| The Board of Trustees, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Patent applications |
| Patent application number | Title | Published |
|---|
| 20090259841 | Method for allocating multiple authentication certificates to vehicles in a vehicle-to-vehicle communication network - In a vehicle-to-vehicle communication network utilizing PKI security methods to protect communications and in which the PKI encryption utilizes a Certificate Authority having both a private key and a publicly distributed key, a method for allocating multiple certificates for each vehicle which are assigned to each vehicle in the communication network. The method includes the step of assigning a unique secret key k to each vehicle in the communication network. The Certificate Authority then creates a plurality of public key and private key encryption pairs for each vehicle and each encryption pair is associated with an index i. A plurality of certificates are then created with one certificate for each value of the index. A revocation list comprising the secret keys is maintained by the Certificate Authority so that all encryption pairs assigned to a particular vehicle may be revoked by the secret key k corresponding to that vehicle. | 10-15-2009 |
| 20080235509 | METHOD FOR EXCHANGING MESSAGES AND VERIFYING THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE MESSAGES IN AN AD HOC NETWORK - A method for exchanging messages containing reliable information between nodes in an ad hoc network, such as a vehicle ad hoc network. The method includes the steps of providing a public key for a PKI encrypted certificate authority signature to all nodes known to transmit reliable information. Each node transmits a signal containing node identification information and the PKI encrypted certificate authority signature associated with that node. Each node also receives like signals from other nodes and then decrypts the certificate authority signatures from the received signals by using the certificate authority public key to ascertain the authenticity of the received certificate authority signatures and the reliability of the received message. Thereafter, the nodes receive and accept messages with a TESLA encrypted signature only with nodes identified to have authentic certificate authority signatures until the occurrence of a subsequent predefined event, such as a new node in the network or the elapse of a predetermined time period. | 09-25-2008 |
