the FBI.They were developed in a working group led by the Justice Depart-
ment's Executive Office of National Security, overseen by Deputy Attorney
General Jamie Gorelick.
such information could be shared from the intelligence side of the house to
the criminal side.
the FBI and the Criminal Division in practice than was allowed under the
department's procedures. Over time the procedures came to be referred to as
"the wall." The term "the wall" is misleading, however, because several factors
led to a series of barriers to information sharing that developed.
Reno's procedures did not include such a provision, the Office assumed the
role anyway, arguing that its position reflected the concerns of Judge Royce
Lamberth, then chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.The
Office threatened that if it could not regulate the flow of information to crim-
inal prosecutors, it would no longer present the FBI's warrant requests to the
FISA Court.The information flow withered.
gence matters and those working on criminal matters. But pressure from the
Office of Intelligence Policy Review, FBI leadership, and the FISA Court built
barriers between agents--even agents serving on the same squads. FBI Deputy
Director Bryant reinforced the Office's caution by informing agents that too
much information sharing could be a career stopper.Agents in the field began
to believe--incorrectly--that no FISA information could be shared with
agents working on criminal investigations.
if no FISA procedures had been used. Thus, relevant information from the
National Security Agency and the CIA often failed to make its way to crimi-
nal investigators. Separate reviews in 1999, 2000, and 2001 concluded inde-
pendently that information sharing was not occurring, and that the intent of
the 1995 procedures was ignored routinely.
tices in chapter 8.
though the prohibition applied only to that small fraction that had been pre-
sented to a grand jury, and even that prohibition had exceptions. But as inter-