The 9/11 Commission Report

List of Illustrations and Tables ix

Member List xi

Staff List xiiixiv

Preface xv

1. "WE HAVE SOME PLANES" 1

1.1

Inside the Four Flights 1

1.2

Improvising a Homeland Defense 14

1.3

National Crisis Management 35

2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 47

2.1

A Declaration of War 47

2.2

Bin Ladin's Appeal in the Islamic World 48

2.3

The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (19881992) 55

2.4

Building an Organization, Declaring

War on the United States (19921996) 59

2.5

Al Qaeda's Renewal in Afghanistan (19961998) 63

3. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES 71

3.1

From the Old Terrorism to the New:

The First World Trade Center Bombing 71

3.2

Adaptation--and Nonadaptation--

. . .

in the Law Enforcement Community 73

3.3

. . . and in the Federal Aviation Administration 82

3.4

. . . and in the Intelligence Community 86

CONTENTS

Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page v

3.5

. . . and in the State Department and the Defense Department 93

3.6

. . . and in the White House 98

3.7

. . . and in the Congress 102

4. RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 108

4.1

Before the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania 108

4.2

Crisis: August 1998 115

4.3

Diplomacy 121

4.4

Covert Action 126

4.5

Searching for Fresh Options 134

5. AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND 145

5.1

Terrorist Entrepreneurs 145

5.2

The "Planes Operation" 153

5.3

The Hamburg Contingent 160

5.4

A Money Trail? 169

6. FROM THREAT TO THREAT 174

6.1

The Millennium Crisis 174

6.2

Post-Crisis Reflection: Agenda for 2000 182

6.3

The Attack on the USS Cole

190

6.4

Change and Continuity 198

6.5

The New Administration's Approach 203

7. THE ATTACK LOOMS 215

7.1

First Arrivals in California 215

7.2

The 9/11 Pilots in the United States 223

7.3

Assembling the Teams 231

7.4

Final Strategies and Tactics 241

8. "THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED" 254

8.1

The Summer of Threat 254

8.2

Late Leads--Mihdhar, Moussaoui, and KSM 266

9. HEROISM AND HORROR 278

9.1

Preparedness as of September 11 278

9.2

September 11, 2001 285

9.3

Emergency Response at the Pentagon 311

9.4

Analysis 315

Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page vi

10. WARTIME 325

10.1

Immediate Responses at Home 326

10.2

Planning for War 330

10.3

"Phase Two" and the Question of Iraq 334

11. FORESIGHT--AND HINDSIGHT 339

11.1

Imagination 339

11.2

Policy 348

11.3

Capabilities 350

11.4

Management 353

12. WHAT TO DO? A GLOBAL STRATEGY 361

12.1

Reflecting on a Generational Challenge 361

12.2

Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations 365

12.3

Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism 374

12.4

Protect against and Prepare for Terrorist Attacks 383

13. HOW TO DO IT? A DIFFERENT WAY OF

ORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT 399

13.1

Unity of Effort across the Foreign-Domestic Divide 400

13.2

Unity of Effort in the Intelligence Community 407

13.3

Unity of Effort in Sharing Information 416

13.4

Unity of Effort in the Congress 419

13.5

Organizing America's Defenses in the United States 423

Appendix A: Common Abbreviations

429

Appendix B:Table of Names

431

Appendix C: Commission Hearings

439

Notes

449

vii

Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page vii

p. 15

FAA Air Traffic Control Centers

p. 15

Reporting structure, Northeast Air Defense Sector

p. 3233

Flight paths and timelines

p. 49

Usama Bin Ladin

p. 64

Map of Afghanistan

p. 148

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed

p. 238239

The 9/11 hijackers

p. 279

The World Trade Center Complex as of 9/11

p. 284

The World Trade Center radio repeater system

p. 288

The World Trade Center North Tower stairwell with deviations

p. 312

The Twin Towers following the impact of American Airlines

Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175

p. 313

The Pentagon after being struck by American Airlines Flight 77

p. 313

American Airlines Flight 93 crash site, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

p. 413

Unity of effort in managing intelligence

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

AND TABLES

Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page ix

Joanne M. Accolla
Staff Assistant
Alexis Albion
Professional Staff Member
Scott H. Allan, Jr.
Counsel
John A. Azzarello
Counsel
Caroline Barnes
Professional Staff Member
Warren Bass
Professional Staff Member
Ann M. Bennett
Information Control Officer
Mark S. Bittinger
Professional Staff Member
Madeleine Blot
Counsel
Antwion M. Blount
Systems Engineer
Sam Brinkley
Professional Staff Member
Geoffrey Scott Brown
Research Assistant
Daniel Byman
Professional Staff Member
Dianna Campagna
Manager of Operations

Samuel M.W. Caspersen
Counsel
Melissa A. Coffey
Staff Assistant
Lance Cole
Consultant
Marquittia L. Coleman
Staff Assistant
Marco A. Cordero
Professional Staff Member
Rajesh De
Counsel
George W. Delgrosso
Investigator
Gerald L. Dillingham
Professional Staff Member
Thomas E. Dowling
Professional Staff Member
Steven M. Dunne
Deputy General Counsel
Thomas R. Eldridge
Counsel
Alice Falk
Editor
John J. Farmer, Jr.
Senior Counsel & Team Leader
Alvin S. Felzenberg
Deputy for Communications

COMMISSION

STAFF

xiii

Philip Zelikow, Executive Director

Christopher A. Kojm, Deputy Executive Director

Daniel Marcus, General Counsel

Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page xiii

Lorry M. Fenner
Professional Staff Member
Susan Ginsburg
Senior Counsel & Team Leader
T. Graham Giusti
Security Officer
Nicole Marie Grandrimo
Professional Staff Member
Douglas N. Greenburg
Counsel
Barbara A. Grewe
Senior Counsel, Special Projects
Elinore Flynn Hartz
Family Liaison
Leonard R. Hawley
Professional Staff Member
L. Christine Healey
Senior Counsel & Team Leader
Karen Heitkotter
Executive Secretary
Walter T. Hempel II
Professional Staff Member
C. Michael Hurley
Senior Counsel & Team Leader
Dana J. Hyde
Counsel
John W. Ivicic
Security Officer
Michael N. Jacobson
Counsel
Hunter W. Jamerson
Intern
Bonnie D. Jenkins
Counsel
Reginald F. Johnson
Staff Assistant
R.William Johnstone
Professional Staff Member
Stephanie L. Kaplan
Special Assistant & Managing Editor
Miles L. Kara, Sr.
Professional Staff Member
Janice L. Kephart
Counsel
Hyon Kim
Counsel
Katarzyna Kozaczuk
Financial Assistant
Gordon Nathaniel Lederman
Counsel

Daniel J. Leopold
Staff Assistant
Sarah Webb Linden
Professional Staff Member
Douglas J. MacEachin
Professional Staff Member & Team Leader
Ernest R. May
Senior Adviser
Joseph McBride
Intern
James Miller
Professional Staff Member
Kelly Moore
Professional Staff Member
Charles M. Pereira
Professional Staff Member
John Raidt
Professional Staff Member
John Roth
Senior Counsel & Team Leader
Peter Rundlet
Counsel
Lloyd D. Salvetti
Professional Staff Member
Kevin J. Scheid
Professional Staff Member & Team Leader
Kevin Shaeffer
Professional Staff Member
Tracy J. Shycoff
Deputy for Administration & Finance
Dietrich L. Snell
Senior Counsel & Team Leader
Jonathan DeWees Stull
Communications Assistant
Lisa Marie Sullivan
Staff Assistant
Quinn John Tamm, Jr.
Professional Staff Member
Catharine S.Taylor
Staff Assistant
Yoel Tobin
Counsel
Emily Landis Walker
Professional Staff Member & Family Liaison
Garth Wermter
Senior IT Consultant
Serena B.Wille
Counsel
Peter Yerkes
Public Affairs Assistant

xiv

COMMISSION STAFF

xiv

Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:26 PM Page xiv

We p re se nt th e narrat ive of this report and the recommendations
that flow from it to the President of the United States, the United States
Congress, and the American people for their consideration. Ten
Commissioners--five Republicans and five Democrats chosen by elected
leaders from our nation's capital at a time of great partisan division--have
come together to present this report without dissent.

We have come together with a unity of purpose because our nation

demands it. September 11, 2001, was a day of unprecedented shock and suf-
fering in the history of the United States.The nation was unprepared. How
did this happen, and how can we avoid such tragedy again?

To answer these questions, the Congress and the President created the

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Public
Law 107-306, November 27, 2002).

Our mandate was sweeping.The law directed us to investigate "facts and

circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001," includ-
ing those relating to intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, diplo-
macy, immigration issues and border control, the flow of assets to terrorist
organizations, commercial aviation, the role of congressional oversight and
resource allocation, and other areas determined relevant by the Commission.

In pursuing our mandate, we have reviewed more than 2.5 million pages

of documents and interviewed more than 1,200 individuals in ten countries.
This included nearly every senior official from the current and previous
administrations who had responsibility for topics covered in our mandate.

We have sought to be independent, impartial, thorough, and nonpartisan.

From the outset, we have been committed to share as much of our investi-
gation as we can with the American people.To that end, we held 19 days of
hearings and took public testimony from 160 witnesses.

PREFACE

Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:26 PM Page xv

Our aim has not been to assign individual blame. Our aim has been to

provide the fullest possible account of the events surrounding 9/11 and to
identify lessons learned.

We learned about an enemy who is sophisticated, patient, disciplined,

and lethal.The enemy rallies broad support in the Arab and Muslim world
by demanding redress of political grievances, but its hostility toward us and
our values is limitless. Its purpose is to rid the world of religious and polit-
ical pluralism, the plebiscite, and equal rights for women. It makes no dis-
tinction between military and civilian targets. Collateral damage is not in its
lexicon.

We learned that the institutions charged with protecting our borders,

civil aviation, and national security did not understand how grave this threat
could be, and did not adjust their policies, plans, and practices to deter or
defeat it.We learned of fault lines within our government--between foreign
and domestic intelligence, and between and within agencies.We learned of
the pervasive problems of managing and sharing information across a large
and unwieldy government that had been built in a different era to confront
different dangers.

At the outset of our work, we said we were looking backward in order

to look forward. We hope that the terrible losses chronicled in this report
can create something positive--an America that is safer, stronger, and wiser.
That September day, we came together as a nation. The test before us is to
sustain that unity of purpose and meet the challenges now confronting us.

We need to design a balanced strategy for the long haul, to attack terror-

ists and prevent their ranks from swelling while at the same time protecting
our country against future attacks.We have been forced to think about the
way our government is organized. The massive departments and agencies
that prevailed in the great struggles of the twentieth century must work
together in new ways, so that all the instruments of national power can be
combined. Congress needs dramatic change as well to strengthen oversight
and focus accountability.

As we complete our final report, we want to begin by thanking our fel-

low Commissioners, whose dedication to this task has been profound. We
have reasoned together over every page, and the report has benefited from
this remarkable dialogue. We want to express our considerable respect for
the intellect and judgment of our colleagues, as well as our great affection
for them.

We want to thank the Commission staff.The dedicated professional staff,

headed by Philip Zelikow, has contributed innumerable hours to the com-
pletion of this report, setting aside other important endeavors to take on this

xvi

PREFACE

Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:26 PM Page xvi

all-consuming assignment. They have conducted the exacting investigative
work upon which the Commission has built.They have given good advice,
and faithfully carried out our guidance.They have been superb.

We thank the Congress and the President. Executive branch agencies

have searched records and produced a multitude of documents for us. We
thank officials, past and present, who were generous with their time and
provided us with insight. The PENTTBOM team at the FBI, the
Director's Review Group at the CIA, and Inspectors General at the
Department of Justice and the CIA provided great assistance. We owe a
huge debt to their investigative labors, painstaking attention to detail, and
readiness to share what they have learned. We have built on the work of
several previous Commissions, and we thank the Congressional Joint
Inquiry, whose fine work helped us get started.We thank the City of New
York for assistance with documents and witnesses, and the Government
Printing Office and W.W. Norton & Company for helping to get this
report to the broad public.

We conclude this list of thanks by coming full circle:We thank the fam-

ilies of 9/11, whose persistence and dedication helped create the
Commission.They have been with us each step of the way, as partners and
witnesses.They know better than any of us the importance of the work we
have undertaken.

We want to note what we have done, and not done.We have endeavored

to provide the most complete account we can of the events of September
11, what happened and why.This final report is only a summary of what we
have done, citing only a fraction of the sources we have consulted. But in
an event of this scale, touching so many issues and organizations, we are
conscious of our limits.We have not interviewed every knowledgeable per-
son or found every relevant piece of paper. New information inevitably will
come to light. We present this report as a foundation for a better under-
standing of a landmark in the history of our nation.

We have listened to scores of overwhelming personal tragedies and

astounding acts of heroism and bravery. We have examined the staggering
impact of the events of 9/11 on the American people and their amazing
resilience and courage as they fought back.We have admired their determi-
nation to do their best to prevent another tragedy while preparing to
respond if it becomes necessary. We emerge from this investigation with
enormous sympathy for the victims and their loved ones, and with
enhanced respect for the American people. We recognize the formidable
challenges that lie ahead.

We also approach the task of recommendations with humility. We have

PREFACE

xvii

Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:26 PM Page xvii

"WE HAVE

SOME PLANES"

Tue sday, S e p te m b e r 11, 2 0 01, dawned temperate and nearly cloudless in
the eastern United States. Millions of men and women readied themselves for
work. Some made their way to the Twin Towers, the signature structures of the
World Trade Center complex in New York City. Others went to Arlington,Vir-
ginia, to the Pentagon. Across the Potomac River, the United States Congress
was back in session. At the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, people began to
line up for a White House tour. In Sarasota, Florida, President George W. Bush
went for an early morning run.

For those heading to an airport, weather conditions could not have been

better for a safe and pleasant journey.Among the travelers were Mohamed Atta
and Abdul Aziz al Omari, who arrived at the airport in Portland, Maine.

1.1 INSIDE THE FOUR FLIGHTS

Boarding the Flights
Boston:American 11 and United 175.

Atta and Omari boarded a 6:00

flight from Portland to Boston's Logan International Airport.

When he checked in for his flight to Boston, Atta was selected by a com-

puterized prescreening system known as CAPPS (Computer Assisted Passen-
ger Prescreening System), created to identify passengers who should be
subject to special security measures. Under security rules in place at the time,
the only consequence of Atta's selection by CAPPS was that his checked bags
were held off the plane until it was confirmed that he had boarded the air-
craft. This did not hinder Atta's plans.

Atta and Omari arrived in Boston at 6:45. Seven minutes later, Atta appar-

ently took a call from Marwan al Shehhi, a longtime colleague who was at
another terminal at Logan Airport.They spoke for three minutes.

It would be

their final conversation.

Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 1

Between 6:45 and 7:40,Atta and Omari, along with Satam al Suqami,Wail

al Shehri, and Waleed al Shehri, checked in and boarded American Airlines
Flight 11, bound for Los Angeles.The flight was scheduled to depart at 7:45.

In another Logan terminal, Shehhi, joined by Fayez Banihammad, Mohand

al Shehri, Ahmed al Ghamdi, and Hamza al Ghamdi, checked in for United
Airlines Flight 175, also bound for Los Angeles.A couple of Shehhi's colleagues
were obviously unused to travel; according to the United ticket agent, they had
trouble understanding the standard security questions, and she had to go over
them slowly until they gave the routine, reassuring answers.

Their flight was

scheduled to depart at 8:00.

The security checkpoints through which passengers, including Atta and his

colleagues, gained access to the American 11 gate were operated by Globe
Security under a contract with American Airlines. In a different terminal, the
single checkpoint through which passengers for United 175 passed was con-
trolled by United Airlines, which had contracted with Huntleigh USA to per-
form the screening.

In passing through these checkpoints, each of the hijackers would have been

screened by a walk-through metal detector calibrated to detect items with at
least the metal content of a .22-caliber handgun. Anyone who might have set
off that detector would have been screened with a hand wand--a procedure
requiring the screener to identify the metal item or items that caused the alarm.
In addition, an X-ray machine would have screened the hijackers' carry-on
belongings.The screening was in place to identify and confiscate weapons and
other items prohibited from being carried onto a commercial flight.

None of

the checkpoint supervisors recalled the hijackers or reported anything suspi-
cious regarding their screening.

While Atta had been selected by CAPPS in Portland, three members of his

hijacking team--Suqami,Wail al Shehri, and Waleed al Shehri--were selected
in Boston.Their selection affected only the handling of their checked bags, not
their screening at the checkpoint. All five men cleared the checkpoint and
made their way to the gate for American 11. Atta, Omari, and Suqami took
their seats in business class (seats 8D, 8G, and 10B, respectively). The Shehri
brothers had adjacent seats in row 2 (Wail in 2A, Waleed in 2B), in the first-
class cabin. They boarded American 11 between 7:31 and 7:40. The aircraft
pushed back from the gate at 7:40.

Shehhi and his team, none of whom had been selected by CAPPS, boarded

United 175 between 7:23 and 7:28 (Banihammad in 2A, Shehri in 2B, Shehhi
in 6C, Hamza al Ghamdi in 9C, and Ahmed al Ghamdi in 9D).Their aircraft
pushed back from the gate just before 8:00.

Washington Dulles: American 77.

Hundreds of miles southwest of Boston,

at Dulles International Airport in the Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.C.,
five more men were preparing to take their early morning flight.At 7:15, a pair

THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT

Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 2

of them, Khalid al Mihdhar and Majed Moqed, checked in at the American
Airlines ticket counter for Flight 77, bound for Los Angeles.Within the next
20 minutes, they would be followed by Hani Hanjour and two brothers, Nawaf
al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi.

Hani Hanjour, Khalid al Mihdhar, and Majed Moqed were flagged by

CAPPS.The Hazmi brothers were also selected for extra scrutiny by the air-
line's customer service representative at the check-in counter. He did so
because one of the brothers did not have photo identification nor could he
understand English, and because the agent found both of the passengers to
be suspicious.The only consequence of their selection was that their checked
bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that they had boarded
the aircraft.

All five hijackers passed through the Main Terminal's west security screen-

ing checkpoint; United Airlines, which was the responsible air carrier, had
contracted out the work to Argenbright Security.

The checkpoint featured

closed-circuit television that recorded all passengers, including the hijackers,
as they were screened. At 7:18, Mihdhar and Moqed entered the security
checkpoint.

Mihdhar and Moqed placed their carry-on bags on the belt of the X-ray

machine and proceeded through the first metal detector. Both set off the alarm,
and they were directed to a second metal detector. Mihdhar did not trigger the
alarm and was permitted through the checkpoint. After Moqed set it off, a
screener wanded him. He passed this inspection.

About 20 minutes later, at 7:35, another passenger for Flight 77, Hani Han-

jour, placed two carry-on bags on the X-ray belt in the Main Terminal's west
checkpoint, and proceeded, without alarm, through the metal detector. A short
time later, Nawaf and Salem al Hazmi entered the same checkpoint. Salem al
Hazmi cleared the metal detector and was permitted through; Nawaf al Hazmi
set off the alarms for both the first and second metal detectors and was then
hand-wanded before being passed. In addition, his over-the-shoulder carry-on
bag was swiped by an explosive trace detector and then passed. The video
footage indicates that he was carrying an unidentified item in his back pocket,
clipped to its rim.

When the local civil aviation security office of the Federal Aviation Admin-

istration (FAA) later investigated these security screening operations, the
screeners recalled nothing out of the ordinary.They could not recall that any
of the passengers they screened were CAPPS selectees. We asked a screening
expert to review the videotape of the hand-wanding, and he found the qual-
ity of the screener's work to have been "marginal at best." The screener should
have "resolved" what set off the alarm; and in the case of both Moqed and
Hazmi, it was clear that he did not.

At 7:50, Majed Moqed and Khalid al Mihdhar boarded the flight and were

seated in 12A and 12B in coach. Hani Hanjour, assigned to seat 1B (first class),

"WE HAVE SOME PLANES"

Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 3

soon followed.The Hazmi brothers, sitting in 5E and 5F, joined Hanjour in the
first-class cabin.

Newark: United 93.

Between 7:03 and 7:39, Saeed al Ghamdi, Ahmed al

Nami, Ahmad al Haznawi, and Ziad Jarrah checked in at the United Airlines
ticket counter for Flight 93, going to Los Angeles.Two checked bags; two did
not. Haznawi was selected by CAPPS. His checked bag was screened for explo-
sives and then loaded on the plane.

The four men passed through the security checkpoint, owned by United

Airlines and operated under contract by Argenbright Security. Like the check-
points in Boston, it lacked closed-circuit television surveillance so there is no
documentary evidence to indicate when the hijackers passed through the
checkpoint, what alarms may have been triggered, or what security procedures
were administered.The FAA interviewed the screeners later; none recalled any-
thing unusual or suspicious.

The four men boarded the plane between 7:39 and 7:48. All four had seats

in the first-class cabin; their plane had no business-class section. Jarrah was in
seat 1B, closest to the cockpit; Nami was in 3C, Ghamdi in 3D, and Haznawi
in 6B.

The 19 men were aboard four transcontinental flights.

They were plan-

ning to hijack these planes and turn them into large guided missiles, loaded
with up to 11,400 gallons of jet fuel. By 8:00

. on the morning of Tuesday,

September 11, 2001, they had defeated all the security layers that America's civil
aviation security system then had in place to prevent a hijacking.

The Hijacking of American 11
American Airlines Flight 11 provided nonstop service from Boston to Los
Angeles. On September 11, Captain John Ogonowski and First Officer
Thomas McGuinness piloted the Boeing 767. It carried its full capacity of nine
flight attendants. Eighty-one passengers boarded the flight with them (includ-
ing the five terrorists).

The plane took off at 7:59. Just before 8:14, it had climbed to 26,000 feet,

not quite its initial assigned cruising altitude of 29,000 feet.All communications
and flight profile data were normal. About this time the "Fasten Seatbelt" sign
would usually have been turned off and the flight attendants would have begun
preparing for cabin service.

At that same time, American 11 had its last routine communication with

the ground when it acknowledged navigational instructions from the FAA's
air traffic control (ATC) center in Boston. Sixteen seconds after that transmis-
sion,ATC instructed the aircraft's pilots to climb to 35,000 feet.That message
and all subsequent attempts to contact the flight were not acknowledged.
From this and other evidence, we believe the hijacking began at 8:14 or
shortly thereafter.

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Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 4

Reports from two flight attendants in the coach cabin, Betty Ong and

Madeline "Amy" Sweeney, tell us most of what we know about how the
hijacking happened. As it began, some of the hijackers--most likely Wail al
Shehri and Waleed al Shehri, who were seated in row 2 in first class--stabbed
the two unarmed flight attendants who would have been preparing for cabin
service.

We do not know exactly how the hijackers gained access to the cockpit;

FAA rules required that the doors remain closed and locked during flight. Ong
speculated that they had "jammed their way" in. Perhaps the terrorists stabbed
the flight attendants to get a cockpit key, to force one of them to open the cock-
pit door, or to lure the captain or first officer out of the cockpit. Or the flight
attendants may just have been in their way.

At the same time or shortly thereafter, Atta--the only terrorist on board

trained to fly a jet--would have moved to the cockpit from his business-class
seat, possibly accompanied by Omari.As this was happening, passenger Daniel
Lewin, who was seated in the row just behind Atta and Omari, was stabbed by
one of the hijackers--probably Satam al Suqami, who was seated directly
behind Lewin. Lewin had served four years as an officer in the Israeli military.
He may have made an attempt to stop the hijackers in front of him, not real-
izing that another was sitting behind him.

The hijackers quickly gained control and sprayed Mace, pepper spray, or

some other irritant in the first-class cabin, in order to force the passengers and
flight attendants toward the rear of the plane.They claimed they had a bomb.

About five minutes after the hijacking began, Betty Ong contacted the

American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North Carolina,
via an AT&T airphone to report an emergency aboard the flight.This was the
first of several occasions on 9/11 when flight attendants took action outside
the scope of their training, which emphasized that in a hijacking, they were to
communicate with the cockpit crew.The emergency call lasted approximately
25 minutes, as Ong calmly and professionally relayed information about events
taking place aboard the airplane to authorities on the ground.

At 8:19, Ong reported:"The cockpit is not answering, somebody's stabbed

in business class--and I think there's Mace--that we can't breathe--I don't
know, I think we're getting hijacked." She then told of the stabbings of the two
flight attendants.

At 8:21, one of the American employees receiving Ong's call in North Car-

olina, Nydia Gonzalez, alerted the American Airlines operations center in Fort
Worth,Texas, reaching Craig Marquis, the manager on duty. Marquis soon real-
ized this was an emergency and instructed the airline's dispatcher responsible
for the flight to contact the cockpit. At 8:23, the dispatcher tried unsuccessfully
to contact the aircraft. Six minutes later, the air traffic control specialist in Amer-
ican's operations center contacted the FAA's Boston Air Traffic Control Center
about the flight. The center was already aware of the problem.

"WE HAVE SOME PLANES"

Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 5

Boston Center knew of a problem on the flight in part because just before

8:25 the hijackers had attempted to communicate with the passengers. The
microphone was keyed, and immediately one of the hijackers said, "Nobody
move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you'll endanger
yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet."Air traffic controllers heard the trans-
mission; Ong did not.The hijackers probably did not know how to operate the
cockpit radio communication system correctly, and thus inadvertently broad-
cast their message over the air traffic control channel instead of the cabin
public-address channel. Also at 8:25, and again at 8:29, Amy Sweeney got
through to the American Flight Services Office in Boston but was cut off after
she reported someone was hurt aboard the flight.Three minutes later, Sweeney
was reconnected to the office and began relaying updates to the manager,
Michael Woodward.

At 8:26, Ong reported that the plane was "flying erratically."A minute later,

Flight 11 turned south. American also began getting identifications of the
hijackers, as Ong and then Sweeney passed on some of the seat numbers of
those who had gained unauthorized access to the cockpit.

Sweeney calmly reported on her line that the plane had been hijacked; a

man in first class had his throat slashed; two flight attendants had been
stabbed--one was seriously hurt and was on oxygen while the other's wounds
seemed minor; a doctor had been requested; the flight attendants were unable
to contact the cockpit; and there was a bomb in the cockpit. Sweeney told
Woodward that she and Ong were trying to relay as much information as they
could to people on the ground.

At 8:38, Ong told Gonzalez that the plane was flying erratically again.

Around this time Sweeney told Woodward that the hijackers were Middle East-
erners, naming three of their seat numbers. One spoke very little English and
one spoke excellent English.The hijackers had gained entry to the cockpit, and
she did not know how.The aircraft was in a rapid descent.

At 8:41, Sweeney told Woodward that passengers in coach were under the

impression that there was a routine medical emergency in first class. Other
flight attendants were busy at duties such as getting medical supplies while Ong
and Sweeney were reporting the events.

At 8:41, in American's operations center, a colleague told Marquis that the

air traffic controllers declared Flight 11 a hijacking and "think he's [American
11] headed toward Kennedy [airport in New York City].They're moving every-
body out of the way.They seem to have him on a primary radar.They seem to
think that he is descending."

At 8:44, Gonzalez reported losing phone contact with Ong. About this

same time Sweeney reported to Woodward,"Something is wrong.We are in a
rapid descent . . . we are all over the place."Woodward asked Sweeney to look
out the window to see if she could determine where they were. Sweeney
responded:"We are flying low. We are flying very, very low. We are flying way

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too low." Seconds later she said,"Oh my God we are way too low." The phone
call ended.

At 8:46:40, American 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade

Center in New York City.

All on board, along with an unknown number of

people in the tower, were killed instantly.

The Hijacking of United 175
United Airlines Flight 175 was scheduled to depart for Los Angeles at 8:00. Cap-
tain Victor Saracini and First Officer Michael Horrocks piloted the Boeing 767,
which had seven flight attendants. Fifty-six passengers boarded the flight.

United 175 pushed back from its gate at 7:58 and departed Logan Airport

at 8:14. By 8:33, it had reached its assigned cruising altitude of 31,000 feet.The
flight attendants would have begun their cabin service.

The flight had taken off just as American 11 was being hijacked, and at 8:42

the United 175 flight crew completed their report on a "suspicious transmis-
sion" overheard from another plane (which turned out to have been Flight 11)
just after takeoff. This was United 175's last communication with the ground.

The hijackers attacked sometime between 8:42 and 8:46.They used knives

(as reported by two passengers and a flight attendant), Mace (reported by one
passenger), and the threat of a bomb (reported by the same passenger). They
stabbed members of the flight crew (reported by a flight attendant and one pas-
senger). Both pilots had been killed (reported by one flight attendant).The eye-
witness accounts came from calls made from the rear of the plane, from
passengers originally seated further forward in the cabin, a sign that passengers
and perhaps crew had been moved to the back of the aircraft. Given similari-
ties to American 11 in hijacker seating and in eyewitness reports of tactics and
weapons, as well as the contact between the presumed team leaders, Atta and
Shehhi, we believe the tactics were similar on both flights.

The first operational evidence that something was abnormal on United

175 came at 8:47, when the aircraft changed beacon codes twice within a
minute. At 8:51, the flight deviated from its assigned altitude, and a minute
later New York air traffic controllers began repeatedly and unsuccessfully try-
ing to contact it.

At 8:52, in Easton, Connecticut, a man named Lee Hanson received a

phone call from his son Peter, a passenger on United 175. His son told him:
"I think they've taken over the cockpit--An attendant has been stabbed--
and someone else up front may have been killed. The plane is making
strange moves. Call United Airlines--Tell them it's Flight 175, Boston to LA."
Lee Hanson then called the Easton Police Department and relayed what he
had heard.

Also at 8:52, a male flight attendant called a United office in San Francisco,

reaching Marc Policastro.The flight attendant reported that the flight had been
hijacked, both pilots had been killed, a flight attendant had been stabbed, and

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the hijackers were probably flying the plane.The call lasted about two minutes,
after which Policastro and a colleague tried unsuccessfully to contact the
flight.

At 8:58, the flight took a heading toward New York City.

At 8:59, Flight 175 passenger Brian David Sweeney tried to call his wife,

Julie. He left a message on their home answering machine that the plane had
been hijacked. He then called his mother, Louise Sweeney, told her the flight
had been hijacked, and added that the passengers were thinking about storm-
ing the cockpit to take control of the plane away from the hijackers.

At 9:00, Lee Hanson received a second call from his son Peter:

It's getting bad, Dad--A stewardess was stabbed--They seem to have
knives and Mace--They said they have a bomb--It's getting very bad
on the plane--Passengers are throwing up and getting sick--The
plane is making jerky movements--I don't think the pilot is flying the
plane--I think we are going down--I think they intend to go to
Chicago or someplace and fly into a building--Don't worry, Dad--
If it happens, it'll be very fast--My God, my God.

The call ended abruptly. Lee Hanson had heard a woman scream just before

it cut off. He turned on a television, and in her home so did Louise Sweeney.
Both then saw the second aircraft hit the World Trade Center.

At 9:03:11, United Airlines Flight 175 struck the South Tower of the World

Trade Center.

All on board, along with an unknown number of people in

the tower, were killed instantly.

The Hijacking of American 77
American Airlines Flight 77 was scheduled to depart from Washington Dulles
for Los Angeles at 8:10. The aircraft was a Boeing 757 piloted by Captain
Charles F. Burlingame and First Officer David Charlebois. There were four
flight attendants. On September 11, the flight carried 58 passengers.

American 77 pushed back from its gate at 8:09 and took off at 8:20. At 8:46,

the flight reached its assigned cruising altitude of 35,000 feet. Cabin service
would have begun. At 8:51, American 77 transmitted its last routine radio com-
munication.The hijacking began between 8:51 and 8:54. As on American 11
and United 175, the hijackers used knives (reported by one passenger) and
moved all the passengers (and possibly crew) to the rear of the aircraft (reported
by one flight attendant and one passenger). Unlike the earlier flights, the Flight
77 hijackers were reported by a passenger to have box cutters. Finally, a pas-
senger reported that an announcement had been made by the "pilot" that the
plane had been hijacked. Neither of the firsthand accounts mentioned any stab-
bings or the threat or use of either a bomb or Mace,though both witnesses began
the flight in the first-class cabin.

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At 8:54, the aircraft deviated from its assigned course, turning south. Two

minutes later the transponder was turned off and even primary radar contact
with the aircraft was lost.The Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center repeat-
edly tried and failed to contact the aircraft. American Airlines dispatchers also
tried, without success.

At 9:00, American Airlines Executive Vice President Gerard Arpey learned

that communications had been lost with American 77.This was now the sec-
ond American aircraft in trouble. He ordered all American Airlines flights in
the Northeast that had not taken off to remain on the ground. Shortly before
9:10, suspecting that American 77 had been hijacked, American headquarters
concluded that the second aircraft to hit the World Trade Center might have
been Flight 77. After learning that United Airlines was missing a plane,Amer-
ican Airlines headquarters extended the ground stop nationwide.

At 9:12, Renee May called her mother, Nancy May, in Las Vegas. She said

her flight was being hijacked by six individuals who had moved them to the
rear of the plane. She asked her mother to alert American Airlines. Nancy May
and her husband promptly did so.

At some point between 9:16 and 9:26, Barbara Olson called her husband,

Ted Olson, the solicitor general of the United States. She reported that the
flight had been hijacked, and the hijackers had knives and box cutters. She fur-
ther indicated that the hijackers were not aware of her phone call, and that they
had put all the passengers in the back of the plane. About a minute into the
conversation, the call was cut off. Solicitor General Olson tried unsuccessfully
to reach Attorney General John Ashcroft.

Shortly after the first call, Barbara Olson reached her husband again. She

reported that the pilot had announced that the flight had been hijacked, and
she asked her husband what she should tell the captain to do.Ted Olson asked
for her location and she replied that the aircraft was then flying over houses.
Another passenger told her they were traveling northeast.The Solicitor Gen-
eral then informed his wife of the two previous hijackings and crashes. She did
not display signs of panic and did not indicate any awareness of an impending
crash. At that point, the second call was cut off.

At 9:29, the autopilot on American 77 was disengaged; the aircraft was at

7,000 feet and approximately 38 miles west of the Pentagon.

At 9:32, con-

trollers at the Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control "observed a primary
radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed." This was later deter-
mined to have been Flight 77.

At 9:34,Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport advised the Secret Ser-

vice of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the White House.Amer-
ican 77 was then 5 miles west-southwest of the Pentagon and began a
330-degree turn. At the end of the turn, it was descending through 2,200 feet,
pointed toward the Pentagon and downtown Washington.The hijacker pilot then
advanced the throttles to maximum power and dove toward the Pentagon.

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At 9:37:46, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon, travel-

ing at approximately 530 miles per hour.

All on board, as well as many civil-

ian and military personnel in the building, were killed.

The Battle for United 93
At 8:42, United Airlines Flight 93 took off from Newark (New Jersey) Liberty
International Airport bound for San Francisco.The aircraft was piloted by Cap-
tain Jason Dahl and First Officer Leroy Homer, and there were five flight atten-
dants. Thirty-seven passengers, including the hijackers, boarded the plane.
Scheduled to depart the gate at 8:00, the Boeing 757's takeoff was delayed
because of the airport's typically heavy morning traffic.

The hijackers had planned to take flights scheduled to depart at 7:45 (Amer-

ican 11), 8:00 (United 175 and United 93), and 8:10 (American 77). Three of
the flights had actually taken off within 10 to 15 minutes of their planned
departure times. United 93 would ordinarily have taken off about 15 minutes
after pulling away from the gate.When it left the ground at 8:42, the flight was
running more than 25 minutes late.

As United 93 left Newark, the flight's crew members were unaware of the

hijacking of American 11.Around 9:00, the FAA,American, and United were
facing the staggering realization of apparent multiple hijackings. At 9:03, they
would see another aircraft strike the World Trade Center. Crisis managers at
the FAA and the airlines did not yet act to warn other aircraft.

At the same

time, Boston Center realized that a message transmitted just before 8:25 by the
hijacker pilot of American 11 included the phrase,"We have some planes."

No one at the FAA or the airlines that day had ever dealt with multiple

hijackings. Such a plot had not been carried out anywhere in the world in more
than 30 years, and never in the United States.As news of the hijackings filtered
through the FAA and the airlines, it does not seem to have occurred to their
leadership that they needed to alert other aircraft in the air that they too might
be at risk.

United 175 was hijacked between 8:42 and 8:46, and awareness of that

hijacking began to spread after 8:51. American 77 was hijacked between 8:51
and 8:54. By 9:00, FAA and airline officials began to comprehend that attack-
ers were going after multiple aircraft. American Airlines' nationwide ground
stop between 9:05 and 9:10 was followed by a United Airlines ground stop.
FAA controllers at Boston Center, which had tracked the first two hijackings,
requested at 9:07 that Herndon Command Center "get messages to airborne
aircraft to increase security for the cockpit."There is no evidence that Hern-
don took such action. Boston Center immediately began speculating about
other aircraft that might be in danger, leading them to worry about a transcon-
tinental flight--Delta 1989--that in fact was not hijacked. At 9:19, the FAA's
New England regional office called Herndon and asked that Cleveland Cen-
ter advise Delta 1989 to use extra cockpit security.

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Several FAA air traffic control officials told us it was the air carriers' respon-

sibility to notify their planes of security problems. One senior FAA air traffic
control manager said that it was simply not the FAA's place to order the air-
lines what to tell their pilots.

We believe such statements do not reflect an

adequate appreciation of the FAA's responsibility for the safety and security of
civil aviation.

The airlines bore responsibility, too.They were facing an escalating number

of conflicting and, for the most part, erroneous reports about other flights, as
well as a continuing lack of vital information from the FAA about the hijacked
flights.We found no evidence, however, that American Airlines sent any cock-
pit warnings to its aircraft on 9/11. United's first decisive action to notify its
airborne aircraft to take defensive action did not come until 9:19, when a
United flight dispatcher, Ed Ballinger, took the initiative to begin transmitting
warnings to his 16 transcontinental flights: "Beware any cockpit intrusion--
Two a/c [aircraft] hit World Trade Center." One of the flights that received
the warning was United 93. Because Ballinger was still responsible for his
other flights as well as Flight 175, his warning message was not transmitted to
Flight 93 until 9:23.

By all accounts, the first 46 minutes of Flight 93's cross-country trip pro-

ceeded routinely. Radio communications from the plane were normal. Head-
ing, speed, and altitude ran according to plan. At 9:24, Ballinger's warning to
United 93 was received in the cockpit.Within two minutes, at 9:26, the pilot,
Jason Dahl, responded with a note of puzzlement: "Ed, confirm latest mssg
plz--Jason."

The hijackers attacked at 9:28. While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern

Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. Eleven seconds into the descent,
the FAA's air traffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two radio
transmissions from the aircraft. During the first broadcast, the captain or first
officer could be heard declaring "Mayday" amid the sounds of a physical strug-
gle in the cockpit. The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated
that the fight was continuing.The captain or first officer could be heard shout-
ing:"Hey get out of here--get out of here--get out of here."

On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93--33

in addition to the 4 hijackers.This was below the norm for Tuesday mornings
during the summer of 2001. But there is no evidence that the hijackers manip-
ulated passenger levels or purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation.

The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11 oper-

ated in five-man teams.They initiated their cockpit takeover within 30 min-
utes of takeoff. On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after
takeoff and there were only four hijackers. The operative likely intended to
round out the team for this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused entry
by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida's Orlando International Air-
port in August.

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Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 11

Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the

plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been
able to use the cockpit jump seat from the outset of the flight. FAA rules allow
use of this seat by documented and approved individuals, usually air carrier or
FAA personnel.We have found no evidence indicating that one of the hijack-
ers, or anyone else, sat there on this flight. All the hijackers had assigned seats
in first class, and they seem to have used them.We believe it is more likely that
Jarrah, the crucial pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated and
inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside, he would not
have been visible to the passengers.

At 9:32, a hijacker, probably Jarrah, made or attempted to make the follow-

ing announcement to the passengers of Flight 93:"Ladies and Gentlemen: Here
the captain, please sit down keep remaining sitting.We have a bomb on board.
So, sit." The flight data recorder (also recovered) indicates that Jarrah then
instructed the plane's autopilot to turn the aircraft around and head east.

The cockpit voice recorder data indicate that a woman, most likely a flight

attendant, was being held captive in the cockpit. She struggled with one of the
hijackers who killed or otherwise silenced her.

Shortly thereafter, the passengers and flight crew began a series of calls from

GTE airphones and cellular phones. These calls between family, friends, and
colleagues took place until the end of the flight and provided those on the
ground with firsthand accounts. They enabled the passengers to gain critical
information, including the news that two aircraft had slammed into the World
Trade Center.

At 9:39, the FAA's Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center overheard

a second announcement indicating that there was a bomb on board, that the
plane was returning to the airport, and that they should remain seated.

While

it apparently was not heard by the passengers, this announcement, like those on
Flight 11 and Flight 77, was intended to deceive them. Jarrah, like Atta earlier,
may have inadvertently broadcast the message because he did not know how
to operate the radio and the intercom. To our knowledge none of them had
ever flown an actual airliner before.

At least two callers from the flight reported that the hijackers knew that pas-

sengers were making calls but did not seem to care. It is quite possible Jarrah
knew of the success of the assault on the World Trade Center. He could have
learned of this from messages being sent by United Airlines to the cockpits of
its transcontinental flights, including Flight 93, warning of cockpit intrusion
and telling of the New York attacks. But even without them, he would cer-
tainly have understood that the attacks on the World Trade Center would
already have unfolded, given Flight 93's tardy departure from Newark. If Jar-
rah did know that the passengers were making calls, it might not have occurred
to him that they were certain to learn what had happened in New York, thereby
defeating his attempts at deception.

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At least ten passengers and two crew members shared vital information with

family, friends, colleagues, or others on the ground. All understood the plane
had been hijacked. They said the hijackers wielded knives and claimed to have
a bomb.The hijackers were wearing red bandanas, and they forced the passen-
gers to the back of the aircraft.

Callers reported that a passenger had been stabbed and that two people were

lying on the floor of the cabin, injured or dead--possibly the captain and first
officer. One caller reported that a flight attendant had been killed.

One of the callers from United 93 also reported that he thought the hijack-

ers might possess a gun. But none of the other callers reported the presence of
a firearm. One recipient of a call from the aircraft recounted specifically ask-
ing her caller whether the hijackers had guns.The passenger replied that he did
not see one. No evidence of firearms or of their identifiable remains was found
at the aircraft's crash site, and the cockpit voice recorder gives no indication of
a gun being fired or mentioned at any time.We believe that if the hijackers had
possessed a gun, they would have used it in the flight's last minutes as the pas-
sengers fought back.

Passengers on three flights reported the hijackers' claim of having a bomb.

The FBI told us they found no trace of explosives at the crash sites. One of
the passengers who mentioned a bomb expressed his belief that it was not real.
Lacking any evidence that the hijackers attempted to smuggle such illegal
items past the security screening checkpoints, we believe the bombs were
probably fake.

During at least five of the passengers' phone calls, information was shared

about the attacks that had occurred earlier that morning at the World Trade
Center. Five calls described the intent of passengers and surviving crew mem-
bers to revolt against the hijackers. According to one call, they voted on
whether to rush the terrorists in an attempt to retake the plane. They decided,
and acted.

At 9:57, the passenger assault began. Several passengers had terminated

phone calls with loved ones in order to join the revolt. One of the callers
ended her message as follows:"Everyone's running up to first class. I've got to
go. Bye."

The cockpit voice recorder captured the sounds of the passenger assault

muffled by the intervening cockpit door. Some family members who listened
to the recording report that they can hear the voice of a loved one among the
din. We cannot identify whose voices can be heard. But the assault was sus-
tained.

In response, Jarrah immediately began to roll the airplane to the left and

right, attempting to knock the passengers off balance. At 9:58:57, Jarrah told
another hijacker in the cockpit to block the door. Jarrah continued to roll the
airplane sharply left and right, but the assault continued. At 9:59:52, Jarrah
changed tactics and pitched the nose of the airplane up and down to disrupt

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Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 13

the assault.The recorder captured the sounds of loud thumps, crashes, shouts,
and breaking glasses and plates. At 10:00:03, Jarrah stabilized the airplane.

Five seconds later, Jarrah asked,"Is that it? Shall we finish it off?" A hijacker

responded,"No. Not yet.When they all come, we finish it off." The sounds of
fighting continued outside the cockpit. Again, Jarrah pitched the nose of the
aircraft up and down.At 10:00:26, a passenger in the background said,"In the
cockpit. If we don't we'll die!" Sixteen seconds later, a passenger yelled,"Roll
it!" Jarrah stopped the violent maneuvers at about 10:01:00 and said,"Allah is
the greatest! Allah is the greatest!" He then asked another hijacker in the cock-
pit,"Is that it? I mean, shall we put it down?" to which the other replied,"Yes,
put it in it, and pull it down."

The passengers continued their assault and at 10:02:23, a hijacker said,"Pull

it down! Pull it down!"The hijackers remained at the controls but must have
judged that the passengers were only seconds from overcoming them.The air-
plane headed down; the control wheel was turned hard to the right.The air-
plane rolled onto its back, and one of the hijackers began shouting "Allah is
the greatest. Allah is the greatest."With the sounds of the passenger counter-
attack continuing, the aircraft plowed into an empty field in Shanksville, Penn-
sylvania, at 580 miles per hour, about 20 minutes' flying time from
Washington, D.C.

Jarrah's objective was to crash his airliner into symbols of the American

Republic, the Capitol or the White House. He was defeated by the alerted,
unarmed passengers of United 93.

1.2 IMPROVISING A HOMELAND DEFENSE

The FAA and NORAD
On 9/11, the defense of U.S. airspace depended on close interaction between
two federal agencies: the FAA and the North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD).The most recent hijacking that involved U.S. air traf-
fic controllers, FAA management, and military coordination had occurred in
1993.

In order to understand how the two agencies interacted eight years

later, we will review their missions, command and control structures, and work-
ing relationship on the morning of 9/11.

FAA Mission and Structure.

As of September 11, 2001, the FAA was man-

dated by law to regulate the safety and security of civil aviation. From an air
traffic controller's perspective, that meant maintaining a safe distance between
airborne aircraft.

Many controllers work at the FAA's 22 Air Route Traffic Control Centers.

They are grouped under regional offices and coordinate closely with the
national Air Traffic Control System Command Center, located in Herndon,

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