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almost every corner of the Muslim world. His vision mirrored that of Sudan's
Islamist leader,Turabi, who convened a series of meetings under the label Pop-
ular Arab and Islamic Conference around the time of Bin Ladin's arrival in that
country. Delegations of violent Islamist extremists came from all the groups
represented in Bin Ladin's Islamic Army Shura. Representatives also came from
organizations such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas, and
Hezbollah.
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Turabi sought to persuade Shiites and Sunnis to put aside their divisions and
join against the common enemy. In late 1991 or 1992, discussions in Sudan
between al Qaeda and Iranian operatives led to an informal agreement to coop-
erate in providing support--even if only training--for actions carried out pri-
marily against Israel and the United States. Not long afterward, senior al Qaeda
operatives and trainers traveled to Iran to receive training in explosives. In the
fall of 1993, another such delegation went to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon for
further training in explosives as well as in intelligence and security. Bin Ladin
reportedly showed particular interest in learning how to use truck bombs such
as the one that had killed 241 U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1983.The relation-
ship between al Qaeda and Iran demonstrated that Sunni-Shia divisions did not
necessarily pose an insurmountable barrier to cooperation in terrorist opera-
tions.As will be described in chapter 7, al Qaeda contacts with Iran continued
in ensuing years.
52
Bin Ladin was also willing to explore possibilities for cooperation with Iraq,
even though Iraq's dictator, Saddam Hussein, had never had an Islamist
agenda--save for his opportunistic pose as a defender of the faithful against
"Crusaders" during the Gulf War of 1991. Moreover, Bin Ladin had in fact
been sponsoring anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan, and sought to attract
them into his Islamic army.
53
To protect his own ties with Iraq,Turabi reportedly brokered an agreement
that Bin Ladin would stop supporting activities against Saddam. Bin Ladin
apparently honored this pledge, at least for a time, although he continued to
aid a group of Islamist extremists operating in part of Iraq (Kurdistan) outside
of Baghdad's control. In the late 1990s, these extremist groups suffered major
defeats by Kurdish forces. In 2001, with Bin Ladin's help they re-formed into
an organization called Ansar al Islam.There are indications that by then the Iraqi
regime tolerated and may even have helped Ansar al Islam against the common
Kurdish enemy.
54
With the Sudanese regime acting as intermediary, Bin Ladin himself met
with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995.
Bin Ladin is said to have asked for space to establish training camps, as well as
assistance in procuring weapons, but there is no evidence that Iraq responded
to this request.
55
As described below, the ensuing years saw additional efforts to
establish connections.
THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM
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