intercept traffic and shoot them down if they do not respond per
[General Arnold].
230
In interviews with us, NEADS personnel expressed considerable confusion
over the nature and effect of the order.
The NEADS commander told us he did not pass along the order because
he was unaware of its ramifications. Both the mission commander and the sen-
ior weapons director indicated they did not pass the order to the fighters cir-
cling Washington and New York because they were unsure how the pilots
would, or should, proceed with this guidance. In short, while leaders in
Washington believed that the fighters above them had been instructed to "take
out" hostile aircraft, the only orders actually conveyed to the pilots were to "ID
type and tail."
231
In most cases, the chain of command authorizing the use of force runs from
the president to the secretary of defense and from the secretary to the combat-
ant commander.The President apparently spoke to Secretary Rumsfeld for the
first time that morning shortly after 10:00. No one can recall the content of this
conversation, but it was a brief call in which the subject of shootdown author-
ity was not discussed.
232
At 10:39, the Vice President updated the Secretary on the air threat
conference:
Vice President:
There's been at least three instances here where we've
had reports of aircraft approaching Washington--a couple were con-
firmed hijack. And, pursuant to the President's instructions I gave
authorization for them to be taken out. Hello?
SecDef:
Yes, I understand.Who did you give that direction to?
Vice President:
It was passed from here through the [operations] cen-
ter at the White House, from the [shelter].
SecDef:
OK, let me ask the question here. Has that directive been trans-
mitted to the aircraft?
Vice President:
Yes, it has.
SecDef:
So we've got a couple of aircraft up there that have those
instructions at this present time?
Vice President:
That is correct. And it's my understanding they've
already taken a couple of aircraft out.
SecDef:
We can't confirm that.We're told that one aircraft is down but
we do not have a pilot report that did it.
233
As this exchange shows, Secretary Rumsfeld was not in the NMCC when
the shootdown order was first conveyed. He went from the parking lot to his
office (where he spoke to the President), then to the Executive Support Cen-
ter, where he participated in the White House video teleconference. He moved
"WE HAVE SOME PLANES"
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