Nerot
Cécile Nerot, Reims FR
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20100023068 | METHOD OF IMPLANTING A SHOULDER PROSTHESIS ASSEMBLY - A shoulder prosthesis assembly includes a metaglenoid element ( | 01-28-2010 |
Cécile Nerot, Reims FR
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20090171462 | HUMERAL COMPONENT OF A SHOULDER JOINT PROSTHESIS - A humeral component of a reverse shoulder prosthesis includes a stem part configured for location within the intramedullary cavity of the humerus, the stem part having a stem axis, an epiphyseal part connected to the elongate stem part and having a concave bearing surface defining an epiphyseal axis, and wherein the epiphyseal axis is offset posteriorly relative to the stem axis. | 07-02-2009 |
20090210065 | MODULAR HUMERAL PROSTHESIS FOR AN INVERTED SHOULDER PROSTHESIS - The invention relates to a modular humeral prosthesis for an inverse shoulder prosthesis, comprising an anatomical shaft ( | 08-20-2009 |
20100023068 | METHOD OF IMPLANTING A SHOULDER PROSTHESIS ASSEMBLY - A shoulder prosthesis assembly includes a metaglenoid element ( | 01-28-2010 |
Dorothee Nerot, Orleans FR
Patent application number | Description | Published |
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20080233804 | PROGRESSIVE UNPLUGGING MULTI-CARDS BODY - A card body comprises a first card body (ID-1 card | 09-25-2008 |
Sebastien Nerot, Peyrolles En Provence FR
Patent application number | Description | Published |
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20090103732 | Method of personalizing a NFC Chipset - The invention relates to a method for personalizing a secure processor in a NFC system to execute a secure application, comprising steps of obtaining by a server identification data of a user memorized in a secure storage medium, personalization data corresponding to the user identification data, and identification data of a NFC system of the user, comprising an encryption key of the secure processor, encrypting by the server personalization data using the encryption key, transmitting to the NFC system encrypted personalization data, receiving by the secure processor encrypted personalization data, deciphering personalization data, and memorizing in a secured way personalization data by the secure processor. | 04-23-2009 |
Sebastien Nerot, Colombes FR
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20160105411 | REPLAYING A BATCH OF SECURE COMMANDS IN A SECURE CHANNEL - An intermediary third-party receives, from a master device, a batch of pre-generated secure commands; plays it so as to send sequentially, to a slave device, the commands. The batch includes an initial command indicating the establishment of a channel secured with a session key dependent on a sequence counter, and second commands protected by a MAC code that is a function of the session key. An update of the sequence counter in non-volatile memory of the slave on each new establishment of a secure channel renders the pre-generated batch obsolete by virtue of a new session key. In order to allow the batch to be replayed, the invention provides for each update value of the counter to be temporarily stored in volatile memory, and for the current value to be overwritten in non-volatile memory on predefined events, including a test counter reaching a maximum number of replays. | 04-14-2016 |
Sébastien Nerot, Jouques FR
Patent application number | Description | Published |
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20100262840 | METHOD AND DEVICES FOR PROTECTING A MICROCIRCUIT FROM ATTACKS FOR OBTAINING SECRET DATA - A method of protecting a microcircuit against attacks aimed at discovering secret data used on the execution, by the microcircuit, of an encryption algorithm includes generating at least one protection parameter for the secret data and modifying the execution of the encryption algorithm through that protection parameter. Generation of the at least one protection parameter includes defining a function generating, by successively applying to at least one secret parameter which is stored in memory, a sequence of values which can only be determined from that secret parameter and that function, and to generate the protection parameter in a reproducible way from at least one value in that sequence. | 10-14-2010 |
20100287386 | SECURE INTEGRATED CIRCUIT COMPRISING MEANS FOR DISCLOSING COUNTERPART MASK VALUES - An integrated circuit includes a communication interface circuit, a cryptographic algorithm, a countermeasure configured to protect the cryptographic algorithm against side-channel attacks, and a mask generator configured to provide the countermeasure with mask values. The integrated circuit is configured to execute a specific command requiring the disclosure of mask values used by the countermeasures to protect the cryptographic algorithm during a cryptographic session, and, in response to such a command, to send the mask values through the communication interface circuit. | 11-11-2010 |
Sébastien Nerot, Jouques FR
Patent application number | Description | Published |
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20100262840 | METHOD AND DEVICES FOR PROTECTING A MICROCIRCUIT FROM ATTACKS FOR OBTAINING SECRET DATA - A method of protecting a microcircuit against attacks aimed at discovering secret data used on the execution, by the microcircuit, of an encryption algorithm includes generating at least one protection parameter for the secret data and modifying the execution of the encryption algorithm through that protection parameter. Generation of the at least one protection parameter includes defining a function generating, by successively applying to at least one secret parameter which is stored in memory, a sequence of values which can only be determined from that secret parameter and that function, and to generate the protection parameter in a reproducible way from at least one value in that sequence. | 10-14-2010 |
20100287386 | SECURE INTEGRATED CIRCUIT COMPRISING MEANS FOR DISCLOSING COUNTERPART MASK VALUES - An integrated circuit includes a communication interface circuit, a cryptographic algorithm, a countermeasure configured to protect the cryptographic algorithm against side-channel attacks, and a mask generator configured to provide the countermeasure with mask values. The integrated circuit is configured to execute a specific command requiring the disclosure of mask values used by the countermeasures to protect the cryptographic algorithm during a cryptographic session, and, in response to such a command, to send the mask values through the communication interface circuit. | 11-11-2010 |
20110170685 | COUNTERMEASURE METHOD AND DEVICES FOR ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION WITH SIGNATURE SCHEME - A countermeasure method in an electronic component implementing an asymmetric private key encryption algorithm includes generating a first output data, using a primitive, and a protection parameter, transforming, using the protection parameter, at least one element of a set consisting of the private key and an intermediate parameter obtained from the first output data, to respectively supply first and second operands, and generating, from an operation involving the first and second operands, a second output data. | 07-14-2011 |
20110274271 | COUNTERMEASURE METHOD AND DEVICES FOR ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION - A countermeasure method in an electronic component implementing an asymmetric private key encryption algorithm includes generating a protection parameter, calculating, using a primitive, an intermediate data from the protection parameter, dividing the binary representation of the private key into several binary blocks, transforming each binary block using the protection parameter and, for each transformed binary block, performing an intermediate calculation using the primitive, and calculating an output data by combining the intermediate data with the intermediate calculations. | 11-10-2011 |