Patent application number | Description | Published |
20110307888 | PROTECTION OF VIRTUAL MACHINES EXECUTING ON A HOST DEVICE - Technology is described for protection of virtual machines executing on a host device having host processors and host memory. The system can include a hypervisor configured to enable the virtual machines to execute concurrently on the host device. An emancipated partition can be provided with a communication channel to the hypervisor. A primary partition can be configured to interface with the emancipated partition through the communication channel via the hypervisor. In addition, an emancipated memory space and virtual register state for the emancipated partition can be protected from direct access by the primary partition. | 12-15-2011 |
20120324236 | Trusted Snapshot Generation - A hypervisor provides a snapshot protocol that generates a verifiable snapshot of a target machine. The verifiable snapshot includes a snapshot and a signed quote. In one implementation, a challenger requests a snapshot of the target machine. In response to the snapshot request, the hypervisor initiates Copy-on-Write (CoW) protection for the target machine. The hypervisor snapshots and hashes each of the memory pages and the virtual central processing unit (CPU) of the target machine. The hypervisor generates a composite hash by merging all individual memory page hashes and the CPU state hash. The hypervisor requests a quote including integrity indicators of all trusted components and the composite hash. The quote uses a cryptographic signature from a trusted platform module, which ensures that any compromise of the integrity of the snapshot is detectable. The snapshot and signed quote are returned to the challenger for verification. | 12-20-2012 |
20120331550 | TRUSTED LANGUAGE RUNTIME ON A MOBILE PLATFORM - Disclosed is a trusted language runtime (TLR) architecture that provides abstractions for developing a runtime for executing trusted applications or portions thereof securely on a mobile device (e.g., a smartphone). TLR offers at least two abstractions to mobile developers: a trustbox and a trustlet. The trustbox is a runtime environment that offers code and data integrity, and confidentiality. Code and data running inside a trustbox cannot be read or modified by any code running outside the trustbox. A trustlet is the code portion of an application that runs inside a trustbox. With TLR, programmers can write applications in .NET and specify which parts of the application handle sensitive data, and thus, run inside the trustbox. With the TLR, the developer places these parts in a trustlet class, and the TLR provides all support needed to run the parts in the trustbox. | 12-27-2012 |
20130031374 | FIRMWARE-BASED TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULE FOR ARM PROCESSOR ARCHITECTURES AND TRUSTZONE SECURITY EXTENSIONS - A “Firmware-Based TPM” or “fTPM” ensures that secure code execution is isolated to prevent a wide variety of potential security breaches. Unlike a conventional hardware based Trusted Platform Module (TPM), isolation is achieved without the use of dedicated security processor hardware or silicon. In general, the fTPM is first instantiated in a pre-OS boot environment by reading the fTPM from system firmware or firmware accessible memory or storage and placed into read-only protected memory of the device. Once instantiated, the fTPM enables execution isolation for ensuring secure code execution. More specifically, the fTPM is placed into protected read-only memory to enable the device to use hardware such as the ARM® architecture's TrustZone™ extensions and security primitives (or similar processor architectures), and thus the devices based on such architectures, to provide secure execution isolation within a “firmware-based TPM” without requiring hardware modifications to existing devices. | 01-31-2013 |
20130047197 | SEALING SECRET DATA WITH A POLICY THAT INCLUDES A SENSOR-BASED CONSTRAINT - Technologies pertaining to limiting access to secret data through utilization of sensor-based constraints are described herein. A sensor-based constraint is a constraint that can only be satisfied by predefined readings that may be output by at least one sensor on a mobile computing device. If the sensor on the mobile computing device outputs a reading that satisfies the sensor-based constraint, secret data is provided to a requesting application. Otherwise, the requesting application is prevented from accessing the secret data. | 02-21-2013 |
20130054948 | Attestation Protocol for Securely Booting a Guest Operating System - In a cloud computing environment, a production server virtualization stack is minimized to present fewer security vulnerabilities to malicious software running within a guest virtual machine. The minimal virtualization stack includes support for those virtual devices necessary for the operation of a guest operating system, with the code base of those virtual devices further reduced. Further, a dedicated, isolated boot server provides functionality to securely boot a guest operating system. The boot server is isolated through use of an attestation protocol, by which the boot server presents a secret to a network switch to attest that the boot server is operating in a clean mode. The attestation protocol may further employ a secure co-processor to seal the secret, so that it is only accessible when the boot server is operating in the clean mode. | 02-28-2013 |
20130102276 | SPLIT BILLING FOR A MOBILE DEVICE - The claimed subject matter provides a method for split billing. The method includes receiving a requested token. The requested token specifies conditions under which network traffic is allowed to be billed against a third party for content requested from a mobile computing device. The method also includes matching network traffic between the mobile computing device and a content provider to the specified conditions. The method further includes metering the matched network traffic to a billing account for the third party. | 04-25-2013 |
20130159729 | SOFTWARE-BASED TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULE - A “Firmware-Based TPM” or “fTPM” ensures that secure code execution is isolated to prevent a wide variety of potential security breaches. Unlike a conventional hardware based Trusted Platform Module (TPM), isolation is achieved without the use of dedicated security processor hardware or silicon. In general, the fTPM is first instantiated in a pre-OS boot environment by reading the fTPM from system firmware or firmware accessible memory or storage and placed into read-only protected memory of the device. Once instantiated, the fTPM enables execution isolation for ensuring secure code execution. More specifically, the fTPM is placed into protected read-only memory to enable the device to use hardware such as the ARM® architecture's TrustZone™ extensions and security primitives (or similar processor architectures), and thus the devices based on such architectures, to provide secure execution isolation within a “firmware-based TPM” without requiring hardware modifications to existing devices. | 06-20-2013 |
20140006805 | Protecting Secret State from Memory Attacks | 01-02-2014 |
20140359270 | ATTESTATION PROTOCOL FOR SECURELY BOOTING A GUEST OPERATING SYSTEM - In a cloud computing environment, a production server virtualization stack is minimized to present fewer security vulnerabilities to malicious software running within a guest virtual machine. The minimal virtualization stack includes support for those virtual devices necessary for the operation of a guest operating system, with the code base of those virtual devices further reduced. Further, a dedicated, isolated boot server provides functionality to securely boot a guest operating system. The boot server is isolated through use of an attestation protocol, by which the boot server presents a secret to a network switch to attest that the boot server is operating in a clean mode. The attestation protocol may further employ a secure co-processor to seal the secret, so that it is only accessible when the boot server is operating in the clean mode. | 12-04-2014 |