background image
fited from the broad infrastructure of such facilities in Afghanistan made avail-
able to the global network of Islamist movements. U.S. intelligence estimates
put the total number of fighters who underwent instruction in Bin Ladin­sup-
ported camps in Afghanistan from 1996 through 9/11 at 10,000 to 20,000.
78
In addition to training fighters and special operators, this larger network of
guesthouses and camps provided a mechanism by which al Qaeda could screen
and vet candidates for induction into its own organization.Thousands flowed
through the camps, but no more than a few hundred seem to have become
al Qaeda members. From the time of its founding, al Qaeda had employed
training and indoctrination to identify "worthy" candidates.
79
Al Qaeda continued meanwhile to collaborate closely with the many Mid-
dle Eastern groups--in Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia,
Somalia, and elsewhere--with which it had been linked when Bin Ladin was
in Sudan. It also reinforced its London base and its other offices around Europe,
the Balkans, and the Caucasus. Bin Ladin bolstered his links to extremists in
South and Southeast Asia, including the Malaysian-Indonesian JI and several
Pakistani groups engaged in the Kashmir conflict.
80
The February 1998 fatwa thus seems to have been a kind of public launch
of a renewed and stronger al Qaeda, after a year and a half of work. Having
rebuilt his fund-raising network, Bin Ladin had again become the rich man of
the jihad movement. He had maintained or restored many of his links with ter-
rorists elsewhere in the world. And he had strengthened the internal ties in his
own organization.
The inner core of al Qaeda continued to be a hierarchical top-down group
with defined positions, tasks, and salaries. Most but not all in this core swore
fealty (or bayat) to Bin Ladin. Other operatives were committed to Bin Ladin
or to his goals and would take assignments for him, but they did not swear
bayat and maintained, or tried to maintain, some autonomy. A looser circle of
adherents might give money to al Qaeda or train in its camps but remained
essentially independent. Nevertheless, they constituted a potential resource for
al Qaeda.
81
Now effectively merged with Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad,
82
al Qaeda
promised to become the general headquarters for international terrorism, with-
out the need for the Islamic Army Shura. Bin Ladin was prepared to pick up
where he had left off in Sudan. He was ready to strike at "the head of the snake."
Al Qaeda's role in organizing terrorist operations had also changed. Before
the move to Afghanistan, it had concentrated on providing funds, training, and
weapons for actions carried out by members of allied groups.The attacks on
the U.S. embassies in East Africa in the summer of 1998 would take a differ-
ent form--planned, directed, and executed by al Qaeda, under the direct super-
vision of Bin Ladin and his chief aides.
THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM
67
Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 67