| Patent application number | Description | Published |
|---|
| 20090025067 | GENERIC EXTENSIBLE PRE-OPERATING SYSTEM CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFRASTRUCTURE - A cryptographic device protocol provides a generic interface allowing pre-OS applications to employ any of a variety of cryptographic devices within the pre-OS environment. The generic interface can be used independent of the specific cryptographic devices and is independent of the cryptographic or hashing algorithms used by each device. Cryptographic functions may be performed in the pre-OS environment by pre-OS applications communicating with cryptographic device drivers using the cryptographic device protocol that is independent of the cryptographic devices. Each cryptographic device may be identified by a unique device identifier and may have a number of keys available to it, with each key being identified by a unique key identifier. | 01-22-2009 |
| 20100082987 | TRANSPARENT TRUST VALIDATION OF AN UNKNOWN PLATFORM - A transparent trust validation of an unknown platform can be performed by communicationally coupling it to a trusted device, such as a portable peripheral device carried by a user, or one or more remote computing devices. Information from the unknown platform can be obtained by boot code copied to it from the trusted device and such information can be validated by the trusted device. The trusted device can then provide an encrypted version of decryption key to the boot code which can request the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) of the unknown platform to decrypt and return the decryption key. If the information originally obtained from the unknown platform and validated by the trusted device was authentic, the TPM will be able to provide the decryption key to the boot code, enabling it to decrypt an encrypted volume comprising applications, operating systems or other components. | 04-01-2010 |
| 20110099625 | TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULE SUPPORTED ONE TIME PASSWORDS - A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) can be utilized to implement One Time Password (OTP) mechanisms. One or more delegation blobs can be created by the TPM and the delegation authentication values of the delegation blobs can be based on the version number of the delegation blobs. A data blob with a protected secret can comprise a pointer to the delegation table of the TPM. The version number can be provided to an authority from which an OTP (a delegation authentication value) can be received. The OTP can be utilized to gain access to the secret and an authentication value of the key blob, which can be utilized to increase the version number of all associated delegation blobs. Policy limitations can be associated with the delegation blobs and can be enforced by policy enforcement mechanisms that can reference the TPM tick counter to enforce temporal policy restrictions. | 04-28-2011 |
| 20110167503 | TPM-BASED LICENSE ACTIVATION AND VALIDATION - A Trusted Activation License (TAL) can be comprised of a key unique to a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and identifying information of the software applications bundled with the computing device having that TPM. To activate the software applications, the identifying information in the TAL can be compared against that of the software applications being activated, and the unique TPM key in the TAL can be compared against that of the TPM on the computing device on which the activation is taking place. Subsequent validations can be based on a protected association between the TAL and an Attestation Identity Key (AIK) that can be generated by the TPM as part of the activation step. Optionally, Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) of the TPM can be periodically changed during validation to protect against useage of one TPM for validations on multiple computing devices. | 07-07-2011 |
| Patent application number | Description | Published |
|---|
| 20090031408 | INTEGRITY PROTECTED SMART CARD TRANSACTION - Systems, methods, and technologies for configuring a conventional smart card and a client machine, and for performing a smart card authorization using the configured smart card and client. Further, the combination of methods provides for mutual authentication—authentication of the client to the user, and authentication of the user to the client. The authentication methods include presenting a specified token to the user sufficient to authenticate the client to the user and thus protect the user-provided PIN. Security is strengthened by using an integrity key based on approved client system configurations. Security is further strengthened by calculating a PIN′ value based on a user-specified PIN and a modifier and using the PIN′ value for unlocking the smart card. | 01-29-2009 |
| 20110176682 | INTEGRITY PROTECTED SMART CARD TRANSACTION - Systems, methods, and technologies for configuring a conventional smart card and a client machine, and for performing a smart card authorization using the configured smart card and client. Further, the combination of methods provides for mutual authentication—authentication of the client to the user, and authentication of the user to the client. The authentication methods include presenting a specified token to the user sufficient to authenticate the client to the user and thus protect the user-provided PIN. Security is strengthened by using an integrity key based on approved client system configurations. Security is further strengthened by calculating a PIN′ value based on a user-specified PIN and a modifier and using the PIN′ value for unlocking the smart card. | 07-21-2011 |
| 20110179282 | INTEGRITY PROTECTED SMART CARD TRANSACTION - Systems, methods, and technologies for configuring a conventional smart card and a client machine, and for performing a smart card authorization using the configured smart card and client. Further, the combination of methods provides for mutual authentication—authentication of the client to the user, and authentication of the user to the client. The authentication methods include presenting a specified token to the user sufficient to authenticate the client to the user and thus protect the user-provided PIN. Security is strengthened by using an integrity key based on approved client system configurations. Security is further strengthened by calculating a PIN′ value based on a user-specified PIN and a modifier and using the PIN′ value for unlocking the smart card. | 07-21-2011 |
| 20110179283 | INTEGRITY PROTECTED SMART CARD TRANSACTION - Systems, methods, and technologies for configuring a conventional smart card and a client machine, and for performing a smart card authorization using the configured smart card and client. Further, the combination of methods provides for mutual authentication—authentication of the client to the user, and authentication of the user to the client. The authentication methods include presenting a specified token to the user sufficient to authenticate the client to the user and thus protect the user-provided PIN. Security is strengthened by using an integrity key based on approved client system configurations. Security is further strengthened by calculating a PIN′ value based on a user-specified PIN and a modifier and using the PIN′ value for unlocking the smart card. | 07-21-2011 |
