ism by 2005. Field executives told Watson that they did not have the analysts,
linguists, or technically trained experts to carry out the strategy. In a report pro-
vided to Director Robert Mueller in September 2001, one year after Watson
presented his plan to field executives, almost every FBI field office was assessed
to be operating below "maximum capacity."The report stated that "the goal to
`prevent terrorism' requires a dramatic shift in emphasis from a reactive capa-
bility to highly functioning intelligence capability which provides not only
leads and operational support, but clear strategic analysis and direction."
The FBI had different tools for law enforcement and intelligence.
ligence matters involving international terrorism, however, the rules were
different. For many years the attorney general could authorize surveillance of
foreign powers and agents of foreign powers without any court review, but in
1978 Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
powers in the United States. In addition to requiring court review of proposed
surveillance (and later, physical searches), the 1978 act was interpreted by the
courts to require that a search be approved only if its "primary purpose" was
to obtain foreign intelligence information. In other words, the authorities of
the FISA law could not be used to circumvent traditional criminal warrant
requirements.The Justice Department interpreted these rulings as saying that
criminal prosecutors could be briefed on FISA information but could not
direct or control its collection.
understanding being that they would not improperly exploit that process for
their criminal cases. Whether the FBI shared with prosecutors information
pertinent to possible criminal investigations was left solely to the judgment of
the FBI.
of Justice's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) is responsible for
reviewing and presenting all FISA applications to the FISA Court. It worried
that because of the numerous prior consultations between FBI agents and pros-
ecutors, the judge might rule that the FISA warrants had been misused. If that
had happened,Ames might have escaped conviction. Richard Scruggs, the act-
ing head of OIPR, complained to Attorney General Janet Reno about the lack
of information-sharing controls. On his own, he began imposing information-
sharing procedures for FISA material. The Office of Intelligence Policy and
Review became the gatekeeper for the flow of FISA information to criminal
prosecutors.