VOL II COMPREHENSIVE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE DCI ON IRAQ'S WMD

Created: 9/30/2004

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Comprehensive Report

of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD

Delivery Systems

elieve that the Arab nationight to ask: thirty nine missiles? Who will fire the Fortieth?

Saddam Husayn

Contents

Key

Evolution of Iraq's Delivery

The Regime Strategy and

Ambition

DctlinetT

Recovery

Miscalculation

Resolving the Retained Scud-Variant Missile

LiquitJ-Propellani Missile

AlSamud

Al Samud II

Solid-Propellant Missile

Al hat'h Missile

General18

Guidance and

Material

Al 'Ubur Missile Program

Guidance and

Other Composite Solid-Propellant

Long-Rangc Ballistic Missile

Clusteringolga Engines

onversions to Surtace-to-Surface

iametcrSolid-Propcllant Missile Project

Program

New Cruise Missile

ange

Propulsion

Guidance and

The Jinin [Jcnin)

Propulsion

Guidance and

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles fUAVs) and Remotely Piloted Vehicles

Brief

PV

Roles and

PV (Al Bay-ah)

Roles and

Huwaysh's Accounting of9 RPV

Al Yamamah

Ibn-Firnas

Foreign

Al Quds UAV

Ch arae55

56

Procuremeni Supporting Iraq's Delivery

Infrastructure Improvements and Technology

Sialic Test-Firing

Solid-Propcllant Rocket Motor Case

Propellanl

Solid-Prupellant Motor Casting

Production ot Solid-Propcllant

Gnphatc

Carbon Firmer Filament

CVramK Warhead Effort?

Prosciibed

Violations of United Nations Sanctions and

1 n

Undeclared

Rote ol lhe

Annexes

A. Resolving the Retained Scud-Variant Missile

It Ijquid-Propellanl Missile

Pinpellnni Missile

Key Findings

Since Ihe, Iraq has consistently sought to acquire an effective long-range weapons delivery capability, and1 Baghdad had purchased the missiles and infrastructure lhat would form Ihe basts for nearly all of Us future missile system developments.Tbc Soviel Unioney supplier of missileandissiles and ground suppon equipment

Iraq's experiences with long-range delivery systems In the Iran/Iraq warital lesson to IraqiSaddam Husayn. The successful Iraqi response lo lhc Iranian long-range bombardment of Baghdad,lo Ihe War of lhc Cities, probably saved Saddam.

raq had successfully demonstrated its ability to modify some of Its delivery systems to increase their range and to develop WMD dissemination options, with theAl Husaynirst step in thisThe next few years of learning and experiments continued that the Regime's goal was for an effective long-range WMD delivery capability and demonstrated the resourcefulness of Iraq's scientists and technicians.

Iraq faded in its efforts to acquire longer-range delivery systems to replace inventory exhausted in the Iran/Iraq war. This,orcing function that drove Iraq to develop indigenous delivery system production capabilities.

Desert Storm and subsequent US resolutions and inspections brought many of Iraq's delivery system programsall. While much of Iraq's long-range missile inventory and production infrastructure was eliminated, Iraq until1 kepi some items hidden to assist future reconstiiution of the force.Txusand Iraq's intransigence during years of inspection left many UN questions unresolved.

Coalition airstrikes effectively targeted much of Iraq's delivery systems infrastructure, and UN inspections dramatically impeded furthei developments of long-range ballistic missiles.

ppears lo have laken time, but Iraq eventually realized that sanctions were not going to end quickly. This forced Iraq to sacrifice its long-range delivery force in an attempt to bringuick end to the

After the flight of Husayn Kamilraq admitted that it had hidden Scud-variant missiles andto aid future reconstiiution but asserted that these items had been unilaterally destroyed bybe UN could not verify these claims and thereafter became more wary of Iraq's admissions aiidegime of more intrusive inspections.

The Iraq Survey Croup (ISG) has uncovered no evidence Iraq retained Scud-variant missiles, and debrief-ings of Iraqi officials in addition to some documentation suggest that Iraq did not retain such missiles

While Other WMD programs were strictly prohibited, the UN pennilled Iraq lo develop and possess delivery systems provided their range did notm. This freedom allowed Iraq to keep ils scientists andemployed and to keep its infrastructure and manufacturing base largely intact by pursuing programs nominally in compliance with the UN limitations. This positioned Iraqotential breakout capabitity.

raq had declared development programs underway for liquid- and solid-propcllant ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVsj.

Iraq's decisions6 lo accept the Oil-For-Foodprogram (OFF) and later8 to ceasewith UNSCOM and IAEAeriod of increased activity in delivery systems developmenl.Thc

pace of ongoing missile programs accelerated, and the Regime authorized its scientists to design missiles with ranges in excess) km that, if developed, would have been clear violations of.

raq had provided the liquid-propellant Al Samud II rogram started intlie solid-propellanl Al Fat'h to the military and waseries of new small UAV systems.

ISG uncovered Iraqi plans or designs for Ihree long-range ballistic missiles with rangesm andm-range cruise missile, although none of these systems progressed to production and only one reportedly passed the design phase. ISG assesses that these plans demonstrate Saddam'slo the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedoma long-range delivery capability.

Procurements supporting delivery system programs expanded after8 departure of the UN inspectors. Iraq also hired outside expertise to assist its development programs.

ISG uncovered evidence thai technicians and engineers from Russia reviewed the designs and assistedof the Al Samuduring its rapid evolution. ISO also found that Iraq had entered into negotiations with North Korean and Russian entities for more capable missile systems.

According to contract information exploited by ISG. Iraq imported atolga liquid-propcllam engines from Poland and possibly Russia or Belarus. While Iraq claims these engines were for the Al Samud II program, the numbers involved appear in excess of immediate requirements, suggesting they could have supported the longer range missiles using clusters ofngines. Iraq also imported missile guidance and control systems from entities in countries like Belarus, Russia and Federal Republic of YugoslaviaNote: FRY is currently known as Serbia and Montenegro but is referred to as FRY in Ihis section.)

In2 Iraq was under increasing pressure from the international community to allow UN Inspectors to return. Iraq in November acccpicd1 and invited inspectors back into the country. InIraq presentedhe UN its Currently Accurate. Full, and Complete DecUiralion (CAFCDI in response to

While lhe CAFCD was judged lo be incompleteehash of old information, it did provide details on the Al Samud II. Al Fai'h. new missile-related facililies. and new small UAV designs.

In3 ihe UN convened an expert panel to discuss lhe Al Samudnd Al Fal'h programs, which resulted in Ihc UN's decision to prohibit the Al Samud II and order its destruction. Missile destruction began in early March but was incomplete when the inspectors were withdrawn later thai month.

The CAFCD and Uniled Nations Monitoring. Veriiication. and Inspeclion Commissionrief glimpse inio what Iraq had accomplished in four years wiihout an imernational presence on ihe ground.

Given Iraq's investments in technology and infrastructure improvements, an effective procurement network, skilled scientists, and designs already on the books for longer range missiles, ISG assesses that Saddam clearly intended to reconstitute long-range delivery systems and that the systems potentially were for WMD.

Iraqew and larger liquid-rocket engine test siand capable, with some modification, of supporting engines or engine clusters largeT lhan the singlengine used in the Al Samud II.

Iraq built or refurbished solid-propellanl facilities and equipment,arge propellanl mixer, an aging oven,asling pit that could support large diameter motors.

Iraq's investing in studies into new propcllants and manufacturing technologies demonstrated its desire for more capable or effective delivery systems.

Evolution of Iraq'systems

Throughout its recent history, Iraq has consistently sought to maintain an effective long-range weapons delivery capability, beginning with ils acquisition of Scud missiles innd SOs and subsequent modifications to increase their range. After expelling the UN inspectorshe Regime authorized the development of longer-range delivery systems, demonstrating its commitment to acquiring these potential WMD delivery platforms.

After Desert Storm, ihe international community learned lhat Iraq hud developed CW and BW warheads for Al Husayn missiles, wasuclear weapon for delivery by ballistic missile, and had pursued developmentAV for CW/ BW delivery. WMD deliveryentral role for Iraq's missile and UAV systems.

During tlie UNSCOM inspection. Iraq embarkedumber of delivery system programs that helped retain the expertise and infrastructure needed toong-range strike capability, although ISG has nothat was the inlenl.

After OIF, ISC found evidence for several new long-range delivery system designs, but has not found evidence for new WMD pay-loads for these, or any, delivery systems.

The Regime Strategy and WMI) Timeline

For an overview ot Iraqi WMD programs and policy choices, readers should consult the Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline chart, enclosedeparate foktout and in tabular at the ruck ofhe periodhe timeline shows specific events bearing on the Regime's efforts in the BW. CW. delis-cry systems and nuclear realms and their chicwtogscal relationship with political and military developments that had direct bearing on the Regime's policy choices. (These events are alsoin tabular form in the Annex section).

Readers should also Ik'lhat, ul the conclusion of each chapter, ISG has included foldoul summary charts that relate inflectioncriticalpoints in the Regime's WMDpanicular events, initiatives, or decisions the Regime took with respect to specific WMD programs.points arc marked in the margins of the texted triangle.

In the. Iraq embarkedetermined path toobust delivery system capability, and1 Iraq had purchased the missiles and infrastructure that would form the basis for nearly all of its future missile system developments. Ihc Soviet Unioney supplier of missile systems in Iraq's bid toiquid-propellant ballistic missile force. Other countries played significant roles in the establishment of related infrastructure. The Iran-Iraq Warey spur to ihese missile system developments. In particular. Iraq needed to achieve longer range missiles. Iran could strike Iraqi cities with Scuds, but Iraq could not sirike Tehran with similar-range systems.

After signing contracts with the Soviet Unionraq48issiles:msporter-crec-tor-launchers; and other ground suppon equipment, propcllants, and warheads.

0 Iraq and Yugoslavia agreed to develop andmall battlefield artillery rocket called then Iraq and lhe7 inThenspired an interest in solid-pro-pcllant missiles.

raq, Egypt, and Argentina signed an agreement (amended5othesolid-propellant boosted two-stage ballistic missile with rangeupm.9 deliveries fell so far behind schedule that the agreement, was canceled. However, before Iraq terminated the agreement it received missile designs, two large solid-propellant mixers, and other infrastructure.

nable to attack Tehran directly during the Iran-Iraq war using standardissiles, Iraqimple modi Ii cation to produce the Al Husaynm range and reduced payload

mass. Ai lirsi. producing one Al Husayn missile required three Scud airframes, hut this rapidly evolvedne-for-one ratio allowing recovery of previously consumed missiles.

raq successfully demonstrated its ability to both modify some of its delivery systems to increase Iheir range and to develop crude WMDoptionsith the AI Husaynirst step in this direction.

Alter successfully undertaking the Al Husaynproject. Iraq initiated anoiher Scudproject known as Al 'Abbas to increase the rangem. The Al 'Abbasange ofmlight testut the program experienced numerous problems and was not flown

raq began researching the Altage space launch vehicleonsisting of live Scud-type missiles strapped together to form the first stageonceptolid rocket fourth stage never moved beyond the designhe Al 'Abid was tested9 and successfully lifted off the launch pad: however, an inter-stage collapse caused the SLV to fail and there were no further flight tests. Ihc Al 'Abid program continued until

Iraq invaded Kuwait in0 and. in (he ensuing Desert Storm, used Al llusayn and Al Hijarah missiles against targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia.

raq successfully designed and tested crude "special" CW or BW agent-lillcd warheads for

the Al Husayn missile. Serial production occurred between August and0tockpile of CBW warheads.

in this time frame, Iraq initialed twoasndconvert anurface-to-air missile (SAM)urface-to-surface missile (SSM) with design rangesmm. respectively. The Pahad- program was canceled in9 hut other similar projects such as Al Rohma (Javelin i

SAM continued. Iraq was actually flight-testing one such undeclared program,, while UNSCOM wa* undertaking inspectionsSGotheronversion projects from thep to OIF that probably trace their origins to the Fahad programs.

Byraq hademotely piloted vehicle (RPV) and had tested BW simulani disseminaiion from modifiedrop tanks. Theonversion program was canceledut these initial steps most likely laid the groundwork for future RPV

)

Desert Storm and subsequentresolutions and inspections brought many of Iraq's delivery system programsalt. While much of Iraq's missile inventory and production infrastructure wasIraq kept some Scud variant missiles bidden to assist future reconstitution of Ihe force until the endhis decision, coupled wiih thedestruction of WMD, and Iraq's intransigence during the inspection years left many questionsfor the UN. Baghdad's prime objective was to rid Iraq of sanctions, which would enable Iraq to develop its delivery system programsuicker pace and to make their systems more accurate. Iraq's fear ofIran's growing military strength and Baghdad's concern lhat inspections would expose its weaknesses to Iran led Baghdad to obfuscate the inspection process.

United Nations Security Council Resolutionrohibited Iraq from developing or possessing any ballistic missilesange in excessrestriction reinforced by subsequentestablished ancalled the United Nations Special(UNSCOM) with the mandate to police these restrictions. In the summerNSCOM oversaw the destruction ofl Husayn missiles,aunchersl NioV launchers.

After Ihe flight of Husayn Kamil. Saddam's son-in-law and head of lhe weapons programs of ihe Military Industrialization Commission (MIC),

Iraq5 admlucd lhal it had intentionally concealed two Scud-type missiles and associated equipment from the UN uniil1 io prevent their destruction so lhal (hey could be used in the future to reconstitute the force. The Iraqideclared il unilaterally destroyed these items, but the UN could not completely verify those claims and became much more wary of Iraq's admissions andegime of moreinspections-

Husayn Kamil was the key to the delivery system development process being closely involved in the appointments of key personnel and even run-of-the-mill design reviews. His flight from Iraq effectively ended all work on long-range missiles

Documentary evidence reveals that Iraq received all of its Scud missiles deliveries from the Soviet Union. The documents also account for theof Iraq's Scud force. This information, apparently never provided to the UN, suggests Iraq did not have Scud-variant missilesey question for the international

In the area of solid-propel lants, UNSCOMtheof twoallon mixer bowlsolid-propcllanl muter meant

for therogram. UNSCOM also supervised the "destruction" of Other equipment associated with theirst stage motor production and declared Ihcotor case aging ovenn effect, thiswas merely disabled and much of il would resurface in ihe program later once Iraq was no longeronitoring and verification regime.

rohibited chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs but permitted Iheand possession of ballistic missiles with upSO km range. Iraq kept its scientists and technicians employed and its missile infrastructure and manufacturing base largely Intact byprograms nominally in compUance with the UN limitations. This positioned Iraqreakout capability. During the. Iraq expanded and modernized itsinfrastructure and had development programs for liquid- and solid-propellant ballistic missiles and UAVs.

Evenime of diminishing resources and as the economy moved to its5 low point, Iraq supported its missile programsatter of priority. This priority ensured that support was susuiined up to OIF.

Iraq's initial foray into liquid-propel lant ballistic missiles after Dcscn Storm staned with iherogram (later replaced by the Al Samud)his missile program relied on SA-2and Iraq's familiarity with Scud manufacturing and was monitored closely by the UN. Research and development continued1 when the program was terminated and replaced by ihe Al Samud II.

Reseaicholid-propellant ballistic missile under therogram (liter renamed Al Fai'h) began before Desert Storm. This program was based in pan on the Ababil-W, with an initial goal ofangem. Research and dcvclopmeni on this program continued

fter1 conversion failurehe Iraqis resumed efforts toanned aircraftPV. ihis time9 trainer aircraft. Research continued intcrminemlyhen the program was terminated. 'Abd-al-Tawab 'Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh. ihe former Minister of Mililary Industrialization, stated thai9 had the same mission as theSG judges that the purpose of thePV program was to deliver CWIBW.

Iraq's decisions6 lo accept OFF and later8 to cease cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEAeriod of increased activity in delivery systems development. The pace of ongoing missile programs accelerated, and Ihe Saddam Regime authorized the design of long-range missiles that were clear violations of.

I rail's haltiitic missile programs experienced rapid advancement compared lo Ihe previous five years of slunied development and concerned new ideas for longer range missiles, some based on old concepts. Given Ihe ever-decreasing effectiveness otIraq was able io consider bolder steps in areas where il Mill had technical difficulties. If lheregime remained sirictly enforced, ihere would have been Utile or no effon by Iraq to address these shortfalls.

ISG discovered that Iraq7 restarted efforts io convertAMs into ballislic missiles, which contravened an UNSCOM letter restricting this kind of work. 'Ihis project was canceled8 but probably restartedith the Sa'd project tom-rangc missile. Research for the Sa'd project continued uphe time UN inspeclors returned

Accordingormer engineer within the Iraqi missile program,78onthly Ballistic Missile Commillee meeiing, Huwaysh openly staled heissileangem.

According to Kamal Mustafa 'Abdallah Sultan Alormer Secretary General of the Republican Guardn the summeruwaysh,peech to SRG and Republican Guard members, promised lhal lhe range of an unspecified missile sysiem would be extendedm, though this would take live years lo accomplish.

Iraq began liighi-tcsting the Al Fat'h0 and continuedul Iraq was not able to acquire oruitable guidance sysiem. Iraq began deploying unguided Al Fai'h missiles to the army in

he Iraqis began developing the Al 'Ubur SAM system, which wouldodified, longer Al Fat'h rocket motor. Iraq considered, bul did not pursue, using the Al 'Ubur motor in

a single-stage ballistic missile thai could havem in range.

. Iraq began an effort lo extend the shelf life ofLUNA) andockets by replacing their aging double-base solid rocket motors wiih composite solid-propel lanl. which also improved the performance of theseRenamed Al Ra'd and Al Nida'. respectively, these efforts helped advance the composite solid-piopellanl manufacturing infrastructure in Iraq.

addam ordered Ihe development of longer range missiles. In response, Huwaysh asked his missile scientists to see what was feasible. Drawings dated0 show iwo missilesluster of cither two or livengines. These designs could have resulted inwith maximum ranges ofm. but the designs did not move forward because the program lacked wrincn authorization from Saddam.

Following Huwaysh's orders, Iraq pursued efforts to0 km) solid-propellant ballistic missile. Source accounis give various dales for this event, bul it was mosl likelynitial concepts includedluster of Al Fat'h motors orarger diameter motor. Iraq alsootoriameterr one meter for useingle-stage missile. Iraq anempted toarrel section from theupergun project lorototype onc-mctcr-diameier solid rockei motor, bul the effort failed because of material incompai-ibililies when Iraqi technicians tried to weld the Supergun section lo lhe motor end-dome.

1 the Al SamudcplacedthcAl Samud program because of instability problems. Flight tests began innd the Al Samudas deployed to the Army in

Iraq8 continued with itsodification efforts with theange extension project andompletely new effort to increase Ihe range of theruise missile to IfiOO km.

' Ihc first efforttraightforward project lhat replaced the existing rockei propulsion sysiem with one lhatigher energy fuel. This change

allowed an increase In rangereaterm. According to one Iraqi scientist, the first successlul Might test ol ihc ex (ended-rangeccuned inuwaysh commentedxtended-rangeay have been fired during OIF, targeting Kuwait.

second elTort began in! when the Office of the President suggested to MIC that itm range cruise missile. This project. Later named Jimn. would attempt to replace the HY-2liquid-propellant rocket engine with

a modified hclKoptcr turboshaft engine to extend iu rangem. Work begannd Iraq had conducted some engine-related tests b) the time UN inspector* returned. At lhal time, one official working on the project judged it was three to live years from completion.

Concurrent with the failures of9 RPVIraq began0 to pursue new, long-range UAV options.

Iraq remained interested in UAVs. and Ihc MIC ordered the development of indigenousUAVs and target drones. Iraq's Ihn-Fimas group8 developed the AlAVattlefield reconnaissance UAV.

econd, more secret, indigenous UAV development pri>gr,uii inalled Al Ouds. which would locus on meetingrequirements for airborne elevuonic warfare programs. However the Al Ouds UAV* were still in development al the start of OIK

Detirery system-related procurement expanded in8 after the departure of thr US' inspectors. Iraq also hired outside expertise to assist Usprograms. Money was pouring into Iraq's delivery system programs, and Iraqi front companies took ads ant age of the freedom to operate without UN oversight.

hired technicians and engineers fiom Russian companies to review the designs and assistol the Al Samud II, perhaps comributing to its rapid evolution.

Iraq entered into negotiations with North Korean and Russian entities fix more capable missile systems. Iraq and North Korea0m range missile, probably the No Dong, and2 Iraq approached Russian entities about acquiring the Iskandert short-range baUrsric(SRBMl

- According to contract infonnaaion. Iraq am ported atoJga liquid propcllant engines from Poland and possibly Russia or Belarus. Iraq claims these engines were for the Al Samud IIbut the numbers involved appear far in excess of immediate requirements, suggesting they could hasc supported the longer range missiles using clusters ofngines. Iraq also importedguidance and control systems Irom entities in Belarus. Russia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

|

The next move of the Regime commenced wUhill-conceived reaction to the terrorist attacks, allowing him to be aligned wdh the "Axis of EriL" Inraq was under increasing pressure from the intrrnattonal community to allow US' inspectors to return. Iraq in November accepted1 andnspectors back into the country. That December, Iraq presented to the UN its Currently Accurate, hull, andhe CAFCD wasepeat of old information, bul it did provide details on the Al Samud D, Al Fat'h, and new missile-related facilities.

* After Iraq disclosed in ils CAFCD that, on at leastccasions, its Al Samud II missile had reached rangesm, the UNtop to Al Samud II flight-testing until they could further assess the system's capabilities. UNMOVICa panel of missile experts inhich concluded that the A) Samud II violated UN statues, and. therefore, the program should he frozen and the missiles desuoyed. Beginning in March. Iit'ci vised the obstruction ofissiles and the disablementaunchers. The missile destruction program was incomplete when the inspectors left in mid-March, leaving Iraq with

Al Siiinud II missiles that could be usedoalition forces. Iraq launched approximately live Al Samud II missiles against Coalition forces during OIF before the system was recalled due to failures.

The Al Karamah Siate Establishment, later known as Al Karamah General Company, detailed design work tor long-range missiles usingngine Clustersuwaysh claimed lhat he ordered one copy of these designs be given to him and thai all other evidence of the program destroyed to avoid detection by UNMOVIC inspectors.

The Su'donversion project, researched hy Al Kindi State Establishment, was abandoned prior lo the arrival of UN inspectors. ISG learned, however, lhal another group embarkedrash program to converto SSMs after UNMOVICdeparted. Twoere converted but never fired.

Iraq declared that its Al Fat'h missile hadm during flight tests to the UN. As wiih the Al Samudissile, the UN ordered that Iraq cease all flight tests of tbe sysiem until they could further evaluate Ihe system's capabilities. By the start ofuided version of the Al Fat'h was within weeks of flighi-tcsting. Evenuidance system, the Al Fat'h proved itself toiable weapon sysiem. and Ihe Iraqi Army fired bciwccnndissiles during OIF.

Iraq's small UAV programs had demonstrated some Success, including anm flight, and given time most likely would have produced larger UAVs with greater payload capabilities. The evidence uncovered by ISG suggests lhal the UAV prognims active at Ihe onset of OIF were intended for reconnaissance or electronic warfare.

The CAt'CD and UNMOVIC inspectionsrief glimpse inio what Iraq had accomplished in four years without an international presence on the ground. Given Iraq's investments in technology and infrastructure improvements, an effectivenetwork, skilled scientists, and designs already

on the books for longer range missiles, ISG assesses that, absent UN oversight, Saddam clearly intended to reconstitute long-range delivery systems,for WMD.

ew liquid-rocket engine lest stand that was larger and more capable than the existing engine test stand. The new stand, with modi licalitins, would have been able to support tests of more powerful engines or clusters of engines. Although ISG found no evidence lhat lesls of more powerful engines had occurred. Iraq had clearly begun io establish theuch tests in Ihc future.

Iraq undertook efforts to improve ils composite solid-propellanl infrastructure. Iraq repaired one of theallon mixers and iwo howls from therogram and tried to repair the second mixer, although reports vary as lo the success. According to two former Iraqi officials, the mixer was usedhort time2 and thenbefore UN inspectors returned. In addition, Iraq built an annealing chamber capable of handling rocket motor cases wiih diameters greater lhan one meter. Other infrastructure improvements included new, larger diameter casting chambers und aincrease in propellanl component production capabilities.

studied new propellanis and manufacturing technologies demonstraling ils desire for more capable or effective delivery systems. Foriquid-propellanl rocket engine test on1 useduel instead of ihe usualn an effort to enhance the engine's performance. ISG learnediquid Fuels Commillee was established ino research thecapabilities for various propellanl* und techniques for producing candidate propcllants or precursors, some advanced up to pilot scale.

Resolving thr Retained Scud-Variant Missile Question

ISG acquired information suggesting lhal1 Iraq did not possess Scud or Scud-variant missiles. Interviews with several farmer high-level Iraqi officials, visits to locations where missiles were reportedly hidden, and documents reportedly never disclosed to the UN, all appear to confirm that Iraq expended or destroyed all of the HI9 Scud missiles it acquired from the Sarin Vnion.

A recently exploited document eoniauis infonnation on all of the ftcud missiles imported from (he Soviet Umonreak down by venal number of their disposition Thisnever shared wiih the UN. although the contents had been discussed with I'N officials provides jii Iraqi analysis foi the discrepancies in thelor its Scud missilci to theartialof the document can he found in the Delivery Systems Annex.

Husam Muhammad Amin Al Yasin. tlie former director of the National Monitoring Dlrccioratedmitted to knowing about the retention of two missiles for reverse-cngincerins bui said ihc missiles were destroyed

According to Ha/.im 'Abd-al-Razraq Ayyubi Al Shihab. the former commander ol the Surface-to-Surfacc Missile (SSM)hc only retained Scud-variant missiles were destroyedwo missiles that were to be used for reversewere unilaterally destroyed byazim claimed thai no other Scud missiles or equipment were retained.

ew former high-ItRegime officialsconflicting informalion regarding theof Scud-variant missiles. Iurtker questioning has not resolved these conflicts. Additionally, ISG has investigated several reports from tourers of unknown credibility concerning the locations of Scud missiles, bul wr have noi found evidence al those locations to support these claims.

"Abdullah Al Mullah Huwaysh, the head of MIC and Deputy Prime Minister, staled thai he had been convinced that Iraq had retained two to

four Scud-variant missilesesultith Qusay Saddam Husayn. Huwaysh described Qusay's irritation with 'AmirRashid Al 'Ubaydi. the former Minister of Oil then charged wiih resolving (he Scud material balance, who had pestered Qusay over thein Scud materiel balance between UNMOVIC and Iraq. Huwaysh Ihen commented that he knew nothing aboui (he location of the missiles or their status and lhat his opinion was based on Qusayeaction. However. Huwaysh speculatedighly restricted area near the so-called "Khanaqin triangle" would have been an ideal location to hide these missiles, since the Special Republican Guard (SRG) controlled Ihe area. Huwaysh was unable to provide any confirmatory evidence io his claim.

ISG believes that the balance of credible reporting and documentary evidence suggests that,raq no longer possessed Scud-variant missiles. Though some former high-level officials offerand suspicions that Iraq has retained Scud-variant missiles, exhaustive investigation by ISG has not yielded evidence supporting these claims.

1 Missile Developments

Iraq demonstrated its ability to quickly develop and deploy liquid-propellunt txillMic missiles, such as the Al Samud II. against UN guidelines. ISG believes thai, given the order to proceed, Iraq had themotivation andapidly move ahead with newer longer range ballistic missile designs.

Iraq began its indigenous liquid-propellani ballistic missile efforu in Iheith thelater known av the Al Samud. Ihese efforts lead io the more successful Al Samud II program, officially beginningeries of debriefings of high-level of licials from Iraq's missile programs, together with document exploitation. ISG has been able loictter understanding of the Al Samudrogram. Although the infrastructure and technical expertise were available, tltere Is no evidence suggesting Iraq intended lo design CBW warheads for either the AI Samud or the At Samud

Early Liquid-Propellanl Missile Efforts

Restriction

earlyraq displayed ambitions to develop an indigenous, liquid-propellanl IhiIUsIic missile. These early developmental efforts imiudedndrojects.n indigenouseplication (the Al Rafadiyan project) also failed bul was tied wiih ibe Ababil-IOO project. The Ababilintendedompliance measure addressing the UN sanctionsimiting the rangem and later renamed ihc Alm-diamcterdesigned by Dr. Hamid Khalil Af 'Azuiwi and Gen Ra'ad Isma' il Jamil AI Adhami ai Ibn-al Hay-iham. The program experienced various problems, especially wiih the missile's stability.r. Muzhir fModherl Sadiq Saba' Khamis Al Tamimi. then Director of both AI Karamah and Ibn-al Hay-tham.issile design, which was deemed moiv stable due io its having an increased diameterm. After reviewing various designs of the Ababil project. UNSCOM lestricted missile programs toiameter of no moremusayn Kami!ompetitive design review between Dr. Muzhir's new bOO-mm-diameter design and Genm design: Gen Ra'ad's design succeeded. After several years of limited success ai MIC, Gen Ra'ad was removed as the head of the program, and Dr. Muzhir was put in charge of the Al Samud programuzhir experimented with the design of theitsbut wort on this program ceasedll efforts were then refocuscd on the AI Samud ll project. See the Delivery Sysiems Annex for further information On Dr. Muzhir and Gen Ra'ad.

olf Eteus, ihc Executive Chairman of UNSCOM.etter to 'Amir Muhammad Rashid Al 'Ubaydi concerning designs for the Ababil-IOO liquid engine missile.

raqew design for theengine missile still under researchhis new design provided for aof an airframe's diameter,mmm. Our analysis conclutled that such ais not appropriate or justified forranges lesshe Commissionstate that any increase of the diameter in ihedesign of the Ababil-IOO liquidm is noi permitted"

Al Samud 11

Iraq researched and developed the Al Samud IIdespite UN provisions, which prohibitedystem with ils specification. Not only did ihc missile have range capabilities beyondm UN limit, but also Iraq procured prohibited items as well as received foreign technical assistance to develop and produce this sysiem, ISG, which hasomprehensive history of the system, has noindicating that Iraq was designing CBW warheads for the missile.

Huwaysh's official approval for the Al Samud II diameter increasem occurred inespite4 letter from UNSCOM Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus specifying that UNSCOM restricted the diameter of Iraq's Ababil-IOO missile to lessm. According to officials wiihin Iraq's missile program,m-diameter design was chosen because Ihis gave the missile morethan the unsuccessful smaller diameter missile and Ihis dimension also allowed Iraq to use HY-2for the missiles.

Accordingormer Iraqi missile program official, Huwaysh approvedm-diameter design for the Al Samud II inngineers wiihin the program strongly believed thai IhcmAl Samud was going to be unsuccessful from

the my beginning. They had determined, halted on Iheir experience and knowledge of Soviet ballistic missile systems, the kiiglhAliarneter (LTD) ratio of such missiles should bendul5 was (he optimum. Seciagram of ihc Al Samud II mksile andhuto of lhc Al Samud II missile.

believes thai etticutsions of anD art fallacious. Iraqi insistence lhal ihe diameter increase was intended solely topecific UD is moreuse to increase die missile's internalfor increasing thr furlfurther increasing the maximum range potential.

) of0 mm-diameter design may be an imptovement over lhat ofm-diamclcrhis is only one of many intcr-dcpendant parameters contributing to the missile's stability.

An Al Karamah official claimed that Dr. Muzhir, who had previouslymm designiscovered Out ihe airframe and ring assembly for theruise missile was basedm diameter Uce.uisc of tunc constraints, these items could easily be used lo quickly develop and manufactute hismm-diamcter missile.epicts an early Al Samud II using anirframe.

Huwaysh Mated that the larger diameter design allowed an additional fuel lank. ISG has not found evidence that Iraq intended to add an addaional fuel tank to thr Al Samud II

The capabilay af ihr Al Samud II missile quicklyarked improvement over iheAl Samud program. After several flight tests, the first of which occurred inraqroduction ramp-up of the missile Ineveral souices have eomiboraied Iraq's cltons lo improve (he accuracy of lhc system, usingexpertise, and mfnismiciuir Irom other missile programs to accelerate lidding the Al Samud II. The key parameters for Use Al Samud II are listed in Tabic 1.

A senior official within Iraq's missile program slated that lhc Al Samud II used gyroscopes taken from the guidance system ol'CfiOlruise missiles.

Up toimer system was used by Al Karamah toimple determination of the time lor engine cut-off. rcgardlevs of theachieved. After that date, the timer was replaced by an integraung axial accrkrofnctcr in the analog cortrol system, which wat designed to provide

an accurate determination of the engine cut-off velocity. This consisted of anccelcromctcr integrated into the control system, calculating Ihe missile velocity using digital integration of lhc axial acceleration. This modified control system would issue the engine shut down command signal when the target vclocily had beenange count, similar to lhat of Ihc Scud and Al Husayn missiles, could be entered horn the launcher lo preset the missile range using prclauuch data

Karamah also began the dcognompletely digital conspcnsator tn he used in place Of* lhc analog compensati* The compensator is an analogdesigned to calculate the conrs-fions riceessary to maintain missile altitude and fligbiparh to the target. The digital cumpeniaaor it scry similar to an onboard flight computer. It was to be ready for use by June or

The guidance system for the Al Samud tl provides outputs to ihe control system that provide corrective signals toraphite jel vanes, redirecting the

Figureorty Al Samud II usmgirframes.

vector of ihe modifiedolga engine. This arrangement, similar lo ihe Scud, provides conirolxes, bul only during lhc rxrwered portion ol flight. The missile reaches apogee as ihe powered rxmion of High! ends (approximatelyeconds in the case of the Al Samud III The missile is unguided after thrust termination andree-fall ballistic flight until impact. This limitation, coupled with the inaccuracies of the guidance and control system, resulted in large miss Ji stances.

teniae source at Al karamah informed ISGevelopmental effort to improve die accuracy of iheAlsing aerodynamic controls on die inboard sectionsigh pressure gas bottle would be used to supply air pressure to dmc pneumatic-controlled actuators lhal provide aerodynamic control throughoul bolh lhc missile's powered flighl and through reentry. This Improvement in control would have been incorporalcd following Ihc completion of the initial guidancemost likely entering testing as early as the end

lraqwasworkJngtoimpnrtncw. modem, complete guidance packages from Russian and FRY entities.

Iraq was intending to purchase Inertia! Navigation Systemsicer-optic systems, and high-preci-smn machinery lor indigenous proclueiioei ofand control components

Iraq relied on foreign assistance to deselop the Alrogram from lis early beginnings. ISG has uncovrred Iraqi efforts lo obtain technical expertise and prohibited items from other countries.

Russian experts contracted through ARMOS assisted with indigenous production as well as the interface between imported guidance systems and the Al Samud II missile.

A high-level official admitted lhat Iraq receivedngines through the Polish company Evax by ihe endollowed by anngines from Al Rawa'a.

ormer high-level civilian official. Iraq brought foreign expens inio ihc country in assist in its missile programs.

Although advancements in the Al Samud II program were achieved quickly, shortage of necessarylimited production. Several sources estimated the number ofmisslbrs produced and delivered to the Army by OIF. Because these accounts vary and are not fully supported by documentary evidence, ISG has compared these claims with earlier information tootential materiel balance for theSee Delivery Systems Annex for more details.

ormer high-level official. Iraq began serial production of ihc Al Samud II missileinhe production goal was to yieldullonth. ISG believes that, becauseack of certain components, Iraq did not always meet this monthly quota, while in some months Ihey may have surpassedwas dependent upon their success atcomponents.

Iraq declared the Samud II system to the UN in its CAFCD inisclosingm-diameter along withsecond engine burn lime. Additionally, Iraq admitted in its semi-annualdeclarations that the system had exceeded ISO km on at leastccasions during flight tests. Because of this, UNMOVIC Executire Chairman Hans Blix, before the UN Security Council inrdered Iraq to freeze allflight tests of the AI Samud II program until technical discus-Shns could occur to determine Ihe capability of the missile.

ormer senior official al Al Karamah. Iraq produced approximatelyissiles during ihc first quarter

Another source claimed lhal, after UNMOVIC inspectors departed the country inraq was able to assemblel Samud II missiles from remaining parts lhal had been placed in mobile trucks to avoid air strikes. These missiles were not delivered to live Army.

Al Samud II Determined To Be an Illegal System

N technical discussion inn International Team of missile expens concluded lhat ihe AI Samud II missile had range capabilities well btioiu! lhem limit. The UN then ordered Iraq to destroy the At Sarmul II arul associated support equipment specific to the system. UNMOVICtheissilesaunchers in March. Due to the inconsistencies in source reporting and the lack of documentary evidence available, ISG has been unable to accurately reconcile the status of the Al Samud II inventory. Refer to the Delivery Systems Annex for an assessment of the Al Samud II missile material balance.

A missileAFF system to ensure lhat lhe warhead is safe to handle and remains unarmed until it has been launched, and then detonates when intended. Afier launch the SAFF system will activate the firing system and arm Ihe warhead. Delona-lion of the explosive warhead charge is initialed by the fu/.c. Common fuzes used by Iraq include timer switches, aecclerometers. barometric devices and impact switches (impact switches are either inertia [nose and tail fuzes] or crush (nose fuze only] and can be used as the primary fuze orackup to ensure detonation if other fu/ing sySiemsor the Al Samud and Al Fat'h warheads. Ihe impact or crush swiich was located in the nose tip and activated by Ihc impact of lhe warhead with Ihe ground. The basic design of the high-explosive (HE) warhead was common between lhe two missiles and could beif needed wiih minimal modifications. The mosl likely composition of the explosive mixture. RDX,luminum powder.

The suhmunition warhead developed for Ihc Al Fat'h missile had an airhurst0 ensure the effective dispersal of the supmunitionshecontained upiiii-tank/anii-person-ncl (ATAP) submumtions.

Al Samud Warhead

ISG has not discovered any information lo suggest that Iraq Itad considered or designed bulk-filled CBWwarheads for the At Samud- An impaciwould be an inefficient method forchemical or biological agents, as Ihe heal and

Iraqi Ballistic Missile Warheads

Iraqnitary high-explosive IHE)for delivery hy both the Al Samud and Al Fat'h missiles. Iraq alsoulmunition warhead for the Al Fat'h and intended toluster warhead for the Al Samud.

Traditionally, the payload or warheadissile can he defined as an explosive or weapons package, the shell in which the weapons package is contained. and the Safe, Arm. Fuze and Fire (SAFE) sysiem.

shock of an explosive detonation could destroy much, if not all. of the agents.

AlrJvough ISG has recovered no evidence to suggest that "special" warheads were developed for the Al Samuds. the warheadirect extrapolation of the impact warhead design for the Scud and AI llusayn missiles and could be modified in the same way Iraq modified the Al Husayn HE warhead to produce crude CBW warheads.

Iraq retained the intellectual capital for reproducing these kinds ol'"special" warhead designs, soand production of this crude type ofcould be achievedancr of weekselatively small team of specialized individuals.

The Alas designed tonitary HE warhead, and Iraq apparently intended toonventional submunition warhead for Ihe missile. The Al Samud HE warhead is an extrapolation of the Scud warhead design and was later adopted for the Al Fat'h missile. Development of the warhead took about eight months and was completed in the summerhe Al Samud warhead components are listed in Table 2.

The original Al Samud warheadfl0-mm-ba.se-diamctcr andeters longesign payload massg. The fuze mechanism is similar to that of the Scud missile. The original warhead design contained one forward booster and two rear boosters ai the base of the warhead, one of which serves lo provide uniform detonation in the system, the other as an auto destruct mechanism in case the missilefrom its predetermined trajectory. Because Iraq lacked confidence in the accuracy of the guidance and control system, the backup and emergency boosters were never incorporated,ingle forward booster. An impact crush switch is incorporated inio the graphite nose of the warhead (sec Figurel Samud warhead design).

Iraq's desire tom range resulteduick modification lo reduce the payload massggg ofenior missile official.

Nose Tip

shell

rolled steel

layer

Asbestos

Shell

rolled steel

or crush switch housed in nose tip

x 3

thud booster actsafety mechanism, detonating il the missile deviates from its predetermined trajectory

IO*

Iraq reduced the warhead mass by relocating lhc base plate and bulkhead forward into the warhead body, which reduced the available HE volume.

modifications continuedlight test in1 used bcitet constructed cylindrical and conical pans of the warheadayloadg andangem.

After succeeding; wiih ihe unitary HE warhead, Iraq intended toubmunition warhead for Ihe Al Samud, accordingenior Iraqi missileHowever, no submunUiom warheads forrithrr Al Samud or Al Samud II werr manufactured.

Al Samud II Hjrhead

ISO has not discovered information to suggest lhat Iraq bad con suterrd or det warheads for the Al Samud H. Ihc Al Samud II was designed tonitary HE warhead, whkh is an extrapolation ol the Scud and Al Samud warhead designs. Al the end oflmodified the Al Samud warhead to accommodate the increase in diameterm lo 7WIesign payloadg for A) Samud was agreed lo with the UN. but the actual payloadg.

ew warhead shellm-ba.se-dinnielerengthm.

The HE was housed in the forward section of the warhead and additional space reserved in the base for an air bonle that would provide pneumatics to control surfaces yet to be implemented in the missile fins (sec Guidance and Conirolo compensate for the additional weight of Ihc warhead shell andsystem. Ihc amount of HE was reduced.

booster for the emergency detonator was to be reinstalled, once confidence was gained in thesystem.chematic diagram of the Al Samudarhead with gyroscope housings ai the base of Ihc warhead and notional emergency booster rod illustrated with doited lines.

Within two weeks. Al Karamahrototype thai was tested ai Alite belonging to ihe Air Force. The Icsl successfully demonstrated lhcand blast radius, resulting in design approval from the Army.

Between January andl Karamah and Al Qa'Qa'atudy io improve the effectiveness of ihc Al Samud warhead. The study was to investigate iwo aspects of the

Methods by which ihc density of the explosivecould be increased: and

How live blast effect of the warhead could be improved.

The theoretical tilling requirements for the study of the Al Samud II warhead were:

g

Fx plosive chargeg

Warhead metal containerg

Composition of explosive24 kg.

Filling of lhc Al Samud warheadanualhowever, ihe study recommended thaiIhe explosive material into the warhead byydraulic press would improve ihe density and thus effectiveness and safe handling of ihe explosive material.

-

Missile Developments

The Iraqi composite solid-propellant missilelhal developed inupported Ihe developmenthort-range ballistic missile (SRBM) system allowed within the UN agitations and the refurbishment of and improvement toweapon systems and attempted to support the developmenl of ballistic missile systems prohibited by the UN.

Al Fat'h Missile Program

Background

Despite the limitations imposed by the UN sanctions and the international arms embargo, Iraq was able to produce and field the domestically designed AI

Fat'h composite solid-propellant balUstic missile. The goal of the program, which commenced inas toissile that couldg payloadange of ISO km witheters Circular Error Probablehe accuracy requirement for an unguided version of the Al Fat'heters CEP.

The Al Fat'h program began under theroject in the.4 the liquid- and solid-propellant missile development programs underad split, and the solid-propellant program retained theame. Accordingenior Iraqu missile official, ihc first technical review meeting was held for the commencement of the Al Fat'h missile program in

Ihc Al Fat'h was designed to cany unitary HE or submunition warheads. ISO has not foundto suggest Ihe At Fat'h was intended for use with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads.

Solid Propellent t

Solid propellanis can be divided into iwo classes: Double Base 'DB) and Composite pivpellants.

propcllants contain two primary ingredients, nitrtxellulose and nitro glycerine. DB propcllants can be extruded iExtruded Doubleor cast (Cast Double Base CDBi toariety of shapes.

propellanisixture of finely ground oxidizer /commonly ammonium pcixhlo-ratel.fuel {commonly aluminumiul

a polymeric binder Icommonlyheseare mixed and cast inio the motor case. The motors spend days at elevated temperatures to cuie ihc propellanl. giving il the correct physical

By the time of Oil', Iraq had producedl Fat'h missiles, with up loonsumed in the development process. Inhe Army hod lew alternative* and accepted lhe unguided Al Fai'h. with the understanding lhal the guidedwould continue to he developed. Betweenndissiles were provided to the Aimy. all of which were unguidcd; live were equipped with submunition warheads.

During OIK Iraq fired betweenndl Fai'h missiles at Coalitionndndissiles were damaged or destroyed by theAfter the war the Coalition recovered al leastissiles, which leaves up tonaccounted for missiles.

Composite propellanisigher combustion temperature and higher performance than that of the DB type. They are also safer but more complex to manufacture lhan DB propellanis.

m limitation imposed byn Bight tests and during operational launches.

modeling of lhe Al Fat'h provided an estimated range capabilitym. Using lighter airframe materials would improve lhe range.

Key elements oftheAl Fat'h development process required foreign assistance or procurement.as discovered that the guidance for the Al Fai'h was to consisistrap-down" inertial navigation sysiem (INS) with gyroscopes and aa-eleromelers. which would full well beyond the production capabilities in Iraq. Also, key ingrediems of the composite solid-pro-pcllunt could not he produced in Iraq.

General Characteristics

The Al Fat'h missile (see Figureolid-pro-pellanl ballistic missile weighingg with an overall length ofetersiametereter for Ihe main bodyeters with ihc aft tin assembly. While forward canards were usedumber of missile test flights, they were not used on the Al Fat'hs provided to Ihe Army, and none have been noted on the Al Fal'hs captured Io date.

airframe was primarily constructedmrMoV9 slieet steel.roved difficult to form, ihe extensive use of this alloy throughoul the airframe simplifies missile construction. Although not available, mar-aging steel would have been the preferred material. The aft fin assemblies and nose cones wereof aluminum.

The Al Fat'h wus designed to he launchedransponcr-Rrector-Launcherased uponAt'lgu missile launcher, the Al Fat'h missile was mountedauncher-storage box with an integral launcher rail.

Fai'h development allowed Iraq to create and refine the technical expertise and develop theneeded to support the design andof missiles with ranges beyond those allowed

by the (W. The Al Fat'h design was conservative and used unnecessarily heavy airframe components, yet the missile reached and in some cases exceeded the

Propulsion

The Al Fat'homposite solid-propellant motor of conventional design and composition. Accordingenior official in the Iraqi missile program. Ihe final motor massg. although Ihe motors variedgg because of variations iu molor insulation. Other documentation rclrievcd by ISG

Rocket or Missile'.'

Although the Al Fat'h .systems fielded with the Army and fired during OIF were unguided and therefore technically rockets, the Iraqi intent was toissile. Because of this ultimate goal, theAl Fat'h is referred to throughout this documentissile.

Guidance and Control

The unguided Al Fal'h used simple aftfins. The guided version of the Al Fat'h would haveelatively complicated control system, with canards, actuators,trapdown INS wiih an indigenously developed computer and imported gyroscopes and acccleromeiers Iraq specified an INS accuracyegice per hour drift, which is relatively sor>histicaicd. Iraq also considered using GlobalSystem (GPS) guidance.

A highly accuraten system, coupled with an adequate canard guidance system, would most likely have provided theAl Fat'h with theeter CEP accuracy for the guided variantange of ISO km. That level of accuracy coupled with the submunition warhead would luive made the Alormidable tactical delivery system.

The instrument/control section of the airframe, while ol" an unnecessarily heavy construction, is constructed using the same material as the rocket motor casing, thereby simplifying manufacture

Tbe planned guidance package for the Al Fal'h would have broken new ground for Iraq by atternpt-ing to incorporate acnvdynamic flight controlsallistic missile.roven concept in some countries, this was the first attempt by Iraq tothis type of control systemallistic missile.

Iraq attempted to acquire Guidance and Control (Ci&C) components and technologyumber of foreign sources. Iraq reportedlyample inertial system from the FRY. but it was considered inadequate and of poor quality (sec the Delivery Systems Procurement section for morehere reportedly wereetsfrom Belarus poorhe nan ofource with good access, although ISG has noconnVmation this delivery actually occurred

Augmenting the Al Fat'h strap-down INS and canard controls with inputs fnvm Ihe GPS would have ftinher increased system accuracy.

Despite llie lag in procuring live INS and tesiing delays, design work onor ihc Al Fai'h was well under way prior lo OIF. Two guided flight lesis were conducted priorhe war. one with roll controlecond wiih pitch conirol. Accordingigh-level official wiihin Ihe missile program, inraq wasailer of weeks froma lest flightull control system (equipped with INS andSG believes that Iraq did not conduct this flight test because, inhe UN had ordered that Iraq cease alttests until further notice. While litis system would haverototype guidance system huilt from available components and be less accurate lhan desired, it would have allowed the Iraqis lo validate the concepts and techniques.

Warhead

ISG has learned through debriefings of senior Iraqi officials thai there were originally three warhead designs proposed for the Alnitary HBa conventional submunition warhead, and awarhead initially suggested touel Air Explosive (FAF) warhead. The army accepted both live HE and submunition warheads, bul lhe FAE warhead was not pursued (sec

lo documenis recovered by ISG,2 ihc SSM Commandequirementuided Al Fai'h missiles.f which were lo be equipped with submunition warheads and the remainingith HE warheads, lo lhe Al Rashid General Company.

'IheAl Fat'h UK warhead was Ihe same as the Al Samud HE warhead discussed earlier, which had been derived from the Scud HE warhead. Sharing the same missile diameter and interface as the Al Samud allowed for savings on produciion costs and facilitated the interchange of warheads, although the Al Fat'h warhead SAFE and arm circuit requited adaptation duehe higher acceleration profile of the Al Fat'h during launch.

HE payload mass variedgg andgofHE. Pigurehowsay of Ihc Al Fai'h unitary HE warheadamaged impact or crush switch located in the nose lip.

Strap-Down Inertiat Navigation System Tutorial

One of the major costs and maintenance factors in an inertial guidance system it related to the use of complex mechanisms required to control the attitude of the platform. If individual gimbated gyroscopes are used, then this adds to the system error budget. One approach to eliminating these problems it the strap-down inertial guidance system.

ypical strap-down system, the gyroscopes and acceleiometers are mountedery rigid structure on the missile. Instead of using gyroscopes to keep the accelerometers pointedonstanttrap-down system allows the accelerometers to rotate with the missile and uses the gyroscopes to keep track of where each accelemmeter is pointed. Because the accelerometers are no longer oriented alongreference axes, the mathematics become more complex; but, with digital computers, tliis is no longer the obstacle it once was.

Strap-down inertial guidance systems offerlower costs, and the potential forwith other flight coiurols. Die keys toare. the gyroscopes and theof these characteristics, the strap-downguidance system is ideal for short-rangesystems.

lhe fuze, activated by Ihc impact of the warhead on lhe ground,iring signalooster charge, which in Rim detonates the main explosive charge. Figurehows the basic layout of ihc unitary warhead.

There is no evidence to suggest thaiwarheads were to be developed for the Al Fat'h missile. However,iteci extrapolation of the. Scud conventional warhead design, the Al Fat'h HE warhead inherits the same primitive design that could allow modification to accommodate bulk-filled chemical or biological agcnls.

* Iraq retained the intellectual capital for reproducing the crude "'special" warhead (CBW) design for the Al Husayn missile, so modification andof ihis type of warhead could be achievedatter of weekselatively small team of specialized individuals.

4 senior Iraqi missile official indicated thatwarheads were deemed to be more effective than unitary HE because they wouldarger lethal footprint and reduce concerns over pooraccuracy. Iraqariety of different configurations for the Al Fat'h submunition warhead before finally arrivingesignuhmuni lions.

submuniiions were based on FRY anli-DCrsOnnel/anti-tankubmunition identical to those used in Ihcubmuniiion payload.

The submuniiions are slacked on top of one anoiher and held in place by foam molds (see.

Theubmunition is an open-endedopper-shaped charge (sec. Upon detonation, ihc body fragmcnis and scatters ihe ball bearings surrounding the outer shell, and the shaped charge fires, projecting the jel forward lo penetiate the target. Typically, lhe submuniiions containf explosives.

judges that His aot possible to modify theubmunition to accommodate chemical or biological agents. Considering lhe small internal volume of the submuniiions and risk of agentfrom Ihc explosive charge, the KB-Iisandidate for chemical or biological agent dissemination.

The shell case of the Al Fai'h submuniiions warhead, manufaciured by Al Rashid.m thick and constructed of aluminum. The original design called for an aluminum warhead base, bul lhe warheads produced used steel due lo material shortages. The additional weight of the steel in lhe productionmeant they could carry1Further, due to limitations in manufacturing technology, ine warhead shell was conical rather than the aerodynamically optimum ogive design.

Rashid General Company began Al Fai'h submuniiion warhead development inevelopment continuedncluding five static lests. Ihree- of which were successful.

Iraq used detonator cord to fragment the warhead and let the ainlream disperse the itibmunilions.

Initially, Iraq wantedingle burster charge in lhe center of lhe warhead lo disperse Ihcafter ihc detonator cotd fractured ihe warhead and aerodynamic forces peeled back ihcive burster charge were conducted in April and2 and successfullyubmuniiions over an areaTO-meter radius. During one (tight-test, however, the burster failed to detonate. The atrstream patting user the exposed submurutions dispersed the tulsmunitions. and fewer munitions were damaged than experienced inexperiment!

esult of this lest. Iraq removed ihe explosive from the burster, hut the empty burster tube was left in place lo preserve Uruelural suppon. Figuresay of an Al Fai'h submuniiion warhead air-shell. The black line running parallel with the sides of the warhead casing shows the detonator cord.

Figurellustrulc* Ihc arrangement of Ihc sub-munitions aboul ihe burstci tube located along the ceniral axis of the warhead

Early attempts to use liming and barometric fuzes for altitude hursts of the sulvmuniiion warhead failed. 'Ihe problem was resolved (seeyiaphragm switch from the Scud barometric sensorattery from anocket.

In operation, the warhead it armed hy the action of theSwitchustained accelerationinimum ofarornctric sensor detects altitude, when ihe missile ascendseighthermal battery is connected, charging the capacitors within ihc firing circuit. As the missile descendsm. the capacitors discharge providing power to Hie detonator, which in turn initiate* Ihc detonation cord and the booster rod.

practice, the height of burst for submunition dispersal wasmmccording lo an official wiihin ihc Iraqi missile program. Even with knowledge of lheoose tolerance is undesirable. (Figureepicts an Al Fat'h missileubmunition warhead.)

00 orolid-propcllant rocket motor static tests were conducted at Ihc Al Musayyib Solid Rockei Moior Support and Test Facility at Al Mulasim. Approximately midway through Ihe sialic testing program, missile (light-testing began. This approach allowed modifications lu the motor design to correct errors discovered during ihc flight-resting.

The testing program passed through various phases as the emphasis shifted from motor performance and basic flight characteristics.ccuracy,and missile acceptance testing.

Flighl-testing began0 and ended inyol Fal'h flight testsrelatively consistcni range peiformance using inert submunition. and unitary FLb warheads. The last two flight tests constituted the acceptance tests for ihe unguided variant of (he missile.

The flight-icsi program did have difficulties and never achievedeter CFJ* expected for the unguided airframe. The system alsoigh failure rate during testingnding in failuref the motors experiencingfailure during firing.

Iraq inicndcd tostrap-down" INS for the Al Fat'h missile in which presets lhat relate directly to predetermined buiSi altitudes (defined through time, velocity, and trajectory) could bebefore launch.ystem hasgreater accuracy in determining altitudearometric sensor.

Testing

ISG, through document exploitation and debrief' ings of senior Iraqi officials,etailed accounting of the Al Fat'h test program. This test program, conducted between0 and2 consisted of approximatelyndividual firings, aboutialic motor tests and aboutrlightetailed breakdown of Al Fat'h missile launches and motor lesls is included in the Delivery Systems Annex.

Material Balance

While there are some firm production numbers for aspects of the Al Fat'h missUe program, such as the number of missile flight tests, estimates for Ihe total number of missiles produced and the number of missiles delivered to Ihe Army vary widely.Iraqi documents and other material provided by senior Iraqi personnelreakdown of warheads, motors, missile airframes, and missile acceptance inspections for Ihe02 (shown Inased on these numbers, missile production probably was limited by Iraq's ability to produce rocket motors.

While the figures refleciissiles accepted by quality-control inspectionsnlyocket motors had been produced. Inocket motors were consumed in static testing for propulsion System development.

Of these, perhaps five lo eight were equipped with submuniiion warheads.

If true, Iraq produced aboutombat-ready missiles by ihe endhirty-lhree otissiles were consumed in test flights, leavingavailable. During ihc first monlhsore missiles probably were produced, probably no more lhan one per week. ISG judges thai bciwccn live and eight Al Fat'h missiles could have been producediven the typical time associated withcuring and missile assembly, coupled wiih the interruption in production as Iraq dispersed material in aniicipaiion of or in response to Coalition attack. Taking these assumptions together. ISG estimates Iraq had betweenndl Fat'h missiles available al ihe onset of OIF.

* During lhe war, Iraq fired betweenndl Fai'h missiles. In addiiion, informal assessmentsAl Fai'hs destroyed or damaged during lhe war vary from fouro dale, Coalition forces have collected at leasil Fai'hs.

Given Ihe above numbers, the number ofAl Fat'h missiles unaccounted for could vary fromseeowever, ammunition and weapon systems are being collected and destroyed all over Iraq,umber of Al Fai'hs have been misiden-lified asr ASTROS baitlefieklull accounting of At Fat'h missiles may not be possible.

numbers generally 3gicc wiih ihose provided by senior officials within the Iraqi missile program, where the number of Al Fat'h missiles provided io the Army varies from as low aso as high

Conclusions

77ie Al Fain was produced with materials allowed under UNSC resolutions,umber of the ingredients in the Al Fal'h solid-propellant wereto monitoring and verification under Annex IV of Ihe Plan approved byreakdown of specific propcllant componcnls listed in Annex IV. see Ihe Delivery Systemsraq attempted toumber of these materials without the knowledge of lhc UN. and these efforts are noted in Ihc Delivery Systems Procurement section.

The range capability of the Al Fat'h exceeded the ISO-krn limit Imposed by theenior Iraqi official insisted the missile was designed loaximum rangemg warhead, bul, during flight lests0he Al Fat'h Hewm on at least eight occasions. The senior Iraqi official attributed the flights wiih ranges greaterm toin lhc rocket motor insulation, resulting in greater than expected propcHani mass.

While Al Samud II tcsis with ranges in excessmactor in the UN's decision lo require lhat missile's destruction, no decision hy the UN had been made on the Al Fal'h prior to OIF.

At least six missiles fired durutg OIF would have exceededthe ISO km range ifnot intercepted. The longest test flight declared by Iraqm, whde the longest combat range probably would have exceeded this range.

M 'Ubur Missile Program

Background

The Al 'Ubur program probably began90 after UNSCOM departed and increased funding was available. The basic concept was toAM system, possibly modeled on the advancedAM. While Iraqi personnel reportedly gained access io.rogram was likely beyond Iraq's capahililics and the whole concept assumed an environment wheie there was no adherence to sanctions. According to one senior Iraqi.

Tbe Al 'Ubur SAM is subjectumber of diverse spellings in its com-ersion from Arabic to English. While Al 'Ubur is used here, the system con be found referred to as Al Ibur. AI Ubour, Al Aboor,umber of other variations.

Based on reporting disclosures about theof the AI 'Ubur, ISG judges that. Iraq most Ukely intended to modify the AI 'Ubur motor, once developed, for use in an SSM mode. Based on ils previous success in converting Iheolga into an SSM, Iraq possessed the techniques required to undertakeroject.

Propulsion

The Al 'Ubur solid rocket molar was the major system component furthest along in development by the lime of OIF. The Al 'Ubur motor was effectively an Al Fat'h motor with its length extendedo 4jS m. ll had them diameler,fonrtulaiion, and steel case material. The Al 'Uburifferent wagon wheel grain design ioifferent thrust profileifferent nozzle optimizedAM. compared tooint star configuration in the Al Fai'h, accordingenior program official.

Ihc Al 'Ubur ihrusi profile failed to meet lhethrust, bul the motor was considered more "stable" than the Al Fai'h motor, according to lhe same official.

Guidance and Control

Given lAe ever-decreasing effectiveness ofIraq was able to consider bolder steps in areas where it stiff had technical difficulties. If the sanctions regime remained strictly enforced, there would have been little or no effort by Iraq to address Ihese shortfalls. The Al 'Ubur design callednap down INS thai would be providedussian company and an integrated radar seeker for terminal guidance, but theysiem was neverThe0M was used for simulation and pans.

* The Al 'Ubur SAM system would have been an extremely complex system with an integrated radar seeker. phased array radar, and controlled viauplinks and downlinks embedded into the radar waveforms. The communication links and the radar were to be designed by lite Al Milad General Company.

According loan official within the Iraqi missilean unnamed Russian company was to provide eight Fibcr-Optic Ciyroscopc (FOG) INS systems: four would go to Al Karamah and four to Al Milad. Four ring laser gyroscope (RLGl INS systems were also to be provided and equally divided between Al Karamah and Al Milad. Al Karamah received up to seven FOG systems by the second-half

ISG judges lhal ihis information may be in error because useull INSAM is noi required. Il is more likely lhal Ihis information is associated with Al Fal'h or At Samud II as specified by another source.

Warhead

The Al 'Ubur SAM was designed lo cany awarheadg.

Testing

Al "Ubur motor testing began using ansubscale motor contained in anotor case. These tests had mixed test results, usingpropcllant grain designs. Full-scale motor testing probably beganut reports vary on the actual stan date.

One senior official reporteduccessful full-scale test was conducted on

Another official reported lhat full-scale testing was conducted from approximately June to

Following the successful sialic tests, Iraqidiscussed using the Al 'Ubur in an SSM role, although no format actions were taken.ariety of resulls.

One calculated range is gisenmecondangem, according to two Officials involved in the Al 'Ubur program. Details of the missile configurations used in theseare unknown.

There were no flight tests of the Al 'Ubur, and activity on the program ceased with the beginning of OIF.

Conclusions

The manufactureodem phased anay-based SAM system would haveauntingfor Iraq, even with access to Russian technical specifications. Exploitation of captured documents, however, indicates development of ihe SAM elements oflheAl 'Ubur program by the endof2IH)2.

The potential use of the At 'Ubur SAMong-range ballistic missile is clear, and high-levelin the program indicated ihey had considered using the Al 'Ubur as an SSM. The similarities in ihe proposed rocket motor and INS indicate an Al 'Ubur SSM eould be developed quickly, but such development could be delected during Ihe Inspection process. Further, given the longer motor andfor tighter materials, an At' Ubur SSM would certainty have exceededm limit imposed hy the UN. ISG judges lhat elements oflheAl 'Ubur SAM program were well beyond Iraq'scapabilities.

Other Composite Solid-Propellant Systems By the, Iraqumber of rocketdial had reached the end or exceeded their shelf life and needed refurbishment, including thend some SAMs. Iraq was not able to acquire replacement systems from abroad or get help for the refurbishment effort; It had to rely on domestic capabilities.

, Iraqre-motor" project to extend ihe shelf life of itsLUNA) andattlefield artillery rockets by replacing their aging double-base solid rocket motors with more eneigetic composite solid-propel lant motors. Renamed Al Ra'ad and Al Nida', respectively, these efforts helped advance the composite solidin Iraq, it is unclear if these projects were completed by the time of OIF.

Composite propellants offer higher energy than double-base propcllants. so the re-motor effort renewed the shelf life and improved performance of the rockets.

Long-Range Ballistic Missile Projects Uniicd Nations Security Council Resolutionesiricted Iraq's delivery systems to ranges not in excess1 km. Further, UN sanctions and rigorous UNSCOM inspectionserious constraint to Iraq's missile research and development programs. Though unable to overtly develop long-range missile projects, compelling evidencethat Iraq, in order to reach targets like Tel Aviv and Tehran, never abandoned its interest in delivery systems with ranges wellm. Husayn Kamifs flight to Jordan effectively ended all work on long-range missiles until Ihe efforts

senior Iraqi missile engineer stated that the subject of long-range missilesmissiles with ranges greater thanm) was not raised againonthly ballisticmeeting chaired by Huwaysh at MIC. At the meeting. Huwaysh reportedly stated his desirem missile.

to Kamal Mustafa -Abdallah Sultan Al Nasiri, the former Secretary General of theGuard. Iluwaysh in the summer9peech to the Republican Guard and SRGin which he stated thai Iraq was developing

a missileangem and that it would take five years to develop.

-0 meeting. Saddam ordered Huwaysh toissileange greater than the range of the Samud II, accordingenior official within the Iraqi missile program.

Clusteringolga Engines Designs

ISG has retrieved copies of Iraqi design drawings for two long-range missiles, one basedluster of two SA-2IVolga engines and the other basedive-engine cluster. Although datedhe drawings are not signed and therefore the name of the draftsman or designer is unknown. Despite extensive research, ISG has notingle, clear explanation of the events leading up to and since the dale of these drawings, bul Iraqi interest in

designs containing clustered engines can he traced hack at least as faree Figureor design drawings.

One designwo-engine cluster mountedlared engine bay thatm-diarneter airframe. Iraqi experts have assessed the range of this version to be alm. The propellanl tanks, pressurization. and warhead of this concept would be common with ihcmm Al Samudallistic missile.

second designive-engine cluster mountedlared engine bay thai suppons a

m-diameier airframe. Iraqi missile experts assessed this design wouldange ofm.

Various sources have provided ISG with differing timelines of events for the clustered engine project pursued by At Karamah, bul most sources suggest the order to develop long-range missiles camehe chronology of events thai led lo theof these designs is unclear.

According to an engineer within the Iraqi missile program. Huwaysh ordered work io start on andesignong-range missile on0 following the tirst successful flight testm Al Samud. The engineer added lhat Ihis work was completed in

The same source later stated that Huwaysh ordered the design work to begin in1 and requested detailed design to commence themonth.

According to another senior missile official, Huwaysh instructed Al Karamah in1tan work on long-range missiles.

Huwaysh insisted that,eeting with Saddam at lhe beginningaddam ordered him toissilem range and lhat it was expected to be ready in six monihs.

Though the dates on the actual design drawings obtained by ISG suggest they were created inther information suggests lhal modifications

were madeource reports provide conflicting accounts as to when they were actually completed.

for the two-engine and live-engine missiles were delivered to Huwaysh in1 ornd all work on these was completed in

igh-ranking MIC official reported thai these designs were completed in

Inuwaysh ordered that all documents pertaining io the long-range missiles be relumed to him. He said thai Muzhir brought him two boxes of documenis and in December of that year. However, olher documentation not forwarded to Huwaysh had been recovered by ISG.

Huwaysh ordered at Ihc onset of OIF that all. the documents on the long-range missile projeclbe destroyed, according lo several high-level officials in ihc Iraqi missile program.

The evidence collected by ISG suggests Iraq had not completed the designs by the time UNMOVIC entered Iraq, although sources vary on the timing of the design work. Many sources refer lo die project as being highly secret with information being passed only in person at face-to-face meetingselect few individuals, which may account forin dates provided by individuals without direct access. Figureepicts the timeline of missile developments.

ISG's confirmation that Iraq was working on designs for long-range clustered-engine missiles, although this work never progressed beyond the design phase, is evidence that the Regime was cosertly researching the development of missiles with ranges in excess of ISO km. Further, Iraq look advantage of existing Al Samud II designs and had begun to develop Ihe infrastructure that could have led to rapid development of these concepts.

usem-diameter airframe could allow the use of Samudigs and fixtures lothe two-engine cluster design. ISG judgesouldood concealment mechanism for work on prohibited programs.

new test stand at Al Ratuh was much larger than ihe preexisting engine lesi siand and could have been modified (or testing clusteredngines. According to one Iraqi engineer, work on lhe new stand began byuggesting that the requirement for the facility must have been drawn up much earlier.

by various sources indicate that, before OIF. Iraq hadngines lhal had been scavenged from damaged missiles. Adding to this, aingines imported from Poland and possibly Russia or Belarus were more engines lhan probably required to immediately support Ihe Al Samud II program. Some of Ihese engines could have been available for use if Iraq had moved forwardlusiered-engine development

onversions lo SMrfaee-lo-Surface Missiles

Numerous sources involved in Iraq's missilehave admitted lo ISG lhal73 Iraq had several undeclared program* to convertAM* intoSSMs wiih maximum rangesmm. Though ISG has not been able to confirm these claims, source interviews indicate thai Iraq pursued at least four projects.

issile program official, inIW7 (while UNSCOM were monitoring in-couniryl, Iraq initiated .in eflort to convert thento an SSMange of alm. Iraq conducted two tests inrlong depressed trajectories so that they would notm. Iraqi officials assessed, however, lhat the missiles were capable ol

km but with poor accuracy. Work on thisceased and the only retained documental ion consisted of range calculations for the missile at various launch angles. CM has yet to recover these calculations.

missile officials from Al Kindi disclosed information about ihc Sti'il project, which begano convert Ihcnto an SSM with arangeIC committee decided to withhold this information from the UN because

the project had noi yet reached lhe prototype stage, and all documentation was removed from Al Kindi prior io ihe return of UN inspectors

missile program official also knew of another project initiated12tudy by 'Ali 'Abd-al-Husayn who was later transferred to work at the NMD. The source had no otheraboul this project.

final project was initialed cither immediately before or during OIF. according to an IraqiThiscrush' project under the control of Al Milad General Company and discussed at MICeeiing onhe project converted twonto SSMs, but Iraq was unable to flight test them due to the speed of the prosecution of the war. accordingenior official within the Iraqi missile program.

In all cases, from Ihe evidence collected lo date, Iraq had not undertaken the wholesale conversion ofSA '2 missiles to SSMs, and ISG has uncovered no evidence that payloads designed for thesewould be anything other than the original HE warheads.

Large-Diameter Solld-Propolliinl Missile Project

0raq began development effortsong-range, solid-propellanl ballistic missile that would, when fully deteloped, greatly exceed the ISO-km-range limit imposed by. Further, the program appears to have been highly comparlmented and virtually undocumented. Destruction of infrastructure previously associated with prohibited programs in accordance withffectively limnedpursuits to research and development efforts.

Program Development

Iraqi desireong range, solid-propel lawmissile systeman be traced to therogram from lhe. This program would havem-range ballistic missile systemeter-diam-eter solid-propellant moior as ihe first stage.

Reports vary, bui. beginning, and maybe even earlier, Iraq again decided ioong-range solid-propellanl missile.

perhaps as early8 or inuwaysh ordered ihc designong-range solid-propellanl ballistic missile according io several senior missile officials.

According to Huwaysh, inaddam ordered ihc consiruciionissile with arangem. Huwaysh then directed Dr. Muzhir Sadiq Saba* Khamis Al Tamimi and 'Abd-al-Baqi Rashid Shia' Al Ta'i lo conduct feasibility studies ofissile, oneiquid and oneolid.

Although it is unclear when the program started or what the range requirements were. HuwayshK)1mall, select Large Diameter Missile (LDMt committee and reportedly tasked Ihe committee withm-runge solid-propellant ballistic missile, according to senior Iraqi missile officials.

One senior Iraqi official reports the committee consisted of Huwaysh, 'Ahd-al-Baqi Rashid Shia* Al Ta'i |DG of the Al Rashid Generalar'uf Mahmud Salim Al Jalabi (DG of ihc Al Fat'h Generaluzahim (probably Staff Ll Gen Muzahim Sa'b Hasan Muhammad Al Nasiri. Senior Deputy to ihc MICnd Muzhir Sadiq Saba' Al Tamimi (DG of the AlGeneral Company).

There arc conflicting numbers for the required range of this missile. Various high-ranking former Iraqi officials have offered range requiremenlsm. al)0m,m.ayloadg wasdepending on the source of the reporting.

By the, Iraq's composite, solid-propellant ballistic missile capabilities were centered in the Al Rashid General Company and the Al Fat'hmpany. bul only Al Rashid pursued development of ihe long-range missile. Accordingenior missile official from Al Rashid. Huwaysh orderedol id-propel lam missileange of aimayload0X) kg.

According to senior Iraqi officials, there were no wrinen records of ihc development elfon, and all affecled compuler hard-dnves were reformatted prior to the return of UN inspectors

While it appears that only one long-range solid-pro-pellani development effort was pursued, lhe com-partnicntcd nature of the program led some Iraqi officials to believe there may have been multiple efforts.

The solid-propellant development effort undertaken by the A) Rashid General Company was augmented with personnel from the Al Fat'h General Company and other MIC entities including Hashem 'Abd Al Muhammad of Al Amin factory, Brigadier 'Abd-al-Hamid of Al Karamahl Jalabi of Al Fai'hnd Brigadier Hashim of Al Fida" General Company (launcher).

A senior Iraqi official staled ihc Al Rashid-based design effort consisted of 'Abd-al-Baqi. Dr. Sa'd lami Hamidi Al 'Anbaki (Chief of lhe Engineeringadday Ibrahimr. Sa'd Mahmud Ahmad (Propellanlnd Sa'd Muhammad (senior Al Rashidccording to this source. Al Rashid wasm-rangc missile.

Ihc Al Rashid effort went forwardhe iniiial concept basedluster of three Al Fat'h motors was rejected because of modeling limitations. The selected design consisted-cicr-diam-eier motor thai may have been based on theesign.

design reportedly wouldeters long with an accuracy off lhe range flownpin-stabilized versionoor an unguided version.

" The solid rocket motor would haveropellanl muss1 kg as compared with an Al Fai'h motor propellant massg.

Al Rashid moved forward wiih rocket motor devel-opment efforts. Iraq attempted toarrel sec-lion from lhc Supergun project toctcr-diamctcr motor case, hut the effort failed because of material incompatibilities when Iraqi technicians were unable to weld the Supergun section to the motor end domes.

All associated materials were cither destroyed prior to the arrival of UNMOVIC2 or reused as motor easting chambers.

Most of the reporting on this development effort does not specify the type of warhead envisioned, with three exceptions. One senior Iraqi specifically staled the missile was developedhemical payload, while twopecifically stated the warhead would be high explosive. ISO found no evidence to support either claim.

While Al Rashid was pursuing the long-rangeenior Al Rashid official apparently had doubts that it could be completed. Although he reportedly never formally slated the missile could not be developed, he apparently did inform Huwaysh sometimef limitaiions in Iraq's solid-propcllantstatingissileangem wouldons of propellant. Huwaysh reportedly informed Saddam Husayn.

Although still limited, Iraq had madeinfrastructure improvements that would have improved its ability to manufacture large motors. At least one ofallon propcllant mixers -'destroyed" by UNSCOM was repaired; Iraq tried, unsuccessfully by the time of the return of the UNMOVIC inspectors, to repair the second. In addition, casting pits, annealing furnaces, and test stands needed for development of long-range solid-piopellant missiles were repaired, modified, or created.

Had the effortong-range solid-pro-pellant missile could have been producedears, according lo one senior Iraqi missile developer.

According to an engineer in the Iraqi missile program, in1 per directive oftudy was undertaken by the Al Fida* Generalloolid-propcllant missile launcherissileangem. Work on this project ceased upon the arrival of UNMOVIC inspectors. Docu mentation of this project was destroyed with the exception of engineering designs for the launcher shown in

New Cruise Missile Projects

After UNSCOM inspectors leftraqwith one cruise missile project and began another. Both of these modifications were to thenti-ship cruise missile. The first project, which was declared by Iraq in its6 Full. Final, and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) as the Al. was an attempt to extend the range of therommm. An attempl lom range, turbojet-powered cruise missileore ambitious second project knowninin lhat began in

ange Extension

'Abd-al-Tawah 'Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh. the Minister of Military Industrialization, created the Special Projects Officesubordinate lo himself and with direct links to the President'sheew key projects lo receive high-level attention and financial support. One such secret project (between MIC. the Iraqi Navy, and the Al Karamah General Company) sought to extend the range of theruise missilem using cannibalized components from their inventory ofI1 anti-ship cruise missiles and changes to the propulsion system.

According to an Iraqi scientist, ihe first lest was conducted in9ocation in Basrah. Though ihis land attack cruise missile (LACM) test was declared by Iraq to the UN in theAccurate, Full, and Complete Declarationraq did not disclose that this was partange extension project.

Propulsion System

According to source reports. Al Karamahwith different engines and propellantto increase theifferent enginesing higher-energy piopellants would be required lo teach the range goal for the project.

Conflicting reports from engineers involved in the program indicate Iraq used engines froms replacements for thengine, and thai each attempt was successful.

According lo several missile officials, Al Karamah changed the fuel used in theromo higher-energy AZ-IIlendfTA and II* UDMH) The change required adjustments to ibe engine fuel pumps ro optimize the tucl'nx uli/cr mixture ratios.

A flight test of the modifiedangem, according to Huwaysh. After thai. Al Karamah made engine and tank adjustments to keep the rangem to avoid the attention of the UN.

ISG judges il unlikely lhal all three engine replacements were successful Changing the fuel and readjusting all of the engines mentioned would probably not resultange extension to

ange extensionm is more likely achievable bv usingngine withuel

Warhead

Several sources have indicated the intended warhead for the extended-rangeE warhead consistingg of TNT. ISG has uncovered no information to suggest this cruise missile wouldubmunition or CBW warhead.

Guidance and Control

Iraqextended-rangerogram would depend upon the acquisition of navigation and guidance systems that were more sophisticated lhan Iheor noddy available components; acquisition of such systems were forbidden by UN sanctions. Iraq began making plans to acquire such systems, bul this wasriority for the program

An engineer in the program indicated thatand testing of the propulsion system *cic the first priorities, and navigation and guidance would be addressed nearer the end of lhc programcycle.

In the event Iraq could noi scavenge or adaptsystems from other missiles like. it planned to acquire them from outside sources.

I >

Reporting from several sources consistentlythai the extended rangeuccessfuBy Jfe to at least ISO km. andm. Although the goal of the program was iond off capability against ships and to make up for thef an air-launched cruise missile capability, the research directly contributed to the longer range Jinin project.

I'he extended-rangerogram if during flight tests did notm likely would not haveiolation of UN resolutions.

Huwaysh commented that Iraq targeted Kuwait with its deployed extended-rangeissiles during OIF.

Iheenin] Project

1raq attempted io convert theniichip cruise missilem range land attack cruise missilehich would build oo theange extension project that had already introducedby the Al Karamah General Companythe flight computers, engines, andissile with this range would be able to reach targets in Iran and Israel from wilhin Iraq's borders. The Jinin project was interrupled by OIF before any flight lests occurred.

According lo an engineer in lhc Iraqi missilethe Jinin project was conceivednd received MIC approval inn this timeost of other long-range projects involving ballistic missile systems were reccis tng

t'i

increased attention. The project officially startednd was intended tohree-to-live-year development project, but it was reportedlyin2 utter UNMOVIC entered Iraq. However, the original airframes and rocket engines were reassembled and returned to storage about two weeks after UNMOVlC's arrival for fear of the project being discovered.

Al Karamah General Company was assigned overall projeci responsibility wiih the DG of Al Karamah (Dr.ltimately responsible for the project. However, Brigadier General Nadhim from A) Karamah was considered to be Ihe project manager and systems engineer.

The initial concept involved modifying any replacing the suslainer propulsion systemodified helicopter turhoshaft engine to sustain cruise flight, which would eliminate the oxidizer tanks anduch longer range. Thefell inlu four distinct phases,enior program manager, wholight test could be conducted in three years.

Phase one would use computer simulations to lest concepts for maintaining structural integrity und stability during engine integration and would attempt lo convert surplus helicopter turboshuft engines to produce thrust rather than torque.

Phase two would icsi and install the engines.

Phase three would build and flightrototype.

Phase four would work on guidance, navigation, und conirol.

The Jinin program involved several research,and production organizations: Al Quds forand warheads. Al Miladystems and aerodynamics, Al Fida* for the launcher, Ibn-Fimas and Iraqi army helicopter workshops for lhe engine modifications, und Al Karamah for final assembly.

Propulsion System

Iraq planned to convert theromto turbojet-powered using surplus helicopter engines. Initially, Iraq planned to useelicopter turbines modified lo produce thrust ruthcr than torque.

Propulsion engineers at Ibn-Firnas estimated that the Jinin would0 pounds) of ihrust, but thengine lesibcd (captured by ISG) was capable of producing0 pounds) of ihrust.esult, Ibn-Firnas began studying lhe conversion of theelicopter engine.

UNMOVIC inspections commenced beforeesibed demonstrations could be completed, and (he tcsibcd was shut down io prevent inadvertent observation by inspectors.

Both of these engines could fil inio Ihe 1IY-2without extensive modifications, thusnew aerodynamic problems caused by structural changes. The engine air intake would be located on the bottom of Ihe missile about midway along the body.

Reportedly. Ibn-Fimas engineers believed ihefrom turboshat! to turbojet would be difficult because the suitors (vanes) could noi be removed since they were integral to the engine's ball bearing assembly, ihey believed that, although thewould be challenging, ihey could solve ihewith enough lime and money. However, reports vary as to the success und extent of the overall engine modification program, and to the status of the design documentation.

Accordingource with excellent access,only reached the modeling phase ofwiih no tests of an operating engine for Jinin. Additionally, all of the engine modeling work, drawings, and related documents were destroyed ai Ibn-Firnas by fire and looting after OIF.

An engineer with direct access indicated that the design work was intentionally destroyed In3 due to Tear of UNMOVIC'sdiscovery of the project. The source believed it could be regeneratedouple of weeks

if UNMOVIC left and the leadership demanded the projeci continue. This concept is supported by reports of Saddam's goalrogramcapability of Icssihan six months.

An engineer in ihc Iraqi missile program slatedodified1ngine test succeeded, hut with lower than expected ihrusthese lowerrc attributed to the poor condition of the older engine. Iraq expected lhat using newerngines would alleviate the thrust problem, but lhat work was interrupted by the arrival of UNMOVIC before letting could begin.

* The same source indicated thai the modifiedngine was moved to Ibn-Firnas for storage. Anurboshuft was recovered from the engine static test stand at Ibn-Firnas by US officials in lateultiple sources involved in the program indicate the engine washe Jininmall di If user, found in the Ibn-Fimas junk yarden: lie'. Irs the same source to be from Ihengine in coalition possession, was mated successfully with the engine exhaust port, adding some credibility to the source's claim.

Warhead

The Jinin missile was intended toF. warhead consistingg of TNT. ISG has uncovered no information lo suggest this missile would carry submuniiions orCRW warheads.

Guidance and Conirol

A ccordingenior program official inhe Jinin navigational accuracy would not be an important factor in the first phases of the project. The priority was simply toissile lo1 kin wiih an lilt warhead. This approach was not unusual for Iraq the Al llusayn project had adopted the same attitude, which is why the Al Husayn was so inaccurate, according to the senior program official.

The program official was initially convinced that the guidance system for theould be used for Ihc Jinin project. He also slated thai thehad not progressed to the stage of working on the guidance section. The project researchers lust wanted to verify ihe engine would work and could lie mounted successfully on ihcirframe. Had these steps been successful, they would have begun work on the guidance and other sections.

The HY-2's existing guidance system was not accurate enough and Iraq did not have access to any guidance system that would be sufficientlyThe program official indicated thai theuidance system would eventually be replacedPS acquired from abroad. As an interim solution. Al Milad considered using the guidance system from0issile, which uses three JXCekrornetcTs and three gyroscopes. Clearly, Iraq again aitumed lhat sanctions were not an inhibit-ing fa. lor.

Anolhcr issue, acknowledged by fhe programinvolved the control and stability of the missile given llie internal rearrangement of the *ub-sysiem components necessary lo accommodate Ihcengine (and potential additional fuel tank t

Conclusions

The Jinin project was in the early RAl> phase when il was interrupled by the return of UK inspectors, and il was subsequently canceled. Although its inherent payload capabilityg could have been adapted forhere is no rvtdenie of intenlforWMI) delivery. If the project hadil mosl likely would have violated

Unmanned Aerialnd Kfmutely Piloted Vehicles (RPVsl

ISG has uncovered only tinuled informationan overall program intent for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) lo deliver chemical or biological warfare agrnls. In addition, ISG has noted that Iraq appears to have embarkedumber of loosely related UAV effortshese efforts can be grouped into two major categories: efforts iomanned aircraft into remotely piloted vehiclesnd efforts to design and build indigenous UAVs, as depicted inonversion programs include the9nd indigenous dcvclopirvrnts include the Ihn-Fimas and Al Quds small UAV programs.

Brief History

Iraq's UAV effons began in iheith ihe development of small RPVs for survcillartcc and reconnaissance roles and continued0 with the attempt toighter aircraft into an RPV. The Iraqis admitted to the UN that the intent for this program was toBW deliveryAlter thePV program failedraq started the Yamamah program to research small indigenous UAVs.. the Iraqis resumed efforts toanned aircraft into an RPV. this time withrainer aircraft.

Reports differ on the purpose forome Iraqi officials report hearsay and suspicion that the system was being developed for CBW delivery-Other sources report9 RPV program had more benign missions such as target drone and reconnaissance.

There is no definitive link betweennd WMD. Ultimately,9 RPVechnical failure and had its funding terminated1 -

Inimeframe. Minister of Military Industrialization Huwaysh felt that small, cheap UAVs were better than converted manned aircraft, so Iraq began an indigenous reconnaissance UAV and target dione development program in the Ibn-Fimas General Company that built on the Yamamah research program of the.

Ibn-Firnax successfully developed the AlAVattlefield reconnaissance UAV. which was sold to ihc Iraqi Army and Republican Guard

A second development program called Al Quds began at the instigation of former YamamahDirector Brigadier Engineer Dr. 'Imad 'Abd-al-Latif AlIC directed that this program focus on larger UAVs to meet military requirements for airborne electronic warfare programs. The Al Ouds program had not yet succeeded by the onset of OIF

Evidence available lo ISG concerning Ihe UAV programs active al Ihe onset of OIF indicates these systems were intended for reconnaissance andwarfare. However, this evidence does not rule

out the future possibility of adapting these UAVs for CBW delivery if Ihe Iraqi Hegime had made adecision to do so.

the AInd. if fully developed, theAl Quds UAVs had the capabibtiespayload, and programmable autonomousbe used as CBWsystems, ISG has noi found evidence the Iraqis intended to use Ihem for this purpose.

as obtained indirect evidence that theEV may have been intended for CBW delivery, bul this program ended.

PV Background

InIC and the Iraqi Air Force Command embarkedrogram to modify theighter into an RPV lor use in one-way "suicide" missions. The operational concept was for lhc aircrafi to take off under remoteround station, then afterertain altitude control would be transferred to another, piloted aircraft in the area The piloted aircraft would then remotely fly thePV to the target area whereupon control would be transferredhe RPVs autopilot for the terminal phase of the mission.

Iraqis equipped theith an autopilot from theighter, due to that autopilot's better capability to ensure stable flight and toall the necessary electrical and mechanical systems. ThePV was also lilted with servo-actuators for the control surfaces, throttle, and brakes. The remote-control system usederman system produced hy the Groupncr Company, with eight channels, and operatedrequency ofHz.

least one flight test was conducted on1 at Al Rashid Air Base. Baghdad, but technical problems required the onboard pilot to take control of the aircraft to insure safe recovery and landing.

Roles and Missions

Be tote OIF. Itaq's National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) conducted an investigation into thePV program toesponse to UNMOVIC. The NMD concluded that thePV program failed due to lack of time and expertise loorkable control system. They also concluded that ihePV had been intendedhemical and/or biological weapons delivery role.

In the, Iraq declared to the United Nations that thePV had been intendedBW role.

The simple onboard sprayer system tested by Iraq (see the Weaponizaiion section in the BW and CW chapters) would have been operaiedimer lhal would be set before takeoff. 'Ihis RPV was intendedne-way flight, flying until its fuel was exhausted.

The program appears to have ended sometimehe NMD reported that Ihc absence of dncu-mentation of this fact and Oliver program details was caused by bombardment of the work siteduring Deserthichshed" in the aircraft repair factory at Al Rashid Air Base. Baghdad.

PV (Al Bay'ah)

Background

Following the failure of thePV programraq's Military Research and Development Center (MRDC)5rogram call Al Bay'ah to modify Ihc9 trainer aircraft into an RPV. Accordingeport,RDC's Drone Directorate became Ihe Ibn-Firnas Center and continued wiih the devclopmcni of

Ibn-Firnas modified9emote-control system using four cameras (primary andforward view; primary and secondary cockpit view) feeding (wo displays at stationsonirol van adapted from the control system ofAV. Initial taxi tesis of9

RPV look place at Al Rashid Airfield in Baghdad, but due to an accident (the aircraft impacted Ihc runwayhn-Fimas moved Ihc program to Al Mutashn Airfield (also known as Samaria Easi Airfield).

The first flight tcsl occurred on or about li7 and was succcssfuL followedecondtest inhese tests remained in lhc airfield traffic pattern.

The third flight icsl was intended to tcsl therange of lhc video and command signals. The aircraft successfullym southeast of Al Mutasiin. but then the ground station lost the video signal from Ihe aircraft and il crashed. Following this, Ibn-Fimas attempted to improve the aircraft's conirol lability hy installing the auio stabilizer system from thenti-ship cruise missile. This modification was largely unsuccessful due to excessive instrument drift.

Although bombing of Al Mutasim8 during Desert Fox delayed progress on9 RPV. Ibn-Firnas conducted approximatelyore flight tests9ll these testsilot in live cockpit and focused on improving the control system.

A single source stated that in the springbn-Firnas attempted an unmanned flight that resultedrash. Following (his crash. Ibn-Firnas recommended canceling lhc program. Huwaysh agreed and terminated funding for live program.

The initial program manager forPV program was Dr. Mahmud Mudhaffer. Dr. Mahmud deed the program6 and was briefly replaced hy Dr. 'Imadr. 'Imad was subsequently replaced by MIC Deputy Director Muzahim Sa'b Hasan Muhammad Al Nasiri. who. accordingorker on the program, had very little technical competence.

Roles and Missions

Multiple sources have described different rules and missions for9 RPV. These include actingecoy for coalition aircraft, an air defense target.

reconnaissance, andBW delivery plai-fot m, ISG has not been able lo confirm or deny lhal9 had an intended CBW delivery role.

officials of Ibn-Fimas repotted thai thewas lo be usedecoy for coalition aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones. It would lure them into an ambush using SAMs (colloquially referred to

Slthough this mission was never Down. Ibn-Fimas personnel also reported that the aircrafi was to be usedarget drone for the Air Defense Forces.

A management level official reported thai lhcwould be used for reconnaissance and possibly electronic warfare. He also described the intended use of the aircraft in7SAM-bush" decoy.

An Iraqi aircraft engineer, with indirect access lo the information, reported thatany Iraqi Air Force engineers believed the intended use ofPV was toS aircraft carrier with chemical or biological weapons. 'Ihis source claims to have been informed by colleagues who worked on9 RPV that the aircraft would be outfitted with biological weapons toS carrier in the Persian Gulf, but the source had no information on how that attack would be conducted. In addition to the indiiect information aboul biologicalthe source also speculated that9 RPV could be armed with chemical weapons.

Huwaysh's Accounting or9 RPV Program

Huwaysh askedeview of9 RPVshortly after taking over as MIC directorresumably as panroader review of all MIC programs. Huwaysh said thai he was briefed that the roles of9 RPV were firstattlefield reconnaissance system and secondure for US aircraft.echanical engineer. Huwaysh believed the program was foolishumber of reasons.

First,anned aircraftm range into an RPVN-mandated maximum rangem was an inefficient use of the

Furthermore, al the time of the briefing,ot been able to extend the range of the aircraft beyondm due to line of sight limitations with the ground control station. This shon range would limit the RPV's utilityeconnaissance system.

Finally. Huwaysh felt lhat there weie too9 aircrafi available for conversion and that they were too expensive to operate for the stated mission, believing that snullei. cheaper UAVsetter option.

Even with these concerns, Iluwaysh was unable to immediately cancel9 RPV because of Saddam's personal interest In the program.after several crushes, combined with the Air Force's refusal to provideor conversion, Huwayshritical review of the program in0 with Ihe Ministry ol Defense. At this review, the Ibn-Fimas DG Dr. Ibrahim Hasan Isma'il Smainegative evaluation,rash in the springuwaysh terminated funding for the program.

During custodial uttersiews. Huwaysh expressed skepticism of the stated mission {reconnaissanceI decoy) of9 RPV. He reported that he inherited both the program and its program manager when he became MIC Directorn his engineer'sHuwaysh considered9 RPV unsuitcd to the battlefield reconnaissance role.

According to Huwaysh, Iraqi officials: never tested reconnaissance cameras onurther, while the Air Force was the must likely customer for such an aircraft, it was not involved In lhc RPVand did not appear to be interested in the program.

Inuwaysh staled that90 perceni replacement foe thePV and was intended lo fulfill the same mission as thehen told that Iraq had declared thePV was intended toBW delivery platform, Huwaysh responded,knowledge youf ihes directly related ta"

also scared (hat Iraq developed litePVBW delivery platform for use against Iran andprayer for ihc aircraft had been developed. In his opinion,9 was morefor CBW dissemination lhan ihc

aliempisndo get Huwaysh io be more explicit on Ihis point have been unsuccessful. In more recent interviews, Huwaysh asserted that he had no direct knowledgeBW delivery role forPP; he only suspccied that thai might be lhe intent because of its unsuitabilily for ils slated reconnaissance mission and ihc public-ily about Ihe Weal's suspicions aboul Iraq's WMD programs.

When confronted by the interviewer thai the Minisicr of Mililary Industrialization must know such details. Huwaysh was adamant thai, in Saddam's Iraq, com-parlmcntalization between organizations prevented full knowledge by anyone but lhe closest members of Saddam's innerlackn Huwaysh'suwaysh deniedember of ihai inner circle and deniedolitical or strategic decisionmaker.

Conclusions

ISG cannot confirm or deny an intended WMD delivery role for9 RPV. The target dronefor9 RPV. as describedormer Iraqi Air Force officer who worked on the program, is consistent with Western practice for AAM and SAM live lire training. Further. Huwaysh reported lhat the number-one lesson Iraq learned from Desert Storm was the need to significantly improve airarget drone of Ihis type could he used to lest new air defense systems and to irainowever. Huwaysh did not associate9 RPV wiih this mission. Finally, the size, operating cost, and complexity ol9 exceed the requirementsattlefield reconnaissance platform.

" If9 RPV mission was truly innocuous, ISG judges that Iraqis from the shop floor up to lhe MIC director would know thai. Also, the small numbervailable for conversion would minimize its utility for missile live fire testing and training.

ihc inconsistency in reporting on intended roles for9 RPV. from individuals who should beosition lo know, is troubling. Huwaysh's CBW"Suspicions" may be funis of actual knowledge lhat he is unwilling or afraid to share withThis, combined with indirect reportingMD delivery role from another source, prevents us from eliminating an intended WMD delivery role for9 RPV.

aircraft's payload capability and flightare sufficient for use ashemical or biological weapons platform.

Iraq had previously experimented with modifying Mirage Fl external fuel tanks into biologicaldispensers and had9 diop tanks toan agricultural spray sysiem for ihcelicopter.

had the capability lo develop chemical or biological weapon spray systems forut there is no evidence of any work along these lines.

ISG judges thai, even though this program did noi come tooundation of knowledgeechnical basis was obtained from which Iraq could resurrect chemical or biological weapon dispensing system programs.

Al Yamamah Project Background

In, Iraq began research and development work on L'AVs designed and built specifically as unmanned vehicles. Tlie initial work was lheof Iraq's Mililary Research and Development Committeeirected by Dr. 'Imad357 the MRDC worked On the Al Yamamah UAV project, which formed Ihc foundation of subsequent indigenous UAV development in Iraq. Tlie Al Yamamah projeciof Ihree designs, the Al Yamamahnd Al Yamamah 4.

The AlAVs were propeller-driven wiih pusher piston engines.

The Alas jci powered,urbo-stancr from the RussianTiTF.R

Iraqi engineers realized ihai mosl UAVs wete not jel powered because slower, propeller-driven UAVs were simpler to construct and control and could remain airborne longer. Subsequently, the Ibn-Firnas General Company copied theesign, increased the size of its tail boom, and renamed it lhe Alakar

Ibn-Firnas UAVs

Background

Orders by Saddamompetition between Ibn-Firnas and the Iraqi Air Force lo produce the first fully autonomous VAV, combined with problems with9 RPV, prompted Ibn-Firnas toon smaller UAVs, Saddam directed that funding increases slated to expand and improve the Air Force be transferred to building UAVs because Iraq was unable to acquire new fighter and bomber aircraft

Ibn-Firnas, headed by Major General Ibrahim Isma'il Smain. had al least three UAV projects under way. The firstmall RPV known assed solely as an air defense anillery training target. Thei-km range andas built. The second was the Alhich was larger, poweredubic centimeter (cc) motor, and used commercial GPS navigation to fly aflightpath (sec. The third was colloquially known askilo airplane" because it was intended tokg payload capacity.

Prototypes were built and tested, bulilo" program experienced controllability problems and was not completed by the time of OIF.ilo airplane" may also be known as the Alrsee.

Inn AlAV flew aflight that lasted three hours andotal distancem,ource with direct access claimed the UAV remained withinm of its launch poini. The UAV was initiallyby the ground control station, ihen switched to autopilot shortly after takeoff and remained on autopilot until recovery.

addition, this successful flight renewed the military's interest in the Al Quds UAV project, which was concurrently developing larger UAVs wiih greater payload capacity for other missions like communications and radar jamming.

In ihe fallIC selected the Alver the Iraqi Air Force entry (called lhe Iraqi Hawk) due to ils superior performance. Inbn-Fimasontract to providelAVs to the Iraqi Army for battlefield reconnaissance (the Republican Guard orderedhe contract specified the delivery of:

) Alith autonomous,guidance;

liih remote-controlfor training purposes only;

amama-ll training aircraft (probably largets);

imulators;

Control, navigation, and reconnaissance equipmeni;

round control stations.

ISG lias been unable to confirm if the specified Items were delivered.

Characteristics

Requirements for the Aln the Army coniraciaircraft equipped with control, remote control and navigation systems via GPS. and gyroscopic autopilot sysiem"sing GPS andurther specifications are shown in Table 5.

The Alideo camera forbut had no means of downlinking ihe video in real lime. 'Ihe video was recorded on board and could be viewed only after the aircrafl was recovered. At one point, thereequest for Ibn-Rrnus to develop an electronic countermcasures payload for this aircraft, but it lacked sufficient payload capacity, accordingAV engineer.

Missions

Ibn-Firnas developed Ibe Musayara UAV as aplatform, according lo Iluwaysh, driven by lessons learned from Ihe Iran-Iraq war where many general officers were shot down on helicopter reconnaissance missions. However, oilier roles were considered. In2 orepublican Guard Major Anmar 'Ami! Hi/a" obtained approval from ihe Presidential Diwan to use UAVs like cruise missiles to attack command and control targets of known locations. Anmar contacted Ibn-Firnas andlight test be arranged to determine if existing UAVs could perform this mission. Anmar's requirement was lor airplanes that work as cruise missiles, covering the distancem. carryingg ofnd Hyingm high, with the accuracyfter entering theof the target into the flight computer.

Inbn-Fimas performed the requested flight test at Tamuz Air Force Baseof Baghdad using an AlAVre-programmed flightpath launched from the backruck.

Shortly after takeoff, the UAV was switched from manual control to autopilot and flew theroute to Muhammadiistance of approximatelym.

Anmar originally wanted llie UAV to crash at ageographic location to prove that it could hit

a planned target, but Ibn-Fimas engineers resisted ihis plan, insisting on recovering the UAV byso it could be used again.

Reportedly, Anmar was impressed by the tcsl and ordered Ibn-Fimas io build himlAVs. Ibn-Firnas officials, however, were suspicious of Anmar's story about using TNT and, to avoidto the project, advised Anmar' they would need more details on the mission in order io build ihe UAVs for him. Anmar reportedly became very nervous at being questioned by Ibn-Fimas officials and demanded Ihey carry out the order, bul Ibn-Firnas refused.

returned later to MICettei from 'Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al Nasiri. Saddam Husayn's personal secretary, ordering Huwaysh ioommittee to investigate why the first order was not carried out and who was resistingit.

appointed his deputy. Muzahim Sa'b Hasan Muhammad Al Nasiri. as head of thewhich determined that Ibn-Fimas' refusal was justified on technical grounds.

also expressed skepticism at the concept of loading the UAVs withg of TNT. believing that missiles could do the job more effectively. He feared that, with all tbe publicity over possible Iraqi possession ot chemical and biological weapons. Anmar may have had something more deadly in mind.

Despite the committee's decision. Ibn-Fimas built six AlAVs (one prototype and fivemodels) bul never delivered them lu Anmar. The UAVs were builtew UAV site near the Al Karamah General Company facility in ihe Waziriya district of Baghdad. These UAVs were not equipped with cameras or recovery parachutes.

" Completion of these UAVs was delayed due to unspecified problems with the autopilot.

OIF. two AlAVs were recovered from the Waziriya site, probably Iwo of ihe UAVs manufactured in response to Anmar's requirement.

Foreign Assistance

Atthough the Ibn-Firnas UAVs were indigenous Iraqi designs, they were enabled by and dependent on foreign-procured components. These programs would not have been possible given strict adherence to sanctions and thus it was implicit that obtaining foreign material wasroblem. Examination of two AlAVs captured afler OIF shows ihey used Britishiston engines.

Information provided by Huwaysh and otherindicateskrainian company known us Orliss, headed hy Dr. Olga Vladimirovna, provided some of ihe engines for the UAVs.

Iraq based Rabban Safina Company also tried to acquirengines through Australia, along with gyroscopes and servomecnanisms from multiple suppliers.

In addition to lhc engines. Ibn-Fimas imported MicropilotG autopilots,GPS cards, and industrial computers for the A)

Table 5

Lengih

m

"ii

Weigh!

Weight

kg

Takeoff Weight

kg

Speed

kph

Plving Time per Tank

Altitude

m

5 Alpecifications

romaiwanese firm. Engineers at Ibn-Fimas wrote lhc guidance software for Ihc Advantcch computers incorporated in thesystem. GPS waypoinl data were programmedaptop computer and loaded into the L'AV'scomputer prior to flight.

Accordingormer high-level Iraqi official, the Iraqi ambassadorussia. 'Abbas Khalaf Kun-fadh. was directly involved in purchasing GPSfor Iraqi UAVs. He bought GPS equipment from Russian technicians who were employed by the Russian government, bul who designed and sold the GPS devices out of their homes to make extra money. 'Abbas reportedly acquired the GPS devices without Ihc knowledge of the Russian government.

Accordingigh-level official in the Iraqi UAV program. Iraq obtained fourndG autopilots through an Australia-based procurement agent. These autopilots were never installed in UAVs because ihey arrived just before OIF. Iraqi officials deny attempting to intentionally acquire mapping software of the United Stales hut did receive mapping software that came as pan of the package with Ihe MP20O0GThe source indicated that these items were located at Ibn-Firnas prior to OIF bul was unaware of their current location.

Potential UAV Control Upgrade

heAl Rati General Company of MIC began experimental workaser control system for use with UAVs. The experiments culminatedAV lest flight using the laser control system in0 at the Ttkrit Air Academy. The UAV. identified as an Ibn-Firnaslewistance0 tm ai an altitudeeters.

Musayara UAV in this experiment was painted redellow stripe as was ihe vehiclehy an Ibn-Firnas UAV technician as the "SO kilo" aircraft. However, the dimensions provided for the UAV used in the laser guidance experiment are. smaller than the Al

laser control system served only as an uplink command signal, although research was under waywo-way control link. The laser control system required an optical tracker lo track the UAV and keep the laser aimed ai the laser receiver on the UAV.

Inl Raj Companyeport on the laser control flight test for MIC. Huwaysh was displeased wiih ihe results. He felt the system was not practical for UAV control because of the short range of Ihe system, and he canceled the program.

Oihct foreign components identified in the Aldepicted innclude;

Remoie-cuntrol unit labeled "PCM Telecommand System, Skylcadcr Radio Control Limited;"

Fcranli Technologies vertical gyro Type FS60P;

Video recorder labeled "VCR Vinton Military Sytems Ltd:"'

Single rate gyro units labeled "BAR Systems;"

Electronic unit labeled "DMS"

X Super Steady Shot, digital eight video camera, model DCR-TRVS30E;

Humphrey vertical gyro, model;

Multiplexhanncl narrowband receiverHz:

Schmalband-Empfangcr multiplex Uni5 MHz.

Conclusions

The Ibn-Firnas programs were Iraq's moslunmanned aerial vehicle programs. Although heavily dependent on foreign procuremeni. Ibn-Fimas successfully developed the AlAV. capable of long-range, pre-programmed autonomous (light and intendederform battlefieldfor the Iraqi Army and Republican Guard.

Less successful were attempts toarger UAVg) payload. However, given lime and Ihe successful Irack record established by the AtSG judges Ibn-Firnas would most likely have succeeded in developing larger, more capable UAVs.

The2 demonstration flight and thespecifications in the Army purchase contract clearly reveal that theAlay have violated the range restrictions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Engineering

analysis indicates the Alas capablene-way fuel-exhaustion range well in excess ofm flown innd with lheGPS-bascd autopilot, the Alas not "icfhcred"emote-control system.

was necessary for the AlAV. in its reconnaissance role, to be able to remain aloft over the battlefield for extended periods andarge number of targets per sortie. Theseparameters were not necessarily indicative of intent to use the Alhemical or biological warfare delivery platform butimited inherent capability.

Al Razi Generalttempts toaser, vice radio, control system would, if successful, have allowed Iraq to launch and recover UAVs without transmitting in the radio frequency spectrum. The directional nature of the laser would make UAV control signals virtually impossible to detect, depriving an adversary of indications and warning of UAV employment via signals inlelligenceaser control system would be much more difficult for an adversary lo jam or spoof.

The accouni of Al Ra/i's flight test indicates that it was successful within linc-of-sight range and. if comhincdehicle with auloriomous guidance capability, could have provided the Iraqis lhe means lo operate more covenly with their UAVs without laser range limitations.

If the reports of Huwaysh's cancellation of the projeci are accurate, either Huwaysh obviously did not appreciate this potential operational advantage, or he did not consider it important.

Republican Guard Major Anmar's attempt to use the AIruise missile shows an awareness of the weapon potential of UAVs;the useonventionally armed UAV raises questions as to its actual use. Although thewc have indicates Anmar intended lo arm the UAV wiih conventional explosives (probably in place of the recoveryhis UAV docs have lhe

range, payload, guidance, and autonomy rveccssary to be usediological weapon delivery platformhe Iraqi leadershipecision to use il in ihis way anduitable dispenser system were available. ISO judges lhal the Aloes not have sufficient payload capacity lo serve as an effective CWplatform.

A BW platform conversion would require replacing the recovery parachuteispenser system and agent and limiting the UAV to one-way delivery-missions. The same guidance system that allows ihc Alo be programmed to automatically image targcis of known location would be capable Of being programmed toW dispensernown location.

ISC has not found evidence of intent or research and development activity associated with using Ibn-Firnas small UAVs as WMD delivery systems.

Al Quds UAV Program

Background

Information uncovered by ISG reveals the Al Ouds UAV program began in9 or0 when Dr. 'Imad 'Ahd-al-Latif Al Rida' submitted ato Hadi Taresh Zabun, DO of the MIC Research Directorate, lhal claimed he couldelter UAV lhan those being developed by Ihn-r'irnas, according to Huwaysh and an official in the Iraqi UAV program. However, in9 MIC recalled Dr. 'Imad from retirement and instructed him to renew Iraq's development of small UAVs. which had stalled after Dr imad's retirement

Huwaysh staled that al approximately Ihe same lime Dr. -Imad proposed his UAV development program, the Iraqi military asked MICAV capable ofkgg payloadsfor

communications and radar jamming equipment.

A high-level MIC official confirmedkgg payload goal* ind lhat Ihey were intended for jamming or direction-finding equipment.

Dr. Tmad had no knowledge of lhe intended mission or payload for lhe aircraft he was developing: he was simplyayload goal, and one report indicates he was not giveng goal until

Huwaysh reported lhat. as part of .Saddam's "Long Arm" policy, hehour endurance UAV (estimated rangeKJ km) in response to Israel's high endurance UAV capability, which is similar to Dr. Tmad's reported behet that SaddamAV on par with those of the US. No direct evidence links the Al Quds program to these stated range and endurance goals; lhe best indication of the actual performance goal for Al Quds2 memorandum Irom MIC Deputy Director Muzahim to Huwayshroject updalc on Al Quds which says, inmad 'Abd-al-Laiif indicated lhal the only part left from lhe project is theof the esteemed minister lo increase the Dying liming to four

confronted with this, memorandum. Huwaysh denied that he ever seterformance goal for Al Quds and claimed to have never seen the memo. On the other hand. Mu/ahim authenticated the memo.

MIC established the Al Quds programangar at Al Rashid Airfield, and developrnent work began inr Tmad requested that the program not be under MIC control, bulayefused and insteadelationship where MIC would maintain budgetary andonuol through lbn-Ftmas, but Dr. Tmad would havediscretion over Ihe ptOgUUL

arrangement allowed Dr. Tmad to hire his own research and dcvclopmcni Malleople (reports differ on its si?r) and also obligated Ibn-Frmas lo provide material support to Al Quds as required.

Ii appears that the Al Quds program was placed under the MIC's Special Projects Office. Master Subjectshich was created by Huwaysh for key projects requiring high-level attention and financial suppon.

Multiple sources reported that the initial AI Quds efforts involved attempts toet-powered UAV that would meet the range and payloadThese efforts reportedly included evaluation of lurbostartcr engines from older Russian MiG and Sukhoi fighter aircraft in Iraq's inventory and ihc Microlurho turbojet engine from lhe ItalianPV that Iraq had obtained prior

MiG and Sukhoi turbostartcr were ruled out due to excessive fuel consumption, and sopixiceeded with the Microlurbo engine.

The first AI Quds prototype.eters long andingspan. One source described the prototype as appearing "sicallh" like but said radar cross-section reduction wasoal of the program. Subsequent UNMOVIC photographs (secf later Al Quds prototypesaceted fuselage somewhat reminiscent of the. Because of initial difficulties in obtaining servos and associated remote-control equipmeni. the initial prototypeockpit, flight controls and control, system for manned flight tests

Unspecified difficulties with the engine forced Dr. Tmad lo abandon plans toanned flight test, and the jet powered Al Quds prototype never flew.

Reportedly, in3 this prototype wasand the components spread ihrough the aircraft scrap yard al Al Rashid and covered with palm leaves to conceal them from UN inspectors. One Iraqi scientist considered the entire anempt toet-powered UAV tofraud."

A high-level official in the Iraqi UAV program deniedarge, jet-powered UAV was the initial intent of the program, and claimed instead that, early in the program, engineers were having trouble fabricating symmetrical wings for the prototypes. Asymmetrical wings would cause the aircraft lo roll on takeoff,

siblyrash before ihc operator could correct the roll. The large, jet-powered, manned vehicle was reportedly intended onlycsibcd for wing symmetryilot on board to correct lhe roll tendency.

The difficulties with the initial Al Quds prototype, combinedack of wind tunnel facilities to test the designs, prompted Dr. Tmad to construct scaled-down versions of the prototype for open-airtesting. According lo an official ai Ibn-Firnas.ubscale prototypes were produced for testing. The official further asserted that Dr. 'Imadecision to focus on the smaller UAVs to compete with the Aleconnaissance UAV being developed by Ibn-Fimas.

These smaller subscale UAVs were tbeehicles shown lo UNMOVIC inspectors at Ibn-Firnas in.

Reportedly. Dr. 'Imad never informed MICof his decision to abandon the larger UAV development to focus instead on ihe smaller RPV-

20a.

Both Huwaysh and Muzahim believed Dr. Tmad was continuing to work on lhe large-payload UAV until3 when theyrogram review. Al ihe review, Huwaysh chastised Dr. Tmad formoney on the program, hiring personnel wilhoul MIC approval, and for not achieving the staled goal Of lhe program. Huwaysh also questioned theofompetitor to lhe Successful Al

claimed that he gave Dr.ays io achieve progress toward the stated goal or the

program would be terminated.

A high-level official at Ibn-Fimas provided aof events somewhat different from Huwaysh's siatemenls, claiming lhalg payloadwas not levied on the Al Quds program until2 when Muzahim slated MIC did not need both Dr. Tmad and Ibn-Fimas to produce small UAVs.The source suggested that Dr. Tmad did not know whatg payload requirement was for. bui speculated thai Muzahim wanted to install lhe reconnaissance system from the Mirage fighter in the UAV.

engineer at Ibn-Firnas reported lhat lhc reason for ihe move from Al Rashid lo Ibn-Firnas was MIC concerns lhal UNMOVIC discovery*eparate, undeclared UAV program would cause irouble for the Regime.

The Al Quds program was declared to the UN in Iraq'ss semi-annual declaration. Documentary evidence obtained by ISG indicates lhat ibe Iraqis claimed lo ihe UN thai Ihe "unmanned aerial vehicles of two" were "an idea that began in. and Ihey announced itH/I5 according io the Resolutionf the Monitoring Plan."

The document furtherhat UNMOVIC inspected this program four times, on20

Reportedly. UNMOVIC inspected Ihe Al Quds program five timesas at Ibn-Fimas.

Another source with direct access reported that, during UNMOVIC inspections. Al Ouds workers were told to each lake home comrnxnens from rhc Al Rashid workshop for safekeeping until icdd to return ihcm. Similar procedure' were reportedly usedisperse equipment prior to the anticipated US air stnkcs.hr documented pre-OIF Iraqi claim that Al Quds began in2 when it actually began in late0 possiblypecific intent to conceal the program from the UN.

Characteristics

Reportedly the eight subscale Alplease refer torototypeseierg payload to be carriedne-square-fool intem.il compartmentvoli powerkg masimuni takeoff weight, and were poweredc. two-stroke, two-cylinder, nine-hwsepower pusher propeller engine.

- The first lest flight of the subscale prototypes took place in April or Mayhe hist iwo sub-scale prototypes were lined with landing gear and took off and landed fromunway.

prototypes were launched from ihe roofickup truck and recovered hy parachute.

A high-level Ibn-l'irnns official referred to ihese eight prototypes ashroughnd did not acknowledge the jct-powercd version described by other sources asowever, there was nond the next aircrall in the series is therhich is described nest.

Dr. 'Imad began development of then2 (presumably after ihe move toPVingspan2aximum ukcoH weightg and was intended io demonstrate the useushcr/pullcr engine configuration. In order to speed and simplify construction of the aircraft,9 drop tank was used for the fuselage.

This aircraft flew only once, onemaininginutes in the airfield traffic pattern. Like the.as truck-launched bul landed conventionally on the runway.

An Ibn-Firnas engineer claimed that Dr. 'Imad'smotivation for developing theas to surpass the pertormancc of Ibn-Fimas' Alhich hadm circuit inhe engineer reported that Dr. 'Imad claimed the lighter structural design of rhc, depicted inould giveaximum tligln lime of over six hours, exceeding the program goal of four hours.

As with the Ibn-Firnas CUV programs, iJie Al Quds VAVs were iniendcd lo be capable of autonomous flight using global positioning syslemreprogrammed autopilot Thenetwork for nvionkc components for Al Quds was through Ibn-Fimas and was the same as that described in the previous section. However, the Al Quds program never progressed to the point ofre prop, rammed auionornous flight and never actually received the MicropilotG autopilot* used in (he Al

Missions

Iluwaysh, Minister of Military Industrialization,ormer Ibn-Firnas engineer all reported electronic warfare missions for Al Quds VAVs. Electronicmissions include direction finding/signal inier-cept or communications and tadar jamming. Huwaysh provided ihe most specific information, saying thai an important lesson learned from the Iran-Iraq war

was the importance ol being able ID intercept and jam enemy communication* and radar signals.

redible description oflhe value of UAVs for this role, discussing hem they can be flown over enemj territory to get close to their targets, improv ing intercept and jamming effectiveness. Aho, being cheap and unmanned.

il would notayor problem if they were shot down.

Ibn-Firnas engineer speculated ihai either lhe Al Miladlain companies would develop the electronic warfare payloiids; Huwaysh was specific ihai Al Milad was ihe developer.

A number of other sources indicate the intended payloads for the AlAVs were directioncommunicaiHvns. ami radar jamming, as well as reconnaissance equipment

Reported Is Dr. 'Imad did not know the intended payloads lor his vehicles. Dr 'Imad was only involved in developing Ihe flight s'chicle. but specu-luted that the payload would be reconnaissance equipment adapted from lhe Mirjge lighter aircraft.

ISG judge*kg payload variant would probably be sufficientntssisv receiver for communication or radar signal interception and direction finding, but tbe lOthkg payload would probably be required lo house the transmitter and receiver requiredamming platform.

Two lower level sources, one with direct and the Other with indirect information on Al Quds. agreed wuh tbe rcctmnaissancc mission ol Al Quds, but the indirect -ourcc added that the Al Quds engineers were directed to leavempty compartment in the fuselage approximatelym wide bym long bym deep foi an tinspecined purpose. ISG judgesrobably Ihe recovery parachute compartment.

Conclusions

The evidence accumulated by ISG indicates the Al Quds program was an initiative to meet an Iraqi military desire for airborne electronic warfare

platforms. The overall program goal for Al Quds wasroduce UAVskgg payload capabilities for communications and radar intercept and jamming missions.

ISG has mncarered no information connecting the Al Quds LAV program to deU*ery of weapons ofestruction. However, successful development of lhe Al Quds UAVs would have provided Iraq with vehicles inherently capable ofgg payload versions) org payload version) weapons. All of theautonomous prtigrammablc guidance, andhave been present. If'the Iraqisecision to use ihem for this, purpose and if iheyuitable ageni dissemination system. However. ISG has uncovered no evidence of cither made to order dispenser development or intent to use At Quds for WMD.

The program began in9 or0 bul was not declared lo the I'S until the3 semi-annual declaration, after Iraq agreed lo rr-odmil DNompleted Al Quds UAVange capability heyond IV) km likely wouldiolation ot UN sanctions. How-ever, when terminated by OIF. the program had not matured lo lhe point where it achieved its fullgoals.

Procuremeni Supporting Iraq's Delivery Systems

Iraq used cotert procuremeni methods to acquire materiel that was either Itanned or controlled under. the Annexes to the Plan approved by, and the Fxportilmport Mechanism approvedI. ISG judges that these effort* were undertaken to reestablish or support Iraq's delivery systems programs. The periodothe ttart of OIF showed an increase in Iraq's procurementnd il is in this period that ISfi belie'*Baghdad made its mosl serious attempt* at rrconttiluting delivery system capabilities similar la those lhal existed prior

Desert Storm and the various VNSC Resolutions led lo the near destruction of Iraq's surface-to-surfaceissile force and production infrastructure.

Iraq began building iis pennilied missile design and manufacturing capabilities, including the ability to produce limited quantities of certain chemicals used in rocket propulsion.

the end of, as was the case prior to Desert Storm. Iraq had the ability to design and build many of the necessary systems for an SSM with the exception of complete liquid-propellanl rockei engines and guidance and control systems.

Accordingormer MIC executive with direct access lo the information, Iraq overcame these deficiencies byovert procurement system. Iraq used Ihis system to buy restricted items from foreign sources through third party countries. These items were controlled by. which put sanctions in place to prevent the export of certain goods, particularly militarylo Iraq.

of Ihese procuremeni activities started8 after the UN inspectors were expelled from Iraq. (NOTE:omplete descriplion of Iraq's procurement pnvcess, refer lo the "Procurement: Illicil Finance and Revenue" section of the ISG report.)

1raq began establishing con-tacts and making limited purchases of controlled delivery system-related items. The initial efforts

were undertaken in an environment of massive civil engineering work to rebuild Iraq's war-damaged infrastructure and while the UN inspection Regime wat still an unknown quantity. In addition,efforts were devoted to rebuilding Iraq's armed forces to counter any threat from Iran.

ISG has uncovered documentary evidence and personal statements suggesting that, despite UN restrictions, Iraq entered into discussions with both Russian entities and North Korea for missile systems, though there is no evidence to confirm that any deliveries took place.

Sources and documents suggest lhat Iraq was actively seeking to obtain lheskanderfrom Russia.

Document exploitation has revealed thai Firas Tlas, the son of former Syrian Defense MinisterGeneral Mustafa Tlas, visited Iraq in1 andariety of missile systems and components that he could supply thiough Russia. Firas offered to sell IraqAM andm-rangeskander-Hmissile, or to provide assistance to help Iraq produce the Iskander. Firas claimed lhat he had previously met wiih Izakoff. lhe former Defense Minister of the Soviet Union, who told him that his !lzakaff"s| friend owned documenis for "TEMPS" missiles, called "Slerliie" in the Wesl. Reportedly

I/akoff said the missilesangem and were very accurate. Tlas said Izakoff claimed thai Mikhail Gorbachev destroyed Ihc missiles, butkoff could supply the documents so thai Iraq could produce ihcm. AccordingkoiT said lhal Dimiirof (sic)lose friend of the President) presented lhc subject to RussianPutin, and President Putin agreed to provide assistance.

claimed ihai Iraq had contacted both Syrian and Russian entities to discuss Iraqthe Iskandcr missileussia would noi export any mililary hardware without an end user certificate signed by the issuing government agency, which is the capacity in which Syria would have served.

NOTE: The TEMPS is known in the West as thecalcboard andangem. These were destroyed under ihc Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty signed in Ihe.

ISG recovered documents containing contract and money flow information concerning illicit trade between Iraq and Nonh Korea. These documents show that, lateenior officials in Iraq, including 'Abd llamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al Nasiri (Ihc presidentialhe Director of ihe Iraqi Imelligence Service (IIS) began to discuss establishing trade with Nonh Korea. Inuwaysh formallyorth Korean delegation to visit Iraq. The Iraqis and Northdecidedace-to-facc meeting would be held on or0 in Baghdad. The North Korean Chang Kwang Technology Group was identified as the technology supplier and ihe prime technical mediator for the Nonh Korean side. After an exchange of several communique's, the representatives from both countries agreedist of specific subjects lhat would be discussed at the meetings, including technology transfer for SSMsangem, coastalangem. and live possibility of North Korean technical experts working inside Iraq.

A set of memoranda recovered by ISG showsigh-level of dialogue between Iraq and Nonh Korea lhat occuned from9 loed to plansonh Korean delegation to secretly visit Iraq in October

Among the lopics for discussion was the supply of "technology for SSMsangemnd-Io-Sca Missilesangcuring the course of discussions with Iraq, the Nonh Korean side acknowledged the sensitivity of transfemng technologies for ihcsc missiles but indicated Nonh Korea was prepared "to cooperate wiih Iraq on the items ithere is no evidence, however, that the missiles were ever purchased.

To improve its delivery system capabilities, Iraq sought technical experts from other countries toassistance. Much of the foreign assistance for theAl Samud missile program came from experts in Russia, bul Iraq did receive assistance from other countries. According to some sources, this assistance was often not sanctioned by the home countries of ihe missile experts providing the aide.

According to Huwaysh and an Iraqi computersviih direct access lo the information,8 MIC enteredontractompany called Babil to hire Russian missile experts as consultants. Bahil would hire the experts, who then traveled ro Iraq aitd xs-orked on Iraqi missile programs,the Al Samud. The initial value of the contract wasillion. That September, the Bahil Company sent lo Iraq missile experts from Russia who came from various universities, research institutes, factories, and productionThe expens wereash salaty0 each month they worked in Iraq.

These individuals were in Baghdad forthree months starting in8 and worked ai locations physically separaicd from Ihc actual production facilities. While there, they engaged in discussions with the Iraqis and drew up plans related lu missile development andI 'pon returning to Russia, they continued to assist Iraq and were visited in Russia by various Iraqis.

Huwaysh claimed lhat experts from Russiaassistance lo Iraq's missilenhc Russian experts provided technical reviews for Ihc Alix-monlh period. This review included evaluations of Ihc entire missile production system. These experts continued lo provide assistance to the

Al Samud prOfriin even alter lhc review bya package of design calculations for liquid-propcllant missiles and drawings fix an inertia! navigation systemluwaysh said UNMOVIC inspectors did not detect the experts front Russiaite visituwaysh speculated that if the Russian government found out thai the experts were working in Iraq, they wouldhave been punished, implying lhat Ihc Russian government had iM <anctioncd these activities.

A former Iraqi rocket motor lest engineer claimed that experts fromV were involsed in the development of the Al Fal'h missile system. Their involvement included analyzing instruments on lhc rocket motor test stand and providing an INS lhat was considered inadequate and of poor quality

A former senrorexcculivc in MIC" who had direct access to the information admitted lhal,raqechnical assistance contractommercial cover company, lhat operated outside of Belarus. The assistance included providing improvements to unidentified Iraqi missileThe con turn also stipulated lhat experts from Belarus wouldemi-permanent presence in Iraq while lhc contract was in effect. According

to ihe source, the head of the Bclarusian delegation was an individual related to ihe office of thenf Belarus, thai suggests that the government of Belarus may have been aware of ihis activity.

Numerous sourer admissions and document- have surfaced, which show some of Iraq's efforts al acquiring guidance and control components for its various missile systems. Because of Us inability Ui successfully indigenoutly produce such complete components. Iraq was heavily reliant upon foreign suppliers to provide such items as accelerometers and gyroscopes.

Twohe Iiaqi missile program provided information concerning Iraqaiicmpu lo improve missile accuracy lo ISG. Nth of whom had direct access to the informationl Karamah signed three contract* with companies from Russia for GAC technical assistance and equipment The contracts' terms were as follows:

- The first contract vva* for approximatelynci-lial navigation systems designed to input to lhc Al Samud guidance syslem. Theyodernized version of the Scud guidance system and contained twoual-axis flexible gyroscopes, two AK-5

accclcromcters. one aligned on lhc yaw (lateral) axis lo correct for Ihe effects of wind drifi in the trajectory, and Ihc other aligned along the axial (ihrust) axis to derive the cut-off velocity for thrust termination to control the missile's range. The contract also required delivery of approximately five assembled andnassembled pseudo-lnertial Measurement Units (TMUs) in addition to some guidance test equipment.

The second contract was forodern, strappedystems thattwo. dual-axis flexible gyroscopes and three orthogonally configured accclcromctcrs, which were also toigital output. The contract was amended to include an on-board flighland control system.ystems on this contract were also designed to work in ihc Al Samud guidance units and were smaller than the ones listed in the first contract. Other itemsin ihe contract include individual pans such as:yrosnd56 acceleromcicis (between. NOTE: Approximatelyccclcromctcrs were received in0 and another five tonhe contraci also included testervo testingle axis rateingle axis vibration tester, anchamber,est unit for an optical dividing head.

- The third contraci was for the purchase of eight IMUs. with fiber-optic gyroscopes, and four IMUs with ring laser gyroscopes. These systems were destined for the Al Karamah and Al Miladand were intended for use in the Al Samud and ttw Al Fat'h missile systems. Up to seven of the guidance systems were delivered lo the Al Kaiamah General Company in the second half ofll ofystems and relatedwere stored al the Al Quds Factory of Ihe Al Karamah General Company immediately before OIF. Although some examples of this hardware were recovered, lhc Al Quds Factory itself has been completely Itwled and no items remain.

Figuresndepict some of the many guidance items recovered by ISG; Figurehows an Actuator stepper motor.

Recovered documents provide details of Iraqi contracts for SSM technical assistance and missile-related hardware. According to these documents,9 the Al Basha'ir Trading Company of Iraqeries of contractsquipment, technology, training, and missile design training with the Infinity DOO Company from the FRY, ISG has noi been able lo confirm Ihe deb" very of the Hems specified in Ihe contracts.

A former high-ranking official in MIC recalled that, at the endraq signed contracts with North Korea worth at leastillion. Iraqownpayment3 million. Some of thespecifiedystems, inertial navigation systems, and on-board computers intended to improve the accuracy of SSMs having an operational range of ISO km or less. Iraq also sought to purchase gyros and accelerometers and asked if they could purchase existingochka components. According io the source. Iraqi missile rjcrsonncl believed that Tochka components would provide greater benefit to the solid-propellant Al Fat'h system than the liquid-propellanl Al Samud,

ISG recovered contracts beiween North Korea and Iraq related to guidance and control components. According lo the contracts in laten eight-person delegation from North Korea visiting Iraq reached agreements to sign six contracts to improve Iraq's missile system capabilities. One of lhewas beiween the Al Karamah Generaland the Hcsong Trading Corporation. North Korea, for the purchase of potentiometers (usedissile alignment equipmentatteries, and test stands for servos and jet vanes used on SSMs. Also, technical assistance was to be made available if required by Iraq. Ihcwas to be delivered via Syrian ponsonths of contract initiation. ISG has been unable to locate any of the delivered equipment.

ISfi gleaned the following information from acquired documents concerning contract number six between Al Basha'ir Trading Company Ltd of Baghdad and Infinity DOO of Belgrade. FRY.

Contract number six. apparentlyotal costas for guidance and control testing equipment and training courses. ISG ha% been unable to confirm that Ihese items were ever delivered, lhe test equipment was as follows:

icsi stand designed for static testing of dynamicaUy tuned gyros.

test stand for solid stale accekrorncter static lest ing.

annterference test stand for testing gyro rigidity and drift.

equipment for developing homing and proximity

software for research and development of all

hardwarc-in-ihe-Ioop simulation software.

SSM simulation software.

* The following are cxcerpls from documents received by ISG. The informal ion is related lo contract number eight which is between Al Milad General Company of Baghdad and Infinity DOO of Belgrade, FRY concerning guidance and conirol equipment ISG has been unable to confirm that these items were ever delivered. Contract number eight, signed onora total costas for

design of an on-board computer system capable off acceleration and's

of shock.

a two-week training course tor customer experts.

a complete sel of designechnical and technological documentation along wiih qua ficaiion testing procedures for the computer.

A former high-ranking official in MIC said lhat. inhe Technology Transferof the IIS procured betweenndyros and accelerometers from China for approximately

he items were intended lorysiem ol lhe Al Samud missile. The gyros were of lite lesommi typerill rule o( Vi degree per hour. The source indicatedhe Iraqis were never uble lo use lhe gyros and uceeleromcicrs because ihc packages were incomplete and there-fore inoperable

An Iraqi scientist with direct access to the informa-Don claimed trui enuties in the FRY2 offered io supply Al Miladusigafion sjstcm lor the Iraqi Jmin program la craise missile based on ihcll requirements for the Jinin project were corrimunicated lo the torcign senders direcily.

According loan Iraqi national wuh indirectof proscribed equipment smuggling. Wl'amalestinian businessman, successfully smuggled missile gyros inio Iraq from Russia via Syriaharhiyah. whose earlier allcmpt to illegally import gyros from Russia lo Dr. Muzhir of Al Kuiaiitah was foiled in Jordan due lo detection by the UN insed one of his contacts to propose lo the Iraqi governmentomponent* containing gyroscopes and acceletotnelerssing the IIS fromAl Karradah. the components were success-fulls delivered lo Al Katamah ihrough Syria inSG hat aot been able to confirm that this transaction occurred.

ISG has uncovered evidence that Iraq hadcontracts with Drussian missile guidance expert and the head of S> stemTech. ISG has been unable to confirm whether thesewere fulfilled.

lluvsjysh claimed that Dr. Dcgtaryev wasihrough the Belarusian firm Infobank touidance sets for the Al Samud. bulrc detained during shipmenl Ihrough Jordan. Iraq then placed an additional orderuidance sets, (hat were successfully delivered. Huwaysh stated that these sets were nevei used because they were seniacility for replication bul ihey were unable lo duplicate them by lhe lime of OIF.

A former Iraqi senior executive in MIC staled thai the Al Karamah General Company signed and executed several contracts wiih Dr. Deglaryev. Through the ARMOS Company. Al Karamah signed contracts with Deglaryev He visited Iraq several times along with other experts and executed several contracts with lhe Al Milad. Al Karumah. and Al Hanth companies valuedillion.

According lo documents ISG retrieved from the office of MIC. Iraq signed coniracts for missile guidance electronics with the firm SystemTcch mn by Deglaryev. Although ISG has been able to recover some of the delivered components. ISG has not confirmed that Ihese contracts were fully executed.

Iraq relied on foreign suppliers for production-related machinery for use in ils Al Samud programs. Iraq's- success at acquiring Ihis machinery probably affected Ihe production rate of these missiles.entities were the main suppliers of machinery and tooling, though other suppliers may haveole.

high-level Iraqi official and an Iraqi scientist claimed lhat. beginningn addition to engineering and technical support, experts signed contracts to supply many of the pieces offor ihe Al Samud program. This equipmeni included many of the production machines along with related dies, moulds, and fixtures for lhe Al Samud program. Two small automaticand longitudinal welding machines were sent from Russia. The Russians also provided jigs and fixtures thai were made in Russia and ihen imported into Iraq.

learned through interviewsormer high-ranking official in MIC that, inraqoniraciompany from Russia for machinery and equipmeni that wasillion. The machineryow former, furnaces, and welding machines. The flow former was tested in Russia and installed at Ihe Al Samud site in Abu Ghurayb bul was noi used before the war. The original contract length wasonths: however, it was extended because ihe workin ibe contract was incomplete. At the start of OIF. work on Ihe engine fixtures for Al Samud II't complete, work on the airframe design

waserceni complete, and work lha! would have contributed lu lhc lest and assembly of new engines wasercent complete. These projects were intended to helproperline for the Al Samud II because the missiles produced before1 were noi of consistent quality, which made them unreliable. The experts co-operated with the Iraqis until OIF. ISG has no evidence lhal Ihe governmenl of Russia sanciioned or approved these conlracis.

former high-ranking official in Iraq's ballistic missile program stated that,l Karamahontract worth SIillion wiih acompany for Al Samud airframe production, assembly, and testing. According lo ihc contract, ihe payments would be lied Io item deliveries. The first payment0 would be paid after receiving the design drawings. The contract was modified1 when the Al Samud missileincreasedm.3f the design drawings were received.

ISG judges lhal Iraq received alolga liquid-propellant engines from Poland and possibly Russia or Belarus. Source claimsby contraci information support thisThis figure is also consistent wiih what Iraq declared to the UN.

Accordingigh-level official in Iraq's missile program. Iraqngines, some of which were secondhand and some damaged, from Polandompany known asajority of these engines reportedly arriveddditionally. Ihe source speculated that Iraq had possiblyngines from Russia through an Iraqi company known as Al Rawa'a.

A letter1 signed by Dr. Hadi Taresh Zabun. the head of MIC's procurement department, indicated that MIC had received approval to enter into contract with Evax for an additionalngines under the same terms and prices as their earlier contract forngines. Another documentubsequent contract for Iraq to receive the remainder ofngines they had ordered,f which they had already received. Ihis was followedetter dated2 from the Polish company Evax io the

Deputy Minister of Military Industrialization, which slateshird shipment has arrived at the pun of Tartus and is on its way lo Baghdad (ihe Al Karamah Generalomprisingolga rocket enginesieces (pressure valve, air valve, servo, and miscellaneous otherThe letter also statesshipmentamples is delayed in Poland awaiting the required inspection before they can he exported (comment: this may refer to Ihe rest ofngines in the contract).

source with indirect access to information claimed that, inraqprocured either (mm Belarus or Russia,olga enginesissile thermal hatlcnci. Ihey then imported these items via Sudan and Syria byront company called Al Rawa'a ISO has no evidence that these East Europeans countries either sanctioned or approved these transactions.

Officials within Iraqmissile programs haveinformation about Iraqpursuit of carbon fdter technology far use in Hi sidid rocket motor programs. Companies from Russia were Iraq's main targets for Ihe acquisition of thii technology.

former scmor-levcl official iu Itaq't missileprovided information about Iraq's attempts to obtain carbon liber technology that is used for solid rocket motors such as the A) Fat'h MIC began pursuing carbon fiber technology from Russia in the last quancrhis effort ran in parallel with work being atiomplishcd by the MilitaryCollege under contract to the Al Rashid General Company. Iraq* Military Engineering College

and the Al Rashid Geneial Company werefor Iraq's indigenous canton fiber production efforts. Al Rashid was responsible for the sobd-pro-pcllant motor Case and the Iraqi MililaryCollege was responsible for the carbon fiber production lines The contract, which included one carbon fiber filament winding machine, onemanufacturing machine, one mandrelmachine, nne high-poweted cleaning machine used lo remove the gypsum from the mandrel, and one curing furnace was not completed by lhc required dale and an extension was granted. By the slan of OIF. the majority of ihe components were finished.

former high-level official in MIC claimed ihai during (he first quartern unidentified Russian company contacted the ARMOSloisil by Iraqi researchers to the Russian carbon fiber production lines and have ihc experts from Russia provide technical assistance. MICelegation, authorized by Huwaysh. io travel to Russia to speak with the technicians and visit the lines. The Iraqi delegation was canceled due to the start of OIK

Iraqs Inability to successfully produce all the chemicals necessary for propcllants for its mis-tile systems forced Iraq to acquire these chemicals from foreign entities. Iraq attempted toront company to mask these activities from international attention. ISO discovered numerous occasions in which Iraq attempted to acquire chemicals for use in their liquid-pmpcllanl missile program. ISO has not been able to confirm that contracts were ever agreed to for all these chemicals or if any agreed contracts were ever fulfilled.

ISG recovered from lhe Baghdad offices nf lhe Arabic Scientific Bureau (ASB) and Inaya Trading company describe solicited quotes from Chinese and Indian companies (including the Inaya Trading Company) for chemicals and niaic-rials used with liquid-propellanl missiles. Some of the chemicals in which Ihc ASB was interested were: Unsymmeirical Dimcihylhydrazineicthylcnctriamincydrazine.Peroxide, Xylidcne. and Tricthylaminc. 'Ihese chemicals are common fuels and oxidizers used in liquid-propellanl engines. Ihc documents do not, however, indicate wheiher any contracts were signed or materia! delivered, and. since Ihc dales reported areurchase of the chemicals may have been stopped by OIK

has learned lhat2 proposals were placed before MIC hy Ihc Al Anas Trading Agencyhrough Dr. Nazar 'Abd-al-'Amir Hamudi. for amounts totaling hundreds of tons of many different liquid propellanis. iheir consiiiucnis or prc-carsor chemicals. The information stales not only was Iraq actively looking for slocks of propellanis that were currently in widespread use bul also thai Ihey were seeking tens of tons of more advanced, higher energy liquid propellanis. ISO believes that, due

to the start of OIF, these chemicals were never delivered.

former executive in MIC told ISG lhal Iraq had wanted lo purchase or produceiquid propellanl because ilore energetic fuel and produces greater thrust Therefore. Ihe Iraqis made several attempts to acquireuel from ihe Ukraine bui they were never successful.

Iraq also undertook efforts lo improve ilsprogram hy importing chemicals needed in the production of solid-propellanis. Though ISG has not been able to confirm that con&acts were ever agreed to for alt these chemicals or if all of tlieere ever fulfilled, ISG did discover large amounts of imported aluminum powderite visit to At Amin Factory, part of the Al Rashid General Company.

ons nf imported aluminum powder,for use in solid-propellant ruckel motors, was discovered during an ISG site exploitationof Al Amin Faciory. At the then current rate of demand, this would have satisfied the requirement for hundreds of motors. Considerable quantities of other propellanf materials had also been imported and were potentially available for use.

A former high-ranking official in lhc Iraqi missile program who had direct accesshcclaimed that Iraq purchased chemicals used in solid-propellant rocket motors- The official reported thai,he Al Rashid General Company purportedly placed orders for raw materials that arc used in the production of solid-propellants forAmong the ordeisurchase made from Ihc AlCompany, owned hy Jahtr Al Dulaymi, for six tons of ammoniumPI and six tons of aluminum powder. The Al 'Ayan Company purchased these ilemsrench company for Al Rashid. ISC km no evidence tliat the French governmenl either sanciioned or approved this transaction.

A few officials have provided information about Iraq's dealings with (lie Indian firm NEC forfor sol id-propel lants. ISG has no confirmation that the government of India either sanctioned or approved these activities, and Indian authorities arrested NECt director, Hans Raj Shiv,3 for his illicit activities.

According lo Huwaysh. former Director of MIC, he had many business dealings with the Indian firm NEC. Huwaysh says (hat as late asans Raj Shiv. the director of NEC, was working in NEC's Baghdad office. Examples of lhc Iraqi-NEC business relationship arc: NEC supplied the Al Oa'qa'a General Companyitric acid production capability used in the production of explosives.9raq purchased from NEC at leaslells lhat were used lo process sodium chloride, probably related AP production.

ISG has learned from an Iraqi scientist with direct access io ihc information that,9 toraq procured from NEC Engineers Private,hc design and construction of AP processing facilities. APajor constitueni of solid-propel-lants. The procurement included machinetools, and direct engineering assistance. This contractual relationship resulted in lhc construction Of two AP production facilities. The Iraqis did most of the work on the first facility bul NEC provided technical assistance, the electrolytic cells, and Ihc centrifuges. This facility had an output capacity ofons per yearhe second AP facility,apacityons per year, required much more

involvement by NEC who provided the equipment, production technology, and engineering suppon. The Iraqi Al Faw Company was involved wiih Ihe physical construction of Ihis facility. ISG judges that these two facilities, if run at full capacity, would Im ve produced sufficientear toons ofore than sufficient to support Iraq's declaredprograms and enough to facilitate work on motors for new missiles.

Accordingormer high-ranking official in the Iraqi missile program, ihc Al Rashid Generalpurchased raw materials for solid-propel lant motors beginningmong the items were:

ons Of AP. Six tons of AP from the Al Rayan Company, which was purchased from France; anons purchased from the following entities: NEC. which purchased ihe AP from an unnamed source; Al Sharqiyah. which purchased the AP from an unnamed purchased the AP from China; and Al Maghrib, which purchased the AP from France;

ons of aluminum powder. An initial order of six tons of aluminum powder from ansource: anons purchased from NEC and three Iraqi companies (Al Sharqiyah,

Al Maghrib, and Al 'Ayan) who purchased il from France;

tons ofHTPB. An initial order of four tons of hydroxyl terminated polybutadieoeinder, purchased from the Al Taqaddum Company, which purchased it from an Italian company: and anons of HTPB from NEC. which purchased ilnited States company,

2 tons of methyl aziridinyt phosphine oxide iMAPO) from NEC. which purchased it from China;

tons ofdtocryl azelate (DOZl from Al Sharqiyah. which purchased itapanese firm.

Infraslruclunn. in- nnd Technology Developments

The steady Imprortmtnl in Iraqi missileseen during the Regime's "Decline"phase was accelerated6 in Ihe: "Recovery" and "Transition"periods. Iraq expended great effort! reconstituting destroyed Of unusable equipment in order to restore required production ind deployrneni capabilities for the Al Samud II and Al Fat'h. These capabilities could have been used to deselop and produce missiles with ranges longer than allowed under. No restraints were applied to achieving this objective, including clear breaches of international treaties and the use of foreign expertise and assistance.

Sialic Test-Firing Facilities

ISO judges that Iraq's existing static lest facilities for liquid rocket engines and solid rocket motors were in no physical condition lo continue to support development and letting of Iraq's hquid-propeUanl rocket engines.

Iraq's existing liquid prx-ipcllanl engine lest stand at Al Rafah was designed toingle Scud-class engine5 Ions of thrust, but, due to moreecadealf of usage, age. andwas probably not capable for Iraq's needs. According to one Iraqi engineer, constructionew lest stand began hynd it was sized to handle un engine larger than thelass or Scud-class engine. However, while physically able loarger engine, lhc facility was not capable of withstanding the thtusl thaiarge engine would normally be expected to produce. The engineer suggested the lest Hand could have been used to test clusteredngines. The facility was not commissioned by ihe lime of OIF. ISC assesses the new stand with modifications was suitable for clustered engines.

Although various static test-finng facilities for solid-propcllant motors existed al the Aleneral Company (Nu'man sitei. these were of smaller capacity in terms of both explosive and thrust rating than those ai Al Muiassim (Yawm Alt Al Mutassim. the Urges!est cells had been upgraded lo allow thtust levels of SO tonse safely tested.

Solid-Propcllant Rocket Motor Case Manufacture

At Al Amin. an aging oven originally installed for the first stage of the proscribedallistic missile, which was "desiroyed" by UNSCOM. was repaired. Iraquch larger annealing furnace, and an existing annealing furnaceearby Saddam General Company (now known as Al Dxha' Company) was used in the manufacturing process for ihe Al Fat'h motor. This annealing capacity greatly exceeded the requiremrnts of ihe Al Fat'h andAl 'Ubur missile systems and presided Iraq with the ability to create motor casings greatereter in diameterrlrrs in length, consistent with the plans now revealed fora larger, longer range missile.

a site exploitation visit to Al Amin. ISG investigated Iheging oven lhat had been 'destroyed' by the UN and had been lecomis-sioncd (or use in the production process for the

Al Fat'h motor. To do this effectively, asleeve was inserted into llie furnace toetter match withm-diameter motor case. The aging oven was incapable ofrMoV9 material of Ihe AI Fat'h motor case.

Iraqew furnace that was capable ofotor case5 meters in diameterength in excess ofeters, that furnaceixture llul couldotoretcr in diameter ISO could not determine if this furnace had been used or rven commissioned.

annealing furnaces at an existing facility of the Saddam General Company were used to anneal solid-propcllant rocket motor cases for ihe Al Fat'h

missile,

Propellant Production

Iraq attempted to increase ils solid-propellanlcapability by repairing Iheallon mixers declared "desiroyed" by ihe t'S.

While accounts differ, Iraq was reponedly able to repair at least one of theallon mixers and two mixing bowls. Reports indicate thai cithei one mixer was repaired lo increase the existing mixing capability, or that both mixers were brought on line

lo suppon lhe reqo ire me ntarger motor for lhe long-range missile program.

A cooperative source Mated lhal the Iraqisprior to the eiary of UNMOVIC inspectors destroyedallon misers. Despite extensive

searches, that included active source participation. ISG has not found physical evidence of misers parts, or debris.

Solid-t'rnpellani Motor Casting Chamber*

Ihe capability la easl large solid-propellant racket motors increased with Ihe repair of Iwo previouslynd prohibited) casting chambers and Ihe construction of an even larger chamber.

A new. even larger casting chamber,< meters external diametereters deep, had been built lor possible use in the prrxluctionotor case up5 meters in diameter. Because the chamber was built by Iracj and had not been used lo produce proscribed items. UNMOVIC chose only to monitor ihe facility.

Production of Solid-Propellanl Ingredients

Ammonium perchlorate(AP) constitutes the greatest mass of composite solid-propellant. and itswas crucial lo the furure of all of Iraq's major solaJ-propellani Missile programs Plannedof propellent constituents would host enabled the production of motor quantities larger than known program requirements

obtained assistance in the expansion of lis AP production capabilities from NEC Engineers Pvtn Indian Company, according lo multiple sources. This facility was located at the former nuclear plant at Al Alhir and wason per year. However, this plant was not fully operational prior to OIT and producedimited quantny of AP.

igh-ranking official in lhe Iraqi missile program. Iraqi universities attempted to revive the Hydroxyl Terminated Poly Butadieneolid-propellant binder, planl ai Al

Ma'mun. Ihis plant, purchased from Lgyptas supposed to supplement existing slockpilcs. The source claimed lhat. although ihc plant hud the necessary equipment, it never had llie technology to use lhe equipment in HTPB production If Iraq had been able to bring this facility on line. Ihet would have reduced if not eliminated reliance on imported HTPB.

' Someons of imported aluminum nossder.for use in solid-propellant rocket motors, was discovered during an ISG site exploitationof Al Amin. Al the current rale of demand. Ihis would have satisfied the re quire me nl for hundreds of motors. Considerable quantities of oiher propellanl materials had also been imported and were potentially available for use.

Propellnnl Research

Iraq waslanned, long-term research program into solid and liquid propellanis. in order to be self-sufficient in propellanl-relaleddenied lo them bysanctions and lo create higher energy propellanis. which could enhance the performance of existing and future halhstic missile systems

raq began an extensive program research-ing higher energy composite solid-propellant ingredients including niuonium perchloraieilro-hydroxyl-terminated poly butadienexido-HTPR, and ammonium dimtramidehe research was conducted in Basrah University and tlie Ibn Sina' Company.ew grams nf each weie manufactured and possibly delivered

lo Al Koshid, but no serious production effort* were undertaken. ISG has found no evidence lhat research intouitro-HTPB, orPB was ever declared to the VS. ISG judges that Iraq was unlikely lo develop missiles in the near term using any of these higher energy solid-propellant ingredients

in theOs, Iraq also conducted research, testing, and limited production of highei energy liquid propcllants such as unsymnietrical dimethyl hydrazine.W' pure hydrogen peroxide. This research

and pilot production wo* conducted ot several facilities including Ibn Sina' Company, Mosul University. Al Kindi General Company, and Al Ray a* Company. From all available evidence, ISC belie vty lhal Iraq was not able lo manufacture large quantities of these propellanis.

Starting in the, Iraq also began research into production of propcllants for iu missile forces. Ihese attempt* al pilot product ton included xylidene. triethyl amineitrogen tetrox-idend inhibited red-fuming nitric acidhile Iraq was somewhat successful at regenerating or producingmixtureitric acidii andSO-SO mixture of xylidene andhey were unsuccessful at producing large quantities of these propellanis or any new propellanis. Iraq was reportedly successful in acquiring quantities of these chemicals from abroad for use in propellanl production.

Graphite Technology

Through ils efforts to reverse-engineer SCUD missile designsraq gained anand ability ta produce graphite nose tips that would satisfy the technical requirements of warheads that could be used on systems from short to very long ranges.

Graphite is used in ballistic missiles sn areas that suffer high thermal and ctosise stresses such as nose cone lips, sohd-propcllant nrtulc thtoji inserts, and ihrust sector control vanes

waof hcial in Iraq'sprogram, the nose of the warheads for the Al Samud and Al Fat'h missiles were graphite and based on the warhead design for llie Scud missile. ISG retrieved three Al Samud II graphiie-tippcd nose cones during site exploitations.

former mililary* officer and engineer claimed lhal the graphite of lhe jci control vanes for the Al Samud proved capable of withstanding the intense heat and erosionertical static test of the engine.

The procurement of graphite lor the Iraqi ballistic missile program is well documented The ArabBureau, whichront company seeking aerospace parts and chemicals for Iraqi statetendered offers fur graphite blocks, The Al Rashid Gcneial Companyons of graphite3ccordingontract document, and.ite exploitation of the Al Amin Factory, ISG discovered two large wooden boxes containing two to three tons of graphite blocks.

Carbon Fiber Filament Winding

Startingraqrogram to develop carbon fiber filament winding capabilities for use in weapons-related applications. This initialise only proceeded as far as the production of plain

According to several officials in the Iraqi missile program. Iraqi interest in carbon fiberwas aroused inhen an Iraqi team including Husayn Kamil went tn Brazil and paidillion for the technicaland training for the ASTROS-II carbon fiber filament winding technology.

A recovered memo datedequest by the Iraqi AI Basha'ir Trading Company to the FRY Company, Infinity DOO,ilament winding production line wiih technology transfer.

An Iraqi engineer stated that,ive Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) possessed an incomplete carbon fiber filament-winding machine that had not been usedhe machine was moved from the Al Athir complex to theTechnology College1 where tl was to be repaired and ihen copied.

Byuwayshissile-related carbon fiber winding production program and selectedm Al Fai'h solid-propellant motor case, nozzle, and end dome as the candidate for the carbon liber filament winding initiative.

eeting inuwayshan effort to seek foreign assistance in carbon fiber composite production, using tlie ARMOS Company,

A high-ranking official in the Iraqi missile program recalled lhat. bv the summerontract was awarded to ihc MIC to develop fiber winding machines with the ability of winding objects one meter in diameter and seven meters long, und the mandrel capacity wasmoeters in length. By the sian of OIF ihc coniraci was still noi complete.

A former MIC official claimed lhat concurrent to Ihe MIC filament winding machine contract. MIC pursued assistance from Russian entities in carbon fiber technology. In September orussian expert reportedly visited MIC and agreedeciprocal visil in Russia on carbon liberrip was planned for Iraqi researchers to visit Russian carbon fiber production lines and receive technical assistance. Ihc trip did not lake place due to Oil-'.

MIC also examined importing carbon fiber raw materials from Europe while at the same limea postgraduate student at Babylon University to research making carbon fiber raw materials from peiroleum.

The properties of carbon liber could% weight savings over components made from steel. As an example, the Al Fai'h sieel motor case, nozzle and end dome make up1 kg ofg tolal mass of ihcarbon It ber design could saveg of weight from theg total weight. This savings could be applied io additional warhead capacity or inwards increasing the range.

Ceramic Warhead Effort?

ISG has no credible evidence lhal Iraq wasceramic warheads for use as CBW warheads. Ceramics poor heat-resistanlproperties negate ils use with conventional, chemical, and biologicalWhile ceramic warheads may retainstability during aerodynamic heating, ihey also transfer this heat directly io lhe payload. Therefore, extremely elaborate techniques would he required to cool any CBW warhead and would, ai least, require thermal insulation for conventional warheads. One source assessed by the collector as likely being

motivated by financial incentives claimed lhal Iraqi scientists were wotting on developing ceramicdesigned for filling with chemical agents and mounting on missilesew hours. 'Ihc source added thai the Badr General Company madeew" Of Ihese wurhcads. There is no evidence to support these claims, and ISG judges that Ihe source'sare not credible.

While ceramic rnatcrials are heal resistant and relatively inert to most chemicals, working with Ihis material is complicated. The LS and Ihc UK investigaied using ceramic warheads for ballistic missiles in, bul Ihese investigations were noi pursued.

A ceramic warhead would have better iu-flighl dimensional stability during re-entry compared io ablative warheads. Dimensional stability during flight directly relates io aerodynamic stability and increased accuracy. However, increased costswith manufacturing and handling ceramic warheads outweigh the bcncfils.

Producing consistent ceramic formulations is still an art. and machining ceramic materialsesired shapeonsisteni basis is notoriously difficult. Ceramic warheads must also be handled with cure, which necessitates entirely new procedures for use and training.

ISG recovered ceramic nose cone pieces which were not sufficient toomplete nose cone. However, initial examination of these ceramic piecesight cone al ihe tip followedransition to an ogive shape, which is similarose cone. These may have been subscale models or may be totally unrelated to ballistic missiles.

Proscribed Activities

ISG has substantial documentary evidence and source reporting indicating that tlie Regimeviolated various international resolutions and agreements in order to pursue Us delivery systems programs. Sources with direct access have described missile projects with design ranges well beyond UN limits and ISG has research documents lo corroborate these claims. Additionally, ISG has

exploited documents that confirm Iraq circumvented UN sanctions by illicitly importing components for use in its missile programs.

Violations of United Nations Sanctions and Resolution-,

ISG has uncovered numerous examples af Iraq's disregard for UN sanctions and resolutions in an effort to improve its missile and UAV capabilities. These violations repeatedly breached,nd pursuant annexes and enabled Iraq lo develop more robust delivery system programs.

Equipment Restoration

Multiple sources ha ve highlighted Iraq's efforts lo reconstitute equipment associated with past missile programs previously disabled or declared destroyed by UNSCOM. Accounts for ihe actual use of these restored Hems vary. ISG has been able lo confirm the existence of some of this equipment, but not all ofiL

Several sources with direct access have provided infonnaiion about the successful repair of one ofallon solid-propellant mixers associated with theissile project that were destroyed by UNSCOM2 at Al Ma'mun. ISG has conducted site exploitation visits to the last reported locations of these mixers but has been unable to locate tliem,

According to two high-level officials within the Iraqi missile program, one of theallon mixere destroyed by the UN was repairedut the other could not be repaired. Ihe officials did not elaborate on what the mixer was used for.

Husam Muhammad Amin Al Yasin, the former director of the NMD, stated lhal Huwaysh ordered the repair of the mixers1 but later staled this order camemin claimed that the Iraqis used the one repaired mixer for about two months. Amin then convinced Huwaysh to allow him to destroy the mixer because iliolation of. According to Amin. thiswas not disclosed to UNMOVIC.

to Iluwaysh.2 'Abd-al-Baqi Rashid Shia' Al Ta'i of the Al Rashid General Company was given permission to repair one of Iheallon solid-propellant mixers. One of the mixers had been completely destroyed so 'Abd-al-Baqi restored the partially destroyed mixer.

A few sources have disclosed infonnaiion about Iraq's efforts tn rebuild theging oven, which was declared, destroyed by UNSCOM. An ISG site exploitation mission has confirmed these claims.

An Iraqi scientist claimed that Iraq had rebuilt the aging oven associated with thet the Al Amin factory. He added that, since the maximum temperature in the furnace could not reach the required temperatureegrees, the Iraqis built an even bigger furnace.

An ISG site exploitation visit lo Al Amin confirmed this claim, and ISG was able to inspect the restoredging ovenarger, built-in annealing furnace. ISG judges that both furnaces could be used in the production of motor cases with diameters larger than one meter, which is beyond the requirements for any rochet or missile permUted by ihe UN.

In addition to the mixer and aging oven, ISG has identified two other areas where Iraq rebuilt or reused equipment that had been disabled, destroyed, or banned.

Accordingcertificate of machine repair" recovered by ISG, one of the three flow-forming machines at Al Karamah lhal had been destroyed by UNSCOM was rebuilt byhe document was signed by several departmcnl heads within the Al Samud program and included athat the machine's intended use was for the production of Al Samud rocket engine covers. ISG has been unable to locate this piece of equipment,

Coalition forcesetter from 'Abd-al-Baqi Rashid Shia'. the director of the Al Rashid General Company,iece of siccl one meter in diameteranceled project. The steelan of the Gerald Bull Supergun project, which Iraq was forced to terminate in order to comply with. The letter from 'Abd-al-Baqi was in reference to the large diameter motor

project. Ir.ii| attemptedarrel-section tixnti (he Supergun Project loeter diameter motor case hut rhc effort tailed because of material incompatibilities. Iraqi technician* wore uruble to weld the motor end domes to thebarrel.

Iraq's restoration of prohibited equipment associ-aled with pant missile programs directly violated Irestrictions on Iraq's missile programs. Iraq chose to deliberately ignore Ihese restrictions to improve iti missile production infrastructure.

Undeclared Activities

Several former high-level Regime officials anddirectly alii luted with Iraq's mililary industries have indicated lhat Iraq intentionally wit tine Idfrom Ihc UN regarding as debseryprograms, to include research into delivery sy stem* with design ranges well in excess ot IV) km.

" According to one former high-ranking government official, Iluwaysh restricted lhc NMD's access lo MIC when ihe NMD was preparing2 CAFCD.esult, some MK! work was omitted, which violated

.sources have admitted their directin the destruction of documents related to delivery systems propams to prevent divulging them to the UN.

This partem of activity occurred at all level* anda widespread effort to protect certain activities and to deceive the international community.to numerous sources. Iraq worked on several delivery system projects that were nevct declared to the UN. violatingome of thesewere designed to achieve rangesm and if developed would have violated. Many missile specialists directly involved in these project* have admitted to destroying documents related to these programs io prevent the UN from discovoiini' ihcm. which violates UNSCR

a series of interviews with former MIC and NMD officials, ISC has discovered that Iraq1 did not disclose the IRFNAcapability at At Qa'qa'a to'. One NMD ollaimed thai Husayn Kamil had passed an order not to declare this capability to the UN and this order was observed even after Husayn Kamil'* death. Other officials claim that Iraq decidedhhold the IRFNA production capability of Alor fear that the UN would destroy Ihe plant, virtually closing Iraq's exiensivc munilions industries.

high-ranking MIC officials and scientists in the Iraqi missile program claim that,0uwaysh ordered Dr. Mu/hir of Al Karamah loong-range liquid-propvllani missile tsee (he Long-Range Missile chapter for more ml eternaluwaysh retained all the hard copy' evidence of this project and later destroyed it to prevent detection by the UN. although ISO has been able to uncover some design draw ings lor two long-rungc missile projects -the two- and live-en gtnc clustered engine designs.

An engineer associated with the Iraqi missileclaimed that, inuwaysh directedRashid Shu" of the Al Ra*hid General Company ioong-range sol id-propellant missile. The engineer alsoiagramauncherong-range sol id-propel lantthat Al Fida' engineers had been working on. lhc engineer claimed that research into this missile project ceased upon the arrival of UNMOVIC in2 (sec* the Long-Range Missile chapter for more information),

Much of Iraq's work ononversion projects was never disclosed to the UN, according to oth-Cialsth theseIC officials decided lo withhold all information from tbe UN about the Sa'd project, headed by Al Kindi. in part because it had not yet reached the prototype stage. Ra'ad Isma'il Jamil Al Adhami'sonversion efforts were noi declared to the UN although the flight tests were manipulated so that the missiles wouldm.

Iraq withheld information aboul it* cltnrts to extend the range of itsruise missiles. Twowithin MIC claimed thatm Jinin cruise missile project ceased at the end2 before the re*umption of UNMOVIC inspections. One source said that (he airframes werefrom Al Karamah where (he modifications

were being madetorage warehouse before UNMOVIC arrived for fear of the project being discovered. Iraq's attempts to extend the range of thenti-ship cruise missile tomand-attack role were not declared to the UN (see Cruise Missile chapter for more information).

A few sources have admitted that at least one Iraqi UAV Dewm, and Huwaysh claimed that Iraq had tested UAVsange ofm but that the range could easily be increasedm byarger fuel tank. Huwaysh alsothat9 programor thePV program,never directlythe mission of9 was to deliver CBW. ISG has no other evidence to support this statement (see the UAV section for more information).

igh-level official within the Iraqi missile program claimed that, in an effort to make Iraq's missile infrastructure less dependent uponsuppliers, MIC directed university projects lo research ingredients used in solid and liquid propellanis. Because of the sensitivity of ihis research, Iraq never disclosed these efforts to the UN. Former university students and individuals associated with the missile program alleged that this undisclosed research occurred atin Baghdad. Mosul, and Basra. Researchers claim their attempts to produce such materials, as Hydroxy Terminated Poly Butadienertronium Pcrchloratcitroglycerine, and Hydrogen Peroxide at high concentration levels were unsuccessful.

ISG has exploited dozens of contracts that confirm Ihe requests, orders, and deliveries of UN-restricted components and equipment involving facilitieswith Iraq's missile and UAV programs. Iraq's use of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, frontand false end user certificates indicate Iraq knew these activities violated internationalIraq also negotiated with other countries for complete missile systems, but there is no evidence any shipments were ever made (sec the Procurement chapter for more information).

Former high-level officials admit MIC procured ballistic missile engineering assistance, gyroscopes.olga missile engines, andatteries from companies in Rastcm Europe. ISG hascontracts and other documents to corroborate these admissions.

Huwaysh admined that Iraq had imported hundreds ofolgant engines from companies inlhat were disclosed lo UNMOVIC. ISG has exploited several official documenis containing the contractual detailserial numbers of these engines).

Former high-level MIC officials disclosed that Iraq received missile components such as gyroscopes and accelerometers from China.

Huwaysh and an Iraqi scientist both asserted that Iraq received assistance and materials lor missile propellanis from Indian firms, particularly NEC.

Several documents have been recovered lhat include information about Iraqi negotiations wiih North Korea lor missile materials and long-range missile systems, probably includingm-range No Dong. There is no evidence Io confirm lhe delivery of any balhsttc missile systems.

Statements from former high-level Regime officials and documentation indicate Russian entitiesassistance io Iraq's missile programs. Russian entities exported numerous key pieces ot equipment to Iraq through illegal channels and also supplied technical expens. Iraq also negotiated for complete Iskandcr-F. missiles systems, although no missiles were ever purchased or delivered, according to Huwaysh.

Captured documenis show Iraq's reliance on FRY assistance toesign, manufacture, calibration, and tesi capability, Iraq also impoited guidance instruments from FRY.

Former high-level MIC officials providedaboul Iraq's procurement efforts through Ukraine. Iraq received missile and UAV com-poncms as well as technical iissistance from the Ukraine.

Benefits of Carbon Fiber Filament Winding in Missile Construction

Carbon Fiber Filament Winding is ideal for missile construction because of the superior materialof carbon fiber and the repeatability andof the filament winding process.

Carbon fiber materials have superior material properties to glass fiber, aluminum, ami steel in the areas of specific strength, specific stiffness, and relative density Carbon fiber composites are five limes stronger and five times lighter0 steelpecific strength la combined measure of both Strength and density) IS times thai of aluminumimes that of glass fiber composites. The chart ai the end of this section highlights lhe superior carbon fiber material properties.

The Iraqi missile and UAV programs benefited from Iraq's defiance of UN sanctions because they were able to obtain material and technical expertise they otherwise could not have developed. Several sources and documentary evidence confirm that Iraq participated in such activities. The measures taken to conceal Ihese activities from the UN are evidence thai Iraq was well aware these activities were illegal.

Role of the MTCR

A Ithough Iraq isignatory of the Missile Technology Control Regimevoluntary agreement among member states whose goal is to control missileuncoveredevidence that companies in MTCR member states provided missile cumponenls and technicalof these components and assis-tance may be controlled under thelo Iraq's dehvery system programs.

' Sources within the Iraqi missile program disclosed lhat Iraq had contracts wiih Russia for flow-forming machines that may have been MTCR controlled, hut ISG has been unable in confirm the delivery of such items. Computer numerically -conirol ledmachines with more lhan Iwo axes, which can be coordinated with simultaneously for contouringfor making rocket motor cases, end domes andcontrolled under Categoryf the MTCR annex.

Individuals within MIC .slated that Iraq received gyroscopes front Russia lor use in their missile programs, specifically the Al Samud II. Contractual evidence also exists that corroborates source claims that Al Karamah imported gyroscopes from Russian companies. Coalition forces recovered gyroscopes with Cyrillic letters on thein and documents inat both Al Karamah and A) Milad, whichthat these items were imported from Russia. Russia may have been in breech of the MTCR because gyroscopes, which measure rotation at about one or more axes, are Category II-controllcd items if theyrift rate of lessegree per hour.

ISGontraciussian entity and Iraq for Russian technical assistance for missile unidentified designs as well as Global Positioning System (GPS) equipment for unidentified missiles. GPS devices, if used to supplement or update the guidance set and increase the accuracy of amissile, are controlled undet Category II of the MTCR annex.

A high-ranking official tn the Iraqi missile program alleged that Iraq received AP and aluminum powderrance firm via the Al 'Ayan Company. Iraq also received HTPB from an Italian firm via the Al Taqaddum Company,apanese firm via the Al Sharqiyah Company und an unidentified source in ihe United Suites via the Indian firm NFC Engineers Private,as Area unable la corroborate this information -ith any other source reporting or contracts.

Annex A

Resolving (the Retained Scud-Variant Missile Question

Introduction

The data in this Annex are complementary to and in support of the material found in the Delivery Systems Report and as such should be referenced only inwith that Report Items in this Annex address specific topics that arc presented in the Report but include greater detail or additional data, and provide more information to support the contentions andin the main text.

serial number. Also included arc two figures: Ihe first entitled "Inventory Accouni of Used Rocketsby Russiaepresenls lhe Scud missile accouni as given lo the US'; Ihc second figure entitled "Inventory Account of Used Rockelsby Russias, according lo ihc engineer, the most accurate accounting for Iraq's ScudThe numbers in ihis secondfigure eery from lhe numbers Iraq disclosed in2 Currently Accurate lull, and Complete Declaration iCAFCDi to lhe US', and the explanation for the discrepancy in the numbers is provided in these documents. According to the source of this information, these documents represent the full story on Scudmaterial balance. This material was most likely prepared loresentation at Ihc Technical Evaluation Meetings (TEMs) held in Baghdad in early IWH.

Scud Missile Material Balance

Documentation recovered by ISG appears to be an Iraqi attempt to account for Us Scud missiles. This material reportedly was never disclosed to the UN. The documentation includes the serial numbers forcud missiles Iraq received from ihe Soviet Union2ontract numbers, and lhe disposition of these missiles broken down by

Inventory Account of Used Rockets Provided by Russia

(Declaration)

Rockets Provided By Russia

819

destruction

133

raining 77

L

r

Gulf

Figurenventory accouni ol used rcckels provided by Russia (declaration).

Available data suggest that Iraq's declaration of its unilateral destruction to the UN was assembled from eyewitness accounts rather than by matching up serial numbers. The Regime officials who participated in this elTort supposedly interviewed morermy personnel and other individuals who saw or claimed to have seen the disposition of the Scudat some time. The method in which thiswas derived was susceptible to error and. as such, should likely not have been forwarded to Ihe UN as the official position.

Inventory Account of Used Rockets Provided by Russia

(Facts)

Destruction

Destruction.

Army Exercises

ebris.

ebris.

Returned to Russia

Confirmed

2

Confirmed

Inspection

7

Confirmed

Total ^

816

Operation

93

Confirmed

Research Improvement

58

Confirmed

Iran

Operation

onfirmed

nventory account ol usee) rockets provided bycts).

eportedly contains Iraq's most accurate accounting for its Scud missiles. Ihe figures in the chart are supported hy the serial numbers contained in some of the other documents. The total number of missiles listed in the accounting. and an explanation was attempted, shown in the following inset.

issing Scud Missiles

ISG derived the following information from recovered documents, 'litis explanation was part of the overall effort to provide rite most accurate accounting for Scud missiles, which Ihe UN has reportedly noi seen.

Engine for Missile Serialngine serial. tvas used to replace6light test onccording to the source's diary, remnants of6 appeared in debris of Iraq's unilaterally destroyed missiles, Otrd tests of these renutants iiuti-cated that the engine had never been fired.6 hod been given toor use in an Al Husayn. but. confusingly, the diary records thai ihe engine was also used in the December6 had in fact been unilaterally destroyed, which is why forensic tests of Ihe remnants shotted that the engine had never been fired.

for Missile Serialie

warhead for the engine with serial8 appeared under serial2 as pari of ihe unilaterally desiroyed debris, but. when the debris was recheckedhey werr unable lo liKale this item again and was thereforeunaccounted for.

for Missile Serial2 among ihe remnants of ihe unilaterally desiroyedozzle was encountered, which had an illegible serial number. The numberhe number was thought to6: however, missiles with these serial numbers were never delivered to Iraq. As with the previous engine, ihis nozzle was not found among the debris when it was recheckedocument recovered fromoted that7 was present for modification for the Al Husayn.

assesses lhai ihe accounting for87 is still incomplete.

Nil

Below ii lhe breakdown foriuile* according to lhe year of delivery and serial number. Thii inforrruMion is reflected in Figure 2.

Year of

Training

_1p_

12

13

14

20

is

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21

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Iran-Iraq War Training

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Ifestfor tfey. missile Iran-Iraq War

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Unilaterally destroyed

SKatrj

destroyed

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OT XJvW

War

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Irao War

War

_War_

War

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for dev. missile

destroyed

War

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Iran-lraa War

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War

War

459

Iran-Iraq War

460

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War

War

467

_lrarjjjagjfl&r

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War

War

Iran-Iraq War

r

472

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destroyed

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War

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far dev missile

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:

5

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ran-Iraq War

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625

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627

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8

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659

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3

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706

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750

761

War

Iran-lraa Wit

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rag Wjflt

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2 _

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2

War

estroyed Iran-lraa War

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, aq War

estroyed

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Iran-lraa War

770

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2

n_n _ <_

War

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Storm

__

War

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Iran-Iraq War

731

M5 iran-lraa War

776

Iran-lraa War

734

3

Iran-Iraq War

-Tea for day, missile

1

War

Iran-law War ran-Iraq War

'36

3

War.

tan__aWat

iraodrag War

781

782

teat

_7JM

War

jf_ar

784

y_dc3iroyod 1

cud Warhead Material balance

ISG has collected an official National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) document, datedn the expenditure of Scud warheads imported from the Sotiet Union, which differs from the figures provided in6 Full, Final, and Compute Disclosurehese FFCD data are aho repeated in2 CAFCD. The NMD document is most likely pari of that organization's effort to reconcile the material for imported Scud warheads. Although unable to serify information, ISG judges lhat thisactual accounting forcudati imported from the Soviet Union.

As wiih ihe data in lor missile consumptionhis material was moM likely prepared toresentation at the Warhead Technical Evaluation Meeting iII;SIheld in Baghdad between tbe Is and8

Following the acceptance of. Iraq was forced to destroy it* remaining inventory of Scud missiles,nd related equipment. Iraq hadarhead- from the Soviet Union and had succeeded in producing warheads indigenously. During the period of warhead deslruciion. thebetween the imported warheads and theproduced warheads became unclear, andull and accurate accounting for the destruction of imported and indigenously produced Scud warhcad.-has never been reconciled.

According lo the NMD accountingraq firedmported warheads and sixproduced warheads (presumably concrete warheads for the Al Hijarah missiles) during1 Gulf War. In the IW_ Fl-CD and the CAFCD, Iraq declared that it had tired Ktf imported warheadsndigenously produced Al Hijarah warheads. Thisiscrepancy of one imported warhead.

6 FFCD and the CAFCD, the Iraqis declared thai they unilaterallymported warheads, litis NMD document showsH had been destroyed.

disagreement between the numbers provided in6 FFCD and the CAFCD. and (his NMD document for the "special" CBW wajheads destroyed by the Chemical .let-ruction Group.s the Urge*i. During this destruction of warheads, an accurate accounting for the number of imported versus indigenously produced warheads was never achieved.

arheads Launched in Training. Flight Tests, and Mineral Analvzatton

warheads (Serial! numbers mentioned in

5

warheads (serial) numbers mentioned in

7

warheads |scrial| numbers mentioned in

7

warheadsumbers mentioned in

7

7

7

7

8

S

for melal analysis

8

8

8

8

...

K

9

9

0

0

definition ifraqi orlatter

0

0

Exhausted

0

0

code or indication about the warhead

0

0

ivision Orders doesn't reflect warhead code

0

Warheads Destroyed bv UNSCOM

1 7

Special Warl

Destroyed bv UNSCOMat Al Muthanna2 and

pr93

certificate for the warhead destruction b> UNSCOM in2 andwere not indicated at the lime but were later by both UNSCOM and Iraq. Now withahrain)

Conventional Warheads Destroyed bv Irao1 (Unilateral)

1

1

Conventional Warheads Returned to Russia

13 Aprill980 I

1

Total

NMD document with the expendituremported Scud warheads.

Annex B

Liquid-Propellanl Missile Developments

l Samud Program

raq began developing liquid-propellani ballistic missiles. The program began as theiquid-propellani missile program, which later became known as the Al Samud. This missile was based onnd Scud technology andtechniques; it was monitored closely by the UN. Research und development continued1 when the program was terminated and replaced by the Al Samud D.

Tabic 3

Original Al Samud Parameters

Subsystem

li

mass

figure

mass

30kB

IM.DX.l

.3

steel

si

lime

volume

to 8%

length, overall

wrt

igh

length, parallel

length, overall

691

igh

length, parallel

021

flow rate

mass

urning lime

flow rate

mass

urning lime

supply

K.lie

one only

are known to be inconsistent.

l Samud Static Test Data

Uhli-J

1

MulBpl _

e

Samud Flight Tests

Single source entrees

Launched

(km)

Filled

(liters)

(liters)

Gk-Ti

8

V.i. '

re_99

00

CO

s Samud flight.

Multiple source entrees

Samud Flight Tests

S*>gle source ciroi-s -

Launched

(km)

Filled

uli-01

ftp*

SopC

l Samud flight

l Samud II Flight Test Data

Multiple source entrees Single source entrees

Al Samud II Flight Tests

Launched

(km)

Filled

(Uteres)

(liters)

Temp

of Air

Speed

(ntfs)

Direction

1

oi

4

Nc-.'CI

5

9

#

C.

<*

M

SC

0

6

J>

C

(Q)

T.

(0)

(0)

(Q)

l Samud II fUght tests

Al Samud II Flight Tests (continued)

Deviation

Comments and Devistions

illed at

'-Lett

atlight datekm'

-Lei:

at

on theiled at

at (iatKfykm'

al Ion alm"

km'

ett

l/Okm'

h Aljanch"

m'

illed at Ibn alkm"

led

n/a*

/f> -Lett

*fi3'

burning time.km"

urn time"

ime-

m*

m*

n/a"

l Samud II flight tests (continued).

l Samudiraik Material Balance

Materials Balance

To determine the likely number of missiles thai could potentially remain in an inventory, the technique of materials balance can be employed. This involves the collection of data associated with all aspects of the production and consumption of the missiles concerned. The production numbers may be gleaned from die factory producing the hardware or where the missiles are integrated or even loaded with propettants. Consumption numbers can be derived from tests, either static or flight, deliveries to the armed forces or those withdrawn due to damage or other causes.

aterials balance of complete missiles cannot be accmnplished. an equivalent might be derived from the many subsystems that make up ihe completeas warheads, engines, or even propettants-This latter appraaclt has been used in an attempt to account for both Scad and Al Samud II missile inventories.

ing parts, which had been placed in mobile trucks to avoid destruction.n addition toreviously mentioned,otal of ISOAl Samud II missiles produced.

According io mulliplc sources. Iraq expended up toissiles during experimental tests (flight and static, UNMOVICestruction program, which accounted forissiles destroyed. ISO have obtained information given in Table b, which shows serial numbers associated withf theissiles destroyed. However, ihc dates of destruction do not appear to correlate to those dates provided by the UNMOVIC spokesman during the period of destruction. According to reporting, Iraq launched live Al Samudissiles during OIF.etails some of Ihe additional al Samud subsystems desiroyed under UNMOVIC supervision. Coalition forces may have been responsible for lhc destruction and recovery ofupioissiles based on available data. Accordingoreign government service, two Al Samud II missiles were taken io Iran. ISG has not been able to confirm this claim. Taking these figures into account, ISG has developed possible scenarios for material balance for the Al Samud II missile giren In Table 6

believesomplete material balance for theAl Samud II missile may not be possible due to various factors. Documentary data indicating the total number of missiles produced have not been recovered hy ISO and Ihc disposition of Ihc missiles i$ unknown.ery good estimate of the total number produced can be achieved based on the knowledge thai the Iraqisroduction taic goal ofer month, according to an official in Iraq's missile program. This rate varied month to month due to availability of pans. The missile began production in1 with the firsteing delivered to the Army inssuming these production figures were maintained between1 andSGikely lotall Samud II missiles may have been produced during this period. Accordingormer senior official al Al Karamah, Iraq produced approximatelyissiles during the first quarter. Another source claimed lhai. after UNMOVIC inspectors departed the country inraq was able to assemblel Samud missiles from remain-

d

Al Samud II Missiles Destroyed Under UNMOVIC Supervision3

Date

No.

No

No.

Mar 03

Mar 03

TE

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

TE

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

l_

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

TL

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

TL

Mar 03

Mai 03

Mar 03

TL

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

TE

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

TE

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

TE

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

TE

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

3-

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

TE

Mar 03

Mai 03

74

Mar 03

Tl.

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

Tl.

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mai 03

Mar 03

Mai 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

Mar 03

No.

.

Serial No.

Tank Serial No.

Serial No.

Serial No.

Serial No.

113

1

II]

1

s

16

19

122

120

u

133

Additional Al Samud I) Subsystems Destroyed Under UNMOVIC Supervision

Case

C-ivc

Case

Produced

In icsls

under UNMOVIC

during OIF

Iran

for

The Liquid Fuels Committee (LFC)

oth ihe Air Defense and ihe Naval Defense and lhe Naval Defense forces had supplied Ai Karamah wiih whatever propellanl was required for testing on an ad hoc basis. Both felt unableontinue ihis relationship as ii was adverselytheir own propellanl starts. On hearing this news. Staff Li. Gen. Muzahim Sa'b al-Hasan Muhammad Al Nasireeting of represeniatives from the Military industrialization Commissionhe Army (Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM/ir Defense Forces, Al Karamah, and the Naval Defense Forces. The armed forces could satisfy iheir own propellanl requirements but.forAl Karamah's new development program, there was none available. Thus, arrangements had to be made to satisfy this need whilst maintaining slock availability to ihe other armed services. To doommittee called the LFC was sel up by the MIC8 to manage and coordinate the requirements of all

liquid-propellanl research, production, and supply (regeneration? manufacture, or importation) to the various users.

There were three goals of the LFC:

o ensure the continued supply for current requirementsnd

l.Nearhe production ofAZ-ll

ar TermThe production of Hydrazine. Unsymmetrical Di-Meihyl Hydrazineitrogen Tetroxide. and Hydrogen Peroxide

By the time of Operation Iraqi Freedomas achieved, some movemeni was in progress toward objectivend most of the candidate propellanis inere at least

iquid-Propellant Material Balance

Closure of the material balance for liquid propet-lanls is extremely difficult because of Ihe amount of regeneration due lo the effects of aging onThe records kept concerning regeneiation do no) make reference to the sources of fresh material acquired in ihe regeneration process. Instead, ihey provide only an input-oulput picture.

The Liquid Fuels Committee (LFC)was initiated in AugustX)nalyze performancefoT various propellant, research techniques for producing candidate chemical propellants or theirand study synthesis routes and manufacturing capabilities of various companies. Through studies of companies and capabilities, the LFC awarded contracts to companies tn begin manufacturing. The projected production capabilities wereons/yr of Di-meihyl amine0 tons/yr of DETA,ons/yr of TTGA. andons/yr of xylidinc.of liquid-piopellant production and research arc shown inndhis production when combined with the imported qiuimities of propellant for surpassed the requirements of the Al Samud IIchematic materiel balance of the liquid propellant used for ihe Al Samud II program is shown below in Figureshroughith tbeor sources along the top, above ihe total and consumption along the bottom of each table.

Til hie HI

The Al Fal'h and Al 'Hour Propellant Control Classifications

Chemical

R

II

Perchlorate (AP)

Powder

Terminated Poly Butadiene (HTPB>

Azelate (DOZ)

Oxide

Diisocyanarc (TDI>

Iraqi Composite Sol id-Propellant Infrastructure

lu support its solid-propelrogram. Iraq constricted, rebuilt, or repaired equipment and facilities destroyed b> INSCOM or CoalHioa forces. The Iraqi effort *a* reJalitriy successful al indigenous production, all hooch some kevstill had lo he imported. The Iraqi composited-propel lant capabilities were centeredin the Al Kind! General Cumpan> and the Al Rashid Generalue lo the lack of involvement with ballistic missile developments. Al Kindi and Its associated faeililies will not he discussed in detail in this document.

The Al Rashid General Company (seeontrolled most if not all of the majormissile Initiatives and the related production facilities.

The Al Fat'h Company functioned primarilyesign, project management, and oversight role for the AI Fat'h missile. Headquartered in the Al "Amiri-yah section of Baghdad, the com rum was foundedt Ibn-al-Hjylham and moved to Al 'Amiriyah in thes.

Al Mamoun Composite Solid Propellant Production Planl and HD Facility (at lo ifiya CiislingfcofinQ'AP)

Al Mutassem Factory (at Al Musayyibest cell)

Ameen Factory Rocket Motor Case Production Plant (components/case'

Jabir bin Hayan Company (motor casing insulation EPDM)

Al Karama Company (warhead)

AL Karama Companyompart.)

Alompany (Launching box)

Kadisia Company (nozzle insulation, carbonraphite)

7 April Company (tuze)

Al Milad Companyonirol ssembly)

lsUucfure.

lhe Al Rashid State Company, (he Al Ma'mun Factory was the center of composite solid-propel lant research and production. Within the complex were facilities for composite propellanl mixing, casting and curing. Infforts in the area of composite propellanis were conducted.

The Al Musayyib Solid Rockei Motor Factory at Al Muiasim contained horizontal rocket motor lest cells and motor assembly buildings. All of the known Al Rashid associate solid-propellant static tests were conducted at Al Musayyib.

The Al Amin Factoryu-al-Rqur IThO-al-Fekarl Factory produced motor casings and nozzles.

l Fat'h Missile Technical Specifications

The Al Fai'h was originally intended to be produced in two variants, guided and unguidcd. llie missileolid-propellant ballistic missileg with an overall lengthiameteror lhe main bodyith the aft fin assembly. During Ihc development of lhe system, large inaccuracies in ihe unguidcd variant were encouniered. All ihc Al Fat'h missiles recovered io dale arc unguidcd. Ine Al Fai'h was designed to be launcheduncher (TEL) based upon the Volgaissile launcher. The composite propellanis utilized in the Al Fai'h areeneral

formulation widely used throughout llie induslry. The propellant is basedydroxyl Terminated Poly Butadiene (HTPB) binder heavily loaded with Ammonium Ptrrchlorate (AP) and aluminum powder. In addition to these mainumber of Other chemicals are used, such as plastkizer, burning rate modifiers, and curing agents.

l Fai'h Missile Manufacturing Difficulties

There were apparently three aspects of the Al Fat'h manufacturing process lhat presented ihe Iraqis with significant challenges. The first was (heof ma racing steel sheets of sufficient size. Mar-aging steel has the advantage of being easy to form in its original state, but when annealed, to provide excellent properties as far as rigidity, strength, and crack resistance. Without maraging steel, the Al Fat'h had to be constructedrMoV9 sheet steel. Forming this sheet steel into the cylindrical shapes needed for the rocket motor casing and airframe was difficult and crealed problems.

mixed in two available mixers, were then poured scqucmially into the motorenior Iraqistaled lhe process worked well but admitted lhat one out of everyotors exploded during motor burn. In addition, Ihis process also eliminated theof multiple simultaneous motor castings.

The final major manufacturing issue was (he Inability lo completely indigenously manufacture

ysiem for Ihe Al Fat'h. The Al Fat'h was intended totrap-down inertial guidanceighly accurate strap-down system with digital flighi computer, coupled wiih an adequate canard terminal guidance sysiem. would mosl likely have provided the Al Fat'h with an accuracy thai met theccuracy for the guided variantangem. This level oi accuracy, coupled especially with the submunition warhead, would have made the Alore accurate and lethal laclical weapon sysiem.

A second manufacturing issue in theof (he Al Fai'h was the lack of large propel* lanl mixing capabilities. The0 gallon) propellanl mixers acquired through (herogram were destroyed by Ihe UN. Although at least two of lhe bowls and one or boih mixers were restored by Iraq, these were in turn destroyed by the Iraqis prior io lhe return of the UN2 and hidden. Either way, lhe equipment was unavailable for use in the propellanl mixing for the Al Fat'h rocket motor. The Al Fai'hg of propellant. While theowls would have provided the capability of easily tilling lhe Al Fat'h motoringle pour, the lack of these bowls forced the Iraqis io use four or liveallon) bowls. These bowls.

l Fal'h Missile Program Organization

As previously mentioned, while the Al Fat'h General Company was responsible for design and program management aspects of the Al Fat'h program, the Al Rashid General Company was primarily theThe Al Rashid General Company utilized aof subordinate companies and contracted sources in the manufacturing process. The generalof Al Rashid is presented in Figureelow.

Al Rashid Company Organization

At Rashid Company

"naooi fan ire

raitiajo'APiAitt-BK)

OlrecKraw ol flaming (Program Maragemwd

Diroctorata ol Commrrrin f. importsuns)

Al Uusayyci Sosd Roc<e! Motor Suppedlest Fan lily (Al Muta&scmiall

IWbranVaFiAP-Aitichi) Solid RcchM Motor Case Prcducnwi Want

Efigriesiirg Office

DitBCotaw ol Maintenance

Directorate ot FinarEo

Inlonration Cwitai (ccmputer center)

DtreciMBto ot Cemmarcnl (Impof/Efpoft Issuer)

ol

ot Legal issues

emaf USD)

Ap Rarto ai Hareim Abase

tvroM Ptwiiubbers. iwt resistant material

nlv

A) RaslUd slcucturo.

Wiihin Ihc Al Rashid Company, Ihc Al Ma'mun Composite Solid-Propel la nl Plant al Lalitiyyah was the center of composite solid-propel lani research and production. Wiihin the complex were facilities for composite propellant mining, casting, and curing. Motors for existing systems, like the LL'NA-M. were rccngineered wiih composite propellant. Motors for new systems, like lhe Al Fai'h. were also assembled and inspected here. In addition, research andefforu in the area of composite propellanis were conducted at both Ma'mun and Al Kindi.

The Al Musayyib Solid Rocket Motor Support and Tesl Facility al Al Muiasim contained horizontal rockei motor tesl cells and molor assembly buildings. All of ihe A) Rashid associated sol id-propel la nl sialic tests were conducted ul Al Musayyib.

The Al Amin Solid Rocket Motor Case Production Planl at Habbaniyah produced motor casings andand undertook hydrostatic testing of lhe molor case. Figurehows an Al-Fut'h motor nozzle.

l Fat'h rockei motor nozzle.

l Fat'h Test Launches

ISG has compiled dala concerning llighl tests for Ihc A) Fai'h missile from various sources shown in

Notepparent transition ofuneeptemberg> accounting of At Path misstie testing.

eople

Ra 'ad and Muzhir

before, die changes in career oflwopeople, Maj (Jen. Rand harmIsmail Al Adhami and Brig. Gen. Dr. Muzhir Saba'Sadiq al-Tamimi, have been cloaked in mysltque and intrigue. They have competed for supremacymanyone often replacing the other in key technical positions in the Iraqi ballistic missile program after undercutting the others efforts. Dissecting the plot tells much about the relationships within the Iraqi hierarchy and the strnng fanuly and religious ties that directly affected the outcome of the efforts louccessful ballistic nussde pnrgram

The first clash came "hen Muzhir is directed by Husayn Kamil (HA.') to review the Rafidiyan projecionversion of theurface-to-air missileurface-to-surface role) The report if critical and the projeci canceled. Ra'ad was fired, and.esult. Muzhir look control of the responsible establishment. Al Karamah. Ra 'ad spent his lime fruitlessly at MIC. later supporting the National Monitoring(HMD) in ils role at ihe Irmp counterpart of UNSCOM.

With support fnm Dr Hamid Khtddal Assawi, Ra'adm diameter missile, which they claimed could maintain Iraq's missile liquid-pro-pelsant expertise and infrastructure whilstwnhtnm-range limitation unposedbyresentation loHKwas successful, and Ra'ad reinstated as Head of Al-Karamah Muzhir. bemg retained at Head of Ibn al Hayrham.ompel am designSO-mmwhich is soon banned by UNSCOM as bemg too difficult to monitorpabte of being fittedype engines. Undaunted.M design, which in5 competed with Ra'ad's designesign revieweomsietition. Ra'ad's design was successful, and Mazhir was forced to work on this project under Ru 'ad.

Ha ad Ismail Jaaun Ismail al-Adaml pah) and Muzhir Satofi Saeuj al- Tammy (npht).

This situation ded not last long as Muihir hoi jailed foror alleicedls importing gyros from Russia Ian allegation sigaetmalya 'adde* eloping the Samud but could not achieve consistency or rrliabiliis

One of Huwaysh 'primary responsibilities when he became heail of MIC was to successfully complete the development of the Al Samuil ballistic missile. Soon after assuming control of MIC, in an attempt to fix the ballistic missile problems, Huwaysh worked to obtained Muzhir's release from jail. With Ra'ad showing Utile progress, Huwaysh, who had heard of Muzhir's past experience in this field, appealed to Saddam and obiained his rvlease. Muzhir who on release, had begun working under Huwaysh at MIC. was tasked to review the Al Samudreport was unfavorable After another failed test flight. Huwaysh fired Ra'ad ineplacing him with Muzhir Ra 'ad. along with Dr Hamid. was transferred to the MIC. Ra 'ad spent the remainder9 at MIC before Huwaysh transferred him to head up the Samarra Ueetnnuet Plant, the Salah al Dm State Companxuwaysh accedes to Muzhir's request to remm diameter Al Samudm design.

called the Al Samud II. The first experimenlat tesi flight ofAl Samud II occurredurprisingly short lime from go-ahead.

The firstl Samud II ballistic missiles wete delivered to the Iraqi Army in

Drawing dalesn designs for aliqttid-propellant ballistic missile,ngine cluster ivpes. suggest lhat. by OIF.have been well along the road tosystems. However, no evidence has beenISC that suggestsevelopment piogram

Nuclear

Keep nuclear scientists together at IAEC in order to poof their skills and have them available when needed...

Saddam Husayn

Evolution of lhe Nuclear Weapons

TV Regime and WMD Timeline

The Early Years;

Decline

Recover) and Transition

MlKakulMlon

Result* of ISG's Investigation on Nuclear

Investigation Into Uranium Pursuits and Indigenous Production

foreign .

Indigenous Production

Iraqi Known Uranium Holdings

Iraqi Uranium Conversion

Aluminum lube

Elements ol ISG

Purported High-Level Interest in Aluminum

Possible Association of Iraqi Nuclear Entities Wiih ihc

lube Characteristics and Shipping

IndigenousPossible Sign Hjghdad Did Not

Iraqi Interest in (Umm

Carbon

Carbon Fiber and Iraq'sCwCentrrtuge

Iraqi CoiKealrncnt of Carbon Fiber-Related Activity.ndOperation Desen

lhe MIC Cartvon Fiber Project in

Flow-Forming

Planned Magnet Production Lines at Al

Procuremeni Details

Rotating Machinery

Investigation of Potential Cenirifugc-Rclatcd

Support

Ash Shaykhili Storage

Al Karanu Stale

Al Waienya

Khadtmiyah Site (Ibn Al lUyiham Missile

Al Samud Factory <Abu Ghurayh Missile

Badr and Umm Al-Mank State Companies (Khan Azad Military Production

Al-Tuhadi Stale

Salah Al Din Stale Company (Samarra Electronics

Al-Nida Slate

Rashid Stale Company sThoAI-Ftqar Factory (formerly the NassrPlant

Ur State Company (An-Nasirisah Aluminum Fabncuion

Uranium

sotope Separation

Al Sul'a'a EMIS Planl at

Al Fajr EMIS Plant al Ash Sharqat

Al-Ja/ira (Mosul Feed Materials Production

Al Zasvid Slate

Al-Nidj State Company (Zaalaraniya Mechanical Workshop

Al-Radwan (Barxa Miliary Production

Al-Nassi Al-Adhim State

Disposition of EMIS-Rclaicd

l^ser Research in Iraq

Laser Related Work Aflerscn Storm

Currcni Status and Future

Iraq's Pre-IWI LIS

Kail (nin

Rail Gun

ssues Related io NuckarWcapons Design and

Casting

Explosiveens Fabrication

High-Speed

Firescl Development jnd Testing

Ncuiron

Migration of lhe Capabilities From theuclear Weapons

IAEC

Interest inFC ind Intervention by Saddam

Increased Funding and Puhhciry of IAEC

Infrastructure Improvements at lhe IAEC: lhe Modernisation

Perceptions thereparing ftMthe NlclM

IAEC Work on Ncuiron

University70

Hidden Enrichment Technology

Survey of Structures al Tuwtiiiha Nuclear Research

Annexes

A. I'tii ii>tn Used by Team* During

earn

of the Videotape* Compiled From Video Recce Mission Mb November

of Mission Survey ot TuwaKha Nuclear CompktOver the

E Summary of Known UN-Tagged

Highlights: Tuwaitha3

uwaithj Maps. Buildings, .md Numbers

Key Findings

Iraq Survey Group (ISG) discovered further evidence of the maturity and significance of theraqi Nudear Program hut found lhat Iraq's ability touclear weapons programdecayed after thai date.

Saddam Husayn ended the nuclear program1 following che Gulf war. ISG found no evidence loconcerted efforts io restart the program.

Although Saddam clearlyigh value to ihe nuclear progress and talent lhat had been developed up to1 war. ihe program ended and ihe intellectual capital decayed in the succeeding years.

Nevertheless,addam did express his intent to retain the intellectual capital developed during the Iraqi Nuclear Program. Seniorof them from the Regime's innerISG they assumed Saddam woulduclear program once UN sanctions ended.

indicated that he would develop the weapons necessary to counter any Iranian threat.

Initially, Saddam chose to conceal his nuclear program in its entirety, as he did with Iraq's BWAggressive UN inspections after Desert Storm forced Saddam to admit the existence of theand destroy or surrender components of Ihe program.

In the wake of Desert Storm, Iraq took steps to conceallements of Us program and to preserve what it could of the professional capabilities of its nuclear scienlific community.

Baghdadariety of measures to conceal key elements of its nuclear program from successive UN inspectors, including specific direction by Saddam Husayn to hide and preserve documentationwith Iraq's nucle.ii program.

ISG. for example, uncovered two specific instances in which scientists involved in uranium enrichment kepi documents and technology. Although apparently acting on their own, they did so with the belief andof resuming uranium enrichment efforts in the future.

Startingid to retain the intellectual core of the former weapons program. Baghdad transferred many nuclear scientists lo related jobs in the Mililary' industrial Commissionhe work undertaken by these scientists at Ihc MIC helped them maintain their weapons knowledge base.

As with other WMD areas. Saddam's ambitions in ihe nuclear area were secondary to his primeof ending UN sanctions.

especially after the defection of Husayn Kamilought lo persuade the IAEA thai Iraq had met ihe UN's disarmament requirements so sanctions would be lifted.

ISGimited number ofctivities that would have aided Ihe reconstiiution of the nuclear weapons program once sanctions were lifted.

activiiies of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission sustained some talent and limited research withrelevanceeconstituted nuclear program.

Specificith significant development, such a> the effort*ail gunopper vapor Liver could have been usefuluture effort touclear weapons program, but ISG round noof such purpose.tunding tor the MIC and the IAEC increased after ihe introduction of the Oil-for-Food program, theresome growth in programs that involved former nuclear weapons wiencitts and engineers.

The Regime prevented vicntitlv from the tormer nuclear weapon* program Irom leaving either their jobs or Iraq. Moreover, in the late I'WtK. personnel from both MIC and the IAEC received significant pay raisesid to main them, and the Retime undertook new investments in unrvemty researchid to ensure that Iraq retained technical knowledge.

Evolution of the Nuclear Weapons Program

The Rifjime unit WMD Timeline

For an overview of Iraqi WMI) programs and policy choices, readers should consult lhe Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline chart, enclosedeparate foldoui and in tabular form at ihe back of Volume I. Covering the period. the timeline shows specific events bearing on the Regime's efforts in the BW. CW.tems, and nuclear realms and their chronological relationship with political and miliary developments that had direct bearing on the Regime's policy choices.

Readers should also be aware that, at the conclusion of each volume of text, we hose also included foldoui summary charts thai relate inflectioncritical turning points in ihe Regime's WMDto particular cvents'iniliatiiestdeiisions the Regime took wiih respect to specific WMD programs.points are marked in the margins of the body of the textray triangle.

The Early Years: Ambition

Saddam demonstrated his commitment touclear weapon aver iwo decades. Saddam's close association wiih ihe Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) stems from his service as Vice President of (he Republic8hen he became President of Iraq3e also served as President of the IAEC and sponsored itsof foreign-supplied facilities with which toa nuclear weapons program.

raqussian suppliedesearch reactor andumber of other facilities ihai could he used for radioisotope production ai the Tuwailha Nuclear Research Center, home of the IAEC. In, through contracts with French andW built facilities at Tuwaitha that, if operational, could have allowed Iraq io ailempt to produce plutoniumeapons

program. The Israeli destruction of IheOsirak) research reactor1 and Iraq's subsequent failure lo replace or rebuild il compelled the Iraqis toore clandestine uranium enrichment programuclear weapon by the.

9raq bought Urge quantities of uranium in various forms includine ycllowcake and uranium dioxide from several countries. Some of the purchasesreported to the IAEA and some were not Iraq's uranium purchases arc detailed in iu CAFCD2 and in other, earlier disclosures.

Not long afler Ihr siarl uf the Iraq-Iran war. Iraq began to tomully pursue uranium eruichment Inhe Office of Studies and(OSD) was established in the IAEC lo conduct research and development in uranium enrichment. The staff of OSD was drawn largely from ihe staff of IAEC and numbeied no more than several hundred. Inhe IAEC was restructured and OSD became known as

During ihe Iraq-Iran war, Iraqariety ofenrichment techniques. It was not until near the last year of the war in thehai Iraq began to make decisions and take serious steps iouclear infrastructure.

Inhe IAECroup structure thar assigned responsibility lor gaseous diffusion research projeets to GroupIS research and development to Groupnd support activities son the Office of Studies and IVs elopmeot, or

Also inrogram, codenamcd the Al-Musayn projectas formed under llusayn Kamil, supervisor of lhe State Organization for Technical Industries at the time, to study the steps required iouclear weapons program in Iraq. The finished reportange ol projects and served as the basisormally constiluted nuclear weapons program. Inhe projeci team was transfencd lo ihc IAEC and in8 becamen OfficeThe program was implemented in7 and construction beganuclear weapon research, development, andcomplex al Al Alhir in

Inucmally left Ihe IAEC und Tuwailha to ad independently as the Enginccr-ing Design Diiecluraie (EDD) in the Ar Rashidiyah District of Baghdad. At lhat time Ihe EDD began lo develop centrifuge enrichment technology and throughout its existence was directly responsible to Husayn Kamil.

Nearly all avenues of uranium enrichment were considered, but by7 Iraq began constructionarge electromagnetic isotopelantarmiya. lo support the large investment in EMISetwork of facilities wasto concentrate uranium, convert uranium to feed material v. fabric air EMIS equipment, and chemicallv recover product.

Ai Ihe Iraq-Iran war drewlose, further changes were made in thr Iraqi Nuclear Program structure lhal would ultimately place thr nuclear neapon* program under lluiayn kamil. In May

hen the Ministry of Industry and Mililary Industrialization (MIMI) was olticially established, EDD. renamed ihc Engineering Design Centerecame one of the institutions of the Military Industrialization Commissionnder MIMI. In0 (Groups. andas transferred to the MIMI and in9 officially given ihe name Petrochemicalnder Dr. Ja'far Diya' Ja'far. Husayn Kamil, Director of MIC and MIMI. assumed control of the Iraqi Nuclear Program.

InH, German rngineers trawled to Baghdad and presented European centrifuge design data that EDC immediately copied to adsance its otherwise slow progress in dereloping centrifuge enrichment- In the years before1 Gulf war. several more (ierrrun engineers became involved, and centrifuge design documents based on technology developed for the European enrichment consortium URENCO were transferred to EDC. Contracts were signedumber ol European linns to acquire key component manufacturing technology and critical equipment for the centrifuge program.

After the invasion of Kuwait and the UN economic embargo. Iraq initiated an accelerated, or "crashouclear weapon that called

for the diversion of IAEA-safeguarded research reactor fuel alTuwaUha. Iraq planned to further enrich some research reactor fuels usingachinc centrifuge cascade lo produce enough weapon-grade uranium lor one nuclear weapon. There wete numerousas deficiencies in cascade development, uranium recovery capability, and weapons design andprevented the Iraqis from succeeding.

At the time Ihe program ended inhe Iraqi Nuclear Program HNP) had several thousand personnel, and Iraq was commissioning EMIS equipmcni at Tarmiya and producing micrograms of enriched uranium. The centrifuge enrichmentwas successfullyingle machineest stand and building facilitiesmallcascade. The Iraqis were workingirsl-gcn-cration nuclear weapon design, which they intended to makeevice deliverable by missile.

Following the invasion of Kuwait, nearly all of tbe key nuclearinvolved In the process-ing of nuclear material or weaponsbombed during Desert Storm. Many of the facilities located at Tuwailha were devastated, and the EMIS enrichment plants at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat were largely desiroyed. Iraq's yellowcake recovery plant al Al-Qa'im and feed material production plant at Mosul (Al Jazira) also were bombed during the war.high-explosives testing site revealed alter the war to be Iraq's planned nuclear weaponsand assemblyalso damaged. Iraq's centrifuge research and development site at Rashdtya and the planned centrifuge production and operations site al Al Furat were neithei found nor targeted in1 war, but industrial sites, found alter lhc war to be supporting nuclear weapons efforts, were attacked and damaged.

The Iraqis first chose not to disclose the extent of their clandestine nuclear program in Iheir1 declaration. As partenial and deception effort at the end ofamil issued ordersollect all documents and equipment indicating

Non-Proliferation Treatyquipmcni and documental ion were moveduncty ofto hide program elements from the IAEA. Iraqi rescarcheis were instructed by their managers to dispose ol their laboratories, some of which were then set up in universities and institutes. In addition, Kamil ordered that at least one vet of all nuclear-related documents and some equipment be ret linedenior scientist

li was not until the Iraqis were confronted withand IAEA successfully seized EMISin1 lhal the Iraqis admitted lo the large enrichment program ljuyeof EMIS equipment were unburied and detitered ta IAEA for destruction laier that year.

Even though the existence of their centrifuge enrichment program was known1 .the Iraqis did not fully drclarr its extent and maintained that it wasimited research and development activity located al Tuwailha, raiher than1 ihc Iraqis also declined the planned centrifuge facility atrst as under construction.

After the seizure ol documents pertaining to Iraq's nuclear weapons program in latehe Iraqis admitted lo the existence of the Al Athir. The facility was destroyed by IAEA in

StartingIO Director Husaynnd EDC personnel and work centers around various military research and production facilities The intention, according io one scientist from theuclear program, was to keep researchers together in ant Kipaooneconstituted nuclear weapon program.

Formerr EDC personnel wtwkine at the Pulse Power Research Center, which became Al Tahadi Slate Establishmenttealed an ionlab with components from former IAEC andail gun experiment for air defense, which also used equipment from IAEC and.

Iraqore comprehensive disclosure of its nuclear program until after Ihe defection of Husayn Kamil Inargeoftenlrifuge and nuclear program documents and equipment was given lo UNSCOM and IAEA. From that pointhe Iraqis appear io have cooperated and provided more complete information. The centrifuge program appears to have laigely been declared,ull set of documents delivered by German engineers was not supplied to IAEA

Efforts that could preserve thr progress and talent that had been deeloped up to1 war included keeping the nudear coder engagedariety of projects, such as rebuilding of Iraq'sHowever, Ihr nuclear program was ended and Ihe intellectual capital decayed in Ihe succeeding years. The economy had declined, and the talent bail been focused on rebuilding the country as well as Other military priorities. In some cases, extraordinary measures had to he taken to retain scientists, such as restricting foreign travel or seeking other jobs.

Recovery and Transition

Iraq collaborated with Ihe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) toeries of Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) statements, includinga "final" presented to the IAEAhich reported its review findings to Ihe UN Security Council inhe IAEA concluded that itechnically coherent picture of theuclear weapons program, although it was troubled by Ihe absence of centrifuge program documentation ind there were gap* in knowledge about nuclear weapon design and developmentand the role of foreignlacier pointeferenceffer by aof Pakistan's A. Q. Khan to assist Iraq innuclear weapons.

'Abd-alTawab 'Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh became direclnr ol the MIC7 and appeared to bear no loyalty lo the fontver nuclear program and IAECe Mandaidi/ed salaries,the preferential pay differential given formerorkers, and instituted measures io emphasize and monitor performance throughout MIC.

With ihe influx of funds from the OH For Foodrogram and later the suspension ofwith UNSCOM, Saddam's attention began to return to the former employees of Ihe Iraqi Nuclear Program. In lhc, raises in salaries were given io ihe employees of boih the MIC and the IAEC. New programs were initiated, which would employ ihe talent of former Iraqi Nuclear Program employees, and both the MICEC expanded. Joint programs with universities: were started not only toeteriorating university system but also to encourage involvement in MIC and IAEC efforts, offering the opportunity to pass knowledge on to new generations of scientists.

nterest by Saddam in air defense stimulated projectsormer nuclearone project that had the prospect ofenewed nuclear weapons effort. The IAECail gun project. and the MIC wasail gun project at Al Tahadioth projects, and other air defense projects al IAEC. had poor prospects for success as weapons. The IAEC rail gunby the former head of theuclear weapons design and development effon. Khalid Ibrahimcould, with significant further development, be useful for future nuclear weapons design and development research.

New departments were established in the Physics Department of the IAEC. While primarilythe IAEC rail gunechnical Researchlaboratories for high-speed imaging.ay, impact studies, electronics, andestablished1 in newly createdoutside the gates ofew laser division was creatednd otheT departments were modernized through purchases of newEfforts were made to expand ties toand train more students at IAEC. Procurernents were made through MIC to improve the equipment at IAEC's machine tool workshop.

In the year prior to Operation Iraqi freedomIC undertook improvements to technology inareas that could have been appliedenewed centrifuge program for uranium enrichment. These dual-use technologies included projects toagnet production line ut Al Tahadi. carbon fiber iilamcni winding equipment for missile fabrication at al Karama. and the creationew Department of Rotating Machinery at Ihn Yunis. All of these projects were created lo improve specific military orproducts, but the technologies could have helpentrifuge development project. ISO, however, has uncovered no indication lhat Iraq had resumed fissile material or nuclear weapon research and development activities

Results of IfWi's Investigation on Nuclear Issue*

Iraq did notuclear device, nor had it tried toapability to produce nuclear weapons

ISG has uncovered no inforntation lo supportof Iraqi pursuit of uranium from abroad in ibe post-Operation Desert Storm era.

' In Thend earlyraq had an aggressive program to acquire uranium. Iraq's known inventory o( safeguarded uranium has been accounted for by the IAEA and Coalition inhese issues are described in detail in the uranium pursuits section of this paper.

Iraq did not reconstitute its indigenous ability to produce ycllowcake.esult Of Insert Storm and IAEA inspectionraq's indigenousproduction capability appears to have been eliminated. Bomb damage1 destroyed the uranium extract ion facility at the Al OaimFertiliTer Plant. During the >ear* of intrusisc inspections, the IAEA also closed and sealed the Abu Skhair mineurtail Iraq's secondary pilot plant production capability for acquiring uranium.

also investigated Ihc former nuclear facility at Tarmiya bui found no indicators that lhe processes being developed Iheie had produced more than

a few kilograms ol uranium-hearing wastesyproduct of phosphoric acid purification.

issues also uie further described in thepursuits section ofaper

raq had neither rebuilt any capability to convert uranium oreorm suitable fornor reestablished other chemical processes related lo hand line ftttile materialeapons program. Prior to) war, Iraq had established uranium conversion and feed material capabilities ai the Tuwaitha Nuclear Researchpremier nuclearwelleed material plant near Mosul called Al-Jazira. Iraq also waschemical processes al Tarmiya, andiwo primary site* for uranium enrichment

using the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) technique. Baghdad also planned to produce feed materials for ii* centrifuge program ai ils mainresearch site Rashidiyah andilot plant at Al Purat. Uranium metal production planned for therogram was planned for the AI-Athir nuclear weapons assembly facility. These issues are described in Ihc EMIS and uranium conversion secuons ol this paper.

Available evidence leads ISG lo judge that Iraq's development of gas centrifuges for uraniumessentially endedrioras centrifuge technology wis one of the primarybeing pursued for uranium enrichment, with emphasis being placed on carbon-nber composite centrifuge rotor*.

lo Iraq's disclosures to IAEA. ISG inier-views and documentary evidence. Iraq's centrifuge program by June IWO hadforeignmagnetic-hearing centrifuges, one of which was tesied with uranium hcxafluoridc

feed. Two oil-bearing centrifuges had also been built by ihe Iraqis as of

ISGeconstituted program for theof producing material for nuclear weapons would have required redevelopment andof centrifuge manufacturing technology, the manufacture of thousands ot mathines requiredroduction plant, effort to gain experience in enrichmentnd production of metric-ton quantities ol uranium hcxafluoridceed. However, the initial research and development stagesingle centrifuge.

Former Presidential Scientihc Adviww Amir Hamudi Hasan al-Sadi uated ihai be neither received nor issued orders to resume any centn-fuge-related work and could not have done so because Ihc war had destroyed ihe equipment and facilities.

lhe head of design implementation in lhe former centrifuge program. Fans 'Abd Al 'Aziz AI Samana'i. did not believe lhat (here was anuclear weapons program tn Iraqe stated thai he did not believe ihiit the

had ihc resources or ability io undertake weapon-related research.r. Fans had worked for MIC, in Studies and Planning, and as Director General ot" the Al-Shahccn Company6 and of (he al Samud State Company

Janul Ij'fai. the designer of theagnetic centrifuge program, staled in an intersiew lhat he also did not believe thai tt was possible, given ihc conditions inn rccoftuituteomplicated and serious effort.

Additional details on ISti's investigation into cenirifuge-related issues can be found in sections dealing with aluminum tubes, carbon liber, flow forming, magnet production, potential centrifuge-related facilities, .mi rotating machinery.

ISG also judges lhal Iraq continued work on none of the many other uranium enrichment programs explored or developed prioruch as EMIS or lasers. However, many of the former EMIS engineers and scientists continued to work for cither the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) or the Military Industrialization Commission iMIC) in roles that could preserve their technical skills.

Since Operation Iraqi Freedom, significant looting and damage hate occuried at most of the dual-use manufacturing facilities that supponed theMIS program. ISChas not been able to confirm that the Iraqi Regime attempted to preserve ihe EMIS technology, although one scientist with thisrogram kept documents and components that would have been usclul to restarting such an effort.

Additional details can be found in the EMIS and Laser Research sections of this report.

It does not appear lhat Iraq look step* lo advance itsork in nuclear wrapons design andISG has notaterials research and fissile component manufacturing capability that would be required louclearprogram. Working with molten highly enriched uranium requires special consideration for criticality during Ihc melting and solidification process. ISG

found no evidence that Iraq had acquired orthe technology dealing with casting andissues of highly enriched uranium.

ISG has not identified any explosive lem development etlort in Iraq Out was associatedenewed nuclear weapons program, we do believe that the Al Quds Company-R establishment createdechnical department, whichacility capable of conducting research.acility appears well suited for types ofresearch lhat could he applicable tomilitary and nuclear weapons research.

ISG obtained evidence tiom recovered documents and from debrielings of Iraqi scieniists thai Iraq utilized high-speedthose ofinterest for nuclear weaponssupport of rail-gun projects that we believe were intended tor air'fi has found no links between Iraq's interrsl in special high-speed switches1uclear weapons

also was not able uncoier indications that Iraq had resumed any work related to neutron initiators'generator*enewed weaponsThe only neutron generation capability found by ISG pertained to known non-weapons-relatcd research under way at the [ABC al Ttiwaitha.

activities arc described in further detail in Potential Weapons Development Issues, IAEC Modernization, and Rail Gun ponions of this report.

I Sti has uncovered two instances in whichlinked to Iraq'iranium enrichment programs kept documentation and technology in anticipation of renewing thesethat they contend were officially sanctioned.

F.MIS program claimed he was told by Ihe head of MIC7 to continue his work with ion implantation at his Al Tahaddi labay to preserve EMIS technology.

The former head of Iraq'sentrifuge program also retained prohibited documents and components in apparent violation of the Regime'sough this ocriviiy svas isolated, il alio had lhe potential lo contributeossible restart of Iraq's uranium ennchmem programs

Additional details on the disclosures of ihese tsvo former enrichment officials can be found in the section of the report concerning Hidden Enrichment Technology.

Furthermore, although all of Ihe officialsby ISC indicated Iraq had ended itsof nuclear weaponsome suggested Saddam remained interested in reconititulion of the nuclear program after sanctions wrre lifteddetails concerning Saddam's continued intent to develop sseapons of mass desirociKXi can be found in the section of this report concerning Regime Strategic Intent

Consistent with Saddam's nuclearraq directed scientific expertise lo several Iraqi etiablishments. This action wouldconsistent with cither preserving knowledge for the eventual rcentthlishment of the nuclear weaponor with simply utilizing Iraq's technicalin areas where it was most needed. In eiiher case, some of Ihc work performed by these formercientists inherently preserved some capabilities that would be neededeconstituted nuclear weapon program. Details on these activities can be found in the section* of the report concerning IAECUniversity Programs, and Migration ofapabilities.

Investigation Into Uranium Pursuits and Indigenous Production Capabilities

foreign Pursuits

ISC ha* not found evidence lo show that Iraq sought uranium from abroad1 or renewedproduction of suchlhat we believe would have constituted an Iraqi effort louclear weapons program. As pan of its investigation, ISG sought information from promi-nent hgurct such as Ja'far Diya'head ofuclear weapons program

to Ja'far. the Iraqi government did not purchase uranium from abroad following itsof ycllowcake from Nigerowever. Iraq also purchased uranium dioxide from Brazilraq declared neither the Brazilian purchase nor one of ihc Niger purchases to thedial the Iraqi Regime was willing to pursue uranium illicidy.

Regarding tpecihe allegations of uranium pursuit* from Niger, Ja'far claims thatS Iraq hod only Iwo contact* withof which involved uranium. Ja'far acknowledged that Iraq's Ambassador lo the Holy See traveled to Niamey to invite ihe President of Niger lo visit Iraq. He indicated lhat Baghdad hoped lhal ihe Nigerian Prcsideni would agree to Ihe visit as he had visited Libya despitebeing levied on Tripoli. Former Iraqito the Holy See Wissam Zahawie has publiclyimilar account.

econd contact between Iraq and Niger occurredigerian minister visited Baghdad1 io request assistance in obtaining petroleum productslleviate Niger'* economic problems. During the negotiations for ihis coniraci. die Nigerians did not offer any kind of puyincnt or other quid pro quo, including offering to provide Iraq with uranium ore, oilier than cash in exchange for petroleum.

Pagef 44

of the Republic of IRAQ Nairobi

Embassy of lhe Republic of IRAQ Nairobi

No. 7

Dated

Foreign Affairsinistryesearch and Analysis irtformation officeranium Material

Enclosed is the report maderiend from Uganda, Abdul Jamal Abdulnasser, (Bika) about getting uranium and other important metals from his friend in Congo. He told us that he is ready lo supply Iraq wiih these metals if Iraq wants them and it can be done without implicating Iraq. After we checked them, we told him we don't deal with these materials and we explained lo rum the circumstances of Iraq and the imposed sanctions, and that Iraq is not concerned about these matters right now. He said that he will do his best to help Iraq and Iraq's regime for Jihad together against our enemy, and he considers supporting the power of Iraq lo be his participation which is the power for all Muslims, and he feels thai his duties are to support and strengthen that power.

Please consider. He kept two samples of uranium and collaList of elements he offered" Com tad Please give me youry regards

Slated above

Abdl Lateef (Comrade)opy' of the letteropy of the attachnien!o get hisllegible sigrature//

//illegibleay 20

onfidential

,27

Figureetter 'electing opportunity to purchase uranium.

ISGopyrude oil contraci dated1 that, although unsigned, appears to support this arrangement.

So for, ISC has found only one offer of uranium to Baghdad sinceapproach Iraq appears to have turned down. Inn ISG team found an Iraqi Embassy document in the IraqiService (IIS) headquarters related to an offer io sell yellowcake to Iraq. The document revealsgandan businessman approached the Iraqis with an offer to sell uranium, reportedly from the Congo. The Iraqi Embassy inreporting this matter back to Baghdad onayit told the Ugandan lhat Iraq does not deal with ihcseexplained ihc circumstances of sanctions, and said that Baghdad was not concerned about these mancrs tight now.s the translation of this document.

Indigenous Production Capabilities

esult of Desert Storm and IAEA inspection efforts, Iraq's indigenous yeUowcakeproduction capability appears to have been eliminated ISG has uncovered no indicator Iraq had reconstituted pnxiuc-tion processesefine uranium or produce yellow-cakecale neededeapons program.

Iraq's main plant for yellowcake production prior1 was at Al-Qa'im. The plant was designed, erected, and commissioned by Mcchimof Belgium during the2sing phosphate ore from the Akashat mine and the Prayon process, the first batch of yellowcake was delivered to the IAEC in5 withons delivered

Bomb damage1 destroyed the uranium extraction facilily at the Al-Qa'im Superphosphate Fertilizer Plant.nspectors found lhat Al-Qa'im had been heavily damaged in the war and the structure was unsafe. Visits to the site in interim years did not reveal any attempt to reestablish the plant to produce yellowcake.

* During the years of intrusive inspections, the IAFA also closed and sealed the Abu Skhair mine toIraq's secondary pilot plant productionfor acquiringear before ibe closure of the Abu-Sha'ir mine under IAFAhe processing plant was converted to"Alum" from kaolin ore. Subsequent visits by UNSCOM/lAEA continued to report inoperability of the mine. The operation established at Abu-Sha'ir in8ons of ore.ons of which were deliveredilot plant at the Geological Survey State Enterprise (GSSE) priorespite ihis effort,g ofwas obtained.

Ja'far also claims lhatid not attempt lo budd another yellowcake production plant1 (see

Imoalition Jones visited the former yellowcake extraction plant at Al-Qaimrums ojyellowcake and radioactiteme believe were associated with theuclear weapons program- These drums were transferred in late3 to thestorage facility located at Tuwaitha. There is no evidence that this material had been produced after Desert Storm

ISG also investigated Ihe1 was part of Iraq's EMIS uraniumfound no indicators that Ihe chemical processes being dethere had produced moreew kilograms of uranium-bearing wastesyproduct of phosphoric acid purification. ISG believe* that theconcentrated much of ibc chemical engineering staff from the formeruclear weaponswould most likely have been involved in an effort toranium recovery capability, had such an effort been under way.

Iraq's Known Uranium Holdings

Known Iraqi uranium holdings have been accounted for by the Coalition and Ihe IAEA, Inoint IAEA and Coalition learn verified the inventory of Iraqi uraniuminventoryboth imported material and that indigenously produced prior1 (sec figure 4)

Duringnd, Iraq bought uranium in various torms from the international market. These materials includedons of0 kg of "natural" uraniumg of "lew-enriched"ercentg of "depleted" uranium dioxide from Portugal. Italy. Niger, and Brazil.

Priorraq also acquired highly enriched uranium for us research reactors from France andthat was removed from1 Gull war. lollowing the Husayn Kamil defectionraq admitted that1 it had intended to use this highly enriched fuel as partcrash program" touclear weapon (see

Table 1

Declared Iraqi International Uranium Purchases

Company

Form

National Oe uranio EP

ions (uranium content approximately

ons)

notified throughnot subject to safeguards according to

22

tons (uranium content approximately HO tons)

IAEA notifiCa-ton (not subject to safeguards according toor-

Ihrough CNEN

9

dioxide

kg

IAEA sale-guards

9

uranium dioxide

kg

9

uranium dioxideuel rods)

kg

2

uranium)

kg

(Otlice National Oes Resources Minieres)

1

cake"

ons)

notified (noi subject to sale-guards according toorrected.)

1

IAEA(not subject to safeguards according to

CNEN (Comrrusao Nacio-nal de Energia Nuclear)

iiCe

kg

IAEA

uranium dioxide

kg

Iraqi Uranium Conversion Program

Iraq'sranium conwersion program was established at different silts lo product ihturanium compounds for Ihe enrichmtnt, reprocessing, and metallurgy programs to suppon itsuclear weapons program. Iraq had established much of its uranium conversion basic research and developmcni at Tuwaitha. As processes were developed, ihey were adapted for prcduciion at Tuwaitha and other she* as appropriate (see

Iraqariety of uranium compounds lo suppon ilsuclear weapons programumber of facilities, including Tuwaitha, al Jazira, Tarmiya, Ash Sharqat. Rashdiya. and Al Athir. Al lhe lime of Desert Storm. Iraq's capabilities to produce uranium compounds/metal varied as noted in Table 2.

Table 2

Uranium Conversion Program (Pre-Operation Desert SJorm)

CapaoWty

at ODS

i

punTicaton

lo UCI. lab production tor EMiS UF.pa ration experiments. UF, ana UF,ab scale preparation

<G1 wingj

p-oriuctiun

nitratealnl; UO, lo UF,etal

etalet* purltication: UF, preparation

ellets ft fuel; nuclear-grade UO.

& conversion to UO.

rational

to UO,tducton tor EWlS: Pilot plan-recoveryphfle collectors; Punfi-catwn ot

ecover, ho- ItR

to UO.lor EMIS

ft storage tanks

to UCI, oroou-^onlS

IC

Underground Facilities

parts storage'ogrem construction phase

recoverynong/aplntii)

recovery tromginphrto)

U to UcjJnonorftphlM)

support toi

ecovery liomginpbcographlte)

Snarqat

recovery lorom components0

hecked out

recovery (HEU ft depleted U]0ollectors

hecked out

'ocoveryollector compenents

heoxed owl

C

ale UF( preparabon ft pjril-raror. UF, prcctucnon

and UF, RiD. UF. pon'.cat-o"

production

ult of Desert Slorm and the VN and IAEA efforuany of the Iraqi uraniumfacilities were destroyed or damaged and Ihe program crippled. Many ot the facilities of Tuwaitha. Al-Athir. al Sharqat. Rashidiyah. and Al-Athir were destroyed during Operation Desert Storm orthrough IAHA inspections. Tablendicates ihc destruction of facilities at the onginal sites and by whose action.

ult of Operation Iraqi Freedom and its aftermath, much of Iraq's residual potential ura-mum conversion capability was destroyed. ISti site visits to many locations found not only destruction resulting Irom Operation Iraqi Freedom, but alio looting that rendered many facilities inoperable. ISO insestigations. including sampling and radiationduring these visits uncovered no indications ol nuclear weapons related activity.

ResearchSGeries of visits lo Tuwairha During iheseiructures were surveyed and cleared.tructures judged destroyed, and eight stniciures deemed hazardous (see

Al-Athir. US military forces found Al-Athirand heavily looted. ISG visited and found DO evidence ol uranium conversion activities.

AI AshfAl Kabeer tTaji Metallurgy! ISG visits lo Al Zahf Al kabcer found Out all research and production buildings >howcd extensive evidence of looting. They found no es idence of uranium metal production or weapon component production and received no positive leadings from radiation

Al Raya. ISG visits to Al Kaya found extensive bomb damage and widespread looting. They found no evidence of uranium meiul production or weapon componeni production and received no positive readings from radiation surveys.

Ibn Slnan ISG visit to Ibn Sina found the facility to be closed since major ground combat operations. The facility had been subject io BOtM looting and was apparently in the ptuccsv otopera!ionv No indicators or evidence or" WMD activity was found (sec

I sieptions lo the general destruction and looting were Al Amal and Al Salaam. Al Amal was activeay. seveneek lo suppon an oil refinery at Basrah. Al Salaam was noi damaged bul showed evidence of minor looiing (sec

is

TaWe3

Iraq's Uranium Conversion Program (Post-Operallon Desert StormN/IAEAacilities)

Impact

Actions

Actions

by Iraq

by Iraq

(Gt wing)

by Iraq

by Iraq

by Iraq

by Iraq

destruction

by Iraq

qu*menl deslroyod

underground

1

and sealed

y lU'stmv'd

destroyed

destroyed

destroyed

dcsiroyed

and/or destruction ofmaterials

and/or destruction ofmaterials

At'-eer

by IA5A

by IAEA

by AEA

Currently Accurate. Fuf.ptoto Declaration of the Past Iraqi Nuclear

AluminumInvestigation

Baghdad's interest in high-strength,aluminumHems controlled underf the Ongoing Monitoring andPlan as possible centrifugebest explained by ils efforts to producemm rockets. ISG conducted numerous interviews related to Iraq's interest in acquiring thesethat regularly pointed toward similar tubes being used in theround-to-ground rocket system.

interviews included prominent figures from Iraq'sentrifuge effort, including Us director, the project manager for rotor manufacture, other former staff, as well as the head of ihe overall nuclear weapons program. ISG also interviewed numerous officials directly involved in themm rocket effort and Iraq's Military Industrialization Commissionone of these officialsto any intended end use of the tubes beyond rockets.

AUhough ISO also uncosered inconsistencies that raise questions about whether high-specification aluminum tubes werr really needed forocket program, these discrepancies are nottouclear end use was planned for the lubes. For example. ISG has found technical drawings that show themm rocket programistory of using lubes lhat appear to have fallen short of tbe standardrocurement attempts in the years before the war. Iraq alio accepted lower-quality, indigenously produced aluminum tube* lor SI -mm rockets in the months before the war despiteforeign procurement attempts fortubes.

believes that hureuueratic momentum made it difficult to abandon the perceived need (or high-specifJcation tubes Irom abroad. These foreign pursuits probably alsoere affectedack of sufficient indigenous manufacturingan effort Iraq reportedly began only Inihc high cost of that production, and pressure of the impending war.

* Efforts to press the Iraqis on other inconsistencies in individual recollections on history, production, questionable engineering practices, oralso did not produce statements to link the tubes to any effort othermm rockets.

Elements of ISG Investigallon

ISG investigated key indicators that suggested acentrifuge end use for thethat revealed plausible explanations for use of the tubesmm rockets, notaMy:

' Purported high-level interest in aluminum tubes by Saddam and Iraq's Deputy Primepotential indicatorrogram of nationalsuchentrifuge program.

- Possible association of Iraqi nuclear entities with the tubes it sought tosuggestiveuclear end-user.

Ttibe characteristics und shippingreporting that shewed the tubes were subject to nuclear controls and seemed lo be over specified for conventional rockets.

Iraqi effort to indigenously manufacture tubes for anm-rocket program and its continued effort to acquire tubes with higher specifications.

Alleged Iraqi interestmmsize that would have been inconsistent withmm rocket program

In the course of this investigation. ISG did not uncover evidencerogram lo design or developmm aluminum rotor centrifuge. Other sections of ISG nuclear report descuhe findings concerning equipmcni and materials flint could haveenewed centrifuge cllort.

Purportedvel Interest in Aluminum Tubes

Possible Association of Iraqi Nuclear Entities With the Tubes

has found lhal high-level Iraqi inleresl in aluminum lubes appears lo have come from efforts lo produce HI -mm rockets, raiheruclear end use. Multiple reports indicate Dr. Huwaysh was keenly interested in high-strength, high-specitication aluminum tubes for rocket production. Dr. Huwaysh attributes his pursuitmm rockets to theof some launchers to the military shortly after he became the head of MICesult. Dr. Huwaysh claims he was hound by requests from the Minister of Defense to produce rockets for thosetask he regularly pressed on MICat quarterly meetings.

Dr.dvocacymm rockets appears to explain why be sought the delivery of items that were probably sample aluminum tubes. In, Dr. Huwaysh sought two shipments of high-strength aluminum from an Iraqi procurement lirm in Syria.

Several Iraqi officials alao commented on Saddam's potential interest in rockets. One official indicates Dr. Huwaysh told MIC engineers lhat Saddam asked htm tom rockets. But this link between lhc lubes and Saddam remains uncorroborated, even by Dr. Huwaysh.

- Ja'far Diya' Ja'far, the head of Iraq'suclear weapons program and mostresidential Science Advisor, has offered somewhat conflicting accounts regarding Saddam's awareness of the aluminum tubes. Whilem rockets. Ja'far claimed Saddam was very interested in aerial weapons. Ja'far has also stated, however, this rocket program was unimportant and that work, including procurement, was known only to lower-level officials. Ja'far- whose debriefing accounts have been known todoubted Saddam understood the technical specifications of the tubes.

Other inleresl by senior officials inm rocket can be traced tohen Husayn Kamil reportedlyroposal to reverse-engineer and build the weapon system. The proposal, made by an Iraqi Army Aviation officer was based on the premise that it was too expensive lom rockets fiom luly.

The Umited information found by ISG that ties Iraqi nuclear entities to the tubes also appears related tomm rocket3 letter from the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) to the IAEA's Iraq Nuclear VerificationVO) notes tliai the Iraqi Atomic Energy(IAEC) conducted material composition testingample aluminum lube inccording to that letter given to ISG. ihe Rashid Stateone Of the entities involved inmm rocketthe sample lube through the Ahmed Al-Barrak Bureau, an import/export lirm in Baghdad.

tube tested by the IAEC reportedlyI mm in length andm insize consistent with prewar procurement attempts. 'Ihc Rashid Stale Company requested other physical property tests, but the IAEC did not haveto do the work.

A leading Iraqi nuclear expert measured Ihe tubes to answer questions posed by the IAEA, bul ISG has found no indication that this represented interest by Iraq in Ihe tubes for centrifuge applications. In the months before the war. Ja'far Diya' Ja'far admits callingeading technical ligurc in the former centrifuge effort. Dr. Faris 'Abd Al-Aziz Al-Samarrai.easure dimensional variances on severalmm rockets. Multiple officials interviewed by ISG confirm Aziz's work for Ja'far to address questions from IAEA inspectors about the tubes.

the letter to the IAEA incorrectly claims that measurements of rockets made with the originalubes met the higherfor tubes set by0 committee.

Ja'far's study for Ihe IAEA inspectors apparently acknowledged it was possible toentrifuge from the tubes, although he thought doing so was unpractical. Ja'far ihoughi the IAEA officials agreed with his assessment bul notes they did notefinitive statement on the utility of ihe lubes for centrifuges. Ja'far thought ihe size of the rocket tubes would cause the enrichment output to be far lower

lhan (he centrifuge design Iraq hud pursued usAbd Al Baqi RashidormerCiencral of the Rashid Stale Companyey figure in themm rocket program, told ISG thai he informally heard that Ja'far and AI-'Azi/ determined that the tubes could not he used for centrifuges.

his rxxUwardehrtcfmc.s, Ja'far also opined lhal usingmm rocketsover siory for aprogram would not have been very useful because Iraq had difficulties importing any goods. Ja'far also told debneferv lhat developing an indigenous carbon-fiber It lament winding capability wuuld have been much more useful if Iraq inteitded toentrifuge effort.

iVr. Mahdi ShukurAIihr hrad of lheentrifuge program, similarly did noi consider il reasonable lhal Iraa could have pursued aprogram based on .sialuminum lubes. Al 'Ubaydi believes that, besides himself, the only Iraqis capable of assessing the suitability of aluminum tubes for centrifuge use were Jama! Ja'far. Dr. Fund Bashir Ynsef. and Dr. Makkiaving fled Iraq years before the war. Al "Cbaydi assessed that no one in Iraq could base redesigned the centrifuge io use an Hi-mm aluminum rotor.

Al' Ubaydi stated thai Iraq was able to quickly develop itsentrifuge program because of Ihe raw inlelligence ol Jamul. Farid. Makki, andunderestimation, we believe, of the contribution of technology, designs, and expertise providedew experts Irom ihe Europeanenrichment consortium, URENCO.Al 'Ubaydi slated il still lookears to understand the working design il obtained from abroad.

AI 'Ubaydi assessed thatentrifuge by scaling rt up or down in lie would haveompletely different task, and he would have hcsnaicdmillion times" before anempting to do so. Al' Ubaydi opinedenewed effort would more likely build on thit earlier work with IJRENCO-iype machines and utilize carbon fiber.

Another official from ihc former centrifugesimilarly told ISG lhat Iraq lacked the

necessary expertise loentrifugemm diameter high-sirengih aluminum tubes. The official noted Iraq's prewar expert tn centrifuge modeling left the country6 and now most likelyniversity instructor. The same source describes other losses of personnel with one colleague having lett to wort in privaic industryhird movedIC center.

ISC also has noiuclear connection thai influenced the evolution of the detign or tolerances for the HI-mm tubes. According to reporting, 'An: Kaddur Al-Kubaysi. former al Fatah Director of Engineering Affairs und lead Kl-nim rockei designer, freely set lhe design of the metal parts of the rocket as he saw fit. This reporting claimed no one changed any specifications for lhe aluminum tube rocket body afternot Ja'far Diya'Ja'far. 'Abd-al-Tawab Huwaysh. 'Abd Al-Baqi Rashid Shiya. or Fans 'Abd Al-Aziz Al-Samarrai.

ISG found only one former nuclear officialconnection may bethe design of themm rocket. As the former bead of al Qa'Qaa'. Sirun Rasnn Sa'idaa involved in developing propellant for the rockei- -one of the allegedng causes of the inaccuracy of (he weapon. Prioreporting indicates Sa'id helped maintain electrical equipmeni for ihcisotopend centrifuge uranium enrichment efforts.

Tube Characteristics and Shipping Requirements

ISG's investigation into why Iraq sought aluminum tubes with such high specifications before thea key factor that raised concerns that the Regime hadentrifugeuncovered plausible but not always consilient accounts that link the lubesmm rockets. Multiple officials involved with the Iraqi rockei program claim that ihe tight specihcaiions on the aluminum tubes were driven by efforts lo improve ihc accuracy of thisweapon. These sources report thatr. Huwayshommittee lo sci final rockei specifications and addiess problems with its accuracy.

Varied Reactions la Ihe Tube Seizure1

has uncovered mixed and sometimes conflicting reactions by Iraqi officials to Ihe1 seizure of high-strength aluminumstopped based on concerns Ihe tubes violated sanctions and nuclear export controls. Ja'far told debriefers that the seizure did not capture hisbecause he thought the tubes simply were stoppedesult of sanctions. He claims he was not aware of airy MIC inquiries in the wake of that seizure to suggest the tubes were intended for centrifuge use and deemed foreign governmenl claims2 thai the lubes were suitable for centrifuges as insignificant. He also claims he did not become concerned about centrifuge allegations until3 when the issue arose in the United Nations Security Council.

Ja'far's reported efforts to gather information ino deal with IAEA inspectors from Faris Aziz and others seem to lie the extent of hiswiih ihc lubes prior to ihe war. ISG believes lhal Ja'farikely candidate to have known of renewed nuclearany been underhis preeminent role as the head of thei nuclear weapons program.

Similarly, tbe head of Iraq'sentrifuge program reportedly had no knowledgeuclear connection to the aluminum tubes until ihe issue surfaced months before Operation Iraqi Freedom.

According to interrogation interviews, he was not pari of Ja'far's review for inspectors, and he was not tasked to consider the suitability of ihe aluminum lubes for centrifuges. Reportedly Al Vbaydi said he learned the tubes were destinedocket program in2 when Dr. Amirresidential Advisor, queried him if theentrifugehad used aluminum.

'Ubaydi reporiedly learned from Jamalechnical expert from theentrifuge program, lhat aluminum could be used in magnelic-bearingpassed ihis point lo Sa 'di.

Dr. Huwaysh, however, claims he took several actions in the wake off many claims he makes thai are inconsistent with other debriefing accounts. Dr. Huwaysh indicates that it was the procurement fronl company lhat first informed MIC lhal the tubes were stopped because of centrifuge concerns. Dr. Huwaysh then claims he asked Al 'Ubaydi lo investigate and received word in2 front Hussam Muhammad Amin, the head of Iraq's Naiional Monitoring Directorate that Al 'Ubaydi concluded ihe lubes could be used for centrifuges. Dr. Huwaysh then claims he ordered 'AbdAI-Baqi Rashid Shiya. then Director General of ihe AI-Rashid Slate Company, to find an alternatesubject to nuclear exportwould Slill be strong enough io make Ihe motor cases for the HI-mm rockets.

Huwaysh adds thai he trusted Baqi lo change the alloy and did not confirm ihe order wasWhenopyaxrocurement company that specified Ihe prohibited alloy. Dr. Huwaysh adamantly claimed ilistake, as Baqi would never have disobeyed his order.

Baqi claims lhal Dr. Huwaysh did not ask him to make any changes after the capture of ihe tubes during ihe summerdding that oilier key rocket program officials would have known ofodification ifii had been ordered. Baqibeard indirectly that Dr. Huwaysh did noi think the tubes were suitable for centrifuges and thai news reporting in this regard was mistaken.

Engineer Abd Al-Baqi Rashid Shiya, ihen Director General of Ihe al Rashid State Company, ledembercomminee. supported by his dcpuiy and head of ihe Naiional Monitoring(NMD) ai al Rashid, Sa'ad Ahmad Mahmud. NMD. Gen. Husam Amin also participated, ostensibly due io his rocker engineering expertise, as did Arlf Kaddori Atavvi Al-Kubaysi. the lead engineer for themm rockcl program. (See inset on insights.)

lhc committee reportedly completed its work inoncluding thai inconsistencies bclwccn rockets resulted in variations in range andproblem they chose to address, in part, by reducing mass differences between rockets and components by tightening specifications. Thealso reportedly considered propellant-related problems and quality-control issues.

Comments From the Head ofommittee"

interviews with 'Abd At-Baqi Rashid Shiva revealed insights into ihe thinking ofhich he led in an attempt to improve the accuracy of the HI-mm rocket Baqi claims lhal0 commiiiee noticed that the engineeringformm rocket had undergone many ad hoc revisions over the years, changes ostensibly made lo ease its manufacture. Baqi told postwar debrief-ers that one goal of0 commiiiee was lo return ihe SI-mm rocket to its original Italian-based design by setting new specifications for importedunrealistic goat given lhal Iraq had made changes in thehat affected propellant performance and lifelime.

According lo Baqi, the committee checked all the parts of the rocket and found that unwantedwas caused by problems with the nozzle and the nonalignment of the propellant, nozzle, and motorslightly different cause than the massnoted by other officials. Baqi also described that the committee examined problems with themanufactured by ihe Al-Qa' Qua' Slatebecause this would occasionally cause rockets to explode during flight. The committee reportedly concluded these misfirings were caused by pining of thea reference to corrosion marks caused by improperproblems with the insulator between the ptopellani and ihe lube. Baqi also claimed that ihe launcher wasignificant part of the rocket's scalierconclusion also reached by0 Comminee.

A separate source associated with ihe rocket program claimed themm rocket accuracy was adversely impactedumber ofresulting from ils conversion from an air-iogroundround-to-ground system. This source claimed lhat down-range accuracy problems were causedack of initial velocity, instabilities from the ground launch platform, and insufficient design features dial would have produced more spin.

Tha source also claimed the quality of Iraqiadversely affected the range ofmm rocket. Iraq reportedly modifiedmm rocket propellant89 when Amir At-Sa'di, then Director of the MIC.roup at al Qa' Qaa' lo examine why some Italian-made rockets prematurely exploded. The group discovered droplets of nitroglycerine formed on the propellant inside the rocket body, causing the malfunction. By modifying the propellant, Iraq increased rocket shelf lifeoears but at ihe cost of consistentperformance thai affected accuracy.

Baqi claims he was not alone an0 committee in questioning why the military wantedmm rocket, adding thatm rocket was easier to produce, had fewer parts,igger warhead

Baqi notes the lead production engineer and Kubaysi as two of0 committee members who shared his views lhat itad idea for Iraq to makemm surface-lo-surface rocket by attempting lo copy ihe Italian auto-surface rocket. Baqi claimed many engineers wanted ta end themm rocketin favor ofm rockets.

Baqi echoed claims by Dr. Huwaysh thai theapparently womed ihemm racket because they already had launchers for ihem. Additionally. Baqi noted quality coniroleneral problem with themm rocket program.

Reporting indicated thatmm rocket program should have been canceled because other rockets in Iraq's arsenal were capable of fulfilling its role and posed fewer problems. According to thistheilometer range ofmm rocket could be covered bymm systems with rangesilometers0 kilometers, respectively. According io reporting, many mililary officers were opposed lomm rocket syslem. bul they allegedly were overruled by more senior leadership. According to reporting, thenun rocket suffered about twice as much scatter asm rockets Iraq produced

Nearly alt critical linear dimensions and related tolerance specifications that raited prewar concerns over possible centrifuge end use can be linked to decisions reportedly made by0 Committee

for rockets.Whik participaling in the work of0 Committee, multiple official* indicate the lead design engineer tightened (he inner and outerspecific*kxm for importedn his interviews with ISG. the lead design engineer noted thai0 Committee decided that the rocket body mass could vary byequirement that led to ihe setting of diamcier specifications used in Iraqi procurement attempts since2 -the same values Iraq's NMD declared IO the IAEA in3 lenei. (see

lead design engineer also reportedly sought to reduce the total allowed mass variation between rocketsrams outilogram total weight, withrams allocated iostemming trom metal parts. Reportedly, pressure testing conlirmed that trimming wall mass from the rocket lubes did not adversely affect the strength of the lube.

Reporting indicates the shipping requirementsfrom recomriKndationv bv Ih. Sanii Ibrahim ot the Baghdad University ol Technology, whowhy the aluminum tubes, purchased from Germany inK lor themm rockei program, corroded when stored otitdoois at Tho Al-Piqar.

concluded (hat the unaiKidi/ed German tubes corrodedalvanic reaction madeby stacking the lubes hoti/onially in direct contact with each oihcr ami outdoors. Ibrahim leportcdly noticed other5 alloytubes also stored outdoorsHt at Tholow-forming lac il it y. These tubes were stored upright and separated Irom each other with nylonthat influenced hison how to prevent tube corrosion.

equirement* seem to hase grown outesire lo avoid angering Dr. Huwaysh. whowas upsethen he saw (he corroded lubes at Tho Al-Fiqarisit inIraq alsourther precaution of iv.iiHidi/ing aluminum parts after machining io ensure ihai no further corrosion would occur.

Tho Al-Fiqar alsoto hase tet otherfor the rockei program that were not directly addressed by0 Committee in ils procurement specification document. Accordingormer official in themm rocket program, the ThoAJ-riqar specifications document was prepared to assist procurement otficiaK in acquiring high-strength aluminum tubes in thai document, the lead production engineer reportedly set an artificially tight *prx i: kanon* mm forot the properties related lo uniform tube wall thickness. Tho Al-Fiqar officials insisted on theas light asm reportedly actuallyensure lhat imported lubes would pass military quality -control requirements alter ihc lubes were machined.

The lead design engineer has also claimed that he determined the maximum value tor eccentricity of the raw- aluminum tubes as needing to be5 mmm.

H ith the reported exception of latitude given to Ihe Director General of Tho Al-Fiqar lo further lighten tolerances, few changes reportedly were made to the imported tube requirements specified by0 Committee. According to an otticial from the Iraqi rockei program, no one was permuted lo loosen lhe specification set hyomminee. However. Ihc lead production engineer reportedly had the authority to further lighten specifications in order to ensure that usable pans were received from vendors. Otherwise lhe parts received might not meet the requirements stated in lhe pertinent procurement documents.

Ihc latitude reportedly available to Ihe leadengineer could explain why Iraq tightened the eccentricity spccilicalion on Ihe lubes in2 an action viewed al the time ioockei program. Tight ecceniricily speci-ricalions reportedly were needed to pass military quality-conirol inspectionheck that could not be overruled by production personnel, according to reporting.

Reporting indicates the hardness requirement for lhe nozzle was one of the few changes made after the comminee completed its work, adding there were no other changes to the nsrial panincluding ihc rocket motor tube.

".i

TubePossible Sign Baghdad Did Not Need High-Specification Tubes

Frustrated by its inability to import tubes, Iraq began indigenous production efforts inhat ultimately raise questions about whether high-specification tubes really were needed for rockets. Dr. Huwaysh reportedlyommittee in May or June2 to study how to indigenouslytubes formm rockets. One report indicates theby the heads of the al Nida and Tho Al-Fiqar Stateusing the extruder at the Vr Establishment in Nasiriyah and two flow-forming machines al Tho Al-Fiqar to produce lubes.Inis commiiiee conducted its work while foreign procurement attempts continued as well as indigenous manufacture of rockets using corroded tubes.

Efforts to extrude mbes reportedly failed after four to six weeks despile assistance from the Badr and al Shahid Stale Companies and ihe University of Technology inDr. Sami Ibrahim. Multiple reports indicate the Ur extrusion press was too weak to handle5 T6 alloy. An effort by Badr topecial tool for the press reportedly ended with the war.

Accounts differ on those responsible for developing the flow-forming techniques lhat successfullyaboutubes per day through continuous

operations at Tho Al-Fiqar. One piece ofcredit the University of Technology and2 Committee for developing the necessary heat treatment procedures while another indicates that the Director General of the al Nida Slate Company devised the production process. MIC reportedly envisioned the Sabah Nisan (Seventh of April) Company would make forgings for futurebut this plan also was interrupted by the war.

77ie indigenous effort to produce tubes in the last months before the war resulted in production and handling standards that fell short ofOtose required for the imported tubes. Reporting indicates thai the lead production engineer gave Dr. Huwaysh some sample flow-formed tubes in late September oroiing that ihe production process was costly and lime consuming. The lead production engineer also indicated that the best possibleachievable on the outer diameter ol' flow-formed tubesigure that falls short of Ihe requirements set for imported tubes. Another source indicates these aluminum tubes reportedly were flow-formediameter of5 mm then machined to their final dimensions. Tofor Ihe limitations in flow-forminga separate, looser set of technical specifications repoiiedly were produced for indigenously produced rocket bodies (see

also indicates indigenously produced tubes were also handled differently than those that would have been imported. Between flow-forming steps indigenously manufactured lubes reportedly were shipped in ordinary wooden boxes or simply Stacked forsharp contrast to lhcand anodi/ation requirements demanded by0 Committee for imported lubes, lhc same reporting also indicates the tubes also reportedly were noi individually wrapped or separated from each other and were sometimes positionedagain contrary to0 Committee recommendations.

Inhe lead production engineer informed Dr. Huwaysh that the indigenously produced flow-formed tubes could be used without affecting rocketsignificant shift from0 Committee findings and one that the MIC director reportedly accepted The lead production engineer reportedly passed this view to Dr. Huwaysheeting attended hy lead engineer Kubaysi. another member of0 Committee.

also indicates indigenously manufactured flow-formed tubes were successfully used in flight tests completed at the end2 with Ihe Iraqi Army approving the looser specification design in

Table 5

Spec Hi cation Compatison

Chamber' Tube Characteristic

Required0

3

Imported From Germany in

Italian Rocket

Diameter

m

mm

m

Diameter at

1 mm

mm from ends

Diameter

m

mm

m

0 mm

Length

m

m

m

4m

summary of Iraqi tube linear dimension specifications showing tighter specifications required afterto those accepted for use from indigenous pwducliwiecond outer diameterthe ituiigemHisly producedflow-formed tubemm length on either end of the tube whereallowed the tube diumeter to significantly increase. Infonnaiion on the imported Germanan Iraqi quality-control document captured by ISG provides figures itu-ansisieni with Iraqi claimsmeasured these tubes3 and found them to In? tighter than0 Commiiiee specifications. Forthe specifications of the Italian rocket that the Iraqis lyverse-engmeered is included.

Despite relaxed standards for indigenously produced tubes and increased International attention on the prospectenewed nuclear program, Baghdad continued to pursue high-specification aluminum tubes from abroad. Accordingeporting, in2 orhe lead production engineerepresentative of ibe Syrian-based Awad Amora Company wiih ihe same high-specification requirements for tubes as had been used with other prospective suppliers. Separate reporting confirms the Awad Amora procurement attempt, noting that Sa'ad Ahmed Mahmoud. the NMD representative at the Al-Rashid Sutc Company, was told by MIC3 to contact the company.

Sa*ad also reportedly told the director of the NMD, General Husam Muhammad Amin about theprocurement attempt, Amin reportedly became nervous about this continued effort to acquire goods Subject to the nuclear controls underf UN1 and raised his concerns wiih Dr. Huwaysh. Nonetheless, ihe Awada Amora deal was still being negotiated ai ihe lime Ihe war started, according to thepoint ISG can independently confirm through captured

Dr. Huwaysh is die lone dissenter again inthe events surrounding the dealings with Awad Amora, claiming ihe open bid was probably issued

Systemic problems such as bureaucraticand fear of senior officials seem to haveignificant role in the history ofmm rocket and probably influenced why Iraq persisted in Its effort to seek tubes with high specifications.suggests Dr. Iluwayshigidstyle. For example, on hearing thai the lead production engineer had succeeded in producingay by continuously operating the two flow formers ai Tho Al-Fiqar. Huwaysh reportedly insisted ihe production be doubled. The stress of working on the flow-forming project ordered by Dr. Huwaysh reportedly caused the Tho Al-Fiqar Director General loeart attack. Dr. Huwaysh also insisted on final approval of any changes lo the rocket design after0 Committee issued ils results.the staff of Al-Fiqar feared Dr. Huwaysh's anger if modifications caused rocket failures.

Fear of senior officials also traces back to the origins ofmm rocket program4 when Army officials reportedly were loath to challenge the decision by Husayn Kamil, ihen Saddam's son-in-law and head of MIC. to rcs-ersc-engineei and produce ihe weapon. Reporting indicates the Iraqi Army actuallymm rockets forbecause ihey preferred themm rockets for ground-to-ground use.

Reporting also reveals how the results of0 Committee may have been influencedeed io avoid problems with Dr. Huwaysh. One report claims ihc committee focused on specification and material problems to gain time to solve production problems at manufacturing facilities. Another report indicated Dr. Huwaysh wanted results quickly from0 Committee: therefore, they did noi anempt in-depth, detailed engineering analyses of rocket scarier, Instead, this report noted that thetightened some design specifications based only on ihe notion that doing so would improve rocketquestionable engineering practice.

Another report from the rocket program noies that many of the changes made byid not make technical sense, as members were simply tightening specifications in order to appear effective in addressing problems. The lead design engineer also told debriefers that rocket assembly was plaguedack of personal integrity, as people were more concerned with avoidingor achieving quotas. The lead design engineer also claimed engineers and scientists would oflen make false claims or inflate their results in order to gamer favor with Dr. Huwaysh.

Fear of being held responsible for the cost of rejected tubes, components, or rockets alsoaffected ihe lead production engineer and his decision to tighten lube specifications for the rocketeportedly such puniiivc accountability practices were common for engineers or managers in Iraq when projects failed. With the high number of procured rubes involved, the cost to reimburse MIC would be excessive, probably leading lo individuals being imprisoned until the debt could be repaid.

* Timing also could have affected why Iraq continued to use the tight specification requirements when dealing with Awad Amora. The acceptance testing by the Iraqi Army occuired around the same lime that the Awad Amora deal was beingprobably too soon for the new technical drawings from the How-forming work lo be forwarded to prospective foreign suppliers.

Iraqi Inlereilmm lube*

ISO has hem unable lo corroborate reporting that suggested Baghdadmm-diameierdiameter that would be too large for the SI-mm rocket launcherossible sign thai Iraq intended some other nanroekrt use for high-strength aluminum lubes. Informationoreignservice received tnndicates thai the potential supplier was asked ahummm diameterchange that would have resulted in aincrease in ouici diameter as compared tomm size consistent with earlier purchase attempts. Wc have investigated this report further, and thewiih Iraq is unclear, as is the intended use ofmrn lubes.

A captured document reveals that Iraq ulivadyonsm5 aluminum shafts at the Huteen Statethai ISG belicses Iraq couldd to produce tubes even larger thanm if it intended io renew asprogram. Reporting, indicates Iraqm5 aluminum shafts before sanctions were imposedraq had beenihe material in the months before3 war to support ihe Tho Al Fiqar flow -forming operations related to themm rocket program.

Carbon Fiber

ISG investigations have revealed lhat MIC's carbon fiber project was ultimately aimed toward iheof components for missiles; specifically, the combustion chambers of the al Fat'h missile. ISG has found no evidence lo suggest that the MIC's carbon fiber projectas connectedrogram to restart uranium enrichment gas centrifuge production: however, the project would have allowed Iraq to acquire valuable caibon-ftber-relatedthat could be used in the future recrmstitutionentrifuge program.

Carbon Fiber and Iraq'sas Centrifuge Program

Iraq's magnetic -bearing centrifuge uraniumprogram began in1 when Germanbrought Kuropran centrifuge design information to Baghdad. Further deliscncs b> additional German engineers gave the IJipneering Design Centerignificant body of centrifuge design details. These German contacts also arranged procuirmeni andtransfer applicable fo the design, production and operation ol centrifuge cascades.

araging steel cylinder lubrication proved difficult, and the FIX'onsignment of aboutarbon liberraq used some of these cylinders to develop test machines lor ils centrifuge program.

Iraq was arranginghipment of winding equipment and materials when sanctions were imposedinder and large quantity of carbon nber tor EDC never teached Iraq),

After adopting UNSCRnraq ceased work on centnluge development, although the Iraqi Concealment Committee took the decision to hide documents and equipment related to this program Although IAEA invpection> were able to expose significant activities related io the centrifuge program. Iraq continued to conceal significant cat -tntuge documents and materials until the defection of Husayn Kamilhis detection triggered additional disclosures tonspectors.

Shakur Alformer head of the pre-l'WI centrifugeto hide centrifuge componenU and documentation for future effort alter the Husayn Kamil defection. We cannot link Al 'Ubaydi'* effort* to hide these material*4 to any instruct from Regime officials.

Tin FIXroduced two centrifuges using imported carbon fibernd foreign assistance byne of which was tested with

VFJeed.he EJX: began seeking machinery and raw materials lo establish an indigenous carbon fiber production capability in supponentrifuge production effort.

included Ihc attempted procurement of awinding machine from the AI.WO company in Switzerland and carhon liber, which was sought through an order placed wiih Ihc German company ROSCH (sec Figure*.

However. ISG analysis suggest lhal, at the time of Desert Storm. Iraq did not hase Ihe capability to indigenously produce eurbun fiber suitable for use In gas centrifuges.

A former senior MIC executive revealed lo ISG that, although Iraq had the capability to produce eposy resin for carhon liher applications, it had no capability lo produce carhon fiber. The Thar Al-Suwan Companyplant could produce only low-strength fiber glass

An ISCr site survey of South Taji. conducted inound no evidence of carbon fiber productionatent capabilily lo produce carbon fiber.

Iraqi Concealment of Carbon Fiber-Related Activity, Materials, and Documenis After Desert Storm

In lhe short period beiween the end of Desert Sloem and Iraq's acceptance of, the EDC continued its development of gas centrifuges and resumed wortO-machineeffort that was partrash program to produce enriched uraniumeapon by further enriching uranium from its safeguarded research reactorenior nuclear scientist told ISG lhal, as soon as1 Gulf warresidential Scientificordered ihe resumption ol workmachine tesl cascade.

On adoption of, work erased on the let! cascade, and Ihe Iraqi Concealment Committee look the decision ta hide documents and equipment regarding gas centrifuge research from. ISO analysis suggests that this mas motivatedesire to restart gas centrifuge research andproauctionime when sanctions were lifted. Howcser. bybe IAEA was aclisely removing and destroying the majority of Iraq'* centrifuge research program

A senior Iraqi nuclear scientist recalled that one of the committee'* first decisions was to hide both theashdiyah and Al Furat facilities and strip all nuclear-related malcnalhem. The SSO was responsible for the removal and packaging of EDC documenis and equipmeni.

The scienlisi also revealed lhal Iraq intended toachinc cascade when sanctions were lifted and (hat the EDC documents and components collected by the SSO1 were lo be used in this effort (sec.

eparate action, Hmayn Kamil ordered the retention of at least one copy of all nuclear-related documents and some centrifuge componentsenior nuclear scientist.ollowing Husayn Kamil's defection, the IAEAumber of WMD-rctaied documents and items of equipmeni from the Haidar Chicken Farm, lhe equipment seized included spools of high tensile, carbon fiber, andntrifuge-assucraied components.

Figure to. Carbon hber tubes.

l 'Ubaydi publicly revealed that he had retained centrifuge-related equipment andat his home throughoutnd during many US inspections. Al 'Ubaydi staled that this had been done in response to Husayn Kamil's order loopy ot" all ccnirilugc-rclaicd documenis.

The MIC Carbon Fiber Project

The MIC carbon fiber project2 began exploring carbon fiber technology for use in the Iraqi Missile Program and was managed by the Ml Conned Al Rashid State Company. Theresearched was specifically for use in the al Fat'h missile, and possibly the Al Naqwa anti-tank guided missilehe project aimed in create an indigenous carbon-fiber-based productionbased on previous experience wiih the Brazilian ASTROS Rockei in, and included theof one filament winding machine already within Iraq and the productionecond. At (he time of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the refurbishment of the first machine wasercent complete, and the production of the second had not started.

A/ 'Ubaydi, the former head of the Iraqi centrifuge project,ole in thearbon fiberISG has not found any evidence to suggest lhal Al 'Ubaydi was involved in the projeci at lhe technical level. His main role was to head UK committee thai selected ihc company lo build lhe filament winding machine.

Inhe AI Rashid State Company took deliveryilament winding machine from the

IAEC. This machine was to be refurbished because il wasonopcrational state, and the design then copied for ihc second filament winding machine. Accordingormer MIC scientist lhe IAEC. lhe carbon fiber filament winding machine had not been usedhe scientist was noi aware of why Ihc IAEC hadachine.

ISG investigations and debriefs with multiplereveal that Ihe minimum production diameter of the filament winding machines underby MICm. This is consistent with the al Fat'h missile. This is significantly wider than

(he carbon fiber rotor used in Ihcraqi gas centrifuge, whichiameter ofm.

Limited information indicates that the filament winding machines may have been used in theof components for the At Saqwa ATOM. This missileiameter ofm and is much more closely matched to lhat of thearbon fiber rotor. However. ISG has been unable lo find information lo corroborate this claim,econd report stared (hat ihe Al Naqwa ATGM molor case was madeurning machine andinding machine.

With exception of the filament winding machine that the AI Rashid State Company received from the IAEC, ISC has not found any further evidence of cooperation between MIC and the IAEC on the carbon fiber project, or any instances of the IAEC taking an interest in the progress or results of the research undertaken by MIC. Multiple source debriefs suppon ihis in that numerous former IAEC and MIC employees attest lo Ihe fact lhat Ihe IAEC and MIC? rarely worked together on joint projects.

Flow-Forming Machinery

ISG did not find evidence lhat flow-formingwas used to produce rotorseconstituted nuclear centrifuge program.esult of IAEA inspections and Iraqi mishandling ofan effort to avoid potenlial militaryeffectively lost its capability lo conduct flow-forming operations of ihe type needed toentrifuge program.

- Onn ISG team inspected the Umm Al Marik site. It was severely looted andThe learn saw several of Ihc machine mounts where ihc How formers had been mounted prior to the war. The remains of one large flow former remained, stripped of all usable parts.

Beginningraq was pursuing advanced flow-formutg technologies and equipment from foreign sources. One company lhat providedtechnical support and machinery to the liaqi industrial base waselalform Company of Germany. Iraq's Engineering Design Center failed toaraging steel centrifuge rotor due io manufacturing limitations, which helped precipitate lhe shift io trying loarbon fiber production capability.

Asetalform had sold nine flow-forming machines to Iraq.

InN Inspection Team visitedNassr Planl; ihey inventoried and recorded the serial numbers of eightlow-forming machines. Iraqi officials contend thai these machines were used lom rockets and components (sec Figures.

Planned Magnet Production Lines at Al Tahadi

ISG has not uncovered information indicating that the magnet production capability being pursued by Iraq beginning6 was intended toas centrifuge uranium enrichment program, bul the magnet production lines would have allowed Ihe Iraqis to preserve their skillsentrifuge magnet program.

Iraq investigated use of centrifuges as one approach to manufacturing enriched uranium in theiruclear program. One of the centrifuge designs investigated included use of magneticto support the rotor. Theraqi nuclear program was able to successfully lest asupported rotor.

Iraq purchased Aluminum-Ntckel-C'obalt (AINiCo) and Cobalt-Samarium (CoSm) ring magnets for theiragnetic-bearing centrifugeCentrifuges can he designed toariety of ring magnets of different dimensions and

ISG also cannot refute Iraq's claim lhat the magnel production lines it sought beginning0 were intended for other than routine industrial and military uses. The declared use of the magnetlines were for production of ring magnets in the Sahara Saddam Missile and for field telephones. According to Iraqi officials, the Iraqis chose to purchase the production lines in lieu of buying the magnets, which would have been cheaper. Inthe Iraqis wanted the experience and knowledge that would eventually come with operating the lines. 'Ihe Al Tahadi site was heavily looted afterIraqi Freedom, and no documents or equipment remained al the site.

The Al Tahadi Company contracted to purchase magnet production lines on Iwo occasionsInof which were completed or delivered. Iraqi specifications for the magnet ptoduc-tion lines were typically vague. The Al-Sirata trading company responding to MIC requests, initiated the first of two procurement effortshe procured line would include cast or powered magnets of all types, including Aluminum-Nickel-Cobalt (AINiCo) and Samarium Cobaltlatter was used in Iraq'suclear program. AccordingIC engineer experienced in magnet production, this contract for magnet production lines was signed0omanian company.

lhc contract included equipmentanufacture AINiCo ring, cubicle and cylindrical magnetsin massrange that could have supported production of magnets needed for centrifuges. Such magnets, however, also would have had to conform to specific density andrequirements for use in centrifuges.

The second contraci for magnet production lines was signed1clarusian company. Only some of the equipment specified in tlie contraci was received,ress machineixer. The contract had included equipment to producefertile magnets.

ISG has not been able In field evidence In show lhal Ihe machine tools ordered2ewin MIC's Saad Company called Ihe Rotating Machinery Department were intendedenewed centrifuge program, and arailoble informationthat Ihe equipment wat not capable ofsuch work. The equipment sought included machines lor rotary balancing and spm testing, at wellilling machineathe.

Such machines can be used to balance equipment such as turbines,nd comprrssorv They arc also applicable to developing skills useful (or centrifuge design anil testing. Iraq'suclear program used rotary balancingechnology used widely in industrial applications, in development of centrifuges for enrichment of uranium.

The Ibn Younis Center, part of the MIC's Saad Company, tormcd the new Rotating Machine Department inhe deportment svas

'fouril was set up. The intention was torolii center to perform repair and maintenance work on the many compressors, turbines, and other rotating machines in Iraqi industry.

Inr. Khalid Ibrahim Saormercientist, asked about the capability of the balancing machine ordered for ihe newly formed Rotating Machinery Department. ISG has received conflicting information as to whether the inquiry shows interest in its potential useentrifugeor was an attempt to ensure that the equipment did noi violate provisions of CN Sccuriiy Councilnnexl the Ongoing Monitoring and Venlicalion Plan.

Dr.igh-ranking llaaihisi and Secretary ol ihe Industrial Committee al the time, asked the Director General of Ibn Younis Center whether the equipment being sought would violate theof Annexhe Director General asked engineers in the Rotating Machinery Departmeni whether the equipment could be used forThe response from the engineers was "no" because the equipment did not meet therequired for centrifuge use.

The Ibn Younis director, however, reported that Sa'id's involvemeni stemmed from his role as Ihe secretary of the Industrial Comminee. which gave him responsibility tor allocations of foreign currency tor procurements. MK' Dcpul) Director Daghcr sought non-MK* currency allocations lor the Department ol Rotating Machinery purchases, and Sa'id reportedly selected unused IAEC funds for these purchases. Iluwaysh told ISG that it would make noor the IAEC to have used its budget to buy equipment lor tbe MIC

Al 'llhaydi slated in an interview that he wascurious about Su'id's interest toormer engineer in theentrifuge enrichment progiam and member of the Rotating Machinery Department, (or information oninquiries he may have received concerning the reconstitutionentrifuge program.

The purchase by Ihe Rotating Machinerymachinery used purchasing channels that were not theto the suspicion surrounding the order. The MIC. of which the KotalingDepartment was pan. had its own purchasing procedures. Tne order for the machines was placed using IAEC resources for theprocedure that would be outside the normal MIC purchasing procedures. ISfi has not discovered the reason for the alternate purchasing arrangement.

Huwaysh told ISG thai it would make no sense for the IAEC to have used its budget to buy equipment for the MIC.

The Rotating Machinery Department alsoalancing machine, which, at the minimum, would have helped Iraq maintain important skills that could have been appliedenewed centrifuge program. It is not clear whether this machine could balance centrifuge rotors, given that the machine specifications called for balancing much heaver components, upgs. The balancing machine that was ordered by the Ibn Younis Center for the Rotating Machinery Department was never received.

Balancing machines were purchased by al least two other organizations In theIraq declared to the IAEA as not being covered bysee

The Specialized Institute for Engineering Industries (SIEI)ertical-type balancing machineaximum balancing speed0 rpm. This is an engineering support company thatresources for the engineering and industrial sector.

The Factory for the Repair of Jet Engines (FRJE)ertical-type balancing machineaximum balancing speedpm. The mission Of FRJE is to repair various types of jet engines used in the Iraqi Air Force (see.

Table 6

Comparison ot Rotating Machinery Department-Ordered Balancing Machine With UN Sanctions Detailed In the UN Nuclear Controls Known as Annex 3

Diameter".'

mm

mm

Capabii'y

kg

9 log

Speed'

rpm

rpm

Imbalance*

kg/mrrvkg

gVmrrV kg

vo Typo"

and belt options supplied

Centrifugal balancing itisx^anes designed tor balancing llcx*te rotors (Annextemconditions must be met to be prohibited.

0 Centrifugal balancing machines designed for balancing hollow cylindrical rotor components (Annextemconditions musl be met to be prohibited

Investigation of Potential Centrifuge-Related Facilities

ISC investigations of sites related to theentrifuge program did not uncover any attempt to utilize these facilities toenewedeffort ISO site visits revealed significant looting and destruction, which have rendered the sites

Site cxploraiion of the Al-Furat site conducted in3 revealed looting and occupation hy squatters. In theentrifuge assembly hall and cascade had been planned tor Al-Furat. The IAFA removed the centrifuge-related equipment from this site in.

Support Facilities

ISO investigation into known or potential support facilities also found no evidence these sites had been involved in any renewed enrichment work.

Along with research and development and productionentrifuge program wouldarge infrastructure for fabrication, assembly, testing, and material support. The following sites werebecause of their potential as locations where key elements of the reconstiiution could take place:

Shaykhili Storage Facility

Karama State Company

(Al-Wa/iriya Silc (al Samud Factory, Khadimiyah Site (INl-Fatah Factory (Al Quds Factory)

Dasdr and Umm Al-Marik Staic Companiesd Military Production Plant)

Al-Tahadi State Company

Salah al-Din State Company (Samarra Electronics Plant)

Al-Nida State Company

Nassr State Company

(Taji Steel Fabrication Plant)

State Company

lAn-Nasiriyah Aluminum Fabrication Plant)

Ash Shaykhili Storage Facility

Ash Shaykhili Storageto Operation Iraqistocks ol fluorine. Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoridend UFR cylinders in.lso contained aventilation system with scrubbers, which would be ideal for pilot-scale development of UFftprocess. In the, the IAEA cither destroyed or collected centrifuge components from various sites across Iraq and placed ihem in storage at Ash Shaykhili. The IAEA inspectors, upon returning to Iraq inetailed inspection of the Ash Shaykhili storage site and made several more inspections of the siie in

In latehe site was surveyed byforces, which found it damaged and bunted from bombing and looting. Also in earlyn ISG team relumed lo Ash Shaykhili to assess the condition of. They found that the contents ofad been burned and everything insidead been removed, except for portions of the air-handling duct work (see.

The results of errvtionmenial samples taken at27B, during the3 ISG site visit,the presence of fluorides at live sile. which wc suspect are ihe result ofctivities. ISG did not find lhat any nuclear-related activity had been established here and based on the current condition of the Ash Shaykhili, ISG concludes that it would not be able to suppon any centrifuge activities without major rework.

Al Karama Slate Company

'Ihc al Karama Siate Company consists of several facilities that have precision machining capabilities. Al Karama's subordinate facilities arc:

Waziriyah Site (al Karama Missile and Electmnics Plain 1.

Khadimiyah Site (Ibn Al-IIaytliam Missileandenter).

Al Samud Factory (Abu Ghurayb Missile and GSE Suppon Facility).

AI Fatah Factory.

Although lite facilities associated with the Al Karama State Company continued to funciion during. ISC did noi find that any of these siics were used toranium enrichment program.

Al-VVazeriyaShe

An ISG exploitation team visited the Karama Al-Waz-eriya Site in early3 and concluded that the site appeared to have been abandoned for at least several months. According io one source at this site, no missiles were produced at the facility after the site was bombed during Operation Dcscn Foxraq did not rebuild the missile production capability at Al-Wzaeriya after Dcscn Fox, and instead used Ihe site as the headquarters for Al Karama.

Khadimiyah Site (Ibn Al-Haythamenter)

The Khadimiyah Site was pan of the al Karama State Company and Iraq's primary' ptoduction andfacility for ihe al Samud and al Samud II Short-Range Ballistic Missilehe facility suffered damage from Coalition air strikes in late

Al Samud Faclory (Abo Ghurayb Missile Facility) Al Samud Factory was Iraq's primary al Samudproduction facility. The al Samud Factory was significantly damaged during Operation Iraqiby Coalition air strikes in laieSG visited the sile on3 and verified both the bomb damage and the effects of the massive looting.

Badr and Umm Al-Marik State Companies (Khan Azad Military Production Plant)

Badr fabricated mechanical components for theas centrifuge program and initially retained flow-forming capability after Operation Desert Storm. Such flow-formingthey beenthrough thehave been used for making metal rotors. ISG has not found lhat these machines were used for fabrication of rotors for gas centrifugesenewed centrifuge program. Site visits conducted in3 revealed that the site was in severe disarray (seend could not function again without extensive renovations.

Al Quds Factory.

a hadi Slate Company

Al-Tahadi was established5 by ihe MIC Formerngineers from Tarmiyah wereio ihis facility where they continued iheir work on electiomagneiic devices and transformers and their research on permanent magnets. Al-Tahadiood lab for measurement of magnetic properties ihaiomputerized system that could measure the magnetic properties of hard and soli materials. Al-Tahadi was looted, and no documents or equipment remain at the site.

Rashid State Company's Tho Al-Fiqar Factory tformerly the Nassr Stale Establishment Mechanical Plant)

Prior to Operation Insert Storm, the machining plant al Nassr produced centrifuge and EMIS components for Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Alter Operation Desen Storm, an IAEA inspection learn foundHow-forming machines. Inn ISCi exploitation team visiied ihis site. The learn found lour flow formers, none of which were functional because they lacked parts.

Al Din State Company (Samarra Electronics Plant)

The Salah al-Din Company is anompany located near Samarra that produced radar equipmeni. antennae for various purposes, communicationprinted circuit boards for electronic equipmeni. and plastic covers for agricultural purposes.of ihis site in3 confirmed ihai lhe plant appeared to produce different types of electronics and electronic components for various uses. The presence of certain industrial chemicals seems to bewith ihc lypcs of industry found al the facility. The facility itself appeared lo be in reasonably good shape. Ihis site did not suffer from some of ihe large-scale looting and scavenging prevalent in other facilities.

Al-Nida State Company

This facility, along with the Rashid Slate Company's Tho Al-Fiqar Factory, had general-purpose machine shops utilizing CNC lathes. CNC milling centers, hydraulic presses, welding equipment, coordinate measuring machines, qualiiy-con!rol laboratories, nondestructive testing equipmeni. and CAD/CAM computers prior to Ihc recent war. Such facilities would be necessaryeconstituted centrifuge program. An ISG team visited the Al-Nida site in laic3 and found lhat the eniire planl had been systematically looted of all equipment, computers, and documents.

Also found were seven, live-axis machine tools. Ihe Iraqis assisting the team mentioned that the live-axis machine tools could noi function as designed. Ihc learn also found two-axis milling machines, four Hartford milling machines (two vertical and iwond large stamping and press machines for serial production of tail fins for rockets.

The learn aho found thousands ofHI-mm aluminum tubes. The Iraqis stated that on the0 lubes were classified as refected tubes or lubes that did not pass prescribed testing. The Iraqis staled that Iheypercent acceptance rate of domesticallymm tubes. Figureonfunctioning flow former at Tho Al-Fiqar. aluminum tubes for SI-mm rockets,ullymm rockei.

lir Slate Company (An-Nasiriyah Aluminum Fabrication Plant)

Iraq attempted io indigenously produce aluminum lubes formm rocket program by using the extrusion facilities at Ur Stale Company. Theequipmeni reportedly was designed to extrude3 type aluminum alloy; thus, attempts made5 aluminum alloy (the type required for centrifuges) were unsuccessful.

Uranium

ISG judges lhal Ihe Iraqi Regime did noi attempt lo reconstitute the EMIS programlthough many of the former EMIS engineers and scientists still worked for eitherC or MIC in roles thai could preserve their technical skills. These technical skills, if maintained, would have helped build the foundationuture nuclearprogram and would have allowed scientists louclear program further up the learning curve. Since Operation Iraqi Freedom, significant looting and damage have occurred at most of ttw dual-use manufacturing facilities that supported theMIS program. There are no indications that the Iraqi Regime attempted to preserve the EMIS technology cither through former EMIS scientists and researchers or by retaining technical documents and historical tiles on the former EMIS program, although one scientist associated with thisrogram appears to have unilaterally kept relevant records and some parts that would have been useful lo restarting such an effort.

Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS)

The electromagnetic isotope separation process (EMISl was the primary technology used by the Iraqis for uranium enrichment in Iheiruclear program. This process was chosen because of the availability of this technology in open literature and the technical capabilities of the Iraqis. Inource containing solid uranium tetrachlorides electrically heated to produce L> ions. The ions arc accelerated by an electrical potential lo high speed. These charged particlesircular trajectoryagnetic field as shown inhe diameter of the circle depends upon the strength of thefield, the velocity of the ion. and the mass of the ton. The ions accumulate after passing through slit apenurcs al the collector.

An EMIS system includes the following processes:

Uoiopcequipment used to separate the uranium isotopes (see.

Chemical recovery- chemical processes used to remove uranium from separator collectors (see Figureor type of collector used in Iraqi

Uraniumto convert the uranium removed from lhc separator collectorsorm lhat is usable either in further enrichment equipment or olhcr downstream processes.

A (low diagram of theraqi EMIS process, shown inemonstrates the various steps. Iraq conducted its research anil development into the EMIS process at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center and wasroduction-scale uranium enrichment facility atuplicate sile under development at Ash Sharqat,eed materialplant near Mosul called Al-Jazira.

A schematic of the Iraqi EMIS separators setup is shown in

Facilities

TheMIS project consisted of three primary production sites. These sites included the Al Safa'a EMIS Plant uranium enrichment facility at Tarmiya (isotope separation and uraniumhc Al Fajr EMIS Plant uranium enrichment facility at Ash Sharqat (isotope separation and uraniumand the Al-lazira feed material production plant near Mosul. Ash-Sharqat was being builtackup facility to Tarmiya. Also, several sites were utilized for fabrication of equipment needed for EMIS. including the Zaafataniya Mechanical Workshop, the Zaafaraniya Power Supply Production Facility, and Al-Radwan (Batra Military Production Feed Plant).

Al Safa'a KMIS Plant at Tarmiya

The Al Safa'a EMIS Plant uranium enrichmentat Tarmiya was designed lo pnxluce enriched uranium for tbe Iraqi nuclear weapons program, using the EMIS process. It was externally complete by1 but was not fully operational. The plant had two types of EMIS buildings: alpha units) for primary uranium enrichment and beta unitss) for enriching material produced by lhc alpha units to weapons-grade

First siage

stage

Chemical Conversion

Separators

(Depleted)

. F3

w2

4 (Depleted)

Process

Process

low diagram ofttte Iraqi EMIS process.

he Al Safa'a EMIS Plant uraniumfacility at Tarmiya was in Ihc process0 separation uniis. with eight units completed and functioning. An Iraqi mechanical engineer, working ai the site, estimated thatoercent of the equipment in the building was destroyed hy1 Gulf war. IAEA inspectors also supervised lhc destruction of EMIS equipmentin

The EMIS facilities occupied most of Ihc central portion of ihe Tarmiya site. The shell of the large alpha-enrichment building is located near the northern entrance of the facility |scc. The damaged shell of the smaller beta enrichment building is in the south-central portion of the facility.

Most of the major buildings ul Tarmiya weredamaged by coalition air strikes during Desert Storm. Int was rendered inoperable under lhc UN-mandated destruction.he plant engaged ostensibly in chemical pilot plantdesign, and low-volume productionumber of specially chemicals for Iraq's weapons programs (see.

In laicenior Iraqi researcher ai Ibn Sina staled loan ISG team lhat.3e hadmall processing line consisting ofixer-settlers in which he produced "very pure-phosphoric acid.e claimed to haveecond phosphoric acid purification line using packed columns instead of mixer/settlers (see. According to the researcher, theline was dismantlednd the equipment (the mixcr-scitlers) was placed in siorage (see. The researcher claimed that any extracted uranium was treated as an impurity and disposed of as part of the waste generated by the processes.

There were no indications of any renewed uranium enrichment operalions al Tarmiya. ISG did learn, however,hosphoric acid purification study conducted in livet the she thatwhat Iraqi staff described as an "'insignificant" amount of uranium that was diluted and discharged down si ream as waste.

Al Fajr EMIS Plant at Ash Sharqat

The Al Fajr EMIS Plant uranium enrichmentat Ash Sharqat was constructed toeplica of the Tarmiya site. The Iraqi's decided late7 to execute this project lo serve two purposes:o replace Tarmiya if the latter is rendered completely nonoperatis'e for whatever reason, oro serveackup to enhance production when required. The Al Fajr EMIS Plant main production buildings were destroyed during Desert Storm and in accordance with UN Sccurily Councilccording lo Iraq's declarations, inilial installation of EMIS separators at Ash Sharqat was to begin only after Tarmiya separators had been installed. The sile has not been rebuilt as of

Al-Jazira (Mosul Teed Materials Production Facility)

Al-Jazira. Mosul Feed Materials Production Facility) was established to produce nuclear feed materials for the EMIS program, namely UO, andhe facility was built innd pui into operation

he MIC took conirol of this facility, and il was subordinated to the General Establishment for Extraction Operations. The primary purpose for this

facility was to extract taw iron from lhe iron-rich ores around the area of Mosul. Wc know from IAEA inspections lhal ihc facility had also been converted1 lo make pigments for paint. Inonirol of lhe planl was transferred from the Stale Establishment for Extraction and Mining(5EEMO) lo Al-Kindi State Establishment in Mosul.he name of this facility was changed lo the Center for Extraction. The purpose of thecontinued lo be ihe extraction of iron oxide from scrap metal. Additionally, the facility engaged in the research for the production of hydrochloric acid.his facilily was renamed (lie Al-Ramia Factory.

As of latehe facility included buildings associated with administration, eleciricity generation, ammonia production, hydrochloric acid production, waste storage, and chemical laboratories. Extensive looiing had occurred throughout the buildings and some structural components (such as piping) had been ripped out. Although portions of this sile remained active. ISG has not uncovered any evidence that this site has been used for any fissile material processing

At-Zawra State Company

The Zaafaraniyah Power Supply Production Facility (also known1 asAI-DijjIa and renamed Zawra Electronics Plantas designed to produce electronic componenls for Ihe Iraqi uraniumprogram using the EMIS method. The factory became operational byhe facilily was capable of manufacturing electronic switch gear and high-voltage power supplies for EMIS-

The Zawra facility was inspected by ISG ini had been severely damaged by vandals and looters. Several industrial machines were found on site and therearehouse for parts. Mosl of ihe warehouses and machine shops were empty al the plant. The Zawra site docs employ civilian workers and is trying lo become productive again.

Al-Nida State Company (Zaafaraniya Mechanical Workshop AI-RaWyah)

The Al-Nida Statu Company (ZaafaraniyahWorkshoplso known) as Zaafaraniyah Nuclear Fabrication Facilityproduced vacuum chambers and components

for Iraq's EMIS program. The facility was capable of manufacturing major metal components for the EMIS process. The status of the facility as of3 is shown in

An ISG team visited the Al-Nida State Company site in late3 and found that the entire plant had been systematically looted of all equipment,and documents.

A IK ad wan (Batra Military Production Facility)

The Al-Radwan (Batra Military Productionproduced components for Iraq's EMIS program. This facility was not damaged during Operation Iraqi Freedom; however, since early summerhe installation was subjected to massive looting, which destroyed or damaged the critical elements needed to restan production operations. At leastercent of the fabrication and production buildings had (heir roof material stripped and their internal components removed. The remaining buildings were lightly to moderately damaged during the looting.

Al-Nassr Al-Adhim State Company

Al-Nassr Al-Adhim Stale Company, known pnor7 as the State Enterprise for Heavy Engineering Equipment (SEHEE) and also known as Daura.arge heavy equipment fabrication and metallurgical facility lhat was used to produce vacuum chambers for themm separators. This facility was not damaged during Operation Iraqi Freedom. ISG exploitation teams visited the site in4 and observed process equipment (tanks, piping, industrial materials, and chemicals) stored at the site but did not uncover any evidence of activities associatedranium enrichment program.

Disposition of EMIS-Relatcd Equipment

Equipmcni and components from Iraq'sMIS enrichment program remained in IraqSC has not discovered any effort by the Iraqi Regime to use these items to reconstitute an EMIS enrichment program. TheMIS project required several types of components andsuch as power supplies, ton sources, control systems, magnet field coils, magnets, magnet poles, return iron, ovens (for vaporizing theacuum systems (pumps, liners, vacuum chambers,nd material collector assemblies. In the, IAEA inspectors collected and cither destroyed or had Ihe equipment transferred from the various EMIS facilitiesuwaitha, Tarmiya. Ash Sharqat. Al-lazira) to Ash Shaykhili and Al-Nafad (open area adjacent to Ash Shaykili) for storage. Inhe Iraqis transferred some of the EMIS components (ring-shaped coils; no disks) stored at Ash Shaykhili lo the Al Shahced Staterass and cupper products company. Most likely, this transfer was accomplished to salvage copper from Ihc EMIS coils for other industrial needs. ISG found an Iraqi video that showed scrap material identified as copper and coils at Al-Shaheed Stale Company in2 being colleclcd and disposed ofmeller.

Laser Research in Iraq

The Iraqi government al Ihe lime of Operation Iraqi Freedom was supporting laser research andwork in mililary and industrial applications. ISG found no evidenceenewed laser isotope separation (LIS) program to enrich uranium.

* ISG believes lhalew Iraqi scientists have the knowledge and experience lo recommence an LIS projeci. Furthermore, Ihc technology and infrastructure to suppon an LIS programt appear to exist in Iraq.

Related Work After Desert Storm

After Operation Desert Storm, laser work that hail been under way in the IAEC as part of an effort to enrich uranium inas transferred toand to the MIC. The various laser projects conducted al these organizations allowed the Iraqis to retain much of their technical know-how in laser technology.

r. Falahformer head ofesearch effons lo enrich uranium withHusayn Kamil to provide additional funding for thescr group.laimed high-power lasers could he used for air defense as well as for enrichment, seeming to imply lhat there were other, valuable uses of lasers and laserin the Iraqi mililary and industrial complex, llusayn Kamil agreedhe additional funding, perhaps lo Icam ifould further develop laser technologysable uranium enrichment method.

n IAEC Optical ('enter was established al lhe University of Baghdad. Hamta's laser projeci was transferred to the Optical Center, andecame one of the Center's Group leaders.

aser projects in Iraq weremoved fromFC to the MIC and7 were physically consolidated al lhe Laser Research Center. It was later named Ihctateand became known as the Ibn Khaldun Laser Center.as co-locaied al the Alwiyah Drug Industrial Center Ibn Al Baytar.

According to Ihc MIC Director Dr. Huwaysh, Al Razi engaged lhe Technology University lo assisl in laser projects. The Dean of the Physics Departmentil lion-dinar coniraci. which was the largest contract MR? hadniversityThis occurred sometime after laser research was stancd al

The former Minister of Education. Dr. Humam 'Abd Al-Khaliq Ahd Al-Ghafur. staled that the Dean of the Plasma and Laser Institute at Baghdad University, up until Operation Iraqi Freedom, was Dr. Nati 'Abd Al-Lalif Tillah and thai Ihc Baghdad University of Technology also conducted laser research. Ine stated lhat he was noi aware of any nuclear-rel3lcd research beingal these institutes.

According an interview with Dr. Nafi 'Abd Al-Lalif Wall. Dean of Baghdad University's Instituic for Laser and Plasma Studies inaser research was conducted ai several loca-lums including lhe Baghdad University Institute lor Laser and Plasma Studies, Ihc Baghdad University of Teehoology, Muslansiriyah University, and at lhe Al-Razi Company. Tilfah staled, however, thai he was not aware of any US-rclalcd laser work being conducted ai these institutions.

A knowledgeable source indicated that some of the important learn members ofS team were working on the developmentopper vapor laser (CVL)7 altechnology wiih potential applications lo LIS. Ihis work continued untilith ihc successful dcvclopmcmVL designed loye laser. The CVL dcvclopmcm effort was led by an liaqi scientist, who successfully operated aCVL in March orhe scientistemonstration ofwan CVL to MIC Director Huwayshhe CVL system rcpoiiedly was placed inio storage2 in an adjacent underground facilily. In April or Mayhc underground facility adjacent to the main Al-Razi facility was visiied and found to have been looted, and equipmeni was missing. The Iraqi scientist slated lhal after the CVL demonstration he workedarium vapor laser up until Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The Iraqi scieniisi said LIS work was never done at Al-Razi. He also slated that Huwaysh expresslysuch work and, therefore, no one would have attempted LIS. The Iraqi scientist also indicated he would have been aware of any such work at other facilities because he was the only laser researcher in Iraqunctioning CVL.

The Iraqi scientist indicated no written repons were produced on the Al-Razi CVL work. Exploitation of documents from Al-Razi contains very fewof LIS or uranium isotope information, and no mention of the CVL development work has been found in these documents.

Inraq pursued various laser application. However, US and its nuclear application does not appear to have been part of this work.

According to one scieniisi. who staned working at Al-Raziaser work for mililarysuch as jamming, range finding,and guidance was being conducted al Al-Razi. Also, according to the same scientist, one group at Al-Razi was workingarbon dioxideaser for an antimissile defense project. 'Ihis projeci reportedly was abandoned because of technical problems.

I jser work also was being done with Nd-YAG and Nd-Glass lasers at Al-Razi. Additionally, anusing hydrogen fluoride and deuterium fluoride lasers for an antimissile defense program was being studied.

Current Status and Future Potential

* Although Al-Razi was not damaged duringIraqi Freedom, it was heavily looted afterward.

Iraq'sIS Efforts

Beginningraq committed significant resources to exploring ihe use of LIS techniques for enriching uranium. 'Ihis work was prompted by then Vice President of the Iraqi Atomic EnergyDr. Humam 'Abd Al-Khaliq 'Abd Al-Ghafur. LIS techniques Hut were under development included atomic vapor laser isotopeVI. IS; and molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS).

TheseIS efforts were under the auspices of the IAEC. raiher than thehe LIS program was terminatedK.

The results ofAEA On -Site Inspection in Iraq led to the conclusion that ihe level of skills, equipment, and infrastructuresraq vsas totally inadequate tn the puisuu of any meaningful activity in LIS

A report written by Dr. Faleh Hassan Hamza has revealed the results of (lie former Iraqi AVLIS effort werelearn could not confirm thai uranium was actually separated. The MLISsuccessfully enriched sulfur hut could not achieve rcpcatablc results with uranium. Based on these experiments.eview of theow ledge of LIS, concluding lhal Iraq had neither the technology infrastructure nor the capability tn purchase the necessary equipment to achieve success with LIS. The laser work slopped

few former LIS scientists remain In Iraq, but the equipment and facilities needed to reconstitute an LIS program are extremely limited. For example:

Following Operation Iraqi Freedom, the CVL that had been demonstrated to theirector inas reportedly stolen from the underground facility in which il was placed. ISG was unable lo determine Ihe location or the current staius of the CVL

Kail Gun Summarv

Iraq's efforts to develop rail guns appear to have been for air defense, but ISG found thaiestablished to partly support an IAEC project led b> Dr. Khalid Ibrahimhead or Iraq'suclear weapons design andcould build skills neededenewed nuclear weapons effort.

ISG has not uncovered information lhat shows lhalork on rail guns in ihcas panenewed nuclear weaponssome of ihc reporting acknowledges ihis potential.

Rail gun equipment and materials uncovered by ISG similarly do noi appear to have been partuclear weapons design and oevelopmeni effort, evenewfurtherthe potential of supporting such work.

Theoretically, the rail gun could provide the range and altitude capability to shoot down aircralt in the no-flya reported goal of Saddam's (see inset).

Rail Gun Efforts

Multiple sources and captured documents indicate that, iaa'idroject under Ihe IAEC toail gun, an experimental device that, if further developed, could, in theory, have applications including nuclear weapons research and antiaircraft weapons. The IAEC rail gunAl Muharek al Khati or'"lhe Lineartwo primaryaboratory at the Roland Missile facility near the Rashid Air Basemall facility within former residential compound outside the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center. The Roland site was destroyed by Coalition bombing inhile the facilily outside oflhe 'Technical Research Branch" was the subject of an ISG site visit in

know from postwar dcbriclings that Sa'id used lhe Technical Research Branch as headquarters of the IAEC rail gun project. Documents found ai lhe site and former scientists involved in the work indi-caic thai Dr. Karim Kalif Mohamid was ihe head of lhe photography unit of the Technical Research Branch.

Numerous Iraqi scientists interviewed hy ISG stated that the IAEC rail gun was an effort to develop an antiaircraftpoint that we believe is supported by documents captured al ibe Technical Research Branch and at lAEC's headquarters atei of papers found ai thewc have determined were wriiicn bylhe rail gunntiaircraft work for lhe Ministry of Defense. Former scientists involved in ihc effon indicate ai least iwo progress reports were submitted io ihe Air Defense Commander. Lieutenant General Shahccn. These same sources, as well as documentary information found by ISG, indicate Shaheen visited Use IAEC rail gun projeci (sec inset on Saddam's Interest in Antiaircraft Weapons).

Olher indications ine rail gun project was intended lor antiaircraft apphcalions include the needechnical cadre specialized in airlan lo locate the work at the air defense site at the al Rashid Military Camp, and the intent ioisual device lo target Ihetoinapers. The document also notes plans in early9 io lest ihe rail gun on what appears to be salvaged military aircraft from an airplane repair company.

An Iraqi scientist told ISG thai the IAEC rail gun project was one of many projects at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center lhat were supported by lhe Ministry of Defense. The same source indicates any scientist could suggest an air defensea means to oblain extra funding and

that Ihe IAEC rail gun was

intended for antiaircraft use, the project preserved skills that couldenewed nuclear weapons design effort. Given his past leadership in the nuclear weapons program, ISG believes that Sa'id clearly

Saddams Interest in Antiaircraft Weapons

The antiaircraft application Is consistent with Saddam's reported intense interest in air defense technologies. One scientist told ISG that Saddam became obsessed withapability to shoot down an enemy aircraft in the no-fiv tone and had challenged the siirnnbc community lo rally around thai goal Saddam reportedls believed that achievingapability would render the no-fry toneandhange in political climate that would hasten the lifting of sanctions

Fadil al-Janatn.headofthe IAECndicates lhal Saddam would often attend monthly meetings with his sim Qusay to discuss air defensefanabi also claims in have last attended in lebruarv.

Fadil al-Janahi indicates that Saddam tasked himevelop knowledge in atomic energy areas andair defense projects. Air defense was the lAEC's number-one priority.

understood lhat his rail gun projeci also dealt with technical subject areas applicable lo nuclearresearch. In one section of tent that sve suspect was part of his proposal to build the IAEC rail gun. Sa"id refers to work on gassimpler des'iccs that also can accelerate projectiles to high speeds.

Sa'id's notes describe thatgun work had been planned for al Athccr ite where he and his staff had planned to design, develop, and assemble nuclear weapons as part of theeapons program. Iras) planned to use gas gunsesearch tool for itsuclear weapons program.

Accordingcientist involved with lhc rait gun program, Sa'id also indicated one of ihe objectives of the project was toew generation oflAEC scientists in applied physics. One source indicated that working on the rail gun projeci was likea seminar where staff could learn new subjects such as plasma physics, electrical engineering, motion physics, high-speed photography. and Hash

Documentation found at the Technical Research Branch also describes work in each of these areas but noted tn the context of an air defense project (see inset on Technical Research Branch).

A proposalycar effort io recruit and train university students was also found at ihe Technical Research Branch site.

C Technical Research Branch

Accordingocument captured by ISG. the IAEC Technical Research Branch consisted of variousunits, which include:

Photography Unit: The aim of Ihis unit was lo strengthen ihe scientific tesis on various physics phenomena for the purpose of treating themontage and also to study iheof standard and digital cameras.

Pressure Measuring Unit: Aimed at counling the pressure of various materials and their mechanical specifications.

X-ray Unit: Aimed at undying mattercounting ihe speed of moving bodies, and the natural behavior of movemenl of ihese bodiesay photography.

Electronic Unit: Aimed al testing and measur ing electrical specifications (resistance, induction, voltage, and currenil and also repair of electronic instruments and computers.

Programming: Tltis unit dealt with ihe physical pmblrms ami factors that affect scientific program

One Iraqi scientist told ISG that Sa'id's rail gun pursuits were more personalty motivated because he was nearing tbe end of his professional career and he wanted to increase his stature with Sarldam. Ihis source indicates Sa'id may have wanted to leave his markigh-profileshooting down

a Coal iiion aircraft. Another Iraqi scientist noted that, even though Sa'id had been removed from the IAEC after reaching the compulsory retirement age ine continued to run the rail gun project and eventually Saddam reinstated him at the IAEC.

Postwar document exploitation efforts reveal Sa'id applied-probably in latea position as Uie Director General of the Industrial Comminee. His application details work experience9oting his work on the IAEC rail gunas well as work on Iraq's "complete, final, and inclusive document for the canceledSG doubts that Sa'id would have needed to pursue the new job or need reinstatement if he had been panoncerted Iraq effort to restart Baghdad's nuclear weapons program.

Sa'id managed, nonetheless, lo initiate his IAEC projectore experienced rail gun effort having been reinitiated under the MIC atAl Tahadieporting from former scientists in the rail gun program suggests that the IAEC project seems to have been the favored effort as the leaders of the MIC project reportedly were asked to join the IAEC rail gun program. At least one scientist from the Al Tahadi rail gun project reportedly also was tasked to assist the IAEC. participating in three meetings between1 andhe same source indicates the Al Tahadi effort also provided equipment to the IAEC rail gun (see inset on MIC's Rail Gun Projects and.

Documentation found at the Technical Research Branch also indicates an agreement was being discussed to have Al Tahadi repair and examine ihc IAEC rail gun.

ISG has found only tenuous indicators that would suggest the rail gun was part of an effort touclear weapons program. One Iraqi scientist recalled Sa'id's role in gas gun work for lheuclear weapons program and though! it possible that the rail gun would be appliedimilar research effort. Documents found by ISG also indicate the IAEC rail gun effort was associatedumber of scientists from the former nuclear weapons design and development program including other former members of Iraq'suclear weapons program (see inset on Tappingxpertise).

coas-aoctsorsal Vow ofAJ-Taheet rat gun snowvg how Pti ruts ars fietdnutatoet and metal supportsnow obUuned from Hahd Hadi Jas-m

on iniorrrunirin gathered mrough

documents, ISG has determined lhat (hr IAEC rail gun cflortlassified program, and at least pan of it was code-named Projectreminiscent of how Iraq classified itsuclear weaponscientist associaled with the tail gun project claims the rail gun project was classified not because of the sensitivity of ils application orappears to have been drawn from open literaturelo create an aura of importance.

source associated with the rail gun effon recalled an emergency meeting called by Sa'id Hithe authority of Husaynhe former head of Iraq's WMD programs ro ask about the feasibility of manufacturing man-made diamonds. When told the project was impractical. Sa'id reportedly indicated this was why ihe rail gun project was needed. Some types of artificialproduction technologykills similar to those needed in developing nuclear weapons.

An ISO Inspection of the Technical Research Branch facility in3 found evidence of new dual-use laboratories and equipment. When further developed, these dual-use technologies could possibly have been useduclear weaponsprogram, especially in the area of hydro-dynamic testing Other activiries discovered at the laboratory were clearly devoted lo rhc IAEC rail gun projeci

Rather than using official IAEC channels. Sa id privately contacted outside contractors to acquire several key pieces of equipment for iheResearch Branchsuspicious approach but one lhal we cannot linkenewed nuclear weapons effort. TnVay machine, for example. Sa'id contractedrustedormercientist- working at the University of Itchnotaf) in Baghdad. This colleague contracted with former coworkers at the Ibn Fimas Company for work done under contraci to the university. The projectwas kept secret from the director of Ihc Ibn Fimas Companyeans to provide Sa'id with financial cover.

A colleague of Said also ccotracted with the Alar Company toiming device using laser diodes lu measure the speed of the rail run projectile. The Al Oaiwaregistered in the name of the wife of one of the Ibn Fimas employees that had worked on theay system.

One colleague of Sa'id -an expert in material* analysis-ontract from Said loaboratory for impact behavior studies. IVl of this contiaciun device to measure the impact of projectiles on various matenals. This became the pressure measuring unit of theResearch Branch Infonnaiionenior official in lhc rail gun program indicates this unit was limited in its ability lo gather materialkind of data of interestenewed no. Icar weaponsof thei*iri>osbcr%pjipmcM (see Figures

Tappingxpertise for the IAEC Kail Gun

Sa'id may have turned to former members of Iheuclear weapons program, eodenamedora variety offrom established competence, personal and professional relations, or even some hidden intent lo tap this expertise toew cadre of nuclear scientists. Debriefings of Iraqis associated With the rail gun project and captured documenis reveal the following formerre connected to the effort:

Khalluq Ka'ufhead ofroup 2B. responsible for Electromagnetic IsotopeMIS I. Hamdi saved as Sa'id's deputy on the rail gun project and the head of the IAEC Technical Research Branch.

' Dr. Sahahtrusted colleague of Sa'id and another formerowderspecialist. Sabah reportedly cmttracied with Sa'id for the production of projectiles for the IAEC railay machine, and shock physics laboratory.

Dr. Abdullahhead ofroupApplied Physics'/and weaponizution theoretician. Ktiitdush had irsponsibtltttes for heat transfer issues.

BasilDirecior ai the Saad Center. al-Qaisi was associated with the fainting of lhe rail gun project.

Dr. Faris Aziz alformer official in theentrifuge prugram-an effortoutside ofnd the nuclear weapons design effort. Dr. Farts was the director general

of Al-Shahid Company that produced copper and brass products. Accordingaptured document, he was to provide oxygen- free copper for the rail gun projeci.

formerentrifuge design engineer who, accordingaptured document, reviewed designs for the rail gun project inenior scientist associated with lhe rail gun project indicates thai Jamai Ja 'far was one of two highly regarded engineers in Iraq who could be broughtariety tifprojects for consultation.

Accordingormer senior official involved with the effort,C antiaircraft project was focused on improving the efficiency of the rail gun and making it more transportable in the years before the war, rather lhan conducting materials experiments like those used in nuclear weapons research. Overall efficiency lor convening electrical energy inio pro-jeclilc speed was poor, estimated al only one to three perceni. accordingormer senior oflicial involved with the program.

In an cfTorl lo reduce the size of lhe rail gun so ii could he weaponi/ed for use on the hackm antiaircrafi gun frame, the Iraqis considered the use of homopular generators to replace ihc hulkyofmade up the research device. Iraqteady progression of huilding homopolar generators in sires5 mega Joules,ega joules, toega joules, but none of these items reportedly were completed because of the lack of precision machinery.

The same official indicates that materials work was limited al the Technical Research Branch and that, because of limitations in lhe availability ofequipment, these tests primarily consisted of studying lhe impacts caused by projectiles on steel plates, ('rude approaches to the study of materials using piezoelectric materials were reported.

Sa 'id's documents refer to the need to conduct experiments aboveeter-per-second limit posed by theuclear controls, specifically calling for speeds as high0 meters per second. ISG believes that this velocity range was used for calculations to estimate the electricalneeded toaboratory research tool lor cxplonng the relationships between projectile mass and barrel length as found in references made later in the document.

IAEC projeci reportedly used three differentsquare annulus barrels measuringm andm, as wellircularm in diameter. Accordingenior official involved in the projeci, Iraq attained ils best results with the circular barrel, which was able lo8 gram polycarbonate projectilepeed of 8K5 meters per second (see Figureum-mari/.ing the Iraqi Rail Gun progress).

Dr. Klmlid Ibrahim Sa 'idenior Ba 'alh Party leader with ties to the Presidency. Prior lo the first Gulf war, he had sersed as head ofroanhe nuclear weapon design and development group, and. after spending most ofs Director of Research in MIC. became Secretary to the Industrial Commiiiee. which coordinated projects between the production ministries. Sa 'id was reportedly killedoalition roadblock

Alternate View Of Science Projects and The Rail Gun

Il should be noted that some senior scientists believed Ihe Rail Gun projeci had neithermerit nor utility as an air defense weapon. In

r. 'Amir Hammudi Hasan al-Sa'di. former Presidential Siientific Advisor, commented on science projects and the Rail Gun in particular. 'Amir said that the stale of scientific research in Iraq had declined after the ON imposed sanctions on Iraq following1 Gulfnew generation of scientists could noi distinguish between validating an idea and bemg able lo mass-produce and deliver systems. He further said that Sadrlam had decreed lhal any scientist wiih an rdecr could make thairesent to the presidency. Special-interestthose who Stood to benefit from thewould then press for its adoption.

nowledgeable person did not step in toallcientifically Invalid project, the project would proceed. Specifically. 'Amir mentioned ihe rail gun and certain decoys as examples of poorly developed concepts crafted to win Saddam's support and gamer funds. 'Amir lamented that such programs wasted resources and efforts. In an earlier interview 'Amir assessment was more direct; he staled lhal the rail gun was "obviously not "for use against aircrafi and viewed the idea as ridiculous. 'Amir said he did not know what the purpose of the rail gun was but suggested lhal it wasorthless project that someone thought up just to get more funding.

raqi raH gun progress.

Issues Related to Nuclear Weapons Design and Development

ISG judges lhal Iraq has noi worked on nuclear weapons designSG investigated Iraq's nuclear weapon design and component manufacture capabilities through interviews with scientists and other government employees, site visits ofIraq nuclear weapon facilities, and exploitation of captured documents.

Casting Technology

ISG has noiaterials research andcomponent manufacturing capability lhat would be required touclear weaponsWorking with molten highly enriched uranium requires special consideration for criiicality during the melting and solidification process. ISG found no evidence that Iiaq had acquired or developed theof dealing with casting and machining issues of higfdy enriched uranium.

Iraq'suclear programs experimented with crucibles and with vacuum induction furnaces, both imported and indigenously constructed, to varying degrees of success, to produce components in molds. Several types of crucibles and crucible materials were used in casting experiments with metallic uranium.

An Iraqi scientist provided ^formation to ISG that is consistent with other sources that Iraqi nuclear program work ul Al Athccr was just getting started in1 and that uranium metal casting work was accomplished within the limitations of the equipment at hand. Iraqi scientists encountered difficulties in use of vacuum casting furnaces to melt uranium metals prior to pouring into molds and with the molds. According to inspections, several small spherical and cylindrical pieces were produced, but ol relatively poor quality asto void and impurity inclusions.

Accordingraq's CAFCD addendumew Ceramics and Alloys Section hat) been formed under thehysics and Materials Directorate0 lo investigate ceramic coating of metals. ISG was unable to determine if the investigations were directed toward solvingroblems lhal Iraqis encountered in pouring ol uranium metal iwo molds during the casting process.

An ISG inspection team visited the South Taji industrial complex and searched for evidence of uranium metal production capabilities and nuclear-weapon-related component production.esult of building damage, looting, and prior removal of equipment, ISG was not able to accurately, assess the prewar functions of tbe facility.

An ISG inspection team visited the south Taji industrial complex and searched for evidence of uranium metal production capabilities and nuclear-weapon-related component production.esult of building damage, looting, and prior removal of equipment, ISG was not able lo accurately assess the prewar functions of the facility.

Explosivens Fabrication Capabilities

ISG has not identified any explosive lensrffort in Iraq that was associatedenewed nuclear weapons program. ISG has

found, howoer. that Ihc Al Qudsnew MJC establishment createdad adepartment, which built an explosive testcapable ol conducting research.acility appears well suited for types of explosive research that could be applicable to conventional military and nuclear weapons research.

Accordingaptured letter, the Generalof the lAFCTechnical Research Branchhree person group to the new Al Ouds Company to "conduct test* and checks" in

Iraq has maintained explosive development activities supporting conventional military weapons systems. This could beual-use activity, and

although not us exacting in tolerance requirements, the technology could be reapplied to explosive lenses Tor nuclear applications.

ISO has not resolved the issue of missing explosive lens mold drawings of concern to IAEAinetter from Maj. Gen. ling. Hussam M. Amin, Director General. National Monitoring Directorate, from, and acquired by ISG, indicated Continued concern with missing explosive lens mold drawings thatcontained critical information.

High-Speed Switches

I.VG obuUnetl evidence from recovered documents and from debriefing* of Iraqi scientists that Iraq utilized high-speedthose ofinterest for nuclear weapons development--in support of its rail gun projects. ISG has found no direct evidence lhat the interest in special high-speed switches1 was in supportuclearprogram.

InSG ohtained information lhatraduate student al the Mustanseriya University was working on an electrothermal accelerator using the rail gun under devclopmcnl al al Tahadi. This igniter could heype of specialized, high-speed switch.

Iraqi documentation recovered by coalition forces describes prototype testingas switch with breakdown times dial are likely less than one microsecond. The gas switch experimentswiihin the rail-gun project. An ISG subject matter expert determined that the described switch was probably in violaiion of lheuidelines of prohibited items.

ISG has found other indirect and fragmentary evidence of interest in specialized switches. However. ISG has noi found this information to be connected lo research into nuclear weapons.

The Military Induslrial Commissionas interested in cleciromagneric pulse generation thai was describedox containingype ol" specialized switch.

A CD-ROM recovered3 from ihe Religious University in Baghdad contained files regarding spark-gap switches and electrothermal accelerators.

Fireset Development and Testing

ISG obtained limited corroboration of previously reported,ireset devehrpment status. No new information regarding fireset development was found. ISG found no evidence that Iraq continued fireset development or testing

An Iraqi scientist reported to ISG Ihai development of onepoinl fireset directlyio nuclear weapon detonation iniiiation was completed prior toecond ri reset was being assembled and environmentally hardened0 bui was never completed. Work on both riresels was ceased innd lhe liresets were evacuaiedafehouse and later relumed io Al Aiheer. One liresct was reported lo be exhumed from rubble at Al Alheer67 and was turned over to inspectors. ISG confirmed thai this information is consistent with that previously reported by Iraq. ISG has not been able loconfirm lhe disposition of the second fireset reported lo have been assembled in iheuclear program.

Neutron Generators

ISG was not able to find that Iraq had resumed any work related to neutron initiators/generatorsenewed weapons program. The only neutroncapability found by ISG pertained lo aknown capabitily used for non-weapons-relaied research under way ai the IAEC al Tuwaitha. litis projeci is described in more detail in the IAEC Issues portion of this repon.

ill

Migration of the Capabilities From theuclear Weapons Project

Startingraq transferred manyfrom the defunct nuclear weapon program into several Iraqi scientific establishments. We have not found clear indications of the intent behind these personnel moves, but some of the work they pursued would have inherently preserved skills that could be applied to possible future nuclear weapon work.

as officially dissolved ineveral senior baqi officials staled that mere svas an initial program to moveersonnel into matching skill centers within the MIC to sustain skills. Some person-

omprised Four Main

Diffusion Enrichment and Centrifuge Enrichment

(Group One is later detached to become the Engineering Design Center)

EMIS. Chemical Enrichment.Engineering (Feed Products)

Administrative Support, Models,and Databases

Weaponization (High-Explosive Lenses and Neutron Generator Development)

ncl were also movedhe Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIMl. Ihe Elcclncity Commission, and ihc

jam:.

'Abd-al-Tawab 'Abdullah Al Mullah Huwaysh, fomiet Director ot the MIC, conlirrned PC-3moved into the numerous companies in the MIC including Al Ravi, Al /awrah. Al Nida, Dm al-Ma'rik. Al Majd. Al Zahf Al-Kabeer. Al Radhwan. Abu Al Rushd. AI Rayah, al Tahadi. and Ibn SirM. It was Huwaysh's cunieMion that skill sets dictated the placement o( scientists.

A senior MIC scientist stated thai scientists associ-aied with Iraq'suclear weapons program were often transicrrcd en masse to one of several MIC companies, including the Al-Raya Company and the Ibn Sina Company. These scientists would partkipate in research projects that would help them maintain their knowledge ol their former nuclear weapons research. An ISG site visit lo Ibn Suu corroborated such activities, including phosphoric acid purification and lanihanidc separation by ion exchange andsimilar lo those required (or uranium extraction and reprocessing icchniqucs (see.

The reassignment ol seicnlitu* to nonnuclcar projects over the years is also refleiicd in comments provided by IAEC Chairman Al-lanabi lo ISG. lanabi claims that he asked Saddam around1 io gather former IAEC scientists and researchers at the IAEC in Tuwaitha. However. Saddam told Al Janabi not loask for rhem ai ihis time because ihe MIC needed these scientists tor other programs

In Iht Immtdiait aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, Iraq also tried to vast tome of itsand capability from thtrogram as partenial and deception effort- In some cases, preservation of thr equipmeni and capability may hair been intendedfor eirnlual reconslilutionuclear program but also wrrr used lo support other nonucleor programs, the "Denial and Deception" program included the movemeni and/or destruction of equipmeni, movement ol personnel, andof facilities. Many actions were diieeily relaied lo the degree of incrimination provided by equipment and facilities with respect to NIT violations.ndicates ihc deliberate destruction of some facilities by Iraq.ndicates some of lhe movements and actions undertaken by Iraq with respect to theconversion program equipment.

to Iraq's IT-CD. "An order was issued tond EDC lEnginecring Design Ccntcrl at the end of1 to hand over the mainand non-nucleai mnieiiats (that indicate NPI violation) of the nuclear program lo SAP (Security Apparatus for the Protection of MilitaryEstablishments) forhe onler covered only the equipment and nonnuclcarwhich indicated violations ofThe main equipment and nonnuclcar materials of the nuclear program were transferred through SAP to the army from the different sites during the period

IVOI until June" The purpose of Ihe above equipment and nonnoclear materials transfer was to avoid detection by IAEA Action

Iraq's declarations provide many examplesalvaged equipmeni from sites formerlywith ils1 nuclear weaponsmove ISG suspecis was as much to concealNPT violations as toeconsiitunon capability. Iraq's declarations and IAEA inspections indicate that the1 concealment activities resulted in some equipmeni being damaged ordestroyed. Ultimately, some items associ-aied with therogram were movedtorage site nl Ash Shay kill ot utilized at several universiliesor slate csiablishmenis.

In lhe early years of inspections. Iraq also tried to claim its Al-Athir nuclear weapons assembly sileaterials development center.

The decision lo destroy or salvage equipment appeared loimple criterion: tht dtgrte of incrimination with respect lo SPT violation by Iraq.

In general, much equipment specificuclear weapons program was to be destroyed, while dual-use equipment was to be salvaged. For example. Tuwaithaas severely damaged during Operation Desert Storm The undamaged plant equipment was salvaged and stored. 'Ihe unu components that were contaminated with natural uianium were unilaterally destroyed while other general purpose components were retained lor subsequent use in nonnucleai activities.

example is the equi|imenl at Rushidiyah. Equipmeni directly related lo lhe nuclear program was lo be destroyed while indirectly related or general purpose equipment was moved toEstablishment for Engineering Technologies

I

ngl neer.'ng Deaign Corner

Centrrujsc'^cous drfusci

nasnayyai.ar

roup?

Isotope Sop" ratio"

(EMIS) la-nvyuh.

esign and Production Facilities

EirtaOiishmont lor Engineenng Technology

(GEE.T)

1

DC

EMIS personnel. Group* 2Aond2B

High Voltage

EMS

[ Eng.neering Materials Center

F

Casting Research Center

n 1

i y

roup SF,SutorOria loSEPPD

Material Selection

Ccnler

Group 7G. Cetoto'

RaOwn Factory

rVida Slat* Establishment

t V 1

Ameer Factory

iaU Establishment

iCcr'ertoi

Cnemlcel

Research

Al chemists.

Groups

Design Cent*.v

Design Center (ME DC) |

eapons Design and Production Facility

EPPO Tohnddi

(Tahadd) Engnecring

Material Center

suborOinawd. Oetotx*)

Scientific Applications Center Imsy* Umt-ayrt) (ksdependent) 4CKSooar

halid axahlmeaves SEPPOum gain.

f RiaWishment (or (industries

Grout)E upgrade teams.outh Ta)

wVutiori ol Iraq nuclear weapons organizations1 (Colors indicate organizational continuity).

General

CF

Septombnr

Establishment lot

Metalurgical

Industries

I9 0cicb*r

AI Zaht al KaCwer State Establishment

Uranium metallurgists

Zahfal Kabeer

Company

Uranium melMurrjslB

f Iraq nuclear weapons organizations1 (Colors truncate organizational continuity) (continued).

(GEET) storage. Iraq did not consider it rclcvani to declare these stores because Iraq considered this equipment neither nuclear nor nuclear related. Some of the equipment and materials were used in the recimstruclion program while others were given to some establishments in need of the equipment.

In the, Iraq retained residualthat coulduclear program by adapting personnel and dual-use equipment to non-nuclear activities but display the generic capabilities appUcable to their previous nuclear-related efforts. In the full accounting of program equipment, some equipment could Only be accounted for as "lost."'

According to one high-level scientist, workers atites were instructed to remove materials, equipment, and documents from their workplace prior to Ihc UN inspections inThefrom the Tarmiya EMIS uranium enrichment site was used loaboratory at the University of Baghdad College ofdhauiiyawhere research oo Freeman ion sources was continued. Other icscareheis at Tarmiya alsoacuum system laboratory at Baghdad University (Jadriya district).

An example of "lost" equipmcni includesat Al-Aihir thai was shipped for destruction. Although some boxes were destroyed by the army, the remaining boxes were returned. The items lhal were not found in these boxes and parts of which could not be located at the destruction sites were considered to be lost during evacuation.

IAEC Modernization

Interest in the IAEC and Intervention by Saddam Husayn

From at9 onward Saddam becameinterested in the activities of the IAEC and began holding regular meetings withof the IAEC. Saddam also began lo personally intervene in matters related to the lAEC, ranging from internal personnel issues, to prompiing otherto work with the IAEC and utilize the lAEC's scientific capabilities. Inaddam agreed to the Oil-for-Food program, resulting in significant fund, which he was able to use to bolster his scientific base.

A former scientist at the IAEC spoke of many scientists leaving the IAEC9 because conditions were so poor. The scieniisi claims that Saddam personally intervened, beginningo improve conditions and raise salaries. He also made what the scientist calledlanket rule" at this lime forbidding scientists from leaving their posts.

Dr. Huwaysh recalled that12 the frequency of meetings between Saddam and Iraqi nuclear scientists increased. During the same time frame. Saddam alsoresidential Order to the Prcsidcni of the IAEC. Dr. Fadil Al-Janabi. that he should keep nuclear scientists together at the IAEC in order to pool their skills and have them available when needed for slatting numerous new projects. Dr. Huwaysh did not know lhc specific details of any of these projects.

Dr. Huwaysh also recalled thai,hen Saddam found oul that former nuclear workers in the IAEC were not being paid as well as those in the MIC. he met with Al-Janabi, initiated raises in their salaries, andonus scheme.

A former MIC official staled lhat. inaddam issued an order requiring the MIC towith the IAEC and to implemeni projects in the areas of physics, machining, and electronics.

Saddam aha began In lake an increased interest in the welfare of former nuclear scientists in the MIC. Dr. Huwaysh Mated that0 Saddam began asking about the welfare of formercientists wirhin the MIC and referred to them as "myormer IAEC Chairman in the, reportedly made it clear that he caied greatly about the formerrogram and beganenewed level of interest in it at this tttnc-

Incrensed Funding and Publicity of IAEC Activities

In the last yean before the war, the lAEC received increased publicity for its achiennut nlsarger budget, prompting mans formercientists to want lo return lo the IAEC from the MIC. Ihis was partly due to the pert coed improvements inand salary increases. More money also became available to the IAEC through direct funding by Saddam.

The former MIC Minister recalled the budget of the IAEC increasingnd that Saddam overruled Ihe Finance Minister's opposition to the budget increase. The MIC Minister did not know by how much the budget increased.

A formei lAEC scientist stated lhat the IAEC budget increased throughn line with standard mini ion but then increased

Infrastructure Improvements at the IAEC: The Modernization Project

Sew computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools sought foruwaithain what has come to be known as iheProject were not subject to nuclear export controls and were reported as required by Ihe UN's Ongoing Monitoring and Verification IOMV) Regime.. following meetings with Saddam. Al-Janabi and Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sa'id embarkedlan to improve live machine

tools workshop at Tuwaitha and supply it with newactivity that was not completed before

l

Former MIC Minister Huwaysh recalled thatl-Janabi and Dr. Sa'id approached him and requested supportpecial project. He was not told the nature of the project but learned that it involved the procuiemcrK of very precise machines. Huwaysh. after consuhing with Saddam, agreed with the understanding that the purchase would be conducted through MIC's Al-Basha'ir Company.

Due to reluctance on the pan of internationalto sell to the IAEC. Al-Janabi used the MIC to purchase the machines io conceal Ihe fact that the.heAl-Janjli also recalled that the contract for the high-precision machines was betweenadr Companyaiwanese supplier. The Deputy Directorfor Engineering was responsible for machine selection. Sa'id assisted in the project because of his extensive experience within the IAEC and his good managerial abilities. Sa'id's main role was to coordinate with the Finance Ministry to receive approval for the purchases and dtaw the hardtrom slate funds when necessary.

Al-Jarubi also stated that he approved the purchase of the machines as part of an initiative lothe lAEC He believed the machines were more accurate than Iraq's existing capability.

While there is no question lhat the IAEC pursued these machines. Oiere are conflicts in theregarding the actual purchasing agent, lhc Al-Badr Company or theompany ISG believes lhat it is most likely the specifications and order were made by the Al-Badr company.

on behalf of the IAEC and the order was placed through the Al-Baaha'ir Company, which was the actual purchasing agent.

Dr. Huwaysh told ISG that, although he mas notare of what mas being purchased, in his opinion the machines that the IAEC were buying were more accurate lhan those al any MIC owned companies and lhat the IAEC was supply-

ing tit workshop with high-precision machine tools. Furthermore, he stated the Modernization Project was classified to the extent that even he was not made aware of its details. This compartmenialization was evident at the top levels ot' the Regime, including Saddam, who personally vcrilied lhat lhe MICwas lo assist the IAEC. However, none of the sources debnefed have been able lo explain why the MIC Minister was excluded from the technical details of ihe projeci.

Dr. Huwaysh's assertion lhat ihc purchase of the machinesecret program is puzzling, given that the machines were reported to lhe UN/IAEA and were thereby sub)cct to inspection. Other sources have commented thai it would have been impossible for Dr. Huwaysh not to know what was being procured because il was his organization doing ihe procurement and that lhe projeci muy not have beenigh-level Iraqistated lhal these high-precision machines were

inslalled at Tuwaitha. and information regarding ihc machines was provided to the UN and IAEA in ihe declaration given in

In contrast, former IAEC employees directly responsible for the selection and installation of tht machines told ISO that the machines the IAECwere the same as those already operating at Badr and were not particularly high precision. Ihc same former IAEC employees wem on to suggest thai lhe machines were, in fact, of poor quality, cheaply made, and were prone to break.

Former IAEC employees. Diya' Jalil llusayn and Zuhair Al Yassiri. selected the machines based on generic workshop requirements. The majority of the machines were Asian in origin, and they were described as "cheap Taiwanese machines."

ISO also received conflicting informationthe specific use of the machine tools workshop

beyond general machining capabilities.Tiic former President of the IAEC described the procurement of Ihc machines as the development of Iraq's "non-nuclear scientifiche machines would enable the IAEC to create molds and manufacture specialty parts for machinery in house rather than outsourcing the work.

A former IAEC employee with close lies to the project told ISO thai the machines were lo be used to manufacture equipment (or use by the IAECprimarily for the Physics Directorate) and were nor to be used for the manufacture of items for outside organirations.

A senior executive in the MIC described how the Center for Mechanical Design was to receive the equipment, reverse-engineer it, and send it to the Badr. which would then produce high-precision tools from it.

Perceptions the Regime Was Preparing for Recomtilution of Ihe Nuclear Program

Saddam's increased interest in the IAEC andof IAEC achievements, increased funding, and infrastructure impro>rmenis prompted Dr. Huwaysh to speculate that Saddam was interested inuclear weapons program.

Dr. Huwaysh was suspicious this procurement was pan of an attempttart the nuclear weapons program because both Janahi and Sa'id were part of thel nuclear weapon program. He also was suspicious of Sa'id's involvement because Sa'id was close to retirement. Furthermore. Dr. Huwaysh knew that high precision machines are needed to make centrifuges, although he admitted he only had lhe general notion of lhe capabilities of the machines.

Dr. Huwaysh believed these factors may base been an indication that0 Saddam had run out of patience waiting for sanctions to end and wanted to renew the nuclear program, though he could offer no concrete evidence lo support this view.Dr. Huwaysh speculated ihai Saddam may

havemall group Of people advising him on nuclear power issues, although Dr. Huwaysh had never heard aboul ii.

Alternatively. Al-Janabi says he approached the Presidential Secretary, 'Abd Hamid Mahmud Al-Khatab. in1roposal to modernise the IAEC in order to detelop Iraq's nonnuetearinfrastructure. Khatab approved the idea and authorised the use of state funds through the Ministry of Finance. It was commonly understood that Khatab spoke for. and with the authority of. Saddam.esult. Janabiroad ctton to raise salaries and modernize departments, including procurement of the CNC machines.

interviewees also were consisteni inthe new equipment was needed lo fix

a degraded, or losi manufacturing capability aiormer vice president ol the IAEC staled thai the purchase of these machines was not intended to modernize theanufacturing capability, but to re-create practical research

A MIC scientist working at the IAEC glassdescribed ihe machine purchaseeans of improving the machines ol the loot room workshop because the existing machines1 were no longer functioning or not functioning properly.

Dr. Huwaysh also has quoted Saddam as saying "We do noi intend or aspire to return to ourprograms to produce WMD, if lhe Security Council abides by ils

IAEC Work un Neulron Ceneraiors

ISG has found no evidence of neutron generator or initiator research as partuclear weapons development program. Programsrench-supplied neutron generator are probably related to ongoing IAEC tmprosement efforts, which started

he IAECargerench company.argets were bought lor Uie neutron generator from the German

company Siemens because the United States would not sell io them. The generator has been used tor research projects related to geology, food,ayome pans of the neutron generator had been looted. Iraq also had small Americium-Beryllium andneutron sources.

Shaker Al-Jaboun. Director of ihe IAEC Nuclear Physics2as in charge of the neutron generator at Tuwaitha as well asrofessor in the Department

of Physics. University of Baghdad,7e supervised numerous graduate studentshe University of Baghdad whose theses included "Measurement of Neutron Activation CrossUsing Neutron Angular Distribution Produced bycV Neutron (iencrator" and "Cafculanon and Measurement of Neutron Cross-Section for Energyhese studies indicate Jabouri and the University ol Baghdad remained involved in material cross-sectionsubject area with applications to civil radiological programs and nuclear weapons research.

According to translated2 memo Iromneutron generator was used in his laboratory in severalnuclear activation projects, lhc projects included radiation effects on materials,of control systems, designotating target, designagnetic analyzer, and design of an ion source.

The lAEC/PhysKal Research and Materials Directorate/Nuclear Applications Section carried out various research activitieseutronand related technologies. B0 has not been able to identify any neutron generator activities by this organization relateduclear weapons progrjm.

University Programs

Universitiesupporting role lo preserve Iraq's nuclear knowledge base. While ISO has found no information that universities supported any pursuit of nuclear weapons, ISO did Itnd that universitiesaven for some formerersonnel and dual-use equipment after Operation Dcscn Storm and were being reestablishedource ofsuppon for the IAEC ami MIC

ISG found that Iraqi educational institutions accepted equipment salvaged from Iherogram, but we are unable ta show that universitiesole in any renewed Iraqi nucleareffort. The following arr examples of instances where Iraqi institutions received equipment from thr former nuclear weapons program:

Tuwaitha. Iraq admitted that educationalthat received equipment trom Tuwaitha for storage and/Or incorpoialion includeTraining Institute. Institute of Technology in Zaalaraniya (student dormitories inniversity of Baghdad ulotmiiories innd the College nl Physical Education.

Tarmiya. Iraq also declared that educationalthat received equipment fromas general laboratory devises and spare vacuum systemstorage and/orinclude University of Musiansiriya,of Baghdad (College of Science I. Saddam University (College of Science I. and the Institute ot Technology (Department of Chemical Industries 1.

Al Atheer. The Al Karama secondary school and Al-Anwar primary school received equipment evacuated from Al Atheer aroundccording to Iraq's declarations. Similarly, some equipment not associated with any NPTwas transferred to Saddam University and the University of Technology. Accoiding to Iraq's declarations, the Babil University also received an unidentified number of boxes of unidentifiedmost of which contained damaged and mixed components from the lormer nuclear weapons program at al Atheer.

'I he University of Baghdad also received equipment and materials from lhe tormet eenirifuge program.

In theraqi nuclear programfound temporary homes in educationali. that occasionally involved shifting of groups of scientists from the former weapons program. University programseansreserve the exisiing knowledge base by pioviding an oppnrluniiy lor formerersonnel lo pass on iheir bask, fundamental knowledge to newof scientists.

According to one high-level scientist, workers aities were instructed to remove materials, equipment, and documenis from their workplace prior to the UN inspections inhefrom the Tarmiya EMIS uranium erwkhment site was used lo outaboratory at the University of Baghdad College of Education (Adhamiyawhere research on Freeman ion sources was continued. Other researchers at Tarmiya alsoacuum sysiem laboratory at Baghdad University (Jadriya district).

Another high-level scientist confirmed lhat staff fromrojects at Tuwaitha received the same instructions.esult. Dr. Oais Abdul Itamin established Electronics Laboratories andlor Power Ekctronks. Instrumentaland Distribution Control at the Technical University in Baghdad with equipment and staff fromaboratory was established at the University of Baghdad led by Dr. Hamid Al Mundiri and staffed byaterialsurface Inspection and Measurement Laboratory was established ai lhe University of Baghdad led by Dr. Nabil Kamu.

Documentary information collected hy ISOthai Dr. Saadi laTar Hasan left Al Alheer in1 and transferred equipmentaddam Urtrversity. Ja'far taught atomic physics, nuclear physics, nuclear spectroscopy, and advancedTht* equipment was used to establish an atomic physics lah lor second yearreliminary lab I'm umlcrgiaduatcs/third-year students,ore advanced lab for fourth-year students.

Through, educational institutionssome personnel with MIC and thethat seem to be motivated most by thr need for former weapons program officials lo find new employment, bul steps lhat inherently preserved access lo scientific knowledge and capabilities from Iherogram. Officials have indicated thai formercieniisls were unhappy with MIC employment, dissaiishcd with IAEC pay, and used the universitiesay to supplement pay and create more interest in their work.

lo Huwaysh. mostersonnel were kept in the MICowever, some nuclear physicists went to the universities because there was no nuclear work far them in the MIC

Al-Jaruhi stated that "most IAEC researchen aho taught at universities or advised doctoral students, both lor scientific and iinancial reasons" However, there was no placement program to place IAEC scientists into university positions. Each scientist had loniversity position on his own and was permilted to work only oneeek ai (he university. Al-Janabi also stated thai the IAEC provided approximately one million dinars per year to universities tor research and that, during the universities' summer break, many faculty members worked at the IAEC or the MIC io make additional money.

lo Dr. Nan 'Abdllah. Dean of Baghdad University's Institute for Laser and Plasma Studies,aser research was conducted at the Baghdad University Institute for Laser und Plasma Studies, the Baghdad University Of Technology, Mustansiriyah University, and (heompany. While most of the research was paid for by the universities and the Ministry ot Higher Education, the Al-Razi Company which was subordinate io thealso financed some postgraduate researchumber of key scientists from theaser uranium ennch-mcntthe head of that cflort. Dr. Falchatfter1

".it

Reporting indicates Ihe relationship between the universities and the MIC and IAKC was relatively ad hoc until the laleuntil efforts were made to send MIC and IAEC projects ta the universities. With Saddam's support. MIC and IAEC dramatically increased joint university activities. The influx of fund* would not onlyeteriorating unrver-*ity sysiem hut would also tend tn focus university programs on MK" and IAEC issues. The result wouldew generation of scientistsocus and understanding of MIC and IAEC pursuits.

to Huwaysh, cooperation between the MIC and Iraqi universities was largely aprioruwaysh claims thateeeting of all Iraqi universityhe loss nf professors to higher-paying industry jobs, which was crippling the university system.esult of the meeting, he approved all professors to perform research for up to four MIC contracts each- Saddam liked his initiative so much that in9 he ordered each ot tne ministries,the IAEC. toimilar program of sending research projects to the universities.esult. MIC-sponsored research projects in Iraqi universities jumped Irom approximately7

to Iraqi declarations, Ihe Institute for training and Employee Development in thecientific Policies and Programs Department is described asariety of coordination activities with universities. This includes both the opportunities for scientists to take advantage of university activities as well as the opportunity for university personnel lo suppon IAEC facilities.

The historical relaliouship between formercientists and Iraqi unit mines suggests that some nuclear-weapons-rrlalrd research could have taken place within the universities, although ISG has uncovered no direct information lhal such work was underumber of highly placed individuals in the former Regime have slated that no nuclear-weapons-related research took place at universities. However, some research activities display obvious dual-use application to nuclear weapons development.

Laser Research. Baghdad UniversityInstitute for Laser and Plasma Studies researched andmany types of lasers, including Copper-Vapor Lasers (CVL) as recentlyhis research was done in conjunction with al-Raai, with the stated purpose of research and development in laser targeting sy stems and directed energy weapons. CVL technology is relevant io Atomic Vapor Laser IsotopeVI.IS) as well as many civil applications, and at least one of the researchers involved in this project waslch Ham/a. ISG believes that this work does not indicateaser isotope separation program bul oilers an opportunity to preserve CVL knowledge and capabilities that could suppon future rcconsti-tution. ISG has also uncovered reporting thaithererohibition of continuing nuclear weapons work including laser isotope separation.

Tarmiya Equipment. ISGigh-level Iraqi official indicate thai equipment from theMIS facility at Tarmiya was moved toUniversity after1 war and prior to the start of intrusivet the university,reportedly were done in Ercctrtan ion sources, and the Tarmiya employee*acuum system at the university. Thisrelevant to EMIS technologies -docs noteconstitu-tion ofrogram, but offers an opportunity to preserve knowledge and capabilities thai could have supported future rcconstitution.

Otherroup ofaterialsset up andaboratory at theof Baghdad with equipment from Group 2EB. The laboratory was led by Dr. Hamid Alurface inspection ami measurement laboratory was also set up at the University of Baghdad and was led by Dr. Nahil Ramu. This laboratory later worked on stealth technology. Alternately, rhc head ofroupttempted to set up alogic control laboratory at the technical University oI Baghdad, but the university rcluscd io accept the laboratory because ol the risk of being discosered hy IAEA inqvetots. All of these examples represent maintenance ot knowledge and capabilities,fi has found no evidence that the laboratories continued work in supponuclear weapons program

Hidden Enrichment technology

.Since Operation Iraqi Freedom, iwo scientists from Iraq'suclear weapons program have emerged lo provide ISG with uranium enrichment technology and components, which they kept hidden from Inspectors. Inormer EMIStold ISG during an interview that he had taken material and equipment thai was related to EMIS and hid Ihem in various places near his home in. The scientist had noi been specifically told to do Ihis hut believed his supervisors were cognizant of his actions. He chose items to hide that could be used in future rcconslituiion of the EMIS program. The scientist turned over to lheroad range of items thai had been withheld from the UN inspectors, including technical reports onollection of foreign EMIS-rclatcdass spcciromeier. blocks of high-purity graphite, high-purity tantalum shielding sheets, and an indigenously designedpiece from inside lhe EMIS machine. Some of Ihese items are shown in

The former head of Iraq'sentrifuge program also retained prohibited documents and components in apparent violation of theirectives. Though this activity was isolated, it also had Ihc potential to contributeossible restart of Iraq's uranium enrichment programs.

Inr. Mahdi ShakarCihali Al 'Ubaydi provided Coalition forces withomplete set of workable centrifuge blueprints, which he. reportedly, had hidden ai his home for the purpose of reconsiiluling Ihcenrichment program after sanctions were lifted.

Al "Ubaydi reportedly hid ihese itemsove approved later thai year by HusaynSaddam's son-in-law and former head of Iraq's WMD programs. Qusay reportedly confirmed lhe orderul al 'Al 'Ubaydi had not beensince. ISO is not able io show thai llie Iraqi Government continued to be aware of Al 'Ubaydi's concealment activities or otherwise planned to use them as panlan to reconstitute lhe centrifuge program.

ormeruclear designhe was surprised when he learned that Al

Ubaydi had retained ccntnluge programin his home. The scientist was verythai orders were given to retain the documents and material associated wuh the former centrifuge program.

Prrssdcntial Scientific Advisor Amu Hamudi Hasan al-Sadi stated that any Iraqithat kept nuclear related material at their homes were acting on their own.

Survey of Structures al Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center

* The mission completed ils objectives and atISO has no plans for further exploitation ai lhc complex. However, it is possible lhat. if further information comes to light, ISG may need to revisit Tuwaitha.

This report presents the findings of an Iraq Survey Group (ISG) survey mission, designed to clear all buildings at ihc Tuwaitha Nuclear Complex prior to their use by Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST)The survey investigated the buildings' probable research functionality, looked for any nuclear relevant or UN-labelled equipment, exploited documentation/ electronic media, and determined ihe buildingsstatus. The mission was one of the largerundertaken by ISG and the largest undertaken by ISO's nuclear team. This site was the most important to Iraq's nuclear research program and was one of hundreds of sites examined by ISG. The comments cited under the Team sections are from team notes taken on sile and should noi be consideredbut indicative of ihe type of information collected.

Summary

status of all buildings and structures at lhc Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, known alas been determined (secand

Certain structures pose hazards from aand uncxploded ordnance point of view. These structures were not entered, and the precise hazards were not determined (sec

A quantity of UN-labeled equipment wasas well as other dual-use equipment including Anderson Samplers (sec Results section and

Someoxes of documentationarge quantity of electronic media were collected and subsequently handed over tn ISG for translation and exploitation (see Main Survey Procedure section and Resultsi.

IIIIIIHIUI Ullll

Tuwaitha is located on ihe east bank of the Tigris River.ilometers southeast of Baghdad, 2southwest of Zaafaraniyah, andilometer west--southwestwo-lane improved highway. The facility is protected by large bcrms that surround and divide it into four distinct areas: the former Sov iet Reactor Complex and Administration/ The Agricultural and Biological Research Center (TABRC) area in ihc northern quadrant, the former French Reactor Complex area in the eastern quadrant, the Research and Development area in the western quadrant, and the former Italian Laboratory area in the southern quadrant. For the purposes of this survey, the area within the berms was divided into fiveo E; Ihe area immediately outside lhc bcrms was zone F; and the wider area sunounding the complex was Wneorkshop facility near the site entrance was zone H. (sec.

ISG representatives were asked tocries of maps from imagery to support the mission as there hadumber of differing buildingschemes; these were rationalized into Ihebuilding numbering system usedeference standard for the mission. The comprehensive nature of the products assisted greatly in accomplishing Ihe mission.

The mission was conductedumber of stages.eries of consultative meetings were held. These accumulated available knowledge of the Tuwaitha sile. They were followedwo-day video reconnaissance (VR) of Ihe site with the aims of identifying any unknown hazards and to assist in the planninginal documeni exploitation (DOCEXj mission as well as ihe main survey (MS).

The initial stage of the main mission was also assistedeeting with Black. Dr. Fadil Muslim Abd Al-Janabi. current head of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commissionhich had its

headquarters at Tuwaitha. Dr. radii was asked about the location and functionality of various asscis at Tuwaitha. and his information was assimilated into the list of targeted buildings for Tuwaitha. He was also asked, and he agreed, to accompany tlie authorhe Tuwaitha site and provide information lhat was of significant assistance to the planning of the mission.

Prior to Ihcargcl list of buildings wasand those facililies (surface andhere it was safe lo do so, were visited during the VR. The finalized targci lisi was usedatabase to record the mission progress.

The video reconnaissance (VR)umberhc sile was undertaken3 using four mullidisciplinary teams lo cover the site quickly on abasis. Analysis of ihc videotapes and commentary produced is included at Annex C. which was instrumcnlal in Ihc dclailcd planning of the main mission.

During the VR, an opiical spectrometer and Andersen samplers were identified,ne-day mission was mounted to recover that equipment and to carryOCEX on ihree targei buildings onhe one-day mission also provided the facility io lesi some of (he procedures planned for ihe main survey, hollowing analysis of the VR results, the buildings' rargcl list was revised, and relevantsubject matter experis (SMEs) lead teams were tasked to review those buildings in lhe main survey (MS).

The MS was conducted by movingSG personnel. SMEs, and force protection slalT toeams with delegated responsibilityet of buildings. The learns lived on sileays in order to avoid force protection risks of daily travel.

The teams were lasked to prctriage any documents in iheir buildings and ihe learn leaders were asked to sign prepnntcd sheets to confirm the status of each building for ISG puiposcs. Overays of ihc MS duration, an up-to-date list of building status was compiled, which is presented aso (his document.

Factors Affecting the Survey

All buildings identified al lhe Tuwaitha complex whose status was uncertain were included in the larget list as pending survey. Buildings that were hazardous in respect ol Iheir structural status from bomb damage, radiological, or oihcr reasons were noi entered and were markedazard on lhe target list. Areas or underground facililies (UGFs) flooded wiih water possibly contaminated wiih coolani from the damaged reactors were also not visited. Wherevisual inspection was madeideo camera. Sealed containers were examined by drilling small holes and inscning opiical fiber-viewing aids into the container to examine the eonicnts and. if necessary, the provision of larger holes lo enable SME access.

Main Survey Procedure

DOCEX Procedures for Combined Media-Processing Center, Baghdad fCMPC-B)

It was important to use the limited linguist resource effectively in the triage of documents and to minimise the duration of this process.ew list of mission-relevant key words was produced and procedures introduced to locate precisely any media identified as sensitive. Ihe teams were told to collect any form of electronic media and personnel files if seen. Blueprints and management diagrams were also targeted.

Mission planning allowed one CMPC batch number per building; documeni boxes were identified by: batch number, building number, and serial number of box. Separators were used to link documents to room numbers. The boxes weretarting batch number. which would increment with building number so, for example, the N* building would

A US Army Major was given the responsibility of monitoring and. if necessary, driving the DOCEX part Of IheS AirC was asked to run the Command Post (CP) and to issue building targets to the teams as required.

The mission was conducted by fielding five survey teams, all of which were leducleardiscipline SME. Pour of the teamsecond disciplineocument gatherer,orce protection person. On arrival on site, each of the teams wasarge DOCEX taskaution task. Following tins clearing of those buildings, tbe teams were allocated buildingseam-availability basis designed to work around the outstanding buildings of the Tuwaitha inner zoneslockwi.se basis. The mission was controlled via the CP and the target list updated as the building status surveyission log of all significant events was maintained by the CP.

Four learns were deployed inoifth team, led by the Author, surveyed zones F. G,ith the aim of dealing with the more difficulttargets, until such timeould be supported by other teams on an availability basis.

Using the given definitions (found inuilding status was updated from pending or caution to cither clear or triaged. and the presence of anyequipment similarly recorded.

Results

It is quite possible thai some sensitive information will be forthcoming once all exploitation isHowever, the primary results of the mission are:

Someoxes of documentationuantity of electronic media were found, which were handed over toor exploitation post mission.

Three Andersen Sampler bases and two lops were recovered.

A quantity of UN-labeled equipment was identified. The information obtained was included in and used to update the "Summary of Known UN Tagged Equipment" presented at Annex 0.

All personnel completed the mission safely and free from any radiological contamination.

(ISG Note: Further exploitation produced noinformation to contradict these results.|

Discussion

A group of unknown Iraqis were spoiled by Team Bravo loading documents and equipmentehicle on the morning ofovember. Detail isunder Team Bravo comments in Annex B.

The initial planning commencedist oftructures;f these had been previously surveyed and cleared by ISG videoand/or previous missions. Furthermore,tructures had been previouslyeemed hazardous,umber were not applicable for exploitation, such as air defense sites, and areas outside the Tuwaitha complex region. As such.tructures remained pending for exploitation. During

ihc main mission, ihcsc VI structures were surveyed. ISG members also returnedumber ot previously surveyed and unidcntiticd structures In all. (he main three-day mission6 structures, all but iwo were certified as either clear or tnaged.

The buildings that were not cleared were the libraryand the tire stationn the Case of the former, the quantity of documents is vast, and allarns as ihey completed their ncernal task list, were dispatched io Ihe library to facilitate the process. The teams were specifically instructed to largei Ph.D. theses and to search for unusual documeni positioning or storage. Using thisest endeavors attcmpl was made to clear the library.

s the lire station, which is operational. During theoom full of binders was identified,eam was dispatched on the lasi day of the MS to triage the binders. Initially, there was somein identifying the location of ihc room, and the fire station personnel denied the existence of any such room. The team withdrew to check their facts and then returned and identified the room, which was securedocked glass paneled door. Staff claimed lhal ihe material was consmercial. belonged to the MOST, and thai they did notey. They offered to contact MOST to askepresentative to appear and give access.

After some discussion it was decided to approach MOST via ISG in order lo gain access to the room as the team had no wish to lorcc entry to an operational facility ot indeed lo damage one of the lewbuildings al Tuwaitha.

Postmisslon Activity

A mission was set upo lo Tuwaithaith the aim of gaining access to the room of decumenishe party armed at approximately OHnd asked for MOST to be contactedeyhoWcr to attend and open the door. After someas agreed to gain access io the room,ull triage of ihe documents was undertaken. Pnor ioeries of photographs

was taken io verify the status of ihe room, and ihis was repealed after lhe door was secured tolhal no damage had been caused to the room or ils fillings.

The records were drawings relating io Ihe Tammuz reaciot with little more recenttK. Nothing of significance io ISO was found,ewwere taken for further exploitation.

Another locked room containing documents was also enteredull triage undertaken, using the procedures mentioned above. Again, nothing of significance to ISO was foundewwere taken for further exploitation. In view of the physical condition of ihe documents, covered wiih dusi and vermin droppings, it was evident thai the documenis had been undisturbed for some lime and no anempi had been made lo introduce otherinto their content.omplex was considered clear.

Postmission action was also requiredumber ot issues, specifically:

" UN-lube led equipment.

Unidentified equipmeni.

Testing of samples collected.

Use of ihc iridium pellets.

IXicumcnt referencing "heavy waier."

Note: These issues have since been resolved und found to be of no concern.

In view of the physical hazards al the Tuwaiiha site, the planning detail, terminology, and methodology required io minimize risk lo ISG personnel may be usedemplate for future ISG missions ioof this naiurc.

The mission has demonstrated that ISG is capable of planning and undertaking ihc most complex of technical missions. The ability toission of this nature inazardous area as the Tuwaitha Nuclear complex, wiihout casualties and with the achievement demonstrated, is seenontribution io ISG's repuiaiion.

Conclusions

Following ihc ihivi' day mission to Tuwaitha and avisitecember, the status of all buildings and structures known on3 hat been determined, and it is suggested that theay be accepted as clear on the basis of best endeavours.

Best cndcavoui* implies the best lhat could be achieved with available resources and equipment. The Tuwaitha site occupies somem- ami there arc plenty ofnder radioactive water inor damaged buildings where documents,media, ot equiprncnt could be hidden by those determined and where some rrsk to personnel would be involved in order lo retrieve them. Without sound supporting IIUMINT. missions surveying hazardous locations would be speculative and difficult lo justify.

Future Work

This mission has attempted lo incorporate IIUMINT suppon suggesting the presence of hidden documents and equipment. The strongest hints wereuildinghich has not been found, and in the basement ol. which has been burned. If additional IIUMINT is forthcoming,round radar survey may be appropriate for the future or the use of other high-techrder to examine all the Hooded basements and water tanks.

Annex A

Definition* Used by Teams During Survey

Clear Room has been inspected, is empty of mission-relevant items, and is certified by the team leader as ready for hand back to Ministry of Science and Technology. The same category may be used touilding.

Triaged Room has been iriaged {documents,epresentative sample of documents in the room has been examined) and is certified by the Team Leader as ready for hand back to the Ministry of Science and Technology. The same category may be used louilding.

I< ill. IOIU IC

Hazard Action

Caution

of interest identified or possible controlled items(s) (an item that is controlled under Expon regulations should have been declared orotential sanctionsction: still photos taken, Military Grid Reference System (MGRS) geocoords, if possible; relevant ISG Dept. informed; and appropriate action initiated. Details to be entered in comments column.

Itcm(s)N or UNSCOM label. Action: still photos taken; use of macro setting to ensure clarity of label details; MGRS geocoords. if possible; relevant ISG Department informed; and appropriate action initiated. Details to be entered in comments column.

Item or items not identified. Action: still photos taken, MGRS geocoords if possible. ISG informed, details fed back to ISG for identification by other SMEs. and appropriate action initiated. Details to be entered in comments column.

Items inconsistent with the advertised functionality of the Department or room. Action: still photos taken; MGRS geocoords. if possible; relevant ISG Department informed; and appropriate action initiated. Details lo be entered in comments column.

Hazard found in room;source or chem.

Team extracted without funhcr action. Team checked for possible contamination or injury. Details of hazard to be entered in comments column together with note of action taken.

Following the offer and availabilitypecialist team from ISG. the word caution was introduced touilding where it was decided as safe for an exploitation team to enter, provided they were escorted bv ISCi team.

eam Results

Team Alpha Results/Comments

37

Room t: Contained motor components and flanges, pmbably water pumps.ergeron from Paris UnlELECWmaller water5 tpm, Nautcur Mano

..maller cranesg capacity, waterI Bignier Schmidi Uurcntade

Roomioraec of equipment probably for the Tammu/ reactors, secondary equipment.eat0 sqf Russian heatwaterignicrmong) distillation columns.mrate of unknown items received from Technicaiomc: miscellaneous valves and fittings to suppon these columns.

Room0 permealors.

Roomable and electric diagrams foreactors.

, Connex OUTSIDR Building 37

Contained digital-processing equipment, scalers, mul-liscalers.nalogue hoards, computer datachanncl high-voltage system. Vacuum pumps: Turho0yhold and Hcracus,

Building S3

Is very close to Buildingnd may he included in thai complex. The buildingultifunctionalin terms of chemical and biological functionality and was the subject of earlier reporting by CBIST.

koom I: Chemical-processing pilot plantconfigured for water filtration: plant for clove oil production, well water distillation, and softening of filtered water, distillation of boiler water,rocess for Liptonubstitute, formula, and picture of layoutroduction scheme also existed for KCI. NaOH. NaCI and ZnO. Seven items of UN-labeled equipment (Annother similar equipment and other less sophisticatedwere present, which did not have labels. It was noticed that certain equipment was missing from the chemical processes mentioned above.

Roomaboratory-scale process for producing new chemical products and product punty testing.

Room IS: Directors office (Mawan I'uad Aziz) had iridium pellets in varying sizes and in vials scattered over his desk. There is postmission speculation over the use of ihese pellets.

dentified as health physics lab but also contained biological and chemical laboratories.

Rooms I,: Were health physics, remainder were bio/chem related. Also pilot plant for reverse osmosis sysiem IROI Some bioreseaich was marine oriented.

Roomas where liquid scintillation counter should have been (sampling trays seen i, counter had been moved into the bunker nest door Contained smalLseale UNSCOM- labeled powder dispenser,nnex E.

Room2ooms for RO.

Roomiscellaneous laboratory-scale bio-related equipment, nutrient media, and chemicals.

Roomhem/bio laboratories, multiple chemicals all over ihe floor, photos of scene andfrom cahinels taken.

acteriologyfe studies of bio in Tigris River. Legionella and Bacillus Subtillis. Photo reference

tobable autoclave Hirayama 1IA30

oil-sampling laboratory. Someinstrumental ion.

Photo referencesnd4ome laboratories had been looted, burned, flooded, and doors damaged.

Personnel bunker Storing liquid scintillation counter, and supporting chemicals. Alsournace (photo references7 and DSCO

Computer-processing center, programs, support systems. No equipmeni, computer mediapen-source literature on rail gun.

Side

ndondestructive teslay. Dye Penetrant, and Magatlux penetrant.

Roomormer photography developmentat the rear.

Photo references for aboveignificant quantity of documents collected in DOCEX of

Building IM

Punctionalily does not match given description. Building was linedranch of ihc Al Rashid bank (Icttei heads) Yeats of branch records going back

Team Bravo Results/Comments

raining building.

RoomsRecovered electronic media.relevant to keyword list were laken for exploi-laiion. Some rooms had been systematically burned; evidence of destruction of large quantity of

ignificant numbers ot folders were seen containing receipts tor correspondence. Many ledger books, duly rosters. Nothing relevant to ISG identified at this time.

Building 3

Medical reception/health physics.

iyostal examined, cryosut *enalype CPVD5hoto referencerotective clothing and decontamiriant aerosol seen.

: Documents taken t'oi exploitation from

Building #2

Electronic Design Center. Computer mediaox of documents collected for fulure exploitaiion. Extensive lire damage on first floor; cylindermissile tmnspon.ition9 and

Building 60

Pharmaceutical medical kit and Diagnostic Center. Computer media recovered throughout the building, no documents taken for triage. Burst plasma bags and other item* consistent with building function.on the floor.

Technical library' and contcrence facility. Extensive range ofheses located in basement and first floor. Building contained inublication production and photographiccapability. One box of documents retrievedubstantial quantity of electronic media, including floppy disk, VMS media, tape cassettes, and photographic negatives recovered from basement, lor exploitaiion.

Iraqi Document Collection:

5 onovember. Team Bravo noticedraqis removing documents and boxes fromeam Bravo challenged the Iraqis, and their

linguist screened Ihe documents and determined then to he professional and scientific publications lhat were being moved to anolhcr building within Tuwaitha for protection. Di. Salehassan was leading this effort for MOST. Building K2 had previously been exploited and cleared by Team Bravo. At the request of the lead SME. Team Bravo also obtained the names of all Ihe Iraqis and Ihe name of the person la whom they reported in MOST.

Team Charlie Results/Comments

Connex Adjacent tn

ritish Aircraft Corporation infrared laser systems and other related ilemv Sometaken lor exploitation.

Building 54

Contained growth media, com meal. agar, and date syrup. Provided access toGF. This1 and undergroundere the subject of CB1ST survey. UN-labeledere ideniified (Annex E)uantity ofdocuments taken lot exploitation.

Underground water tank, no large exposed entrances. NSTR withoui diving capability.

Building 75

Environmental radiation monitoring. Some mission-relevant documents taken for exploitation.

BuHding 56

Biological Feniloer PlaniAJuality-ControlBlueprint of facility found, building inwith that document. Equipment list found, most of equipment missing. Some mission-relevant documents taken tor ciploiration.

Building 8

Administration buildinp, quantity of documents taken lor exploitation.

MX

Team Delta Results/Comments

4.1

Auditorium facility NSTR.

12

Divided through middle1isit was carried out with security team in attendance, as this building was identifiedAUTION.

eutron generator building. Officesealth physics, radioisotope study, anday.

Ground floor contained:

ndr. Jobori, head of neutron source projects office. Office contained documentsto beryllium (Be) and other neutron(Physics was relevant lo neutron initiatorMD).

Roomontained neutron generator_in pristine condition, covered with PVC drapes. Also glove boxu source.

hemical laboratory containing various acidserium (Ce) source embedded in the floor.

ign on outside labeling as ChemicalRooms found relating to PCB development, film laboratory, cryogenics; single office had documents relating to laser research.

Roomottle of Fomhlin oil found, used for lubrication of centrifuge bearings, not big enoughomplete centrifuge enrichment farm but could be relevant to laboratory-scale facility.

Room S: Medical room, contained documenisto various pathogens documenis removed for exploitation.

Roomontained folders and binders of records for pharmaceutical equipment purchase/procurement. Sample taken for exploitation.

Building 10

Cryogenics production. Generators lor nitrogen (Ns) and helium (He) Seen, not significant in themselves.

During an interviewource, there were indications of the presencearge quantity of hidden documents in the basement of this facility. On inspection by members of ISG's Nuclear team int was found that the document store had been systematically burned.

Building 5

Contained offices of IA EC.

Ground floor, mosdy burned, could have started in small conference room. Magnetic media taken bul no exploitable documents recovered.

Roomasement: Document storage for IAEC. Documents found2 dealing with UNSCOM and IAEA inspections; documents gathered andfor exploitation.

Building 4

Document storage and reactor operations building, alsoeating, ventilation and air-condi-lioning (HVAC) system.

Roomnteresting find madeocument"heavyhis document was among other documents dealing with water for HVAC applications. Specific checks on translation arc being made to clarify this reference in view of ils possible relevanceMD program.

lectronics repair office, document found relating io thyristors; document taken forThyristors are relevant io nuclear device trigger systems.

Team Golf Results/Comments

Team Golf, the fifth team, was responsible for visiting all the target structures outside lhe berms in zones Foxtrot. Golf, and Hotel. Duringays of the mission, lhe team visitedtructures some not previously identified, confirming MGRS, wherefunctionality, and ISO status relevance. With one

exception.. all ihe sile* were clear, some were destroyed or vandalized, some were the remains of air defense sites, and others were waichumber were inhabited by squatters.

May have been an old guard building. Building was wrecked, but among the nibble was found the remainsater distillation set and sieam generaiionpansaboratory cold chamber, Ihc cabinet of an environmental chamber, and the remainsentrifuge capable of more0 rpm.

yti

Annex C

Analysis of the Videotapes' Compiled From Video Recce

Team Delta

Reference

Room

Number

dump, wiih docaided scientific equipment including Andersen samplerslunnel

1

ofdoiuments. Collected on II

flics aod doeumems. Collected13

Russian smoke jieneralors?

container, fertilizer and Uboratory equipment, nmhonrnemal cabinet by llwaius. Imported by Kharl Khob.

Tower

exception of Fire Station at thi? location associated block at the end of the FS and some temporary buildings containing FS stores, all otherat Cumplex ofave been desiroyed and are clear. NFA no further action required.

barrack buildings vicinity. noeqiiipmeni. Connect wiih steps, which leadop of bcrm. AA ptisiikms.

slielt eases burnedump, adjacent water uuue. and Fireacross mad. Some other store* buildings at back of complex. Room containing fiks and neatly arranged records.

briefly look at ihcscinguist

Tower

Tower

crater,bs Israeli

crater

of. no building remains.

140

destroyed.

and cable run, downeel.

Team Delta

1 (continuedl

0

pylon, surrounded By scrap metal and shelving adjacent to site ot.

and huikbne. rubtile. Junk removed lioin Tuwaitha humheil building

piles of junk building nibble.

W

xplosion caused pinnacle In ihc middle.

Tower, identifies boxes in junk yard.

of ruined piahablc guard Oiiick*.

guard shack. Bamiek Hiinlcn.

luce respirator. Symbol bent minaret ai Moselin Hycr. Two or Uiree symbol ot local nunulaeliav in Motel.

Delta

2

Reference

lower

Smoke Canisters

Tower

Tower

Structure

Tower

Tower

concrete links.

Team Dctia

continued)

14

obrciod II

film ly.tcm and dmo iruunnf buiklinp in area at Build. Cwlenedovember,

58

u> hralib renter (insideide road blocked wiih wrecked bin

olcluster ol bulWlnp ai Buddingomplex.

al buildingomplex thawing manhole ctxtr and high, capacity rectifiers and docuinetil

substation complex. Jiu*inn diKfinc for looten lo sural copper cables

07

conirol room, lhowtng "vyrtconMruci" equipmeni. Shot of loot-en digging to ileal table and water lysiem. Sftix of room behind control mom milcable InnWna,

bwldtnf at sabtUlm. yaall essoinee and lane (winning pool lyreh eod|eepwldaforapfcx.

lomMb^dawail*jr botedom. EvidenceawrenHal. and potuhtr nil tan inearth. Some ill ireciwrred fee CMPC.vrin> edottuauming.om-rnunO

N*

and OwnUcai.

DdUi

3

Reference

Ml

ot rooms inomplex mainhoton optical benchUK. Photos of laser Impact on urgcis.cage (large).

conirol equipmeni pn-uimcd In have come Irom main building in

omplex,

Aacxfco pan of Akatcl equipment, pn-wimed Irom main budding inomplex and ptMibly board *rth previous Alcatel device. Presumed teapot UM as tbe equipmentwndbajjed for pmaxiiea.

Jobia Vwn eqvipnra looLi cipcnsMc

looting ne* Ausfislu* coturosniooden case. (SC.2 Monwrey Road. Dandenuna,59assed by -Wart- GBC lmc?ra. XL.edial Scmtik

spec-iromrler.

1 tain Delta

4 (continued)

"

building as continuing pan ofomplex wiih autoclave Haute) and incubator/Shaker with UNSCOM bid

fired boiler uied lOr steam general ion to power autoclave.

lower

building at rear ofomplex wiih equipmcni junk inside.coniainer wiih more junk and an object, which looked like pan of HT

l*

detailed examination

Tower

buildingompleted.

readable

hii idling not yci completed.

buildings on top of berm.

Delta

4

Reference

from bcrms over Tuwuiuia complex.

from bcrms over Tuwaitha complex.

from bcrms over Tuwaitha complex.

from hcrms over Tuwaitha complex.

H Trashed WoA*hop area.

SR

H Tiaslied Wtiekshop area.

rashed Workshop area.

Team Alpha

Reference

Kmmi

Number

rderyotmd buster with sxrourOcd bv damage. Foamcehe

Sjuem emprv NFA

frrpouNl erapUcenmi nl entrance at Ihecompleiely ernpty.

MI

Tower. (No particular huildnu! number)

provided

Cooling Tower

tep* going down, noi etptoied

tierFA>

1

3

u;s

3

f.

8

HS. Glove hm

Laao-

rainrv

arge brick, nro-anry Hructare.

Noteon Ihe hmnm floor are barred. Eitcmite looting Umnifb out withrandomlywhat renuiiH ot unrm.il rqtnpmrnt. themical <onUinme iiorage, evidence o(noperation, electrical power equipmentdevices, work tablet *nd workboratory glasswire, some office furniture, noiet-xuv bind em and files sirewo about, and debus. Atoom was designatedpectroscopes Laboratory.

The south end ofotiliinedncw areas under constntctKin. which contained nothing.

Section of Buildingdjacent lo nrw comcrucuoo contained much of the tame as primary building ami

Southwest end o: BuddiigiVjuhJrooms wiihuimuw-Hon. probably noei oecapied

azard symbol oa door.

Ort> heading to souia of

remote maroruiatcv and room with PVC

required.

8

.

ater laboratory

Alpha

6

iSmmM

hrick .urucru/e. northcmmoM building

4

'IS

Team Alpha

liiniiM i

3

II

i

9

7 Upstairs hinders

omputet media

h Design of Infonnaiion

17

omputer media

19

omputer/Maths tecluiiques

Technical manuals 1mb token ring map of Tuwaitha taken hack.

hu iUhngnmplcx

Admin Block piled high with document*.

warren ot offices

pmgram

and ledger

storage area

buildingomplex

of paper on Ibe Hour, torn up.

chart

on bookcase.

Container large, end ol mad in section E. underground storage/6 * *

i

House

ramloniier sal inn. ElcciroJyic production of

Team Alpha

7

Reference

/Room Number

mcnt

of structures

.

torageelded shut.

eel long.

Container wiih soil blocking each end

our. Do noi enter radiation.

to counlpm

facility. Radioacils* sourcefarpm Gamma.

aier-coolins tower. Building destroyed.

nderground facility personnel bunker.

ompletely desuoyed.

ompletely destroyed.

torage buildings.

mall, with two moms. Water filtration syslem. second room empty

Beta

Reference

Room Number

6 used to be one large building, behind is another buildine not on map, wend *

Tank writing on blackboard. Building 64

iwage Tank writing on blackboard.

Team Beta

9

Reference

/ Room Number

187

14

mnce blocked

184

noi on map entrance. Above ground

-wuid Sc innUaiioo analCA Tri-Cnre

East Corner

2

1

4

s in faeiGF buluge water lank flowingeep.

ylindrical Tar*.

oth entry doors were locked but opened

76

Building 71

75

dots some documents

disks some documenis

uilding

bricks, protecting source? And Filler"

mom.

dociunciiii.

documenis.

documenis.

some documents, box of floppy disks.

leam Beta

10

ce

/ Room Number

adiation Irom wall oicL

NFA

uilding empty.

NFA

Vidintraside by side

NFA

Beta

II

Reference

Room Number

13

document*.

ice on desk?

dot umcni. SSERdrvtce.

rlaptoi*.

piper*

papers. tVf mkukI Fge. photo and disk

ail. Els LEQUbUX *a

00

Danger Notice. Drum ofead bracki.

Vail

of Acetone.

ikiwn to bin-emeu! of

Board.

FufMiwer. Suwucu Steel

CTsVim Dir-June cowaMer (Frronl

;

Ru^rvrme Sr^aoraeio.'

Team Beta

ontinued)

1 ven/kiln, notebook.

roor

io rest of building denied.

of lead bricks.

Buikliog24

upstairs

piled full of equipment spares.

ledgers and notebooks.

of document* on bookshelf

Ccnificate.

menu

llaniiy Sonnr High Speed Centrifuge

documents and laboratory notebooks.

i

o! Documents im floor and hook case.

of bookcase and ledgers.

outside door to latter Few documents

1

Tea* Beta

n no

VolUfX Tneper lype US 4

Stabilized Powof Supply

H

building.

l'h.,rli.

12

im

.

amy. doeorneni*

UJ

out

noon

otii

and ledgers in In ml if.-II

some |xiper* <xi Ibe floor.

and Icdgeri in bwfedielf. Luge uuuiitiiy.

.ptoH

and document! on floor.

co tbe floor.

papex or- the floor, tenders in booksbch'

on floor.

cocuneni*

n suite facility.

papers.

papers.

9

ledgers under desk.

Team Charlie

continued)

on floor, ledgers in bookshelf

andloor.

on flooi.

.urge bookshelf lull of ledgers.

ledgers behind desk.

on ilcuir.

,1

bathroom nnd burned ofBecs. ash Irom paper*.

thine

papers on floor.

& 33

*

Of burned cumikir, facing Wesl.

room upstairs, building services and view, of rool.

8

room oneO. paper* in entnuice lull.

on floor.

room

LHS tolknving Sccurily Burner, papers.

on floor.

00

on door,Itling cabinet with documents.

on floor.

on floor

floor.

on floor.

enil <tl .ecurily area.

on floor cxploti.

room on LHS. papers on lloor.cn suite facility. Stumer nook full ol ledgers.

inktirv X

pupcrs.

pnpers on floor.

papers on floor.

1 I

i

!

i

.earn

Charlie

continued)

quantity of document* on floor

coma

ol documents on floor.

cih.nrl *iih ledgers and documents on floor.

<oc*er. documents oo floor.

brfl altarbarrier, re* dncunvnts.

on Hmr.

paper.

paper.

on LHS

p>|r

room

tip io roof

io uiilny ana hnutcd in small room on root

74IW0

oor on north side, all doom andere hiied with atldwnui wrunry barv

on LHS

nn ftooi Curacies, papm back room

on fell erfpr qvaaut)t-mctHi mmom

1

Exploit

otbroken open and empty.

hor of buildmji and associated tried and iiarwmission lower.

building soulhof Bldg ll.nopapm.

ccupied by Security Guards.

offome documents, bkxkcd in.

alked for advice.

decBflirMi

"

.uibluny .yvtrr-

'.tir.j: 11

: Iiuiliiinr II.

lo small noragc room, with racking, no ducumrnis.

of Buildingnd cairy wing. Some documenti.

Team Charlie

continued)

equipment.

ofiquid N2 generator.

oflicc, some documenis.

Tux* sign.

of some instructions relating to equipment.

and Room willi storage of equipmeni.

helium equipmeni.

of BOC TurBOCool helium Liquificr.

djacent lo tISIRAC bombed by Israeli's

5!:

GRS. followed by shots of entrance and foyer.

paper* on floor

notice in Arab*.

hinders on desks und floor of moms viewed.

documents.

documents.

Of CAM

eacL

on floor.

plot!

drawings.

of Central Workshop by Bilcon Projects..

of administration building.

papers.

rooms

hinders. Arabic notes on drafting table.

followed by siairs leading down.

of documents Vast quantity.

facing cast. Numbered pumps, electrical services and HVAC system.

ong, floodedeeL

exanu-nal ion?

Off end of building, bomh damage, not eniered.

building to casterious damage.

of litlle buddingerious bomb damage.

Team Charlie

continued)

that) inio suhhascmeni.

staircase leading down.

ol destroyed building.

tor small

pan* of Building 22

of hoi cells and remain* irf manipulator'.

of bombed out sections of

dangerous, no further exploration.

of access way betweens ihis remains of pneunuiic rabbit sysiem?

of between Buildings

uodergnrund Ixiscmeni. NW comer. Grid* af all four corKis.

East Comer.

nasi Comer.

Wesl Comer

comer of rxiilding wiih substation station facility

conlnit or supply building.

rooms.

side of building, high unhealed eount rate, sacks of Portland cement.

of1

in ibed full of scrap metal, cable, etc.

Nuclea* Research Center

i hi

j! ill

hi

Hi

1

gfi 1

lift

im

10'I

Annex E

Summary of Known UN-Tagged Equipment

UN Tag

Status

Cabinet. Class D

m

202

Found

ean* research work Hydrocarbon degradation. Present Use: At in ihe past. Future Use: Ai in the past. This item not listed by UNSCOMnd not declared.

<*S*

Found

Use: Used lor hydrocarbon degradationresent Use: As in the past. Future Use; As in Ihe put.

shaker 6L

IB1st Root Rm 3

Found

Use: For Rhizobium cultivation/research. Present Use: Oui ofliire Use: To be repaired for use as in (he past.

naff iv Cabinet. Cliiss II*

120

Found

fie: Analyze produciwn and research and olhcrresent Use: As in the past. Future Use: As in the past.

(tagged in error)

120

Found

Use; Enzyme production research. Present Use: As in the past. Future Use* As in the paw. Tagged in error,HAKER incubator as reported by.

Cabinet. Class 11

NKNOWN

Found

Use: Vaccine production from egg embryos. Present Use: As in ihe past. Future Use: As in the past.

freeze

m 13

Found

Use: Drying of food samples, baby food etc. Present Use: As in the past. Future Use; As in

tlx- pas.!.

freeze 2L

round floor

Use: Radio Pbannaceuiicals freeze drying. Present Use: As in ihe past. Future Use: As io the past.

L

IS Rni-'

Found

Use: Rhuobium freere-drying research. Present Use* As in the past. Future Use: As in Ihe past. Earlier UNSCOM team staled machine not taggablc.

Top Opening/ Steel)

4 Corridor

Found

Use: Rennin production from bacicria.Use: Rennin production from bacteria. Fulure Use: Rconin production. Origin: Purchased new. averean ago.

Cooled Orbital

4 Corridor across from

Found

Use: Used for starter cultures for B. iher-eigersis and single cell protein. Present Use: Autrophk bacteria for metal leaching. Future Use: Autroptik hacterin for mcul leaching.

Incubator SL (Front

30

Found

Use: Growing cultures. Present Use: Not working. Future Use: If spare pans become available, will repair. Origin: Bought newmported.

Summary of Known UN-Tagged Equipment (continued)

3 (Top Open)

Found

For thermophilic bacteria, thermos table en/yine |Hmluctiitn. uartK'ularly heamocel-lukncv Origin* Arrivedears ago. Note: Aliltough model no. is overwrittens seen and correct.

Double Jacketed

Building

Found

tag sheet for further record input

IX".He Jacketed

Buildimj

Found

tog sheet for further record input

Double Jacketed

Pcs-ticidr Building

Found

tag sheet for further record input

Double Jacketed

Foil ml

tag sheet for further record inpul

Double Jacketed

Building

Found

lag sheet for further record input

Double Jacketed

Buildiog

Found

lag sheet for runner record inpul

Double Jacketed

Building

Found

tag sheet for funher record inpul

Double Jacketed

Found

tag sheet for funher record inpul

DouWc Jacketed

Building

Found

lag sheet for funher record inpul

cabinet. Class II

4 Km KM

Found

DNA (Rcctrophoresiv Unii)

108

Found

unit will be used for DNA sequencing as soon as sense ordered pans arrive. Equipment wa*rs ago. Never used.

106

nderground Stow. Dam-

5 L.

4

nderground Store. Diun-

-

106

4

control unit

106

Found

cmp controlonirol unit: PQ2 conirol uiiiU stirrer spcctl contnsl and How control

Freeze

or-ridor

Found

ol Known UN-Tagged

(coniinucd)

freeze iwnallj

4 Corridor

Found

S L

m

Found

:

Lyophilizer Ismail) Stoppering Tray

i floor

Found

1

freeze. bonom

i floor

Found

freeze

56

Found

Water Bulb

4aboratory

Found

Use: Growingnd bacteria forresent Use: Not working. Fulure Use: Easily repaired when spare pans becomeOrigin: Unknown.

n m

hemi-val pilot plant

Sim

Use: Not used, made al TuwaithaPmseni Use: not used. Future Use: Unknown

Flow

hrmi-eal pilot plant

Sllu

Use: Date symp purification. Present Use: Stored. Future Use: Unknown

i

IncubatOt

round floor

Use: Found in destroyed buildings. Present Use: Not in use. In the future: Shaking ol liquids only (No nucrooiga-iUins)

Freeze

4

Found

Aefodynamic

MS

ftiund

Powder. Small Scale

m 8

oom

cooccnitinon of panicle sires, lor dun cOnceiitrati.ins.

Ccnual Control i rl

m 5

Found

Press

Shaker

90

Found

(Two liered lor SL>

irsiicro-Nology (Room

Found

dn.iMo jaekctcd. Sieel|4flO Lj

Work-shop, outside

Found

Summary of Known UN-Tagged Equipment (continued)

double iaekeicd.OL)

Bldg 53

Sua

double iaekeicd.0 L)

BWg 33

Situ

double jacketed. Steel (TOOL)

Outside bldg 53

Bldg 53

double jacketed.0 L)

53

Situ

m ibe puiilicaiion of ctbanol.

Freeze, Lvoplullicr

loor

Found

Alaa Slianf i* responsible for thisryer

double jacketed, steel

53

Sim

shaker

Prep Bldg. Hall, Pioni Tissue Station

Found

piece of equipment appears io be declared by Tuwaitha and is stated to be untagged and not functional.

orbital

Room

Found

orbital

ee-tionB

Noi found impliesarticular item was noi positively identified. This may have been due io the removal of the label or the fact thai the equipment was not prcscnl or may have been destroyed/relocated.

Library (Iromunker (behindna we# Irom Derm.

Annex G

Tuwaitha Maps, Buildings, and Numbers

Team Safely

All entry Icam members were lined wiih dosimeters sciinimum alarm levelR/Hr.Team Leadersecond dosimeter issued byconsultants.

All personnel were instructed (irmly not to enter any Hazard areas and to leave any buildingif Iheir dosimeter alarms were triggered, and to call out the radiaiion Quick Response Force (QRF) established in Ihe CP at the living

accommodation on sile. Teams were allowed to enter buildings definedaution only with an approved ISG escort.

All persons, leaving ihc vicinity ofourere monitored for contamina-lion before entering living area on return.

Dosimeter readings were recorded as lhe dosimeters were collected al Ihc end of Ihe mission.

HO

Regime inflection Points: Key Nuclear Weapons Activities Across the Regime Timeline

rrarvtraq war km Iraq toward inscftency and OtKttnt. and htcf*gnted active WMD

Eooncrrac and mntary daclna trraesened the Regime but

recoverya rrcre ccnficjent Rogrne posure

EccmonK gromm entbottenedDecisions

programsRag-maSaddam isolateddegenerated

to Husayn rmttJmmmVkm

Suspension ot Co-opemOonCOM

tovasKtiofKuweM

waa an active, advanced, and wort-ionrwdear osaponii program during tils phase1 clandestine nudear waapona program achieved many slgraftcani milestones

welMunded Iraq Alomc Eoergy Commission (IAFC) ousted during ttva period

Tha tragi ngctoar program dements were con-dined jroer Husayn Kami in Noremttar IMS

Dr.'Ar*i. PreeJCemWi Advisorraq waa mm year* away InvTi temvjnuOcar mil apon

ta Crash Program was started to overt asjajaiy fcf touclear weapon.tig-marn. rrttchning. asacmby. and doevery (Tha Craeb Program waa canceledolowna lha oesBucnon of key lactates during lha flrat Quit war)

enith ot the Iraq nudoar program Tha ma*tigudes' weapon wm ixi It near borlxon and waa central tombition

t The riudear prog-am was Oestroyed by wai. Sanctons, and tho UN Saddam's dearsuclear weapon remstrong but tne Itist Gutt war effectively ended Iraq's nudear weaponsrar

KanJ ordered Ihe retenbonopy ol a* nuclear-related documents and some centrifugebut ne diverted nudear esrwUse to help rebuild the national ksnaatniclure. Truro was some retention ot residual generic nut-tear capabilities by adapt-ng personnel and dual use equipment to new program*

waa dMcovered1 that esq tied catubona (for uranrum erriciiment) and waa moving them to en urd-acbaad irxaoon Via empmmad the naaaey ot tha nudear weaponsprogram. Funhar lecfracat paper* detaang Iraq's riuetear weeper* development program men sened at Vw, erne

elardeefene njjiear program) tceyWtets mg-ated to theusa-Ua Commasloney warnhe MaahM base to retain sans and lo be peat mad tor potential mOrar rscone'itulon Iraq oW not have access to Highly Ennrtiod Uranium4

The tllght of Husayn Kamil6 eiposed the clandestine nuclear program andoid in the loadert Ihe program thereobceable decline in any rtudear-rnMed research6

I ho Husayn Kanvl incident also eiposod the pan*1 Cram Program, designed io reprocess nudear fuel lor the waapona program. The UN follow-uo detvered vcaimes of technical reports on the Iraqi nuclaer weapons program

Saddam suspended nudear wsepum tros antr taroona took head, hato defcr roicrwiSX'i oTtha pro-amaflat ureaore wereSaft-acmmferfwasi-aytofwReomaBa^

the IAEC cxxiUriuoo So OoCine dumg no Do nod The nudear program aunared audit* coalas Vie UN sought to dlnmnnllo wbol remainad o( Iraq* nuclear weapons irtnarttructure

A new Oirec*xof the IAEC west apptaraed In0

The Hut and Fnai Claajaaa Deytoture.bs. rroMded an open anOxwo Vw Iraqi nudear program

roltiwing tie accaptaixe ot the UN Ol Tor Food program and tlgna of eoanorrac growth, In9 the Regime attempted to upgrade Vie educational system, and encouragedreoaeroh in banc sciences, incknlng physics and rudear ao0oeenrg

Tbe rnaaitonarife ol Vie IAEC throughout thepencepresage tor SadOam

Contu-ued low ftirvnna and poo* nuctea--ntraslructM hut circumstantial litoicaiona of Inleni n> prepare tot roeorweuOon after sancthris wwe lifted

6 onwurd. Saddam took an rieraeeng InterestIAFC actwaes. Working conditions for IAEC ord nuctear-retated nrrployees Improved

his dues-use device Nad pcaontai nucites raeeereh andbjWbjjm

IMrTKIIi^ViaewsBbonofrietAECI*fufjfkpT*T> Thrt pto^wn nctoded budget, aalary and nbasbudureThe Pieuderit of the IAEC persuaded Saddam to order MIC to gne rum any assistance ha required tor Ihe UodemUabon Projotl

Dual-use lochnc'oglKS pursueil by Iraq slowed Regane to meniatn some spedarUed lechrscal knowledge that could be SDOrCabte to nuclear weapcos aaiialBpwiant aa Use aeonomy rnproveo

The iraeBeduel corpa requiredudear program, however,ecay aa soereets and ergj-wrs onfiec

retgana nta set ki IAEC during the prose

IAEC worked wdhMtConsultancy basis during Use period aa ordered by Saddam

The Currently Accurate. Full and Complete Deetaraaoo. publishedrovkted an updeWd sMBja on tre peel Iraa nulrar program

aaq dto notkstaa nudear eeepon tsbneaaon program at Mi stage

The romn.el ol sarvraan* remaned Saddam's ley pnonty. bul he appeared rnant to pursue nuclear reoDntBtutton Iheroanor. It pvnued.count)tulico would nave been guarded and irxremental to avoid iraarnetlonal ronfrontaOon

Dual use recrddcoei wctfrl ham provided some Knowledge and unoerttandrg to suppon any kaure nudear program

won wouu rwve been request] a> masart ai nude* prooraT

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