| Patent application number | Description | Published |
|---|
| 20080296375 | Method for assigning voter identifications in a vote by mail system - A method of conducting an election including storing a signature image for each voter, providing a plurality of return envelopes, providing an indicium having a barcode on each of the return envelopes, for each of the return envelopes, associating the barcode of the indicium with a respective one of the voters, and mailing each return envelope and a ballot to the voter with which the barcode data of the indicium of the envelope has been associated. When each return envelope including a completed ballot and a written signature thereon is received, the method includes obtaining from the return envelope the written signature and the barcode of the indicium provided thereon, using the obtained barcode to access the stored authorized signature image of the voter with which the barcode is associated, and comparing the obtained written signature to the authorized signature in the accessed image. | 12-04-2008 |
| 20080306885 | System and method for authenticating indicia using identity-based signature scheme - Methods and systems for verification of indicia that do not require key management systems, and in which revocation of key pairs is easily performed without adding costs to the verification process are provided. Indicia are generated and authenticated utilizing an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme. A key generating authority generates a private key for a PSD, distributes the private key securely to the PSD, and provides public information for use by a verification service when verifying cryptographic digital signatures generated with the private key. The corresponding public key is a string consisting of PSD information that is provided as part of the indicium. The verification service can verify the signature of each indicium by obtaining the public key string from the indicium, and utilizing the key generating authority's public information. | 12-11-2008 |
| 20080314997 | Vote by mail envelope that protects integrity of ballot during signature verification - A vote-by-mail return envelope that includes a pouch portion for containing the ballot and a stub portion on which the voter applies his/her signature and method for processing are provided. Each portion of the envelope contains a respective barcode that identifies the respective portion. When the envelope is received at the vote-counting location, the stub is separated from the pouch, thereby separating the voter's signature, name, etc. from the ballot. The signature is then verified from the stub, and subsequent processing of the pouch uses the pouch barcode identifier as a link to the stub barcode identifier and/or to the result of the signature verification, to determine whether the ballot in the pouch is eligible for counting or whether some remedial procedure is necessary. | 12-25-2008 |
| 20090032591 | ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEM AND ASSOCIATED METHOD - An electronic voting system includes a vote security device (VSD), a user interface for presenting a ballot to a voter, and an audit trail printer operatively coupled to the VSD. The printer prints an audit trail ballot only in response to verifying encrypted and/or digitally signed messages received from the VSD that indicates the voter's ballot selections. The printer is structured to allow the voter to view but not access the audit trail ballot. The voter is able to accept or reject the audit trail ballot using the user interface. If the ballot is rejected, the VSD causes the printer to print a rejection indicator on the ballot, and if the voter accepts the ballot, the VSD causes the printer to print an acceptance indicator on the ballot. A digitally signed record of the voter's ballot selections is generated and stored. | 02-05-2009 |
| 20090055000 | SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR ROUTING SELECTION USING STATISTICAL DATA - A system, method, and medium, the method including receiving parameter information associated with a mailer, associating the parameter information with a mailing, receiving statistical information, the statistical information including historical performance data of at least one carrier, determining a delivery sequence for the mailing based on the received mailer parameter information and the statistical information, and outputting the determined delivery sequence for the mailing. | 02-26-2009 |
| 20090100267 | Signatures with confidential message recovery - A portion of the signed message in an ECPVS is kept truly confidential by dividing the message being signed into at least three parts, wherein one portion is visible, another portion is recoverable by any entity and carries the necessary redundancy for verification, and at least one additional portion is kept confidential. The additional portion is kept confidential by encrypting such portion using a key generated from information specific to that verifying entity. In this way, any entity with access to the signer's public key can verify the signature by checking for a specific characteristic, such as a certain amount of redundancy in the one recovered portion, but cannot recover the confidential portion, only the specific entity can do so. Message recovery is also provided in an elliptic curve signature using a modification of the well analyzed ECDSA signing equation instead of, e.g. the Schnorr equation used in traditional PV signature schemes. | 04-16-2009 |
| 20090103734 | METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR SECURING ROUTING INFORMATION OF A COMMUNICATION USING IDENTITY-BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEME - Methods and systems for providing confidentiality of communications sent via a network that is efficient, easy to implement, and does not require significant key management. The identity of each node of the routing path of a communication is encrypted utilizing an identity-based encryption scheme. This allows each node of the routing path to decrypt only those portions of the routing path necessary to send the communication to the next node. Thus, each node will only know the immediate previous node from which the communication came, and the next node to which the communication is to be sent. The remainder of the routing path of the communication, along with the original sender and intended recipient, remain confidential from any intermediate nodes in the routing path. Use of the identity-based encryption scheme removes the need for significant key management to maintain the encryption/decryption keys. | 04-23-2009 |
| 20090160174 | SECURE VOTE BY MAIL SYSTEM AND METHOD - A method of enabling a voter to vote by mail by using a secret vote code (SVC) that includes translating the SVC into a one-time code (OTC) valid only for the election, storing the OTC, and mailing to the voter a ballot, a return envelope, and a mechanism for enabling the SVC to be translated into a translated format. Further, the method includes receiving the return envelope from the voter that includes a completed ballot, the voter's signature, and the translated format, determining whether the signature obtained from the envelope matches a stored signature for the voter, obtaining a second one-time code based on the translated format and determining whether the second one-time code matches the stored one-time code. The ballot is counted only if it is determined that: (i) the signatures match, and (ii) the second one-time code matches the stored one-time code. | 06-25-2009 |
| 20100049536 | METHODS FOR CREATING CONSOLIDATED MAILPIECES - A method includes receiving a plurality of mail messages. The plurality of mail messages are all appointed for delivery by mail to the same recipient. Each of the mail messages includes a respective account number for the mail recipient. The method further includes combining the received mail messages into a single combined mailpiece addressed to the mail recipient. All of the account numbers included in the mail messages are mutually different from each other. | 02-25-2010 |
| 20100111296 | COLLISION-RESISTANT ELLIPTIC CURVE HASH FUNCTIONS - Elliptic curve hash functions are provided which do not require a pre-existing hash function, such as that required by the MuHash. The elliptic curve hash functions can be built from scratch and are collision free and can be incremental. In one embodiment, rather than a pre-existing hash function, the identity function with padding is used; and in another embodiment, rather than a pre-existing hash function, a block cipher with a fixed non-secret key is used. | 05-06-2010 |
