| Patent application number | Description | Published |
|---|
| 20080215880 | MULTI-DOMAIN DYNAMIC GROUP VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS - Systems and/or methods of secure communication of information between multi-domain virtual private networks (VPNs) are presented. A dynamic group VPN (DGVPN) can reside in one domain and a disparate DGVPN can reside in a disparate domain. An administrative security authority (ASA) can be employed in each domain. Each ASA can generate and exchange respective keying material and crypto-policy information to be used for inter-domain communications when routing data from a member in one DGVPN to a member(s) in the disparate DGVPN, such that an ASA in one domain can facilitate encryption of data in accordance with the policy of the other domain before the data is sent to the other domain. Each ASA can establish a key server to generate the keying material and crypto-policy information associated with its local DGVPN, and such material and information can be propagated to intra-domain members. | 09-04-2008 |
| 20080260151 | USE OF METADATA FOR TIME BASED ANTI-REPLAY - A system and method for facilitating anti-replay protection with multi-sender traffic is disclosed. The system employs time-based anti-replay protection wherein a sender transmits a data packet with a pseudo-timestamp encapsulated in a metadata payload. At the receiving end, the receiver compares the pseudo-timestamp information received with its own pseudo-time, determines if a packet is valid, and rejects a replay packet. The pseudo-time information is transmitted through the metadata payload and new fields need not be added to the IPSec (IP Security) Protocol, thus the existing hardware can be employed without any changes or modifications. | 10-23-2008 |
| 20080298592 | TECHNIQUE FOR CHANGING GROUP MEMBER REACHABILITY INFORMATION - In one embodiment, a technique for updating an address associated with a first entity in a communications network with a second entity in the communications network wherein the address is used to forward information to the first entity from the second entity. The first entity registers a first address associated with the first entity with the second entity. The first entity determines that a second address associated with the first entity is to be used instead of the first address to communicate with the first entity. The first entity generates an update message containing the second address, the update message obviating having to register the second address with the second entity. The first entity forwards the update message to the second entity to cause the second entity to use the second address instead of the first address to forward information to the first entity. | 12-04-2008 |
| 20080307054 | DYNAMIC KEY MANAGEMENT SERVER DISCOVERY - Various systems and method are disclosed for automatically disseminating key server contact information in a network. For example, one method (e.g., performed by a discovery server) involves generating a discovery message that includes at least one list of one or more key servers and then sending that discovery message to one or more members of a key management protocol group. Each list of key servers can include contact information for one or more key servers and indicate the priority of each key server relative to other key servers within the list. | 12-11-2008 |
| 20090083536 | Method and apparatus for distributing group data in a tunneled encrypted virtual private network - A packet forwarding process, on a data communications device, forwards a packet to a plurality of destinations within a network from that data communications device using an “encrypt then replicate” method. The packet forwarding process receives a packet that is to be transmitted to the plurality of destinations, and applies a security association to the packet using security information shared between the data communications device, and the plurality of destinations, to create a secured packet. The secured packet contains a header that has a source address and a destination address. The source address is inserted into the header, and then the packet forwarding process replicates the secured packet, once for each of the plurality of destinations. After replication, the destination address is inserted into the header, and the packet forwarding process transmits each replicated secured packet to each of the plurality of destinations authorized to maintain the security association. | 03-26-2009 |
| 20090097417 | SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR IMPROVING SPOKE TO SPOKE COMMUNICATION IN A COMPUTER NETWORK - Various embodiments of the disclosed subject matter provide methods and systems for improved efficiency in spoke-to-spoke network communication. Embodiments provide systems and methods for registering a spoke with a hub, updating at least one database with spoke registration information at the hub, and advertising the spoke registration information to other spokes using a single control plane that includes transport security, peer discovery, and unicast routing information. | 04-16-2009 |
| 20100154028 | MIGRATING A NETWORK TO TUNNEL-LESS ENCRYPTION - A method comprises, in a network comprising VPN gateway devices configured only for plaintext data communication, configuring a policy server with a security policy including DO NOT ENCRYPT statements temporarily overriding PERMIT statements defining which packets should be encrypted; selecting one sub-group of the VPN gateway devices in which tunnel-less encryption is not configured; configuring of the VPN gateway devices in the sub-group for tunnel-less encryption by: configuring each device in a passive mode of operation in which the device is configured to receive either encrypted packets or plaintext packets matching encryption policy; configuring local DO NOT ENCRYPT statements matching traffic that is currently being converted to ciphertext; removing, from the access control list of the policy server, DO NOT ENCRYPT statements referring to protected LAN CIDR blocks behind the VPN gateway devices in the selected sub-group; configuring the sub-group to send encrypted packets by removing, from each of the VPN gateway devices in the selected sub-group, the local DO NOT ENCRYPT statements for the CIDR blocks currently being converted and protected by the selected sub-group; repeating the configuring each of the VPN gateway devices in the selected sub-group for tunnel-less encryption, and the configuring the sub-group to send encrypted packets, for each other one of the sub-groups; and removing the passive mode on each of the VPN gateway devices. | 06-17-2010 |
| 20100169645 | KEY TRANSPORT IN AUTHENTICATION OR CRYPTOGRAPHY - A computer system for authenticating, encrypting, and transmitting a secret communication, where the encryption key is transmitted along with the encrypted message, is disclosed. In an embodiment, a first transmitting processor encrypts a plaintext message to a ciphertext message using a data key, encrypts the data key using a key encrypting key, and sends a communication comprising the encrypted data key and the ciphertext message. A second receiving processor receives the communication and then decrypts the encrypted data key using the key encrypting key and decrypts the ciphertext message using the data key to recover the plaintext message. | 07-01-2010 |
| 20100205428 | Method and Apparatus for Distributing Group Data In A Tunneled Encrypted Virtual Private Network - A packet forwarding process, on a data communications device, forwards a packet to a plurality of destinations within a network from that data communications device using an “encrypt, then replicate” method. The packet forwarding process receives a packet that is to be transmitted to the plurality of destinations, and applies a security association to the packet using security information shared between the data communications device, and the plurality of destinations, to create a secured packet. The secured packet contains a header that has a source address and a destination address. The source address is inserted into the header, and then the packet forwarding process replicates the secured packet, once for each of the plurality of destinations. After replication, the destination address is inserted into the header, and the packet forwarding process transmits each replicated secured packet to each of the plurality of destinations authorized to maintain the security association. | 08-12-2010 |
| 20100223458 | PAIR-WISE KEYING FOR TUNNELED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS - In an embodiment, a method for generating and distributing keys retains the scalability of a group VPN, but also provides true pair-wise keying such that an attacker who compromises one of the devices in a VPN cannot use the keys gained by that compromise to decrypt the packets from the other gateways in the VPN, or spoof one of the communicating gateways. The method is resistant to collusion when co-operating attackers overtake several VPN gateways and observe the keys stored in those gateways. In an embodiment, a VPN gateway comprises a cryptographic data processor configured to encrypt and to decrypt data packets; group key management logic; and Key Generation System logic. In one approach a gateway performs, in relation to adding a group member, receiving in a security association (SA) message secret data for use in the KGS; and derives keys for secure communication with one or more peer VPN gateways using the secret data. | 09-02-2010 |
| 20100246829 | KEY GENERATION FOR NETWORKS - Systems, methods, and other embodiments associated with key generation for networks are described. One example method includes configuring a key server with a pseudo-random function (PRF). The key server may provide keying material to gateways. The method may also include controlling the key server to generate a cryptography data structure (e.g., D-matrix) based, at least in part, on the PRF and a seed value. The method may also include controlling the key server to selectively distribute a portion of the cryptography data structure and/or data derived from the cryptography data structure to a gateway. The gateway may then encrypt communications based, at least in part, on the portion of the cryptography data structure. The method may also include selectively distributing an epoch value to members of the set of gateways that may then decrypt an encrypted communication based, at least in part, on the epoch value. | 09-30-2010 |
| 20100306352 | NETWORK DEVICE PROVISIONING - Systems, methods and other embodiments associated with network device provisioning are described. One example method includes storing a set of device specific identification data in a network device. The example method may also include storing an association between the network device and a set of device specific provisioning data. The example method may also include providing the set of device specific provisioning data to the network device. The set of device specific provisioning data may be provided in response to receiving a provisioning data request from the network device. | 12-02-2010 |
| 20100329463 | GROUP KEY MANAGEMENT FOR MOBILE AD-HOC NETWORKS - Group key management in a mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) may be provided. Each network node associated with the MANET may comprise a group distribution key and a list of authorized member nodes from which a group key manager may be elected. The group key manager may periodically issue a new group key to be used in protecting communications among the network nodes. A compromised node may be excluded from receiving updated group keys and thus isolated from the MANET. | 12-30-2010 |
| 20110164752 | Detection of Stale Encryption Policy By Group Members - Various techniques that allow group members to detect the use of stale encryption policy by other group members are disclosed. One method involves receiving a message from a first group member via a network. The message is received by a second group member. The method then detects that the first group member is not using a most recent policy update supplied by a key server, in response to information in the message. In response, a notification message can be sent from the second group member. The notification message indicates that at least one group member is not using the most recently policy update. The notification message can be sent to the key server or towards the first group member. | 07-07-2011 |
