 'Ali Al likriti.
irectorate of Accounting
Headed by Nazar Yasin Alas responsible for domestic and foreign bank accounts and IIS financial maUcrs. Sub-directorate* managed expenditures, financial archives, and salaries, as well
as supporting the comptroller. Each IIS directorate had anfficer to handle all accounting affairs of that directorate, such as the distribution of salaries, purchasing of equipment, food, clothing, and other directorate specific items.
irectorate of Clandestine Operations
MI3 was responsible for operational supponsuch as lock-picking, surveillance photography, electronic eavesdropping, and counterintelligence functions at liaqi embassies abroad.arget was identified and approved for collection. MI3 conducted the operation. Analysis of the collected information, however, was left to ihe requestor M5 mosi likely tasked MI3 lo collect against UNwho were monitored through wire taps,devices, and hidden cameras at the Canal Hotel, which served as the UN Headquarters in Baghdad. After Dcscn Storm, the High Technologyand Electronic* Research and Developmentwas subsumed into the Directoraie of Clandestine Operations For thiss also commonly referred to as the Technical Operations or Technical Moniioring Directoraie.
irectorate of Special Operations
irected by Muhammad Khudayr Sabah Al Dulaymi. was responsible for training and conducting special operations missions. It trained Iraqis.Syrians. Yemeni, Lebanese, Egyptian, and Sudanese operatives in counterterrorism. explosives, marksmanshjp. and foreign Operations at its facilities
at Salman Pal Addjiionally. MI4 oversawighly secretive project regarding
explosives. Sources lo date have not been able to
provide suflicicnt details regarding the "Challenge
Project."
MIS. Directorate of legal Affairs
MI5 provided the IIS officers and employees *ith legal advKc. handled all employees' legal cases, reviewed all new laws that pertained to IIS officers, and implemented (hr laws and regulations within the IIS. While it served alt ofrimarily assisted Ml
Special Operations Department, composedoreignomestic section, performedassassinations inside or ouiside of Iraq.
The "Tiger Group" was similar to Specialexcept thai it was primarily comprised of suicide bombers.
The Training Department provided training for all IIS officers going abroad.
The Comnterterrtieism Department handled comn-lenerror ismin Iraq and at embassies; reportedly, il disarmed terrorists hijacking aairliner fnm Saddam International Airport.
The Administrative Department provided support services such as administration, finances.and logistics.
The Anti-Iranian Department infiltrated operatives into Iran for intellrgente collection and operated against Iranian group* attempting lo enter Iraq.
irectorate of Criminologv
asen MWJ was extracted from M9 and designated as its own directoratehr directorate retained the organizational structureJ except lor the Kiplosivcs Section, which was also designated as its own directorate, the Al Gtiafiqi Projecthctovided in the fields of chemical and biological science, criminal investigation and forensic sciences, chemical and poison production, and intelligence suppon offer insight to its nickname, ihc "Directorate of Specialu'man 'All Muhammad Al Tikriii's last director having served6
In1 orlft requested assistance from Ihe IIS Scientific and Technical Intelligence Departmento acquire. Devices were requested for atomic absorption, infrared, and ultravioletfor the analysis of chemicalay and bombdcicction devices which were planned lor use in Iraqi embassies; materials used in detect and exploit latent fingerprinls lor criminal investigations:evice used to test for forged or falsifiedion requested by the Secret Communications Directorate.
The Secret Communications Division wasfor document seals and stamps, document authentication, arui mail security. The division also worked on improving secret and invisiNe inks.
Thealysis and ForensicInvestigations performed various testing on foods and. il lesied for bacteria and viruses in food, dairy products, and water. The fbrensks department specialized in fingerprints, ballistics, forgery, and the protection of diplomatic mail.
The Chemical Preparation Division conducted theoretical and practical research on toxicpoisons, and anesthetics for operational use by other IIS directorates, such as M4 or MS.
The Explosives Division, also known asas responsible for delecting and disabling of explosive devices relating to the mail or vehicles, as well as producing such devices for the IIS. This divisionybrid between Mlb's formerordinance disposal section and ihel Ghafiqi Project.
irectorate uf Signals Intelligence
MI7 monitored, collected, and analyzed external signals and voicehe signalsproject, formerly known asas almost completely destroyed during the lirst Gulf War. Following the war. the project was resurrected and re-designated the "Hadi Project."for it was pasted between Iraq's imelligence and security servicesresidential decree in therought it permanently into the IIS MIhes thehe IIS. consisting of four divisions and two branches, and employingersonnel. Khalid Karim Khalifa Braish Al'Ajili was ihe director5 to the beginning of OIF.
as the pinnacle of Iraqi signals intelligence. It monitored internal Iraqi communications to ensure communications security, intercepted foreigncommunications, und collected against foreign embassies. UN Headquarters, and,5 to
N inspectors.
The Evolution of theJ Department
as reassigned as Mittt was headed by Dr 'Amir 'Awni Juma'a1hen he was replaced by the last MI6 director. Nu'man. MI6's organization from its inception until0 consisted of the following four sections:
Administratiim and Archives Division
Secret Communication* Division
Phystochemical Analysis and CriminalDivision
Special Materials Division -Chemical Production Section -Explosives and Radiation Detection andSection
According to captured documentation,9 the IIS Director approved the decon-struction of the Special Materials Division, as well, the Al Ghaftqi Project. The SpecialSection was reorganized so that the Explosives Detection and Treatment Section could merge with lhe AIrojector the "unification of technical specusllies since the defensive wort is so closely ned with offensive workThe Radiation Detection utility was to remain with MI6.
A consulting agency for the IIS Director proposed that the Chemical Production Section become an independent division sulmrdinate. comprised
hemical Supply Department and an Intelligence Applications Department. Its duties at the time of rrorgamzaiion consisted of preparing substances which paralyzes the individuals' functionality,tranqushzert and hypnotics for intelligence uses, preparing safe instant lethal substances, andthese ssdniances by various means such as drinks or medicine. This was the last restru* luring of MI6 prior to OIF. (Seeection for additional Information on the Al Ghafltp Project./
Service and Administration Divisionersonnel
-MI7IH2 Vehicle MaintenanceIIH Building Maintenance
7l2 Analysis Division
I Algorithmic Encryption Design
ElectronicCryptanalysis
i Manual arid Mechanical Cryptanalysis
OperationsJamming, and Direction Finding
-Central SIGINT Station at Al Rashidiyah
North SIGINT Station at Mosul -South SIGINT Station at Basrah
Wesl SIGINT Station at AI Rutbah
SecurityI4 Technical Support Division
-Signals Research -Technical Analysis -Satellite Intercept Computer Branch Analysis and Production Branch Administration
-Military Communications -Civilian Communicationsnalysis -Encrypted Communications Analysis
irectorate of Residcnc v
ssued visas, determined residency status, and enforced immigration laws lor all Arabs andliving in Iraq.
irectorateommercial Projects
lhc Directorate of Commercial Projects ran from companies lo help illicit procurcmcni and importation of dual-use materiel and other prohibited items into Iraq. The Foreign Branch oversaw the nunjgernent of trade with overseas (root companies, such as MIC's AI Basba'rr Trade Crjrnpany. lid. and the Syriaa firms SES Trade Company and the MAS Fxooorruc Group. The Domestic Branch oversaw theof numerous small businesses throughout Iraq to financially supplement IIS operations, usage by the IIS. such as prim shops for forgery, and strategic surveillance of foreign interests.
I9 directoi Mana' 'Abdallah Rashidalt to all Foreign Branch operationsesult of the failure of one of its companieseliver spare pans, tires, batteries, elcctionicand vehicles. At lhc same lime, the manager of the Domestic Brunch was jailed for attempting to smuggle copper uui ot Iraq. These two incidents led to the permanent closure and subsequent salvage of the Directoraie of Cornmcn.nlas disbanded and its sections were reassigned to the M4 and M5he Foreign Branch projects were re-designatedX under the Directoraie of Foreign Intelligence. Ihe DomeiiK Branch projects were re-designatedIK under theof Counterintelligence (are Retime Finance and Procurement for additioiuil Information on illicit procurement,.
irectorate or Surveillance
The Directorate of Surveillance monitored individual targets with human surveillance and may have been involved in collection against UN. with three field intelligence unit* and anbranch, was directly subordinate to the IIS Deputy' Director. Suppon requests had to first be approved by the Deputy Director before tasking was eseemed Requests also had to provide specific information on targets and Ihe intended location of surveillance. Restricted manpower and resources, however, limited colhxlion periods to approximately seven to ten days. Akram 'Dinar Salih Al Tikriti was the director0 to OIF.
Mhe Arah Division responsible for all Arab immigrants regardless ofiounirv
M1&I2 The Foreigners Division: responsible far all non-Arab immigrants
he Airportatellite office located at the point-of-entry
M1RI4 The Regional Divisionsatellite office located ai ibe various regional governorates and points of origin.
hc Al GhaOqi Project TheAl Ghafiqi Project exhted lo moke explosive devices for the IIS to be used In assassination and demolition operations. Ihc Explosives SectionJ was extracted from the M'> Directoratend assigned as its own; .it the same time, the remainder ofas also extracted and designated ashe name Al Ghafiqi. referringeographic area between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, was most likely attached lo Ihe protect0 as it was designated as an independent directorate. The project is also known as" where 'sheen'is ihc first letter in the word for Section, however, this was not seen until
Khali) Ibrahim Fayad Al Sahahi was the director of the former Explosives Section sincend he continued to head the organization usirector until his departurer. 'Amir'Awni iuma'a, who was previouslyirectoras the superintendent of the Al Ghafiqiduring the negotiations to integrate Al Ghafiqiadi'a Muhammad Salih was theof the project, which was decommissioned0 and reassigned to MI ft.
No one person constructed an entire explosive device alone. The construction process drilled through ihe sections ot the directorate An minros iseddevice <IED)he chemistrywhich developed the explosive materials for the device, the Electronics Department prepared the tuners and wiring of thend the Mechanical Departmem produced the igniters and designed the IED. Al Ghafiqi constantly invented new designs or methods to conceal explosives; books, briefcases, belts, vests, thermoses, car seats, lloor mats, and facial tissue boxes were all used to concealDX. or TNT,
irectorate of Protective Services lhe Directorate ol Proieclive Services was similar in compositionight infantry battalion and it protected HS facilities along with the Ba'th Patty national leadership. Iu mott recent director prior to OIF was Khavsam Ibrahim Omar A> >ub Alrovided external Kcuniy at IIS sites- while M6 handled internal security issues similar to the way that the SRG and SSO handled security at presidential palaces.
Three subordinate divisionsarried outphysical security missions lot the USin Baghdad, thehaliq (Iranians opposed to the current Iraniannd the US Regional Officesersonnel guarded all IIS safehouses.ersonnel may have been present in ihe event of lhe transportation of WMD materiel, because it had previously provided convoy security (or ihc shipment of lighl weapons.
irectorate of Military Industries
Also known as "Alrovidedfor all MIC and IAEC sues, and it assisted tch Natioal Slonitonng Directorate (NMD) with purging MIC facilities of documents to be safeguarded from the UN. An Iraqi Regular Army unit was commonly to-located at MIC facilities for external protection,andled security within the facility, as well as the security stall manning gales at industrialweapons manufacturing plants, chemicalplants, and MIClso provided limited sccurily for three MIC companies: Armos, Al Basha'ir. and Alfrom companies for illicit MIC procurement. We do noi know to whatrovided security for these companies. The last directoras 'Abd-al-Hamid Sulay-man Ibrahim Al Huraymis Al Nasiri.
fficers also were involved in NMD document Concealment and destruction efforts. Inaddam ended cooperation with UNSCOMand soon alter he ordered the creationMD comminee lo purge all MIC records of sensitive docurnenlaiion related to past prohibiied programs. While many documenis had already been declared, some were givengent "Ay ad Oaian Talab, die director ot MZ.WI Counter-Espionage Section, to keepockbox. These documenis have noi yet been recovered.
uman Rt sourcesIHI Military PersonnelIH2 Civilian Personnel3 Personnel ManagementHI4 Passports and Visas
M23I2 Internal Security
nvestigationsl Interrogations2 Investigationsail
M23'4 Nuclear Energy
ompanies
2 Opposition Group Activities
3 Comaer-Espionage
M23'S Maintenance DivisionISH Management SectionI2 Building Maintenance3 Vehicle Maintenance
ounter-Espionage Division
Ml'Comnter-EsptrmageHV2pposition Group Activities
irectorate of Opposition Groupargeted opposition groups based overseas, such as the Al Dawa Party, the Communist Party, and theasked its satellite ottices around Iraq io monitor coalition forces prior to OIF. bul limited resources presented any measurablesam Khudhayr 'Abbas Al Unlay mi Al Awani. was the director0t thai point accordingfficer, ailfficers were (old lo bum their documents and go home, "ll wasie source said, "the US did not exist anymore."
The Directoraie of General Military Intelligence
Tbe Directorate of General Military Intelligence (DGMI) was Iraq's main military intelligence service, ihe DGMI collected intelligence on the military capabilities of the countries adjacent to Iraq, as well as Kurdish forces. The director of DGMI. Staff Ll. Gen. Zuhayr Talib 'Abd-al-Sattar, reported directly to the Presidential Secretary, despite the subordination of the DGMI to the Ministry of
In addition to military analysis and targeting, the DGMI acted as an internal police force within the Iraqi military by assigning DGMI Intelligenceto each military unit down to the battalion level. Technically, the officer's mission was intelligence suppon, but the majority of the officerworkon controlling corruption and theft within the unit.s the SSO placed political officers within ihe Republican Guard, the DGMI placed intelligence officers within the military services to monitor troops.
ihis organization has also been recognized as the General Military Intelligence Directorateeneral Directorate of Military' Intelligenceirectorate of Military Intelligenceilitary Intelligence Directoratend the Islikhbarat, the shortened version of its Arabic name: Mudiriyah Al Isiikhbarai Al 'Askriah Al 'Ammah.
The Directorate of General Security
The Directorate of General(DGS) provided localcollection and prosecution of Regime opposition groups within the individual govcrnoratcs of Iraq. Linlc rcponing exists about its composition and structure, but minorto the DGS all reflect an effon focused against the infiltration of Iranian. Turkomen. and Kurdish oppositionists.
Annex C
Iraq's Security Services
Overview
The former Regime's security services protected Ihe President, secured the presidential palace grounds, and guaranteed loyalty to the Regime. These organizations, however, also concealed information andfrom Uniled Nations weapon inspectors. This annex williew of the most recenl organizational structure of Ihcsc security services.
Guard
The Special Security Organization, using personal escorts and protection units, mainiained the innermostlevels surrounding the President and ihc Regime. Ihc Republican Guard, comprised of the SpecialGuard and the Republican Guard Forces Command, served as lhe outer rings of Regime and nationul security. Priorhe Special Republican Guard was specifically tasked lo conceal WMD-rclatcd material in collaboration with ihc Special Sccurily Organization.
This portion of ihe Report is largely based on testimony from former Regime officials who were active in many of Iraq's former governing, economic, security and intelligence organizations. While ihey were critical to our assessment of the former Regime's WMD strategy, ihe detainees would often minimize their involvement or knowledge of sensitive issues. The placement of blame or knowledge wiih individuals, who were not in ato contradict their statements, such as deceased or fled to another country, wasommonNotwithstanding, most detainees were very cooperative and provided insight into the inter-workings of the former Regime. Original documeniatitm captured during Operation Iraqi Freedom has served to confirm, supplement, and reinforce detainee statements.
'IzzaI Ibrahim Al Duri
Chairman
'Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al Nasiri
Secretary General
X
Saddam Husayn
Director. SSO
Tahir Jalil Habbush
Director, IIS
National Security Council
National Security Councilorum for cooperation between Iraq's security and intelligence agencies regarding overlapping issues among the agencies and joint-service projects, ll was comprised of'Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri, 'Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al Nasiri. and lhe directors of the four main security and intelligenceSpecial Security Organizationhe Iraqi Intelligence Service (IISI. the Directorate of General Military Intelligencend the Directorate of General Security (DGS).
'Izzat Ibrahim, Vice-President and the Vice-Chair-man of ihe Revolutionary Command Councilcted as the chairman, and 'Abd acted as theGeneral of the National Security Council, ihe
Council did not have regular preplanned meetings, but it met periodically at 'Izzat's headquarters at Al Aibnani Palace in Baghdad to address anyor issues lhat had emerged since the lastDespite these meetings most problems- big orbrought directly to Saddam by the
The presidential secretary, 'Abd, screened almost all of the reporting sent to the Presidential Office by the SSO. IIS. DGMI, and DGS. Die directors of these organizations, including Qusay Saddam llusayn. who headed the SSO. reported directly to 'Abd. who chose what should proceed to the President. Thefrom the SSO and IIS was opened by thesecretary himself, and not the staff. 'Abd then evaluated whether it was for ihe President's action or Daily Brief. If the matter related to routinethe Secretary acted on the correspondence, himself, and then he returned il to the originating office. However, this did not include the hiring and firing of department directors.
lhe presidential secretaryigher status than Qusay priorusay. as Director of the SSO. still had to report to 'Abd despite being theson. Qusay was no longer within 'Abd'schain of responsibility after Qusay was elected to tlie Ba 'th Party leadership inowever, the SSO was still required to report to the presidential secretary.
The Special Security Organization
Saddam Husayn formed lhc Special Securityal-Amn al-Khass in Arabic! tialter he became President9 The assurance of Regime stabilityide spectrum al support and services, and Saddam relied on the expertise of the Special Security Organization (SSO)addam used the SSO. which consisted ofersonnel, to reveal any threats to him and his
Leadership of Ihc Organization
Husayn Kama
Husayn Kamil Hasan Al Majid Husayn Kamil Hasan Al Majid headed the SSO from as early3ccordingenior Republican Guard officer.e was also theof the Military Industrial Commission, the Republican Guard (including the Special Republicanaddam's SpecialGuard, and the Ministry of Oil.
Husayn Kamil did not appear to rely on depulies. He had the power, because of his family ties andio the President, to have anyone tired or have them placed underormer subordinate noted "Husayn Kamil did noiight-hand man, as he was tooany of the senior leadership believe thai all of Iraq's problems with the United Nations were the result of his unilateral decisions. He was hriclly appointed to and eventually (ircd as the Minister of Defenselter which he was appointed by Saddam to be Ihe Minister of the Military Industrial Commission. His transfer from lhc SSO9ap in SSO leadership (See Ihc "Husayn Kamil" tcxtbox in lhc Regime Strategic Intent chapter lor additional information).
bin Al Hasan During the fust Gulf War, Fannar Zihin Alousin of Saddam, directed Ihe SSO. Fannarigurehead. Qusay Suddam Husayn. who was appointed by Saddam to be the deputy director,led the organisation. Little is known about the SSO leadership9
Qusay Saddam Husayn
Qusay Saddam Husayn Director, SSO
Qusay became SSO Director in1 orhe sccuriiy organization lost much of its influence without Husayn Kamil. Many of Ihe responsibililies were noi passed to Qusay because he was viewed aswas approximatelyears old when appointed lo direct the SSO. Qusayraduate of the College of Law; he was not given military rank and always wore civilian clothes. For this reason Qusay enlisted the assistance of Husayn Kamil for leadership guidance.
With ihe assistance of Husayn Kamilnd under ihc leadership of Qusay. the SSOmany funeiions, such as protection, collection, and deception operations. Together, these two used (he assets ai (heir disposal toenial and deception program againsl the United Nations.
After ihe departure of Husayn Kamilusay supervised the command authority of theGuard and the Special Republican Guard while simultaneously serving as director of the SSO. In liile. Qusay was referred to as the "Honorable Supervisor of the Republicanut he was never referred to as "theusay was able to manage the SSO, ihough he did not have ihe seniority,or depth in military matters to command troops. Commanders feared and respected QuSay because, much like Husayn Kamil, he had almost-absolute power in the Regime. When he spoke IO militaryhowever, he would generally issue vague managerial directives.
Qusay stepped down as the Director of the SSO after he was elected one of two deputies in charge of the military branch of the Ba'th Party onhree days after being elected to Ba'th PartyManaging his new responsibilities in addition to his role in the SSO waseavy burden on Qusay.
Walid Hamid Tavrfiq
StaffMaj. Gen. Walid Hamid Tawfiq held the position of SSOfrom1 untiltaff major general al the time, was selected to till Qusay's position because he was the most senior officer within the SSO. Qusay wanted to appoint the Director ofGuard Security to the position of SSObut that officer wasolonel. Qusay never completely relinquished control of the SSO. Qusay ordered Walid to report directly to him. though the normal chain of reporting fur Ihe SSOs lo report security matters lo the presidential secretary. 'Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al Nasiri.
Qusay evenelieved Walid of duty and returned as the Director of the SSO inhe circumstances around Walid's reappointment lu the Governor of Al Basrah arc uncertain. Walid claims lhat he was removed one week after heener from Saddam admonishing htm foran individual who was. without the knowledge of Walid, close to Saddam.
Structure of Ihe Organization
Unlike the Iraqi Intelligence Servicehcand branches of the SSO did notoded nomenclature.
Residential
The first tier of security closest to Saddam took no direction from the SSO. as this responsibility was removed from the SSO daring the. The Himayah (Arabic foreneral term for the Department of Senior Escorts fal-Murafiq al-Qadim) was composed of two groups, the Special Protection lAmn al-Khus) and the Specialarashich were directly accountable to the Secretary of the President. 'Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al Nasiri. The Special Protection was wiih the Presidentay, seveneek io provide personal security. The Special Guard had moreogistic rale, providing personal services suih as laundry, fao-i. and shopping. The SSO picked ihe candidates and monitored the members of ihis group lo ensure loyally to Saddam.
The Office of the Director
The Office of the Director contained the staffto Qusay and daily SSO operations. Qusay relied less on the established officials of the organi cation, and8 he developed his own close circle of personal aides much as his father had done. Among them were 'Ali Husayn Al Rashid, Qusay'spersonal bodyguard; Hani 'Abd-al-Latif Tulfali Al Nasiri. the first cousin of Qusay's mother; and Suhayl Muhammad Sultan Al Duri, Qusay's secretary.of Public Relations, and by default, the Official Secretary of the SSO Director (Officeuhayl replaced Sulayman 'Ulwan Ibrahim Al Huray-mis Al Nasiri who served as Qusay's secretary1 and Officehen Qusay dismissed him.
The director's office had four sections thai handled allocation of residential properties for SSOadministration of SSO computers, financialand Ihe inter-office and outgoing mail.
The Directoraie of Security Affairs The Directorate of Sccuriiy Affairs, the second licr of presidential protection, consisted of two sections dial were charged with the security of presidential palaces, the office of Ihc presidency, and Ba'th Parly offices and headquarters. Made up ofersonnel.
Qusay
SSO Duetto's Office
Department
Public Opinion*
ate ol RG Security
Ol tec tor ate o' Security Ada's
Directorate olc-'i!.
SSO Security
Branc
SSO Security Branch
Sovei "lanre and
it
VfrflClK
Biaich
Spoctol Secwtiy Oigan,ra-.on
Ifr nf Security UTatn was the largest directcralc and last headed hy Col. Muham-nad Rijah Al Haddushi. It .upplicd protective serviceshe Presidential Diss an and Bath Pany Regionalas well as the support contingency known as" whichcomposed of drivers, cooks, and laundcrcrs who traveled with Saddam.
The Directorate of Rrpuhlkml Guard Security Hani 'Ahd-al-Lalit
Tull'ah Al Nasiri, oik-of
Qusay's mosl capable deputies, headed this directorate, which monitored loyally to the Regime within Ihe Republican Guard.usay told Staff Maj Gen Walid Hamid Tawfiq. dcsmic Walid'* appoimmcM to SSO Director, that he wssuld not have conuol over Hani or fas dueciorate. Hani rcUincd his position of Director of lhe Directorate of Republican <iuard (RGl Sccurily as he ascended the ranks of the SSO. Three
months after Wahd was appointed as SSO Director. Qusay appointed Ham. his preferred choice for SSO Director, to the position of Astisiani Director.
Three departments wiitiin this directorate closely watched the SRG. the Allahu AkbarGnd the hil'h Al Mubuyyin Operations* RGhile not large enough to warrant their own departments, iwo SSO Sccurily Officers scrutlni/ed ihc KG Missile Command and ihc RG Aithave at Al Rashid. as well (sec The Republican Guard section, below, forinformation).
Prior1 the SSO used sccurily officers loeducate, and discipline (he military Iroops in an effort u> pioicet against enemy intelligence.1 the SSO shifted n> locus to inornior the military commanders io guarantee their loyalty and poliU-cal reliability. These securityeminiscent of Soviet commissars, were ernhedded withinGuard units down lo the battalion level, and they did not answer lo the RG chain ol command.
SSO Security Officerspecial thrcc-mooth course held by the SSO. commonly wore civilian allue or military uniform without rank and. hy nature of theirere noi commonly liked
Duties of ihe SSO Palace Security
The Directorate of Security Affairs oversaw lhedetails within the presidential palaces andof the Iraqi Regime. While the Special Republican Guard (SRG) maintained the perimeter and main entrance gate security, lhe Directorate of Security Affairs provided chse-pmieciion internal security measures:
Access control for incoming and outgoing palace visitors, to include verifying auihorizations,Imdges, personal and vehicular searches-
Verifying personnel records for all inside and outside palace workers with the assistance of the Directorate of General Security (DGS).
Escorting or monitoring all workers (janitors,contractors,n the presidential palaces.
Requesting and validating annual securityfrom the Directorate of General Security for all enlisted and commissioned SRG personnel.
by ihe other soldiers. In lhe cvenl of disloyallyecurity breach. Ihe sccurily officer would rcpori the eveni directly lo Ihc director of Rfi Sccurily. horecurity officer al ihe ballalion level would noi be required lo pass the information through Ihc brigade and division security offices. The Direciorecurity could bypass the SSO Direcior because of his special link wiih Qusay.
The Dlrectorale of Communications Secure communications between strategic Regime facilities was ihc responsibility of the Directorate of Communications, directed by Head Engineer Safa* Shakir Taha. This directorate established andlandlinc and wireless communications for all palaces, directorates, presidential and Diwan offices, and Republican Guard headquarters. Twowithin the directorate specialized in wireless and landlinc communications systems. The Landline Department was headed by Engineer Salam 'Aziz; the Wireless Dc[>arimcni was headed by Engineer 'Abd-al-Rahman.
The SSO Security Branch
Similar in mission io the RG Security Directorateolice department's Internal Affairs division, the SSO Security Branch monitored the personnel of the Special Securityousin of Qusay. Fatik Karim Sulayman Al Majid, was the last known director of this branch. Fatik had almost constant access to Saddam, because the SSO Security Bunch was Saddam's window inio Qusay's inner circle.
Saddam appointed strong loyalists, all of whom were members of his personal guard staff. Io each of Ibe security and intelligence services near the beginningll of these positions reported lheof their various agencies lo Fatik, Director of lite SSO Security Branch. Khalid Najim 'Abdallah Sultan Al Majid Al Tikrili was appointed to head (he IIS Security Branchaytham Sulayman Al Majid was appointed to head ihe Security Branch for the Directorate nf General Military Intelligence, and Salim 'Abd-al-Qaiar Sulayman was appointedead the respective sccunty elcmen( of the Direcluraie of General Security.
Cross-checking of (he various services placed Ihc SSOuperior position over these agencies, hor example, ihc IIS was not informed of SSO operations, bul lhe SSO would be informed of all IIS operations; only the liaison officers between ihc iwowould communicate officially. If the IIS became awarea'ih Party member plotting action againsl the Regime, ihe case would be passed directlyhe SSO. However, if Ihc US wished toase, Saddam most likely would have been consulted.
The Surveillance and Information Branch
The Surveillance and Information Branch was tasked wiih monitoring Iraqi officials, all employees within ihe office of the presidency, and other designated targets, lo identify individuals nf questionable loyalty. Tlie direcior of this branch. Rati' Hamid Muhammad Al Sagmani, oversaw ihc operations of Iwothe Telecommunications Monitoring Section, headed by Muhammad Ra'uf Ghassub, and the Human Surveillance Section, headed by llarilh Al Duri. Rali' was another of Qusay's close associates within the SSO.
The Organization Section monitored all assigned SSO personnel except those on ihe presidential detail, it had one officer assigned to each of the other liranches and directorates wilhin the SSO. This section was headed by Mu'ayyid 'Abd-al-Hamid.
pecial Section monitored all assignedlo the presidential detail, including thedetail, ihose who housed and provided logistics to the protection detail, and those who provided support services lo Saddamhepherds for live meat, chefs, tailors, and dayhis section was headed by Sa'd 'Abdallah Yahran.
The Investigation and Interrogation Sectioninvestigations, interrogations, andof personnel for crimes ranging from the ft to treason. Its jurisdiction was determined by Saddam or Qusay. This section was headed by Col. 'Adil Hamid Jamil
The Information and Identification Sectionpersonnel files, marriage approval, weapons accountability, and organizational identification and passports for SSO personnel. TheSection, also referred to as "Personnel" was headed by Samir 'Awad, and the Identificationwas headed by Muhammad Wahadi.
The Separated Employees Section monitored alt former SSO officers. Also known as the "Veterans'his section was headed by Tha'ir Al Diiri.
Administration Branch
the administrative branch of the sso, which was headed by wasfi mukhlif al ajili. had foursections: supplies. services and maintenance, personnel (humannd accounting, which handled salaries and promotions.
Vehicles Branch
despite having its own motor pool and vehicles, the sso attempted to acquire pans or maintenance for its own vehicles from the special republican guard. lt. col. 'isam mamud 'abdallah al tikrili headed the iranspon assets of the sso.
The Scientific Branch
the ssoaboratory specifically to test the president's food. all food, clothing, and presidential supplies were acquired through the ministry of health or the ministry of trade. this branch was headed by dr. sahah shuhab ahmad al sumaydi. his two immediate subordinates were dr. 'adrian ibrahim. head of the department of chemistry, and dr. muja/ tawfiq, head of the department of biology.
the lab tested anything specifically for theincluding clothing, and its function was very secretive, even within the sso. for example. qusay planned refusal to acknowledge that the lab belonged to the sso, even if confronted by un inspectors about the lab. the lab was previously declared as belonging to the ministry of trade, which originally set up the lab for the sso. therefore, (inexamined the lab under the assumption that it belonged to the ministry of trade, yet, fully aware of the lab's true function with regard to saddam. had the sso acknowledged its ownership of ihe lab, it would have further increased the level of distrust between inspectors and iraq.
The Special Security Institute
while many sso officers were already seasoned from prior intelligence service positions, all sso officers were trained in baghdad al the special sccuriiy institute, directed by khalid kulayb 'awani. the institute's primary mission was to educate sso. srg, and presidential office employees on all aspects of governmental security, including military training, political indoctrination, and security of presidential sites. it operatedearly schedule with classes beginning on ihe seventh day ofwo-month vacation in july and august, and completion of the annual curriculum in december.
the basic course for special security officers lasted three months at the institute in the al-jihad district of baghdad. the course consisted of physical security training relating to different types of facilities and premises, personnel security and search techniques, the debriefing of casuul contacts, and methods used by hostile intelligence services to recruit sources. this course lumcd company-grade republican guard officers into sso security officers, who subsequently were embedded into military units.
The Seen rityUnlt
I he SSOattalion si/cd unll responsible for lhc security of strategically important roads around Baghdad and 'fiknt. Hasan Nu'aniah Hamid Al Alusi replaced Col. 'Uday Al Habbu* as the commander of the Security Unit inhe unii consisted of four companiesommand element. The firstwas composed of police patrol cars, the second company were also police vehicles, includingvehicles, for traffic enforcement, the third and fourth ccropanics were foot-patrols mainly recruited from the SRG.
The unit's main focus was the route between Ihe Baghdad International Airport and the Republican Palace in Baghdad. Similar service was provided by the unit on other routes, but with less manpower lequiiements. These security operations were,permanent assignments; the Security Unit was rarely tasked with other assignments.
Public Opinion li
The Public Opinion Department collectedon all rumors regarding ihe Regime. Thisheaded by Suhayl Muhammad Sultan Al Duri who simultaneously held the position of Manager of the Director's Office, maintained sources in all major cities who would report on all facets of public opinion regarding Saddam or the Regime.
l-egal Department
The Legal Department, led by fudge Basim "Ulnar Al Tikrifj. was responsible for all legal cases involving employees of the SSO.
Research Depart men I
The Research Department, headed by Dr. Mu'ayyid Al TikxrQ.oint computer project with the Military Industrial Commission, according to former senior officers wilhin ihe SSO command leadership. Allegedly, this section was comprised of four or five employees in addition to Dr. Mu'ayyid and was financed through the SSO. Neither Walid nor Hani, despite iheir senior position* within Ihe SSO, knew much about the department's sensitive activities.
Collaboration With Other Services
The SSO collaborated with every Iraqi security or intelligence serviceimitedservicepecific charter but overlappingwere common. Moreover, all of Iraq's services were monitored for loyalty to the Regime.
The SSO had links to every security and intelligence service of Iraq for political reasons, but il did not vet Ihe reporting of the various agenciet- All of the service* nharcd similar reporting chains, however.eport had been seen by the director of the relevant service, ii followed one of two paths: it the report related to administrative or financial matters, it went to ihe Presidential Diwan; if the report related to imelligence or securiiy, it went to the Presidential Secretary.
The secuiily and intelligence services relied on each other for operational missions as well. The SSO would be informed if an agencyecurity breach or suspected disloyalty among its ranks. Allcmatrvely. lhc SSO tasked ihe Directorate of General Security for background checks and the Iraqi Intelligenceand the General Military' Intelligence Directorate for collection strategies and technologies.
A The Republican Guard
AWWWmL The Republican Guard (RG) consisted ol two mililary branches charged wiih l_ divergent missionsouilincd below. Jmmr^^mmm* Noncihclcss. both branches of the RG received orders from the RG Secretarial, which was directly subordinate to Qusay Saddam Husayn. The last officer to hold the position of Secretariat General, more commonly referred to as Secretary General, was Staff la. Gen. Kamal Mustafa 'Abdallah Sultan Al Nasiri.
The smaller RG branch, the Special Republican Guard, was the third tier of presidential security after the Presidential Bodyguards and SSO- The Special Republican Guard's primary mission was theprotection and security of the presidential grounds and other sites sensitive to national security.
The larger contingent, the Republican Guard forces Command, was ofien recognized as the "elite fighting force of Iraq" and was also Ihe group most oflen referred lo whenof the Republican Guard. The Republican Guard Forceswould bethe fourth, and final, tier of the Regime sccuriiy services.
Qusay, in ihc role of the "Honorable Supervisor" of the Republican Guard, like his father,een eye on the mililary forces closest to the Regime. No piece of military equipment could befora brigade, division, or corpswithout the prior written permission of Qusay through the RG Secretariat. Security officers from the SSO were embedded within the Republican Guard to ensure that this was strictly followed and report if it was contradicted.
und other sites sensitive to national security. Although tasked with guarding presidential grounds, the SSO officers also conducted all personal and vehicular searches and infernal sccuriiy. The SRG wasfor manning gate guards and securing the grounds, perimeter, and surrounding areas. Even the SRG Commander. Brig. Barzan 'Abd-al-GhafurSulayman Al Majid. was not permitted to enter any presideniial grounds without prior approval. Saddam ensured that all mililary units were kept far enough away in order to prevent any potential coup.
The SRG wasarge brigadeof seven battalion-sized elements referred to as Regiments. Ihc SRG bulked up to theivision2 when tlvc threathe government increased, although ii hadbefore orallcr thetrained for coup suppression. The SRG maintained its large Barzan 'Aodal-Ghatui stature untilhen ihc branch could noi support iisown logistic requirements and was reduced from four brigades to one. It mi again augmented to divisional sire before Operation Iraqi Freedom, but the SRG units played no role in combat as maneuver units during Operalions Desert Storm or Iraqi
The chain of enmmand within the SRG was strictly controlled, given tlie proximity of military troops to Saddam. Orders could only be passed down from the RG Secretarial to ihe SRG commander. The SSO al times would attempt to commandeer SRG assets for ad hoc tasks, bul the SRC Commander would refuse loingle vehicle without an official written order from the RG Secretariat.
The SRG, under the direction of the SSO.in WMD-related concealment activities1quipment, documents, and other unidentified sensitive materials from theIndustrialization Commission were loaded on trucks and stored at SRG facilities in order lo prevent their discovery by UNSCOM inspectors, according to numerous sources.
Qusay
RG Secretariat
Republican Guard
RG RegimentSRG RegimentRG Reg>mentRG RegimentRG Regimenl f> SRG Regiment
Allah Akbar Operations Command
Hammurabi Forces Command
'Adrian Forces Command
Nebuchadnezzar Forces Command
G SF Bde
Fat'h Ar-Mubayyin Operations Command
Medina Al-Manawrah Forces Command
Al-Nida-Forces Command
Baghdad Forces Command
-G SF Bde
PepiMcan Guard Organizational Structure.
The Republican Guard Forces Command
primary mission of ibe Republican Guard Forces(RGFC) was lo safeguard Regime stability androiecl lhe Regime from both foreign and domestic enemies. RGFC units helped repel the Iranian invasion in the mid Io, invaded Kuwaitihe Shi'aand Kurdish uprisings in, and briefly defended ihe approaches to Baghdadhe mission of live RGFC resembled that of ihc Regulardefense of the Regime and nation.
The RGFC was composed of iwo corps-si/cdlhal were "supervised" by Qusay, bui Staff Ia. Gen. Sayf-al-Din Fulayyih Hasan Taha Al Rawi. as Chief of Slalf. was lhe operational commander. The original corps, ihc Allahu Akbar Operations(I" RGas dispersed in ihc nonhcrn half of Iraq and the other, lhe Fal'h Al Muhayyin OperationsGn the south-cm half of Iraq. Each corps had ihree division-sized elements referred loForces Command" and an independent Special Forces Brigade.
Two of ihese divisions were garrisoned in Mosul and Krikuk to support the Regular Army in the north, ihree heavy (armored) divisions proiecicd Ihe approaches io Baghdad, and one infantry division was garrisoned in Al Kill. Tlie RGFC was lhe lasi and Ihc heaviest armed tier of Regime security. While il was essential lo the protection of Ihc Regime, Saddam kept the unils away from Baghdadrevent their involvement in any military-led coups.
J
!
Annex D
Saddam's Personal Involvement in WMD Planning
The Iraq Survey Group recovered ihis recanting of Sad<tam ami senior officials discussing ihe use of WMD. This discussion was pariore general meeting which would appear from ihc content to have taken place during the second week ofhis is ofparticular interest as itompellingof Saddam's personal interest and involvement in WMD planning and preparation.
Personal Involveniinl in WMD Planning
as talking tn 'Abdold him there is no need toig fuss about these suits because we an? going to use Ihem in this special occasion, even if ithinese design the collar, ihe neck line should be lower lhan this.
Speakerhe soil. Sir. willeck line like ihc Dishdashj (luditinfi.illocan use normal white shin wuh il.
Saddam: Why did they bong it lo us like this then?
Speakeraw ihc slate minister wearing the suit.
Husaynir, formally, we are wearing ii. bul you seem lo be cold sir (everyone was laughing).
hink ihe people who designed lhat suit will not make that mistake: b'irsi, because you wear it right on the body, so ii will gel diny soon; secondly, out of elegance, ihc hand shouldn'( appear from ihc suit like this.
Speakerir. (he design of (he suit ishile shinollar (neck line) like dishdasha.
Saddam: Then my design is right.
Husaynbsolutely nghi. sir.
Saddam: Then work on it and make the corrections to the sizes.
Speakerir. we will amend il to be exactly with the neck line.
Saddam: Even If llink bit. Now when some oneuit, of couisc lhe shin line willinle bit. buirefer noi to have ii
ObvKSUS.
Speakerir. you can see that nobody is wearing il.
Saddam: It's forgotten, butill ask Abubecause he is lhe best at remembering |shack-hngince I'MS the Iraqi army has been using these kinds of Suits (people commenting and talking in ihc background!.
ant io make surethe door please (doorgerm and chemicalas well as the chemical and germ bombs, are available to Ihe "concernedo that in case we ordered an attack, ihey can do it without missing any of their targets.'
Husayn Kamil: Sir, if you'll allow me. Some of ihc chemicals now arc distributed, this is according io Ihe last rcpon from ihe Minister of Defense, which was submitted to you sir. Chemical warheads arc stored and arc ready at Air Bases, and they know how and when to deal with, as well as arm these heads. Also, some other anillery machines and rockets (missiles) are available from the army. While some of lhe empty "stuff" is available for us, our position is very good, and we don't have any operational problems.in the past, many substantial items andwere imported: now, we were able ioocal project, which was established to comply wiih daily production. Also, another bigger project will be finalizedonth, as wellhird project in the coming two to three months that will keep us on lhe safe side, in terms of supply. We, Sir. only deal in common materials like phosphorus, ethyl alcohol and methyl [interrupted].
Saddam:ihis is not imponani to me.
llusayn Kamil: So. Sir, regarding ihc germs and [he pauses).
Saddam: And the Chemicals.
Husayn Kamil: No. wc have some ol the chemicals available (interrupted).
Saddam: So, wc qualify thai ihe missiles, bywill be ready onh.
Husayn Kamil: Sir. we doni have the germs.
en. where arc they?
Husayn Kamil: It's with us.
Saddam: what is it doing witheed these germs to be fixed on the missiles, and tell him to hit. because startingh. everyone should be ready (or the action to happen at anytime,onsider Riyadharget.
Husayn Kamil: Sir. let me explain to you. What we produced now are the rocket head* and ihe containers, and wc distributed them underground in threelocations. We considered these location* the best places wc have, and that if wehance to scatter and to find more locations, then we would have done it. These locations are far away from Baghdad, this is problematic because of transportation which will lake seven days to commute, but we minimized all the transportation proceduresay. However, when we want to commute il. we cannot do il within one day Sir. and it' we want to do il by plane, then. Sir. we have to go for the method (paused],
Saddam: Let's talk about it later (waiters entered the room, sound of plates banging and side talks to the
waiters).
Husayn Kamil: (door slants) Sir. we have three types ot germ weapons, but wc base to decide which one we should use. some types stay capable for manynterrupted).
Saddam: wc want the long term, the many years kind.
Husayn Kamil: Sir. this option is available and all other options are available us well.
Saddam: You mean at which lime should we use it and at which moment!
Husayn Kamil: Yes sir. 'lhat is why there has toecision about which method of attack wc use: aa fighter bombighter plane.
Saddam: With them all. all the method*.
Husayn Kamil: Sir. we have to calculate now
Saddam: Husayn knows about (hose.
Husayn Kamil: Sir, there arc some cakulations wc have to do. since we have modified hghlers. The bombs or the warheads are all available, but the moment for using them at zero hour is something we should indicate sir; we will say that this will be launched (interrupted).
Saddam: At the moment of use (aeroou should launch them all against their targets.
Husayn Kamil: All of the method* are available, sir.
Saddam: We don't want to depend on one option. The missiles will be intercepted and ihe planes, at least One will crash, but whenever the mis*ile* or planes fall down over ihe enemy land,onsider the goal is achieved and the mission lulfilled.
Husayn Kamil: Sir, It is available and storedhut if you, Sir, order us to transfer it, weit worried it will cause contamination. It has been stored foroears, and yet has not beenas being safeir, it had been experimenied on only once and some of theSir, were contaminated.
ant as soon as possible, if we ore not transferring the weapons, tolear order to the "concerned people" thai the weapon should be tn their handsight even givenon-returnTranslatorto have access to the weapons; to take them with them and not to returnill give them an order staling thai at "onef I'm not there and you don't hcai my voice, you will hear somebody else's voice, so you can receive the order from him. and then you can go attack yourant the weapons to be distributed toant Riyadh and Jcddah, which are the biggest Saudi cities with all the decision makeis. and ihc Saudi rulers live there. This is for the germ and chemical weapons.
Husayn Kamil: In leims of chemical weapons, wc have an excellent situation and good grip on them
(Translator Comment: they arc in good control of ttieml.
Saddam: Only in case we are obliged and therereat necessity to put them into action. Also, all the Israeli cities, all of them. Of course you shouldon Tel Aviv, since it is their center.
Husayn Kamil: Sir, the best way to transport this weapon and achieve the most harmful effects would come by using planes.rop plane: to scatter it. This is.housand times more harmful. This is according to the analyses of the technicians
Saddam: Wc should consider alternatives Husayn (He called Husayneaning that if the planes don't arrive, then the missile will, and if the missile is intercepted, the plane will arrive.
Husayn Kamil; Sir. il is rare that the missiles are intercepted.
Saddam: Anyways, il is our duty lo think ol all the bad scenarios of this mission. Then Israel first, and if the Americans attack us with unconventional, harmful types of weapons, or ai the moment we see it feasible to attack, but as for now. put Riyadh and Jeddah as
Saddam: Ail Force Commander |Muzahim Sa'b Hasan Muhammad Al Nasiri, at Ihe limel, you should coordinate with the Minister ot Industry to gel access to the weapons in ihc shortest time possible, of courseot of consideration tor the technical and safety factors.arn toritten authorization to lhe 'concernedhai is signed by me. in Case something happens io me. You know thisife and death issue, all the orders aboul targels are scaled inand authenticated, lurtherrnorc. for tbe officials from the missile (rockets) authority, you should coordinate with them so that they lake the mis-sue to locations. They are lo inlorm the chief of staff, or operations commander deputy, lo go to Husayn. Minister of Industry and go wuh ihc same necessary procedures. Regarding the chemical weapon|.
Husayn Kamil: We arc really in good control of il sir.
Saddam:ean it should be with the "raking action" people. (Translator Comment: Ihe people who will execute Ihe command: iniplcmenters.l
llusayn Kamil: Sir, Ihe chemical is available and our establishment is ihc one responsible for commuting the weapon and supervising how il is used.
Saddam: Excellent. Do you have anything slocked in ihe establishment stores?
llusayn Kamil: We have (empty) heads but we also have production all over. Not only in the factories: it is scattered.
ant you to keep in mind thai by thenothing should be stored in your factories lhat the "enemy" can have access lo.
Husayn Kamil: Sir. the Minislry of defense should pull thai "Stuff" out. The Minislry of defenseS' of that stuff. When and if they ask us for ihc rest, wc will have no problem supplying ii. Sir. we are in anrepared situation regarding the missile warheads and fighter's bombs. They are all modified and ready for launching any time, ihc chemical and ihc germ.
No conversation (sound of plates banging).
Saddam: Where arc the most American forces and troops gathered and concentrated?
Speakerir, it is in Khalid Military city "Madinatocatedilometers past Hafr Al-Balen in Saudi, where the front General Command and Air Force Command are located. Most of the American army sectors. Sir, are by the coastal side in Al-Dammam. where most of ihe camp complexes exisl.
arn ihesc big gatherings and complexes to be allocated properly* and given to lhe Air Forcelo be added to ihc above largets of the germs weapons. This should be done by an order to Muza-him. This isirect order and it has the green light from mc. since this mission doesn't fall inio daily regularilletter, signed by mc, listing the commands and ihe alternative plans and probabilities of this mission, which should beliterally.
Speakerir. Economically important largets such as refineries, powerater reservoirs, should we include them in ihe mission?
Saddam: These locations should be pul under the regular Air Force operations, and included in attacks noi on this pankular mission.
Husayn Kamil: Sir, these vital locations must be added to the mission and become priority targets to thehemical weapons, because this will end all sorts of life. People are drinking water from these desalination plants and getting their fuel from refineries, thus ending ihc mission.
Saddam: Muzahim has already written these locations down and will lake care ot n. Kclinenes andj
Muzahim: The Refineries and desalination plants. Sir.
Saddam: May God help us do it. Then there was no
conversation.
Saddam: We will never lower our beads as long as we are alive, even if we haveestroy everybody.
The recording continues after ihisurtherinutes, in which the participiuits discuss othermatters, such as senior command appointments and low-level defensive preparations. There was no further discussion of WMD
Regime Finance and Procurement
We have said wiih certainly llutt ihe embargo will not he liftedecurity Council resolution, but will corrode by itself.
Saddam speaking in0 to markh anniversary of the Iraqi armed forces.
Contents
A Word on ihe Scope of This
Key
Chapter
The Regime
Ambition
Decline
Recovery
Transition and Miscalculation
Directing and Budgeting Iraq's Illicit
Overview
President and Presidential Secretary's Role in Illicit
Presidential Diwan's Role in Illicit Procurement
Diwan's Role in Supplemental Funding of Government
Extent of Knowledge of the Former President of the
Budgeting Iraqi
General Government
Sources of Government
Supplemental Budgetary
Supplemental Budget Submission Procedure
Approval and Authorisation of Supplemental
Disbursal of Supplemental
Financing Iraq's Illicit
Iraqi Economy's Role in Illicit
Economic Ambition
Economic
Economic Recovery
Economic Transition and Miscalculation
Iraq's Revenue Sources
Bilateral Trade
Phases of the UN OFF Program
Disposition of UN OFF
Oil Voucher
Secret voucher
Iraqi Oil Vouchers Provided to International
American and British Oil Voucher
Benon Sevan's Use of Iraqi Oil Vouchers
Iraqi Intelligence Service Nominations for Oil
Oil Export33
How Surcharges Were
Kickback* on Commercial Good* Import35
Private-Sector Oil
Role of the
SOMO's Relationship to the
Official Oil
Banking and the Transfer of Financial Assets for Procurement
CBI't Role in licensing Money
ole in Tracking Foreign Accounts for
Iraqi Bank
Funding ol the
The Use of Foreign
Use of Banks in
Use of Ranks in
Use of Banks in
Use of Banks in
Use of Banks in
Use of Banks in50
Regime Attempts To Recover Funds Prior to
The Role of Cash51
Iraq's Gold
Executing Illicit Procurement in Iraq: Ministries. Commissions, and Front
Overview
Ministry of Foreign
MFA-IIS
MFA's UN Sanctions
MFA and Iraq's Bilateral
Ministry of Trade
MoT's Role in57
Facilitating Illicit Procurement With Cover58
Facilitating Illicit Trade Through Commercial
Ministry of
MoO Ptocwufiwi
MoD Procurement
Budgeting and Financing Military
MoD Procurement
Procurement for Ihe Republican Guard and Special Republican
Military Industrialization
Procurement Leadership in the
MIC: Bcncikiary of Illicit
MIC Bonking
Items Procured via ihc MIC's Link io Iraqi
MIC Front
Iraqi Intelligence
IIS Procurcmem leadership and
IIS Procurement Cooperation with Foreign Intelligence
Tocurcd hy the79
IIS From C
Special Sccurily
SSO Procurement leadership and
Iraqi Alomic Energy
Minislry ot Transport and
Mission and Key IVocurement Companies under ihe
Minislry ofucation and Scientific
University Collaboration With
Esploilaiion ol Academic Exchanges for Procure men
Minislry of
MmiMry of hrayjejor
Front Companyl-bnun and
The Al-Fjtun
Al Handal Genenl Trading
Supplying Iraq With Prohimied
Overs
Procurement Suppliers During the Decline1 io
Romania
Piocuremeni Supplies* During lhe Recovery6 to
South
People's Republic of
Former Federal Republic of
Procurerncnt Suppliers in lhe Transition and Miscalculate*8 to
North
Transportation Routes From North Korea to
l^yrnent Methods lot North Korean
in
Methods Used To Hide Tiansshiprnent to
Polish-Iraqi Procurement Financial
123
126
127
129
129
Key Belamsian Individuals Linked to Blicit Trade With Iraq
uipment and .Services Provided hy Belarus
Payments From Iraq to Belarus
Taiwan
Egypt
Opening Conventionai Trade Wiih Yemen tor Oil and
Yemen Emerges as an Intermediary for Iraqi Illicit
Importing Prohibited
Deceptive Tiade Practices Supporting Illicit
Use of Trade Intermediaries
Disguising the Nature of Prohibited
Consealing the Identity of
Discussing the Commodity's
Use of Illicit Smuggling and Transportation
Smuggling by138
Smuggling by
Smuggling by
Smuggling via Jordanian139
Smuggling via Syrian
Smuggling via the Arabian
Annexes
of Iraq's Bilateral Trade
Oil Voucher
Budgetary
Economic
B. Illicit Burnings Sources and Estimation
F.Iraqi Oil
G. Iraq's Banking
II. UN Security Council Resolutions Applicable to
I. Su.pcctcd WMD-Relaled Dual-l'se (ioods and Procuivmeni
J. The Procarrrnent of Conventional Military Goods in Breach of UN
K. Suspected Intermediary and Front Companies Associated With
I Procurement,
A Word on Ihc -Scope of This Chapter
This chapter of the Comprehensive Report details the evolution of Iraq's campaign to evade and overcome ihc UN ban on its import of material related to Weapons of Macs Destruction and conventional military forces. It also describes Iraq's effort to use the sale of its oil to hasten the end of the entire sanctions Regime. Because this chapter deals with Iraq's international trade and finance, half of the picture rests with entities outsidecompanies, and individuals-
To icll the story, wc had totrade partners or entities Iraq thoughtto its plight. Most of those individuals or entities arc clearly identified in Iraqi documents, some of which were substantiated through interviews with former Iraqi Regime officials. We name those individuals and entities here in the interest of candor, clarity, and thoroughness. But it is not in ISCi's mandate or capabilities IO investigate or judge those non-Iraqi individuals or entities. And in many cases, the Iraqi documents andstop short of confirminganicular transaction was consummated, orourted foreignofficial said "yes" to Iraqi blaisdishments.
We also must point out thai some Iraqi trade was legal and legitimate under the UN Oil-For-Food Program. Il is important to understand thai the Iraqi Regime used both sanctioned and unsanctioned trade lo buyand gain allies. But Iraq's intent to circumvent sanctions by no means incriminates those who may have in some cases unwittingly provided unsanctioned commodities lo Iraq. Wc would like to emphasize that this report docs not intend to analyze or assess the legal implications for non-Iraqis.
Throughoutnd upIF, Saddam focused on one set of objectives: the survival of himself, his Regime, and his legacy. To secure those objectives. Saddam needed to exploit Iraqi oil assets, totrong military capability lo deter internal and external threats, and to foster his image as an Arab leader. Saddam recognized that the reconstiiution of Iraqi WMD enhanced boih his sccuriiy and image.Saddam needed to end UN-imposed sanctions to fulfill his goals.
Saddam severely under estimated the economic and military costs of invading Iran0 and Kuwaits well as underestimating the subsequent international condemnation of his invasion of Kuwait. He did not anticipate this condemnation, nor the subsequent imposition, comprehensiveness, severity, andof UN sanctions. His initial belief that UN sanctions would not last, resulting in his country's economic decline, changed8 when the UNSC did not lift sanctions after he believed resolutions were fulfilled. Although Saddam had reluctantly accepted Ihc UN's Oil for Food (OFF) programe soonits economic value and additional opportunities for further manipulation and influence of the UNSCanctions Committee member states. Therefore, he resigned himself to the continuaiion of UN sanctions understanding that they wouldpaper tiger" regardless of continued US resolve to maintain them.
Throughout sanctions, Saddam continually directed his advisorsormulate and implement strategies,and methods to terminate the UN's sanctions regime established by. The Regime devised an effective diplomatic and economic strategy of generating revenue and procuring illicit goods utilizing the Iraqi intelligence, banking, industrial, and military apparatus that eroded United Nations' member states and other international players' resolve to enforce compliance, while capitalizing politically on its humanitarian crisis.
From Saddam's perspective. UN sanctions hindered his ability to rule Iraq with complete authority and autonomy. In the long run, UN sanctions also interfered with his efforts toistoric legacy. According to Saddam and his senior advisors. Ihe UN, al Ihe behest of Ihe US. placed an economic strangle hold on Iraq. The UN controlled Saddam's main source of revenue (oil exports) and determined what Iraq could import.
UN sanctions curbed Saddam's ability to import weapons, technology, and expertise imo Iraq. Sanctions also limited his ability to finance his military, intelligence, and security forces to deal with his perceived and real external threats.
- In Short. Saddam considered UN sanctionsorm of economic war and the UN's OFF program and Northern and Southern Watch Operations as campaigns of that larger economic war orchestrated by the US and UK. His evolving strategy centered on breaking free of UN sanctions in order to liberate his economy from the economic strangle-hold so he could continue to pursue his political and personal objectives.
One aspect of Saddam's Strategy of unhinging the UN's sanctions against Iraq, centered on Saddam's efforts to influence certain UN SC permanent members, such as Russia. France, and China and some nonpermanent (Syria. Ukraine) members to end UN sanctions. Under Saddam's orders, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) formulated andtrategy aimed at these UNSC members and internationalpubUc opinion with the purpose of ending UN sanctions and undermining Us subsequent OFF program byand economic means.inimum. Saddam wanted io divide the live permanent members and foment international public suppon of Iraq at Ihc UN and throughout the worldavvy public relations campaign and an extensive diplomatic effort.
Another clement of this strategy involved Circumventing UN sanctions and the OFF program by means of "Protocols" or governmcnl-to-govcrnmcnt economic trade agreements. Protocols allowed Saddam toa large amount of revenue outside the purview of the UN. The successful implementation of the Protocols, continued oil smuggling efforts, and the manipulation of UN OFF contracts emboldened Saddam to pursue his military reconstiiution efforts starting7 and peakinghese efforts covered conventional arms, dual-use goods acquisition, and some WMD-related programs.
Once money began Io flow inio Iraq, the Regime's authorities, aided by foreign companies and some foreign governments, devised and implemenied methods and techniques io ptocure illicit goods from foreign
To implement its procurement efforts, Iraq under Saddam,etwork of Iraqi front companies, some with close relationships to high-ranking foreign government officials. These foreign government officials, in turn, worked through their respective ministries, state-run companies and ministry-sponsored frontio procure illicit goods, services, and technologies for Iraq's WMD-rclaicd, conventional arms, and/or dual-use goods programs.
The Regime financed these government-sanctioned programs by several illicit revenue streams that amassed moreillion from theo OIF outside the UN-approved methods The most profitable stream concerned Protocols or govcmmcnt-to-govemmcni agreements lhat generated5 billion for Saddam. Iraq earned an additionalillion from kickbacks or surcharges associated wiih the UN's OFF0 million from oil "cash sales" or smuggling; and0 million from other surcharge impositions.
Analysis of Iraqi Financial Data
Saddam directed the Regime's key ministries and governmental agencies io devise and implement straicgies, policies, and techniques to discredit the UN sanctions, harass UN personnel in Iraq, and discredit the US. At the same lime, according to reporting, he also wanted to obfuscate Iraq's refusal to reveal the nature of its WMD and WMD-rclalcd programs, their capabilities, and his intentions.
Saddam used the IIS to undertake the most sensitive procurement missions. Consequently, the IISthe Import of UN sanctioned and dual-use goods into Iraq through countries like Syria, Jordan, Belarus and Turkey.
The IIS had representatives in most of Iraq's embassies in these foreign countriesariety of official covers. One type of cover was the "commercial attaches" that were seni io make contacts wiih foreignThe attaches sei up front companies, facilitated die banking process and transfers of funds asand approved by the senior ofticials within ihe Government.
The MFAritical role in facilitating Iraq's procurement of military goods, dual-use goodsto WMD, transponing cash and other valuable goods earned by illicit oil revenue, and forming andiplomatic strategy to end UN sanctions and the subsequent UN OFF program by nefarious means.
Saddam used the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MHESR) through its universities and research programs io maintain, develop, and acquire expertise, to advance or preserve existent research projects and developments, and to procure goods prohibited by UN SC sanctions.
The Ministry of Oil (MoO> controlled the oil voucher distribution program lhat used oil to influence UN members to support Iraq's goals. Saddam personally approved and removed aU names of voucher recipi-
The Iraqi revenue analysis presented in this report iv based on government documents and financial databases, spreadsheets, and other records obtained from SOMO, the Iraqi Minislry of Oil. and the Central Bank of Iraq ICBIl, and other Ministries. These sources appear to be of good quality and consistent with other pre- and post-Operation Iraqi Freedom information. All Iraqi revenue data and derived figures in this report have been calculated in current dollars.
ents. He made all modifications lo Ihe list, adding or deleting names at wilt. Other senior Iraqi leaders could nominate or recommend an individual or organization to be added or subtracted from the voucher list, and ad hoc allocation committees met to review and update the allocations.
Iraq under Saddam successfully devised various methods to acquire and import items prohibited under UN sanctions. Numerous Iraqi and foreign trade intermediaries disguised illicit Items, hid the identity of the end user, and/or changed the final destination of the commodity to get it to the region.ut of the protits. these trade intermediaries moved, and in many cases smuggled, the prohibited items through land. sea. and air entry points along the Iraqi border.
Byhe exponential growth of Iraq's illicit revenue, increased international sympathy for Iraq's humanitarian plight, and increased complicity by Iraqi's neighbors led elements within Saddam's Regime to boast that the UN sanctions were slowly eroding. Inhe ruling Iraqi Ba athisi paper. Al-Thawrah. claimed victory over UN sanctions, staling that Iraq was accelerating its pace to develop its national economy despite the UNnraqi Foreign Minister Sabri stated in an Al-Jazirah TV interview that UN sanctions efforts had collapsed at the same time Baghdad had been making steady progress on iismililary. Arab relations, and international affairs.
Companies in Syria.banon. Turkey, UAE, and Yemen assisted Saddam with the acquisition ofitems through deceptive trade practices. In the case of Syria and Yemen, this included support from agencies or personnel within Ihc government itself.
Numerous ministries in Saddam's Regime facilitated the smuggling of illicit goods through Iraq's borders, pons, and airports. The Iraqi Intelligencend the Military Industiralizalion Commissionowever, were directly responsible for skirting UN monitoring and importing prohibited items for Saddam.
Chapter Summary
'Ihc Illicit Pinancc and Procurement chapter focuses on the economic means, key actors and organizations, foreign suppliers, and procurement mechanisms used by Saddam to pursue his set ol objectives: survival of himself, his Regime, and his legacy. The first section of the chapter provides an historic background divided into key economic phases. The chapter then examines Saddam's major revenue streams outside the UNregime: bilateral trade Protocols, UN OFF oil surcharges, commodity kickbacks, and "cash sales" or oil smuggling activities. ISC. estimates the total amount of revenue eumcd1hile paying special attention to money earned after the introduction of the OFT' program. ISO also addresses how the Regime used its oil assets to influence non-Iraqi individuals by means of an institutionalized, secret oil voucher program.
Following the illicit revenue section, the chapter identifies the Iraqi Regime's key individuals, ministries, organizations, and private entities within the Regime that were involved in Saddam's procurement and revenue activities. Next. Oie section identities foreigngovernments, state-owned and private firms, and/or individual agents that engaged in the export of goods in contravention of UN resolutions. In some cases. ISG has uncovered foreign government activity and knowledge that ranged from tacit approval to activeIn other cases, firms engaged in lhe illegal activities without their government's consent or knowledge. Moreover. ISG's investigation exposed Iraqi and foreign trade intermediaries' deceptive methods used to pur-Chase, acquire, and import UN-banned items.
Finally, this chapter provides several annexes that give more detail on the spectrum of issues examined in the procurement chapter of ISG's report.onsists of translations of Iraq's major trade Protocols;s an Oil voucher recipient list lhat ISG obtained from Iraq's State Oil Marketing Organizationelates Iraq's normal governmental budgetary process, whilerovides general Iraqi economic data.utlines ISG's illicit earnings sources and estimation methodology, androvides anoil smuggling case study.xplains Iraq's banking system, andists Iraqi-related UN Security Council Resolutions.eveal suspected Iraqi dual-use and conventional weaponstransactions, whileists suspected companies engaged inary-related trade with Iraq. Finally.ist of procurement acronyms found throughout this section.
1 "tie Kecime I'imrlinc
an overview of Iraqi WMD programs and policy choices, readers should consul! lhc RegimeChan, enclosedeparate foldout and in tabular form at the back of ISC report. Covering the period0he timeline shows specific events bearing on the Regime's efforts in the BW. CW, delivery systems and nuclear realms and their chronological relationship with political and military developments tltoi had direct hearing on the Regime's policy choices
Readers should also be aware that at the conclusion of each volume of text, we Itave also included foldout summary charts lhat relate inflectionturning points in the Regime's WMDparticular events, initialises, or decisions the Regime took with respect io specific WMD programs. Inflection points are marked in the margins of the textray triangle.
During ihe Ambiiion phase in Iraq, Saddam and his Regime practiced open, traditional procurement of conventional weapons and developed clandestine methods for obtaining WMD materials and dual-use items. Iraq's oil wealth allowed Saddam to overcome the inherent inefficienciesentrally planned economy. After the costly war with Iran, Saddam's procurement efforts focused primarily on restocking Iraq's war materials. These defense-relatedgoals, however, were hindered by economic weakness. In the later pan of this period, the Iraqi economy began to falter, saddledighdebt from the war. rising costs ofenerous welfare state, low international oil prices, and the high cost entailed in weapons and WMD programs. Saddam's ill-conceived, shonsightedreforms7 and reactionary price controls, nationalization, and subsidies9 pushed the Iraqi economy further into crisis. Capping thephase, Saddam chose to tight his way out of economic crises by invading Kuwait.
In the post-Gulf war decline phase, the possession of WMD remained important to lhc Regime. Saddam's procurement of conventional weapons and WMD. however, was hindered severelyotentof international monitoringollapsing oil-based economy. These constraints wereby the decision not to make full WMD disclosures and the subsequent attempt to remove WMD signatures through unilateral destruction. The poor handling of the WMD disclosures further hardened the international community. UNresulting from Saddam's refusal to comply with UN resolutions, froze the Regime's export of oil and import ofoff Saddam's ability to generate the revenue needed for illicit purchases on international arms and dual-use markets. The Iraqi economy also suffered under UN sanctions during this period as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita fell9 to anhe decline in the street-value of the Iraqi Dinar rendered the average Iraqi citizen's savings worthless, casting the Iraqi middle-class into poverty. Simultaneously, this period of decline exhibited an increase in corruption, incompetence, and patronage throughout Saddam's Regime.
Husayn Kamil's flight lo Jordan5 and
Saddam's handling of the issue led to further WMD disclosures and subsequent international opprobrium. Saddamesire for WMD, bul economic growth and the ending of sanctions became theconcern as the economy till rock bottom inhe combination of these factorsSaddam's decision'to accept. the UN OFF
The Recovery phase was ushered in by Saddam's acceptance of UNnd the UN OFFTrade fostered under ihc OFF program starting7 allowed Saddam to pursue numerous illicit revenue earning schemes, which began generating significant amounts of cash outside of the auspices of the UN. With the legitimate side of the OFF program
providing lhe Iraq populaiion wiih economic relief. Saddam was free io develop illicit procurementto arm his Regime against perceived and real threats. By the end of this period, Iraq hadrowing underground network of tradefront companies, and international suppliers willing to trade oil or hard currency for conventional weapons. WMD precursors, andhe state of the Iraqi economy no longer threatened Saddam's hold on power in Iraq, and economic recoveryore confident Regime posture.
Transition and
The Transition and Miscalculation phases opened with Iraq's suspension of cooperation wiih UNSCOM and IAEA. The subsequent lack of effectiveemboldened Saddam and his procurement programs. The Regime successfully manipulated Iraq's oil production and sales policies to influence internalolitical actors and public opinion. However, during this period, Iraq's long-neglected oil infrastructure began to falter, resulting in anio meet demand.esult, ihe growth in the legitimate side of the Iraq economy slowed.Saddam's increasing illegitimate revenue and profits from UN oil sales compensated for legitimate revenue loses. Illicit oil revenue provided Saddam with sufficient funds to pay off his loyalists and expand selected UlicU procurement programs.9 until he was deposed inaddam's conventional weapons and WMD-relatedprograms steadily grew in scale, variety, and efficiency. Saddam inviied UNMOVIC and IAEA back into Iraq inn lhe face ofinternational pressure, calculatingurge in cooperation might have brought sanctions to an end.
Directing and Budgeting Iraq's Illicit Procurement
Overview
Throughoutnd up toaddam continually directed his advisors to formulate and implement policies, methods, and techniques tothe UN's sanctions and obtain prohibitedmilitary and WMD-rclatcd goods.
directed and approved illicit procurement
by his Regime.
The Diwan and Presidential Secretary' facilitated Saddam's procurement directives by processing nonbudget funding for conventional military and WMD programs.
The Iraqi budget process was divided into two differentormal budget that servedommon governmental budgetupplemental or secret budget that was controlled by Saddam and the Economic Affairs Committeehis supplemental process, which emerged in ils most efficient formsed Uticil hard currency to finance prohibited procurement programs.
The Syria. Jordan. Turkey, and Egypt Protocols were official bilateral cooperative agreements approved by officials of the countries involved (sec Annex A: Translations of Iraq's Bilateral Trade Protocols).
According to press reporting, Aziz traveled to Moscowecoveredalso indicate that Tariq Azizetter to Moscow in person, and he mel wiih seniorleaders.
Belarusian President Lukashenko and Saddampecial relationship in whichagreed to support Saddam because of the Iraqi President's suppon of1 Belarusianelections.
Saddam approved and directed the illicitrelationships that Iraq had with otherin order to improve Iraq's military capabilities against regional threats. The Presidential Secretary, Abidm id Mahmud al-Tikriti,ember of the committee that was formed to task ihc IIS via IIS Director Tahir Jalil Habbush al-Tikriti to procure technology for Ihe MIC. In accordance with Saddam's instructions io Huwaysh to improve Iraq's missile capabilities, the MlC-IIS Joint effort was tolhe support to Iraq's missile programs.
President and Presidential Secretary's Role in Illicit Procurement
The highest levels of the government, including the President and the Presidential Secretary, used trade Protocols and other cooperative agreements1 as vehicles to circumvent isanctions and to facilitate the continued arming of Iraq. Iraq negotiated bilateral trade agreements calledwith Syria, Jordan. Turkey, and Egypt and less formal cooperative trade agreements with several East European countries such as Belarus. Poland. Ukraine, and Russia.
The oil vouchers that the Regime would giveho supported his Regime goals further emphasized Saddam's influence over these trade agreements. 'Ihc Presidential Secretary along wiih Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan al-Jizrawi facilitated theof ihese vouchers and approved other trade arrangements by handling the paperwork involved and giving approval on behalf of Saddam forof the oil shares.
Reportedly, Russian. Ukrainian, and Belarusian individuals, who in Baghdad's view, had contributed in some special way io Iraq's security, received oil shares al the request of Saddam (for Ihe full list, sec Annex B: Known Oil Voucherome of these persons have also been identified in Iraqiprocurement efforts (see
Table 1
A Selection of Oil Vouchers Awarded by Saddam Husayn
of Oil Per Year
Khazbulatov
of tne Supreme Soviet Paria ment under Pres* den| Bonss iiif-niniElraticr
Zu-aanov
ot Communist Parry of the RuS&an Federation
Ruoasev
of Ire Russian Solidarity With Iraq organization
Zameialin and Nikolai Yevanyinko
of tne Federation ot Trade Unions and Former Presidential Administration Deputy Chief
Victor Shevtsov
of InlobanK and Head of Beimetatenerooa or Butarus an tore gn trade company
Shebrcv
BEL FARM enterprise
Roboty
in Ihe Belarusian security network (possibly the Belarusran KGB)
f.s
Papirshnoy
of private Ukrainian company
Yuri Orsharuskiy
ofkrainian Irm
5
Kodnavitsev
oo-nd Kozak
federation of Trade Unions
Diwan's Role in Illicit Procurement
The Presidential Office of Saddam comprised two sections: the Presidential Secretary, and theOffice or Presidential Diwan. The Diwan was created in9 to research and study specific issues requested by the President, the Council of Ministers, the Economic Affairs Commiueend the Revolutionary Command Councilhe Diwan was purely an administrative presidential bureau with no policymaking authority. Il liad several depanmenisariety of issues (sechere was also aninancial Accounts Department.
Diwan's Role in Supplemental Funding of Government Ministries
Military and security service entities such as the IIS and the (MIC) could submit requests for additional funds to ihc Presidency. The information on this procedure is often contradictory.
According to the Minister of Finance, the Iraqi security organizations submitted wrincn requests for additional funds cither to the chief of theDiwan, or to the head of the Presidential
Secretariat. The latter, who was also the Secretary of the National Security Council (NSO. probably handled all requests from any security organization and may have been preferred by someheads as he was considered to be closer to the President.
The head of the MIC, the Minister of Defense and the Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) have also described approaching lhc Diwan for supplementary funds. The Chief of Ihe Diwan and Presidential Secretary were sometimes unaware of requests made io one another. Saddamdid this to limit the number of people who had access to expenditure data. Requests sent to the Presidential Diwan were sometimes sent to the Diwan's Financial Accounts Department for study. The chief of the Presidential Diwan sometimes directed the head of ihe Financial Accountsto discuss the request wiih the concerned minister. (Both Khalil Mahudi. the Secretary of the Council of Ministersnd Muhammed Mahdi Al Salih, the Trade Minister, were former heads of the Financial Accounts Department.)
Organizations seeking budget supplements could alsoersonal appointment with Saddam.
PRESIDENTIAL DIWAN
mrocoi wii im i
t> HOI
oiiwttbhit
>
n el-
s' ii'i
fnWt'TO.
Fiffrganization ol Ihe presidential Dnvan.
of Knowledge of Ihe Former President of ihe Diwan
The Chief of (he Diwan. Ahmad Husayn Khudayir al-Samarra'i. maintains lhat he authorized payments lo bodies such as the MIC only on Ihe orders of the President through the Presidential Secretary without knowing the details of the projects being financed. However, the bead of the MIC and Minister of Finance identified him as having been involved in the processing of requests for exira-budgciary payments to the military and security services. Moreover, the Minisier of Finance stated that documents coniaining details of the request, such as project information or justification, were kept at the Chief of the Diwanffice, or with the Presidential Secretary, depending
on where the request had been submined. In addition, captured documents suggesi lhc Chief of the Diwan had al least some knowledge of military and sccuriiy maticrs.
In. al-SamarTa'i provided acovcrnote for paperwork covering Protocolseorgian entityilitary aircraft industrialization
Inl-Samarra'iover note foi paperwork concerning problemsontraCI between the MIC and the Moldavian company Bal-comhe fo* an assaultm) ordinance production line.
Budgeting Iraqi Procurement
and property taxes.
and secret budget planningCustoms duties andgovernment forum and was processed directly
between the Ministry of Finance (MoF) andA percentage of the profits from gnvcrnmcnt-owncd
Presidency, between the requesting organizationand businesses such as banks and insur-
the Presidency, or between the requestinga/id Saddam. The former Regime relied heavily
on liquidating assets (forcing the Central BankThe revenues of leased staleto print more money) to meet ils yearly budget
The municipalities.
Government Budget The general government budget, made up of current and capital spending, however, does not represent the total Iraqi budget because sensitive issues, such as defense, intelligence, and security were excluded.esult, governmenl expenditures and debtwere higher lhan what was listed in ihe budgel.
ccording lo statistics from ihc CBI. Ihc former Regime spent1 billion1his represents an increase5 percent
Complete data about Iraqi government budget spending1 arcommon refrain among government officials and detainees is lhat many of ihese records perished during looting
and fires after the US invaded Baghdad.
Because of ihe economic constraints following the war with Iran (sec Economicst becamefor the Regime to draft and adhere io anbudget. Figures estimated in January diverged considerably by the end of the fiscal year. Also, because of Saddam's patronage policies. Iheaccounts were reportedly routinely overdrawn byercent, and aboulercent of lhe infrastructure expenditure was spent by Saddam.
Sources of Government Revenue
On-budgetincluded in the general
governmentfrom sources such as:
Not all-Iraqi government revenue was accounted for in the general government budget. Some of ihcsc nfl-hudgci funds included income earned through:
The Syrian, Turkish, and Jordanian trade Protocols.
Kickbacks on UN OFF Program import contracls.
Supplemental Budgetary* Process
The procurement programs supporting Iraq's WMI) programs and prohibited conventional militarypurchases were financedupplemcnlal budget process thai occurred ouisidc of ihcnational and defense budgets (for details on the development, approval, and execution of the common national budgets, see Annex C: Iraq's Budgetaryhe approval process and disbursement of funds from ihc supplemental budget illustrate who was distributing the money inio (be illicitprograms and reflect, in quantitative terms, Ihc intenl of the Regime.
Supplemental Budget Submission Procedure There were Iwo methods for ministries andto obtain fundraising for specific projects or procuremenl activities lhal were over and above the scope of iheir annual budgcis:
One method was through the (FAC).
The other was to go directly to Ihe Presidential Diwan or the Presidential Secrciariai.
Iraq's National
As illustrated in Figure1raqi revenues decreased by an average3 percent.61 revenues increased byercent. The reason forercent increase in revenues6 is unclear becauseoil revenues from the UN Oil-for-Fovd(OFF) would not have been realized unlit early
ome Of this increase, however,esuh of revenues rising fromow base, lit
herepereeitt increase in revenues
overlarge increase lhatonsistent with an increase in revenues from OFF. Fyrendiiitirs also decreased1ut byeicent.5x)>eiulitures increased by an averageercent increasel the same time. Over theearshe government budget deficit decreased fromillion to UlOmUtion (sec Annex C: Iraq's Budgetary Process).
The Economic Affairs Committee (EAC)
tnaddam reestablished the EAC to handle economic issues that would have normally gone to the Presidential Diwan (the EAC existed inS but was abolished at an unknownhe EAC had influence over fiscal and monetary policy issues such as government spending, taxation, and importation and interest rates. Only the head of the committee, rather than presenting them to the other committee members, handled some presumablyissues.
ihc first method, which was common for mosland organizations, was to apply for approval from the EAC for the allocation of additional funds (sec
These requests may have been suhmitiedhe chief of the Presidential Diwan or the Secretary of the Council of Ministcisho would submit the requests to Saddam. It is unclear how much control Saddam exerted during ihi$ phase of the process.
IfC voted positively, the Minister of Finance wouldirective to Uie CBI to send theamounthe domestic or overseas account or accounts of the concerned ministry.
If thereispute regarding the approval, the issue would be elevated to the CoM for approval. If the dispute were resolved in the requestor's favor, the Minister of Finance would direct the CBI to complete ihc transaction.
The second method was reserved for the military and security service entities such as the IIS, the MnD, MIC, and other security organizations that submitted requests for additional funds to the President. The information on this procedure is oflen contradictory (see
to the MoF. the Iraqi sccurilysubmitted written requests for additional funds to the President, through either the Chief of the Presidential Diwan or the head of the Presidential Secretariat. The latter, who was also Ihc secretary of ihc NSC, probably handled all requests from any security organization, and may have been preferred by some organizational heads as he was considered to be closer lo the President.
The head of ihc MIC. ihc Minister of Defense, and the Governor of Ihc CBI have also described approaching the Diwan for supplementary funds. Ihc Chief of lhe Diwan and Presidential Sccrclaiy were sometimes unaware of requests made lo one another. Saddam reportedly did ihis lo limit ihe number of people who had access to expenditure data. Requests sent io lhe Presidential Diwan were sometimes sent Io the Diwan's Economicforsludy.The Chief of ihe Presidential Diwan sometimes directed the head of the Economic Department lo discuss the request with theminister. Both Khalil Maltudi, the Secretary of the Council of Ministersnd Muhammcd Mahdi Al Salih. (lie trade minister, were former heads of Ihe Economic Department.
Organisations seeking budget supplements could alsoersonal appointment with Saddam.
Approval and Authorization of Supplemental Funding
While Saddam was the primary approval authority for requests for extra funds, signed authorizations
were also issued from the Chief of the Presidential Diwan or the Presidential Secretary (both were authorized to represent Saddam).
ll the supplement request were made during ameeting between Saddam and the head of an Iraqi security organization. Saddam wouldapprove or disapprove Ihe additional funds.
This verbal approval was put in writing and seni io ihc requesting ministry,isbursal order was sent to the MoF.
Confirmation of these payments would usually he presented as an order from ihc Presidentialto the Chief of the Diwan.
Approvals for all other ministries would be issued in writing Io the concerned minislry and Ihc MoF (ll is unclear whether this includes the IIS, MOD. MIC. and Iraqi security organizations).
orders seni io the MuF contained the dale, signature of approving authority, amount, hut no information about the request. Documents containing details of ihe request. Such as project
IRAQ: Budgetupplementary Funds, Most Ministries and Organizations, Part I
Figureupplementary budget process: most ministries.
IRAQ: Budgetupplementary Funds, Secret and Off-budget Issues, Part II
>
ODi MC
vppkxnontary budget process: US, MIS. and other special organizations.
information or justification, were kept at the Chief of the Presidential Diwan's office or theSecretary's office, depending on where the request had been submitted,
ISG has collected information concerning the nature of payments sought by the military and securitythrough the Diwan. However. Ihis information generally lacks detail.
example, the IIS successfully sought additional funding of5 million Iraqiconversion rateD to the dollar was used to5 million IDo provide weaponry and ammunition for the Jala! Al-Talibani Group in
According to MIC Director and Deputy PrimeAbd al-Tawah Mullah Huwaysh, the MIC would approach the Diwan for additional hard currency funds. Examples of such occasions occurringncluded:
A paymentillion for an unsuccessful deal to purchase their Defense System, with payment split evenly between the Ministry of Finance and Presidenl Diwan.
illion for the purchasemmfrom the Former Federal Republic of(FRY) and Syria.
illion for the purchase of light weapons and ammunition (includingnd KORNET ATGMs) from Russiayrian company.
illionaintenance facility forand the purchase ofndngines.
illiononiraci widi Ihe FRY company ORAOaintenance facility forngines.
The purchaseight-vision goggles from Ukraine.
Disbursal of Supplemental Funds
As staled by ihe Minister of Finance, the preferred method used to disburse requests for extra-budgetary funds was for the EAC to add the additional funds to Ihe requesting ministry's budget. However incases, such as when requests were limethe funds would be paid directly to the ministry. Most transactions were conducted using accounts at the Ralidian bank. Additional accounts were located at the CHI.
Financing Iraq's Illicit I'roairrm.Tit
Overview
Iraq developed four major mechanisms for raising illicit funds outside the legitimate UN OFF program. These included the sale of Iraqi oil to neighboring and regional states via trade Protocols, the imposition of surcharges on nil sold through the UN OFFand the receipt of kickbacks on UN-approved contracts for goods purchased under the UN OFF program, and so-called "cash-sales" or smuggling.
6ombination of the UN OFF Program, bilateral trade, and illicit oilallowed the Iraqi economy to recover from theepression. This recovery ended the threat of economically induced Regime instability and provided Saddam with sufficient resources to pursue cosily procurement programs.
After the economic recovery wanedrevenues continued to amass via increasingly efficient kickback schemes and illicit oil sales. ISC estimates Saddamillion in hard currency through illicit means03 (sec
N OFF Program opened many Opportunities for Saddam's Regime:
Itillion in needed goods for the people of Iraq, relieving the economic pressure on Regime stability.
Saddam was able to subvert the UN OFF program to generate an estimatedillion in revenue outside of UN controlree
The UN OFF oil voucher program provided Saddamseful method of rewardingorganizations and individuals willing towith Iraq to subvert UN sanctions.
Iraqi Economy's Role in Illicit Procurement
During Saddam's rule. Iraq adopted (he Soviet Union's centrally planned economic model. Saddam sought to centrally plan all facets of Ibc stateand utilized "Five Year Plans" to optimize the use of national resources, viewing the Iraqi economy fromerspective, we assess it underwent distinct phaseshrough OIF:ndReaders may find it useful to refer lo thesummary chan at the end of the chapter.
Economic
Given Iraq's large oil revenues ofnd. Saddam was able io ambitiouslytate-controlled economy without having to choose between solvency and other priorities, such as health and welfare programs, infrastructure development and development of his armed forces (sec: Iraq Economic. Iraq's oil wealth allowed Saddam to overcome the inefficiencies of the economy until the war with Iran. Even with the war. his cash reserves and borrowed money from friendly Arab states allowed Saddam to continue his ambitious policies into the.
TTu- Iran-Iraq war, however, exhausted and crippled the Iraqi economy:
Iraq had been free of foreign debt andillion in foreign reserveshese reserves, however, could not hear more than the opening salvos of the war wiih Iran, whichears cost anillion in armsalone.
Following the war. Iraq was under pressure to pay off high-interest, shon-ierm debts to Westernestimated5 billion. Saddam, however, never paid off this debt [secD: Iraq Economic
77ie economic burdens resulting from the Iran-Iraq war led Saddam to abandon Ba 'alb-socialist economic policies thai dominated innd
.addam attempted to turn ihc Iraqi economy around with abrupl economic reforms.
Jordanrotocol Re.snue
Protocol Revenue
Protocol Revenue
Egyptian Protocol Revenue
rivate Sector Cash Sales
CffF onurcharge*
from Commercialr Hjinanitarian Goods Commcis
Jordan Protocol Syria Prolocol Turkey Protocol Egypt Importil Surcharge Private Sector
Figureraqi Htot earnings by type (miMon.
including abolishing universal employment labor laws Collecting Compenuilion for the First Gulf War and privatizing key governmenl industries.
a result, thousands ol government workers were jobless.
Bus companies, gasepartment stores, agricultural businesses, and lactones were leftthe responsibility of the posernment.
Rather than shocking the Iraqi economy into pcrtorm-ing. these measures,eepened ihc economic crisis and accelerated the collapse ot living standards for most Iraqis.hrcal to the viability of the Regime. Saddam again imposed price controls, renationalizcd some former state enterprises, and raised industrial and agricultural subsidies. The Iraqi economy was pushed lo crisis by Saddam 's inability to address orumber of economic
lhc rising cost of maintaining the Iraqi welfare stale, which was among the more generous and comprehensive systems in ihe Arab world.
low oil prices on the intenutiorul markets, which Saddam associated with Kuwait and its conducting "economic warfare"raq
Ihe lingering debt from the war wiih Iran.
The cost of rebuilding his military and expanding his WMD programs,
Saddam chose to fight his way out of economic crisis by invading Kuwait.
Economic1
Raiher lhan rescuing the Iraqi economy, the in vion of Kuwait resulted imgreater fiscal strains as Saddam found himselfecond coaly war. this timeSdedCoalition. Afterefeat in Kuwait, lhc UN trade sanctions placed on Iraq following the invasion remained in place. These sanctions, supported byl nations, cut Iraq's ability to export oil, its main revenueAfter Desert Storm, Saddam also had to contend with compensation claims made for reparations of damage inflicted during ihe invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) was responsible for processing andsuch claims as authorized by UN Security Ci-until. Hirt the insistence of Moscow, she UN rraJdressed the revenuealloc of Iraqi oil revenue. In0 it rated for the UNSC-adopted UNSCR I* M> that changed the percentage of oil allocated to the UNCC from JO percent) toen ent. The UNCC estimated that the reduction toercent would generate an5 million in Phase XII of the OFF program for the Iraqi Regime. Aslaims6 billion have been adjudicated, ami claimsllion have been awarded by the UNCC. Additional claimsi billion need lo be resolved.
mallei* was illustrated when ihc governmenl setirectorate2omhai economic crimes under Ibrahim al-Bailaw i. who reported directlyatban Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti. lhe Interior Minister and Saddam's brother. The task of the Directorate was to punish merchants and liadcrs guilty ofnhe Regime summarily executederchams in front ot their vhopv in Baghdad's market district. Saddam felt lhat Ihc duty ol" ihe private sector was to provide goods ind services to the Iraqi people while constraining pnee increases. These merchants were found to be ditrking their "duty."
Economice judge that thr harsh economic conditions56 mere the primary factors in Saddams decision to reluctantly accept thesee Uniled Nations OPE Program section)
wanted to pcrpeluuic the image that his people were suffering as "hosiages" io thecommunity under the UN sanctions.
UN-approved oil exports from Iraq began inhe trade fostered under the UN OFF program opened the door for Iraq to developkickback and illicit money earning schemes,
possibly beginning as earlyhese legitirnate and illegitimate revenue streams bolstered the Iraqi economy enough sout ateast for the Iraqi leadership and the elite
- In6eriod. Iraq's GDP increased fromillionillion.
According loihe UN International Children's Emergency Fundraq's chronicrate dropped fromerceni6 to just overercent
Iraqi oil production jumped fromillion barrels per day (bbl/d)7illionn
Economic Transition and
raq's economic growth slowedumber of reasons, most involving the production and sale of oil As the Iraqi economy improved,
Saddam began to restrict oil production to influence the price of oil in the world market and to leverage political influence. Additionally. Iraq's oil sector could noi meet demand because of years of poor reservoir management, corrosion problems at various oil facilities, deterioration of water injectionlack of spare parts, and damage lo od storage and pumping facilities. Ihcse petroleumaddam's ability teo;'. xtd hampered the Regime's ability to sustain thegrowth shown7
Iraq's GDP slippedeakillion0illion
Iraqi oil production droppedillionnoillion
Nevertheless, from thentil Operation Iraqi Freedom. Saddam steadily strengthened ihe fiscal position of the Regime while investing, as he wished, in development, technology, industry, and defense. Saddam also had enough revenue at his disposal to keep his loyalists in ihc Regime well paid. In short,6 the slate of the Iraqi economy no longer threatened Saddam's hold on power in Iraq.
The budget for theey illicit procurement organization, grew8 million60 mdlion in 2HiV
Despite Iraq's economic problems, MIC Direcior Abd al-Tawab Mullah Huwaysh staled that Saddam wentalace and mosque building spree in thehat1 construction
Iraq's Revenue Sources
During UN sanctions on Iraq, from0 until OIF inaddams Regime earned an estimatedillion utilizing four primary illicit sources of hard currency income. The UN OFF program became Saddam's sole legitimate means to generate revenue outside of Iraq
BerwW the scenes, the Irani governmenl illegally generated bilons of dollars In revenue through illegal surcharges It pOxod on UN approval oilt secretly received on top of UN app-oved contracts tor purchase of commercial goods, and from *egai;seaet cash border sates and smugging
f-gutQaddam's mgiittakt and met of revenue process
PROTOCOLS KICKBACKS
edit antUjshcarnmus Undcr-ihe-uMc
mtl o'l export* under pvrcx'iil kickbacks from o eenis per SECTOR CASH
Figures. Summary ol dtieit Iraqi
Illicit barrel surcharges on oil sold through the UN OFT program, hereafter referred lo as surcharges.
Ten-perceni kickbacks from imports authorized under the UN OFF program, hereafter referred to as kickbacks.
Exports, primarily petroleum, to private-sector buyers outside the Protocol and UN systems,referred to as private-sector exports.
The Regime filtered tht majority of the illicitly earned monies through foreign hank accounts in the name of Iraqi banks, ministries, or agencies in violation of US sanctions. According to senior Iraqi officials at SOMO. oil suppliers and traders, who sometimes brought large suitcases full ofmbassies and Iraqi Ministry offices, so that the payments would be untraceable, filled ihese illegal bank accounts.
7addam generated enough revenue to procure sanctioned mililary goods and equipment, dual-use industrial nutierial, and technology as well as some legitimate uses. These sanctioned goods transactions will be described in detail in later sections. He used those funds lo slow the erosion of his conventional mililary capability in contravention of UN SC resolutions. Availablealso indicates Iraq used trade Protocols with various countriesacilitate the delivery of some dual-use items thai could be used in the development and production of WMD.
Bilateral trade Protocols
Iraq's bilateral trade Protocols with neighboring states provided Saddam with his largest source of Illicit Income during UN sanctions. The Protocol with Jordan ensured theinancial survival until ihe UN OFF program began Inoial income from ihc Protocols is estimated al SS billion.
* Baghdad coordinated Protocols with Syria, Turkey. Jordan, and Fgypi. These governments were full parties to all aspects of Iraq's unauthorized oil cxpons and imports (sec Annex A: Translations of Iraq's Bilateral Trade Protocols).
Analysis of Iraqi Financial Data
Die following revenue analysis is based ondocumenis and financial databases,and other records obtained from SOMO, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, and die Central Bank of Iraqmong others. These sources appear to be genuine, of good quality, and consistent with other pre- and post-Opemlion Iraqi Freedom information. This hard data are augmented, put into contest, and explained by slatements from former and current Iraqi government officials, particularly from SOMO. the Ministry of Oil. the Ministry of Trade, and ihe CBI (for more details, see Annex E: Illicit Earnings Sources and Estimation Methodology).
for what (hey importedrobably was thehai Iraq shipped to Egypt ihiough Jordan during the firs! half
officials also agreed to import nonpetro-Icum Iraqi productsncluding sulfur, urea, and barley, bul we do noi know if these goods were actually imported or what Iraq's earnings were from them.
We do not have complete Iraqi data for Iraq's effeC' live earnings from the Jordan Protocol during the sanctions period but estimate them4 billion
(see Annex E, Illicit Earnings Sources and Estimation Methodology).
judge Iraq's earnings amounted io0 million annually15otal ofillion. This estimate includes trade approved under ihe Protocol averaging0 million annually and Iraq's debt Io Jordan increasing hyillion, which accounts for additional Iraqi imports averaging0ear (sec.
Wc used announced trade Protocol levels toearnings68 amounting0 million.
A combination of SOMO invoice and collections data was used to estimate earnings937 billion.
earnings under the Protocol primarily were deposited in an Iraqi Ministry of Trade (MoT) account in the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) (see.
Jordan deposited its credit payments for Iraqi oil. into an account ai the CBJ on behalf of the CBI. Funds were then disbursed io suppliers by the CBJ by order of the CBI.
rior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Iraq had an4 million dollars in its irade account in Jordan. With total deposits to the trade account during the sanctions Regime estimated at4 billion4 million remaining at Ihe end of Ihc war, Iraq would have spent almosi S4 billion on Jordanian origin goods and reexports under tlie Protocol agreement.
The Jordan Protocol is generally referred IO (by Jordanian and Iraqi officials)ercent credit account, with no cash being provided to Iraq. SOMO informationenior MoT official, however,mall portion of ihc trade waserceni credit andercent cash.
Documenis list oil sales lo the Jordanian Minislry of Energy and Mineralspercentpercent cash basis. Contracts of this lype are listed only2 and are valued at2 million.
A high-level Iraqi Trade Ministry official stated lhal Jordan's paymenis to Iraq for lhe cash portion of the trade Protocol was negotiated between ihc CBI and Jordan and provided specific writtenabout how to transfer ihc funds to Iraq. Wc have no further information on this aspect of the Jordan-Iraq trade Protocol.
A MoO official staled his ministry had iwo accounts in Jordan funded by the Protocol. This could refer, in part, Iopcrccnt cash portion of (he Irade, although ihe accounts heldillion while Ihis trade only2 million.
AccordingOMO's database,pcrccnt earnings were deposited in (he Jordan National Bank.pcrcem cash earnings were deposited in ihe Ahli Bank, where much of Iraq's cashfrom other Protocols were deposited. These, along wiih cash earnings from other sources, could account for Ihe funds in Ihe Ministry's accounts.
Ii is possible, maybe even likely, that Iraqi oil sales underrrangement, sales in ihc Jordanian military, and purchases ihai resulted in SI billion in debt owed lo Jordan are not technically pan of ihc iradc Protocol. Nevertheless, given the governmenl lo government nature of these transactions. Ihey were accounted for here instead of as private-sector exports.
Syria Trade Protocol. Iraq's trade Protocol with Syria was Iraq's primary illicit income source0 until OIF inith Syria facing increased political pressure from ihc US, opening relations wiih Iraq seemed attractive for bothand financial reasons. Negotiations began, and the Protocol was signed before Hafiz al-Assad died on
he relationship ptobably accelerated when al-Assad's son, Bashar al-Assad, becameonor Baghdad, the relationship was attractive because Syria could buy significantly more oil at better financial terms than Iraq's other available illicit markets and Damascus was morelhan any other neighboring stale to allow military goods lo be shipped to Iraq through its territory.
SOMO and the Syrian Oil Marketing Ofhccthe bilateral Irade Protocol in Baghdad fromoontracts were written under the Protocol Irom0 through3 {see Annex A: Translations of Iraq's Bilateral Trade Protocols).
Under the agreement. Iraq exported crude, gas oil, fuel oil. gasoline, base oil. LPG and asphalt to Syria by pipeline and/oro. k
total earnings over the life of the Protocol were aboutillion (see Figure II).
Iraq charged Syria roughly S6 less than theprice for crude under the UN OFT program. Cms nil was solder metric ton and fuel oil was solder metric ton. both significantly discounted from world prices. These shipments allowed Syria to export its own crude oil al market prices instead of having to use it for domestic
Under the Syrian Protocol.ercent of Iraq's earnings were depositedOMO account in the Commercial Bank of Syria for use in buying Syrian goods or foreign-made items purchased through Syria.
Iraqi sources'statements concerning theof Ihe remainingercent cash payment are not clear The best information, however, seems lo indicate the cash was first deposited in aBank of Syria cash account. Once ihis account reachedillion, the funds were transferred to an account at the Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank in Beirut. Ifbanon One source states ihis account was in lebanon. another in Damascus. SOMO eventually transferred ihe money to CBI accounts in Baghdad, jiossibly by courier.
to SOMOillion inwere wrfltcn drawing on the SOMOcredit) account with Syria. If8 billion) of Iraq's total earnings8 billion were deposited in that account during ihe existence of the Protocol, there would bemillionm unspent funds at the end of the war. All of these contracts probably had not been completed before OIF. This, and the possibility of other small accounts, probably explains2 million in total Iraqi funds remaining in Syria at the outbreak of OIF.
Turkey Trade Protocol. Trade under the Turkey-Iraq Protocolignificant source of illicit income for Iraq0 until OIP Inhe Protocolationalization and expansion ofIraqi-private-sector contracts. Iraq was able to increase the volume of its exports and earnings.
The main details of the Turkish Protocol were agreed to at meetings between Iraqi and Turkish delegations ininutes of meetings were signed on9ndheanuary document was signed by Amir Rashid Muhammad al-Ubaydi, MoO. Republic of Iraq, andurkish tradeRepublic of Turkey. It wasoint team of experts from the Iwo sides would mcei every three months lo review lhc progress of iheof the Protocol (secf Iraq's llilater.il trade Protocols).
raq agreed to5 millionbl/d) of crude oil lo four Turkish buyers: Oz Ortadobgu, Ram Dis. ickfen, and the Turkish Petroleum International Company (TPICiPIC was the trading arm of the Turkish National Oil Company and wji granted the righ! to contract for additional oil above5 rraluoo metric tons.
Contracts were written under the Protocol from0 lo
Iraq's total earnings oier the life of Ihe Protocol0 million (see.
WOO in each year 16
mp's estimated garntngs from the'.i
raq'srotocol fmMon US
froma>
charged Turkey' roughlyess than ihcprice lor crude under the UN OFF progrum. The low price nerved as an incentive I'or Turkey io participate in ihe scheme.
Under lhe Turkish agreemem,illion) ol Iraq's earnings were to be deposited inio an account at the Turkey Halk. The account was under lhe name of TPIC, but the control of SOMO. This account was to be used by SOMO to pay Turkish companies (or goods and services delivered and rervdered io Iraqi
Accordingenior SOMO official, some ol these funds were transferred to inicrest bearing accounts. As otOMO7 million in these accounts and had earned7 million in interest since
Iraqi statements aboul lhe amount of cash deposited are inconsistent, bul the hesi information indicates the remainingerceni inillion) was depositedOMO account at lhe Saradar Hank in lebanon. Some of ibese funds may eventually have been transferredBI account at ihe Syrian lxbancsc Commercial Bank. SOMO eventually transferred lhe money- to CBI accounts in Baghdad, possibly by courier.
Iraqi siatcmcnLs about cash deposits arc ugain inconsistent,OMO foreign accountsheet showed theercent) account containing5 million just prior to OIF. Another repon stales Turkish cniitics owes5 million bui also mentions an account balance in44 million. Ai least in the case of4 million, ihe accounting ineludcd both the Protocol credit accountillion) and some savingsfillion} of Iraq's total earnings0 million were deposited in this account,5 million (assuming the lower figure) was remaining al ihe end of the war. Iraq would have spent2 million on Turkish goods and reexports under the Protocol agreement. The value of contracts signed using SOMO accounts amounted5 million according to SOMO records. Some ol these contracts almosi certainly were not completed prior to OIF.
rade Protocol Iraq aad Egypt participatedelatively shorl-lired Protocol fromoc do not have access io documentsIhis agreement, bul. accordingenioi liaqi official. Ihc deal involved the MIC-rclaied company. AMIusan
The lint contract under tbe Protocol was signed innd the last contract tn
The trade Involved primarily crude oil, but the last two contracts were for fuel oil.
Ibe trade reached an estimated peak0nhe cargo was shipped by truck from Iraq to Aqaba, Jordan, where it was loaded on ships (or transport to Egypt or Yemen.
Iraq '* total earnings over the lift af the Protocol' million according to SOMO records. All butillion was earned
Iraq genrtdly charged Egypt about S7 per metre ion lest than the authorized price for crude under the UN OFF program. The first two contractser metric ion off the UN price.
the Protocolpercent credit andcash. The credit account was under SOMO's native at the National Bank of Egypt and tbe cash proceeds were deposited in the Ahli Bank (Jordan National Bank) in Jordan.
United Nations OFF Program The UN OFF program taxed the Iraqi Regime from financial collapse and humanitarian disaster. When Iraq began exporting oil under UN OFFhe Regime averted economic conditions that threatened Us survival The program alioIraq wish unprecedented opportunities to earn significant amounts of hard currency outside the control of the UN.
Phases of the UN OFF Prof-ram
lhe UN OFF Program was run in phases. Each phase was approvedNSCR and was designed to last lor IK0 days, although the length was adjusted al limes as deemed necessary.an from Ml6he first oiloncdnd the first con-liacts financed from the sale of oil were appioved inhe first shipments of food arrived in Iraq in7 and the firsi medicines arrived inhe final oil expecting period. authorized byas in effectC3 (see.
Disposition or IN OFF Funds
As ofraq's oil exports under ihc program had earnedillion. After deducting the costs of lhe UN's administering Uie OFF program and WMD monitoring mission, as well as,illion was available tor Iraqi humanitarian imports. Of ihis amount:
illion worth of humanitarian supplies and equipmeni were delivered io Iraq6 billion of oil industry spare parts and equipment.
illion was approved for projects in beby UN agencies.
illion had been transferred io the Devetop-mcnt Fund for Iraq as of
lhe remainder ol this revenue was uncommitted and in lhe irN-lraq accounts awaiiing further dism-bution.
In addition toillion, an2 billion in approved and funded humanitarian goods were in the production and delivery pipeline and under review by Uie UN and Iraqi authorities.
Oil Vouchers and Allocations Throughout the UN OFF Program. Iraqlandestine oil allocation toucher program that involved the granting of oil certificates to certain Individmals or organizations lo compensate them for their services or efforts in undermining thr resolve of the international community to enforce UNSC resolutions. Saddam also used the vouchereans of wtluencing people andihai might help ihe Regime. By thr end of the final) of the UN OFF Program. Iraq hadillion barrels of oil to approved recipients. However,illion barrels ntre actually lifted (loaded andsame figure reported by Ihe UN.
Ihc oil allocation program was implemented through an opaque voucher program overseen and approved by Saddam and managed ai the mosl vemoi levels of the Iraqi Regime
Starting inf (he UN OFT program, until OIF, ihc Iraqi Regime began iohc alhxa-lions process by giving quantities of oil toand polmcal panics ii favored.
According to Tariq Aziz, Taha Yasin Ramadan al-Ji/rawi. and Hikmat Mizban Ibrahim al-Azzawi, the oil voucher program was managed on an ad hoc hasishy the Regime oflicials listed in
The Iraqi Intelligence Service, Ambassadors, and other senior Iraqi officials also commonly made nominations for oil allocations.
Oil Voucher Process
The MoO normally distributed the secret oilin six-monih cycles, which occurred inwith the UN OFF phases (see. Senior Iraqi leaders could nominate or recommend an individual or organization to he added or subtracted from the voucher list and an ad hoc allocationmet to review and update the allocations (see Annex B; Known Oil Voucherowever. Saddam personally approved and removed all names on ihe voucher recipient lists.
This voucher program was documented in detailomplete lisiing maintained by Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan al-Jizrawi and the Minister for Oil, AmirMuhammcd Rashid Tikriti Al Lhaydi.hange was requested by telephone hy Saddam or any other lop official, cither the MoO or SOMOetailed memo for the record of theenior Iraqi official, ambassador, the IIS, oi Saddam himself wouldpecific recipient. company, individual, Or organisation) and ibcamount of Ihc allocalkm. Thaiwas then considered by the ad hoc committee and balanced againsl the total amount of oil available for export under the UN program disbursement. When former Vice President Ramadan finalized the recipient list, it was sent to Al Ubaydi. The official at SOMO in charge of issuing Ihc final allocalion vouchers (making the disbursements) stated that Tariq Aziz would give Ihc final list to him. He believed that it was Aziz lhat finalized ihc list upon the direction of Saddam.
Secret Voucher Recipients
In general, secret oil allocations were awarded to:
Traditional oil companies that owned refineries.
Different personalities and parlies, which were labeled "special allocations" orhis group included Bcnon Sevan, the former UN Chief of lhc Office of Iraq Programumerous individuals including Russian, Yugoslav, Ukrainian, and French citizens.
'The Russian Slate" with specific recipients(see Annex B: Known Oil Voucher Recipients).
Recipients could collect their allocation vouchers in person ai SOMO or designate someone to collect them on Iheir behalf. The oil voucher was ainstrument. Recipients, especially those not in the petroleum business, could sell or trade the allocationsiscount to international oil buyers or companies0 toent per barrel profit. Frequent buyers
Millions of Barrels
OH Voucher Allocations LiftedTotal Oil Voucher Allocations
30
430
303
103
JMAWAWA
1 2 3 4 S 6 7
IS. Largs differences in the later phases between the amount allocated under tne voucher system and the amount actuary htted was duo to cteruptkyis tn Iraq's oil exports.
Chinesewiss approx. ft*
Males an approx S%
approx. 6%
Jodanian approx.lan approx. 4%
Hb Opn nis In Other tfcttona
he nationality otoucher recipients by volume of oil allocated
ihcsc large allocations included companies in the L'AE as well as Elf Total. Royal Dutch Shell and other*..
Figureeflects the general proportion of the nationalities targeted to receive Iraq's oil allocations hy volume of oil allocated, accordingormerofficial with direct access to the information. The lop three countries wiih companies Or entities receiving vouchers were.nd Chinaof the five permanentof (be UNSC. other than lhe US and UK.
Iraqi Oil Vouchers Provided to International Leader*
The following select individuals (secnclude world lenders, senior politicians and corporate officials, were approved by the ad hoc committee as recipients of oil vouchers under this program (see Annex B: Known Oil Voucher Recipientsore complete Ii sling).
The voucher list provided by SOMO includesmembers of governmenl. politicians, andThe former Iraqi Vice President Ramadan
Millions of Barrels Allocated ulflcd
staled thai he believed ihc Russian Government was sympathetic IO Ihc plight ol Iraq and strongly against ihc sanctions imposed upon it and thai mosl of Ihc parties of Ihe Russian Parliament (Duma) supported Iraq's position. He stated thai many Russianwere dealing with the Iraqi ministries in charge of exports, and that this was no sccrei because many of the Russian Ministers visiied Iraq regularly lo aid this activity.
American and British OilRecipients
Accordingormer high ranking Iraqi official with direct accesshe information, there are twoand one L'K citizen listed as recipients on the list of Iraq's illicit ml allocationlthough al Icasi ihree names ore annotated "American" on the Iraqi lists] Deputy Prime Minster Tariq Aziz was ihe principal point of contact for handling all high profile foreignll American recipient* and most other non-Arab voucheralledho lived in countries outside of the Arab world.
Benon Sevan's Use of Iraqi Oil Vouchers At the center of theday operations of theillion OFF program, Sevan who spent his entire career at the UN, received oil allocations through various companies that he recommended to the Iraqi government .This arrangementbegan soon after the OFF program started inn investigation by the IraqiCouncil hasener linking Sevananamanian-registered company called African Middle East Petroleum Company. The leuer, dated
rom Saddam Zayn Hasan.manager of SOMO. and addressed ioRashid Tikriti Al Ubaydi. Ihen the Iraqi
implicates Muwafiq Ayyub in playingin scning up the deal. 'Ihc letter says:of the Iraqi mission in New Yorkby telephone lhat Ihc above-mentionedbeen recommended by his Excellency Mr.of the Iraqi program at Ihc UN. duringtripecond page detailedof Oil Allocated and given lo Mr. Benon
otalillion barrels of oil as Ihe "quantity execuied."
A Source at SOMO confirmed that Sevan received allocations by wayypriot company or Ihe Panamanian registered. The African Middle East Petroleum Company. According to the source, when lhe Chairman of the Iraqi UN OFF Committee. Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan al-Jizrawi, saw any company with Sevan's name in parenthesis next to il (and thereot of them, according to the source) on the proposed voucher recipient list. Ramadan auio-matically gave approval to issue the voucherswith thai account.
SOMO voucher docuinents only list Sevan into the African Middle East PetroleumWe have no further information on the roleyprioi company or any other company.
igh-level source at SOMO, Sevan never received his oil allocations in person. Sevan's vouchers were always picked up by Fakhir Abdul Noor. an Egyptian now residing in Switzerland and connected to the African Middle Easl Petroleum Company, who would sign documents on Sevan's behalf and pick up his allocations ai SOMO. Noor conducted this business for Sevan for each phase of the UN OFF MOl slatting in the fourth phase and ending in ihe ninih phase. Sevan's allocations ended after lhe ninth phase when SOMO representatives informed Noor that the African Middle EaslCompany owed money under lhe oil surcharge program and the payments were in arrears.
Iraqi Inlelligence Service Nominations for Oil Vouchers
Those who were nominated by the IIS and placed on the master voucher list were most likely placed there for (heir service in an inlelligence capacity for the former Regime, lhe following two individuals were nominated by (he IIS and approved for inclusion on Ihc list (sec.
Oil Export Surcharges
In addition Io income from Ihc trade Protocols andFF program Iraqurcharge
Iraq's OU Allocation Voucher Process
fee for each barrel of oil it exported under the UN OFF program because of the relatively large built-in profit margin allowed by the UN Oil Overseers. Buyers were willing io payurcharge, usuallyoents pet barrel of oil. because fbey made sufficient profit to do so. Iraq reduced ihc amount ii charged2 as ihc Sanctions Committeeeliminated the profit margin; the last SOMO invoiceurcharge was dated
The surcharge system began in lhe 8th phase of lhe UN OFF program. According to SOMO records, the surcharge was chargedillion barrels of oil betweenhe total contract value for the surcharges3 million.
Iraq actually collected6 million in surcharge payments from0 until3 (see. Iraq was unable toillion in surcharges, (secllicit Earnings Sources and Estimation
Payments were usually made to SOMO bankordan and Lebanon,illion was delivered in cash to Iraqi embassies, usually Moscow by Russian entities, according to SOMO
The UN allowed Iraq loertain amount of oil under the Oil For Food Program and the proceeds would go to Iraq through an UN approved hank, the BNP. The UN did not monitor Iraq's Oil voucher system and, according to senior Iraqi officials at SOMO, Baghdad made every effort to keep the details of the system hidden from the UN. During Iraq's negotiations with the UN concerning ihe OFFBaghdad fought hardfor the right to determine lo whom it could sell its oil and Baghdad considered the UN's concession on this point an importantThe UN approved the final contract between Iraq and the lifting company, ensured the company was on the register of approved lifting companies, and monitored the actual lifting of the oil to make sure lhe amount lifted fit within the approved contract amount. The UN also made sure lhat the total amount lifted matched the OFF allocation.
The legality of Oil Voucher AUocations
The Oil Voucher Allocation system was set up by the former Regime af Iraq in order to allocate their exports under the UN Oll-For-Food (OFF) Program to entities that would gain Iraq the greatest benefit.
Using the voucher programethod of rewarding and/or influencing entities or countries really did not begin until aboutf the OFF Program.an7 lot the lime, this internal Iraqi process was unknown to the UN and was not addressed in any UN resolutions.
The UN approved all companies lifting oilOFF program and accounted for all the Iraqiby authorized oil lifting firms. However,and individuals may have abused thisusing an intermediary to lift and sell the oilto ihem by Iraq under the voucher system.according to oil voucher registersSOMO and statements by Iraqiprivate individuals and politicalwere listedoucher recipient.N registered oil lifter) was usedthese vouchers and actually lifted the oil underapproved contract. In this example, ihe UNaware thai an individual or politicalinvolved in, andwas profiling from, theConsequently, if individuals orreceived profits from these oil salestaking part in actions which were notihe UN OFF program. ISG has no directthese individuals or political organizationreceiving ihe proceeds from these oilHowever, individuals and organizationsas being on lhe list for oil allocations,from Iraqi officials support ihc fact thatreceived oil allocations, and evidenceentered into contracts wiih theactually lifted these allocations exist. Inthe Oil Voucher Allocation program isof how Saddam's Regime strove toUN sanctions and the OFF processfavor with well placed individualsthat would be able to favorably act onon the political scene.
documents. Ten other Iraqi embassies were usedThe system continued until1 whenthis way including: Hanoi, Vietnam.and US took unilateral action lo eliminate the
Turkey and Geneva,profit thai allowed surcharges to be paid.
companies preferred lo pay Iraqi embassies directly out of fear for public disclosure of thearrangement. This may explain the preference to conduct such business with cash.
Payments were mostly made in US dollars,ew times they wen; made in Euros. The cash was later moved to Baghdad from the embassies viapouch and deposited in (he SOMO accounts at the CBI or Rafidian hanks.
A former senior Iraqi official with direct access to the information stated lhat Saddam first orderedbelat rate oferceni of their profits as ihe surcharge, but ihe companies refuseday. Saddam thencent per barrel surcharge lhat his advisors warned him was not workable. When Saddam realized they were right, he allowed the surchargee diopped toents and ihcn finally toents. Ten cents was the amount first charged by SOMO in
Some companies, particularly Ihc French, refused to pay the surcharge.
However, some companiesmiddleman' to hide the link between Ihc originating company and Iraq.
Iraq tolerated the refusal nf snmc companies to pay the lO-cent per barrel surcharge until the end of the 8th phasen order to avoid their refusal lo ship (he oil and reduce Iraq's projected ex pons-
cni surcharge was increased in1 during the 9th phasearrel for sales to the US andents per barrel for sales to Other countries. The surcharges continued inlo phasetents per barrel to all customers (see.
The surcharge system was an open secret. The subject was discussed by Ihc media and by worldwide oil market- It was known ihc former Regime received income from its sales that were deposited in Special accounts outside of Iraq.
How Surcharges Were Collected
The buyers agreeing to the surcharges did soritten personal pledge to pay. Iraq's main leveragenforce payment was to deny the buyer futureuntil he made good on his debt. Iraq exercised this option in the case of lhc African Middle East Petroleum Company, according lo SOMO documents. Byh phase, there werentities receiving oil expori allocations that were not allowed to signbecause Ihey had not fully paid Iheir surcharges.
Kickbacks on Commercial Goods Import Contracts
The fourth revenue source for Saddam's Regime was kickbacks from US OFT program commercial goods contracts being imported into Iraq. Accordingormer senior MoT official, beginning with lhchase inraq began loickback on all UN OFF program import contracts to generate illicit income. The amount of the kickback could vary, hut generally was aroundercent. ISO suspects, however, lhat Iraq had been receiving similar types of kickbacks since the beginning of the UN OFF program to varying degrees.
Contracts were written forerceni above the aciual price and the supplier company would deposit this amount into Iraqi accounts. The fee was often included for spare pans or after sales service. The fee was often applied, particularly in Jordan, through the mechanism of the supplier0 percenibond in advance, which was thentransferred to an Iraqi account when the supplier was paid for lhc goods.
A source described how it oltcn worked for one front company. For instance, (he Al-Eman Groupordanian Company) wouldontract with Iraq and deposit theercent performance bond in an escrow holding account. When the goods were delivered to Iraq, the UN Iraq account would paylulll-Fiiuii. Alil rvunl. the Jordan National Bank would automatically kick back lhc performance bond to an Iraqi account instead of returning ii to Al- Eman, as wouldbe the case.
Millions o( HnrrtK Allotted
Ahmad Sharif And Mustek
Hamad Bin Ali AIThuni
4
5
former senior Iraqi official with direct access lo (hebelieved Sharif ioalaysian resident and an owner or high level executive of the company Mastck.
A Qatari national and owner of the private airline Gulf Fagleegular commercial enterprise) Al Thani was responsible for opening an air link between Baghdad and Damascus.
IS oil voucher reapwnls.
50
raq's oslimaiod earnings irom OFF oil(million
Sales to Other Countries: Europe and Far East MarketsSates to US Companies
ISG does not have information from Iraqi sources regarding ihe revenue earned from these kickbacks; but we estimate,0 percent average, that these kickbacks totaled approximatelyillion fromH) until OIF (sec. For more information on the methodology used to generate this estimate, see Annex H: Illicit Faming* Sources and Estimation Methodology.
According to senior MoT and official sources, kickback payments were dcposiicd inio temporary accounts controlled by (he Iraqi ministry involved with (he contract at banks in Jordan and Lebanon. These "bridge" accounts were not in llie name of lhe ministry, bin used false names lo disassociate ihc Iraqi government from the transaction. Wilhinours, the funds were transferredBI account al the same bank. Al ihc end of each day. the minislry bridge accountsero balance. Kickback payments also
were made io at least two Iraqi from companies; Alia in Jordan andabel in Ihc UAH.the kickback funds were couriered back to the CBI in Iraq.
Each individual ministry that engaged in the import kickback contract scheme had copies of theircontracts or deals. The MoT was responsible for monitoring these contracts but was not involved in negotiating the terms. Each of the following(seengaged inercent fee scheme:
Although the kickback was paid to the particularthat entered into the contract, those ministries were not able to use theusually were transferred to the CBI as mentioned above.
In order to encourage kickback collections by the ministry, and in order to compensate the ministry for the difficulties involved with the scheme, the CBIercent of theercent kickback to ihc ministry collecting the kickback.
These funds were distributed to the employees of ihe particular ministry as an incentive to collect the kickbacks.
Another method of generating kickbacks from UN OFF import contracts emerged in the later years of the UN OFF program. This method was based on deceiving the UN over the quality of the items being imported to Iraq. For this illicit revenue scheme, Iraq arrangedo-operative supplier toegitimate UN OFF contract specifying "first-quality" humanitarian goods. Iraq would then be authorized under UN OFF to pay top quality prices for the items via the UN OFF-controlled accounts. In reality, however, the co-operative suppliercheap, poor-quality goods for the contract. This generated very high profits for the co-operative supplier. Saddam then arranged for the excess profits to be returned to Iraq via diplomatic channels, after the co-operative supplier took itshis revenue scheme was particularly nefarious since it left the people of Iraq with second-quality, sometime useless, humanitarian goods, (see the Use of Foreign Banks sections.)
Private-Sector Oil Sales
Iraq's irade wiih private-sector businessmen during Ihe sanctions periodIillionto illicit money earned from kickbacks and surcharges related to theOFF program and
Protocols with neighbor states (see. Iraqis also refer to this irade as "border trade" or(see Annex F: Iraqi Oil Smugglingase study on this topic.)
These sales began almost immediately alterwere implemented, with examples dating back to al
exported crude oil. petroleum products, and dry goods such as dates and barley. ISO has very Utile information about the volume or earnings from the dry goods portion of the trade.
1SG esiimates Iraq earnedillion annually17 fora total0 million during the period.
Privule-sector sales were made by SOMO. but outside the UN OFF oil export program and the tradewith Jordan. Syria, Turkey, and Egypt. SOMO information on these sales covers8 until OIF. Payment for these sales amountednd was made in three ways:
Some contracts were listed usccording to the SOMO Invoice and Contract Data Base, these contracts were signed from7 through3 and were for all types of petroleum products (gas oil, fuel oil. asphalt,s well as small amounts of crude oil. These cargoes were shipped through the Arabian Gull. Turkey. Jordan, Syria, and possibly Lebanon. The contracts were valued0 million3 million wascollected.
Another category of contracts washese contracts were signed from8 through3 and were primarily for fuel oil and gas oil. Like the cash contracts above, these cargoes were shipped through the Arabian Gulf, Turkey, Jordan. Syria, and possibly Lebanon. The contracts were valued9 million. Because these were barter contracts as payment for goods to be received by specific Iraqi ministries. SOMO received no cash in payment.
The final category of contracts was "Iraqihese contracts were signed from9 throughhey were all for fuel oil and all were sold to therobably the Kurds. The income was in dinars and wheninto dollars at prevailing exchange rates only
amounted to aboutillion. Because this was not hard currency income, it is not counted in the total hard currency income mentioned elsewhere in ihis section.
SOMO lists its cash, baiter, and dinar contracts as being destined for lhcr "South."
on the buyer's names, shipmentshe North almost certainly were mostly destined for Turkey. One of the major purchasers paying wiih cash was the Asia Company, which bought almost
illion barrels4 million from9 throughccording to AmirRashid Tikrili Al Ubaydi. Iraq's Oil Minister, Barzani, die leader of lhc Kurdish Democratic Party, controlled this company. The dinar contracts probably were destined for the Kurds in the three Northern Gosemoratcs. Some of ihe shipments to lhc North could have found their way to Iran. The total value of private-sector trade with the North8 million.
Based on the buyers listed, shipments for ihe Wesi were destined at least for Jordan and Syria. Some of these shipments probably also found their way to Lebanon. The tola! value of private-sector irade with the Westillion.
Based on the buyers listed, shipments for ihe South were destined fur export by small vessels through the Arabian Gulf, with most probably destined
for the UAE and other nearby hunkering markets. Some probably wound up in India and perhaps other destinations. The total value of private-sector trade with the South9 million (see inset).
Accordingumber of Iraqi officials, the money earned from private secior border trade wasdeposited into accounts in Lebanon and Jordan controlled by the CBI (see.
accounts were kept in US dollars, except for one account in Euros that was closed alter one month.
One account was maintained in the Kalidian Bank, Mosul, Iraq branch. This account handled earnings from (he private-sector trade through the North.
The "SOMO Office" in Basrah handled earnings from private sales through the Soulh. ISG does not know if this means thereorresponding Ralidian Bank account io handle these earnings in the South.
Role of Ihc SOMO
Iraq's SOMO it the state-run monopoly that controls all of Iraq's crude oil exports. Il i* oveiseen by the Iraqi MoO and functions as ihe Ministry's marketing arm. SOMO matnuiined all records for sales under the UN OFF program; cash border sales, sales through ihe Protocol agreements, and oil allocation (vouchers) arrangements.
to ihe procedures agenda approved by the, SOMO was responsible for the marketing process of Iraqi oil and was esenlually permitted to sell as much oil as il could. However, these sales contracts were only allowed toregistered with lhc UN as approved buyers of Iraq's crude oil These companies were onl>
ake payments lo Iraq into the UN supervised escrow account in the Itancjur Nationale de Paris in New York.
According to SOMO officials, Saddam demanded that Iraq keep the price of its oil as low as possible in order lo leave roam for oil traders to pay Iraq the illegalales director at SOMO slated that they were instructed by the government to get the lowest price. Under normal circumstances, SOMO would have sought the highest price lor Iraq's oil. its only legal source of real revenue.
Among the companies listed in SOMO's records as having paid illegal surcharges art some of the world's largest refineriet and oil trading companies.
SOMO maintained detailed financial records listing invoices and collect mnt for each contract Thesewhen questioned about surcharge payments, deny they were the parties that made them.
example, according lu SOMO records, one of the most active purchasers of Iraqi crudewiss-based company named Gkncorc. I(0 in illegal suicharges during the period of the program. Ihe company denies anydealings with lhc liuqi government outside of the UN OFF program.
Determining who paid surcharges, and for whal
Figure 2t. liaq's estimated earnings 'torn OFF import kickbacks fmfflton
^Ministry of ou (Mpojir
uf Housing
1
Ministry of Education
ofanl-
Electricity Board
ofations -
OfHealth -rf
of Trade "flp;
of AgHcuIturei
raqi ministries involved in OFF kickbacks.
lol997 8 9 0 1 2 3 Total
each year 4 1 3
2
raq's estimated earnings from private-sector oH sales {million
Bank-Jordan
"FIHeP (Mosul)
Bank-Jordan
converted to USS
Bank-Jordan
Embassies
Bank-Lebanon
otal amounts received in Iraqi bank accounts under private sector -cash sales'.'
' Ths SOMO ntorrr-aW istw fcg lha- Jl frOMo mm ITS SOMO Oifanuirai eUMatow- The reasonibuw
for each oil transaction will take some time. Iraqi oil shipments passed through many panics before being deliverednd recipients, the large oil refineries and companies outside Iraq. The parties or oil agents that first bought the oil only to turn around and resell it for profits could have been anyone from small-inexperienced oil dealers and companies, or even businessmen and companies being bribed or rewarded far various reasons by the Iraqi government.
According to SOMO records and senior MoO officials, oil surcharges were deposited into Iraq's bank accounts. Only designated, trusted Oilemployees withdrew the cash and brought it to Baghdadegular basis.
An estimatedillion is believed to be left from the illicit funds deposited in foreign Iraqi bank accounts.
As of0 million had been recovered from these accounts and returned to Iraq, according to the US Treasury Dcpanmcni.
Saddam directed SOMO to set up accounts at the National Bank of Jordun, also known as the Ahli
Bank of Jordan. SOMO created separate accounts bom for surcharge paymenis and for Prorocc4-geocr-atcd revenue. Three surcharge accounts wereed. one each for the deposits of US dollars. Francs, and eventually Euros. The two required signatories on these accounts were SOMO employees.
Funds from SOMO accounts had to be releasedOMO order. Payments Irom accounts holding (he credit portion of earnings from (he Protocol with Syria (at Synan Commercial Bank) and the credii ponton of earnings from ihe Protocol with Turkey (the TPIC account on behalf ol SOMO at the Halk Bank) required authorization* front various ministries and the Presidential Officehen SOMO received the appropriate approvals, itetter directing use hanks to make payments.
SOMO had at least thirteen accounts lhat were used to receive and/or hold theercent fee amounts received from lhe various ministries.
The MoO had no authority over these accounts and they were located in Jordan. Syria, Lebanon, and the UAE.
elationship to the MoO
lUl SVMO't role wax ta tell Iraq's oil aad handle
tome of the funds derived from those sales, the
MoO's role was primarily to proturt goods and
services needed hy Ihe oil sector. As pan ol this ctTon
the MoO would collect tin-erceni fee on import
contracts.
A former Oil Ministry ofliciul in charge offor maintenance equipment ami spare pans stated ihey wouldow bid and lequirc anotherercent be added to the contract. Iraqi officials believedcrcem could be easily hidden from (he UN. For example, if ihe bid were forillion, the supplier would he told to make1 million. This scheme wav quite effective lorillicit revenue.
The MoO has bank accounts at severallocations and in veveral different countries. SOMO'sccounts were separate from the MoO. Accordingigh-level source at (be MoO. ihc Ministry had only basic information relative to the. SOMO accounts, such av the name of ihe financial
institution, the account holder's name, and ihc name of the person who had signatory authority on ihe account
source staled that the MoO had thisso lhat Ihey could Uansfcr funds lo ihc accounts when oil was sold. Accordingource at the Minislry, the Moil is currently trying to recover funds from some of these accounts, particularly in fordan. and return the money to Baghdad.
Iraq's MoO currently has iwo active hank accountshe Jordan National Bank. Qticcn Nor Branch, Amman. Jordan. Those arc the same accounts thai the MoO has used fax the last several years. The first accountoini account held in the name of the MoO and Jordan Petroleum Refinery. Itson3 wasillion. The second account is called ihe Ministry personal current account lis balance on the same date9 million.
The source of these funds was from ihe sale of crude od and oil products to Jordan under the Trade Protocols.
The Oil Ministry claims lhat the lunds in these accounts were lo be used to pure fuse engineering and chemical materials necessary to keep Iraq's oil industry opcraUnginimum production level.
Official Oil Accounts
SOMOariety of hank accounts to manage and control Iraq's legal and illegal oil revenues. These accounts have been categorized as non-surcharge accounts (including Protocolil surcharge accounts, and cash sales accounts. Figurehows ihc bank accounts that SOMO opened forpurposes.
The first live SOMO account* are individually named accounts at the Ahli Bank in Jordan. For more detail on those names, see
The fifth account listed at the Ahli Bank in the name of Aliakdhas wasProtocol trade account set up lo receive psyrnents reLaied to the Iraq-Jordanian Protocol and wa* openedew monihs before the nan of OIF. This trade account allowedercent ol oil proceeds io remain in the trade accouni andrceni of lhe proceeds lo be
SOMO Account Balances Outside of Iraq
Name
Name
Type
Balance in US$
Zom. Ai
i Yafccrvan Hassan Afrhim
Bank. Jordan
Account
JOfd.in
Zibin. AjiaKdhan Hassan Arm im
Saddam Zibln. AJiakdhan Hassan Abnhtm
Ahli Sank. Jordan
Ahli Bank. Jordan
Account
Cash Account
Zlbln. Alinkdnnn HHSsan Abrilum
Ahli Bank. Jordan
Account
Lebanon Lebanon
akdhan
SOMO
SOMO
Ahli Bank. Jordan
FransaOank. Lebanon
ebenon
Account Cash Account Cash Account
Egypl
Syria
SOMO SOMO SOMO
Lebanon
National Bank of Egypt
Commercial Bank of Syria
Account
Trade Account Trade Account
unknown Turkey
Vietnam Malaysia
Switzerland
SOMO
TPIC
SOMO SOMO
SOMO
SOMO
EmbassySyne
Syrian _abanon Ccrnmercael Sank
Haft Barw. Arfca-a
Iraqi Embassy. Moscow
Iraqi Embassy. Hanc.
Iraq Fmbass>
Iraqi Embassy Geneva
Account
Cash AccountAccour* Cas" Account
Cash Account Cash Account
Cash ArcounT
OMO accounts balances oorsn* ol (data provided by.
utilized elsewhere. The signature authority on this account was Ali Rijab and Yakdhan Hassan Abri-him.
are two different cash accounts listed at the Sardar Bunk in Lebanon, both with the name "Rodolphe" listed as the bank point of contact.
established another account at the National Bank of Egypt that was usedrotocol trade account, similar to the one set up for Syria.plit allowedercent of oil proceeds to remain in the trade account andercent of the proceeds to be deposited into Ahli Bank account in Jordan.
The Commercial Bank of Syria cash account .received theerceni of uie oil proceeds. The bank was instructed that when the account balance exceededillion, il was to instantly transfer uie extra amount to the Syrian Lebanon Commercial Bank account.
The Turkish Petroleum International Company (TIPC)rading arm of the Turkish National Oil Company and the SOMO equivalent in Turkey. SOMO funds were deposited at the Halk Bank located in Ankara Tuikey.
The account was actually in the name of TPIC "in the favor" of SOMO. Currently SOMO isto have funds still held at the Halk Bank released.
SOMO amounts listed at the Iraqi Embassies were received directly from oil contract holders. These payments were sonietimes delivered directly to the Embassies and other times deposited first into an Ahli Bank account.
As noted inhe accounts at the Ahli Bank in Jordan are in the names of Saddam Zibin, Yakdan Hasan Abrihim al-Karkhi, and Ali Rijab Hassan. The accounts all have the same prefix3 and suffix range fromenior sources at SOMO were not sure of the reason for this.
Figurehows ihe SOMO non-surcharge accounts through TPIC maintained ai ihc Halk Bank in Turkey. The cumulated interest earned for these accounts, according to SOMO.. Seven of
these accounts (shown in green) remain open. The current Iraqi Embassy in Turkey has been inwith the TPIC representatives about the current account balance of SOMO with TPIC The embassy was informed lhat TPIC believes that the amount due to SOMO is0ource at SOMO stated lhat TPIC must base allowed unauthorized withdrawals from Uiese accounts.
In the eighth phase of the UN OFF program. Iraq began toeeot per barrel illicit surcharge on all oil sales contracts to foreign entities wiih the exception of Syria (see the Oil Surchargeummary of the surcharge amounts due collected, and left outstanding for phases eight through twelve are displayed in the chart below (see.
These oil surcharge payments were deposited into several accounts ai banks located in Jordan and leba-non. Names of these banks included ihe Jordanian National Bank (Ahlihe Sardar Bank, and the Fransabank in Lebanon (sec. Escrow accounts were opened in tbe name of SOMOthese other numbered accounts were opened by Director General of SOMO, Rafid Abd al-Halim or his Deputy and the Director of Finance ot his Deputy for the deposit of surcharges.
various accounts at the Ahli Bank were created to receive cash, which flowed in from surcharges, the Protocol accounts, and from payments received through border trade cash sales.
amounts listed for the CBI and the Rahdian Bank arc accounts that were still open in
twoabel accounts were for US Dollars and Euros. They were only open for one or two months before being closed out.abelanially state owned oil and banking enterprise in the UAEercent of which is state owned while UAE investors own thehis business was used to move goods ouiside of the UN MOU and is still in operation.
accounts are shown at the Fransabank in Lebanon. They were Euro accounts, however, the balances have been convened to US Dollars for this chart.
of these accounts were set up lo receive oil surcharge amounts while ihc third account (marked
A?
Amount Deposited Amounts inU. k lhmk
Remaining (accordinu to SOMO)
OMO bank accounts at the Haikurkey
Various Bank Account Distributions of Total Sorcharges Revenues
Ahli Bank. Jordan
Iraqi Embassies
Fransabank,ransabank. Lebanon'
abel, UAE
adar Bank, Lebanon
entral Bank of Iraq
afidain Bank, Iraq
ank account distributions ol
with anhow* tho toiul proceeds received by Iraq lor the sale of crude oil outside of the UN MOU and not jusl for the surcharge amounts.
Figureraphic rrprcseiiiaiion of ihc data in Ihc chart abore. It illustrate* hosv the surcharge revenues were distributed among the associated SOMO bank accounts-Figureists the Iraqi bank accounts, which were established to receive cash payments Irom illegal border sales of crude oil.
Sources at SOMO explained that Ihc account ai the Jordan bank was scl up for Furos and was closed aficr jusi one monih. The balance of this accouni was shifted ovei lo Ihc Ahli Hank accounts.
The Kafidian "Filler/Iraq accouniOMO accouni al ihc Ralidian Bank branch Office located in Mosul which collected surchaigc amounts from the border sales of oil to ihc areas Io ihc north. The SOMO office in Basra handled ihc areashe south.
Figureepicts ihc allocation of the cash salesin Ihe various banks.
Banking und Ihe Transfer of Finumial Assets for Procurement
Iraq manipulated its national banking structure to finance thr illicit prttcurrmenl of dual-use goods and WMD-relateds well as other military goods and services prohibited by the VS. Through its national banking system. Iraq establishedaccounts to linance ilv illegal procurement network Iraq's international accounts, mainly located in Jordan. Lebanon and Syria, were Instrumental in Iraq's ability lo successfully transfer billions ofof its illicitly earned oil revenues from its various global accountsnternational suppliers, fromdomestic governmenl and business entities, and foreign governments (see Annex O: Iraq'sSystem for more details on ihc origins of the Iraqi banking system).
CBI
The CBI was responsible for issuing and storingof ihc governmenl, protecting againslcurrency and disbursing funds hascd on directives from (he Minister of Finance. Individuals anddoing business with lhe governmenl of Iraq would have to go ihmugli ihe CHI. which handled all official government iransactions and funds. The CBI is composed of three domestic branches, including lis readquaners in Baghdad as well as one office in Basra and one office in Mosul The Governortbe CBI before OIF was Isam Rashid al Huwaysh.
Accordingenior Iraqi financial official, the CBI established overseas accounts insbanest banks, seven Jordanian banks, und one Belarusian bank to deposit cash from the ten percent system of kickbacks from foreign suppliers of goods and foodstuffs. CBI did noi maintain overseas accounts in other countries because senior bank officers feared thai such accounts would be Iro/en hy lhe United Stales. The financial official said lhal other Iraqiminisincs also ntuiniuincd overseas accounts of funds provided from lhe CHI overseas accounts. CBI did not maintain any overseas holdings in real estate, stocks.r diamonds.
CBFs Roleee rising Money Exchangers
Prior u> OIF. ihc Exchange IVpamncm of the CBI was responsible for licensing theicensed money exchangers in the business ofcurrency of one country into ihc currency of another country. Money exchangers were required toicense from the MoT. and present it to (he CBI in order to registeroney exchanger. Some money exchangers mark their currency forpurposes and to assist in the prevention of counterfeiting.
Iraq Rafldain "Filler Accouni
Lebanon. Frontia Bank
Jordan, Bank ol Jordan
Iraqi Embassyordan AMI Bank
otal amotrts received in tragi bank account bom bocaei trade 'cash sales.'
K..I, in Tracking Foreign Accounts Tor Iraq
The CBI Investment Departmentok thui contnincd all foreign accounts opened by ihc bank, including the numbered or bridge accounts opened in Lebanon andridge account* concealed thr fact that foreign companies were making payments to Iraq. Under ihis system, illicit liwripn paymcni* appeared to be going In an kcoum openedersonal or numbered account. Then the Mp bank* immcdiaicly transferred proceeds fnsm ihe bodge accountBI accouM.
CBI maintained accounts in foreign countries tpecin-cally for the tramfer and distribution of funds to thirdhc Imevtment Departmem ul the CBI diJ noi conduct normal hanking activity after ihc United Nation* imposed sanctions on Iraq0 because
its access to overseas accounts, and investment opportunities in particular were lightly limited and controlled. However, cite Foreign Accounts section of the Investment Department still maintained vigilance over lhc CBI accounts that had been frozen around the world in order to track lhc accrual ot interest in ihcse accounts.
This section also maintained the hidden oversea* accounts in Lebanon and Jordan, which the former Regime used for earnings from ihc ten percent contract kickback scheme and oil surcharge* payments. An Investment Department ofliccr of the CBI *as directly responsible for transferring foreign currency funds from Ihe CBI'* hidden over*
sea* accountsnd Jordan lo scparale accounts held hy ihc former Regime leadership and the IIS in overseas banks.
Ine stalc-ossncd Rafidian Bank look over the CHI's role in managing Iraqi government funds abroad, mostly through Rahdian's Amman branch.
The Central Bank of Iraq did aot possess any authority for auditing the foreign currency account activities of overseas assets of the Rasheed Batik, the Rafidian Bank, or the Iraqihc Cabinet of Ministers decided to give ihc Rashccd and Ralidian Banks a* well as Iraqi government ministries ihc authority lo open their own overseas accounts independent of CBI controls or authority.esult, Ihe CBI was no longer able to determine Ihc foreign currency holdings of these institutions.
When directed by the EAC, CBI would transfercurrency funds from it* overseas xvounis inand Lebanese hanks into ministries' avcounis. often those held at Use Ralidian Bank In Amman. Jordan or Beirut. Ixhanon. In theory, the EAC would only direct CBI to transfer hinds mio another go*em-mcnt bank or ministry oversea* account to fund an import purchase. The KAC transfer of funds' request, however, only indicated the recipient IraqiIhc amount, and the bunk account number to which the funds were vent CBI officials had no means for establishing the end use or final destination of the transferred funds
CBI did not transfer any funds into personal accounts from ils overseas accounts. Any transfer of government funds inio |ier*oiial accounts would have been possible only if conducted through the overseas brunches of the Ralidian and Rasheed banks or other government ministries' accounts.
CBI Governor al Huwaysh wrote several letters to the cabinet ministers requeuing increased controls, or at least auditing capahdily. over foreign currencyconducted by the Rafidian and Rasheed hanks and governmenl mimstncs In earlyith Use imminent threat of war, the cabinet orderedministries with overseas accounts to transfer all their foreign currency funds to CBI accounts in overseas banks. This was done in order to provide greater security for government funds that had been
dispersed in these various overseas accounts, hut noi yet utilized.
Inaddameeting during which he ordered the removal olillion from the CBI in ordervoidt all the money being destroyed in one location in the event of an allied attack. Present al the meeting were Useof Finance, the Minister of Trade, the Director of the MKT. the Presidential Secretary, the Chief of the Presidennal Diwan. and the Governor of the CBI.
Two weeks before lhe outbreak of ihc war inaddamommittee that wasfor ihe distribution of funds. The committee consisted of the Minister of Finance, the Chief of the Presidential Diwan. live Presidential Secreiary and Saddam's sun, Qusay Saddam Husayn al-Tikriii. The group visited the CBI and inspected ihc boxes thai contained ihc Jl billion, 'lhe money was storedkilogiam bones lhat contained cither MOO nolc*otes.
According io multiple Iraqincluding CBI Direcior Huwavsh. Ousay. along with SSO Director Han 'Abd al-Laiif Tilfa al-Tikriti. and appnsxlmaiclyther people, appeared at the CBI on3 and removed the boxes of money The money wa* then distnhuicd to different ministries, including the MoT. which received eight boxes nl" money. Alter the war. the MoT boxes were turned in to the proper aulhontics through 'Adrian al-Adhamiya. head of Use MoT legal Department. Overall, all Ihc money was recovered except lor0 million.
Iraqi Bunk Holding*
Ihc folk-wing chart (seeummarizes the total assets accumulated by Iraqi'* banks before OlF(for more details, see Annex G. Iraq's Banking System).
Funding of ihe Ministries
Prior to Ihc sanction* resulting from thenvasion of Kuwait. Ihc Iraqi government would finance its international trade and operations using let tcrs of credit, secured or non-secured and recoverable or non-recoverable, in accordance with international
Central Bank of Iraq (Foreign Account*
RBfldlan
otal i
Iraq's banks3
laws and regulalions. Tlic imposition of the sanctions forced the Iraqis to seek: alternative methods lo avoid having their assets frozen in accounts in the name of their government or ministries. The twomethods used to circumvent the sanctions were lo pay cash io intermediaries and the use of nominee named letters of credit.
The Finance Minister authorized individuals to take Currency out of Iraq. This was against Ihc law for both Iraqi citizens and non-citizens without the consent of the Finance Minister. The Finance Ministry would receive an order from Saddam, authorizing antoertain amount of currency outside of Iraq. The Finance Minister would then arrange wiih Iraqi customs for that individual to be allowed safe passage through the border, with the currency.the funds authorized were not very large. Funds ranged0ccasionally as highhose authorized to lake the currency abroad were friends of Saddam and supporters of the Iraqi cause.
At the beginningach ministry andagency established accounts with banks in Syria, Jordan and lebanon, in the names of selected employees within each of their respectiveThe Iraqi government used its Rafidian and Rashced bunks in these countries because of their direct links to Baghdad. After MIC contracted for the
procurement of goods or materials Ihey would send insuuetions to the bank to transfer the amount of the contract value into an account for lhc supplier Or middleman. The recipient would be credited with the funds, but the funds would not actually be released until after delivery of the products.
The Use of Foreign Banks
Before1 Gulf War. ihe Regime had funds in accounts in theropc. Turkey and Japan.he Regime shifted its assets into accounts in Jordan. Lebanon. Belarus. Egypt and Syria. Anwas drafted with Sudan but never completed. Accounts appeared in the names of the CBI and the SOMO.
The CBI's Investment Department Director General. Asrar 'Abd al-Ilusayn was responsible forof theseaccounts and maintained signatory power of the accounts, upimit ofillion. CBI Governor bum Rashid al-Huwaysh had final responsibility and supervisory authority over these accounts. There were no restrictions on live amounts al-Huwaysh could transfer or withdraw from the accounts. The CBI Investment Department tetaincd information on account numbers and account activities at its office in Baghdad on computer discs.
and ihe overseas banks forwarded accouni statement io lhe Investment Departmentonthly basis. CHI's paper records of these accounts were burned, cither during OIF or afterwards when the bank offices were looted. CBI did not maintain records of other ministries* overseas accounts or iccords of Regime leaders' personal overseas accounts.
esult of ihe financial obligations and economic strains of Iwo consecutive wars and the freezing of its accounis in Western Europe and ihe United Slates, CBI had virtually no foreign currency in overseas accounts or its own vault in Baghdad. CBI then began increasing the number of its overseas accounts in Jordan and Lebanon after Iraq accepted and implemented the UN OFF Program and oil exports starred to flow inBI only began accumulating large amounts of foreignin these accounts1 after ihe introductionormal system of illegal kickbacks from foreign suppliersccordingenior Iraqi financial officer.
Priorhe amount in these accounis was minimal. CBI selected Jordanian and Lebanese Banks for the establishment of overseas accounts based upon prior relations wiih the bank or based uponbids tendered by various banks thai sentto Baghdad seeking the Regime's banking business. Whenew bank. CBI would consul) international banking records and consider the additional level of interesi the foreign bank would offer above the international bank interest rate.this interest rale would beerceni above lhe international bank rate, usually tbe London rate.
Accordingenior Iraqi finance officer, when CBI planned toew account, the hank would send two investment department officials to either Jordan or Lebanon wiih an official letter. When lhe Regime requested CBI draw upon the accounis lo transfer foreign currency cash lo Baghdad, CBI wouldelegation of three CBI officials. One with account signatory power, to the foreign hank with an official letter from the CBI. ll usuallyeek lo ten days for the banks io prepare lhe cash, since the hanks usually did not maintain large amounts of foreign currency cash on the premises. Then, the cash, the amounts of which usually rangedwas delivered to the Iraqi Embassy and pui in diplomatic pouches for transport back to Baghdad by vehicle. CBI governor al-IIuwaysh himselfillion in his vehicle on his rciurnirip from Beirut to Baghdad.
Use of Banks in Lebanon
ebanese banks were used to hide Iraqi cash, which was physically trucked lo Baghdad by (he IIS when accounisredetermined level, accordingigh-ranking Iraqi official. Aconsisting of ihc Ministers of Trade, Treasury, Commerce, the governor ot the CBI and the Diwan secretary sent CHI officials abroad lo collect this cash, accoiding to lhe former head of the Diwan.
Use of Banks in Jordan
Much of Iraq's money in Jordan was held in private accounts operated by the Iraqi Embassy in Amman or the Iraqi Trading Office. Il was standardto have two signaiories for the accountsecurity measure to prevent ihctl. Double-signatory Iraqi accounis in Jordan could only be governmenl accounis. Of particular iniercsl was Ihe Jordanian Branch of lhe Rafidian Bank, which was established purely for use of lhe Iraqi government; lhe Uniled Bank for Investment was also important, because of its establishment for use by Saddam's family.were never made by telex or electronicbecause it was feared these would be detected by the US or UK. Instead, those wishing io buy oil. or oihcr commodities such as sheep, oulside of the OFF program would pay cash to an accouni al Rafidian Bank in Amman. Funher cash transfers would then be made to other banks, including ihc Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) in Amman, where Regime money remained. Transfers of cash to oilier countries would be hand-carried using thebag io avoid ihc need io send moneyMoney was sent to Europe in order to procure goods for Iraq, bul was never seni Own- for secrecy, as lhe controls over the financial system made it too difficult.
Accordingormer high-ranking Iraqi government official, when Jordanian officials approved athe Jordanian Minislry of Industry and Trade notified the Ceniral Bank of Jordan to verity lhe availability of funds. Jordanian suppliers were (hen required loerformance bond and lhe Iraqi importers were required loetter of credit from the Rafidian Bank. The Letter of Credit required specification of pay ment terms according io (he Iraqi-Jordanian Protocol. After lhe receipt of goods, lhe
Iraqi importer would verify acceptance so payment this account, could be released.
order to make payments to Iraq for the Cash, an arrangement was negotiated annually between the Central Banks of Iraq and Jordan. There were written instjuctions concerning the procesi for transferrins fundsraq. In order to transfer funds, the Raridun Bank served as an intermediary between the Central Bank of Jordan and the CBI. Jordannique case; trading with Iraq was ongoing since theo the trade credits Iraq earned from thiswere controlled by the Central Bank. Funds were dispersed by the Central Bank of Jordan by order of the CBI or by specific Protocol designed for payment for goods and sen-ices. This Protocol includedpaymentsordan lor Iraqi air travel and Iraqi telephone calls as well as salaries for the employees of ihc Iraqi embassy in Jordan.
Accordingigh-ranking Jordanian bankingthe CBI had no accounts with the Central Bank of Jordan and the only relationship between tbe two was through the implementation ol the bilateral oil for goods barter Protocol. The CBJ worked diligently with the MoT and Industry and the Customsto ensure proper valuation of Protocol shipments, because over-valuation hudroblem.
Use of Banks in Syria
The Syrian connection became much more widely used after the February IW ascension of King Abdullah Bin Hussein in Jordan and the0 ascension of Syrian President Bashar Assad. King Abdullah's government began to create morefor the Iraqi Regimeregard to importing products from Jordan. Consequenily. Iraq turned to Damascus whouch friendlier atmosphere for goods not sanctioned by the UN.
The Commercial Bank nf Syna was the repository ol funds used by the Iraqi government to purchase goods and materials both prohibited and allowed under UN sanctions. The fair market value of oil and oilwould be deposited by Syrian buyers into an account in the Commercial Bank ol Syria. Eachin the Iraqi government had use of these funds: however, there were quotasfor the amounts they would be ablese. The lop 'our ministries with access to ihese funds in descending order included the MoO. the MoT. the Ministry of Industry (Mol) and the MIC The ordersisburse funds through rhis account would conic from ihe Iraqi Minister o: Oil. It is estimated that there could0 million held in
Use of Banks in Turkey
SOMO and the Turkish Petroleum International Company (TIPC) had an agreement to0 percent account in the Halk Bank in Turkey and inier-cst bearing accounts.
Useof Baaksin
A high-ranking official in Iraqi Banking stated thai this trade agreement began1OMO vet up bank accounts at the Al Ahli Bank in Egypt through which payment was made for ihc purchase of oil from Iraq. SOMO officials had signatory authority over the accounts. This trade agreement was set up by the MoT and Oil and was not within the guidelines of the UN OFF program.
Some Egyptian government officials helped the government of Iraq lo obtain hard currency illegally via the UN OFF program, li is unclear whom in the Egyptian Government wav providing the assistance and who was aware of this acuvity. Under ihis illicit system, the Egyptian government officials wouldontract with the Government of Iraq toertain amount of approved humanitarian goodsei price under trie UN OFF Program. The contract would specify that the goods shipped would be first-quality merchandise. In actuality, the goods shipped would he second-quality goods. When the UN paid the Egyptian Government officials for thegoods, the Egyptian Government officials would distribute the funds lor the second-quality products,mall margin of profit lor them, and convert the remaining money into US dollars or gold bullion and deposit the money into the Ralidian Bank or directly into the CBI. When this hard currency was received in Baghdad, the Iraqi government would pack bundles of US one hundred dollar bill* into bags and boxes and distribute them io ihe Iraqi embassies abroad.after the arrest of the Iraqi IIS Chief of Station in Amman, the Iraqi government moved their primary transit point to Damascus out ol fear that thewould be arrested while crossing the Jordanian border.
Use of Banks in Belarus
The CBI used Interbank in Belarus to hide Regime
asscis in employee-named accounis. These accounis held funds accumulated through the kickback of funds from impon contracts under ihe UN OFF program. Huwaysh, former Direcior of the MIC. estimated that ihcrc was Jl million in ihis accouni and lhe Iraqi MIC hadillion tor procurement of Belarusian goods in this accouni. However, ihai actual total5 million (see Iraq's Illicit Revenue section).
Regime Attempts To Recover Funds Prior to OIF
A high-ranking govemmem official staled that Saddam ordered all funds located in foreign banks brought back to IraqSG judges lhal Saddam took Ihii action to prevent his assets from being frozen or seized by the internationalThis order indicates lhat Saddam knew he might come under international pressureossiblyeaction to lhe Al-Samud missile project or the illicit profiteering from the OFF program.
A committee was formed to accomplish the transfer of these Iraqi funds. The committee consisted of the Finance and Trade Ministers, the Chief of the Presidential Diwan. and the Governor of the CBI.
The role of the Diwan Chief was mainly to provide funds to those individuals, known aselected by lhe Finance and Trade Ministers and CBI Governor to travel to retrieve the funds. Most couriers were trusted employees of their respective governmenl entities.
Al ihe committee's second meeting, the Governor of the CBI slated lhat Iraq had already brought back to Iraq up0 million worth of gold. The gold was purchased through an unidentified bank in Beirut and secured in CBI vaults.
The Role of Cash Transactions
The CBI provided foreign currency in cash io Saddam through an official funding mechanism established to release cash from CBI reserves io the Presidential Office. The Presidential Otr.cc did notixed budget, and CBI often received messages requesting foreign currency for release to the Presidential Office. The amounts ranged from thousands of US dollars up to SI million, which were always paid in cash in foreign currency. Ihe Prcsidcniial Office was the only entity that would ever request money in cash Irom lhe CBI, but the requests never exceededillion. The
Presidential Office stated that Ihc cash was used for overseas travel, for govemmem business, andreasons. Tlie CBI Credit Department accounted for ihc cash seni io ihc Presidential Office in the same way thai it accounted for funds used by IraqiThe ministries, however, never received foreign currency cash. If the ministries needed Iraqi dinars for domestic purposes, ihey would obtain it from iheir respective Ralidian bank accounts.
Saddam seldom interfered in ihc affairs or business of the CBI.tandard practice. CBI intra-govern-mcnial relations focused on Ihc Cabinet of Ministers, lhe Ministry of Finance, and Ihc Presidential Office Staff. 'Ihe authorization for CBI io release cash io lhe Presidential Office usually came from either the Presidential Office Chief of Staff or the Viceof the Cabinet of Ministers. Some nolable exceptions were Saddam'snnual special requests for cash and his last request for cash onhen he authorized Qusay to withdrawillion from the CBI.
Iraq's Gold Reserves
The CBI vaults contained four tons of gold reserves as of earlyIhc value of these gold reserves was insignificant in comparison io the bank's level of cash reserves. CBI began accumulating these gold reserves1 by purchasing gold in relatively small quantitiesrcqucnt husis from Lebanese banks in which the former Iraqi Regime had largecurrency*t.md.ird purchaseihe respective lehunese hanks supply ine the gold would deliver it to the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut for shipment io CBI vault* in Baghdad via diplomjiic pouch. The CBI bought gold in amount* rangingilograms per purchase. This amount ot gold coukl be shipped eauly by diplomatic pouch. Also. CBI bought gold in small quamiticv in order IO avoid raising the market level of goldhanon and to avotd scrutiny hy ihe I'S. The Regime did not remove any of the gold Irom CBI vaults dunng the war with coalition foicci.
lhe CBI Investment lX'partmi'ni Director General Asrar "Abd al-Husayn was direclly responsible lor management of the gold purchases using cash from ihe overseas accounts in lebanon. CBI Governor Dr. Isam Rashid al-Huwaysh, however, retained final responsibility for supervision of the goldprogram.
The Regime implemented the gold purchase1 upon the recommendation of al-Huwaysh and against the opposition of Minister of Finance Hikmat Mizban Ibrahim al-Azzawi. Al-Huwaysh was concerned that Saddam and his sons could easily remove cash reserves whenever they wanted or could easily use ihe cash reserves in purchasing weapons from foreign suppliers.
Gold, on the other hand, was heavy and could not be easily removed, ensuring that the CBI would retain these reserves, even if the Regime decided to remove ihc cash reserves. Al-Huwaysh, however, could not use this argument to convince Saddam
toold purchase program, and he instead argued that the gold reserves could not he destroyed in the event of bombing and lire at the bankar.
accepted this lancr argument andthe gold purchased beginningrior to the outbreak war with coalition forces, the Regime did not have any plan for dispersing the gold upon commencement of hostilities.
The Rafidian Bank central office in Baghdad had an unknown but relatively small quantity of gold in its vault as ofnder the former Regime, Iraqis were not allowed to sell their gold overseas, but many people attempted to smuggle their personal gold out of Iraq to take advantage of the higher prices in overseas markets and to secure foreign currency. When these smugglers were caught, theconfiscated the gold and put it in the vault of the Rafidian Bank. Iraqi ministries did not retain any gold.
Executing Illicit Procurement in Iraq: Ministries, Commissions, and Front Companies
Overview
Saddam used his complete conirol over ihe Iraqi Government to facilitate his illicit procurementAlmost every Ministry in the Regime assisted with procurement in some way. Directed by Saddam, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Oil, and Trade helped the former Regime orchestrate its primary foreign objective of ending UN sanctions (see Annex H: UN Sccuriiy Council Resolulioris Applicable to Iraq).
The MFA curried favors ul the UN. Among other lechniquCS and tactics used by the MFA, il bestowed oil allocations to nationals of five UNSC permanent members to influence and divide the council in order lo erode sanctions. For additional details on the MFA role in influencing ihe UNSC, see lhc RSI chapter.
The MoT established bilateral trade Protocols that were used lo hide prohibited trade. The ininisiry used commercial attaches to pay for illicit
The MoD developed requirements, hosted and conducted foreign visits, and procured conventional military goods, the export of which breached UN sanctions.
The banking system established foreign accounts to hold illicit hard currency until it could be used for procurement or smuggled into Baghdad.
The Ministry of Higher Education an Scientific Research (MHESR) conducted dual-use research: procured and developed technical expertise in WMD-rclalcd fields and procured key technologies through university systems.
Saddam, however, relied on three organizations in particular for the procurement of prohibited materials
lo include potentially-WMD related or dual-use items (sec Annex I: Suspected Iraqi Dual-Use Procurement Transactions):
- Theeaded by Huwayshnd iu associated front companies led Iraqi efforts io obtain prohihiied military hardware and dual-use goods.
The US was directed by Saddam to assist lhc MIC with rjrocurcrnvnifix
The Iraqi Atomic EnergyI.AC >its own illicit procurement goals, occasionally with MIC assistance
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Directed by Saddam, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Oil. and Trade helped the former Regime orchestrate its primary foreign objective of ending UN sanctions. To pursue those objectives. Ihc MFAoreign economic strategy first aimed at ending UN sanctions (establishednd subsequcnlly eliminating (lie UN's OFF program. Another important MFA mission focused onthe Regime's illicil procurement mechanism. In particular, the MFAritical supporting role in facilitating Iraq's procurement of military goods, prohibited dual-use items, transporting cash and other valuable goods earned by illicit oil revenue, and forming andiplomatic strategy to end VS sanctions and the subsequent UN OFF program by nefarious means. The MFA facilitated, established, and maintained foreign government and business contacts and provided Iraqi officials involved in illegal international Irade with financial and poliii-cal sanctuaries.
The MFA also assisted the implemciHuiion ofiransaciions and provided physical sanctuaries and poliitcal/diplomatie/coinmercial covers for other Iraqi intelligence officials involved in procurement activities across Iraq's borders. Accordingormer Charge d'affaires at the Iraqi interests section in Syria, it was common practice for embassies toforeign cash from the CBI oveiscas accounis in
Lebanon, in its vault in Baghdad via diplomatic pouch and courier system.
He specifically mentions the Iraqi embassy inbanon and the Iraqi interests section al the Algerian embassy in Damascus. Syria,such activity,
The Iraqi embassy in Beirut would transfer cash to Damascus by diplomatic-plated vehicles.
The Iraqi Embassy in Moscow assisted, among otherussian company called Alfa Echo in signing contracts for importing oil from Iraq.
Moreover. Ihc MFA possessed an indigenouscapability, its Research and News Analyzing Office (RNA) lhat kept senior Iraqi leadership, such as Ihe President. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister informed about global events. The MFA managed this office and had branches in many of its key embassies. Il is not certain whether personnel in the MFA's Research and News Analyzing Office were IIS agents or actual MFA officials. Nonetheless, the RNA focused primarily on collecting information of economic and political consequence to Iraq by means of open sources and other news reporting. MFA's RNA paid special attention to political, military and economic developments in the Middle East (special attention tolobal oil production and market developments. Eastern Europe, and the United States.
Acting as Iraq's plenipotentiary, Tariq Aziz (seeften facilitated business meetings between foreigners and Iraqi officials. Foreignrepresentatives and government officials would contact him in order to gain access to key Iraqi officials that were in charge of approving oil and arms contracts.
Onhe president of the Russian company Russncft, Michail Outscrviev. informed Aziz and the former Oil Minister Amir Rashid lhat he planned to travelive-man delegation to Iraq via private plane io negotiate with ihe Iraqi Oil Minister for oil and gas contracts. The Russian business delegation was supposed to try into Iraqflight number) and expected to stay in Iraq on
aghdadcientific delegation to Belarus and China in order to slay current on all aspects of nuclear physics and Idhinese fiber optics communication system.
ariqIraq's otenipotentiaiy
0^
MFA-IIS Connections
The MFA also supported US operations by offering its agents political and economic cover to conduct economic and political espionage. Besides providing traditional covers for IIS agents. Ihc MFA cooperated closely wiih the OS on otherormer IIS officer also slated lhat all MFA diplomatic couriers were US officers and were controlled by the IlS's Internal Sccuriiyirectorate. Moreover, al Iraqi consulates and embassies where IIS officer presence was absent. MFA personnel filled in as IheirWhile we do not know the full extent of MFA's role in assisting the IIS in conducting illicit activity, wc have found other indicators of the breadth and nature of the US'activities from captured
According to one document on MFA letterhead, the MFA transferred two known IIS agenls lo its embassy in Belarus under pseudonyms innother document in the same file, an IIS "Ministerial" Order, acknowledged the transfer, Ihc agents' job descriptions, iheir salaries, as well as sent copies of IIS order lo olher directorates.
One month prior io OIF, al least seven IIS officers were reassigned to the MFA to cover up their iruc positions in the government. They were given new identities and positions. This activity was similar to giving agents cover stories operating outside of Iraq, according io one former IIS agent.
Outside of Iraq, Iraqi embassies provided the IIS with the only means of secure communicationsof the diplomatic courier services. Iraqitransmitted ciphered faxes to foreign posts. However. Ihe majority of posts had manual code-books while major posts like Washington, Paris. Moscow and South African weie given machines
necessary to accommodate the large amount of incoming faxes. The IIS personnel deciphered all faxes, accordingormer IIS officer
MFA's UN Sanctions Counter-Strategy The UFA formulaltd andtrategy aimed al ending ihr US sanctions and breaching ils subsequent VN OFF program by diphimatic and economic means. Iraq pursued Us related goals of ending UN sanctions mnd the UN OFF program by enlisting the help of three permanent UNSC members: Russia. France and China. Iraq believed il managed to varying degrees of success tothese permanent UNSC members from strictly enforcing previously agreed UN resolutions and from initiating additional resolutions di.it lurthertbe Iraqi economy. Hy ottering permanent and non-permanent Sccurily Council members economic "carrois andraq bclived ii managed loinfluence voting ai ihc UNSC. Iraq's economic 'carrots" included ottering companies from those couniries lucrative oil. reconstruction, agricultural and commercial goods, and weapon systems contracts. In contrast, Ihe Iraqi "sticks" included not onlythose contracts lo other morebut held the threat of forfeiture of foreignotaling between apccosimatcly0 billion. Saddam expressed confidence that France and Russia would suppon Iraq's efforts to further erode ihc UN sanctions Regime.
According loone source, using "semi-diplomatiche IIS ancmpted to iccruit agents from the UN headquarter in New York to provideor influence public opinion and their national policy toward Iraq.
Besides attempting to co-opt certain permanent UNSC members, undei cover ol MFA sponsored international conferences. Iraq tried to recruiteastern Funvpean politicians by publicly lauding ihc ir pro-Iraqi sentiments and support in the UN.
Iraqi-Russian Relations. Saddam's Regime needed both Moscow's political clout in the UN and hsexpertise and resources io sustain his Regime fromntil OIF Numerous nips taken hy then Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariqo Moscow servedood indicator of lhe Russians* opinion of Iraq's dependence on Russia.
In earlyhe US and ibe UK withdrew iheir joint-proposalevamp lite UN existing sanctions Regime, called "Smartecause ofChinese, and French opposition. The USlUK proposal attempted to restructure two key elements of lhe existing sanctions Regime: illicit procurement of weapons and dual-use goods and illicitof revenue from Iraqi oil sales outside the UN's OFF program. In contrast, the Russian draftproposed ta reduce the current percentage t" the Compensation fundercent toerceni of total value of Iraqi oilnd increase the total amount in Iraq's escrow account0 million to pay other expenses in accordance withsee Annex H: UNSCR Applicable tohe UN estimated thatercent reduction in payments to the United Nations Compensation Commission fUNCCl added5 million in Iraq's coffers per each UN OFF six-month phase.
thai Iraq would strengthen iu cooperation with the UN and improve relations with its neighbors.
Iraq indirectly threatened to end trade relations with China if Beijing agreed to the goods review lisi (see Annex H: UN Security Council Resolutionsto Iraq).
Iraqi-France Relations. Unlike the relatively predictable relationships with China and Russia, Ihe Iraqi-French relationship was more tumultuous Saddam recognized the important role dial France played on the international stage, and in particular in the UNSC. Consequently. Saddam ordered the MFA and other ministries to improve relation* wiih France, according in recovered documents. Ihc documents revealed ihut the UStrategy to improve Iraqi-Franco relations thai encompassed inviting French delegations lo Baghdad; giving economic favors u> key French diplomats or individuals thai have access to key French leaders; increasing Iraqi embassy staff in Paris; and assessing possibilities (or financially supporting one of the candidates in an upcoming French presidential election.
Moreover, the IIS paperumber of French individuals that (he Iraqi's thought had closeto French President Chirac, including,to the Iraqi assessment, the official spokesperson of President Chirac's re-election campaign, two reportedf President Chirac, and two well-known French businessmen. In MayS correspondence addressed to Saddam slatedFA (quite possibly an IIS officer under diplomatic cover) met with French parliamentarian lo discuss Iraq-Franco relations, lhc French politician assured the Iraqi that France would use its veto in ihe UNSC againsl any American decision to attack Iraq,to the US memo.
From Baghdad's perspective, the MFA concluded that the primary motive for French continued suppon andth Iraq in the UN was eccewrnic. According to Tariq Ariz. French oil companies wanted to secure rwo large oil contracts: Russian companies not only wanted to secure (or lock in) oilul also sought other commercial contracts covering agricultural, electricity, machinery, food, and automobiles and irucks products.
France competed with Russian agriculluul products for Iiaqi contracts.
Inepresentativerench water purification company requested projects for his company in Iraq.
MFA and Iraq's Bilateral Protocols
Concurrent with Iraq's overarching strategy to break UN sanctions, the MFA. with the approval of Saddam, attempted to mitigate the economic effects of UN sanctions and at the same time to by-pass the scrutiny of the UN's OFF program by arranging various types of economic bilateral agreements. These countries, in particular, Syria. Turkey, and Jordan (see, were willing to enter into such agreements.
Geographic proximity, cultural affinity, and aand interdependent economic relationship with Iraq explain why Turkey, Jordan, and Syria reached formal Protocols wiih Iraq outside the UN OFF program and in contravention of UN resolutions. Iraq would sell oil and od products to these councries in exchange for cash and goods. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran did not enter into any economicwith Iraq, but Iran had reportedly assisted Iraq's oil smuggling operations in the Arabian Gulf region throughoutOs and up to OIF.
Ministry of Trade
The MoT coordinated economic activities between other Iraqi government munistries at well ascompanies and foreign ministries. Ilv MoT
accomplished these tasks by ceeisolidattng the import requiicrnents from all ministries, obtaining approval expenditures by the MoF. and negotiating oversea* trade agreements The MoT generally accomplished trade for Iraq Ihrough:
Legitimate channels under the auspices of the UN sanctions Regime and the UN OFF.
Cooperative preferential trade protocol agreements with Syria. Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt.
Common trade agreements, albeit inof UN sanctions, with other partners.
In additionhese traditional procurement roles, the MoTimited role in thr procurement of illicit goods such as military weaponry or WMD
technologies for the Regime, To supplement ihis procurement activity, ihc MIC* and MoD used iheir own methodsrocure communications systems, ammunition, sccurily equipmeni, and computers. Abd al-Tawab Mullah Huwaysh. Director of ihc MIC. however, slated thai Ihe MIC was able to import (he raw materials ii needed and did not need to use any other ministry's funds to purchase goods and services abroad.
Nevertheless, lhe importance ul ihe MoT in illicit procurcmeni should not be dismissed. The MoT's trade deals wuh willing countries and foreignprovided Iraqi military and security entities, such as (he MoD. SRG. IIS, and Ihe Diwan. with the access and connections needed to ultimately procure dual-use and sanctioned goods and services. Inof UN sanctions and resolutions, ihc MoT provided "cover" contracts for ammunition,systems, and other military materiel for the MoD, SRG, IIS. and ihc Diwan.
MoT's Role in Procurement
For ihc mosl part, (he MoT procured legitimate Civilian goods both legally under UN OFT. as well as illicitly through bilateral trade protocols and Oilier unregulated trade agreements, ihe MoT played one of ils most important roles in the execution of the UN OFF Program, including:
Coordinating other ministries' import requirementsDistributionfter UN approval, (his consolidated plan served as lhe basic importfor goods and services imported under each six month UN OFF phase.
A few non-minisierial organizations, including the MIC and Iraqi Atomic EnergyEC| were not permittedurchase hems under UN OFF. These Ministries or dcparimcnls relied on ihc MoTrocure common goods lor them via UN OFF.
Muhammad Mahdi Al Salih, ihc former Ministerof Trade, claimed lhe MoT supported (he Iraqi military through the OFF program only with legitimateitems. Typical goods procured by ihe MoT for the MIC and MoD via OFF included: stationery, oflicc computers, generators, civilian trucks, water tankers, fuel tankers, and building materials. For example. Al Salih recalled that the MoT had purchased lOO.OXH) uniforms for the Iraqi police and vehicles for (he SSO. Al Salih, however, later admitted lo importing ammunition, communication systems, and otherItems for MoD. IIS, SRG, and Ihe Diwan outside the UN framework.
The MoT also played an importani role in executing the Jordanian trade protocol. Under this agreement, (he MoT gathered and forwarded all Iraqi contracts to Jordan for approval. These records were, howevei. inadvertently destroyed wiih Ihe rest of (he MoT building in the Opening hours of OIF Both llie MoT and MoO shared responsibility for negotiating the bilateral Proiocol agreements with Syria. Turkey, and Jordan. The MoO, however, was Ihc prime negotiator in the case of Syria and Turkey, and controlled the trade under these Protocols.
The MoT purchased goods under the Syria and Turkey trade Protocols, particularly for mililary and security services (hat did noi have their ownof funds under the agreement.
Captured documents reveal the MoT paid (or "goods and services" ihrough these protocols for the Directorate of General Security, General Police Directorate. Military Intelligence Division, MoD and SSO.
There are no indications of the nature of (he ileitis pmcured hy Ihc MoT for these organizations othereference to MoD contracts with the General Company for Grain Manufacturing, which suggest ihai (he MoT was procuring for food.
According to Al Salih. in addition to the UN OFF and the (radc protocols, the MoT coordinated trade outside of US sanctionsumber of other countries, including UAE, Qatar, Oman, Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen, and Sudan, These wereframeworks for cooperation and free irade thai allowed for Ihc import and export of domestically produced products wilhoul license or lax.
Facilitating Illicit Procurement With Cover
There is some dcbaic among Iraqi sources regarding lhe MoT's rule in providing false cover contracts fur sensitive impotis. According to one former official, the MoT provided "cover" contracts for military-related goods, such as communications equipment, computers, and military clothing obtained via the Jordan. Syrian, and Turkish trade Protocols.the political sensitivity surrounding these agreements, none of Iraq's neighbors wantede scrutinized by the international community for doing business with Ihc Iraqi military, cither for civilian (dual-use) or overtly military goods. False coverwould have been easier to hide in the flow of (rade occurring over Iraq's borders witii Syria, Jordan, and Turkey.
Ihis source is corroborated by annotations on cap-lured tables of Syrian and Turkish trade contracts, which reveal that every entry listing (he MoT as ihc sponsoring governmenl agency was concealing the MIC and MoD as Ihc true end users for the goods.
Captured records also show lhal MoT contracted with (he Syrian firm SES Inicrnationalnown provider of mililary and dual-use goods lo Iraq)illion of goods fromver SO perceni of which was for goods and services for two MIC manufacturing companies.
Muhammad Mahdi Al Salih. Ihe former Minister of Trade, recalled lhat Ihc MoT had conducted business wiih SES. bul only for civilian goods, including deformed bars and limber under UN OFF, and for Mitsubishi pickups under lhe Syrian trade Protocol. He denied lhat ihc MoT ever procured goods for MIC manufacturing companies.
The former head of ihe MIC. Huwaysh, who did not believe lhal Ihc MoT had ever procured goods for these two companies, later corroborated Al Salih's denial.
Facilitating Illicit Trade Through Commercial Attaches
According to Al Salih, the MoT's commercial attache (CA) program beganA's were eventually posted in Jordan. Syria. Turkey. Egypt. Sudan,Moscow. Belarus.and China. In many of these
SS
hcrc wasingle employee, bul me office in Ionian ultimately employed fi*ur indi.idu ah. headedommercial Counselor andAedicated accountant. Accordingormer high-ranking Iraqi Govemmem official, theve individual* were managed and paid for by ihc MoT, hul reportedly acted independently and were not required In report hack to the MoT.
CAs worked from Iraq's embassies abroad and served av special trade ambassadors working in Iraq'sCommon roles for CAs included:
in the Iraqi Embassy to register foreign companies for trade with Iraq.
Checking to see whether foreign companies should be blacklisted for dealings with Israel.
Facilitating trade with foreign supplier*.
According to reporting, some US officers worked under cover as CA. ISG assesses lhal il is possible the MoT was noi aware of this IIS presence in its ranks.
According In Al Salih. CA in lhe trade protocol stoles (Jordan. Syria, and Turkey) were aware of the hank accounis used to transfer protocol cash0 toercent of all coniracts) into Iraq
CAs in Jordan, andessor extent. Syria and Turkey, also followed up on all Iraqi Governmenl lironcial transactions from the trade Protocol*
In the, the Jordan desk was the rmwl important CA for Iraq. The Amman Commercialnd his deputy were responsible for facilitating all UN OFF contracts, the trade protocol business (the Syria and Turkey protocols did not exist until. and any additional private trade from the military and security service entities. Facilitating these contracts focused on opening Iciicrs of credit in Jordanian banks and following up with payment when receipt of the goods was confirmed in Baghdad The CA accountant followed contract implementation, tat collection, and tracked any fees.
an example, captured docu mental ion details lhal individual* ai the CA's office in Amman opened lei-icrs of credit for the payment5 millionhinese company
mental Ion show, thai this wa. (b|mm cannon barrel-manufacturing technology from the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
There is no indication, however, from the docu-mentation that the CA staff was aware of lhe enact nature of ihe contract.
In ihehe importance of the CA's office in Jordanear before OIF, ihe MIC removed cash from the CA's office in Jordaneak activity, andililary re preservative to represent its interest*
According to the former Minister of Trade, lhe MIC. and SOMO arranged contracts with Syria dinxtly through ihe CA in Syria and the Commercial Bank in Syria, ll is more likely, however, thai ihc CA in Synaess active role with MIC and SOMO, particularly in the payments process, because business in Syna was conducted ihrough payment on supply rather lhan letters of credit.
Supporting inlelligence shows in one case lhal SOMO authorized ihc 5ih Syrian Commercial Bank in Damascus to transfer funds directlyyrian middleman working for the Syrian-based SES wuh no mention of the CA.
Ii2 Iraq's Al-Bastuj'ir Trading Company intrructcd ihc Syrian firm where and how lodtsirib ute lundv receivedraq's Oil Ministryonraqi military).
As with the Syrian Protocol, ihe0 Turkish Prolitvnl operatedayment on supply basis, and therefore probably did not involve the CA in Turkey.
Jordanian Cos* Study
Commercial attaches worked on behalf of the MIC to events relatedurdiase of and payment transfer make purchases and transfer money for payment in for materials from Jordan, according to translated foreign countries. The timeline in figurehows the documents.
7
AN8
AN8
request was made to the Directorate of MtCCommercial Affairs to contract for the purchase of Antimonyilograms, which is an industrial chemical that can abo be usedissile propellent. The end user for the chemical was Al-Karama State Establishment
Committoo recommends entering into contract to obtain tho chemical material fromAl-Wadha Commercial Contracting and Export for tho amount
A request for forurrency is made.
8
8
B
8
of Deposit into the account of Al-Wadha Commercial Agencies and Export Companyne percent of contract amountine.
A request Is made from the Commercial Depart mail to the MC Director for permission too Al-Wadha Co.
MC sands directions to the Commercial Attache In Amman to take tho necessary actions to3 to fii-Wadha Co.
A request Is made to the Jordan Nat ional Bank/Special Banking Department too Al-Wadha Trading Co.and related debl memo.
9
alf years later directions are sent to the Commercial Attache In Amman again to settle the payment0 to Al-Wadha Co. per cash voucher.
rmctrne lo support Jordan CA case study
MoD's Procurement Leadership at Ihe Onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom
Minister of Defense: Staff Gen. Sultan Hashim Ahmad Al Ta'i. As ihe Minister of Defense, he approved all MoD procurement proposals submitted by lhe Chief of Staff. Sultan wasember of the "Committee of Three" which had oversight and control over llie Iraqi defense budget.
Chief of Staff: Staff. Gen. Ibrahim Ahmad AAbd-al-Sattar Muhammad. Ibrahim was directly responsible for MoD procurement activities. He could reject, but not grant final approval on MoD procurement
Direcior of Weapons and Supplies: Staff Maj. Gen. Taleb 'Vwayn al-Juma'a Al Tikriti. Taicb was responsible for coordinating MoD weapons procure-mem via the MIC9) j.
Directormaments and Supplies: Brig. Nabll Rahman. Sabil was responsible for ihe procurement of products such as military uniforms, supplies, and other consumable items used to support military operations.
This mutually supporting relationship between the MoD. MIC. and Saddam's illicit fundingalso supported the procurement needs of the RG and SRG.
MoD Procurement Leadership The Minister of Defense reviewed all MoDand, in coordination with the Presidential Diwan. could approve MoD procurementup lo S2 million. The MoD Chief of Staff (CoS) and subordinate supply directors processed and coordinated procurement requirements for approval at higher levels, but could not approve MoDFor procurement requirements greater thanillion, the Minister of Defense was requiredore deliberative process involving the MIC. Presidential Secretary, and the President. The MoD did not have final approval authority for these high cost procurement programs.
MoD Procurement Directorates
According to Sultan Hashim Ahmad Al-Ta'i, the former MoD, the Ministiy of Defense was divided into directorates, the two largest being theof Armament and llie Directorate of Weapons and Supplies. These two Directorates were the MoD's primary procurement organizations (see.
Directorate of Armament and Supplies. According lo Al-Ta'i, the Directorate of Armament andprocured non-weapons related suppb'esfar the military to carry out its missions. These consumable items included, but were not limited to, office supplies, military rations, and military
Directorate of Weapons and Supplies.to Al-Ta'i and Abid Hamid Mahmud al-Tikriti, the former presidential secretary, the Directorate of Weapons and Supplies had two key procurement-related roles: acquiring weapons and ammunition and supporting foreign procurement delegations. Priorhe Directorate of Weapons anddirectly procured weapons and materials for ihe MoD from boih domestic and foreign sources. After ihe imposition of UN sanctions withhe directorate was no longer able to obtain weapons abroad and depended on the MIC to execute foreign procurement.
BGSuhinN
cwtsur
HI. 'i.-mil ii.
Taleb Uwayn Al-Juma'a, the Chief of lhcof Weapons and Supplies, usually served as the MoD delegate for these visits. When accompanying the MIC abroad Uwayn was subordinated to the MIC leadership.
The only lime MoD procurement was notby ihe MIC was when Ihe Minister of Defense or his Chief of Staff headed the Iraqi
TW* Uwrn ahAjraa't
BO NaMI BW-ni"
inistry ot Defense leadetstap hierarchy.
According io Al-Ta'i, the MIC was responsible foroercent of MoD procurement Data from Ihc Syrian trade protocols; however, indicate thai ihis percentage was probably closer toerceni. In any case, ihe MIC negotiated contracts,foreign and domestic sources for prohibited items (often via its frontnd arranged the delivery of goods for the MoD.
l-Ta'i dealt directly with lhc head of the MIC. Abd al-Tawab Mullah Huwaysh, and his two deputies, Dagher Muhammad Mahmud and Muzahim Sa'ab Al-IIasan, on substantiveissues.
The Directoraie of Weapons and Supplieswiih the MIC on MoD procurement projects via regular meetings. These meetingsange of day-to-day procurement issues,lhc mechanics of requesting and delivering items, financing procurement contracts, addressing complaints over late deliveries, and adjudicating problems related to poor quality equipment.
According io Al-Ta'i, the Directorate of Weapons and Supplies participated In severaldefense procurement delegations each year, providing expertise in weapons pricing and how foreign systems could best improve Iraq's defense
When Iraq hosted these delegations, the MICnegotiated, and signed procurement contracts on behalf of the MoD.
* Uwayn developed some overseas procurement con-tads from MIC sponsored travel to Yugoslavia and Russia. Uwayn also traveled to Syria two or three times, on one occasion with Huwaysh.
Budgeting and Financing Mililary Procurement
As with Ihe other Iraqi ministries, the MoD operated two budgetary processes: one deliberate and (he other supplemental. The formal MoD budget was small, preplanned, and approvedeliberative process involving multiple ministries and commissions. Theormal budget was used to purchaseitems and fund the basic operation of ihe force.
According lo dataaptured generalbudget document, containing only operating expenditures, Iraqi defense spending7 millionhis figure, however, decs not represent true Iraqi defense spending, as the former Regime did not lisi defense spending in its general budget during' sanctions Regime.
In .sharp contrast to the MoD'* formal budget, the supplemental MoD budget wat controlled by Saddam and wat used for illicit procurement of
Iraqi military units identifiedand forwarded them up the chain of theto the directorate head.
director reviewed nrsd forward procurcmeni requirements to the Chief tir Deputy Chief of Staff who would review the piocurcmeniand forward them to them to the Minister of Defense, Al-Ta'i.
Although other Iraqi ministries wcic required io work wnhin iheir formal budgets, Al-Ta'i could request more money (rom the Presidential Diwan, On some occasions, however, (he MoD supplemental budget requests were routed through Saddam's secretary, Abid Hamid Mahmud. who could make decisions more rapidly than Ihe Diwan.
Although Mahmud has stated that he had no rote in MoD procurement, sse judge that heole in high-pnonty procurement lor the MoD. based on bis position and statement* by another high-level Iraqi military officer. This otneer asserted2 supplemental request lor Internet satellite commumcatMins tor the MoD was routed through the Presidential Secretary. The Secretariat subsequently arranged lor the purchaseyrian company.
Ultimately, Saddam personally upproved the funding for classified MoD, MIC. and IIS projects; informed the governmental bodies of his approval via Mahmud. and used Mahmud lo distribute supplemental funding for the projects.
MoD Procurement ProcessoD procurement depended on the nature of the item required. If the UN prohibited the goods, the illicit procurement process accomplished the procurement. If the items were dual-use goods, they were procured via the channels describedin the chapter.
Illicit Procurement for the MoD. Alter the UN imposed sanctionsember states werefrom exporting conventional military goods to Iraq.esult. Saddam tasked the MIC to obtain prohibited materials and equipment on behalf of the MoD. According to al-Sattar. the former MoD CoS. the Minister of Defence coordinated all foreign illicit procurement directly with the MIC.
lhc MIC and MoD negotiated specific weapons procurement requirementsCoordinaiion Conference- held every three months at the MIC headquarters in Baghdad.
Dual-Use Goods Defined
"Dual-Use Goodi" art items that might be of use lo the military, but were not specially or originally designed or modified for military use. The term "goods" includes equipment, chemicals, materials,ru. lading spare parts I. technology, and software.
The leim "dual-use goods" can he contrasted with "military goods" that were specially or originally designed for use by the military.
UN Sanctions on Ihr Procurement of Conventional .Military Goods
Accordingormer high-ranking MICpecial Committee for Procurement for the MIC. MoD, and SRC was established insee. The Special Committee reviewed and recommended securits related procurementwhich vsere then approved by Iluwaysh. and ultimately passed to Ousay for approval.
The committee's hrst task was to develop Iraq's air defense system.
ISG has found scry little eonoboraling e> idence of ihe existence of this committee. I: ven it itsignificant procurement in ihe nine months before the regime was removed, it is likely Saddam still retained the linal approval on expensive or politically sensitive procurement projects.
All member states of the United Nations were prohtb-uedfrom exporting conventional military goods lo Iraq by UNSCR.. Some countries, however, failed lo abide by these Uiiernaiionaland permitted their nationalt to partkhe sale of amvenaoiul mditary goods to Iraq. Some nationals involied j* this Illicit arms trade were associated with, or in some cases directly related io. their national leaders. For more detailed information see and Annex H, UN Security Council Resolutions Applicable to Iraq and Annex J. The Procurement of Conventional Mililary Goods in Breach of UN
Dual-Use Goods Procurement Tor the MoD. For routine procurement requirements, the Diwan reviewed the Minister of Defense's requisitions and identified an appropriate ministry to prepare theto purchase the items domestically or t