Patent application number | Description | Published |
20110302398 | KEY PROTECTORS BASED ON ONLINE KEYS - An online key stored by a remote service is generated or otherwise obtained, and a storage media (as it applies to the storage of data on a physical or virtual storage media) master key for encrypting and decrypting a physical or virtual storage media or encrypting and decrypting one or more storage media encryption keys that are used to encrypt a physical or virtual storage media is encrypted based at least in part on the online key. A key protector for the storage media is stored, the key protector including the encrypted master key. The key protector can be subsequently accessed, and the online key obtained from the remote service. The master key is decrypted based on the online key, allowing the one or more storage media encryption keys that are used to decrypt the storage media to be decrypted. | 12-08-2011 |
20110314279 | Single-Use Authentication Methods for Accessing Encrypted Data - Single-use authentication methods for accessing encrypted data stored on a protected volume of a computer are described, wherein access to the encrypted data involves decrypting a key protector stored on the computer that holds a volume-specific cryptographic key needed to decrypt the protected volume. Such single-use authentication methods rely on the provision of a key protector that can only be used once and/or that requires a new access credential for each use. In certain embodiments, a challenge-response process is also used as part of the authentication method to tie the issuance of a key protector and/or access credential to particular pieces of information that can uniquely identify a user. | 12-22-2011 |
20120257759 | ONE-TIME RECOVERY CREDENTIALS FOR ENCRYPTED DATA ACCESS - A key recovery request for a device is received at a key recovery service and a particular one-time recovery credential in a sequence of multiple one-time recovery credentials is identified. In the sequence of multiple one-time recovery credentials, previous one-time recovery credentials in the sequence are indeterminable given subsequent one-time recovery credentials in the sequence. A recovery key associated with the device is also identified. The particular one-time recovery credential in the sequence is generated based on the recovery key, and is returned in response to the key recovery request. The particular one-time recovery credential can then be used by the device to decrypt encrypted data stored on a storage media of the device. | 10-11-2012 |
20130086661 | TECHNIQUES FOR CLIENT CONTRUCTED SESSIONS - Systems and methods for authentication generate keys from secret credentials shared between authenticating parties and authenticators. Generation of the keys may involve utilizing specialized information that, as a result of being used to generate the keys, renders the generated keys usable for a smaller scope of uses than the secret credential. Further, key generation may involve multiple invocations of a function where each of at least a subset of the invocations of the function results in a key that has a smaller scope of permissible use than a key produced from a previous invocation of the function. Generated keys may be used as signing keys to sign messages. One or more actions may be taken depending on whether a message and/or the manner in which the message was submitted complies with restrictions of the a key's use. | 04-04-2013 |
20130086662 | PARAMETER BASED KEY DERIVATION - Systems and methods for authentication generate keys from secret credentials shared between authenticating parties and authenticators. Generation of the keys may involve utilizing specialized information that, as a result of being used to generate the keys, renders the generated keys usable for a smaller scope of uses than the secret credential. Further, key generation may involve multiple invocations of a function where each of at least a subset of the invocations of the function results in a key that has a smaller scope of permissible use than a key produced from a previous invocation of the function. Generated keys may be used as signing keys to sign messages. One or more actions may be taken depending on whether a message and/or the manner in which the message was submitted complies with restrictions of the a key's use. | 04-04-2013 |
20130086663 | KEY DERIVATION TECHNIQUES - Systems and methods for authentication generate keys from secret credentials shared between authenticating parties and authenticators. Generation of the keys may involve utilizing specialized information that, as a result of being used to generate the keys, renders the generated keys usable for a smaller scope of uses than the secret credential. Further, key generation may involve multiple invocations of a function where each of at least a subset of the invocations of the function results in a key that has a smaller scope of permissible use than a key produced from a previous invocation of the function. Generated keys may be used as signing keys to sign messages. One or more actions may be taken depending on whether a message and/or the manner in which the message was submitted complies with restrictions of the a key's use. | 04-04-2013 |
20140108814 | CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT - Cryptographic key management techniques are described. In one or more implementations, an access control rule is read that includes a Boolean expression having a plurality of atoms. The cryptographic keys that corresponds each of the plurality of atoms in the access control rule are requested. One or more cryptographic operations are then performed on data using one or more of the cryptographic keys. | 04-17-2014 |
20140258732 | SOURCE IDENTIFICATION FOR UNAUTHORIZED COPIES OF CONTENT - Systems and methods for authentication generate keys from secret credentials shared between authenticating parties and authenticators. Generation of the keys may involve utilizing specialized information in the form of parameters that are used to specialize keys. Keys and/or information derived from keys held by multiple authorities may be used to generate other keys such that signatures requiring such keys and/or information can be verified without access to the keys. Keys may also be derived to form a hierarchy of keys that are distributed such that a key holder's ability to decrypt data depends on the key's position in the hierarchy relative to the position of a key used to encrypt the data. Key hierarchies may also be used to distribute key sets to content processing devices to enable the devices to decrypt content such that sources or potential sources of unauthorized content are identifiable from the decrypted content. | 09-11-2014 |
20140282950 | AUTOMATED SECRET RENEGOTIATION - Secret information, such as seeds, codes, and keys, can be automatically renegotiated between at least one sender and at least one recipient. Various mechanisms, such as counters, events, or challenges, can be used to trigger automatic renegotiations through various requests or communications. These changes can cause the current secret information to diverge from older copies of the secret information that might have been obtained by unintended third parties. In some embodiments, a secret can be configured to “decay” over time, or have small changes periodically introduced that can be determined to be valid by an authorized party, but can reduce the effectiveness of prior versions of the secret information. | 09-18-2014 |